Caucasian Front World War 1 Black Sea. Transcaucasia during the First World War

21.12.2015

Annotation:

The article presents an analysis of the course of military operations on the Caucasian front during the First World War. All the most significant military operations carried out by the Caucasian Army under the leadership of General N.N. are analyzed. Yudenich, conditions and factors that predetermined their success. The reasons that caused the collapse of the Caucasian Front and Russia's withdrawal from the First World War, including in the Caucasian direction, are identified.

The European theater of military operations, although it was the main one during the First World War due to the fact that it was here that the armed confrontation became most violent, was nevertheless far from the only one. The fighting went far beyond the European continent, thereby defining other theaters of war. One of these theaters of war was the Middle East, within which Russia had the Caucasus Front, where it was opposed by the Ottoman Empire.

Its involvement in the war was of fundamental importance for Germany. Turkey, according to the plan of German strategists, having an army of millions, was supposed to draw upon itself the reserves and resources of Russia to the Caucasus, and Great Britain to the Sinai Peninsula and Mesopotamia (the territory of modern Iraq).

For Turkey itself, which experienced a number of military defeats at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, participation in a new war, especially against Russia, was far from a rosy prospect. Therefore, despite allied obligations, the leadership of the Ottoman Empire hesitated for a long time before starting a war with Russia. Both the head of state, Sultan Mehmed V, and most of the members of his government opposed this. Only Turkish Minister of War Enver Pasha, who was under the influence of the head of the German mission in Turkey, General L. von Sanders, was a supporter of the war.

Because of this, the Turkish leadership in September 1914, through the Russian ambassador in Istanbul N. Girs, conveyed its position on its readiness not only to be neutral in the war that had already begun, but also to act as an ally of Russia against Germany.

Paradoxically, this is exactly what the tsarist leadership did not like. Nicholas II was haunted by the laurels of his great ancestors: Peter I and Catherine II, and he really wanted to realize the idea of ​​​​gaining Constantinople and the Black Sea straits for Russia and thereby going down in history. The best way to achieve this was only a victorious war with Turkey. Based on this, Russia's foreign policy strategy in the Middle East was built. Therefore, the question of allied relations with Turkey was not even raised.

Thus, arrogance in foreign policy activities, isolation from political realities, and overestimation of one’s strengths and capabilities led to the fact that the Russian leadership placed the country in a war on two fronts. The Russian soldier once again had to pay for the voluntarism of the country's political leadership.

Combat operations in the Caucasian direction began literally immediately after the bombing by Turkish ships on October 29-30, 1914 of the Russian Black Sea ports of Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk. In Russia, this event received the unofficial name “Sevastopol Reveille”. On November 2, 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey, followed by England and France on November 5 and 6.

At the same time, Turkish troops crossed the Russian border and occupied part of Adjara. Subsequently, it was planned to reach the Kars-Batum-Tiflis-Baku line, raise the Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus, Adjara, Azerbaijan and Persia to jihad against Russia and thus cut off the Caucasian army from the center of the country and defeat it.

These plans were, of course, grandiose, but their main vulnerability lay in underestimating the potential of the Caucasian army and its command.

Despite the fact that most of the troops of the Caucasian Military District were sent to the Austro-German front, the group of Russian troops was still combat-ready, and the quality of officers and enlisted personnel was higher than in the center of the country.

It is noteworthy that the planning of operations and their direct management during combat was carried out by one of the best Russian military leaders of that time - the commander of the Suvorov school - General N.N. Yudenich, who became widely known after Lenin’s appeal “Everyone to fight Yudenich,” and then, through the efforts of ideologized censorship, was consigned to oblivion.

But it was the leadership talent of General N.N. Yudenich largely determined the success of the actions of the Caucasian Army. And almost all of the operations she carried out until April 1917 were successful, among which the following were of particular importance: Sarykamysh (December 1914 - January 1915), Alashkert (July - August 1915), Hamadan (October - December 1915), Erzurum (December 1915 - February 1916), Trebizond (January-April 1916) and others.

The course of hostilities on the Caucasian front at the initial stage of the war was determined by the Sarykamysh operation, the conduct of which by Russian troops should rightfully be included in the history textbooks of military art. Since its uniqueness is actually comparable to the Swiss campaign of A.V. Suvorov. Not only did the offensive of the Russian troops take place in conditions of 20-30 degree frosts, it was also carried out in mountainous areas and against an enemy superior in strength.

The number of Russian troops near Sarykamysh was about 63 thousand people under the overall command of the assistant commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Army, General A.Z. Myshlaevsky. The 90,000-strong 3rd Turkish field army opposed the Russian troops.

Having advanced more than 100 kilometers deep into Turkish territory, the formations of the Caucasian Army largely lost contact with weapons and food supply bases. In addition, communications between the center and the flanks were disrupted. In general, the position of the Russian troops was so unfavorable that General A.Z. Myshlaevsky, not believing in the success of the upcoming operation, gave the order to retreat, left the troops and left for Tiflis, which further complicated the situation.

The Turks, on the contrary, were so confident of their victory that the offensive operation against the Russian troops was personally led by Minister of War Enver Pasha. The chief of staff of the army was a representative of the German command, Lieutenant General F. Bronsart von Schellendorff. It was he who planned the course of the upcoming operation, which, according to the plan of the Turkish-German command, was to become a kind of Schlieffen “Cannes” for the Russian troops, by analogy with the defeat of France in the same period by German troops.

The Turks did not succeed in “Kannov”, and even more so the polished ones, since the chief of staff of the Caucasian Army, General N.N., confused their cards. Yudenich, who was convinced that “the decision to retreat presupposes an inevitable collapse. And if there is fierce resistance, it is quite possible to snatch victory.”1 Based on this, he insisted on canceling the order to retreat and took measures to strengthen the Sarykamysh garrison, which at that time consisted of only two militia squads and two reserve battalions. In fact, these “paramilitary” formations had to withstand the first onslaught of the 10th Turkish Army Corps. And they withstood it and repelled it. The Turkish offensive on Sarykamysh began on December 13. Despite their multiple superiority, the Turks never managed to capture the city. And by December 15, the Sarykamysh garrison was strengthened and already numbered more than 22 battalions, 8 hundreds, 78 machine guns and 34 guns.

The situation for the Turkish troops was also complicated by weather conditions. Having failed to take Sarykamysh and provide its troops with winter quarters, the Turkish corps in the snowy mountains lost only about 10 thousand people to frostbite.

On December 17, Russian troops launched a counteroffensive and pushed Turkish troops back from Sarykamysh. On December 22, the 9th Turkish Corps was completely surrounded, and on December 25, the new commander of the Caucasian Army, General N.N. Yudenich gave the order to launch a counteroffensive. Having thrown back the remnants of the 3rd Army by 30-40 km by January 5, 1915, the Russian troops stopped the pursuit, which was carried out in 20-30 degree frost. Enver Pasha's troops lost about 78 thousand people killed, frozen, wounded and prisoners. (over 80% of the composition). The losses of Russian troops amounted to 26 thousand people. (killed, wounded, frostbitten).

The significance of this operation was that it actually stopped Turkish aggression in Transcaucasia and strengthened the position of the Caucasian Army in Eastern Anatolia of Turkey.

Another significant event of 1915 was the Alashkert defensive operation (July-August) of the Caucasian Army.

In an effort to take revenge for the defeat at Sarykamysh, the Turkish command concentrated a strong strike force in this direction as part of the newly formed 3rd Field Army under the command of General Kiamil Pasha. Its task was to encircle units of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps (Infantry General P.I. Oganovsky) in a difficult and deserted area north of Lake Van, destroy it, and then launch an offensive on Kars to cut off the communications of the Russian troops and force them to retreat. The superiority of the Turkish troops in manpower was almost twofold. It was also important that the Turkish offensive operation took place simultaneously with the offensive of the Austro-German troops on the Eastern (Russian) Front, which excluded the possibility of providing any assistance to the Caucasian army.

However, the calculations of Turkish strategists did not come true. In an effort to destroy units of the 4th Caucasian Corps as quickly as possible, the Turkish command exposed its flanks, which N.N. took advantage of. Yudenich, planning a counteroffensive in these areas.

It began with a counterattack on July 9, 1915 by a detachment of Lieutenant General N.N. Baratov to the flank and rear of the 3rd Turkish Army. A day later, the main forces of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps went on the offensive. Turkish troops, fearing an encirclement, began to retreat, gaining a foothold on the Buluk-Bashi, Ercis line, 70 kilometers east of the strategically important city of Erzurum.

Thus, as a result of the operation, the enemy’s plan to destroy the 4th Caucasian Army Corps and break through to Kars failed. Russian troops retained most of the territory they occupied. At the same time, the most important significance of the results of the Alashkert operation was that after it the Turks finally lost the strategic initiative in the Caucasian direction and went on the defensive.

During the same period (second half of 1915), hostilities spread to the territory of Persia, which, although it declared its neutrality, at the same time did not have the ability to ensure it. Therefore, the neutrality of Persia, despite the fact that it was recognized by all the warring parties, was widely ignored by them. The most active in terms of involving Persia in the war was the Turkish leadership, which sought to use the commonality of ethno-confessional factors to launch a “jihad” against Russia on Persian territory in order to create a direct threat to the Baku oil-bearing region, which is strategically important for Russia.

In order to prevent Persia from joining Turkey in October-December 1915, the command of the Caucasian Army planned and successfully carried out the Hamadan Operation, during which the pro-Turkish Persian armed forces were defeated and the territory of Northern Persia was taken under control. Thus, the security of both the left flank of the Caucasian Army and the Baku region was ensured.

At the end of 1915, the situation on the Caucasian front became significantly more complicated, and, paradoxically, through the fault of Russia's allies - Great Britain and France. Concerned about its successes in Eastern Anatolia, which threatened all the vital regions of Turkey right up to Istanbul, Russia’s allies decided to conduct an amphibious operation to take control of both the capital of Turkey and its Black Sea straits. The operation was called the Dardanelles (Gallipolis) operation. It is noteworthy that the initiator of its implementation was none other than W. Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty of Britain).

To implement it, the Allies concentrated 60 ships and more than 100 thousand personnel. At the same time, British, Australian, New Zealand, Indian and French troops took part in the land operation to land troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The operation began on February 19 and ended in August 1915 with the defeat of the Entente forces. British losses amounted to about 119.7 thousand people, France - 26.5 thousand people. Although the losses of the Turkish troops were more significant - 186 thousand people, they compensated for the victory they won. The result of the Dardanelles operation was the strengthening of the positions of Germany and Turkey in the Balkans, the entry of Bulgaria into the war on their side, as well as the government crisis in Britain, as a result of which W. Churchill, as its initiator, was forced to resign.

After the victory in the Dardanelles operation, the Turkish command planned to transfer the most combat-ready units from Gallipoli to the Caucasian front. But N.N. Yudenich got ahead of this maneuver by conducting the Erzurum and Trebizond operations. In them, Russian troops achieved their greatest success on the Caucasian front.

The goal of these operations was to capture the Erzurum fortress and the port of Trebizond, the main bases of Turkish troops in the Caucasus direction. Here, the 3rd Turkish Army of Kiamil Pasha (about 100 thousand people) acted against the Caucasian Army (103 thousand people).

On December 28, 1915, the 2nd Turkestan (General M.A. Przhevalsky) and 1st Caucasian (General P.P. Kalitin) army corps launched an attack on Erzurum. The offensive took place in snow-capped mountains with strong winds and frost. Nevertheless, despite the difficult natural and climatic conditions, Russian troops broke through the Turkish front and on January 8 reached the approaches to Erzurum. The assault on this heavily fortified Turkish fortress in conditions of severe cold and snow drifts, in the absence of siege artillery, was fraught with great risk. Even the Tsar’s governor in the Caucasus, Nikolai Nikolaevich Jr., was opposed to its implementation. However, the commander of the Caucasian Army, General N.N. Yudenich nevertheless decided to continue the operation, taking full responsibility for its implementation. On the evening of January 29, the assault on the Erzurum positions began. After five days of fierce fighting, Russian troops broke into Erzerum, and then began the pursuit of Turkish troops, which lasted until February 18. At a distance of about 70-100 km west of Erzurum, Russian troops stopped, having advanced generally into Turkish territory by more than 150 km from the state border.

The success of this operation was also greatly facilitated by large-scale disinformation of the enemy. At the direction of N.N. Yudenich, a rumor was spread among the troops about preparations for an attack on Erzurum only in the spring of 1916. At the same time, officers began to be given leave, and officers' wives were allowed to arrive at army locations. The 4th Division was removed from the front and sent to Persia in order to convince the enemy that the next offensive was being prepared in the Baghdad direction. All this was so convincing that the commander of the 3rd Turkish Army left the troops and went to Istanbul. Measures were also taken to secretly concentrate troops.

The very offensive of the Russian troops began on the eve of the New Year and Christmas holidays (December 28), which the Turks did not expect, and therefore were unable to provide adequate resistance.

In other words, the success of the operation was largely due to the highest level of military-strategic art of General N.N. Yudenich, as well as the courage, stamina and desire for victory of the soldiers of his Caucasian army. All this in combination predetermined the successful outcome of the Erzurum operation, which even the Tsar’s viceroy in the Caucasus did not believe in.

The capture of Erzurum and, in general, the entire offensive operation of the Caucasian Army in the winter campaign of 1916 were of extremely important military-strategic significance. The road deep into Asia Minor was actually open to Russian troops, since Erzurum was the last Turkish fortress on the way to Istanbul. This, in turn, forced the Turkish command to hastily transfer reinforcements from other directions to the Caucasian front. And it was precisely thanks to the successes of the Russian troops that, for example, the Turkish operation in the Suez Canal area was abandoned, and the British expeditionary army in Mesopotamia received greater freedom of action.

In addition, the victory at Erzurum was of extremely important military and political significance for Russia. Extremely interested in active hostilities on the Russian front, Russia’s allies literally “meeted” her wishes on all issues related to the post-war world order. This is evidenced, at least, by the provisions of the Anglo-Franco-Russian Agreement concluded on March 4, 1916 on the “goals of Russia’s war in Asia Minor,” which provided for the transfer to the jurisdiction of Russia of the region of Constantinople and the straits, as well as the northern part of Turkish Armenia. In turn, Russia recognized the right of England to occupy the neutral zone of Persia. In addition, the Entente powers took away the “Holy Places” (Palestine) from Turkey.

The logical continuation of the Erzurum operation was the Trebizond operation (January 23 - April 5, 1916). The importance of Trebizond was determined by the fact that it was through it that the 3rd Turkish field army was supplied, so taking it under control greatly complicated the actions of Turkish troops throughout the region. Awareness of the significance of the upcoming operation took place even at the level of the highest military-political leadership of Russia: both the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Nicholas II, and his Headquarters. This obviously explains the unprecedented case of the First World War, when troops were not taken from the Caucasus to the Austro-German front, but, on the contrary, they were sent here. We are talking in particular about two Kuban Plastun brigades sent from Novorossiysk to the area of ​​the upcoming operation in early April 1916. And although the operation itself began at the end of January with the bombing of Turkish positions by the Black Sea Fleet, it was with their arrival that its active phase actually began, ending with the capture of Trebizond on April 5.

As a result of the success of the Trebizond operation, the shortest connection between the Turkish 3rd Army and Istanbul was interrupted. The Black Sea Fleet light forces base and supply base organized by the Russian command in Trebizond significantly strengthened the position of the Caucasian Army. At the same time, Russian military art was enriched by the experience of organizing joint actions of the army and navy in the coastal direction.

At the same time, it should be noted that not all military operations of the Caucasian Army were as successful as those described above. We are talking in particular about the Kerind-Kasreshira operation, within the framework of which the 1st Caucasian Separate Corps of General N.N. Baratov (about 20 thousand people) carried out a campaign from Iran to Mesopotamia with the aim of rescuing the English detachment of General Townsend (more than 10 thousand people), besieged by the Turks in Kut el-Amar (southeast of Baghdad).

The campaign took place from April 5 to May 9, 1916. Building N.N. Baratov occupied a number of Persian cities and entered Mesopotamia. However, this difficult and dangerous campaign through the desert lost its meaning, since already on April 13, the English garrison in Kut el-Amar capitulated, after which the command of the 6th Turkish Army sent its main forces against the 1st Caucasian Separate Corps itself. time already greatly thinned out (mainly from diseases). Near the city of Haneken (150 km northeast of Baghdad), an unsuccessful battle took place for the Russian troops, after which the corps of N.N. Baratova left the occupied cities and retreated to Hamadan. East of this Iranian city, the Turkish offensive was stopped.

Directly in the Turkish direction of the Caucasian Front, the actions of Russian troops were more successful. Thus, in June-August 1916, the Erzrincan operation was carried out. It is noteworthy that, just like at Sarykamysh and Alashkert, active hostilities were started by the Turkish side, which sought to take revenge for the defeat at Erzurum and Trebizond. By this time, the Turkish command had transferred up to 10 divisions from Gallipoli to the Caucasian front, bringing the number of its troops on the Caucasian front again to more than 250 thousand people in two armies: the 3rd and 2nd. It is noteworthy that the troops of the 2nd Army are the winners of the Anglo-French in the Dardanelles.

The operation itself began on May 18 with the launch of the 3rd Turkish Field Army, reinforced by Dardanelles units, on the offensive in the Erzurum direction.

In oncoming battles, the Caucasian riflemen managed to wear down the enemy, preventing the enemy from approaching Erzurum. The scale of the fighting expanded, and both sides introduced more and more new forces into the unfolding battle. After an appropriate regrouping, on June 13, the entire Turkish 3rd Army went on the offensive on Trebizond and Erzurum.

During the battles, Turkish troops managed to wedge themselves into the junction between the 5th Caucasian (Lieutenant General V.A. Yablochkin) and 2nd Turkestan (Lieutenant General M.A. Przhevalsky) corps, but they were unable to develop this breakthrough, because the 19th Turkestan Regiment under the command of Colonel B.N. stood in their way as an “iron wall”. Litvinova. For two days the regiment resisted the attack of two enemy divisions2.

With their steadfastness, the soldiers and officers of this regiment provided N.N. Yudenich has the opportunity to regroup his forces and launch a counteroffensive.

On June 23, the troops of the 1st Caucasian Corps of General P.P. Kalitin, with the support of mounted Cossack regiments, launched a counterattack in the Mamakhatun direction. In the oncoming battles that ensued along the entire Erzurum front, the Turkish reserves were crushed and the spirit of the troops was broken.

On July 1, the troops of the Caucasian Army launched a general offensive along the entire front from the Black Sea coast to the Erzurum direction. By July 3, the 2nd Turkestan Corps occupied Bayburt, and the 1st Caucasian Corps overthrew the enemy across the river. Northern Euphrates. In the period from July 6 to July 20, a large-scale counteroffensive of the Caucasian Army took place, during which the 3rd Turkish Army was again defeated, losing more than seventeen thousand people only as prisoners. On July 12, Russian troops broke into Erzincan, the last major Turkish city up to Ankara.

Having been defeated near Erzincan, the Turkish command entrusted the task of returning Erzerum to the newly formed 2nd Army under the command of Ahmet Izet Pasha (120 thousand people).

On July 23, the 2nd Turkish Army went on the offensive in the Ognotic direction, where the 4th Caucasian Corps of General V.V. de Witt, thereby starting the Ognot operation.

The advancing Turkish troops managed to fetter the actions of the 1st Caucasian Corps, attacking the 4th Caucasian Corps with their main forces. On July 23, the Russians left Bitlis, and two days later the Turks reached the state border. At the same time, fighting began in Persia. An extremely difficult situation has arisen for the Caucasian Army. According to, for example, the historian of the Russian army A.A. Kersnovsky A.A., “since the time of Sarykamysh, this was the most serious crisis of the Caucasian Front”3.

The outcome of the battle was decided by a counterattack planned by N.N. Yudenich to the flank of the 2nd Turkish Army. In the battles of August 4-11, the counterattack was crowned with complete success: the enemy was overturned on his right flank and thrown back to the Euphrates. On August 19, the 2nd Turkish Army, with its last effort, once again broke through the Russian front, but there was no longer enough strength to develop the success. Until August 29, oncoming battles took place in the Erzurum and Ognot directions, interspersed with constant counterattacks by the sides.

Thus, N.N. Yudenich once again wrested the initiative from the enemy, forcing him to switch to defensive actions and refuse to continue the offensive and thereby achieve success in the entire operation.

The military campaign of 1916 was completed with success in the Ognotic operation. Its results exceeded all the expectations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command; the Caucasian Army seriously advanced deep into the Ottoman Empire, defeated the enemy in a number of battles, and captured the most important and largest cities in the region - Erzurum, Trebizond, Van and Erzincan. The Turkish summer offensive was thwarted during the Erzincan and Ognot operations. The main task of the army, which was set at the beginning of the First World War, was solved - Transcaucasia was reliably protected. In the occupied territories, a temporary General Government of Turkish Armenia was established, directly subordinate to the command of the Caucasian Army.

By the beginning of September 1916, the Caucasian front had stabilized at the line of Elleu, Erzincan, Ognot, Bitlis and Lake Van. Both sides have exhausted their offensive capabilities.

The Turkish troops, having been defeated in all battles on the Caucasian front and having lost more than 300 thousand soldiers and officers in them, were incapable of any active combat operations, especially offensive ones.

The Caucasian Army, cut off from supply bases and stationed in a mountainous, treeless area, had problems with sanitary losses exceeding combat losses. The army needed both replenishment of personnel, ammunition, food and fodder, and basic rest.

Therefore, active hostilities were planned only in 1917. By this time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to conduct a landing operation against Istanbul. The basis for this was given not only by the successes of the army of General N.N. on the Caucasian front. Yudenich, but also the undivided supremacy of the Black Sea Fleet at sea under the command of Vice Admiral A.V. Kolchak.

Corrections to these plans were made first by the February and then by the October Revolutions of 1917. By focusing attention on the Austro-German front and providing all possible assistance to the allies, the tsarist government missed the development of crisis processes within the country. These processes were caused not so much by the deteriorating economic situation as by the intensification of the struggle between various political groupings at the highest level of state power, as well as the decline in the authority of the tsar himself and his family, who surrounded themselves with various kinds of crooks and opportunists.

All this, against the backdrop of unsuccessful operations of the Russian armies on the Austro-German front, led to an acute political crisis that ended with the February Revolution. Demagogues and populists came to power in the country in the person of the Provisional Government led by A.F. Kerensky and the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (N.S. Chkheidze, L.D. Trotsky, G.E. Zinoviev). The latter, for example, was responsible for the adoption of the notorious Order No. 1, which marked the beginning of the disintegration of the Russian army at the front. Along with other populist measures, the order provided for the actual abolition of unity of command in the active army (“democratization of the army”), which led to increasing anarchy in the form of soldiers refusing to go on the offensive and lynchings of officers; In addition, there was a colossal increase in desertion.

The Provisional Government also did not perform well, taking the position of, on the one hand, flirting with revolutionary-minded soldiers at the front, and on the other, continuing the war.

All this caused chaos and unrest among the troops, including the Caucasian Front. During 1917, the Caucasian army gradually disintegrated, soldiers deserted, going home, and by the end of the year the Caucasian front was completely collapsed.

General N.N. Yudenich, appointed during this period as commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front, created on the basis of the Caucasian Army, continued offensive operations against the Turks, but difficulties with supplying troops, a decline in discipline under the influence of revolutionary agitation and an increase in the incidence of malaria forced him to stop the last operation on the Caucasian Front - the Mesopotamian one - and withdraw troops to mountainous areas.

Having refused to carry out the order of the Provisional Government to resume the offensive, on May 31, 1917, he was removed from command of the front “for resisting the instructions” of the Provisional Government, and handed over command to Infantry General M.A. Przhevalsky and transferred to the disposal of the Minister of War.

The war with Turkey for Russia ended with the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, which meant the formal cessation of the existence of the Caucasian Front and the possibility of returning to their homeland for all Russian troops still remaining in Turkey and Persia.

The further fate of both the Caucasian Army and its legendary commander, General N.N. Yudenich were tragic.

N.N. Yudenich, having led the White movement in the North-West of Russia and, accordingly, the North-Western Army in September-October 1919, was on the outskirts of Petrograd. Having failed to take Petrograd and betrayed by the allies, he was arrested by independent Estonian authorities and released only after the intervention of the leadership of the French and English missions. The subsequent years of his life were associated with emigration to France.

The Caucasian army, abandoned to the mercy of fate by the government of the country, which by that time had already become Soviet, was forced to independently reach Russia through the territory of the newly formed “democratic” states (Georgia and Azerbaijan). Along the way, army units and formations were subjected to looting and violence.

Subsequently, democratic states paid dearly for the fact that they lost the guarantee of their security in the person of the Caucasian Army, being subjected to actual occupation by Turkey and Germany, and then Great Britain. She paid dearly for the betrayal of her army, including the Caucasian and Soviet Russia. Having adopted the inherently criminal slogan “transform the imperialist war into a civil war,” the country once again, in the words of K. Clausewitz, began to defeat itself.

In this regard, one cannot but agree with the words of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin that victory was stolen from Russia in the First World War. In our opinion, it was stolen not only by Russia’s allies, who traditionally treated it fraudulently, but also by the United States, which entered the war when its outcome was already virtually predetermined. It was also stolen by the degraded political elite of the country, which was unable to take measures to strengthen statehood during the period of its most acute crisis, as well as by democratically advanced counter-elites, who put the interests of achieving power and personal well-being above the state ones.

Bocharnikov Igor Valentinovich

1 — Oskin M.V. “History of the First World War”, M., “Veche”, 2014, p. 157-163.

2 - The fierceness of the fighting is evidenced by the fact that out of 60 officers and 3,200 soldiers, the regiment's losses amounted to 43 officers and 2,069 soldiers. At the same time, the advancing Turkish units and formations lost about 6 thousand people. In hand-to-hand combat, even the commander of the 10th Turkish division was raised by soldiers of the 19th Turkestan Regiment.

3 - Kersnovsky A.A. “History of the Russian Army”, M., 1994, vol. 4, p. 158.

Bibliography:

Bocharnikov I.V. Military-political interests of Russia in Transcaucasia: historical experience and modern practice of implementation. Diss. ...candidate of political science Sci. M: VU, 1996.
Kersnovsky A.A. “History of the Russian Army”, M., 1994, vol. 4, p. 158.
Korsun N. G. The First World War on the Caucasian Front, M., 1946.
Novikov N.V. Fleet operations against the shore on the Black Sea in 1914 - 1917, 2nd ed., M., 1937.
Oskin M.V. History of the First World War. M.: “Veche”, 2014. P. 157 ‒ 163.

Caucasian Front 1914-1915

"October 21 and 22. It was daytime. A cold, strong autumn wind was blowing, and somehow my soul felt heavy in Turkey, which seemed inhospitable at first glance. On the road beyond Chingil, we came across the corpses of Kurds.
Then I met a lot of Armenian fugitives from the city of Bayazet, which was taken by ours on October 22. Then a small party of Armenian volunteers proceeded to Bayazet from Russia. The soldiers saw them off shouting “Hurray.”
Everyone was aware of the present important moment, and some kind of unity was felt between the Russian army and the Armenian people, who had been tortured by the Turks and Kurds for centuries.
And now the moment comes when this tormented people must be liberated and saved from death, the entire Armenian people awaits liberation from the centuries-old oppression and tyranny of the Kurds.
Everyone’s eyes are turned to the savior of all Slavs and their protector, Great Russia, which has already risen as one man for the brothers, for the honor and dignity of our Motherland.
In turn, the Armenian people want to provide all possible assistance to her in this holy cause. God bless us.

November 7 At 7 o’clock in the morning we passed the village of Chelkany, and an hour later we approached the pass, where we met Pevnev’s detachment. Our task was to shoot down the enemy and occupy the pass.
The fifth and eighth companies were assigned to the chain. By 12 noon we came under enemy fire for the first time.
The Turks retreated with shouts and noise under our friendly onslaught and occupied the very heights of the pass. From their side, shouts of “Alga” (meaning “forward”) were heard.
But seeing our energetic advance, they began to retreat from the heights.
The 8th company occupied the highest mountain, where they spent the night. And the Turks retreated from the pass to the village of Khanyk. Our offensive was very difficult, all over mountainous terrain.

November 9 They set out from Aushtu to the pass and, together with the Plastuns, were supposed to occupy the villages of Khanyk and Sevik closest to the pass. Our company was assigned to the regimental banner.
The battle soon began, we were in reserve with the banner. Apparently the Turks were shooting with great aim and many bullets were flying over us. Here the horse of the machine gun team was killed and a soldier of the same team was wounded. We had two non-commissioned officers and six privates wounded.
In this battle, the Turks were defeated and retreated in disorder to the villages of Derik, Suverti and Rutany. After darkness fell, the battle stopped and the 8th company was assigned guard duty to the left of the pass to Sevik.

November 14 At Kara-Kilis, two more battalions of the Grozny regiment approached us for reinforcement. We went on the offensive again, with battalions of the 2nd regiment in the front line. The battle began at 1 o'clock in the afternoon.
The enemy opened heavy fire on our lines.
Now the regiment commander ordered the 8th company to scatter in a chain for support. The enemy could not resist our onslaught and gradually began to retreat. There were guns on both sides.
But the Turkish shells were accurate, but did not explode, and therefore there were very few losses. By evening the Turks retreated.
As dusk fell, hunters were called to occupy Khanyk. Under the command of the Regimental Adjutant Lieutenant Zaitsev, the hunters headed to Khanyk and occupied it and took two guns.
After this, the entire detachment entered Khanyk. Obviously, the Turks did not expect our strong raid and were taken by surprise, locked themselves in houses and opened fire from there, but it cost them dearly.
Here we gave them such a brawl that they probably never dreamed of... those who ran out or resisted were pinned with bayonets or the Cossacks overtook them and chopped them down with sabers.
Many Turks had their sleeves rolled up and their hands covered in flour and dough, apparently busy baking pita bread...
We ate delicious lavash... But then about two hundred of them surrendered. Many of them also managed to escape, which was favored by the dark night.
Among those who fled, as the captured Arab artillery captain said, was the head of the Turkish detachment, Huseyn Pasha. And so we spent the night in Khanyk.
In this battle, only 4 people in the 8th company were wounded. The captured Turks turned out to be the majority of Arabs, who had been traveling here for about three months from Baghdad and other distant provinces of Turkey; all of them were sent to Kara-Kilisa the next day...

November 16 at 8 o'clock in the morning our detachment set out from Dutakh. The 8th company was assigned a stop in Derik, where we arrived at 1 o'clock in the afternoon.
There was a party of Kurds here, and those taken by surprise opened heavy fire on us, but they were all killed. There were up to 50 people.

January 5, 1915 At 8:30 we set out and spent the night in Bushen. Three hours of the day have passed in Kara-Kilisa, destroyed buildings and those burned by the Kurds during their retreat are visible everywhere.
On the way we met several corpses of Armenian women killed by barbarian Kurds.
Apparently the Kurds and Turks did not expect our rapid advance and in every house there were traces of the presence of the Turks, or many different food supplies and even their own belongings were left.

6th January, Baptism. We got up at about 7.30 am. We drank tea. We ate breakfast prepared in the camp kitchen. And everyone was busy talking and joking.
Around 11 o'clock in the afternoon, the Cossacks brought in 13 captured Turks, captured by the Cossacks as they retreated to the pass.
Our officers let them smoke, questioned them, and apparently the Turks were pleased with the chance that they were captured. From the 6th to the 13th we stayed in Bushek.

February 8 In the morning a double gig rolled up and brought 97 parcels for the soldiers to our company. I am overjoyed and received all four of my parcels in perfect condition.
Three were from Novocherkassk, from our own, and one was from Sulina, from Artem.
For the first time in 5 months, I happily snacked on delicious smoked sausage, caviar, cheese, and more. The supply of snacks will probably be enough for me for a month and the rich crackers that my mother and wife themselves prepared.
The enemy was completely confused, and, seeing that he was already surrounded, began to throw away his equipment and ammunition. We pursued him vigorously. Several times the enemy, suffering losses from our fire, stopped, gathering in groups, wanting to surrender. But the fire of machine guns operating on them from the direction of the villages. Shadian forced them to move on.
Along the path of our advance there were many wounded and killed Turks. In front of them, three Turks were captured by the company's men. Then at the stream flowing northeast of the village. Zeidekan, the head of the company overtook the tail of the enemy column and captured up to 50 Turks here.
Continuing to pursue, we overtook him north of the village. Zeidekan, where, together with the people of the 50th company of our regiment, they surrounded him. One of our companies captured about 180 people with 2 officers.
In addition, other companies captured many more Turks with 5 officers and 1 wounded colonel.
There were no losses in our company in this battle. There were losses, but few, in other companies, no more than 25-30 people with wounded. The corpses of the enemy were strewn along all the slopes and battlefields.

When the Turkish artillery noticed that they were being bypassed, they hastened to sneak away, abandoning the carts and so on and taking only the bodies from the guns on their packs. Many Turks managed to escape to the mountains earlier.
Towards the end of the battle, many were overtaken by our Cossacks Labintsy and taken prisoner, and those who resisted were sent to Mohammed, having previously been cut into several parts.
This time we were dealing not with the Kurds, but with selected Turkish rifle regiments that were sent here from Constantinople. It was the 32nd Constantinople Infantry Regiment.
But we are not afraid of any of their units and we will always be able to cope, and we will show the Turks what a Russian soldier is.
There were many wounded Turks lying on the battlefield, but now our orderlies began bandaging them, and each of us helped alleviate the lot of the wounded. All the wounded were brought on stretchers to the first dressing station and about 400 prisoners were escorted by our 8th company to the village of Chelkany, where they were handed over to the Chief of the Garrison and we returned to Kala at 4 o’clock. morning.
On this day we had to walk there and back at least 35 miles. After this, for another 2 days our units located in Zeidekan removed the corpses of the killed Turks. The rest of them, fleeing back, on the third day came across our Sarakamysh detachment, which took some of them prisoner and killed others.

10 and 11- rested. By the evening of this day, March 20, the ensign returned, brought parcels for the soldiers and brought 10 pieces of ham for himself and me. French rolls, a jar of condensed cream with chocolate, Dutch cheese, smoked sausage and butter. All this was bought for double the price, because it was brought from Erivan along impossibly bad roads and dirt.

March 22, 1915 Sunday. Today is Easter! Christ is risen! At about 8 o'clock they lined us up and came to the company to congratulate the temporary commander. Company Commander, Warrant Officer Marine, after congratulations, we sang the company Christ Risen! Many shed tears and a sad voice rang out throughout the village... We also congratulated each other. At 8 o'clock. Lunch was distributed and by 9 o'clock in the morning they were already lined up to go to the pass.

On May 5th, the regiment sent one 2-row accordion from the Adler company and one tambourine for all companies, for entertainment and play in their free time, there were also players.
In the evenings, large groups of soldiers are already noticeable, where they are happily playing the accordion and there are many people who like to dance.
There was a lot of dancing, and in some places some people sang along to the songs. And so, the harmonies that emerged brought joy and entertainment into the environment of our monotonous combat life.

All L. [...], where we became a bivouac, lived Armenian refugees from [...] Melazgert. Everyone suffered greatly and went bankrupt. Here the soldiers bought milk from them, they all look at us with hidden joy and harbor hope for their future salvation. Everyone is ready to provide whatever service they can.
By 8 o'clock our battalion was already getting ready to move on. The head of the division, Lieutenant General Varopanov, gathered us around him and said a few words. He thanked us for our efforts and distinctions, then said that he was sending us to avenge our injured comrades from the 4th battalion, who had a battle with three large forces of the Turks, lost their battalion commander Captain Nikitin and three more officers and about 140 lower ranks .

June 15th At exactly 8 o'clock we moved towards the enemy positions in battle formation. Amazing terrain, always mountains, one higher than the other, and steep gorges and rocks.
The enemy occupied the farthest highest peaks. Our task was to shoot down the Turks and occupy the city of Ahlat, on the shores of Lake Van.
Everyone rode and walked in silence, anxiously crossing themselves on the road. Yes, and there was something to be silent and pray. After all, glory awaited many and heroic death awaited many.
But they walked cheerfully and boldly, realizing the importance of the moment, and the words of our Beginning. divisions.
It was necessary to take revenge and knock out the enemy. Behind the cavalry and infantry were stretchers on gigs with horses from the infirmary of the 66th Infantry Division.
We had mountain and cavalry artillery and machine guns with us." - from the diary of a non-commissioned officer, company clerk of the 8th company of the 1st Akhulchinsky Infantry Regiment, A.S. Arutyunov.

On September 9, the Turkish government announced to all powers that it had decided to abolish the capitulation regime (the special legal status of foreign citizens).

However, most members of the Turkish government, including the Grand Vizier, still opposed the war. Then War Minister Enver Pasha, together with the German command, started the war without the consent of the rest of the government, presenting the country with a fait accompli. On October 16, the Turkish cruiser Hamidiye approached Novorossiysk. Stopping near the city, the cruiser lowered a boat, on which two Turkish naval officers arrived in Novorossiysk. They demanded that the local authorities surrender the city and transfer to them all government funds and all treasury property. After hearing this demand, the local authorities arrested both Turkish officers and sent them to prison. Without waiting for the officers to return, the cruiser "Gamidiye" weighed anchor and left. Several shots from a Turkish destroyer that arrived later sank the Russian ship Nikolai in the port. Oil tanks on the shore were damaged and caught fire. On October 29 and 30, 1914, the Turkish fleet shelled Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk (in Russia this event received the unofficial name “Sevastopol Reveille”). On November 2, 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey. England and France followed on November 5 and 6. Thus, the Caucasian Front emerged between Russia and Turkey in the Asian theater of operations.

The martial art of the generals of the Ottoman army and its organization were inferior in level to the Entente, but military operations on the Caucasian front were able to divert some of the Russian forces from the fronts in Poland and Galicia and ensure the victory of the German army, even at the cost of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. It was for this purpose that Germany provided the Turkish army with the military-technical resources necessary for waging war, and the Ottoman Empire provided its human resources by deploying the 3rd Army on the Russian front, which at the initial stage was headed by the Minister of War Enver Pasha himself (Chief of Staff - German General F. Bronzart von Schellendorff). The 3rd Army, numbering about 100 infantry battalions, 35 cavalry squadrons and up to 250 guns, occupied positions from the Black Sea coast to Mosul, with the bulk of the forces concentrated on the left flank against the Russian Caucasian Army.

For Russia, the Caucasus theater of war was secondary compared to the Western Front - however, Russia should have been wary of Turkish attempts to regain control of the Kars fortress and the port of Batumi, which Turkey had lost in the late 1870s. Military operations on the Caucasian front took place mainly on the territory of Western Armenia, as well as Persia.

The war in the Caucasus theater of operations was fought by both sides in extremely difficult conditions for supplying troops - the mountainous terrain and lack of communications, especially railways, increased the importance of control over the Black Sea ports in this area (primarily Batum and Trabzon.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Caucasian Army was dispersed into two groups in accordance with two main operational directions:

• Kara direction (Kars - Erzurum) - approx. 6 divisions in the Olta - Sarykamysh area,
• Erivan direction (Erivan - Alashkert) - approx. 2 divisions and cavalry in the Igdir area.

The flanks were covered by small independent detachments of border guards, Cossacks and militia: the right flank was directed along the Black Sea coast to Batum, and the left was against the Kurdish areas, where, with the announcement of mobilization, the Turks began to form Kurdish irregular cavalry.

With the outbreak of the First World War, the Armenian volunteer movement developed in Transcaucasia. The Armenians pinned certain hopes on this war, counting on the liberation of Western Armenia with the help of Russian weapons. Therefore, Armenian socio-political forces and national parties declared this war just and declared unconditional support for the Entente. The Turkish leadership, for its part, tried to attract Western Armenians to its side and invited them to create volunteer detachments as part of the Turkish army and persuade the Eastern Armenians to jointly act against Russia. These plans, however, were not destined to come true.

The creation of Armenian squads (volunteer detachments) was carried out by the Armenian National Bureau in Tiflis. The total number of Armenian volunteers amounted to 25 thousand people under the command of well-known leaders of the Armenian national movement in Western Armenia. The first four volunteer detachments joined the ranks of the active army in various sectors of the Caucasian Front already in November 1914. Armenian volunteers distinguished themselves in the battles for Van, Dilman, Bitlis, Mush, Erzerum and other cities of Western Armenia. late 1915 - early 1916 The Armenian volunteer detachments were disbanded, and on their basis, rifle battalions were created within the Russian units, which participated in hostilities until the end of the war.

1914

Positions of the Russian army near Sarykamysh 1914

In November 1914, the Russian army, having crossed the Turkish border, launched an offensive in a zone of up to 350 km, but, encountering enemy resistance, was forced to go on the defensive.

At the same time, Turkish troops invaded Russian territory. On November 5 (18), 1914, Russian troops left the city of Artvin and retreated towards Batum. With the assistance of the Adjarians who rebelled against the Russian authorities, the entire Batumi region came under the control of Turkish troops, with the exception of the Mikhailovsky Fortress (fortress area) and the Upper Adjarian section of the Batumi district, as well as the city of Ardagan in the Kars region and a significant part of the Ardagan district. In the occupied territories, the Turks, with the assistance of the Adjarians, carried out massacres of the Armenian and Greek populations.

In December 1914 - January 1915, during the Sarykamysh operation, the Russian Caucasian Army stopped the advance of the 3rd Turkish Army under the command of Enver Pasha on Kars, and then completely defeated them.

1915

Russian airplane in the back of a truck on the Caucasian front

Since January, in connection with the removal of A.Z. Myshlaevsky, N.N. Yudenich took command.

In February-April 1915, the Russian and Turkish armies were reorganizing. The battles were local in nature. By the end of March, the Russian army cleared southern Adjara and the entire Batumi region of the Turks.

The Russian army had the task of ousting the Turks from the Batum area and conducting an offensive in Persia. The Turkish army, fulfilling the plan of the German-Turkish command to launch “jihad” (the holy war of Muslims against infidels), sought to involve Persia and Afghanistan in an open attack against Russia and England and, by attacking in the Erivan direction, achieve the separation of the Baku oil-bearing region from Russia.

At the end of April, cavalry units of the Turkish army invaded Iran.

Anti-Armenian propaganda unfolded in Turkey. Western Armenians were accused of mass desertion from the Turkish army, of organizing sabotage and uprisings in the rear of Turkish troops. About 60 thousand Armenians, drafted into the Turkish army at the beginning of the war, were subsequently disarmed, sent to work in the rear, and then destroyed. On April 24, 1915, the Armenian Genocide, organized by the Ottoman government, began - the destruction of the civilian Western Armenian population. To counter the policy of extermination and with the participation of the Armenian intelligentsia, in a number of places the Armenians organized successful self-defense, providing organized armed resistance to the Turks. In particular, a Turkish division was sent to suppress self-defense in the city of Van, which lasted from April 20 to May 19, blockading the city.

Armenians who defended Van before the arrival of the Russian army

To help the rebels, the 4th Caucasian Army Corps of the Russian Army went on the offensive. The Turks retreated, and important settlements were captured by the Russian army. Russian troops cleared a vast territory from the Turks, advancing 100 km. The fighting in this area went down in history under the name of Van self-defense. The arrival of Russian troops on May 19 saved thousands of Armenians from imminent death, who, after the temporary withdrawal of Russian troops on July 31, moved to Eastern Armenia.

In July, Russian troops repelled the offensive of Turkish troops in the area of ​​Lake Van.

During the Alashkert operation (July-August 1915), Russian troops defeated the enemy, thwarted the offensive planned by the Turkish command in the Kara direction and facilitated the actions of British troops in Mesopotamia.

In the second half of the year, fighting spread to Persian territory.

In October-December 1915, the commander of the Caucasian Army, General Yudenich, carried out the successful Hamadan operation, which prevented Persia from entering the war on the side of Germany. On October 30, Russian troops landed in the port of Anzali (Persia), by the end of December they defeated pro-Turkish armed forces and took control of the territory of Northern Persia, securing the left flank of the Caucasian army.

1916

A captured Turkish gun in Erzurum taken by Russian troops. Beginning 1916

The Turkish command did not have a clear war plan for 1916; Enver Pasha even suggested that the German command transfer Turkish troops liberated after the Dardanelles operation to the Isonzo or Galicia. The actions of the Russian army resulted in two main operations: Erzurum, Trebizond, and further advancement to the west, deep into the Ottoman Empire.

An ancient Armenian temple, turned into an arsenal by the Turks. Erzurum, 1916

In December 1915 - February 1916. The Russian army carried out a successful Erzurum offensive operation, as a result of which on January 20 (February 2) Russian troops approached Erzurum. The assault on the fortress began on January 29 (February 11). On February 3 (16), Erzurum was taken, the Turkish garrison retreated, losing up to 70% of its personnel and almost all its artillery. The pursuit of the retreating Turkish troops continued until the front line stabilized 70-100 km west of Erzurum.

The actions of Russian troops in other directions were also successful: Russian troops approached Trabzon (Trebizond), the most important Turkish port, and won the battle of Bitlis. The spring thaw did not allow the Russian troops to completely defeat the Turkish army retreating from Erzurum, but spring comes earlier on the Black Sea coast, and the Russian army began active operations there.

On April 5, after a series of successful battles, the most important port of Trebizond was taken. By the summer of 1916, Russian troops took control of most of Western Armenia.

Trebizond taken by Russian troops in 1916 The territory of historical (Turkish) Armenia, occupied by Russian troops by the summer of 1916

The defeat of the Turkish army in the Erzurum operation and the successful Russian offensive in the Trebizond direction forced the Turkish command to take measures to strengthen the 3rd and 6th Turkish armies in order to launch a counteroffensive. On June 9, the Turkish army went on the offensive with the goal of cutting off Russian forces in Trebizond from the main troops. The attackers managed to break through the front, but on June 21, having suffered heavy losses, the Turks were forced to suspend the offensive.

Despite the new defeat, Turkish troops made another attempt to attack in the Ognotic direction. The Russian command deployed significant forces to the right flank, which restored the situation with offensive actions from August 4 to 11. Subsequently, the Russians and Turks alternately took offensive actions, and success leaned first in one direction or the other. In some areas the Russians managed to advance, but in others they had to abandon their positions. Without particularly major successes on both sides, the fighting continued until August 29, when snow fell in the mountains and frost struck, forcing the opponents to stop fighting.

The results of the 1916 campaign on the Caucasian front exceeded the expectations of the Russian command. Russian troops advanced deep into Turkey, capturing the most important and largest cities - Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, Erzincan and Bitlis. The Caucasian Army fulfilled its main task - protecting Transcaucasia from the invasion of the Turks on a huge front, the length of which by the end of 1916 exceeded 1000 miles.

In the territories of Western Armenia occupied by Russian troops, an occupation regime was established, and military administrative districts subordinate to the military command were created. In June 1916, the Russian government approved the “Temporary Regulations on the Administration of Regions Conquered from Turkey by Law of War,” according to which the occupied territory was declared a temporary General Government of Turkish Armenia, directly subordinate to the main command of the Caucasian Army. If the war ended successfully for Russia, the Armenians who fled their homes during the genocide would return to their native land. Already in mid-1916, the economic development of Turkish territory began: several branches of railways were built.

1917

In the winter of 1917, there was a positional calm on the Caucasian front. The harsh winter made fighting difficult. In all areas from the Black Sea to Lake Van, only minor skirmishes were noted. The supply of food and fodder was very difficult.

On the Persian sector of the front, the commander of the Caucasian Army, General Yudenich, organized an attack on Mesopotamia in January 1917, which forced the Ottoman Empire to transfer some troops to the Russian front, weakening the defense of Baghdad, which was soon occupied by the British.

After the February Revolution, General Yudenich, appointed commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front, created on the basis of the Caucasian Army, continued offensive operations against the Turks, but difficulties with supplying troops, a decline in discipline under the influence of revolutionary agitation and an increase in the incidence of malaria forced him to stop the Mesopotamian operation and withdraw troops to mountainous areas . Having refused to carry out the order of the Provisional Government to resume the offensive, on May 31, 1917, General Yudenich N.N. was removed from command of the front “for resisting the instructions” of the Provisional Government, surrendered command to Infantry General M.A. Przhevalsky and was transferred to the disposal of the Minister of War.

The February Revolution of 1917 caused chaos and unrest among the troops of the Caucasian Front. During 1917, the Russian army gradually disintegrated, soldiers deserted, going home, and by the end of the year the Caucasian front was completely collapsed.

On December 5 (18), 1917, the so-called Erzincan Truce was concluded between Russian and Turkish troops. This led to a massive withdrawal of Russian troops from Western (Turkish) Armenia to Russian territory.

Turks in Armenia. Russian drawing, October 1917

By the beginning of 1918, Turkish forces in Transcaucasia were actually opposed by only a few thousand Caucasian (mostly Armenian) volunteers under the command of two hundred officers.

Even under the Provisional Government, by mid-July 1917, 6 Armenian regiments were created on the Caucasian Front at the proposal of Armenian public organizations in St. Petersburg and Tiflis. By October 1917, 2 Armenian divisions were already operating here. On December 13, 1917, the new commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front, Major General Lebedinsky, formed the Armenian volunteer corps, whose commander was Lieutenant General F.I. Nazarbekov (later the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia), and General Vyshinsky as chief of staff. At the request of the Armenian National Council, “General Dro” was appointed as a special commissioner under Commander-in-Chief Nazarbekov. Later, the Western Armenian division under the command of Andranik also entered the Armenian corps.

1918

Main article: German-Turkish intervention in Transcaucasia (1918)

In the first half of February (new style), Turkish troops, taking advantage of the collapse of the Caucasian Front and violating the terms of the December truce, launched a large-scale offensive in the Erzurum, Van and Primorsky directions, under the pretext of the need to protect the Muslim population of Eastern Turkey, almost immediately occupying Erzincan. The Turks in Western Armenia were actually opposed only by the Armenian volunteer corps, consisting of three incomplete divisions, which did not offer serious resistance to the superior forces of the Turkish army.

Under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the Armenian troops retreated, covering the crowds of Western Armenian refugees who were leaving with them. After occupying Alexandropol, the Turkish command sent part of its troops to Karaklis (modern Vanadzor); On May 21, another group of Turkish troops under the command of Yakub Shevki Pasha launched an offensive in the direction of Sardarapat (modern Armavir), with the goal of breaking through to Erivan and the Ararat Plain.

On February 10 (23), 1918 in Tiflis, the Transcaucasian Commissariat convened the Transcaucasian Seimas, which included deputies elected from Transcaucasia to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, and representatives of local political parties. After a lengthy discussion, the Sejm decided to begin separate peace negotiations with Turkey, based on the principle of restoring the Russian-Turkish borders of 1914 at the start of the war.

Meanwhile, on February 21 (March 6), the Turks, having broken the three-day resistance of a few Armenian volunteers, captured Ardahan with the help of the local Muslim population. On February 27 (March 12), the retreat of Armenian troops and refugees from Erzurum began. On March 2 (15), a retreating crowd of thousands reached Sarykamysh. With the fall of Erzurum, the Turks effectively regained control of all of Eastern Anatolia. On March 2 (15), the commander of the Armenian corps, General Nazarbekov, was appointed commander of the front from Olti to Maku; the Olti-Batum line was to be defended by Georgian troops. Nazarbekov commanded 15,000 people on a 250 km front.

The peace negotiations, which took place from March 1 (14) to April 1 (14) in Trebizond, ended in failure. A few days earlier, Türkiye signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Soviet Russia. According to Art. The IV Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Russian-Turkish additional treaty transferred to Turkey not only the territories of Western Armenia, but also the regions of Batum, Kars and Ardahan populated by Georgians and Armenians, annexed by Russia as a result of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The RSFSR pledged not to interfere “in the new organization of state-legal and international legal relations of these districts”, to restore the border “in the form in which it existed before the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78” and to dissolve on its territory and in the “occupied Turkish provinces" (that is, in Western Armenia) all Armenian volunteer squads.

Turkey, which had just signed a peace treaty with Russia on the most favorable terms and had already effectively returned to the borders of 1914, demanded that the Transcaucasian delegation recognize the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. The Diet interrupted negotiations and recalled the delegation from Trebizond, officially entering the war with Turkey. At the same time, representatives of the Azerbaijani faction in the Seimas openly stated that they would not participate in the creation of a common union of Transcaucasian peoples against Turkey, given their “special religious ties with Turkey.”

For Russia, the war with Turkey was completed with the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which meant the formal cessation of the existence of the Caucasian Front and the possibility of returning to their homeland for all Russian troops still remaining in Turkey and Persia. However, the actual offensive of the Ottoman Empire was stopped only at the end of May, as a result of the Battle of Sardarapat.

The events that followed are described in more detail in the articles:

• Republic of Armenia
• Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
• Battle for Baku

see also

• Persian campaign
• Sochi conflict
• Armenian genocide
• Assyrian genocide
• Genocide of the Pontic Greeks

Notes

1. (http://www.odin-fakt.ru/iskry/_43_jurnala_iskry_god1914/)
2. David Martirosyan: The tragedy of the Batumi Armenians: just a “massacre” or a harbinger of the Armenian genocide?
3. Ivan Ratziger: To the lawyers of cannibalism: Facts about the massacre of Armenians and Aisors in Turkey and Iran
4. 1 2 Kersnovsky A. A. History of the Russian Army. Fight in the Caucasus.
5. Korsun N. G. The First World War on the Caucasian Front. - 1946. - P. 76.
6. Andranik Zoravar

Literature

• World War in numbers. - M.: Voengiz, 1934. - 128 p. - 15,000 copies.
• Zayonchkovsky A. M. The First World War. - St. Petersburg: Polygon, 2000. - 878 p. - ISBN 5-89173-082-0.
• History of the First World War 1914-1918. / edited by I. I. Rostunov. - in 2 volumes. - M.: Nauka, 1975. - 25,500 copies.
• Korsun N. G. The First World War on the Caucasian Front. - M.: Military Publishing House NKO USSR, 1946. - 100 p.
• Basil Liddell Hart. 1914. The truth about the First World War. - M.: Eksmo, 2009. - 480 p. - (A turning point in history). - 4300 copies. - ISBN 978-5-699-36036-9.
• Verzhkhovsky D.V. First World War 1914-1918. - M.: Nauka, 1954. - 203 p.

• Kersnovsky A. A. History of the Russian Army. Fight in the Caucasus.
• Maslovsky E.V. World War on the Caucasian front, 1914-1917: strategic essay.

Links

• Armenian volunteers in the First World War
• Stepan Semenovich Kondurushkin. “Following the war. November and December 1914 Caucasus"

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