The driving forces of the people's uprising under the leadership. Popular movement led by Stepan Razin

UPRISING UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF E.I. PUGACHEV (1773-1775)

1. Causes of the uprising

Discontent of the Yaik Cossacks government measures aimed at eliminating his privileges. In 1771, the Cossacks lost their autonomy and were deprived of the right to traditional trades (fishing, salt mining). In addition, discord was growing between the rich Cossack “ foreman” and the rest of the “troops”.

Increased personal dependence of peasants from landowners, an increase in state taxes and property duties, caused by the beginning of the development of market relations and the serfdom legislation of the 60s.

Difficult living and working conditions for working people, as well as assigned peasants in the factories of the Urals.

Social and psychological atmosphere in the country, heated up under the influence of the hopes of the peasantry that, following the liberation of the nobles from compulsory service to the state, their emancipation would begin. These aspirations gave rise to rumors that the “manifesto on peasant freedom” had already been prepared by the tsar, but the “evil nobles” decided to hide it and made an attempt on the life of the emperor. However, he miraculously escaped and is just waiting for the moment to appear before the people and lead them to fight for Truth and the return of the throne. It was in this atmosphere that impostors appeared, posing as Peter III.

2. General characteristics of the uprising

Events of 1773-1775 represented the most large-scale Cossack-peasant uprising in the history of Russia, which had both the features of a peasant war and a typical popular revolt. Its character can be clarified by Pugachev’s manifestos and decrees, the content of which changed during the uprising. If at the initial stage the goals of the rebels were limited to restoring the privileges of the Cossacks and providing Cossack freedom to all participants in the movement, then with the involvement of working people, and most importantly, landowner peasants, the nature of the demands changed significantly.

IN July manifesto 1774. the liberation of the peasants from serfdom and taxes, the transfer of land to them, the liquidation of officials and nobles as the main “disturbers of the empire and ruiners of the peasants” were proclaimed.

The clear anti-serfdom and anti-state orientation of the movement did not give it any constructive content, which is why, in general, it did not go beyond the scope of a rebellion - “senseless and merciless.”

Features and driving forces

This movement was distinguished by its scope, the ferocity of the struggle and a greater degree of organization than before. For example, the rebels created the Military Collegium, which became the main headquarters, the highest civil and judicial authority in the territory “liberated” by the rebels.

For the first time, elements - albeit immature - of the ideology of the uprising appeared, formulated in the manifestos and decrees of Pugachev.

The movement was attended by the Yaik Cossacks, who became the main military force of the uprising, serfs, working people of the Urals, who provided the rebel army with artillery, and the peoples of the Volga region (Bashkirs, Tatars, Kalmyks), who organized themselves into cavalry units.

The leaders of the uprising were Emelyan Ivanovich Pugachev- a Don Cossack who pretended to be the surviving Tsar Peter Fedorovich; and his associates I. Zarubin (Chika), I. Beloborodov, A. Sokolov, nicknamed “Khlopusha”, Salavat Yulaev and etc.

3. Progress of the uprising

The uprising covered a vast territory: the Orenburg region, the Urals, the Urals, the Lower and Middle Volga regions and went through the following stages:

First period (September 1773-March 1774). The uprising began on September 17 with the appearance of a small detachment of Cossacks, which, having replenished and captured a number of small fortresses, approached Orenburg. They failed to take the city right away and the rebels began a siege. The royal detachments sent to help were defeated on the outskirts of Orenburg.

During this period, the organization of the Pugachev army, which reached 30 thousand people, took place; State Military Collegium. The movement spread to new territories, and attempts were made to capture Ufa. But on March 22, 1774, under Tatishchevoy fortress Punitive troops inflicted a brutal defeat on the rebels. It seemed that Pugachev, who had gone to the Urals with 500 Cossacks, would no longer rise.

Second period (April-June 1774). The peculiarity of spontaneous popular uprisings was that they quickly made up for human losses due to the influx of new thousands of oppressed people. Pugachev's new army captured a number of factories in the Urals and, pursued by tsarist troops, reached Kazan. Approximately 20 thousand rebels began to storm the city, but without having time to take the Kazan Kremlin, they were defeated by government troops led by Mikhelson.

It was during the critical days of the battles near Kazan that Catherine II, in order to inspire the nobles and emphasize her solidarity, declared herself a “Kazan landowner.” The defeated Pugachev with a small detachment crossed to the right bank of the Volga.

Third period (June-September 1774). However, this flight gave the movement unprecedented scope. Finding himself in a zone of complete serfdom, Pugachev quickly replenished his forces. When his troops approached, the peasants themselves dealt with the landowners and officials.

In July, his famous manifesto was published, responding to the aspirations of the Russian peasantry. The authorities were already expecting the rebels to march on Moscow, but Pugachev, realizing that the peasant army militarily could not resist government troops, turned south, hoping to raise the Don Cossacks. In August, Pugachev’s exhausted and poorly armed detachments approached Tsaritsyn, but were unable to take the city and were soon overtaken and completely defeated by Mikhelson. Pugachev with a small group crossed to the left bank of the Volga, where he was captured and handed over to the authorities by the Yaik Cossacks who were with him.

The final period (September 1774 - January 1775). At this stage, the last centers of the uprising were suppressed, and in January 1775, Pugachev, who behaved with dignity and courage, was executed in Moscow.

4. Reasons for the defeat of the uprising

The weakness of the organization and the extremely poor weapons of the rebels.

Lack of a clear understanding of one’s goals and a constructive program for the uprising.

The predatory nature and cruelty of the rebels, which caused widespread indignation in various sectors of society.

The strength of the state mechanism, which was able to mobilize and organize the suppression of such a large-scale uprising.

5. Historical significance of the uprising

The uprising prompted the government to improve the system of governing the country and completely eliminate the autonomy of the Cossack troops. The Yaik River was renamed the river. Ural.

The uprising showed the illusory nature of ideas about the advantages of patriarchal peasant self-government, because spontaneous peasant uprisings took place under the leadership of the community.

The memory of the “Pugachevism” and the desire to avoid it became one of the factors in the government’s policy and, as a result, pushed it later to soften and abolish serfdom.

The peasants' speech influenced the development of Russian social thought and the spiritual life of the country.

Bibliography

Anisimov E.V. The time of Peter's reforms. L., 1989.

Anisimov E.V. Russia in the middle of the 18th century. (The fight for the legacy of Peter I). M., 1986.

Anisimov E.V. Russia without Peter. St. Petersburg, 1994.

Bagger H. Reforms of Peter the Great. Research Review. M., 1985.

Timelessness and temporary workers: Memories of the era of “palace coups 1720-1760s.” M., 1991.

Beskrovny L.G. Russian army and navy in the 18th century. M..1958.

The short-lived Copper Riot was further evidence of the country's crisis state. The pinnacle of its expression was the movement led by the Don Cossack S. T. Razin. From that time on, representatives of the Don Cossacks acted as leaders of major movements.

The Don freemen have long attracted fugitives from the southern and central districts of the Russian state. The government, needing the services of the Don Cossacks, avoided conflicts with them and put up with the unwritten law: “There is no extradition from the Don,” i.e. runaway peasants were not returned to their owners. The government also put up with the right of the Don Cossacks to foreign relations with their closest neighbors - the Crimeans and Kalmyks. The government was forced to put up with the Cossacks’ campaigns for “zipuns,” which complicated Russia’s relations with the Crimeans and the Ottoman Empire.

Thus, the Cossacks differed from the peasants both in their occupation, and in the fact that they did not bear duties in favor of the landowner and the state, but, on the contrary, received a salary from the latter, and, finally, in the fact that they were warriors.

In the second half of the 17th century. there were significantly fewer opportunities for going “for zipuns”: after the Cossacks left Azov, which they had owned for five years (1637-1642), the Ottomans strengthened it so much that they practically deprived them of access to the Azov and Black Seas.

Having failed in an attempt to break into the Sea of ​​Azov through the Ottoman barrier in Azov, Razin in May 1667, at the head of a detachment of a thousand people, went to the Volga, where he first attacked convoys of ships, and then in June, passing Astrakhan, went out to sea, rose along the river Yaik to the Yaitsky town and took possession of it. Having spent the winter there, the difference, taking with them artillery, moved on plows to the western shores of the Caspian Sea, where they made successful raids on the possessions of the Iranian Shah.

Winter 1668-1669 The Razins spent on Pig Island near Gilan. Here they defeated the fleet equipped against them by the Shah of Iran, but had to leave the island and head towards their native shores. In August 1669, Razin and the Cossacks landed in Astrakhan.

The appearance of the Razins in Astrakhan made an indelible impression on its residents. Razin himself appeared as a lucky chieftain who arrived with rich booty. Ordinary Cossacks paraded around the city in velvet and silk clothes; plows were equipped with ropes twisted from silk and silk sails. Razin generously distributed gold coins to the population.

On September 4, 1669, Razin went to the Don, where he was greeted with triumph. Here he began preparing a new campaign, this time not for the zipuns, but against the “traitor boyars.” The route one hundred should have also passed along the Volga, but not to the south, but to the north. In Razin’s campaign in 1670, along with the Cossacks and Russian peasants, the peoples of the Volga region took part: Mordovians, Tatars, Chuvashs, etc.

During their stay in Tsaritsyn, the difference won two important victories that raised their prestige: first over the Streltsy, sent by the government from Moscow, and then over the Streltsy, moving under the command of Prince Semyon Lvov from Astrakhan. The Astrakhan archers went over to Razin.

Razin continued to move towards Astrakhan and on June 22 launched an attack. The powerful walls of the Kremlin with 400 cannons placed on them could have been impregnable, but the Astrakhan people opened the gates. Only a small group of initial people, led by the governor Prince Ivan Prozorovsky, took refuge in the cathedral, resisted, and were killed.

From Astrakhan, Razin's huge army again arrived in Paritsyn, where it was decided to move up the Volga. Saratov and Samara voluntarily went over to the side of the rebels. Razin addressed the population of the Volga region with “charming letters” in which he called on them to join the uprising and “bring out” the traitors, i.e. boyars, nobles, governors and clerks. On September 4, Razin approached Simbirsk and stubbornly besieged it for almost a month.

The raging, drunken crowds of Razipites led a riotous life, accompanied by copious shedding of blood: they deprived the lives of governors, service people in their homeland, clerks, archers, as well as archers who did not want to join the movement. Government troops did not show mercy either - they put to death everyone who survived on the battlefield; the same fate befell almost all the Razin residents who were captured: they were hanged without trial, hacked with sabers. Mutual cruelty, the manifestation of bestial instincts, abuse of wives and daughters undermined the moral foundations of society and violated the main Christian commandment - do not kill. An example of ferocious reprisals against the vanquished is the burning of Elder Alena at the stake.

Razin's campaigns for zipuns, his robbery of the population of the Caspian Sea coast, undoubtedly were of a predatory nature and had nothing to do with social protest. This was a movement of Cossack freemen. At the next stage, perhaps not very clearly, but still the social aspect of the movement can be traced, although its predatory nature did not disappear: the Razins robbed nobles, governors and leading people, merchant and government caravans traveling along the Volga, the treasury of monasteries, landowners estates and even peasant households. The robberies caused enormous damage to the country's economy, and the confrontation claimed tens of thousands of human lives.

Why did all this happen, what goals were pursued by the peasants and peoples of the Middle Volga region who participated in the movement? They, of course, had reasons for speaking out - serfdom, the power of the landowner and the government administration were intensifying in the country. But the surviving documents do not give a proper answer to the question posed above, just as neither Razin nor his associates answer it.

The frightened government announced the mobilization of the capital and provincial nobility. On August 28, 1670, the tsar bade farewell to 60 thousand servicemen from their homeland who were on their way to the Middle Volga region.

Meanwhile, the military men, led by the governor Prince Ivan Miloslavsky, settled in the Simbirsk Kremlin and withstood four rebel assaults. On October 3, government troops under the command of Yuri Baryatinsky approached Simbirsk from Kazan and, after the defeat inflicted on Razin, united with Miloslavsky’s military men. Razin went to the Don to gather a new army, but was captured by homely Cossacks and handed over to the government.

The ultimate goal of Razin's campaign was the capture of Moscow, where the Razins intended to beat the boyars, nobles and boyars' children. What's next? Judging by their practical actions, Razin and his comrades considered the establishment of the Cossack way of life ideal. But this was a utopia, because who was supposed to cultivate the arable land, provide the Cossacks with grain and cash wages, who was supposed to compensate for the income the Cossacks received from going for zipuns? The same peasants. Therefore, Razin’s movement could end not with a change in social relations, but with a change of persons in the privileged stratum of society, its composition.

The uprising failed. The reason for this was the spontaneity and poor organization of the movement, the lack of clear goals of the struggle. Crowds of poorly armed people could not resist government troops who had undergone military training.

The movement had a tsarist character - in the eyes of the rebels, the “good” tsar was associated not with the name of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, but with his son Alexei, who had died shortly before. This did not stop them from having two plows in their flotilla: in one of them, upholstered in red velvet, it was as if Tsarevich Alexei Alekseevich was, and in the other, upholstered in black velvet, the former Patriarch Nikon, who was in exile, was in exile.

On June 4, 1671, Razin was taken to Moscow and two days later executed on Red Square. The Church anathematized him. The government celebrated the victory. At the same time, the name of the successful Ataman Razin turned into a legend - the people's memory has preserved many songs and epics about him.

17. Church reforms of the mid-17th century and the “Nikon affair.” Church schism and its social content.

Even during the development of the reform, a circle of its most active supporters formed around Nikon. The famous adventurer Arseny the Greek gained great influence on the cause of future reform. He received his theological education at the Uniate College of St. Afanasia. Upon arrival in Greece, he was ordained a priest and began to seek episcopal rank. After a series of failures, Arseny the Greek agrees to circumcision and converts to Islam. Having moved to Wallachia, he again converted to Uniatism. When Arseny appeared in Moscow, he was sent to the Solovetsky Monastery as a dangerous heretic. From here Nikon took him to him, making him in 1652 the head of the Greco-Latin school and director of the Printing House. It is noteworthy that after Arseny completed the “correction” of Russian liturgical books, he was again sent to prison in Solovki. Another close friend of Nikon was the Kiev monk, a graduate of the Jesuit college, Epiphanius Slavinetsky. One of the favorite activities of the “graceful didaskal” was the invention of new words. He tried to fill both his writings and liturgical books with them. However, the main inspirer of the beginning reform was the Eastern Patriarch Athanasius Patelarius. In his numerous letters, he convinced Nikon that the Russian Church, having become independent and independent from the Greeks, had lost piety. Modern historians have established that Athanasius was a clear protégé of the Vatican. He was overthrown from the throne of Constantinople three times and three times, with the help of money and intrigue, he regained this post. In the east, Afanachy Patelarius was well known as “a good Catholic who enjoyed the favor of Propaganda.”

Relying on such helpers and inspirers, taking advantage of the royal friendship, Nikon embarked on church reform decisively and boldly.

He began by strengthening his own power. While still a simple monk, he could not get along in any monastery. The period of his stay in the Anzersky monastery of the Solovetsky archipelago is well known. There he became known as a willful and rude monk. The rector of the monastery, the Monk Eleazar of Anzersky, perspicaciously predicted the future fate of Nikon: “What a troublemaker and rebel Russia harbors within itself. This will confuse its borders and fill it with many tremors and troubles.” Angry with the saint, Nikon left Solovki. High conceit and pride had sad consequences for the future patriarch. Not possessing developed spiritual gifts, he quickly became a victim of a spiritual disease known in patristic literature as “prelest.” In one of his letters to the king, he reported that God had given him an invisible golden crown: “I saw the royal golden crown in the air... From that time on, I began to expect a visit.” “Visions” haunted Nikon until the end of his life.

Having become patriarch, Nikon believed even more in his exclusivity and became embittered. According to the testimony of contemporaries, Nikon had a cruel and stubborn character, behaved proudly and inaccessibly, calling himself, following the example of the Pope, “extreme saint,” and was titled “great sovereign.” From the first days of his archpastoral career, Nikon began to use anathemas, beatings, torture and imprisonment. According to N. Kapterev, “Nikon’s actions completely lacked the spirit of true Christian archpastorship.” Among other things, the new patriarch was distinguished by his covetousness. In terms of income, Nikon could compete with the autocrat himself. Every year the patriarchal treasury increased by 700,000 rubles. He treated bishops arrogantly, did not want to call them his brothers, and in every possible way humiliated and persecuted the rest of the clergy. Historian V.O. Klyuchevsky called Nikon a church dictator.

The reform undertaken by the patriarch affected all aspects of church life. Its main directions were the “correction” of books, the abolition of ancient forms of worship, liturgical and canonical innovations. The reform began with the so-called “book law”. The vast experience accumulated by the Church in publishing and correcting liturgical books was not used in the course of this “religion.” Thousands of ancient manuscripts collected in Russian and Greek monasteries turned out to be unclaimed. Instead, on the instructions of Arseny the Greek, books from Western, predominantly Uniate, press were purchased. One of the main books on the right, the Greek Euchologion from the Venetian edition, is known to many researchers and was kept in the Moscow Synodal Library before the revolution. Sensing what was going on, the Orthodox workers of the Printing House began to slowly disperse. The learned monks Joseph and Savvaty flatly refused further work. Faced with church rejection of their plans, Arseny the Greek and Epiphany Slavinetsky decided to falsify. In the prefaces of the new books, they reported that the texts were “corrected according to old and charatean Slavic and Greek models.” The result of the “right” was the real damage to Russian liturgical books. They were replete with inserts from Catholic prayer books, theological inaccuracies and grammatical errors. Moreover, the “corrected” editions not only contradicted the ancient books, but also had no agreement with each other. Professor A. Dmitrievsky, who thoroughly studied the “book right” of Patriarch Nikon, states: “In textual terms, all these publications differ very greatly from each other, and we see differences between editions not only of a few lines, but sometimes of a page, two or more "

The change in books was followed by other church innovations. The most significant of them were the following:

¾ instead of the two-fingered sign of the cross, which was adopted in Rus' from the Byzantine Orthodox Church along with Christianity and which is part of the Holy Apostolic tradition, three-fingered sign of Latin origin was introduced;

¾ in old books, in accordance with the grammar of the Slavic language, the name of the Savior “Jesus” was always written and pronounced; in new books this name was changed to the Greekized “Jesus”;

¾ in old books it is established during baptism, wedding and consecration of the temple to walk around the sun as a sign that we are following the Sun-Christ. In the new books, walking against the sun has been introduced;

¾ in old books in the Creed (8th member) it reads: “And in the Holy Spirit of the True and Life-Giving Lord”; after corrections, the word “True” was deleted;

¾ instead of purely, i.e. the double alleluia, which the Russian Church has created since ancient times, the three-lipped (that is, triple) alleluia was introduced;

¾ instead of monodic znamenny church singing, at the personal request of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, polyphonic Polish partes was introduced.

Three-quarters of Catholics who had received false baptism began to be accepted into the Church without baptism.

Nikon and his assistants boldly attempted to change church institutions, customs and even the apostolic traditions of the Russian Orthodox Church, adopted at the Baptism of Rus'.

The church reform of Patriarch Nikon undermined the inviolability of Orthodox forms of worship of God, devalued the hitherto indisputable authority of Christian antiquity, discredited the history of Russian Orthodoxy, and opened the way to further church modernization and secularization of religious consciousness. Having left the solid ground of the Orthodox confession, the dominant church subsequently continued to drift towards Western dogma and ritual.

The introduction of new rituals and services according to the corrected books was perceived by many as the introduction of a new religious faith, different from the previous one, “true Orthodox.” A movement of supporters of the old faith arose - a schism, the founders of which were provincial zealots of piety. They became the ideologists of this movement, the composition of which was heterogeneous. Among them were many low-income church ministers. Speaking for the “old faith,” they expressed dissatisfaction with the increasing oppression on the part of the church authorities. The majority of supporters of the “old faith” were townspeople and peasants, dissatisfied with the strengthening of the feudal-serf regime and the deterioration of their position, which they associated with innovations, including in the religious and church sphere. Nikon's reform was not accepted by some secular feudal lords, bishops and monks. Nikon's departure gave rise to hopes among supporters of the “old faith” for a rejection of innovations and a return to previous church rites and rituals. Investigations of schismatics carried out by the tsarist authorities showed that already in the late 50s and early 60s of the 17th century. in some areas this movement became widespread. Moreover, among the schismatics found, along with supporters of the “old faith,” there were many followers of the teachings of the monk Capito, that is, people who denied the need for a professional clergy and church authorities. Under these conditions, the tsarist government became the leader of the Orthodox Church of Russia, which after 1658 focused on solving two main tasks - consolidating the results of church reform and overcoming the crisis in church administration caused by Nikon's abandonment of the patriarchal chair. This was to be facilitated by the investigation of schismatics, the return from exile of Archpriest Avvakum, Daniel and other clergy, the ideologists of the schism, and the government’s attempts to persuade them to reconcile with the official church (Ivan Neronov reconciled with it back in 1656). The solution to these problems took almost eight years, mainly due to Nikon’s opposition.

The church council elected Archimandrite Joasaph of the Trinity-Sergius Monastery as the new patriarch. At the request of the Eastern Patriarchs, the convened council condemned the old rituals and canceled the resolution of the Stoglavy Council of 1551 on these rituals as unfounded. Believers who adhered to the old rites and defended them were condemned as heretics; it was ordered to excommunicate them from the church, and the secular authorities were ordered to try them in a civil court as opponents of the church. The decisions of the council on the old rituals contributed to the formalization and consolidation of the split of the Russian Orthodox Church into the official church that dominated society and the Old Believers. The latter, in those conditions, was hostile not only to the official church, but also to the state closely associated with it.

In the 1650-1660s, a movement of supporters of the “old faith” and a schism in the Russian Orthodox Church arose.

Entertaining artistic narratives and hysterical writings, including those criticizing church orders, were in great demand.

Struggling with the desire for secular education, the churchmen insisted that only by studying the Holy Scriptures and theological literature can believers achieve true enlightenment, cleansing the soul from sins and spiritual salvation—the main goal of a person’s earthly life. They regarded Western influence as a source of penetration into Russia of harmful foreign customs, innovations and views of Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism hostile to Orthodoxy. Therefore, they were supporters of Russia's national isolation and opponents of its rapprochement with Western states.

A consistent exponent and conductor of the policy of hostility and intolerance towards the Old Believers and other church opponents, other faiths, foreigners, their faith and customs, and secular knowledge was Joachim, Patriarch from 1674 to 1690. Opponents of the desire for secular knowledge, rapprochement with the West and the spread of foreign culture and customs there were also leaders of the schism, among them Archpriest Avvakum, and those that developed in the last third of the 17th century. Old Believer religious communities.

The tsarist government actively supported the church in the fight against schism and heterodoxy and used the full power of the state apparatus. She also initiated new measures aimed at improving the church organization and its further centralization.

Schism of the last third of the 17th century. is a complex socio-religious movement. It was attended by supporters of the “old faith” (they made up the majority of participants in the movement), members of various sects and heretical movements who did not recognize the official church and were hostile to it and the state, which was closely associated with this church. The hostility of the schism to the official church and the state was not determined by differences of a religious and ritual nature. It was determined by the progressive aspects of the ideology of this movement, its social composition and character. The ideology of the split reflected the aspirations of the peasantry and partly the townspeople, and therefore it had both conservative and progressive features. The first include the idealization and defense of antiquity, isolation and propaganda of accepting the crown of martyrdom in the name of the “old faith” as the only way to save the soul. These ideas left their mark on the schism movement, giving rise to conservative religious aspirations and the practice of “baptisms of fire” (self-immolation). The progressive sides of the ideology of schism include sanctification, that is, the religious justification of various forms of resistance to the power of the official church and the feudal-serf state, and the struggle for the democratization of the church.

The complexity and inconsistency of the schism movement was manifested in the uprising in the Solovetsky Monastery of 1668-1676, which began as an uprising by supporters of the “old faith.” The aristocratic elite of the “elders” opposed Nikon’s church reform, the ordinary mass of monks - moreover - for the democratization of the church, and the “beltsy”, that is, novices and monastic workers, were against feudal oppression, and in particular against serfdom in the monastery itself.

To suppress the movement, various means were used, including ideological ones, in particular, anti-schismatic polemical works were published (“Rod of Rule” by Simeon of Polotsk in 1667, “Spiritual Doom” by Patriarch Joachim” in 1682, etc.), and to increase the “educational quality” of church services, the publication of books containing sermons began (for example, “The Soulful Dinner” and “The Soulful Supper” by Simeon of Polotsk).

But the main ones were violent means of combating schism, which were used by secular authorities at the request of the church leadership. The period of repression began with the exile of the ideologists of the schism, who refused reconciliation with the official church at a church council in April 1666; of them, archpriests Avvakum and Lazar, deacon Fedor and former monk Epiphanius were exiled and kept in the Pustozersk prison. The exiles were followed by the mass execution of the surviving participants of the Solovetsky Uprising (more than 50 people were executed). Patriarch Joachim insisted on such a severe punishment. Cruel punishments, including executions, were more often practiced under Fyodor Alekseevich (1676-1682). This caused a new uprising of schismatics during the Moscow uprising of 1682. The failure of the “rebellion” of supporters of the old faith led to the execution of their leaders. The hatred of the ruling class and the official church for the schism and schismatics was expressed in legislation. According to the decree of 1684, schismatics were to be tortured and, if they did not submit to the official church, executed. Those schismatics who, wishing to be saved, submitted to the church and then returned to the schism again, were to be “executed by death without trial.” This marked the beginning of mass persecution.

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NOU VPO Far Eastern Institute of International Business

Faculty of Organizational Management

TEST

In the discipline "National History"

SUBJECT: " Peasant war led by E. Pugachev"

Completed by: student gr. 319-M

Panorevinko Yu.S..

Code 09-м-07

Checked by: Ph.D., Associate Professor

Gridunova A.N.

Khabarovsk 2010

Introduction…………………………………………………………….…………………3

1. Decrees of Catherine II on the peasant issue in the 60s……….5

2. Reasons, driving forces, features of the peasant war led by E. Pugachev, its results……………………………6

3. Conclusion………………………………………………………13

4. References……………………………………………………………...14

INTRODUCTION

Peasant War 1773-1775 under the leadership of E.I. Pugachev was the most powerful armed uprising of the working masses of feudal Russia against the regime of serfdom exploitation and political lawlessness. It covered a vast territory in the southeast of the country (Orenburg, Siberian, Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Voronezh, Astrakhan provinces), where 2 million 900 thousand male residents lived, mostly consisting of peasants of various categories and nationalities. The uprising was a consequence of the deepening crisis situations in the socio-economic life of the country, accompanied by increased feudal and national oppression of the working masses and aggravation of class relations.

The deep antagonism between the oppressed population of the country and the ruling elite manifested itself in various forms of class action. The culmination of the people's struggle was Pugachev's speech, which quickly grew into a wide peasant war. Its main events took place in the Southern Urals. The reasons for this should be sought in the socio-economic and political history of the region.

Objectively, the uprising was directed against Russian statehood. The ideal was seen in a Cossack-peasant, “free” state with its peasant king, to make everyone eternal Cossacks, to grant land, freedom, land, forests, hay, and fishing grounds. As they say, “bestow with a cross and a beard”, exemption from recruitment and extortion, execute nobles, landowners and unrighteous judges.

This topic has been sufficiently studied and covered by such historians as Yuri Aleksandrovich Limonov, Vladimir Vasilyevich Mavrodin, Viktor Ivanovich Buganov.

However, the topic that I chose for the test has not lost its relevance even after 230 years since the beginning of the uprising. Even now, in our time, problems related to the correctness of leadership and the meaningfulness of the actions of our government continue to arise, which leads to protests, rallies, and demonstrations in defense of our rights, freedoms and interests. There will probably never be a government that would satisfy the interests of all segments of the population. Especially in Russia, where the tax burden often exceeds the income of the bulk of the population living below the poverty line.

An attempt to understand what the prerequisites were that pushed such a large number of people, different in their class composition and interests, geographically scattered, will be my course work, in which, having examined all the facts and events step by step, we can conclude what was the reason and why the uprising did not lead to victory rebels.

1. Decrees of Catherine II on the peasant issue in the 60s.

In the early 60s of the 18th century. The situation in the country was determined by several main factors. First of all, it is worth noting the growth of peasant unrest. Catherine II was forced to admit that at the time of her coming to power, up to one and a half thousand landowners and monastery peasants “defied obedience” (“the factory and monastery peasants were almost all in clear disobedience to the authorities and in some places the landowners began to join them”). And all of them, as the empress put it, “had to be moderated.” Among the peasants, various kinds of false manifestos and decrees became especially widespread, by virtue of which the peasants refused to work for their former masters.
The policy of “enlightened absolutism” did not improve the situation of numerous state peasants. Ferocious laws that brought whips and whips, prison and exile, hard labor and conscription to the people, constituted the most characteristic shadow side of this policy. All this could not but cause constant protest by the oppressed masses, the end result of which was open armed uprisings by the peasants.

Serfdom already reached its apogee at the beginning of the reign. In the 60s, a series of decrees were issued that deprived peasants of any minimal rights: they were prohibited from owning real estate, taking contracts and farming out, acting as guarantors, trading without special permission, and leaving their place of residence without written permission. In 1765, landowners received the right to exile peasants to hard labor, and peasants were forbidden to complain about landowners; their complaints were considered a false denunciation, and the one who filed it was subject to severe punishment.

2. Reasons, driving forces, features of the peasant war led by E. Pugachev, its results.

The continuous strengthening of serfdom and the growth of duties during the first half of the 18th century caused fierce resistance from the peasants. Its main form was flight. The fugitives went to the Cossack regions, to the Urals, to Siberia, to Ukraine, to the northern forests.

They often created “robber gangs” that not only robbed on the roads, but also destroyed landowners’ estates, and destroyed documents on the ownership of land and serfs.

More than once the peasants openly rebelled, seized the landowners' property, beat and even killed their masters, and resisted the troops that pacified them. Often the rebels demanded that they be transferred to the category of palace or state peasants.

Unrest among working people became more frequent, striving to return from factories to their native villages, and, on the other hand, seeking improved working conditions and higher salaries.

The frequent repetition of popular uprisings and the fierceness of the rebels testified to the trouble in the country and the impending danger.

The spread of imposture indicated the same thing. The contenders for the throne declared themselves either the son of Tsar Ivan, or Tsarevich Alexei, or Peter II. There were especially many “Petrov III” - six before 1773. This was explained by the fact that Peter III eased the situation of the Old Believers, tried to transfer the monastic peasants into state peasants, and also by the fact that he was overthrown by the nobles. (The peasants believed that the emperor suffered for caring for the common people). However, only one of the many impostors managed to seriously shake the empire.

In 1773, another “Peter III” showed up in the Yaitsky (Ural) Cossack army. The Don Cossack Emelyan Ivanovich Pugachev declared himself to them.

The uprising of E. Pugachev became the largest in Russian history. In Russian historiography of the Soviet period it was called the Peasant War. The Peasant War was understood as a major uprising of the peasantry and other lower strata of the population, covering a significant territory, leading in fact to the split of the country into a part controlled by the government and a part controlled by the rebels, threatening the very existence of the feudal-serf system. During the Peasant War, rebel armies are created, waging a long struggle with government troops. In recent years, the term “Peasant War” is used relatively rarely; researchers prefer to write about the Cossack-peasant uprising under the leadership of E.I. Pugacheva. However, most experts agree that of all the peasant uprisings in Russia, it was Pugachev’s uprising that can most justifiably claim the name “Peasant War.”

What were the reasons for the uprising and war?

o Dissatisfaction of the Yaik Cossacks with government measures aimed at eliminating their privileges. In 1771, the Cossacks lost their autonomy and were deprived of the right to traditional trades (fishing, salt mining). In addition, discord was growing between the rich Cossack " senior"and the rest of the "troops".

o Strengthening the personal dependence of peasants on landowners, the growth of state taxes and landowner duties, caused by the beginning of the development of market relations and the serfdom legislation of the 60s.

o Difficult living and working conditions for working people, as well as assigned peasants in the factories of the Urals.

o Inflexible national policy of the government in the Middle Volga region.

o The socio-psychological atmosphere in the country, heated up under the influence of the hopes of the peasantry that, following the liberation of the nobles from compulsory service to the state, their emancipation would begin. These aspirations gave rise to rumors that the “manifesto on peasant freedom” had already been prepared by the tsar, but the “evil nobles” decided to hide it and made an attempt on the life of the emperor. However, he miraculously escaped and is just waiting for the moment to appear before the people and lead them to fight for Truth and the return of the throne. It was in this atmosphere that impostors appeared, posing as Peter III.

o Deterioration of the economic situation in the country due to the Russian-Turkish war.

In 1772, there was an uprising on Yaik with the aim of removing the chieftain and a number of elders. The Cossacks resisted the punitive troops. After the rebellion was suppressed, the instigators were exiled to Siberia, and the military circle was destroyed. The situation on Yaik has become extremely tense. Therefore, the Cossacks enthusiastically greeted “Emperor” Pugachev, who promised to reward them with “rivers, seas and herbs, cash salaries, lead and gunpowder and all freedom.” On September 18, 1773, with a detachment of 200 Cossacks, Pugachev set out for the capital of the army - Yaitsky town. Almost all of the military teams sent against him went over to the side of the rebels. And yet, having about 500 people, Pugachev did not dare to storm the fortified fortress with a garrison of 1000 people. Having bypassed it, he moved up the Yaik, capturing small fortresses along the way, the garrisons of which joined his army. Bloody reprisals were carried out against nobles and officers.

On October 5, 1773, Pugachev approached Orenburg, a well-fortified provincial city with a garrison of 3.5 thousand people with 70 guns. The rebels had 3 thousand people and 20 guns. The assault on the city was unsuccessful, and the Pugachevites began a siege. Governor I.A. Reinsdorp did not dare to attack the rebels, not relying on his soldiers.

A detachment of General V.A. was sent to help Orenburg. Kara numbering 1.5 thousand people and 1200 Bashkirs led by Salavat Yulaev. However, the rebels defeated Kara, and S. Yulaev went over to the side of the impostor. Pugachev was also joined by 1,200 soldiers, Cossacks and Kalmyks from Colonel Chernyshev’s detachment (the colonel himself was captured and hanged). Only Brigadier Korfu managed to safely lead 2.5 thousand soldiers to Orenburg. Pugachev, who had set up his headquarters in Berd, five miles from Orenburg, was constantly receiving reinforcements: Kalmyks, Bashkirs, mining workers of the Urals, and assigned peasants. The number of his troops exceeded 20 thousand people. True, most of them were armed only with edged weapons, or even spears. The level of combat training of this heterogeneous crowd was also low. However, Pugachev sought to give his army a semblance of organization. He established the “Military Collegium” and surrounded himself with guards. He assigned ranks and titles to his associates. The Ural artisans Ivan Beloborodov and Afanasy Sokolov (Khlopusha) became colonels, and the Cossack Chika-Zarubin became “Count Chernyshev.”

The expansion of the uprising seriously worried the government. Chief General A.I. is appointed commander of the troops sent against Pugachev. Bibikov. Under his command there were 16 thousand soldiers and 40 guns. At the beginning of 1774, Bibikov's troops began an offensive. In March, Pugachev was defeated at the Tatishchev Fortress, and Lieutenant Colonel Mikhelson defeated the troops of Chiki-Zarubin near Ufa. Pugachev's main army was practically destroyed: about 2 thousand rebels were killed, over 4 thousand were wounded or captured. The government announced the suppression of the rebellion.

However, Pugachev, who had no more than 400 people left, did not lay down his arms, but went to Bashkiria. Now the Bashkirs and mining workers became the main support of the movement. At the same time, many Cossacks moved away from Pugachev as he moved away from their native places.

Despite setbacks in clashes with government forces, the ranks of the rebels grew. In July, Pugachev led a 20,000-strong army to Kazan. After the capture of Kazan, Pugachev intended to move to Moscow. On July 12, the rebels managed to occupy the city, but they were unable to capture the Kazan Kremlin. In the evening, Michelson's troops, who were pursuing Pugachev, came to the aid of the besieged. In a fierce battle, Pugachev was again defeated. Of his 20 thousand supporters, 2 thousand were killed, 10 thousand were captured, and about 6 thousand fled. With two thousand survivors, Pugachev crossed to the right bank of the Volga and turned south, hoping to rebel the Don.

“Pugachev fled, but his flight seemed like an invasion,” wrote A.S. Pushkin. Having crossed the Volga, Pugachev found himself in areas of landownership, where he was supported by a mass of serfs. It was now that the uprising acquired the character of a genuine peasant war. All over the Volga region, noble estates burned. Approaching Saratov, Pugachev again had 20 thousand people.

Panic began in the capital. In the Moscow province they announced a gathering of militia against the impostor. The Empress declared that she intended to stand at the head of the troops heading against Pugachev. Chief General P.I. Panin was appointed to replace the deceased Bibikov, giving him the broadest powers. A.V. was called from the army. Suvorov.

Meanwhile, the rebel troops were no longer as powerful as they were a year ago. They now consisted of peasants who did not know military affairs. In addition, their detachments acted more and more separately. Having dealt with the master, the man considered the task completed and hurried to manage the land. Therefore, the composition of Pugachev’s army changed all the time. Government troops followed in her footsteps. In August, Pugachev besieged Tsaritsyn, but was overtaken and defeated by Mikhelson, losing 2 thousand people killed and 6 thousand prisoners. With the remnants of his followers, Pugachev crossed the Volga, deciding to return to Yaik. However, the Yaik Cossacks accompanying him, realizing the inevitability of defeat, handed him over to the authorities.

Transported by Suvorov to Moscow, Pugachev was interrogated and tortured for two months, and on January 10, 1775 he was executed along with four comrades on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. The uprising was suppressed.

The peasant war under the leadership of Emelyan Pugachev ended in the defeat of the rebels. It suffered from all the weaknesses inevitably inherent in peasant uprisings: unclear goals, spontaneity, fragmentation of the movement, and the lack of truly organized, disciplined and trained military forces.

The spontaneity was reflected primarily in the absence of a well-thought-out program. Not to mention the ordinary rebels, even the leaders, not excluding Pugachev himself, did not clearly and definitely imagine the system that would be established if they won.

But, despite the naive monarchism of the peasants, the anti-serfdom orientation of the Peasant War is clear. The slogans of the rebels are much clearer than in previous peasant wars and uprisings.

The leaders of the uprising did not have a unified plan of action, which was clearly reflected during the second offensive of government troops in January-March 1774. The rebel detachments were scattered over a vast territory and often acted completely independently, isolated from each other. Therefore, despite their heroism, they were separately defeated by government forces.

However, this does not detract from the enormous progressive significance of the uprising. The Peasant War of 1773–1775 dealt a serious blow to the feudal-serf system, it undermined its foundations, shook the centuries-old foundations and contributed to the development of progressive ideas among the Russian intelligentsia. What subsequently led to the liberation of the peasants in 1861.

The peasant war, in principle, could have been won, but it could not create a new, fair system that its participants dreamed of. After all, the rebels did not imagine him otherwise than in the form of a Cossack freeman, impossible on a national scale.

Pugachev's victory would mean the extermination of the only educated layer - the nobility. This would cause irreparable damage to culture, undermine the state system of Russia, and create a threat to its territorial integrity. On the other hand, the Peasant War forced the landowners and the government, having dealt with the rebels, to moderate the degree of exploitation. Thus, wages were significantly increased at Ural factories. But an unbridled increase in duties could lead to the massive ruin of the peasant economy, and after it - to the general collapse of the country's economy. The ferocity and massive scale of the uprising clearly showed the ruling circles that the situation in the country required change. The consequence of the peasant war was new reforms. Thus, popular indignation led to the strengthening of the system against which it was directed.

The memory of the “Pugachevism” has firmly entered the consciousness of both the lower classes and the ruling strata. The Decembrists tried to avoid Pugachevism in 1825. The associates of Alexander II remembered it when they made the historic decision to abolish serfdom in 1861.

CONCLUSION.

The Peasant War suffered defeat, which was inevitable for peasant actions in the era of feudalism, but it dealt a blow to the foundations of serfdom. The reasons for the defeat of the Peasant War were rooted in the spontaneity and fragmentation of the movement, in the absence of a clearly realized program of struggle for a new social system. Pugachev and his Military Collegium were unable to organize an army to successfully fight government forces. The ruling class and the state opposed the spontaneous action of the people with the regular army, the administrative and police apparatus, finance, and the church; They also received significant support from the emerging Russian bourgeoisie (manufacturers, manufacturers, merchants). After the Peasant War, the government of Catherine II, in order to prevent new peasant uprisings, strengthened the local state apparatus, strengthening its punitive capabilities. To ease the severity of the peasant issue, certain measures were taken in the field of economic policy. The regime of noble reaction, established after the Peasant War, was unable, however, to suppress the peasant movement in the country, which especially intensified at the end of the 18th century. Under the influence of the Peasant War, the formation of anti-serfdom ideology in Russia took place.

The uprising prompted the government to improve the system of governing the country and completely eliminate the autonomy of the Cossack troops. The Yaik River was renamed the river. Ural. It showed the illusory nature of ideas about the advantages of patriarchal peasant self-government, because spontaneous peasant uprisings took place under the leadership of the community. The peasants' speech influenced the development of Russian social thought and the spiritual life of the country. The memory of the “Pugachevism” and the desire to avoid it became one of the factors in the government’s policy and, as a result, pushed it later to soften and abolish serfdom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1. Buganov V.I., Pugachev. – M.: Moscow worker, 1983/ Buganov V.I., Pugachev.

2. Muratov Kh. I. Peasant war under the leadership of E. I. Pugachev. – M./Buganov V.I., Politizdat, 1970

3. Eidelman N. Ya. Your eighteenth century. – M./ Eidelman N. Ya. Artist. Lit., 1991

5. Uprising led by Stepan Razin

The culmination of popular uprisings in the 17th century. there was an uprising of Cossacks and peasants led by S. T. Razin. This movement originated in the villages of the Don Cossacks. The Don freemen have always attracted fugitives from the southern and central regions of the Russian state. Here they were protected by an unwritten law - “there is no extradition from the Don.” The government, needing the services of the Cossacks for the defense of the southern borders, paid them a salary and put up with the self-government that existed there.

Stepan Timofeevich Razin, a native of the village of Zimoveyskaya, belonged to the homely Cossacks and enjoyed great authority. In 1667 he led a detachment of a thousand people who went on a campaign “for zipuns” to the Volga, and then to the river. Yaik, where the Yaitsky town was occupied with battle. Summer of 1668 Razin's army of almost 2 thousand was already successfully operating in the possessions of Persia (Iran) on the Caspian coast. The Razins exchanged the captured valuables for Russian prisoners, who replenished their ranks. Summer of 1669 The Cossacks defeated the fleet at Pig Island, equipped against them by the Persian Shah. This greatly complicated Russian-Iranian relations and aggravated the government’s position towards the Cossacks.

In early October, Razin returned to the Don via Astrakhan, where he was greeted with triumph. Inspired by success, he began preparing a new campaign, this time “for the good king” against the “traitor boyars.” The next campaign of the Cossacks along the Volga to the north resulted in peasant unrest. The Cossacks remained the military core, and with the influx of a huge number of fugitive peasants and peoples of the Volga region - Mordovians, Tatars, Chuvashs - into the detachment, the social orientation of the movement changed dramatically. In May 1670 S. T. Razin’s 7,000-strong detachment captured the city of Tsaritsyn, and at the same time, the streltsy detachments sent from Moscow and Astrakhan were defeated. Having established Cossack rule in Tsaritsyn and Astrakhan, Razin moved north - Saratov and Samara voluntarily went over to his side. Razin addressed the population of the Volga region with “charming letters,” in which he called on them to join the uprising and harass the “traitors,” i.e., boyars, nobles, governors, and officials. The uprising covered a vast territory, in which numerous detachments led by atamans M. Osipov, M. Kharitonov, V. Fedorov, nun Alena and others operated.

In September 1670 Razin's army approached Simbirsk and stubbornly besieged it for a month. The frightened government announced mobilization - in August 1670. The 60,000-strong royal army headed to the Middle Volga region. In early October, a government detachment under the command of Yu. Baryatinsky defeated the main forces of Razin and joined the Simbirsk garrison under the command of the governor, Prince I. Miloslavsky. Razin with a small detachment went to the Don, where he hoped to recruit a new army, but was betrayed by the top of the Cossacks and handed over to the government. June 4, 1671 he was taken to Moscow and executed on Red Square two days later. In November 1671 Astrakhan, the last stronghold of the rebels, fell. Participants in the uprising were subjected to brutal repression. In Arzamas alone, over 11 thousand people were executed.

6. Reunification of Ukraine with Russia

In the 17th century Ukrainian lands were under the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. According to the Union of Lublin in 1569, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which included Ukrainian lands, united with Poland. After the union, Polish magnates and gentry began to settle on Ukrainian lands. Feudal oppression intensified in Ukraine. Ukrainian peasants and urban artisans were ruined by rising taxes and duties. The regime of severe oppression in Ukraine was also aggravated by the fact that back in 1557 the lords received from the royal authorities the right to execute the death penalty against their serfs. Along with the strengthening of feudal oppression, the population of Ukraine experienced national and religious oppression.

The strengthening of feudal, national and religious oppression in Ukraine by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was the reason for the rise of the national liberation movement. Its first wave occurred in the 20-30s. XVII century, but was brutally suppressed by the Polish lords. A new stage of the national liberation movement occurred in the late 40s - early 50s. Its center became the Zaporozhye Sich, where the free Cossacks were formed. The struggle of the Ukrainian people was led by the outstanding statesman and commander Bogdan Khmelnytsky. His will, intelligence, courage, military talent, and devotion to Ukraine created for him enormous authority among broad sections of the Ukrainian population and, above all, the Cossacks. The driving forces of the national liberation movement in Ukraine were the peasantry, Cossacks, petty bourgeois (city dwellers), and small and middle Ukrainian gentry.

The uprising in Ukraine began in the spring of 1648. This year the rebels inflicted defeat on the Poles at Zheltye Vody, Korsun and Pilyavtsy. At the same time, Khmelnitsky turned to Russia with a request to accept Ukraine “under the hand of Moscow” and jointly fight against Poland. The government of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich was unable to satisfy his request. Russia was not ready for war with Poland: popular uprisings were raging in the country. Russia, closely monitoring the course of events in Ukraine, provided it with diplomatic, economic and military support.

After the battle of Zbarazh in the summer of 1649, where the rebels were victorious, Poland and Ukraine began negotiations for peace. On August 8, 1649, the Peace of Zborov was signed. According to its terms, Bohdan Khmelnitsky was recognized by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as hetman, the number of registered Cossacks (who received a salary) was determined at 40 thousand. The Polish government recognized the self-government of the Cossack army, to which the Kiev, Chernigov and Bratslav voivodeships were assigned. The presence of Polish troops and Jesuits on their territory was prohibited, but Polish feudal lords could return to their possessions in these voivodeships. In Poland, this peace was regarded as a concession to the rebels and caused discontent among the magnates and gentry. Ukrainian peasants met with hostility the return of the Polish feudal lords to their possessions. Further continuation of the struggle in Ukraine was inevitable.

Military operations resumed in the spring of 1650. The decisive battle took place in June 1651. near Berestechko. An ally of the Ukrainians, Khan Islam-Girey, bribed by the Poles, withdrew his cavalry, which largely predetermined the defeat of the rebels and the advance of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth troops into Ukraine. It was stopped only in September 1651 near Bila Tserkva, where peace was concluded. Its conditions were difficult. The register of Cossacks was reduced to 20 thousand. Only the Kiev Voivodeship was left in Cossack self-government. The hetman was deprived of the right to independent foreign relations. The Polish lords were given back full power over the dependent population. The response to this was new performances in the Dnieper region. In 1652, near Batog, the rebels defeated the Polish army. However, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, having gathered an army of 50 thousand, launched an attack on Ukraine, the situation of which was becoming increasingly dangerous. In April 1653, Khmelnitsky again turned to Russia with a request to accept Ukraine into its composition.

May 10, 1653 The Zemsky Sobor in Moscow decided to accept Ukraine into Russia. Buturlin's Russian embassy went there. January 8, 1654 The Great Rada of Ukraine in Pereyaslavl decided to reunite Ukraine with Russia, which became part of it with broad autonomous rights. In Ukraine, the election of the hetman was preserved. Local government bodies, class rights of the nobility and Cossack elders were recognized. The hetman had the right of foreign relations with all countries except Poland and Turkey. The Cossack register was established at 60 thousand.

Conclusion

These features of the class struggle develop and acquire a new quality in the 17th-18th centuries. It was an era of grandiose peasant wars and powerful urban uprisings. Then the regime of oppression and exploitation of the lower classes reached its culmination, and the power of the punitive organs of the state rose to hitherto unprecedented heights. But it was precisely this period of late feudalism that gave birth to previously unprecedented social cataclysms, enormous in scale and intensity, the ferocity of the struggle, and the pressure on the class enemy. They covered the entire country, from the western borders to Eastern Siberia.

Despite the defeat of countless peasant uprisings, unrest, and wars, their participants advanced the cause of the fight against the exploiters. From century to century, the scale of mass participation of the grassroots in direct historical action increased immeasurably. In the XVII-XVIII centuries. For the first time in the history of the class struggle, its participants are organized into rebel armies, give battle to government troops, win victories, storm and take cities, besiege the capital of Russia or approach it. Elements of organization and consciousness are increasing, the experience of struggle is being enriched, the baton of which is passed on from one generation to another.

With all this, the popular uprisings of the period of feudalism remained generally spontaneous, poorly organized, and not illuminated by a clear political consciousness. The rebels did not have a clear program for the reconstruction of society.

List of used literature

1. V.I. Buganov, “Essays on the history of the class struggle in Russia in the 11th – 18th centuries,” - M: Prosveshchenie, 1986.

2. Pushkarev S.G., “Review of Russian History”, - Stavropol: Caucasian Territory, 1993.

3. Platonov S.F. “Collected works on Russian history”, T. 1, - St. Petersburg, 1993.

4. S. V. Novikova, “History of the Fatherland.” School Student's Handbook. M., philological society “Slovo”, 1996.

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Socio-political development

Russia in the 17th century.

Popular movements

1.1. Urban uprisings. In the 11th century There were a number of popular uprisings, caused both by the general enslavement policy of the state, the deterioration of the financial situation of the masses, the strengthening of the autocracy, and specific historical factors.

1.1.1. Prerequisites for the Salt Riot of 1648:

- Tax increases and the failure of the government's tax reform B. Morozova. Wanting to increase revenues to the treasury, the uncle of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich in 1646 abolished a number of direct taxes and introduced indirect taxes - he increased the prices of an essential commodity - salt. However, the result was extremely unexpected: although it was difficult to live without salt, which played the role of a preservative, people sharply reduced its consumption. The government, forced to restore the old prices for salt, began to collect arrears from the canceled taxes for two years.

- Bribery and arbitrariness of authorities both in the center and locally, which especially intensified with the coming to power of the young Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (1645-1676), who actually entrusted the management of the country to his relatives.

- B. Morozov’s reluctance to take into account the interests of the bulk of service people. The nobility, for example, insisted on the abolition of school years and the organization of the search for runaway peasants, but in the capital they encountered Moscow red tape, i.e. unwillingness of the authorities to satisfy their urgent demands.

- Population growth of white settlements Due to the flow there of tax-payers from black settlements, ready to lose personal freedom for the sake of salvation from the tax burden, it led to the fact that taxes, the amount of which remained the same and were distributed among those who remained, increased. In addition, the townspeople did not want to tolerate competition from white Sloboda residents, as well as peasants engaged in trade and craft activities.

1.1.2. Salt riot. The reason for the uprising was the dispersal by the archers on June 1, 1648 of a crowd of Muscovites who were trying to give money to the Tsar, who was returning from a pilgrimage. petition letter . Soon the crowd broke into the Kremlin, and the archers, who had not received salaries for a long time and were also dissatisfied with the policies of the government of B. Morozov, refused to carry out orders. Finding themselves face to face with a spontaneously formed coalition of servicemen, townspeople and archers, the confused government was forced to sacrifice those of its representatives who turned out to be the most hated by the people. The head of the Zemsky Prikaz, L. Pleshcheev, and the okolnichy, who headed the Pushkarsky Prikaz, P. Trakhaniotov, were given over to the crowd to be torn to pieces. The Tsar managed to save B. Morozov.

The main concession was to convene Zemsky Cathedral, at which it was decided to develop a new set of laws, approved in 1649. Cathedral Code , satisfied some of the demands of the forces taking part in the uprising. This was one of its features, because... Usually popular uprisings led to destruction and increased government reaction.

1.1.3 Other appearances. Before and after the Salt Riot, uprisings broke out in more than 30 cities of the country: in the same 1648 in Ustyug, Kursk, Voronezh, in 1650 - grain riots in Novgorod and Pskov. In 1662 it broke out Copper Riot, caused by the government's monetary reform. The protracted Russian-Polish war devastated the treasury and the government took extraordinary measures - issuing copper money, which was in circulation along with silver money. This led to devaluation, which particularly affected people who received cash salaries, as well as artisans and small traders. As a result, the protest was suppressed, but the government moved to withdraw copper money from circulation.

Uprising under the leadership of S. Razin.

1.2.1. General characteristics and composition of the movement. The most powerful popular uprising of the era was the uprising under the leadership of S. Razin of 1667-1671.

In Soviet historiography it was called an anti-feudal peasant war, while in every possible way idealizing the people's defender S. Razin.

Mainly Cossacks took part in the movement. The peasants who joined them defended the interests not of their class, but of their own. They did not fight against feudal relations as such. Having been cut off from productive labor, the peasants who participated in the uprising wanted to become Cossacks, or, if successful, servicemen. There was no talk of any change in the social system or government structure. It is no coincidence that in his charming letters S. Razin stated that his main goal was to stand up for the great sovereign and exterminate the traitor boyars.

This movement can be characterized as a Cossack-peasant uprising, complicated by the features of the Russian revolt.

1.2.2. Prerequisites for the uprising:

- Registration of serfdom and an increase in the tax burden, which led to a sharp deterioration in the situation of the peasantry and townspeople and their flight to the outskirts beyond state control.

- Aggravation of the situation on the Don due to the growth of the so-called golutvennogo Cossacks - golytba, replenished at the expense of fugitive people. And if wealthy ( homely ) Cossacks who were in the service of the state received cash and grain salaries, it became increasingly difficult for the new arrivals to feed themselves. In addition, the homely ones owned fisheries and received most of the spoils during the duvan (i.e., its division). It was forbidden to plow on the Don; with the capture of the city of Azov by the Turks, access to the sea was closed; only trips to the Crimean and Turkish coasts for zipuns brought the Cossacks, although dangerous, but considerable booty.

- General deterioration of the situation in the country, caused by the long Russian-Polish war, monetary reform and their consequences.

- Church reform of Patriarch Nikon, which entailed an ideological split and a deep spiritual crisis in Russian society.

- The desire of the authorities to take control of the Cossack freemen, limit it and integrate it into the state system, which also created a field of tension and contributed to the explosion of Cossack indignation.

1.2.3. Leader's personality. The head of the Cossack gang was Stepan Razin, who came from the top of the Cossacks. Razin's leadership role was determined by the following factors: his older brother, Ivan, who did not follow the orders of the tsarist governor during hostilities with Poland, was executed. This shocked the future leader of the uprising, who began to perceive the common troubles of the people through the prism of personal tragedy. Kozatskaya foreman did not fully consider him one of her own and thereby pushed him out of her ranks, forcing him to assert himself among the insolent Cossacks.

During the movement itself, Razin's fame grew as a successful and brave chieftain, charmed by bullets and sabers, bringing will and justice to the people. With his daring and boundlessness in everything - in generosity towards ordinary people and violence against enemies - he corresponded to the aspirations of the people, their ideas about justice and power. This glorification of a man who was far from his ideal image in life allowed him to remain in people's memory.

Main stages.

First stage. In May 1667, S. Razin led the Cossacks from the Don to the Volga. Having passed Astrakhan and robbed a caravan of ships along the way, the Razins went out into the Caspian Sea. Then, after wintering in Yaitsky town , the Cossacks made successful raids on the possessions of the Iranian Shah. Their return in August 1669 to the Don with rich booty made a great impression and strengthened Razin’s fame as a successful chieftain. Thousands of new people came to him, he began to prepare them for a new campaign, but not for the zipuns, but against the boyars.

Second phase. In April 1670, the Razins approached Tsaritsyn and, without meeting resistance, captured the city. Then, thanks to the help of the local population and archers, they took the well-fortified Astrakhan. The authorities hoped that Razin would repeat his previous route and go to the Caspian Sea, but he, leaving his ataman V. Us in the city, moved up the Volga and captured Saratov and Samara without a fight. Everywhere he introduced the Cossack system, brutally dealt with the boyars, nobles and officials. Fugitive people joined Razin, the uprising covered a vast territory of the Volga region. Realizing the impending threat, the authorities mobilized all their forces. Alexei Mikhailovich himself blessed the 60 thousand army of servicemen and archers to suppress the uprising. As a result, the tsarist troops defeated Razin’s 20 thousand detachment near Simbirsk in October 1670. The ataman himself was seriously wounded and, hoping to continue the fight, fled to the Don. But after the defeat, he no longer enjoyed his former influence, and was soon captured by homely Cossacks and handed over to the authorities. In June 1671, after severe torture, which he bravely endured, Razin was executed on Red Square. And in November, government troops took Astrakhan, the last stronghold of the uprising.