Patriotic War of 1812 (French Campagne de Russie pendant l "année 1812) - the war between Russia and Napoleonic France on Russian territory in 1812.

The reasons for the war were Russia’s refusal to actively support the continental blockade, in which Napoleon saw the main weapon against Great Britain, as well as Napoleon’s policy towards European states, carried out without taking into account the interests of Russia.

At the first stage of the war (from June to September 1812), the Russian army fought back from the borders of Russia to Moscow, fighting the Battle of Borodino in front of Moscow.

At the second stage of the war (from October to December 1812), Napoleonic army first maneuvered, trying to go to winter quarters in areas not ravaged by war, and then retreated to the borders of Russia, pursued by the Russian army, hunger and frost.

The war ended with the almost complete destruction of Napoleonic army, the liberation of Russian territory and the transfer of hostilities to the lands of the Duchy of Warsaw and Germany in 1813 (see War of the Sixth Coalition). Among the reasons for the defeat of Napoleon's army, the Russian historian N. Troitsky names popular participation in the war and the heroism of the Russian army, the unpreparedness of the French army for combat operations in large spaces and in the natural and climatic conditions of Russia, the leadership talents of the Russian commander-in-chief M. I. Kutuzov and other generals.

Background to the conflict

After the defeat of Russian troops in the Battle of Friedland, on July 7, 1807, Emperor Alexander I concluded the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon, according to which he undertook to join the continental blockade of Great Britain, which was contrary to the economic and political interests of Russia. According to the Russian nobility and army, the terms of the peace treaty were humiliating and shameful for the country. The Russian government used the Treaty of Tilsit and the years that followed it to accumulate strength for the upcoming fight against Napoleon.

As a result of the Peace of Tilsit and the Congress of Erfurt, Russia took Finland from Sweden in 1808 and made a number of other territorial acquisitions; It gave Napoleon a free hand to conquer all of Europe. French troops, after a series of annexations, carried out mainly at the expense of Austrian possessions (see War of the Fifth Coalition), moved close to the borders of the Russian Empire.

Causes of the war

From France

After 1807, Great Britain remained Napoleon's main and, in fact, only enemy. Britain seized France's colonies in America and India and interfered with French trade. Given that England dominated the sea, Napoleon's only real weapon in the fight against it was a continental blockade, the effectiveness of which depended on the willingness of other European states to comply with sanctions. Napoleon persistently demanded that Alexander I more consistently implement the continental blockade, but was faced with Russia's reluctance to sever relations with its main trading partner.

In 1810, the Russian government introduced free trade with neutral countries, allowing Russia to trade with Britain through intermediaries, and adopted a protective tariff that increased customs rates, mainly on imported French goods. This caused the indignation of the French government.

Napoleon, not being a hereditary monarch, wanted to confirm the legitimacy of his coronation through marriage with a representative of one of the great monarchical houses of Europe. In 1808, a marriage proposal was made to the Russian royal house between Napoleon and the sister of Alexander I, Grand Duchess Catherine. The proposal was rejected under the pretext of Catherine's engagement to the Prince of Saxe-Coburg. In 1810, Napoleon was refused a second time, this time regarding a marriage with another Grand Duchess - 14-year-old Anna (later Queen of the Netherlands). Also in 1810, Napoleon married Princess Marie-Louise of Austria, daughter of Emperor Franz II of Austria. According to the historian E.V. Tarle, the “Austrian marriage” for Napoleon “was the greatest security for the rear in case he had to fight with Russia again.” Alexander I's double refusal to Napoleon and Napoleon's marriage to an Austrian princess caused a crisis of confidence in Russian-French relations and sharply worsened them.

At the beginning of 1811, Russia, constantly fearing the restoration of Poland, pulled several divisions to the borders of the Duchy of Warsaw, which was perceived by Napoleon as a military threat towards the duchy.

In 1811, Napoleon told his ambassador in Warsaw, Abbé de Pradt: “In five years I will be master of the whole world. There is only Russia left, I will crush it...”

From Russia

According to traditional ideas in Russian science, Russian landowners and merchants suffered from the consequences of the continental blockade, to which Russia joined under the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, and, as a result, the state finances of Russia. If before the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1801-1806 Russia exported 2.2 million quarters of grain annually, then after - in 1807-1810 - exports amounted to 600 thousand quarters. The reduction in exports led to a sharp drop in bread prices. A pound of bread, which cost 40 kopecks in silver in 1804, was sold for 22 kopecks in 1810. At the same time, the export of gold accelerated in exchange for luxury goods supplied from France. All this led to a decrease in the value of the ruble and the depreciation of Russian paper money. The Russian government was forced to take measures to protect the country's economy. In 1810, it introduced free trade with neutral countries (which allowed Russia to trade with Great Britain through intermediaries) and increased customs rates on imported luxury goods and wine, that is, precisely on French exports.

However, a number of researchers argue that the welfare of the main tax-paying classes, which included the merchants and peasants, did not undergo significant changes during the blockade. This, in particular, can be judged by the dynamics of arrears in payments to the budget, which shows that these classes even found the opportunity to pay increased taxes during the period under review. These same authors argue that restricting the import of foreign goods stimulated the development of domestic industry. An anonymous contemporary of those events characterizes the consequences of this forced protectionism as follows: “Cloth factories could never have arisen. Trapes, silk fabrics, canvas, linens and other fabrics that have barely begun to multiply, as well as being suppressed by English needlework. They began to recover with difficulty after stopping bargaining with them. Calico and printed factories suffered the same fate.” In addition, the goods, the obtaining of which was difficult due to the blockade of England, were not essential items: sugar and coffee had not yet come into widespread use; salt, which is also often listed among the missing goods, was produced in excess in Russia itself and was imported from abroad. borders only in the Baltic provinces. The reduction in customs duties, observed during the blockade, did not have much impact on the domestic budget, since duties were not its significant item, and even at the time of reaching their maximum value in 1803, when they amounted to 13.1 million rubles, they accounted for accounted for only 12.9% of budget revenues. Therefore, according to this point of view, the continental blockade of England was for Alexander I only a reason to sever relations with France.

In 1807, from the Polish lands that were part of Prussia and Austria according to the second and third partitions of Poland, Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Napoleon supported the dreams of the Duchy of Warsaw to recreate an independent Poland up to the borders of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was possible to do only after separating part of its territory from Russia. In 1810, Napoleon took possessions from the Duke of Oldenburg, a relative of Alexander I, which caused indignation in St. Petersburg. Alexander I demanded that the Duchy of Warsaw be transferred as compensation for the taken possessions to the Duke of Oldenburg or that it be liquidated as an independent entity.

Contrary to the terms of the Tilsit Agreement, Napoleon continued to occupy the territory of Prussia with his troops, Alexander I demanded that they be withdrawn from there.

From the end of 1810, European diplomatic circles began to discuss the impending war between the French and Russian empires. By the autumn of 1811, the Russian ambassador in Paris, Prince Kurakin, reported to St. Petersburg about signs of an imminent war.

Diplomacy and intelligence on the eve of the war

On December 17, 1811, in Paris, agreements were reached between Napoleon and the Austrian Empire, represented by Ambassador Schwarzenberg, on the basis of which the Franco-Austrian military alliance was concluded. Austria pledged to field a 30,000-strong corps against Russia under Napoleon's command, and Napoleon agreed to return to Austria the Illyrian provinces that he had taken from it in the Treaty of Schönbrunn in 1809. Austria received these provinces only after the end of Napoleon's war with Russia, and, moreover, Austria was obliged to cede Galicia to Poland.

On February 24, 1812, Napoleon also concluded a treaty of alliance with Prussia. The Prussians agreed to provide 20 thousand soldiers and provide the French army with the necessary supplies, in exchange for this the Prussian king demanded something from the conquered Russian lands (Courland, Livonia, Estland).

Before the start of the campaign, Napoleon studied the political, military and economic situation in Russia. The French carried out extensive reconnaissance. Since 1810, spies entered Russia under the guise of artists, monks, travelers, traders, and retired Russian officers. Intelligence used the French and other foreigners - tutors, doctors, teachers, servants. Polish intelligence, headed by the chief of staff of the troops of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, General Fischer, was also active. Even Prussia, officially friendly to Russia, had informants at its embassy in St. Petersburg. Shortly before the war, the French managed to obtain engraving boards of the “stolist” Russian map. Its inscriptions were translated into French, and it was this map that the French generals used during the war. Ambassadors of France to Russia L. Caulaincourt and J.-A. Lauriston were "resident No. 1 of French intelligence." The command of the French army knew the composition and number of Russian troops.

In preparation for the war, Russia also engaged in active diplomacy and intelligence. As a result of secret negotiations in the spring of 1812, the Austrians made it clear that they would not be zealous for the benefit of Napoleon and their army would not go far from the Austro-Russian border.

Two proposals were made to the Swedish Crown Prince (former Napoleonic Marshal) Bernadotte. Napoleon offered the Swedes Finland if they opposed Russia, and Alexander offered Norway if they opposed Napoleon. Bernadotte, having weighed both proposals, leaned towards Alexander - not only because Norway was richer than Finland, but also because Sweden was protected from Napoleon by the sea, and from Russia by nothing. In January 1812, Napoleon occupied Swedish Pomerania, pushing Sweden into an alliance with Russia. On March 24 (April 5) of the same year, Bernadotte concluded an alliance treaty with Russia.

On May 22, 1812, the commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army, Kutuzov, ended the five-year war for Moldova and made peace with Turkey. In the south of Russia, the Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov was released as a barrier against Austria, which was forced to be in an alliance with Napoleon.

Napoleon subsequently said that he should have abandoned the war with Russia at the moment when he learned that neither Turkey nor Sweden would fight with Russia.

As a result of the successful actions of Russian intelligence, the command of the Russian army knew in detail the state of the Great Army. Every 1st and 15th day of the month, the French Minister of War presented to the Emperor the so-called “Report on the status” of the entire French army with all changes in the number of its individual units, with all changes in its quartering, taking into account new appointments to command posts, etc. etc. Through an agent at the French main headquarters, this report immediately went to Colonel A.I. Chernyshev, seconded to the Russian embassy in Paris, and from him to St. Petersburg.

On the side of France

By 1811, the French Empire with its vassal states numbered 71 million people out of a population of 172 million in Europe. At the initial stage, Napoleon was able to gather, according to various sources, from 400 to 450 thousand soldiers for a campaign against Russia, of which the French themselves made up half (see Grand Army). There is evidence (in particular, General Berthesen (French) Russian) that the actual strength of the 1st line of the Grand Army was only about half of its payroll, that is, no more than 235 thousand people, and that the commanders when submitting reports hid the true composition of their units. It is noteworthy that the Russian intelligence data of that time also gave this number. 16 different nationalities took part in the campaign: the most numerous were Germans and Poles. On the basis of alliance agreements with France, Austria and Prussia allocated 30 and 20 thousand troops, respectively. After the invasion, units of up to 20 thousand, formed from residents of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, were added to the Great Army.

Napoleon had reserves: from 130 to 220 thousand soldiers in the garrisons of Central Europe (of which 70 thousand in the 9th (Victor) and 11th (Augereau) reserve corps in Prussia) and 100 thousand of the French National Guard, which by law was not could fight outside the country.

In anticipation of the military conflict, the French command created large artillery and food warehouses along the Vistula River from Warsaw to Danzig. Danzig became the largest supply center for troops, where by January 1812 there was a food supply for 50 days for 400 thousand people and 50 thousand horses.

Napoleon concentrated his main forces in 3 groups, which, according to the plan, were supposed to encircle and destroy piece by piece the armies of Barclay and Bagration. The left (218 thousand people) was headed by Napoleon himself, the central (82 thousand people) - his stepson, Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, the right (78 thousand people) - the younger brother in the Bonaparte family, King of Westphalia Jerome Bonaparte . In addition to the main forces, Jacques Macdonald's corps of 32.5 thousand people was positioned against Wittgenstein on the left flank. , and in the south - on the right flank - the allied corps of Karl Schwarzenberg, numbering 34 thousand people.

The strengths of the Great Army were its large numbers, good material and technical support, combat experience, and belief in the invincibility of the army. The weak point was its very diverse national composition.

On the side of Russia

Army size

The population of Russia in 1811 was more than 40 million people. The blow of Napoleon's army was taken by the troops stationed on the western border: the 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd Army of Bagration, a total of 153 thousand soldiers and 758 guns. Even further south in Volyn (northwest of present-day Ukraine) was located the 3rd Army of Tormasov (up to 45 thousand, 168 guns), which served as a barrier from Austria. In Moldova, the Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov (55 thousand, 202 guns) stood against Turkey. In Finland, the corps of the Russian General Shteingel (19 thousand, 102 guns) stood against Sweden. In the Riga area there was a separate Essen corps (up to 18 thousand), up to 4 reserve corps were located further from the border.

According to the lists, the irregular Cossack troops numbered 117 thousand light cavalry, but in reality 20-25 thousand Cossacks took part in the war.

Armament

Arms factories annually produced 1200-1300 guns and more than 150 thousand pounds of bombs and cannonballs (cf. French factories produced 900-1000 guns). The Tula, Sestroretsk and Izhevsk arms factories produced from 43 to 96 thousand guns per year, in addition, the arsenals could repair almost the same number of weapons, while in all French - about 100 thousand guns per year. Russian weapons of that time were of relatively high quality and, in terms of tactical and technical data, were not inferior to French ones. However, the capacity of Russia's own production was not enough to meet all the needs of the army. Some regiments and even divisions were armed with English or Austrian rifles. The Russian infantry was armed mainly with smoothbore rifles; only a few shooters had rifled fittings or screw guns. The artillery had 6- and 12-pounder cannons, as well as unicorns, which fired grenades weighing ½ and ¼ pounds. The predominant type of field artillery was the 6-pounder, as was the case in most European countries at the time.

By the beginning of the war, the warehouses of the Russian army contained a stockpile of several hundred guns, as well as up to 175 thousand guns, 296 thousand artillery and 44 million gun charges. Artillery depots supplying the Russian army were located along 3 lines:

Vilna - Dinaburg - Nesvizh - Bobruisk - Polonnoe - Kyiv

Pskov - Porkhov - Shostka - Bryansk - Smolensk

Novgorod - Moscow - Kaluga

According to technical and military data, the Russian army did not lag behind the French army. The weak side of the Russian army was the theft of “commission agents” and quartermaster ranks, the embezzlement of many regimental, company and other ranks who profited from allowances, which abuses, according to the figurative remark of a contemporary, were “half legalized.”

Army management reform

In March 1811, in Russia, under the leadership of Minister of War Barclay de Tolly, a reform of army management began - the “Commission for the Drawing up of Military Charters and Codes” was created. The commission took into account the experience of different countries - the military regulations of Austria of 1807-1809, the military regulations of Prussia of 1807-1810, much attention was paid to the latest regulations and instructions of the French army.

According to the new regulations, command of the army was entrusted to the commander-in-chief, who also controlled it through the main headquarters. The army's main headquarters was divided into four sections: the chief of the main staff; engineering; artillery; quartermaster's. The heads of the main headquarters departments were directly subordinate to the commander-in-chief. The chief of the main staff had predominant importance among them. The chief of the main staff was the second person in the army; all orders of the commander-in-chief were transmitted through him; he took command of the army in the event of illness or death of the commander-in-chief. The department of the chief of the main staff consisted of two parts: the quartermaster and the army duty department. The quartermaster general led the operational part of the army; the general on duty was in charge of issues related to the combat, logistics, military sanitary, military police and military judicial services.

In February 1812, the War Ministry formed the 1st and 2nd Western Armies from the troops located on the western border. In March, printed copies of the regulations were sent to the armies, and the formation of their headquarters began.

Allies

On July 18, 1812, Russia and Great Britain signed the Peace of Orebro, which ended the sluggish Anglo-Russian war that began after Russia joined the continental blockade. The Peace of Orebro restored friendly and trade relations based on the principle of “most favored nation” and provided for mutual assistance in the event of an attack by a third power. The English army was involved in battles with the French in Spain. Spain, having tied up 200-300 thousand French soldiers with partisan resistance, indirectly provided assistance to Russia. On July 8 (20), 1812, in Velikiye Luki, the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian government, R. A. Koshelev, signed an alliance agreement with the representative of the Spanish Supreme Junta, Zea de Bermudez.

Strategic plans of the parties before the start of hostilities

The goals of the Russian campaign for Napoleon were:

first of all, the tightening of the continental blockade of England;

the revival, in contrast to the Russian Empire, of the Polish independent state with the inclusion of the territories of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine (initially, Napoleon even defined the war as the Second Polish);

concluding a military alliance with Russia for a possible joint campaign in India.

Counting on Alexander to be the first to attack the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Napoleon planned to quickly end the war by defeating the Russian army in a general battle on Polish-Lithuanian territory in the area of ​​Vilna or Warsaw, where the population was anti-Russian. Napoleon's calculation was simple - the defeat of the Russian army in one or two battles would force Alexander I to accept his conditions.

On the eve of the Russian campaign, Napoleon declared to Metternich: “Triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I'll stop there." Unlike the policies pursued in Europe, Napoleon did not set goals to change the political structure of Russia (in particular, he did not intend to free the peasants from serfdom).

After analyzing secret reports from the beginning of 1812, the historian O.V. Sokolov concluded that Napoleon expected to quickly end the campaign by winning a large border battle. The retreat of the Russian army deep into Russia took him by surprise, forcing him to stay in Vilna for 18 days in indecision: the emperor had never allowed such hesitation before.

In memoirs written years, sometimes decades later, grandiose plans for the conquest of Moscow began to be attributed to Napoleon. Thus, they say that in a conversation with the French ambassador in Warsaw Pradt on the eve of the invasion, Napoleon said: “I am going to Moscow and in one or two battles I will finish everything. Emperor Alexander will be on his knees to ask for peace. I will burn Tula and disarm Russia.” Another statement of Napoleon is cited: “If I take Kyiv, I will take Russia by the feet; if I take possession of St. Petersburg, I will take her by the head; Having occupied Moscow, I will strike her in the heart.”

Strategic plans for a war with France - both defensive and offensive in nature (the latter included the capture of the Duchy of Warsaw and, possibly, Silesia, as well as Prussia (in other plans Prussia was considered a likely ally) - began to be developed in the Russian Empire from February 1810; on Currently, more than 30 different names of authors are known (only a few of whom, however, were directly involved in the development of strategic plans) and more than 40 documents of varying degrees of detail.

Long before the start of the war, the Russian command foresaw the possibility of a long, organized retreat in order to avoid the risk of losing the army in a decisive battle. The general principles of the retreat strategy were developed by the Prussian military theorist D. G. Bülow; in August 1810, the plan of Ludwig von Wolzogen, drawn up a year earlier at the suggestion of Eugene of Württemberg, was presented to Prince P.M. Volkonsky for consideration, which recommended the creation of a system of fortified strong points and a strategy for the retreat of two armies in diverging directions. In May 1811, Emperor Alexander I explained his attitude towards the upcoming battle to the French Ambassador to Russia, Armand Caulaincourt:

If Emperor Napoleon starts a war against me, then it is possible and even probable that he will beat us if we accept the battle, but this will not yet give him peace. ... We have an immense space behind us, and we will maintain a well-organized army. ... If the lot of arms decides the case against me, then I would rather retreat to Kamchatka than cede my provinces and sign treaties in my capital that are only a respite. The Frenchman is brave, but long hardships and bad climate tire and discourage him. Our climate and our winter will fight for us.

From the defensive plans presented to Russian Emperor Alexander I, the plan of General Pfuel was chosen. According to Pfuel's plan, it was supposed to conduct combat operations with three armies, one of the armies was supposed to hold the enemy from the front, and the others were to act from the flank and rear. It was planned that if the French launched an offensive against the 1st Army, it should retreat and defend from the Drissky fortified camp, while at that time the 2nd Army attacked the flank and rear of the advancing French. Active defensive actions of both armies on the French lines of communication were supposed to force the enemy to retreat, since, according to the author of the plan, he could not remain in the devastated territory for a long time. The 3rd Army, according to this plan, covered the flanks of the 2nd Army and the Kiev direction. During the war, Pfuel's plan was rejected as impossible in the conditions of modern maneuver warfare.

Other proposals regarding war strategy were also put forward. In particular, the commander of the 2nd Western Army, General Bagration, proposed an offensive plan against Napoleon, which provided for the advance of Russian troops to the Vistula line in the spring of 1812 with the capture of Warsaw. The Tsar did not approve of this plan, since by that time Napoleon had already concentrated 220 thousand soldiers in fortifications along the Russian border.

Napoleon's offensive (June - September 1812)

On May 9, 1812, Napoleon left Saint-Cloud for Dresden, where he met with the “allied” monarchs of Europe. From Dresden, the emperor went to the Great Army on the Neman River, which separated Prussia and Russia. On June 22, Napoleon addressed the troops with an appeal, in which he accused Russia of violating the Tilsit Agreement and called the attack on Russia the second Polish war. The appeal was included in the 2nd Bulletin of the Grand Army - these propaganda issues were published throughout the war.

On the evening of June 11 (23), 1812, a patrol of the Life Guards Cossack Regiment three miles up the Neman River, not far from Kovno (Lithuania), noticed a suspicious movement on the opposite bank. When it became completely dark, a company of French sappers crossed the river from an elevated and wooded bank to the Russian bank on boats and ferries, and the first shootout took place. After midnight on June 24, 1812, the crossing of French troops across the border Neman began across four bridges built above Kovno.

At 6 o'clock in the morning on June 12 (24), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered the Russian fortress of Kovno. On the evening of June 24, Emperor Alexander I was at Bennigsen’s ball in Vilna, where he was informed about Napoleon’s invasion.

The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the Great Army near Kovno took 4 days. The river was crossed by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd infantry corps, guards and cavalry.

The first clash with the Russian army (the Russian rearguard with Murat's cavalry attacking it) took place on June 25 near the village of Barbarishki (modern Babrishkes). The same skirmishes occurred at Rumšiški (modern Rumšiškės) and Poparcy (modern Papartsyai).

On June 17 (29) - June 18 (30), near Prena south of Kovno, another group (67 thousand soldiers: 4th and 6th infantry corps, cavalry) under the command of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais crossed the Neman. Almost simultaneously, on June 18 (30), even further south, near Grodno, the Neman crossed 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers: 5th, 7th, 8th infantry and 4th cavalry corps) under the overall command of the King of Westphalia, Jerome Bonaparte.

In the northern direction near Tilsit, the Neman crossed the 10th Corps of Marshal MacDonald. In the southern direction, from Warsaw across the Bug, a separate Austrian corps of General Schwarzenberg (30-34 thousand soldiers) began to invade.

On June 16 (28), Vilna was occupied. Napoleon, having arranged state affairs in occupied Lithuania, left the city following his troops only on July 4 (16).

From Neman to Smolensk

Northern direction

Napoleon aimed the 10th Corps (32 thousand) of Marshal MacDonald at St. Petersburg. First, the corps had to occupy Riga, and then, connecting with the 2nd Corps of Marshal Oudinot (28 thousand), move on. The basis of Macdonald's corps was the 20,000-strong Prussian corps under the command of General Gravert (later York).

Marshal MacDonald approached the fortifications of Riga, however, lacking siege artillery, he stopped at the distant approaches to the city. The military governor of Riga, General Essen, burned the outskirts and locked himself in the city with a strong garrison (18 thousand). Trying to support Oudinot, Macdonald captured the abandoned city of Dinaburg on the Western Dvina River and stopped active operations, waiting for siege artillery from East Prussia. The Prussians of MacDonald's corps avoided active combat clashes in this foreign war.

Marshal Oudinot, having occupied the city of Polotsk, decided to bypass from the north the separate corps of General Wittgenstein (25 thousand), allocated by the commander-in-chief of the 1st Army Barclay de Tolly during the retreat through Polotsk to defend the St. Petersburg direction. Fearing Oudinot's connection with Macdonald, Wittgenstein on July 18 (30) attacked Oudinot's corps near Klyastitsy, which was not expecting an attack and weakened by the march, threw it back to Polotsk and tried to capture the city on August 5 (17) - August 6 (18), but the corps of General Saint Syrah, promptly dispatched by Napoleon to support Oudinot's corps, helped repulse the attack and restore balance.

Marshals MacDonald and Oudinot were stuck in low-intensity fighting, remaining in place.

Central (Moscow) direction

Units of the 1st Western Army were scattered from the Baltic to Lida, the headquarters was in Vilna. The commander of the 1st Army was Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, his chief of staff was Major General A.P. Ermolov; Quartermaster General - Colonel of the Quartermaster Unit K.F. Tol.

Due to Napoleon's rapid advance, the scattered Russian corps faced the threat of being defeated piecemeal. Dokhturov's corps found itself in an operational environment, but was able to escape and arrive at the Sventsyany assembly point. The French cut off Dorokhov's cavalry detachment, which joined Bagration's army. After the 1st Army united, Barclay de Tolly began to gradually retreat to Vilna and further to Drissa.

On June 26, the army left Vilna and on July 10 arrived at the Drissky fortified camp, in which, according to Pfuel’s plan, the Russian army was supposed to exhaust the enemy. The generals managed to convince the tsar of the absurdity of this plan, and on July 17 the army retreated through Polotsk to Vitebsk, leaving Wittgenstein’s 1st Corps to defend St. Petersburg.

In Polotsk, the harm from Alexander I’s stay with the army became so obvious that at the beginning of July, the tsar’s closest confidants (A.S. Shishkov, A.A. Arakcheev and A.D. Balashov) convinced him to leave under the pretext of the need to be present in the capital for preparation of reserves.

The 2nd Western Army (up to 45 thousand) at the beginning of the invasion was located near Grodno (in the west of Belarus) about 150 km from the 1st Army. The 2nd Western Army was headed by P.I. Bagration, the position of chief of staff was held by Major General E.F. Saint-Prix, adjutant general of Alexander I; Quartermaster General - Major General M. S. Vistitsky 2nd.

Bagration tried to connect with the main 1st Army, but upon reaching Lida (100 km from Vilno), he realized that the French would not allow this. The 2nd Army retreated south. The Cossacks of Ataman Platov, covering the rear of the retreating army, successfully detained the French in the battles of Grodno and Mir. To cut off the 2nd Army from the main forces and destroy it, Napoleon sent Marshal Davout with a force of up to 50 thousand soldiers. Davout moved from Vilna to Minsk, which he occupied on July 8. Jerome Bonaparte with 4 corps also attacked Bagration from the west. Bagration, with rapid marches and successful rearguard battles, broke away from Jerome's troops and through Novogrudok, Nesvizh and Slutsk, bypassing Minsk from the south, moved to Bobruisk.

On July 19, the 2nd Army was in Bobruisk on the Berezina River, while Davout's corps on July 21 positioned its forward units in Mogilev. Bagration, approaching the Dnieper 60 kilometers below Mogilev, sent Raevsky’s corps on July 23 with the goal of pushing Davout away from Mogilev and taking a direct road to Vitebsk, where according to plans the Russian armies were to unite. As a result of the battle near Saltanovka, Raevsky delayed Davout’s advance east to Smolensk, but the path to Vitebsk was closed. Bagration was able to cross the Dnieper in the town of Novoye Bykhovo without interference on July 24-25 and headed towards Smolensk. Davout had no strength left to pursue the 2nd Army, while the group of Jerome Bonaparte (who had been removed from command by that time), hopelessly lagging behind the 2nd Army, was redirected by Napoleon to other directions.

On July 23, the 1st Army arrived in Vitebsk, where Barclay de Tolly wanted to wait for the 2nd Army. To prevent the advance of the French, he sent the 4th Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy to meet the enemy vanguard. On July 25-26, 26 versts from Vitebsk, a battle took place near Ostrovno. On July 27, Barclay de Tolly retreated from Vitebsk to Smolensk, having learned about the approach of Napoleon with the main forces and the impossibility of Bagration breaking through to Vitebsk.

On August 3, the 1st and 2nd Russian armies united near Smolensk, thus achieving their first strategic success. There was a short respite in the war; both sides were putting their troops in order, tired of continuous marches.

Upon reaching Vitebsk, Napoleon made a stop to give rest to the troops, upset after 400 km of advance. On August 13, after much hesitation, Napoleon set out from Vitebsk to Smolensk.

South direction

The 7th Saxon Corps under the command of General Rainier (17-22 thousand) was supposed to cover the right flank of Napoleon's main forces from the 3rd Russian Army under the command of General Tormasov (46 thousand people with 164 guns). Rainier took up a position along the Brest-Kobrin-Pinsk line, spreading out an already small body over 170 km. On July 27, Tormasov was surrounded by Kobrin, the Saxon garrison under the command of Klengel (up to 5 thousand) was completely defeated. Brest and Pinsk were also cleared of the French garrisons.

Realizing that the weakened Rainier would not be able to hold Tormasov, Napoleon decided not to attract General Schwarzenberg’s Austrian Corps (30 thousand) to the main direction and left it in the south against Tormasov. Rainier, having gathered his troops and linked up with Schwarzenberg, attacked Tormasov on August 12 at Gorodechny, forcing the Russians to retreat to Lutsk. The Saxons are mainly fighting in this direction, the Austrians are trying to limit themselves to artillery shelling and maneuvers.

Until the end of September, low-intensity fighting took place in the southern direction in a sparsely populated swampy area in the Lutsk region.

In addition to General Tormasov, in the southern direction there was the 2nd Russian reserve corps of General Ertel, formed in Mozyr and providing support to the blocked garrison of Bobruisk. To blockade Bobruisk, as well as to cover communications from Ertel, Napoleon left the Polish division of General Dombrowski (8 thousand) from the 5th Polish Corps.

From Smolensk to Moscow

After the unification of the Russian armies, the generals began to persistently demand from the commander-in-chief Barclay de Tolly a general battle. Taking advantage of the scattered position of the French corps, Barclay de Tolly decided to defeat them one by one and marched on August 8 to Rudnya, where Marshal Murat’s cavalry was quartered.

However, Napoleon, taking advantage of the slow advance of the Russian army, gathered his corps into a fist and tried to go to Barclay de Tolly’s rear, bypassing his left flank from the south, for which he crossed the Dnieper River west of Smolensk. On the path of the vanguard of the French army was the 27th division of General Neverovsky, covering the left flank of the Russian army near Krasnoye. Neverovsky's stubborn resistance gave time to transfer General Raevsky's corps to Smolensk.

By August 16, Napoleon approached Smolensk with 180 thousand. Bagration instructed General Raevsky (15 thousand soldiers), into whose 7th corps the remnants of Neverovsky’s division joined, to defend Smolensk. Barclay de Tolly was against a battle that was unnecessary in his opinion, but at that time there was actual dual command in the Russian army. At 6 a.m. on August 16, Napoleon began the assault on the city with a march. The stubborn battle for Smolensk continued until the morning of August 18, when Barclay de Tolly withdrew his troops from the burning city to avoid a big battle without a chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration’s army) covered the retreat route of the Russian army to Dorogobuzh, which Napoleon could cut with a roundabout maneuver (similar to the one that failed at Smolensk).

Marshal Ney pursued the retreating army. On August 19, in a bloody battle near Valutina Gora, the Russian rearguard detained Marshal Ney, who suffered significant losses. Napoleon sent General Junot to go behind the Russian rear in a roundabout way, but he failed to complete the task, and the Russian army left in perfect order towards Moscow to Dorogobuzh. The battle for Smolensk, which destroyed a large city, marked the development of a nationwide war between the Russian people and the enemy, which was immediately felt by both ordinary French suppliers and Napoleon’s marshals. Settlements along the route of the French army were burned, the population left as far as possible. Immediately after the Battle of Smolensk, Napoleon made a disguised peace proposal to Tsar Alexander I, so far from a position of strength, but did not receive an answer.

Reorganization of command and control of the Russian army

Having left the army, the emperor did not bother to appoint a general commander-in-chief. Relations between Bagration and Barclay de Tolly after the retreat from Smolensk became more and more tense every day. The lack of unity of command could lead to catastrophic consequences. To resolve the issue, an Emergency Committee was established, and on August 17, at its meeting, Infantry General Kutuzov was unanimously approved as Commander-in-Chief. On August 17 (29), Kutuzov received the army in Tsarevo-Zaimishche. On this day the French entered Vyazma. Kutuzov formed his headquarters using the headquarters of the Western armies. Cavalry General Bennigsen was appointed to the post of chief of the main headquarters of Kutuzov, Vistitsky became the quartermaster general of all armies, Tol became his assistant, and Colonel P. S. Kaisarov became the general on duty.

Borodino

Continuing the general strategic line of his predecessor, Kutuzov could not avoid a general battle for political and moral reasons. By September 3, the Russian army retreated to the village of Borodino. Further retreat meant the surrender of Moscow. Kutuzov decided to give a general battle. To gain time to prepare fortifications on the Borodino field, Kutuzov ordered General Gorchakov to detain the enemy near the village of Shevardino, where a pentagonal redoubt was erected. The battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt lasted all day on September 5, only by midnight Kompan's division broke into its ramparts.

On August 26 (September 7) near the village of Borodino (125 km west of Moscow), the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place between the Russian and French armies. The numbers of armies were comparable - 130-135 thousand for Napoleon versus 110-130 thousand for Kutuzov. The Russian army lacked weapons - there were no guns to arm 31 thousand militia from Moscow and Smolensk. The warriors were given pikes, but Kutuzov did not use people as “cannon fodder” (the warriors performed auxiliary functions, for example, carrying out the wounded).

In fact, the battle was an assault by French troops on a line of Russian fortifications (flashes, redoubts and lunettes). On both sides, both in defense and in attacking fortifications, artillery was widely used. Around noon, during the eighth attack of Bagration's flushes, Napoleon moved 45 thousand of his soldiers and 400 guns against 18 thousand soldiers and 300 guns of Bagration - on a front of 1.5 km, which in total on both sides gives 470 guns on 1 km of front. As M. Adams notes, “Borodino marked the beginning of the era of artillery.”

After a bloody 12-hour battle, the French, at the cost of 30 - 34 thousand killed and wounded, pushed back the left flank and center of the Russian positions, but were unable to develop the offensive. The Russian army also suffered heavy losses (40 - 45 thousand killed and wounded). There were almost no prisoners on either side. On September 8, Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk with the firm intention of preserving the army.

Military Council in Fili

On September 1 (13), the Russian army camped in front of Moscow: the right flank of the army was near the village of Fili, the center between the villages of Troitsky and Volynsky, the left flank in front of the village of Vorobyov. The rearguard of the army was located on the Setun River. The length of the front line was about four kilometers. Communication between army units was greatly hampered by impassable ravines and the Karpovka River. Having examined this position from Poklonnaya Hill, the commander-in-chief and other military leaders declared it unacceptable for battle.

At 5 o'clock on the same day, the Military Council met in the house of the Filyov peasant A. Frolov, the exact number of participants of which is unknown. According to the recollections of war participants, the following generals were invited to the council: M. B. Barclay de Tolly, L. L. Bennigsen, D. S. Dokhturov, A. P. Ermolov, P. P. Konovnitsyn, A. I. Osterman -Tolstoy, N.N. Raevsky, F.P. Uvarov and Colonel K.F. Tol. The duty general P.S. Kaisarov was also present at the council. One question was discussed - to give battle near Moscow, or to leave the city without a fight.

M.B. Barclay de Tolly pointed out the necessity of leaving Moscow to save the army: “Having saved Moscow, Russia will not be saved from a cruel, ruinous war. But saving the army does not yet destroy the hopes of the fatherland.” L. L. Bennigsen insisted on the battle, and the majority of the meeting participants leaned towards his side. The final decision was made by M.I. Kutuzov: “As long as the army exists and is able to resist the enemy, until then we will retain the hope of successfully completing the war, but when the army is destroyed, Moscow and Russia will perish. I order you to retreat." Kutuzov interrupted the meeting and ordered a retreat through Moscow along the Ryazan road.

After Kutuzov’s advice, according to the recollections of those close to him, he slept poorly, walked for a long time and said the famous: “Well, I’ll bring the damned French... they will eat horse meat.” Towards the evening of September 14, Napoleon entered empty Moscow.

Surrender of Moscow

On September 14, Napoleon occupied Moscow without a fight. Marshal Mortier was appointed military governor, Duronel was appointed commandant of the fortress and city, and Lesseps was appointed “intendant of the city of Moscow and the Moscow province” (civil power). Lesseps “chose”, and Napoleon approved, 22 people from the Russian population, who received the name of the municipality, which had no power.

Already on the night of September 14-15, the city was engulfed in fire, which by the night of September 15-16 intensified so much that Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin.

Up to 400 lower-class townspeople were shot by a French court-martial on suspicion of arson.

There are several versions of the fire:

organized arson when leaving the city (usually associated with the name of the Governor General of Moscow Rostopchin);

arson by Russian spies (several Russians were shot by the French on such charges) and criminals deliberately released from Moscow prisons by Rostopchin;

uncontrolled actions of the occupiers, an accidental fire, the spread of which was facilitated by the general chaos in the abandoned city.

The fire had several sources, so it is possible that all versions are true to one degree or another.

The fire raged until September 18 and destroyed most of Moscow. Of the 30 thousand houses that were in Moscow before the invasion, “hardly 5 thousand” remained after Napoleon left the city.

Three attempts by Napoleon to achieve peace

Napoleon viewed the capture of Moscow as the acquisition, first of all, of an important political, rather than military, position. From here Napoleon discusses the further plan of the military campaign, in particular the campaign against St. Petersburg. This campaign was feared at the St. Petersburg court and in the royal family. But Napoleon’s marshals objected; they considered this plan impracticable - “to go towards winter, to the north” with a reduced army, having Kutuzov in the rear, was unthinkable. Napoleon did not defend this plan.

Also from Moscow, Napoleon made attempts to make peace with Alexander I.

On September 18, Napoleon, through the head of the Orphanage, Major General Ivan Akinfievich Tutolmin, conveyed that he respected Alexander in the old way and would like to make peace. Napoleon, as before, intended to demand the annexation of Lithuania, confirmation of the blockade and a military alliance with France.

September 20. The next attempt was made two days later. A letter offering peace was delivered to Alexander through I. A. Yakovlev (father of A. I. Herzen). There was no response to Tutolmin’s report or Napoleon’s personal letter to Alexander.

On October 4, Napoleon sent General Lauriston to Kutuzov in Tarutino for passage to Alexander I with a peace proposal: “I need peace, I need it absolutely at any cost, save only honor.” On October 5, Lauriston had a half-hour meeting with Field Marshal Kutuzov, after which Prince Volkonsky was sent to Alexander I with a report about Napoleon’s proposal, to which Napoleon did not wait for an answer from Alexander.

People's War against Napoleon

Initially, with the news of the offensive of Napoleonic troops, this information was received ambiguously among the common people. In particular, serious collaborationist sentiments arose, mainly among serfs and courtyard people. Rumors spread that Napoleon wanted to free the peasants, give them freedom and give them land. Already during the military campaign, there were frequent attacks by peasant detachments on Russian government troops; in many areas, the serfs themselves caught the landowners hiding in the forests and brought them to the French camp.

The advance of the French army deep into Russia, the increase in violence against the population, fires in Smolensk and Moscow, the decline in discipline in Napoleon’s army and the transformation of a significant part of it into a gang of marauders and robbers led to growing resistance from the Russian population. Guerrilla warfare and the organization of militia began.

Army partisan units

From June to August 1812, Napoleon's army, pursuing the retreating Russian armies, covered about 1,200 kilometers from the Neman to Moscow. As a result, her communication lines were greatly stretched. The command of the Russian army decided to create flying partisan detachments to operate in the enemy’s rear and communication lines, in order to impede his supply. The most famous, but far from the only commanders of the flying squads were Denis Davydov, Alexander Seslavin, Alexander Figner. Army partisan detachments received full support from the peasants.

Peasant partisan units

Russian soldiers who escaped from captivity and volunteers from among the local population took the initiative to organize self-defense and form partisan detachments. Patriotism as a sense of belonging to a nation was alien to the peasants, but violence and robbery by Napoleonic troops caused guerrilla warfare. Ermolai Chetvertakov, Semyon Shubin, Gerasim Kurin and Yegor Stulov, Vasilisa Kozhina, Samus, Praskovya and other commanders from among the peasants, nobles and townspeople were able to form combat-ready partisan detachments. The guerrilla war was accompanied by unprecedented violence and atrocities on both sides. During its stay in Moscow alone, the French army lost more than 25 thousand people from partisan actions.

The course of the war was significantly influenced by the refusal of the peasants to supply the enemy with provisions and fodder. In the fall of 1812, the chief of police of the Berezinsky subprefecture, Dombrovsky, wrote: “I am ordered to deliver everything, but there is nowhere to take it from... There is a lot of grain in the fields that was not harvested due to the disobedience of the peasants.” Peasant resistance led to interruptions in supplies to the Great Army, whose supply system was based largely on local food procurement.

Militia formation

The partisans formed, as it were, the first ring of encirclement around Moscow, occupied by the French. The second ring consisted of militias. Back on July 6, 1812, Alexander I issued a manifesto ordering the nobles to form a militia from their serfs, join it themselves and choose a commander over themselves. On the same day as the manifesto, an appeal was issued to “Our Mother Capital, Moscow,” containing an appeal to Muscovites to organize a militia. In total, during the War of 1812, more than 400 thousand militias were deployed, of which three districts were formed: the 1st - for the defense of Moscow, the 2nd - for the defense of St. Petersburg and the 3rd - reserve. The militia warriors were organized into foot and horse regiments and squads, divided into battalions, hundreds and dozens.

After the surrender of Moscow, Kutuzov obviously avoided a major battle, the army accumulated strength. During this time, the people collected 60 million rubles to wage the war. In the Russian provinces (Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Tula, Kaluga, Tver and others) a militia of 205 thousand was recruited, in Ukraine - 75 thousand. Only 90 thousand guns were found to arm the militia, and about 50 thousand guns were purchased in England. Partisans and militias surrounded Moscow in a tight ring, threatening to turn Napoleon's strategic encirclement into a tactical one.

Tarutino maneuver

On September 2 (14), while the French were entering Moscow (at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon), Miloradovich's rearguard was leaving Moscow. Sebastiani's French cavalry stopped at Miloradovich's request and allowed the last Russian troops and convoys to pass without a fight. On September 4 (16), the army retreated to the Borovsky transport and moved to the right bank of the Moscow River. In addition to the army, more than 40 thousand convoys and crews of Moscow residents crossed through the Borovsky transportation. The army's main headquarters was located in Kulakovo. On September 5 (17), Kutuzov, moving along the right bank of the Pakhra, crossed the Kashirskaya road, on the 6th he reached Podolsk, and on the 9th - the village of Krasnaya Pakhra on the old Kaluga road. Until September 14 (26), Napoleon did not know where the Russian army was. The Cossacks, retreating along the Ryazan road, deceived and carried away Murat's detachment along two marches, to Bronnitsy. The French lost sight of the Russian army, and only the appearance of the Cossacks on the Mozhaisk road prompted Napoleon to send Józef Poniatowski’s corps to Podolsk on the night of September 10 (22).

The location of the Russian army near Krasnaya Pakhra was covered by: Miloradovich's vanguard - near the village of Desna, Raevsky's corps - near the village of Lukovnya, between the Kaluga and Tula roads, Vasilchikov's cavalry - near Podolsk.

From Krasnaya Pakhra, by October 2, Kutuzov withdrew the army further south to the village of Tarutino, closer to Kaluga. Being on the old Kaluga road, the Russian army covered Tula, Kaluga, Bryansk and the grain-producing southern provinces, and threatened the enemy rear between Moscow and Smolensk.

The English General R. Wilson, who was at the headquarters of the Russian army, pushed the Russian command to a decisive battle. Not yielding to pressure, Kutuzov, in a conversation with L. L. Benningsen, directly stated: “We will never, my dear, agree with you. You think only about the benefit of England, but for me, if this island goes to the bottom of the sea today, I won’t groan.”

In Moscow, Napoleon found himself in a trap; it was not possible to spend the winter in a city devastated by fire: foraging outside the city was not going well, the extended communications of the French were very vulnerable, and the army was beginning to disintegrate. Napoleon began to prepare to retreat to winter quarters somewhere between the Dnieper and Dvina.

On October 18, Russian troops attacked a French barrier under the command of Marshal Murat near Tarutino, which was monitoring the Russian army. Having lost up to 4 thousand soldiers and 38 guns, Murat retreated. The Tarutino battle became a landmark event, marking the transition of the initiative in the war to the Russian army.

Napoleon's retreat (October - December 1812)

Napoleon's main army cut deep into Russia, like a wedge. At the time when Napoleon entered Moscow, the army of General Wittgenstein, held by the French corps of Marshals Saint-Cyr and Oudinot, hung over his left flank in the north in the Polotsk region. Napoleon's right flank trampled near the borders of the Russian Empire in Belarus. The army of General Tormasov connected with its presence the Austrian corps of General Schwarzenberg and the 7th corps of General Rainier. French garrisons along the Smolensk road guarded the communication line and Napoleon's rear.

Strategic plans of the parties after the retreat from Moscow

There are no surviving documents with Napoleon's exact plans for continuing the campaign. All plans are limited to vague phrases that the army will winter somewhere between “Smolensk, Mogilev, Minsk and Vitebsk. ... Moscow no longer represents a military position. I’m going to look for another position from where it will be more profitable to launch a new campaign, the action of which will be directed towards St. Petersburg or Kyiv.”

Kutuzov assumed that Napoleon would most likely retreat to the south or along the Smolensk road. The southwestern direction increasingly appeared in the testimony of prisoners and deserters. Kutuzov placed under surveillance all possible escape routes for Napoleon's army from Moscow. At the same time, the defense of the northern borders of the Volyn, Kyiv, Chernigov and Kaluga provinces was strengthened.

In December 1812, Kutuzov presented a report to Alexander I, in which he gave a strategic overview of the campaign from the day the army retreated to the Tarutino camp until the expulsion of enemy troops from Russia. Referring to Napoleon’s plans after speaking from Moscow, Kutuzov wrote that he was going to “go along the Borovskaya road to Kaluga, and would he be able to defeat us at Maly Yaroslavets, knocking us over the Oka, and settle down in our richest provinces for winter quarters.” Kutuzov's foresight was manifested in the fact that with his Tarutino maneuver he anticipated the movement of French troops to Smolensk through Kaluga.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets

On October 19, the French army (110 thousand) with a huge convoy began to leave Moscow along the Old Kaluga Road. Napoleon planned to get to the nearest large food base in Smolensk through an area not devastated by the war - through Kaluga.

The road to Kaluga was blocked by Napoleon's army, positioned near the village of Tarutino on the Old Kaluga Road. Due to the lack of horses, the French artillery fleet was reduced, and large cavalry formations practically disappeared. Not wanting to break through a fortified position with a weakened army, Napoleon turned around the village of Troitsky (modern Troitsk) onto the New Kaluga Road (modern Kiev Highway) to bypass Tarutino. However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets, cutting off the French retreat along the New Kaluga Road.

On October 24, the battle of Maloyaroslavets took place. The city changed hands eight times. In the end, the French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm. By October 22, Kutuzov's army consisted of 97 thousand regular troops, 20 thousand Cossacks, 622 guns and more than 10 thousand militia warriors. Napoleon had up to 70 thousand combat-ready soldiers at hand, the cavalry had practically disappeared, and the artillery was much weaker than the Russian one. The course of the war was now dictated by the Russian army.

On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk. In the battles for Maloyaroslavets, the Russian army solved a major strategic problem - it thwarted the plan for the French troops to break through to Ukraine and forced the enemy to retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, which they had destroyed. From Mozhaisk, the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the road along which it advanced on Moscow.

From Maloyaroslavets to Berezina

From Maloyaroslavets to the village of Krasnoye (45 km west of Smolensk), Napoleon was pursued by the vanguard of the Russian army under the command of General Miloradovich. General Platov's Cossacks and partisans attacked the retreating French from all sides, greatly complicating the supply of the army. The main army of Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov moved south parallel to Napoleon.

On November 1, Napoleon passed Vyazma. On November 3, the Russian vanguard severely battered the closing corps of the French in the battle of Vyazma.

On November 8, Napoleon entered Smolensk, where he spent 5 days waiting for the stragglers. Napoleon had 40-45 thousand soldiers with 127 guns at his disposal in Smolensk, and about the same number of unfit soldiers who were wounded and lost their weapons. Units of the French army, thinned out on the march from Moscow, entered Smolensk for a whole week with the hope of rest and food. There were no large supplies of food in the city, and what there was was plundered by crowds of uncontrollable soldiers. Napoleon ordered the shooting of the army quartermaster Sioff, who encountered resistance from the peasants and failed to organize the collection of food. The second intendant, Villeblanche, was saved from execution only by the story about the elusive partisan leader Praskovya and the disobedience of the peasants.

On November 9, the combined forces of the partisan detachments of Denis Davydov, Seslavin, Figner and the Orlov-Denisov cavalry detachment of 3,300 people with 4 guns defeated the French brigade of General Augereau in the battle of Lyakhovo, 60 officers and about 1.5 thousand Napoleonic soldiers surrendered.

Napoleon's strategic position was deteriorating: Admiral Chichagov's Danube Army was approaching from the south, General Wittgenstein was advancing from the north, whose vanguard captured Vitebsk on November 7, depriving the French of the food reserves accumulated there.

On November 14, Napoleon and the guard moved from Smolensk following the vanguard corps. Marshal Ney's corps, which was in the rearguard, left Smolensk only on November 17. The column of French troops was greatly extended. Kutuzov took advantage of this circumstance, sending the vanguard under the command of Miloradovich to cut across the corps of Eugene Beauharnais, Davout and Ney in the area of ​​​​the village of Krasnoye. On November 15-18, as a result of the battles near the Red Army, Napoleon’s troops managed to break through, losing many soldiers and most of the artillery.

The Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov (24 thousand) liberated Minsk on November 16, depriving Napoleon of its largest rear center. Moreover, on November 21, Chichagov's vanguard liberated the city of Borisov, where Napoleon planned to cross the Berezina River. The vanguard corps of Marshal Oudinot drove Chichagov from Borisov to the western bank of the Berezina, however, the Russian admiral with a strong army guarded possible crossing points.

On November 24, Napoleon approached the Berezina, breaking away from the pursuing armies of Wittgenstein and Kutuzov.

From Berezina to Neman

On November 25, through a series of skillful maneuvers, Napoleon managed to divert the attention of Admiral Chichagov to the city of Borisov and south of Borisov. Chichagov believed that Napoleon intended to cross in these places in order to take a shortcut to the road to Minsk and then head to join the Austrian allies. Meanwhile, the French built 2 bridges north of Borisov, along which on November 26-27 Napoleon crossed to the right (western) bank of the Berezina River, discarding the weak Russian guards.

Realizing the error, Admiral Chichagov unsuccessfully attacked Napoleon with his main forces on November 28 on the right bank. On the left bank, the French rearguard, defending the crossing, was attacked by the approaching corps of General Wittgenstein. The main army of Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov fell behind.

Without waiting for the entire huge crowd of French stragglers, consisting of the wounded, frostbitten, those who had lost their weapons and civilians, to cross, Napoleon ordered the bridges to be burned on the morning of November 29. The main result of the battle on the Berezina was that Napoleon avoided complete defeat in conditions of significant superiority of Russian forces. In the memories of the French, the crossing of the Berezina occupies no less place than the largest Battle of Borodino.

Having lost 21 thousand people at the crossing, Napoleon, with 9 thousand soldiers remaining under arms, moved towards Vilna, joining along the way French divisions operating in other directions. The army was accompanied by a large crowd of unfit people, mainly soldiers from the allied states who had lost their weapons.

On December 5, Napoleon left the army to Murat and Ney and went to Paris to recruit new soldiers to replace those killed in Russia. On December 16, the last, 29th bulletin of the Grande Armée was published, in which Napoleon was forced to indirectly acknowledge the scale of the losses, attributing them to the premature onset of unusually severe frosts. The bulletin caused shock in French society.

In fact, unusually severe frosts hit only during the crossing of the Berezina. Continuing in the following days, they finally exterminated the French, already weakened by hunger. The better-equipped Russian troops continued the pursuit, despite the cold. The vanguard of Kutuzov's troops, under the command of Ataman Platov, approached Vilna the day after the French entered there. Unable to defend the city and having lost about 20 thousand people in Vilna, Ney and Murat continued their retreat to the Neman River, which divided Russia with Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw.

The size of the Napoleonic army when moving into Russia (beige) and back (black stripes). The width of the stripes reflects the size of the army. The bottom of the graph shows the behavior of air temperature on the Reaumur scale after the Great Army left Moscow (from right to left).

On December 14, in Kovno, the pitiful remnants of the Great Army, numbering 1,600 people, crossed the Neman River to the Duchy of Warsaw, and then to Prussia. Later they were joined by remnants of troops from other directions. The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the almost complete destruction of the invading Great Army.

The last stage of the war was commented on by the impartial observer Clausewitz:

The Russians rarely got ahead of the French, although they had many opportunities for this; when they managed to get ahead of the enemy, they released him every time; in all battles the French remained victorious; the Russians gave them the opportunity to accomplish the impossible; but if we sum it up, it turns out that the French army ceased to exist, and the entire campaign ended in complete success for the Russians, with the exception that they failed to capture Napoleon himself and his closest collaborators...

Northern direction

After the 2nd battle for Polotsk (October 18-20), which took place 2 months after the 1st, Marshal Saint-Cyr retreated south to Chashniki, bringing General Wittgenstein’s advancing army dangerously closer to Napoleon’s rear line. During these days, Napoleon began his retreat from Moscow. Marshal Victor's 9th Corps, which arrived in September as Napoleon's reserve from Europe, was immediately sent to help from Smolensk. The combined forces of the French reached 36 thousand soldiers, which approximately corresponded to the forces of Wittgenstein (30 thousand people). A counter-battle took place on October 31 near Chashniki, as a result of which the French retreated to the south.

Vitebsk remained unprotected; a detachment from the army of General Wittgenstein took the city by storm on November 7, capturing 300 garrison soldiers and food supplies prepared for Napoleon’s retreating army. On November 14, Marshal Victor, in the area of ​​the village of Smolyany, tried to push Wittgenstein back across the Dvina River, however, to no avail, and the parties maintained their positions until Napoleon approached the Berezina River. Then Marshal Victor, joining the main army, retreated to the Berezina as Napoleon's rearguard, holding back Wittgenstein's pressure.

In the Baltic states near Riga, a positional war was fought with rare Russian forays against the corps of Marshal MacDonald. The Finnish corps of General Steingel (12 thousand) came on September 20 to help the garrison of Riga, however, after a successful sortie on September 29 against the French siege artillery, Steingel was transferred to Wittgenstein in Polotsk to the theater of the main military operations. On November 15, Marshal MacDonald, in turn, successfully attacked Russian positions, almost destroying a large Russian detachment.

Marshal MacDonald's 10th Corps began to retreat from Riga towards Prussia only on December 19, after the remnants of Napoleon's main army had left Russia. On December 26, MacDonald's troops had to engage in battle with the vanguard of General Wittgenstein. On December 30, Russian General Dibich concluded an armistice agreement with the commander of the Prussian corps, General York, known at the place of signing as the Taurogen Convention. Thus, Macdonald lost his main forces, he had to hastily retreat through East Prussia.

South direction

On September 18, Admiral Chichagov's 38,000-strong army approached the southern front near Lutsk from the Danube. The combined forces of Admiral Chichagov and General Tormasov (more than 60 thousand) attacked the Austrian General Schwarzenberg (40 thousand), forcing him to retreat to the Duchy of Warsaw in mid-October. Admiral Chichagov, who took over the main command, gave the troops a 2-week rest, after which on October 27 he moved from Brest-Litovsk to Minsk with 24 thousand soldiers, leaving General Saken with a 27 thousand-strong corps against the Austrians.

General Schwarzenberg tried to pursue Chichagov, bypassing the positions of Sacken and hiding from his troops with the Saxon corps of General Rainier. Rainier was unable to hold off Saken's superior forces, and Schwarzenberg was forced to help him. With their joint forces, Rainier and Schwarzenberg forced Sacken to retreat south of Brest-Litovsk, however, as a result, Chichagov’s army broke through to Napoleon’s rear and occupied Minsk on November 16, and on November 21 approached the city of Borisov on the Berezina, where the retreating Napoleon planned to cross.

On November 27, Schwarzenberg, by order of Napoleon, moved to Minsk, but stopped in Slonim, from where on December 14 he retreated through Bialystok to the Duchy of Warsaw.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

Immediate results of the war

The main result of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the almost complete destruction of Napoleon's Grand Army.

According to the calculations of the military historian Clausewitz, the army of the invasion of Russia, together with reinforcements during the war, numbered 610 thousand soldiers, including 50 thousand soldiers from Austria and Prussia. According to the Prussian official Auerswald, by December 21, 1812, 255 generals, 5,111 officers, 26,950 lower ranks had passed through East Prussia from the Great Army, “all in a very pitiful condition.” To these 30 thousand must be added approximately 6 thousand soldiers (returned to the French army) from the corps of General Rainier and Marshal MacDonald, operating in the northern and southern directions. Many of those who returned to Königsberg, according to Count Segur, died of illness upon reaching safe territory.

The surviving officers formed the backbone of Napoleon's new army, recruited in 1813.

Thus, Napoleon lost about 580 thousand soldiers in Russia. These losses, according to T. Lenz’s calculations, include 200 thousand killed, from 150 to 190 thousand prisoners, about 130 thousand deserters who fled to their homeland (mainly from among the Prussian, Austrian, Saxon and Westphalian troops, but there were also examples among French soldiers), about 60 thousand more fugitives were sheltered by Russian peasants, townspeople and nobles. Of the 47 thousand guards who entered Russia with the emperor, six months later only a few hundred soldiers remained. Over 1,200 guns were lost in Russia.

The historian of the mid-19th century Bogdanovich calculated the replenishment of the Russian armies during the war according to the statements of the Military Scientific Archive of the General Staff. The total loss by December 1812 was 210 thousand soldiers. Of these, according to Bogdanovich, up to 40 thousand returned to duty. The losses of the corps operating in secondary directions and the militias could be approximately the same 40 thousand people. In general, Bogdanovich estimated the losses of the Russian army at 210 thousand soldiers and militias.

In January 1813, the “Overseas Campaign of the Russian Army” began - the fighting moved to the territory of Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated in the Battle of Leipzig, and in April 1814 he abdicated the throne of France (see War of the Sixth Coalition).

Reasons for Napoleon's defeat

Among the reasons for Napoleon's defeat in his Russian campaign, the most often cited are:

popular participation in the war and mass heroism of Russian soldiers and officers;

the length of Russia's territory and harsh climatic conditions;

military leadership talent of the commander-in-chief of the Russian army Kutuzov and other generals.

The main reason for Napoleon's defeat was a nationwide upsurge in defense of the fatherland. As D. Lieven shows, the people's war was not only spontaneous, but also ideologically justified “from above” (and even before the start of the war). In the unity of the Russian army with the people we must look for the source of its power in 1812.

The Russian army's abandonment of a pitched battle on the border and retreat deep into the vast territories of the Russian Empire led to "a change in plans that forced Napoleon to advance further, beyond the effective limits of his supply system." The stubborn resistance of the Russian troops and the ability of the Russian commanders M.B. Barclay de Tolly and M.I. Kutuzov to preserve the army did not allow Napoleon to win the war by winning one big battle.

As they moved away from the Niemen, Napoleonic army was forced to rely more and more on foraging rather than on a system of pre-prepared stores. In conditions of the large stretch of supply lines, the decisive role was played by the indiscipline of the French foraging teams, staffed with low-quality recruits and conscripts, and the resistance of the Russian people to the enemy by concealing food and fodder, the armed struggle of partisans with French foragers and the interception of enemy convoys (the so-called asymmetrical war) . The combination of these reasons led to the collapse of the French system of supplying troops with food and fodder and ultimately to famine and the transformation of most of the army into an incapable crowd in which everyone dreamed only of personal salvation.

At the final stage of the war, in December immediately after the Berezina, this depressing picture was aggravated by frost below −20 ° C, which completely demoralized Napoleon’s army. The defeat was completed by the Russian army, which, as Clausewitz put it, continued its retreat and finally brought the enemy to the border again:

In Russia, you can play “cat and mouse” with your enemy and, thus, continuing to retreat, in the end you can again bring the enemy to the border. This figurative expression... reflects mainly the spatial factor and the benefits of gigantic extensions, which do not allow the attacker to cover the traversed space with a simple advance and strategically take possession of it.

Long-term consequences of the war

The defeat of Napoleon in Russia allowed the international coalition, in which Russia played the main role, to crush the French Empire. The victory over Napoleon raised the international prestige of Russia as never before, which played a decisive role at the Congress of Vienna and in the following decades exercised a decisive influence on European affairs. At the same time, the strengthening of Russia's foreign policy was not supported by the development of its internal structure. Although the victory inspired and united the entire Russian society, military successes did not lead to a change in the socio-economic structure of Russian life. Many peasants who were soldiers and militiamen in the Russian army marched victoriously across Europe and saw that serfdom was abolished everywhere. The peasantry expected significant changes, which did not materialize. Russian serfdom continued to exist after 1812. Some historians are inclined to believe that at that time all the socio-economic conditions that would immediately lead to its collapse were not yet present. However, a sharp surge in peasant uprisings and the formation of political opposition among the progressive nobility, which followed immediately after the hostilities, refute this view.

It is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that, in fact, the victory over Napoleonic France led to the restoration of reactionary regimes in Europe and the abolition of many democratic initiatives in social life. And feudal imperial Russia played a key role in all this. The Holy Alliance, which arose soon after the war, created on the initiative and under the patronage of Emperor Alexander I, began to actively suppress any manifestations of national independence, civil and religious freedom in European states.

The victory in the Patriotic War caused not only a rise in the national spirit, but also a desire for free thought, which ultimately led to the Decembrist uprising in 1825. A. A. Bestuzhev wrote to Nicholas I from the Peter and Paul Fortress: “... Napoleon invaded Russia, and then the Russian people first felt their strength; It was then that a feeling of independence, first political, and subsequently popular, awakened in all hearts. This is the beginning of free thought in Russia.”

Not only the Decembrists are linked with 1812; the idea was expressed long ago: “without the twelfth year there would have been no Pushkin.” The entire Russian culture and national identity received a powerful impetus in the year of the Napoleonic invasion. According to A.I. Herzen, from the point of view of the creative activity of broad layers of society, “the true history of Russia is revealed only by 1812; everything that happened before was just a preface.”

Many former prisoners of war from Napoleonic Grand Army after the Patriotic War of 1812 remained on Russian territory and accepted Russian citizenship. An example is the several thousand “Orenburg French” who were enrolled in the Cossacks of the Orenburg Army. V. D. Dandeville, the son of the former French officer Désiré d’Andeville, subsequently became a Russian general and ataman of the Ural Cossack army. Many of the captured Poles who served in Napoleon's army were enlisted in the Siberian Cossacks. Soon after the end of the campaigns of 1812-1814. these Poles were given the right to return to their homeland. But many of them, having already married Russians, did not want to take advantage of this right and remained among the Siberian Cossacks forever, later receiving the ranks of police officers and even officers. Many of them, possessing a completely European education, were appointed teachers at the Cossack military school that opened soon after (the future cadet corps). Later, the descendants of these Poles completely merged with the rest of the population of the army, becoming completely Russian, both in appearance and language, and in faith and the Russian spirit. Only surviving surnames like: Svarovsky, Yanovsky, Kostyletsky, Yadrovsky, Legchinsky, Dabshynsky, Stabrovsky, Lyaskovsky, Edomsky, Zhagulsky and many others show that the ancestors of the Cossacks bearing these surnames were once Poles.

The Patriotic War of 1812 became part of the historical memory of the Russian people. According to the Russian historian, literary critic and publisher P. I. Bartenev: “One has only to read the description of the Patriotic War, so that not only those who love Russia will love it, but those who love it will love it even more passionately, even more sincerely and thank God that such is Russia.”

During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, the memory of the heroes of 1812, among other things, helped to overcome the loss of morale in the troops during the defeats and retreats at the initial stage of the invasion of Nazi Germany and its European allies in the fascist bloc on the Soviet Union.

Memory of the War of 1812

On August 30, 1814, Emperor Alexander I issued the following manifesto: “December 25, the day of the Nativity of Christ, will henceforth be a day of thanksgiving celebration under the name in the church circle: the Nativity of our Savior Jesus Christ and the remembrance of the deliverance of the Church and the Russian Power from the invasion of the Gauls and with them the twenty tongues " Until 1917, the holiday of the Nativity of Christ was celebrated in the Russian Empire as national Victory Day.

The Patriotic War of 1812 occupies a significant place in the historical memory of Russian and other peoples; it is reflected both in scientific research and in works of architecture and art, in other cultural events and phenomena, below are some examples:

The Patriotic War of 1812 is the subject of the greatest number of studies compared to any other event in the thousand-year history of Russia until 1917. More than 15 thousand books and articles have been written specifically about the war.

To commemorate the victory in the Patriotic War of 1812, many monuments were erected, of which the most famous are:

Cathedral of Christ the Savior (Moscow);

ensemble of Palace Square with the Alexander Column (St. Petersburg).

The Winter Palace has a Military Gallery, which consists of 332 portraits of Russian generals who participated in the Patriotic War of 1812. Most of the portraits were done by the Englishman George Dow.

Every year on the first Sunday of September on the Borodino field, more than a thousand participants recreate episodes of the Battle of Borodino during a military-historical reconstruction.

One of the most famous works of world literature was L. N. Tolstoy’s novel “War and Peace.”

Based on the novel by Tolstoy in the USSR, the film directed by S. Bondarchuk “War and Peace” won an Oscar in 1968; its large-scale battle scenes are still considered unsurpassed.

S. S. Prokofiev wrote the opera “War and Peace” on his own libretto together with Mira Mendelssohn-Prokofieva (1943; final edition 1952; first production 1946, Leningrad).

100th anniversary of the Patriotic War

In 1912, the year of the centenary of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian government decided to search for living participants in the war. In the vicinity of Tobolsk, Pavel Yakovlevich Tolstoguzov (illustrated), an alleged participant in the Battle of Borodino, who was 117 years old at that time, was found.

200th anniversary of the Patriotic War

Internet project of the Russian State Library “The Patriotic War of 1812: The Epoch in Documents, Memoirs, Illustrations.” Provides access to full-text resources - electronic copies of publications related to that era and published in the 19th - early 20th centuries.

The RIA Novosti Internet project “1812: War and Peace” became the winner of the Runet Prize - 2012.

From August 12 to October 19, 2012, a detachment of Don Cossacks on horses of the Don breed repeated Platov’s campaign “to Paris” (“Moscow-Paris March”). The purpose of the campaign was also to worship the graves of Russian soldiers along the route.

PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1812

Causes and nature of the war. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the largest event in Russian history. Its emergence was caused by Napoleon's desire to achieve world domination. In Europe, only Russia and England maintained their independence. Despite the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia continued to oppose the expansion of Napoleonic aggression. Napoleon was especially irritated by her systematic violation of the continental blockade. Since 1810, both sides, realizing the inevitability of a new clash, were preparing for war. Napoleon flooded the Duchy of Warsaw with his troops and created military warehouses there. The threat of invasion looms over Russia's borders. In turn, the Russian government increased the number of troops in the western provinces.

In the military conflict between the two sides, Napoleon became the aggressor. He began military operations and invaded Russian territory. In this regard, for the Russian people the war became a liberation war, a Patriotic war. Not only the regular army, but also the broad masses of the people took part in it.

Correlation of forces. In preparation for the war against Russia, Napoleon gathered a significant army - up to 678 thousand soldiers. These were perfectly armed and trained troops, seasoned in previous wars. They were led by a galaxy of brilliant marshals and generals - L. Davout, L. Berthier, M. Ney, I. Murat and others. They were commanded by the most famous commander of that time, Napoleon Bonaparte. The weak point of his army was its motley national composition. German and Spanish The aggressive plans of the French bourgeoisie were deeply alien to the Polish and Portuguese, Austrian and Italian soldiers.

Active preparations for the war that Russia had been waging since 1810 brought results. She managed to create modern armed forces for that time, powerful artillery, which, as it turned out during the war, was superior to the French. The troops were led by talented military leaders M.I. Kutuzov, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, P.I. Bagration, A.P. Ermolov, N.N. Raevsky, M.A. Miloradovich and others. They were distinguished by their great military experience and personal courage. The advantage of the Russian army was determined by the patriotic enthusiasm of all segments of the population, large human resources, food and fodder reserves.

However, at the initial stage of the war, the French army outnumbered the Russian one. The first echelon of troops that entered Russia numbered 450 thousand people, while the Russians on the western border were about 320 thousand people, divided into three armies. 1st - under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - covered the St. Petersburg direction, the 2nd - led by P.I. Bagration - defended the center of Russia, the 3rd - General A.P. Tormasov - was located in the southern direction.

Plans of the parties. Napoleon planned to seize a significant part of Russian territory up to Moscow and sign a new treaty with Alexander to subjugate Russia. Napoleon's strategic plan was based on his military experience acquired during the wars in Europe. He intended to prevent the dispersed Russian forces from uniting and deciding the outcome of the war in one or more border battles.

Even on the eve of the war, the Russian emperor and his entourage decided not to make any compromises with Napoleon. If the clash was successful, they intended to transfer hostilities to the territory of Western Europe. In case of defeat, Alexander was ready to retreat to Siberia (all the way to Kamchatka, according to him) to continue the fight from there. Russia had several strategic military plans. One of them was developed by the Prussian General Fuhl. It provided for the concentration of most of the Russian army in a fortified camp near the city of Drissa on the Western Dvina. According to Fuhl, this gave an advantage in the first border battle. The project remained unrealized, since the position on Drissa was unfavorable and the fortifications were weak. In addition, the balance of forces forced the Russian command to choose a strategy of active defense, i.e. retreat with rearguard battles deep into Russian territory. As the course of the war showed, this was the most correct decision.

The beginning of the war. On the morning of June 12, 1812, French troops crossed the Neman and invaded Russia by forced march.

The 1st and 2nd Russian armies retreated, avoiding a general battle. They fought stubborn rearguard battles with individual units of the French, exhausting and weakening the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. The Russian troops faced two main tasks - to eliminate disunity (not to allow themselves to be defeated individually) and to establish unity of command in the army. The first task was solved on July 22, when the 1st and 2nd armies united near Smolensk. Thus, Napoleon's original plan was thwarted. On August 8, Alexander appointed M.I. Kutuzov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. This meant solving the second problem. M.I. Kutuzov took command of the combined Russian forces on 17 August. He did not change his retreat tactics. However, the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle. She was found near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow.

Battle of Borodino. M.I. Kutuzov chose defensive tactics and deployed his troops in accordance with this. The left flank was defended by the army of P.I. Bagration, covered with artificial earthen fortifications - flashes. In the center there was an earthen mound where the artillery and troops of General N.N. were located. Raevsky. Army M.B. Barclay de Tolly was on the right flank.

Napoleon adhered to offensive tactics. He intended to break through the defenses of the Russian army on the flanks, encircle it and completely defeat it.

Early in the morning of August 26, the French launched an offensive on the left flank. The fight for flushes lasted until 12 noon. Both sides suffered huge losses. General P.I. was seriously wounded. Bagration. (He died from his wounds a few days later.) Taking the flushes did not bring any particular advantages to the French, since they were unable to break through the left flank. The Russians retreated in an orderly manner and took up a position near the Semenovsky ravine.

At the same time, the situation in the center, where Napoleon directed the main attack, became more complicated. To help the troops of General N.N. Raevsky M.I. Kutuzov ordered the Cossacks M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps F.P. Uvarov to carry out a raid behind French lines. Napoleon was forced to interrupt the assault on the battery for almost 2 hours. This allowed M.I. Kutuzov to bring fresh forces to the center. Battery N.N. Raevsky passed from hand to hand several times and was captured by the French only at 16:00.

The capture of Russian fortifications did not mean Napoleon's victory. On the contrary, the offensive impulse of the French army dried up. She needed fresh forces, but Napoleon did not dare to use his last reserve - the imperial guard. The battle, which lasted more than 12 hours, gradually subsided. The losses on both sides were enormous. Borodino was a moral and political victory for the Russians: the combat potential of the Russian army was preserved, while Napoleonic's was significantly weakened. Far from France, in the vast Russian expanses, it was difficult to restore it.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets. After Borodino, the Russians began to retreat to Moscow. Napoleon followed, but did not strive for a new battle. On September 1, a military council of the Russian command took place in the village of Fili. M.I. Kutuzov, contrary to the general opinion of the generals, decided to leave Moscow. The French army entered it on September 2, 1812.

M.I. Kutuzov, withdrawing troops from Moscow, carried out an original plan - the Tarutino march-maneuver. Retreating from Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army turned sharply to the south and in the Krasnaya Pakhra area reached the old Kaluga road. This maneuver, firstly, prevented the French from seizing the Kaluga and Tula provinces, where ammunition and food were collected. Secondly, M.I. Kutuzov managed to break away from Napoleon's army. He set up a camp in Tarutino, where the Russian troops rested and were replenished with fresh regular units, militia, weapons and food supplies.

The occupation of Moscow did not benefit Napoleon. Abandoned by the inhabitants (an unprecedented case in history), it burned in the fire. There was no food or other supplies in it. The French army was completely demoralized and turned into a bunch of robbers and marauders. Its decomposition was so strong that Napoleon had only two options - either immediately make peace or begin a retreat. But all the peace proposals of the French emperor were unconditionally rejected by M.I. Kutuzov and Alexander.

On October 7, the French left Moscow. Napoleon still hoped to defeat the Russians or at least break into the unravaged southern regions, since the issue of providing the army with food and fodder was very acute. He moved his troops to Kaluga. On October 12, another bloody battle took place near the town of Maloyaroslavets. Once again, neither side achieved a decisive victory. However, the French were stopped and forced to retreat along the Smolensk road they had destroyed.

Expulsion of Napoleon from Russia. The retreat of the French army looked like a disorderly flight. It was accelerated by the unfolding partisan movement and the offensive actions of Russian troops.

The patriotic upsurge began literally immediately after Napoleon entered Russia. The robberies and looting of French soldiers provoked resistance from local residents. But this was not the main thing - the Russian people could not put up with the presence of invaders on their native land. History includes the names of ordinary people (A.N. Seslavin, G.M. Kurin, E.V. Chetvertakov, V. Kozhina) who organized partisan detachments. “flying detachments” of regular army soldiers led by career officers were also sent to the French rear.

At the final stage of the war, M.I. Kutuzov chose the tactics of parallel pursuit. He took care of every Russian soldier and understood that the enemy’s forces were melting every day. The final defeat of Napoleon was planned near the city of Borisov. For this purpose, troops were brought up from the south and north-west. Serious damage was inflicted on the French near the city of Krasny in early November, when more than half of the 50 thousand people of the retreating army were captured or died in battle. Fearing encirclement, Napoleon hastened to transport his troops across the Berezina River on November 14-17. The battle at the crossing completed the defeat of the French army. Napoleon abandoned her and secretly left for Paris. Order M.I. Kutuzov on the army on December 21 and the Tsar's Manifesto on December 25, 1812 marked the end of the Patriotic War.

The meaning of war. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the greatest event in Russian History. During its course, heroism, courage, patriotism and selfless love of all layers of society and especially ordinary people for their own were clearly demonstrated. Homeland. However, the war caused significant damage to the Russian economy, which was estimated at 1 billion rubles. About 2 million people died. Many western regions of the country were devastated. All this had a huge impact on the further internal development of Russia.

What you need to know about this topic:

Socio-economic development of Russia in the first half of the 19th century. Social structure of the population.

Development of agriculture.

Development of Russian industry in the first half of the 19th century. The formation of capitalist relations. Industrial revolution: essence, prerequisites, chronology.

Development of water and highway communications. Start of railway construction.

Exacerbation of socio-political contradictions in the country. The palace coup of 1801 and the accession to the throne of Alexander I. “The days of Alexander were a wonderful beginning.”

Peasant question. Decree "On Free Plowmen". Government measures in the field of education. State activities of M.M. Speransky and his plan for state reforms. Creation of the State Council.

Russia's participation in anti-French coalitions. Treaty of Tilsit.

Patriotic War of 1812. International relations on the eve of the war. Causes and beginning of the war. Balance of forces and military plans of the parties. M.B. Barclay de Tolly. P.I. Bagration. M.I.Kutuzov. Stages of war. Results and significance of the war.

Foreign campaigns of 1813-1814. Congress of Vienna and its decisions. Holy Alliance.

The internal situation of the country in 1815-1825. Strengthening conservative sentiments in Russian society. A.A. Arakcheev and Arakcheevism. Military settlements.

Foreign policy of tsarism in the first quarter of the 19th century.

The first secret organizations of the Decembrists were the “Union of Salvation” and the “Union of Prosperity”. Northern and Southern society. The main program documents of the Decembrists are “Russian Truth” by P.I. Pestel and “Constitution” by N.M. Muravyov. Death of Alexander I. Interregnum. Uprising on December 14, 1825 in St. Petersburg. Uprising of the Chernigov regiment. Investigation and trial of the Decembrists. The significance of the Decembrist uprising.

The beginning of the reign of Nicholas I. Strengthening autocratic power. Further centralization and bureaucratization of the Russian state system. Intensifying repressive measures. Creation of the III department. Censorship regulations. The era of censorship terror.

Codification. M.M. Speransky. Reform of state peasants. P.D. Kiselev. Decree "On Obligated Peasants".

Polish uprising 1830-1831

The main directions of Russian foreign policy in the second quarter of the 19th century.

Eastern question. Russian-Turkish War 1828-1829 The problem of the straits in Russian foreign policy in the 30s and 40s of the 19th century.

Russia and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848. in Europe.

Crimean War. International relations on the eve of the war. Causes of the war. Progress of military operations. Russia's defeat in the war. Peace of Paris 1856. International and domestic consequences of the war.

Annexation of the Caucasus to Russia.

The formation of the state (imamate) in the North Caucasus. Muridism. Shamil. Caucasian War. The significance of the annexation of the Caucasus to Russia.

Social thought and social movement in Russia in the second quarter of the 19th century.

Formation of government ideology. The theory of official nationality. Mugs from the late 20s - early 30s of the 19th century.

N.V. Stankevich’s circle and German idealistic philosophy. A.I. Herzen’s circle and utopian socialism. "Philosophical Letter" by P.Ya.Chaadaev. Westerners. Moderate. Radicals. Slavophiles. M.V. Butashevich-Petrashevsky and his circle. The theory of "Russian socialism" by A.I. Herzen.

Socio-economic and political prerequisites for bourgeois reforms of the 60-70s of the 19th century.

Peasant reform. Preparation of reform. "Regulation" February 19, 1861 Personal liberation of the peasants. Allotments. Ransom. Duties of peasants. Temporary condition.

Zemstvo, judicial, urban reforms. Financial reforms. Reforms in the field of education. Censorship rules. Military reforms. The meaning of bourgeois reforms.

Socio-economic development of Russia in the second half of the 19th century. Social structure of the population.

Industrial development. Industrial revolution: essence, prerequisites, chronology. The main stages of the development of capitalism in industry.

The development of capitalism in agriculture. Rural community in post-reform Russia. Agrarian crisis of the 80-90s of the XIX century.

Social movement in Russia in the 50-60s of the 19th century.

Social movement in Russia in the 70-90s of the 19th century.

Revolutionary populist movement of the 70s - early 80s of the 19th century.

"Land and Freedom" of the 70s of the XIX century. "People's Will" and "Black Redistribution". Assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881. The collapse of Narodnaya Volya.

Labor movement in the second half of the 19th century. Strike struggle. The first workers' organizations. A work issue arises. Factory legislation.

Liberal populism of the 80-90s of the 19th century. Spread of the ideas of Marxism in Russia. Group "Emancipation of Labor" (1883-1903). The emergence of Russian social democracy. Marxist circles of the 80s of the XIX century.

St. Petersburg "Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class." V.I. Ulyanov. "Legal Marxism".

Political reaction of the 80-90s of the XIX century. The era of counter-reforms.

Alexander III. Manifesto on the “inviolability” of autocracy (1881). The policy of counter-reforms. Results and significance of counter-reforms.

International position of Russia after the Crimean War. Changing the country's foreign policy program. The main directions and stages of Russian foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century.

Russia in the system of international relations after the Franco-Prussian war. Union of Three Emperors.

Russia and the Eastern crisis of the 70s of the XIX century. The goals of Russia's policy in the eastern question. Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878: causes, plans and forces of the parties, course of military operations. Treaty of San Stefano. Berlin Congress and its decisions. The role of Russia in the liberation of the Balkan peoples from the Ottoman yoke.

Foreign policy of Russia in the 80-90s of the XIX century. Formation of the Triple Alliance (1882). Deterioration of Russia's relations with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Conclusion of the Russian-French alliance (1891-1894).

• Buganov V.I., Zyryanov P.N. History of Russia: the end of the 17th - 19th centuries. . - M.: Education, 1996.

Patriotic War of 1812
	Russian empire
	Almost complete destruction of Napoleon's army
Opponents
Allies:	Allies:
	England and Sweden did not participate in the war on Russian territory
Commanders
Napoleon I	Alexander I
E. MacDonald	M. I. Kutuzov
Jerome Bonaparte	M. B. Barclay de Tolly
K.-F. Schwarzenberg, E. Beauharnais	P. I. Bagration †
N.-Sh. Oudinot	A. P. Tormasov
K.-V. Perrin	P. V. Chichagov
L.-N. Davout,	P. H. Wittgenstein
Strengths of the parties
610 thousand soldiers, 1370 guns	650 thousand soldiers, 1600 guns, 400 thousand militias
Military losses
About 550 thousand, 1200 guns	210 thousand soldiers

Patriotic War of 1812- military actions in 1812 between Russia and the army of Napoleon Bonaparte that invaded its territory. In Napoleonic studies the term " Russian campaign of 1812"(fr. campagne de Russie pendant l "année 1812).

It ended with the almost complete destruction of Napoleonic army and the transfer of military operations to the territory of Poland and Germany in 1813.

Napoleon originally called for this war second Polish, because one of his declared goals of the campaign was the revival of the Polish independent state in opposition to the Russian Empire, including the territories of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. In pre-revolutionary literature there is such an epithet of war as “the invasion of twelve languages.”

Background

Political situation on the eve of the war

After the defeat of Russian troops in the Battle of Friedland in June 1807. Emperor Alexander I concluded the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon, according to which he undertook to join the continental blockade of England. By agreement with Napoleon, Russia took Finland from Sweden in 1808 and made a number of other territorial acquisitions; Napoleon had a free hand to conquer all of Europe with the exception of England and Spain. After an unsuccessful attempt to marry the Russian Grand Duchess, in 1810 Napoleon married Marie-Louise of Austria, daughter of the Austrian Emperor Franz, thus strengthening his rear and creating a foothold in Europe.

French troops, after a series of annexations, moved close to the borders of the Russian Empire.

On February 24, 1812, Napoleon concluded an alliance treaty with Prussia, which was supposed to field 20 thousand soldiers against Russia, as well as provide logistics for the French army. Napoleon also concluded a military alliance with Austria on March 14 of the same year, according to which the Austrians pledged to field 30 thousand soldiers against Russia.

Russia also diplomatically prepared the rear. As a result of secret negotiations in the spring of 1812, the Austrians made it clear that their army would not go far from the Austro-Russian border and would not be zealous at all for the benefit of Napoleon. In April of the same year, on the Swedish side, former Napoleonic Marshal Bernadotte (the future King of Sweden Charles XIV), elected crown prince in 1810 and de facto head of the Swedish aristocracy, gave assurances of his friendly position towards Russia and concluded an alliance treaty. On May 22, 1812, the Russian ambassador Kutuzov (the future field marshal and Napoleon's conqueror) managed to conclude a profitable peace with Turkey, ending the five-year war for Moldavia. In the south of Russia, Chichagov’s Danube Army was released as a barrier against Austria, which was forced to be in an alliance with Napoleon.

On May 19, 1812, Napoleon left for Dresden, where he reviewed the vassal monarchs of Europe. From Dresden, the emperor went to the “Great Army” on the Neman River, which separated Prussia and Russia. On June 22, Napoleon wrote an appeal to the troops, in which he accused Russia of violating the Tilsit Agreement and called the invasion the second Polish war. The liberation of Poland became one of the slogans that made it possible to attract many Poles into the French army. Even the French marshals did not understand the meaning and goals of the invasion of Russia, but they habitually obeyed.

At 2 o'clock in the morning on June 24, 1812, Napoleon ordered the start of the crossing to the Russian bank of the Neman through 4 bridges above Kovno.

Causes of the war

The French infringed on the interests of Russians in Europe and threatened the restoration of independent Poland. Napoleon demanded that Tsar Alexander I tighten the blockade of England. The Russian Empire did not respect the continental blockade and imposed duties on French goods. Russia demanded the withdrawal of French troops from Prussia, stationed there in violation of the Treaty of Tilsit.

Armed forces of opponents

Napoleon was able to concentrate about 450 thousand soldiers against Russia, of which the French themselves made up half. Italians, Poles, Germans, Dutch, and even Spaniards mobilized by force also took part in the campaign. Austria and Prussia allocated corps (30 and 20 thousand, respectively) against Russia under alliance agreements with Napoleon.

Spain, having tied up about 200 thousand French soldiers with partisan resistance, provided great assistance to Russia. England provided material and financial support to Russia, but its army was involved in battles in Spain, and the strong British fleet could not influence land operations in Europe, although it was one of the factors that tilted Sweden's position in favor of Russia.

Napoleon had the following reserves: about 90 thousand French soldiers in the garrisons of central Europe (of which 60 thousand in the 11th reserve corps in Prussia) and 100 thousand in the French National Guard, which by law could not fight outside France.

Russia had a large army, but could not quickly mobilize troops due to poor roads and vast territory. The blow of Napoleon's army was taken by the troops stationed on the western border: Barclay's 1st Army and Bagration's 2nd Army, a total of 153 thousand soldiers and 758 guns. Even further south in Volyn (northwest Ukraine) was located the 3rd Army of Tormasov (up to 45 thousand, 168 guns), which served as a barrier from Austria. In Moldova, Chichagov’s Danube Army (55 thousand, 202 guns) stood against Turkey. In Finland, the corps of the Russian General Shteingel (19 thousand, 102 guns) stood against Sweden. In the Riga area there was a separate Essen corps (up to 18 thousand), up to 4 reserve corps were located further from the border.

According to the lists, the irregular Cossack troops numbered up to 110 thousand light cavalry, but in reality up to 20 thousand Cossacks took part in the war.

	Infantry, thousand	Cavalry, thousand	Artillery	Cossacks, thousand	Garrisons, thousand	Note
			35-40 thousand soldiers, 1600 guns			110-132 thousand in Barclay’s 1st Army in Lithuania, 39-48 thousand in Bagration’s 2nd Army in Belarus, 40-48 thousand in the 3rd Army of Tormasov in Ukraine, 52-57 thousand on the Danube, 19 thousand in Finland, the rest of the troops in the Caucasus and throughout the country
			1370 guns		190 Outside Russia	450 thousand invaded Russia. After the start of the war, another 140 thousand arrived in Russia in the form of reinforcements. In the garrisons of Europe up to 90 thousand + National Guard in France (100 thousand) Also not listed here are 200 thousand in Spain and 30 thousand allied corps from Austria. The values ​​given include all troops under Napoleon, including soldiers from the German states of the Rhineland, Prussia, the Italian kingdoms, Poland.

Strategic plans of the parties

From the very beginning, the Russian side planned a long, organized retreat in order to avoid the risk of a decisive battle and the possible loss of the army. Emperor Alexander I told the French ambassador to Russia, Armand Caulaincourt, in a private conversation in May 1811:

« If Emperor Napoleon starts a war against me, then it is possible and even probable that he will beat us if we accept the battle, but this will not yet give him peace. The Spaniards were beaten repeatedly, but they were neither defeated nor subjugated. And yet they are not as far from Paris as we are: they have neither our climate nor our resources. We won't take any risks. We have vast space behind us, and we will maintain a well-organized army. […] If the lot of arms decides the case against me, then I would rather retreat to Kamchatka than cede my provinces and sign treaties in my capital that are only a respite. The Frenchman is brave, but long hardships and bad climate tire and discourage him. Our climate and our winter will fight for us.»

However, the original campaign plan developed by the military theorist Pfuel proposed defense at the Driss fortified camp. During the war, Pfuel's plan was rejected by the generals as impossible to implement in the conditions of modern maneuver warfare. Artillery warehouses for supplying the Russian army were located in three lines:

• Vilna - Dinaburg - Nesvizh - Bobruisk - Polonnoe - Kyiv
• Pskov - Porkhov - Shostka - Bryansk - Smolensk
• Moscow - Novgorod - Kaluga

Napoleon wished to conduct a limited campaign for 1812. He told Metternich: “ Triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I'll stop there.“The French emperor hoped that the defeat of the Russian army in the general battle would force Alexander to accept his conditions. Caulaincourt in his memoirs recalls Napoleon’s phrase: “ He started talking about Russian nobles who, in the event of war, would fear for their palaces and, after a major battle, would force Emperor Alexander to sign peace.»

Napoleon's offensive (June–September 1812)

At 6 a.m. on June 24 (June 12, old style), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered Russian Kovno (modern Kaunas in Lithuania), crossing the Neman. The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the French army (1st, 2nd, 3rd infantry corps, guards and cavalry) near Kovno took 4 days.

On June 29-30, near Prena (modern Prienai in Lithuania) a little south of Kovno, another group (79 thousand soldiers: 6th and 4th infantry corps, cavalry) under the command of Prince Beauharnais crossed the Neman.

At the same time, on June 30, even further south near Grodno, the Neman was crossed by 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers: 5th, 7th, 8th infantry and 4th cavalry corps) under the overall command of Jerome Bonaparte.

North of Kovno near Tilsit, the Neman crossed the 10th Corps of the French Marshal MacDonald. In the south of the central direction from Warsaw, the Bug River was crossed by a separate Austrian corps of Schwarzenberg (30-33 thousand soldiers).

Emperor Alexander I learned of the start of the invasion late in the evening of June 24 in Vilna (modern Vilnius in Lithuania). And already on June 28, the French entered Vilna. Only on July 16, Napoleon, having arranged state affairs in occupied Lithuania, left the city following his troops.

From Neman to Smolensk (July - August 1812)

Northern direction

Napoleon sent Marshal MacDonald's 10th Corps, consisting of 32 thousand Prussians and Germans, to the north of the Russian Empire. His goal was to capture Riga, and then, uniting with the 2nd Corps of Marshal Oudinot (28 thousand), attack St. Petersburg. The core of MacDonald's corps was a 20,000-strong Prussian corps under the command of General Gravert (later York). MacDonald approached the fortifications of Riga, however, lacking siege artillery, he stopped at the distant approaches to the city. The military governor of Riga, Essen, burned the outskirts and locked himself in the city with a strong garrison. Trying to support Oudinot, Macdonald captured the abandoned Dinaburg on the Western Dvina and stopped active operations, waiting for siege artillery from East Prussia. The Prussians of MacDonald's corps tried to avoid active military clashes in this foreign war, however, if the situation threatened the “honor of the Prussian arms,” the Prussians offered active resistance, and repeatedly repulsed Russian forays from Riga with heavy losses.

Oudinot, having occupied Polotsk, decided to bypass Wittgenstein’s separate corps (25 thousand), allocated by Barclay’s 1st Army during the retreat through Polotsk, from the north, and cut it off from the rear. Fearing Oudinot's connection with MacDonald, on July 30 Wittgenstein attacked Oudinot's 2/3 corps, which was not expecting an attack and was weakened by a march on the 2/3 corps, in the battle of Klyastitsy and threw it back to Polotsk. The victory allowed Wittgenstein to attack Polotsk on August 17-18, but Saint-Cyr's corps, timely sent by Napoleon to support Oudinot's corps, helped repulse the attack and restore balance.

Oudinot and MacDonald were stuck in low-intensity fighting, remaining in place.

Moscow direction

Units of Barclay's 1st Army were scattered from the Baltic to Lida, with headquarters located in Vilna. In view of Napoleon's rapid advance, the divided Russian corps faced the threat of being defeated piecemeal. Dokhturov's corps found itself in an operational environment, but was able to escape and arrive at the Sventsyany assembly point. At the same time, Dorokhov’s cavalry detachment found itself cut off from the corps and united with Bagration’s army. After the 1st Army united, Barclay de Tolly began to gradually retreat to Vilna and further to Drissa.

On June 26, Barclay's army left Vilna and on July 10 arrived at the Drissa fortified camp on the Western Dvina (in northern Belarus), where Emperor Alexander I planned to fight off Napoleonic troops. The generals managed to convince the emperor of the absurdity of this idea put forward by the military theorist Pfuel (or Ful). On July 16, the Russian army continued its retreat through Polotsk to Vitebsk, leaving Lieutenant General Wittgenstein’s 1st Corps to defend St. Petersburg. In Polotsk, Alexander I left the army, convinced to leave by persistent requests from dignitaries and family. An executive general and cautious strategist, Barclay retreated under the pressure of superior forces from almost all of Europe, and this greatly irritated Napoleon, who was interested in a speedy general battle.

The 2nd Russian Army (up to 45 thousand) under the command of Bagration at the beginning of the invasion was located near Grodno in western Belarus, approximately 150 kilometers from Barclay’s 1st Army. At first Bagration moved to join the main 1st Army, but when he reached Lida (100 km from Vilno), it was too late. He had to escape from the French to the south. To cut Bagration off from the main forces and destroy him, Napoleon sent Marshal Davout with a force of up to 50 thousand soldiers to cross Bagration. Davout moved from Vilna to Minsk, which he occupied on July 8. On the other hand, from the west, Jerome Bonaparte attacked Bagration with 4 corps, which crossed the Neman near Grodno. Napoleon sought to prevent the connection of the Russian armies in order to defeat them piece by piece. Bagration, with swift marches and successful rearguard battles, broke away from Jerome's troops, and now Marshal Davout became his main opponent.

On July 19, Bagration was in Bobruisk on the Berezina, while Davout on July 21 occupied Mogilev on the Dnieper with advanced units, that is, the French were ahead of Bagration, being in the northeast of the Russian 2nd Army. Bagration, having approached the Dnieper 60 km below Mogilev, sent General Raevsky’s corps against Davout on July 23 with the goal of pushing the French back from Mogilev and taking a direct road to Vitebsk, where according to plans the Russian armies were to unite. As a result of the battle near Saltanovka, Raevsky delayed Davout's advance east to Smolensk, but the path to Vitebsk was blocked. Bagration was able to cross the Dnieper in the town of Novoye Bykhovo without interference on July 25 and headed towards Smolensk. Davout no longer had the strength to pursue the Russian 2nd Army, and the troops of Jerome Bonaparte, hopelessly behind, were still crossing the wooded and swampy territory of Belarus.

On July 23, Barclay's army arrived in Vitebsk, where Barclay wanted to wait for Bagration. To prevent the advance of the French, he sent the 4th Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy to meet the enemy vanguard. On July 25, 26 versts from Vitebsk, the battle of Ostrovno took place, which continued on July 26.

On July 27, Barclay retreated from Vitebsk to Smolensk, having learned about the approach of Napoleon with the main forces and the impossibility of Bagration breaking through to Vitebsk. On August 3, the Russian 1st and 2nd armies united near Smolensk, thus achieving their first strategic success. There was a short respite in the war; both sides were putting their troops in order, tired of continuous marches.

Upon reaching Vitebsk, Napoleon stopped to rest his troops, frustrated after a 400 km offensive in the absence of supply bases. Only on August 12, after much hesitation, Napoleon set out from Vitebsk to Smolensk.

South direction

The 7th Saxon Corps under the command of Rainier (17-22 thousand) was supposed to cover the left flank of Napoleon’s main forces from the 3rd Russian Army under the command of Tormasov (25 thousand under arms). Rainier took a cordon position along the Brest-Kobrin-Pinsk line, spreading out an already small body over 170 km. On July 27, Tormasov was surrounded by Kobrin, the Saxon garrison under the command of Klengel (up to 5 thousand) was completely defeated. Brest and Pinsk were also cleared of the French garrisons.

Realizing that the weakened Rainier would not be able to hold Tormasov, Napoleon decided not to attract Schwarzenberg’s Austrian corps (30 thousand) to the main direction and left it in the south against Tormasov. Rainier, gathering his troops and linking up with Schwarzenberg, attacked Tormasov on 12 August at Gorodechny, forcing the Russians to retreat to Lutsk (northwest Ukraine). The main battles take place between the Saxons and the Russians, the Austrians try to limit themselves to artillery shelling and maneuvers.

Until the end of September, low-intensity fighting took place in the southern direction in a sparsely populated swampy area in the Lutsk region.

In addition to Tormasov, in the southern direction there was the 2nd Russian reserve corps of Lieutenant General Ertel, formed in Mozyr and providing support to the blocked garrison of Bobruisk. To blockade Bobruisk, as well as to cover communications from Ertel, Napoleon left Dombrowski's Polish division (10 thousand) from the 5th Polish Corps.

From Smolensk to Borodin (August-September 1812)

After the unification of the Russian armies, the generals began to persistently demand from Barclay a general battle. Taking advantage of the scattered position of the French corps, Barclay decided to defeat them one by one and marched on August 8 to Rudnya, where Murat’s cavalry was quartered.

However, Napoleon, taking advantage of the slow advance of the Russian army, gathered his corps into a fist and tried to go to Barclay’s rear, bypassing his left flank from the south, for which he crossed the Dnieper west of Smolensk. On the path of the vanguard of the French army was the 27th division of General Neverovsky, covering the left flank of the Russian army near Krasnoye. Neverovsky's stubborn resistance gave time to transfer General Raevsky's corps to Smolensk.

By August 16, Napoleon approached Smolensk with 180 thousand. Bagration instructed General Raevsky (15 thousand soldiers), into whose 7th corps the remnants of Neverovsky's division joined, to defend Smolensk. Barclay was against a battle that was unnecessary in his opinion, but at that time there was actual dual command in the Russian army. At 6 a.m. on August 16, Napoleon began the assault on the city with a march. The stubborn battle for Smolensk continued until the morning of August 18, when Barclay withdrew his troops from the burning city to avoid a major battle without a chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration’s army) covered the retreat route of the Russian army to Dorogobuzh, which Napoleon could cut with a roundabout maneuver (similar to the one that failed at Smolensk).

Marshal Ney pursued the retreating army. On August 19, in a bloody battle near Valutina Gora, the Russian rearguard detained the marshal, who suffered significant losses. Napoleon sent General Junot to go behind the Russian rear in a roundabout way, but he was unable to complete the task, running into an impassable swamp, and the Russian army left in good order towards Moscow to Dorogobuzh. The battle for Smolensk, which destroyed a large city, marked the development of a nationwide war between the Russian people and the enemy, which was immediately felt by both ordinary French suppliers and Napoleon’s marshals. Settlements along the route of the French army were burned, the population left as far as possible. Immediately after the Battle of Smolensk, Napoleon made a disguised peace proposal to Tsar Alexander I, so far from a position of strength, but did not receive an answer.

Relations between Bagration and Barclay after leaving Smolensk became more and more tense with each day of retreat, and in this dispute the mood of the nobility was not on the side of the cautious Barclay. On August 17, the emperor assembled a council, which recommended that he appoint infantry general Prince Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Russian army. On August 29, Kutuzov received the army in Tsarevo-Zaimishche. On this day the French entered Vyazma.

Continuing the general strategic line of his predecessor, Kutuzov could not avoid a general battle for political and moral reasons. Russian society demanded a battle, even though it was unnecessary from a military point of view. By September 3, the Russian army retreated to the village of Borodino; further retreat implied the surrender of Moscow. Kutuzov decided to give a general battle, since the balance of power had shifted in the Russian direction. If at the beginning of the invasion Napoleon had a threefold superiority in the number of soldiers over the opposing Russian army, now the numbers of the armies were comparable - 135 thousand for Napoleon versus 110-130 thousand for Kutuzov. The problem of the Russian army was the lack of weapons. While the militia provided up to 80-100 thousand warriors from the Russian central provinces, there were no guns to arm the militia. The warriors were given pikes, but Kutuzov did not use people as “cannon fodder.”

On September 7 (August 26, Old Style) near the village of Borodino (124 km west of Moscow), the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place between the Russian and French armies.

After almost two days of battle, which consisted of an assault by French troops on the fortified Russian line, the French, at the cost of 30-34 thousand of their soldiers, pushed the Russian left flank out of position. The Russian army suffered heavy losses, and Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk on September 8 with the firm intention of preserving the army.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon on September 13, in the village of Fili, Kutuzov ordered the generals to gather for a meeting on the further plan of action. Most of the generals spoke in favor of a new general battle with Napoleon. Then Kutuzov interrupted the meeting and announced that he was ordering a retreat.

On September 14, the Russian army passed through Moscow and reached the Ryazan road (southeast of Moscow). Towards evening, Napoleon entered empty Moscow.

Capture of Moscow (September 1812)

On September 14, Napoleon occupied Moscow without a fight, and already on the night of the same day the city was engulfed in fire, which by the night of September 15 intensified so much that Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin. The fire raged until September 18 and destroyed most of Moscow.

Up to 400 lower-class townspeople were shot by a French court-martial on suspicion of arson.

There are several versions of the fire - organized arson when leaving the city (usually associated with the name of F.V. Rostopchin), arson by Russian spies (several Russians were shot by the French on such charges), uncontrolled actions of the occupiers, an accidental fire, the spread of which was facilitated by general chaos in an abandoned city. The fire had several sources, so it is possible that all versions are true to one degree or another.

Kutuzov, retreating from Moscow south to the Ryazan road, performed the famous Tarutino maneuver. Having knocked off the trail of Murat's pursuing cavalrymen, Kutuzov turned west from the Ryazan road through Podolsk onto the old Kaluga road, where he reached on September 20 in the Krasnaya Pakhra area (near the modern city of Troitsk).

Then, convinced that his position was unprofitable, by October 2, Kutuzov transferred the army south to the village of Tarutino, which lies along the old Kaluga road in the Kaluga region not far from the border with Moscow. With this maneuver, Kutuzov blocked Napoleon’s main roads to the southern provinces, and also created a constant threat to the rear communications of the French.

Napoleon called Moscow not a military, but a political position. Hence, he makes repeated attempts to reconcile with Alexander I. In Moscow, Napoleon found himself in a trap: it was not possible to spend the winter in a city devastated by a fire, foraging outside the city was not going well, the French communications stretched over thousands of kilometers were very vulnerable, the army, after suffering hardships, began to disintegrate. On October 5, Napoleon sent General Lauriston to Kutuzov for passage to Alexander I with the order: “ I need peace, I need it absolutely at all costs, save only honor" Kutuzov, after a short conversation, sent Lauriston back to Moscow. Napoleon began to prepare for a retreat not yet from Russia, but to winter quarters somewhere between the Dnieper and Dvina.

Napoleon's retreat (October-December 1812)

Napoleon's main army cut deep into Russia like a wedge. At the time when Napoleon entered Moscow, Wittgenstein's army, held by the French corps of Saint-Cyr and Oudinot, hung over his left flank in the north in the Polotsk region. Napoleon's right flank trampled near the borders of the Russian Empire in Belarus. Tormasov's army connected with its presence the Austrian corps of Schwarzenberg and the 7th corps of Rainier. French garrisons along the Smolensk road guarded the communication line and Napoleon's rear.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets (October 1812)

On October 18, Kutuzov launched an attack on the French barrier under the command of Murat, who was monitoring the Russian army near Tarutino. Having lost up to 4 thousand soldiers and 38 guns, Murat retreated to Moscow. The Tarutino battle became a landmark event, marking the transition of the Russian army to a counteroffensive.

On October 19, the French army (110 thousand) with a huge convoy began to leave Moscow along the old Kaluga road. Napoleon, in anticipation of the coming winter, planned to get to the nearest large base, Smolensk, where, according to his calculations, supplies were stocked for the French army, which was experiencing hardships. In the Russian off-road conditions, it was possible to get to Smolensk by a direct route, the Smolensk road, along which the French came to Moscow. Another route led south through Kaluga. The second route was preferable, since it passed through unravaged areas, and the loss of horses from the lack of forage in the French army reached alarming proportions. Due to the lack of horses, the artillery fleet was reduced, and large French cavalry formations practically disappeared.

The road to Kaluga was blocked by Napoleon's army, positioned near Tarutino on the old Kaluga road. Not wanting to break through a fortified position with a weakened army, Napoleon turned in the area of ​​the village of Troitskoye (modern Troitsk) onto the new Kaluga road (modern Kyiv highway) to bypass Tarutino.

However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets, cutting off the French retreat along the new Kaluga road.

On October 24, the battle of Maloyaroslavets took place. The French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm. By October 22, Kutuzov's army consisted of 97 thousand regular troops, 20 thousand Cossacks, 622 guns and more than 10 thousand militia warriors. Napoleon had up to 70 thousand combat-ready soldiers at hand, the cavalry had practically disappeared, and the artillery was much weaker than the Russian one. The course of the war was now dictated by the Russian army.

On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk. The battles for Maloyaroslavets were in vain for the French and only delayed their retreat. From Mozhaisk, the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the road along which it advanced on Moscow.

From Maloyaroslavets to Berezina (October-November 1812)

From Maloyaroslavets to the village of Krasny (45 km west of Smolensk), Napoleon was pursued by the vanguard of the Russian army under the command of Miloradovich. Platov's Cossacks and partisans attacked the retreating French from all sides, not giving the enemy any opportunity for supplies. Kutuzov's main army slowly moved south parallel to Napoleon, performing the so-called flank march.

On November 1, Napoleon passed Vyazma, on November 8 he entered Smolensk, where he spent 5 days waiting for the stragglers. On November 3, the Russian vanguard severely battered the closing corps of the French in the battle of Vyazma. Napoleon had at his disposal in Smolensk up to 50 thousand soldiers under arms (of which only 5 thousand were cavalry), and about the same number of unfit soldiers who were wounded and lost their weapons.

Units of the French army, greatly thinned out on the march from Moscow, entered Smolensk for a whole week with the hope of rest and food. There were no large supplies of food in the city, and what was there was plundered by crowds of uncontrollable soldiers of the Great Army. Napoleon ordered the shooting of the French intendant Sioff, who, faced with resistance from the peasants, failed to organize the collection of food.

Napoleon's strategic position had deteriorated greatly, Chichagov's Danube Army was approaching from the south, Wittgenstein was advancing from the north, whose vanguard captured Vitebsk on November 7, depriving the French of the food reserves accumulated there.

On November 14, Napoleon and the guard moved from Smolensk following the vanguard corps. Ney's corps, which was in the rearguard, left Smolensk only on November 17. The column of French troops was greatly extended, since the difficulties of the road precluded a compact march of large masses of people. Kutuzov took advantage of this circumstance, cutting off the French’s route of retreat in the Krasnoye area. On November 15-18, as a result of the battles near Krasny, Napoleon managed to break through, losing many soldiers and most of the artillery.

The Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov (24 thousand) captured Minsk on November 16, depriving Napoleon of its largest rear center. Moreover, on November 21, Chichagov's vanguard captured Borisov, where Napoleon planned to cross the Berezina. The vanguard corps of Marshal Oudinot drove Chichagov from Borisov to the western bank of the Berezina, but the Russian admiral with a strong army guarded possible crossing points.

On November 24, Napoleon approached the Berezina, breaking away from the pursuing armies of Wittgenstein and Kutuzov.

From Berezina to Neman (November-December 1812)

On November 25, through a series of skillful maneuvers, Napoleon managed to divert Chichagov’s attention to Borisov and south of Borisov. Chichagov believed that Napoleon intended to cross in these places in order to take a shortcut to the road to Minsk and then head to join the Austrian allies. Meanwhile, the French built 2 bridges north of Borisov, along which on November 26-27 Napoleon crossed to the right (western) bank of the Berezina, throwing off the weak Russian guards.

Realizing the mistake, Chichagov attacked Napoleon with his main forces on November 28 on the right bank. On the left bank, the French rearguard defending the crossing was attacked by Wittgenstein's approaching corps. Kutuzov's main army fell behind. Without waiting for the entire huge crowd of French stragglers, consisting of the wounded, frostbitten, those who had lost their weapons and civilians, to cross, Napoleon ordered the bridges to be burned on the morning of November 29. The main result of the battle on the Berezina was that Napoleon avoided complete defeat in conditions of significant superiority of Russian forces. In the memories of the French, the crossing of the Berezina occupies no less place than the largest Battle of Borodino.

Having lost up to 30 thousand people at the crossing, Napoleon, with 9 thousand soldiers remaining under arms, moved towards Vilna, joining along the way French divisions operating in other directions. The army was accompanied by a large crowd of unfit people, mainly soldiers from the allied states who had lost their weapons. The course of the war at the final stage, a 2-week pursuit by the Russian army of the remnants of Napoleonic troops to the border of the Russian Empire, is outlined in the article “From the Berezina to the Neman.” Severe frosts that struck during the crossing finally exterminated the French, already weakened by hunger. The pursuit of Russian troops did not give Napoleon the opportunity to gather at least some strength in Vilna; the flight of the French continued to the Neman, which separated Russia from Prussia and the buffer state of the Duchy of Warsaw.

On December 6, Napoleon left the army, going to Paris to recruit new soldiers to replace those killed in Russia. Of the 47 thousand elite guards who entered Russia with the emperor, six months later only a few hundred soldiers remained.

On December 14, in Kovno, the pitiful remnants of the “Great Army” in the amount of 1,600 people crossed the Neman into Poland, and then into Prussia. Later they were joined by remnants of troops from other directions. The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the almost complete destruction of the invading “Grand Army”.

The last stage of the war was commented on by the impartial observer Clausewitz:

Northern direction (October-December 1812)

After the 2nd battle for Polotsk (October 18-20), which took place 2 months after the 1st, Marshal Saint-Cyr retreated south to Chashniki, bringing Wittgenstein’s advancing army dangerously closer to Napoleon’s rear line. During these days, Napoleon began his retreat from Moscow. Marshal Victor's 9th Corps, which arrived in September as Napoleon's reserve from Europe, was immediately sent to help from Smolensk. The combined forces of the French reached 36 thousand soldiers, which approximately corresponded to the forces of Wittgenstein. An oncoming battle took place on October 31 near Chashniki, as a result of which the French were defeated and rolled back even further to the south.

Vitebsk remained uncovered; a detachment from Wittgenstein’s army stormed the city on November 7, capturing 300 garrison soldiers and food supplies for Napoleon’s retreating army. On November 14, Marshal Victor, near the village of Smolyan, tried to push Wittgenstein back across the Dvina, but was unsuccessful, and the parties maintained their positions until Napoleon approached the Berezina. Then Victor, joining the main army, retreated to the Berezina as Napoleon's rearguard, holding back Wittgenstein's pressure.

In the Baltic states near Riga, a positional war was fought with rare Russian forays against MacDonald's corps. General Steingel's Finnish corps (12 thousand) came to the aid of the Riga garrison on September 20, but after a successful sortie on September 29 against the French siege artillery, Steingel was transferred to Wittgenstein in Polotsk to the theater of the main military operations. On November 15, Macdonald, in turn, successfully attacked Russian positions, almost destroying a large Russian detachment.

Marshal MacDonald's 10th Corps began to retreat from Riga towards Prussia only on December 19, after the pitiful remnants of Napoleon's main army had left Russia. On December 26, MacDonald's troops had to engage in battle with Wittgenstein's vanguard. On December 30, Russian General Dibich concluded an armistice agreement with the commander of the Prussian corps, General York, known at the place of signing as the Taurogen Convention. Thus, Macdonald lost his main forces, he had to hastily retreat through East Prussia.

Southern direction (October-December 1812)

On September 18, Admiral Chichagov with an army (38 thousand) approached from the Danube to the slow-moving southern front in the Lutsk region. The combined forces of Chichagov and Tormasov (65 thousand) attacked Schwarzenberg (40 thousand), forcing the latter to leave for Poland in mid-October. Chichagov, who took over the main command after the recall of Tormasov, gave the troops a 2-week rest, after which on October 27 he moved from Brest-Litovsk to Minsk with 24 thousand soldiers, leaving General Sacken with a 27 thousand-strong corps against the Austrians Schwarzenberg.

Schwarzenberg pursued Chichagov, bypassing Sacken's positions and covering himself from his troops with Rainier's Saxon corps. Rainier was unable to hold off Sacken's superior forces, and Schwarzenberg was forced to turn towards the Russians from Slonim. With joint forces, Rainier and Schwarzenberg drove Sacken south of Brest-Litovsk, however, as a result, Chichagov’s army broke through to Napoleon’s rear and occupied Minsk on November 16, and on November 21 approached Borisov on the Berezina, where the retreating Napoleon planned to cross.

On November 27, Schwarzenberg, by order of Napoleon, moved to Minsk, but stopped in Slonim, from where on December 14 he retreated through Bialystok to Poland.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

Napoleon, a recognized genius of military art, invaded Russia with forces three times greater than the Western Russian armies under the command of generals not marked by brilliant victories, and after just six months of the campaign, his army, the strongest in history, was completely destroyed.

The destruction of almost 550 thousand soldiers is beyond the imagination of even modern Western historians. A large number of articles are devoted to searching for the reasons for the defeat of the greatest commander and analyzing the factors of the war. The most frequently cited reasons are bad roads in Russia and frost; there are attempts to explain the defeat by the poor harvest of 1812, which is why it was not possible to ensure normal supplies.

The Russian campaign (in Western names) received the name Patriotic in Russia, which explains the defeat of Napoleon. A combination of factors led to his defeat: popular participation in the war, mass heroism of soldiers and officers, the leadership talent of Kutuzov and other generals, and the skillful use of natural factors. The victory in the Patriotic War caused not only a rise in national spirit, but also a desire to modernize the country, which ultimately led to the Decembrist uprising in 1825.

Clausewitz, analyzing Napoleon’s campaign in Russia from a military point of view, comes to the conclusion:

According to Clausewitz's calculations, the invasion army in Russia, together with reinforcements during the war, numbered 610 thousand soldiers, including 50 thousand soldier of Austria and Prussia. While the Austrians and Prussians, operating in secondary directions, mostly survived, only Napoleon's main army had assembled across the Vistula by January 1813. 23 thousand soldier. Napoleon lost over 550 thousand trained soldiers, the entire elite guard, over 1200 guns.

According to the calculations of the Prussian official Auerswald, by December 21, 1812, 255 generals, 5,111 officers, 26,950 lower ranks had passed through East Prussia from the Great Army, “in a pitiable condition and mostly unarmed.” Many of them, according to Count Segur, died of disease upon reaching safe territory. To this number must be added approximately 6 thousand soldiers (who returned to the French army) from the Rainier and Macdonald corps, operating in other directions. Apparently, from all these returning soldiers, 23 thousand (mentioned by Clausewitz) later gathered under the command of the French. The relatively large number of surviving officers allowed Napoleon to organize a new army, calling up the recruits of 1813.

In a report to Emperor Alexander I, Field Marshal Kutuzov estimated the total number of French prisoners at 150 thousand man (December, 1812).

Although Napoleon managed to gather fresh forces, their fighting qualities could not replace the dead veterans. The Patriotic War in January 1813 turned into the “Foreign Campaign of the Russian Army”: the fighting moved to the territory of Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated in the Battle of Leipzig and in April 1814 abdicated the throne of France (see article War of the Sixth Coalition).

The historian of the mid-19th century M.I. Bogdanovich traced the replenishment of the Russian armies during the war according to the statements of the Military Scientific Archive of the General Staff. He counted the reinforcements of the Main Army at 134 thousand people. By the time of the occupation of Vilna in December, the main army numbered 70 thousand soldiers in its ranks, and the composition of the 1st and 2nd Western armies at the beginning of the war was up to 150 thousand soldiers. Thus, the total loss by December is 210 thousand soldiers. Of these, according to Bogdanovich’s assumption, up to 40 thousand wounded and sick returned to duty. The losses of the corps operating in secondary directions and the losses of the militias could amount to approximately the same 40 thousand people. Based on these calculations, Bogdanovich estimates the losses of the Russian army in the Patriotic War at 210 thousand soldiers and militias.

Memory of the War of 1812

On August 30, 1814, Emperor Alexander I issued a Manifesto: “ December 25, the day of the Nativity of Christ, will henceforth be a day of thanksgiving celebration under the name in the church circle: the Nativity of our Savior Jesus Christ and the remembrance of the deliverance of the Church and the Russian Empire from the invasion of the Gauls and with them the twenty tongues».

The highest manifesto on bringing thanksgiving to God for the liberation of Russia 12/25/1812

God and the whole world are witnesses to this with what desires and strength the enemy entered our beloved Fatherland. Nothing could avert his evil and stubborn intentions. Firmly relying on his own and the terrible forces he had collected against Us from almost all European Powers, and driven by the greed of conquest and the thirst for blood, he hastened to burst into the very breast of Our Great Empire in order to pour out on it all the horrors and disasters that were not generated by chance, but from ancient times the all-devastating war prepared for them. Knowing from experience the boundless lust for power and the impudence of his enterprises, the bitter cup of evils prepared for Us from him, and seeing him already entering Our borders with indomitable rage, We were forced with a painful and contrite heart, calling on God for help, to draw our sword, and promise to Our Kingdom that We will not put it into the vagina, until at least one of the enemies remains armed in Our land. We placed this promise firmly in Our hearts, hoping for the strong valor of the people entrusted to Us by God, in which we were not deceived. What an example of courage, courage, piety, patience and firmness Russia has shown! The enemy who had broken into her chest with all the unheard of means of cruelty and frenzy could not achieve the point that she would sigh even once about the deep wounds inflicted on her by him. It seemed that with the shedding of her blood, the spirit of courage increased in her, with the fires of her cities, love for the Fatherland was inflamed, with the destruction and desecration of the temples of God, faith was confirmed in her and irreconcilable vengeance arose. The army, the nobles, the nobility, the clergy, the merchants, the people, in a word, all government ranks and fortunes, sparing neither their property nor their lives, formed a single soul, a soul together courageous and pious, as much flaming with love for the Fatherland as with love for God . From this universal consent and zeal, consequences soon arose that were hardly incredible, hardly ever heard of. Let those gathered from 20 Kingdoms and nations, united under one banner, imagine the terrible forces with which the power-hungry, arrogant, and fierce enemy entered Our land! Half a million foot and horse soldiers and about one and a half thousand cannons followed him. With such a huge militia, he penetrates into the very middle of Russia, spreads, and begins to spread fire and devastation everywhere. But six months have barely passed since he entered Our borders, and where is he? Here it is appropriate to say the words of the sacred Songsinger: “I have seen the wicked exalted and towering like the cedars of Lebanon. And I passed by, and behold, I sought him, and his place was not found.” Truly this lofty saying was fulfilled in all the power of its meaning over Our proud and wicked enemy. Where are his troops, like a cloud of black clouds driven by the winds? Scattered like rain. A great part of them, having watered the earth with blood, lies covering the space of Moscow, Kaluga, Smolensk, Belarusian and Lithuanian fields. Another great part in various and frequent battles was taken prisoner with many military leaders and generals, and in such a way that after repeated and severe defeats, finally their entire regiments, resorting to the generosity of the victors, bowed their weapons before them. The rest, an equally great part, driven in their swift flight by Our victorious troops and greeted by scum and famine, covered the path from Moscow itself to the borders of Russia with corpses, cannons, carts, shells, so that the smallest, insignificant part of the exhausted ones remaining from all their numerous forces and unarmed warriors, hardly half-dead, can come to their country, in order to inform them, to the eternal horror and trembling of their fellow countrymen, since a terrible execution befalls those who dare with abusive intentions to enter the bowels of powerful Russia. Now, with heartfelt joy and ardent gratitude to God, We announce to Our dear loyal subjects that the event has surpassed even Our very hope, and that what We announced at the opening of this war has been fulfilled beyond measure: there is no longer a single enemy on the face of Our land; or better yet, they all stayed here, but how? dead, wounded and prisoners. The proud ruler and leader himself could barely ride away with his most important officials, having lost all his army and all the cannons he brought with him, which, more than a thousand, not counting those buried and sunk by him, were recaptured from him and are in Our hands. The spectacle of the death of his troops is incredible! You can hardly believe your own eyes! Who could do this? Without taking away worthy glory either from the famous Commander-in-Chief of our troops, who brought immortal merit to the Fatherland, or from other skillful and courageous leaders and military leaders who distinguished themselves with zeal and zeal; nor in general for all of Our brave army, we can say that what they did is beyond human strength. And so, let us recognize God’s providence in this great matter. Let us prostrate ourselves before His Holy Throne, and seeing clearly His hand, punishing pride and wickedness, instead of vanity and arrogance about Our victories, let us learn from this great and terrible example to be meek and humble doers of His laws and will, not like these defilers who have fallen away from the faith temples of God, Our enemies, whose bodies in countless numbers are strewn as food for dogs and corvids! Great is the Lord Our God in His mercy and in His wrath! Let us go by the goodness of our deeds and the purity of our feelings and thoughts, the only path leading to Him, to the temple of His holiness, and there, crowned by His hand with glory, let us give thanks for the generosity poured out on us, and let us fall to Him with warm prayers, that He may extend His mercy over By Us, and ceasing wars and battles, He will send victory to Us; desired peace and silence.

The Christmas holiday was also celebrated as the modern Victory Day until 1917.

To commemorate the victory in the war, many monuments and memorials were erected, of which the most famous are the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and the ensemble of Palace Square with the Alexander Column. A grandiose project has been implemented in painting, the Military Gallery, which consists of 332 portraits of Russian generals who participated in the Patriotic War of 1812. One of the most famous works of Russian literature was the epic novel “War and Peace,” where L. N. Tolstoy tried to comprehend global human issues against the backdrop of war. The Soviet film War and Peace, based on the novel, won an Academy Award in 1968; its large-scale battle scenes are still considered unsurpassed.

The attack on Russia was a continuation of Napoleon's hegemonic policy of establishing dominance over the European continent. By the beginning of 1812, most of Europe became dependent on France. Russia and Great Britain remained the only countries that posed a threat to Napoleonic plans.

After the Treaty of Tilsit Union on June 25 (July 7), 1807, Franco-Russian relations gradually deteriorated. Russia provided virtually no assistance to France during its war with Austria in 1809 and thwarted Napoleon's marriage project to Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna. For his part, Napoleon, having annexed Austrian Galicia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1809, actually restored the Polish state, which directly bordered Russia. In 1810, France annexed the Duchy of Oldenburg, which belonged to the brother-in-law of Alexander I; Russia's protests had no effect. That same year, a customs war broke out between the two countries; Napoleon also demanded that Russia stop trading with neutral states, which gave it the opportunity to violate the continental blockade of Great Britain. In April 1812, Franco-Russian relations were practically interrupted.

The main allies of France were Prussia (treaty of February 12 (24), 1812) and Austria (treaty of March 2 (14), 1812). However, Napoleon failed to isolate Russia. On March 24 (April 5), 1812, she entered into an alliance with Sweden, which was joined by England on April 21 (May 3). On May 16 (28), Russia signed the Peace of Bucharest with the Ottoman Empire, which ended the Russian-Turkish War of 1806–1812, which allowed Alexander I to use the Danube Army to protect the western borders.

By the beginning of the war, Napoleon's army (Grand Army) numbered 678 thousand people (480 thousand infantry, 100 thousand cavalry and 30 thousand artillery) and included the imperial guard, twelve corps (eleven multinational and one purely Austrian), Murat's cavalry and artillery (1372 guns). By June 1812 it was concentrated on the border of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; its main part was located near Kovno. Russia had 480 thousand people and 1600 guns, but these forces were scattered over a vast territory; in the west it had approx. 220 thousand, which made up three armies: the First (120 thousand) under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, stationed on the Rossiena-Lida line, the Second (50 thousand) under the command of P.I. Bagration, located in the interfluve of the Neman and Western Bug, and the Third, reserve (46 thousand) under the command of A.P. Tormasov, stationed in Volyn. In addition, the Danube Army (50 thousand) came from Romania under the command of P.V. Chichagov, and from Finland - the corps of F.F. Steingel (15 thousand).

Period I: June 12 (24) – July 22 (August 3).

June 10 (22), 1812 France declared war on Russia. On June 12–14 (24–26), the main forces of the Great Army crossed the Neman near Kovno; MacDonald's 10th Corps crossed at Tilsit, Eugene Beauharnais's 4th Corps crossed at Prena, and the troops of the Westphalian King Jerome crossed at Grodno. Napoleon planned to wedge himself between the First and Second Armies and defeat them one by one in pitched battles as close to the border as possible. The plan of the Russian command, developed by General K. Full, envisaged the retreat of the First Army to the fortified camp at Drissa on the Western Dvina, where it was to give a general battle to the French. According to this plan, Barclay de Tolly began to retreat to Drissa, pursued by Murat's cavalry. Bagration was ordered to join him through Minsk, but the 1st French Corps (Davout) managed to cut his path at the very end of June and force him to retreat to Nesvizh. Due to the numerical superiority of the enemy and the disadvantageous position at Drissa, Barclay de Tolly, instructing the corps of P.H. Wittgenstein (24 thousand) to cover the road to St. Petersburg, retreated to Vitebsk. On June 30 (July 12) the French took Borisov, and on July 8 (20) Mogilev. Bagration's attempt to break through to Vitebsk through Mogilev was thwarted by Davout near Saltanovka on July 11 (23). Having learned about this, Barclay de Tolly retreated to Smolensk; The heroism of the corps of A.I. Osterman-Tolstoy, for three days - July 13-15 (25-27) - holding back the onslaught of the French vanguard near Ostrovnaya, allowed the First Army to break away from the pursuit of the enemy. On July 22 (August 3) it united in Smolensk with Bagration’s army, which carried out a wide outflanking maneuver from the south through the Sozh River valley.

On the northern flank, the 2nd (Oudinot) and 10th (MacDonald) French corps tried to cut off Wittgenstein from Pskov and St. Petersburg, but failed; nevertheless, MacDonald occupied Courland, and Oudinot, with the support of the 6th Corps (Saint-Cyr), captured Polotsk. On the southern flank, Tormasov's Third Army pushed back Reinier's 7th (Saxon) Corps from Kobrin to Slonim, but then, after a battle with superior forces of the Saxons and Austrians (Schwarzenberg) near Gorodechnaya on July 31 (August 12), it retreated to Lutsk, where it united with the approaching Danube army of Chichagov.

Period II: July 22 (August 3) – September 3 (15).

Having met in Smolensk, the First and Second Armies launched an attack to the northwest in the direction of Rudnya. Napoleon, having crossed the Dnieper, tried to cut them off from Smolensk, but the stubborn resistance of D.P. Neverovsky’s division on August 1 (13) near Krasnoye delayed the French and allowed Barclay de Tolly and Bagration to return to the city. On August 5 (17), the French began the assault on Smolensk; The Russians retreated under the cover of the heroically defending rearguard of D.S. Dokhturov. The 3rd French corps (Ney) overtook N.A. Tuchkov’s corps at Valutina Mountain on August 7 (19), but was unable to defeat it. The continuation of the retreat caused strong discontent in the army and at court against Barclay de Tolly, who exercised general leadership of military operations; Most of the generals, led by Bagration, insisted on a general battle, while Barclay de Tolly considered it necessary to lure Napoleon deep into the country in order to weaken him as much as possible. Disagreements in the military leadership and the demands of public opinion forced Alexander I to appoint M.I. Kutuzov as commander in chief on August 8 (20), who on August 26 (September 7) gave the French a general battle near the village of Borodino. The battle was brutal, both sides suffered huge losses, and neither achieved decisive success. According to Napoleon, “the French showed themselves worthy of victory, the Russians acquired the right to be invincible.” The Russian army retreated to Moscow. Its retreat was covered by the rearguard of M.I. Platov, who successfully repelled the attacks of Murat’s cavalry and Davout’s corps. At a military council in the village of Fili near Moscow on September 1 (13), M.I. Kutuzov decided to leave Moscow to save the army. On September 2 (14), the troops and most of the residents left the city. On September 3 (15), the Grand Army entered it.

III period: September 3 (15) – October 6 (18).

Kutuzov's troops first moved southeast along the Ryazan road, but then turned southwest and went along the old Kaluga highway. This allowed them to avoid persecution and cover the main grain provinces and arms factories of Tula. Murat's cavalry raid forced Kutuzov to retreat to Tarutino (Tarutino maneuver), where the Russians set up a fortified camp on September 20 (October 2); Murat stood nearby, near Podolsk.

The balance of forces began to change in favor of the Russians. The fire of Moscow on September 3–7 (15–19) deprived the Grand Army of a significant part of forage and food. In the areas occupied by the French, a partisan movement developed, actively supported by the peasantry; The first partisan detachment was organized by hussar lieutenant colonel Denis Davydov. Napoleon tried to enter into peace negotiations with Alexander I, but was refused; he also failed to agree with the Russian command on a temporary cessation of hostilities. The position of the French on the flanks worsened: Wittgenstein’s corps was strengthened by Steingel’s corps and the St. Petersburg militia that arrived from Finland; The Danube and Third armies were united into one under the command of Chichagov, who took Brest-Litovsk on September 29 (October 11); a plan was developed according to which the troops of Wittgenstein and Chichagov were to unite in order to cut off French communications and lock the Grand Army in Russia. Under these conditions, Napoleon decided to withdraw it to the west.

Period IV: October 6 (18) – December 2 (14).

On October 6 (18), Kutuzov’s army attacked Murat’s corps on the river. Blackie and forced him to retreat. On October 7 (19), the French (100 thousand) left Moscow, blowing up part of the Kremlin buildings, and moved along the Novokaluga road, intending to get to Smolensk through the rich southern provinces. However, the bloody battle near Maloyaroslavets on October 12 (24) forced them to turn onto the ruined old Smolensk road on October 14 (26). The pursuit of the Great Army was entrusted to M.I. Platov and M.A. Miloradovich, who on October 22 (November 3) near Vyazma inflicted serious damage on its rearguard. On October 24 (November 5), when Napoleon reached Dorogobuzh, frosts struck, which became a real disaster for the French. On October 28 (November 9) they reached Smolensk, but did not find sufficient supplies of food and fodder there; At the same time, the partisans defeated Augereau’s brigade near the village of Lyakhovo, and Platov’s Cossacks severely battered Murat’s cavalry near Dukhovshchina, preventing it from breaking through to Vitebsk. A real threat of encirclement arose: Wittgenstein, having taken Polotsk on October 7 (19) and repelled the attack of the corps of Victor and Saint-Cyr on October 19 (31) near Chashniki, walked towards the Berezina from the north, and Chichagov, having pushed the Austrians and Saxons to Dragichin, rushed towards it from South. This forced Napoleon to leave Smolensk on November 2 (14) and hurry to the crossing near Borisov. On the same day, Wittgenstein defeated Victor's corps near Smolyanets. On November 3–6 (15–18), Kutuzov launched several attacks on the stretched out units of the Great Army near Krasnoye: the French suffered heavy losses, but avoided complete destruction. On November 4 (16), Chichagov took Minsk, and on November 10 (22), Borisov occupied it. The next day, Oudinot's corps knocked him out of Borisov and organized a false crossing there, which made it possible to divert the attention of the Russians and enabled the main French forces to begin crossing the Berezina upstream near the village on November 14 (26). Student; on the evening of November 15 (27), they were attacked by Chichagov on the western bank, and by Kutuzov and Wittgenstein on the eastern bank; nevertheless, the French managed to complete the crossing on November 16 (28), although they lost half of their personnel and all their artillery. The Russians actively pursued the enemy, who was retreating to the border. On November 23 (December 5), Napoleon abandoned his troops in Smorgon and left for Warsaw, transferring command to Murat, after which the retreat turned into a stampede. On November 26 (December 8), the remnants of the Great Army reached Vilna, and on December 2 (14) they reached Kovno and crossed the Neman into the territory of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. At the same time, Macdonald withdrew his corps from Riga to Konigsberg, and the Austrians and Saxons withdrew from Drogichin to Warsaw and Pułtusk. By the end of December, Russia was cleared of the enemy.

The death of the Great Army (no more than 20 thousand returned to their homeland) broke the military power of the Napoleonic Empire and was the beginning of its collapse. The transition of the Prussian corps of J. von Wartenburg to the Russian side on December 18 (30), 1812 turned out to be the first link in the process of disintegration of the system of dependent states created by Napoleon in Europe, which, one after another, began to join the anti-French coalition led by Russia. Military operations were transferred to European territory (Foreign campaign of the Russian army 1813–1814). The Patriotic War developed into a pan-European war, which ended in the spring of 1814 with the surrender of France and the fall of the Napoleonic regime.

Russia withstood the most difficult historical test with honor and became the most powerful power in Europe.

Ivan Krivushin

History of the USSR. Short course Shestakov Andrey Vasilievich

34. Tsar Alexander I. Patriotic War of 1812

Annexation of Georgia. Having ascended the throne after the murder of Paul, his son Alexander I took part in a conspiracy against his father. Alexander I continued the conquest of the shores of the Black Sea and the rich lands of the Caucasus, begun by Peter I and Catherine II. First of all, he strengthened himself in Georgia.

In Georgia, as in Russia at that time, landowners dominated. The peasants, without straightening their backs, worked for them from morning to evening. The peasants lived in huts made of stones and dugouts. Most of the harvest from the fields and gardens was taken from them by their masters - the landowners. The rulers of the states neighboring Georgia (Turkey and Iran) made devastating raids on the rich Georgian lands and further ruined the peasants.

After one attack, when the Iranians took captive more than 10 thousand Georgians, the king of Georgia turned to Paul I for help. Royal troops were brought into the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi; in 1801 Georgia finally joined Russia. The devastating raids of the Iranian kings on Georgia stopped.

Georgia became the possession of Tsarist Russia. Russian officials were placed in courts and other institutions. They demanded that petitioners speak in all Georgian institutions only in Russian, which the Georgian people did not know. Serfdom continued to exist in Georgia. The cruelly oppressed Georgian peasants more than once rebelled against their landowners and tsarist officials, but with the help of Georgian princes and nobles, the tsarist troops mercilessly suppressed them. Relying on the serf-owning nobles of Georgia, Alexander I firmly established himself in Transcaucasia.

Conquest of Finland and Bessarabia. In 1805, Alexander I, having restored the military alliance with England, began a war with Napoleon 1, who declared himself Emperor of France.

Napoleon defeated the troops of Alexander I and demanded that Russia stop trading with France's main enemy, England. The defeated Alexander I had to agree. Napoleon promised for this not to interfere with the Russian emperor's war with Sweden and Turkey. Napoleon himself subjugated almost all the peoples of Western Europe to French rule.

Soon, Alexander I declared war on Sweden and quickly occupied Finland, which belonged to the Swedes, with his troops. The Russian army crossed the ice of the Gulf of Bothnia in winter and threatened the capital of Sweden. The Swedish king had to make peace in 1809 and agreed to the transfer of Russia to Finland.

After 3 years, Alexander I managed to conquer Bessarabia, which she had captured, from Turkey - the region between the Dniester and the Prut.

Patriotic war of 1812. But the alliance between Russia and France did not last long. Landowners and merchants were very interested in free trade with England and demanded that the Tsar break with Napoleon. The nobles also feared that under the influence of bourgeois France, where serfdom was abolished, their dominance in Russia would be weakened. Alexander I conceded. Trade with England resumed.

Then Napoleon with a huge army of more than 500 thousand people attacked Russia in the summer 1812 of the year. There were only about 200 thousand Russian troops. They retreated, destroying all food supplies and equipment along the way. Soon Napoleon captured Lithuania and Belarus and moved towards Moscow. Napoleon's invasion of Russia roused the Russian people to the Patriotic War against the invaders; the peasants began a guerrilla war.

Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars, Bashkirs and other peoples of our country took part in the fight against Napoleon.

Suvorov's favorite student, the great commander Field Marshal Mikhail, was placed at the head of the Russian army Kutuzov.

At the end of August, the largest battle took place near Moscow near the village of Borodino. Russian troops stubbornly fought against the enemy who was ravaging their country. More than 50 thousand Russians were killed in this bloody battle, but the strength of the Russian army was not broken.

The French losses were enormous, but the advantage still remained on their side. Kutuzov decided to surrender Moscow to Napoleon without a fight and retreat in order to save the army.

The French occupied Moscow. Large fires started in the city. Many houses burned down. In Moscow, the French were left without food.

Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov (1745–1813).

Winter was approaching. It was impossible for the French to stay in Moscow. Napoleon and his army began to retreat along the road that had been destroyed during the campaign against Moscow. His attempt to retreat by another route failed - other roads were occupied by Russian troops.

Kutuzov relentlessly pursued Napoleon's retreating troops. The partisans attacked and exterminated individual French troops. When crossing the river. On the Berezina River, Napoleon barely escaped the complete defeat of the remnants of his army and personal captivity. Of Napoleon’s entire huge army, only 30 thousand people survived and returned abroad from Russia.

In 1812. Retreat of the French army. From a painting by Pryanishnikov.

Napoleon gathered a new army and began to continue the war. But now Prussia, Austria, England and Sweden came out against him in alliance with Russia. They defeated Napoleon near the city of Leipzig. The Allies crossed the French border and occupied Paris.

Napoleon's victors restored the power of the old French kings and princes in France. The French were ruled by the brother of the king who was executed during the revolution. Napoleon was exiled to a distant island in the Atlantic Ocean. In all other European states previously conquered by Napoleon, the kings and princes he had driven out began to rule again.

For his fight against Napoleon, the allies gave a part of Poland with the city of Warsaw to Alexander I.

To fight the revolution in Europe, the Russian Tsar, the Prussian King and the Austrian Emperor entered into a reactionary Holy Alliance. They vowed to help each other in the fight against popular uprisings. The head of this union was the Russian Tsar Alexander I. Tsarist Russia became the gendarme of Europe.

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