The reasons for the outbreak of the Patriotic War of 1812 are brief. Church of the Life-Giving Trinity on Vorobyovy Gory

The cause of the war was the violation by Russia and France of the terms of the Tilsit Treaty. Russia actually abandoned the blockade of England, accepting ships with British goods under neutral flags in its ports. France annexed the Duchy of Oldenburg, and Napoleon considered the demand for the withdrawal of French troops from Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw offensive. A military clash between the two great powers was becoming inevitable.

June 12, 1812 Napoleon at the head of an army of 600 thousand, crossing the river. Neman invaded Russia. Having an army of about 240 thousand people, Russian troops were forced to retreat before the French Armada. On August 3, the first and second Russian armies united near Smolensk, and a battle was fought. Napoleon failed to achieve complete victory. In August, M.I. was appointed commander-in-chief. Kutuzov. A talented strategist with extensive military experience, he was extremely popular among the people and in the army. Kutuzov decided to give battle in the area of ​​the village of Borodino. A good position for the troops was chosen. The right flank was protected by the river. Koloch, the left one was protected by earthen fortifications - flashes, they were defended by the troops of P.I. Bagration. The troops of General N.N. stood in the center. Raevsky and artillery. Their positions were covered by the Shevardinsky redoubt.

Napoleon intended to break through the Russian formation from the left flank, and then direct all efforts to the center and press Kutuzov’s army to the river. He directed the fire of 400 guns at Bagration's flashes. The French launched eight attacks, starting at 5 a.m., suffering huge losses. Only by 4 o'clock in the afternoon did the French manage to advance to the center, temporarily capturing Raevsky's batteries. At the height of the battle, a desperate raid into the rear of the French was carried out by the lancers of the 1st cavalry corps F.P. Uvarov and the Cossacks of Ataman M.I. Platova. This restrained the attacking impulse of the French. Napoleon did not dare to bring the old guard into battle and lose the backbone of the army away from France.

The battle ended late in the evening. The troops suffered huge losses: the French - 58 thousand people, the Russians - 44 thousand.

Napoleon considered himself the winner in this battle, but later admitted: “Near Moscow, the Russians won the right to be invincible.” At the Battle of Borodino, the Russian army won a great moral and political victory over the European dictator.

On September 1, 1812, at a meeting in Fili, Kutuzov decided to leave Moscow. The retreat was necessary to preserve the army and further fight for the independence of the fatherland.

Napoleon entered Moscow on September 2 and stayed there until October 7, 1812, awaiting peace proposals. During this time, most of the city was burned. Bonaparte's attempts to make peace with Alexander I were unsuccessful.

Kutuzov stopped in the Kaluga direction in the village of Tarutino (80 km south of Moscow), covering Kaluga with large reserves of fodder and Tula with its arsenals. In the Tarutino camp, the Russian army replenished its reserves and received equipment. Meanwhile, guerrilla warfare broke out. The peasant detachments of Gerasim Kurin, Fyodor Potapov, and Vasilisa Kozhina crushed the French food detachments. Special army detachments of D.V. operated. Davydov and A.N. Seslavina.

Having left Moscow in October, Napoleon tried to go to Kaluga and spend the winter in a province not devastated by the war. On October 12, near Maloyaroslavets, Napoleon’s army was defeated and began to retreat along the devastated Smolensk road, driven by frost and hunger. Pursuing the retreating French, Russian troops destroyed their formations in parts. The final defeat of Napoleon's army took place in the battle of the river. Berezina November 14-16. Only 30 thousand French soldiers were able to leave Russia. On December 25, Alexander I issued a manifesto on the victorious end of the Patriotic War.

In 1813-1814 The foreign campaign of the Russian army took place for the liberation of Europe from the rule of Napoleon. In alliance with Austria, Prussia and Sweden, Russian troops inflicted a number of defeats on the French, the largest being the “Battle of the Nations” near Leipzig. The Treaty of Paris on May 18, 1814 deprived Napoleon of the throne and returned France to the borders of 1793.

The Napoleonic Wars are a glorious page in Russian history, but not a single war happens just like that. It is impossible to speak briefly about the causes of the Patriotic War of 1812, because they are deep and multifaceted.

Causes of the Patriotic War of 1812

The era of the Napoleonic Wars began long before 1812, and even then Russia was in confrontation with France. In 1807, the Treaty of Tilsit was concluded, according to which St. Petersburg was to support Paris in the continental blockade of Great Britain. This agreement was considered temporary and forced by the upper classes, because it undermined the economy of the country, which received large cash injections from trade with England. Alexander I was not going to suffer losses from the blockade, and Napoleon regarded Russia as one of the main rivals in achieving world domination.

Rice. 1. Portrait of Alexander I.

Table “The main causes of the war between France and Russia”

In addition to the above reasons, another was Napoleon’s long-standing dream to recreate the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within its former borders. At the expense of the territory of Austria and Prussia, he had already created the Duchy of Warsaw. To complete the idea, he needed the western lands of Russia.

It is also worth noting that Napoleonic troops occupied the Duchy of Oldenburg, which belonged to the uncle of Alexander I, which angered the Russian emperor, causing him a personal insult.

Rice. 2. Map of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 19th century.

Since 1806, Russia waged a protracted war with the Ottoman Empire. Peace was concluded only in 1812. The protracted nature of the hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, which was not as strong as before, may have pushed Napoleon to take more decisive action against Russia.

France strongly supported the Ottoman Empire in the fight against Russia, seeing in it an opportunity to draw Russian forces to the south, distracting them from the French threat. And although Napoleon did not directly intervene in the course of the fighting of the Russian-Turkish war, he exerted all possible influence in order to prolong the fighting and inflict as much damage on Russia as possible.

Rice. 3. Portrait of Napoleon Bonaparte.

As a result, mutual hostility began to grow between Russia and France from 1807 to 1812. Napoleon gradually built up military power on Russia's western borders, increasing his army through allied pacts with Prussia. But Austria subtly hinted to Russia that they would not actively help.

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The fate of Sweden in the political game between Russia and France is interesting. Napoleon offered the Swedes Finland, which they had recently lost in the war with Russia, and Alexander I promised to help Sweden conquer Norway. The Swedish king chose Russia, and not only because of this. It was separated from France by the sea, and Russian troops could reach it by land. In January 1812, Napoleon occupied Swedish Pomerania, putting an end to diplomatic preparations for war with the Russians.

What have we learned?

Russian-French relations during the Napoleonic Wars were very tense and fragile. An open and general war, which was supposed to remove all questions about who is the main force in Europe, was predictable. The year 1812 was supposed to come for Russia, because both states had reasons for this.

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Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

Humanitarian University

Yekaterinburg city

Faculty of Social Psychology

Specialty “Socio-cultural service and tourism”

Part-time form of study

Course 1 (2006)

FULL NAME. student Vyatkina Svetlana Vladimirovna

Discipline

NATIONAL HISTORY

Test

Patriotic War of 1812: causes, course of events, consequences

Teacher: Zemtsov V.N.

Delivery date:

Result

return date

Ekaterinburg-2006

Introduction. 3

Chapter 1. Causes of the Patriotic War of 1812 4

Chapter 2. Course of events of the war.. 7

Paragraph 1. Preparation for war. 7

Paragraph 2. Beginning of hostilities. 12

Paragraph 3. Battle of Borodino. 18

Paragraph 4. End of the war.. 25

Chapter 3. Consequences of the Patriotic War.. 32

Conclusion. 34

This topic was chosen because the Patriotic War against Napoleon was an event that played a vital role in the destinies of the Russian people, Russian culture, foreign policy and Russia as a whole. The War of 1812 had not only pan-European, but also global significance. For Russia, from the first days it was a just war, had a national character and therefore contributed to the growth of national self-awareness. The clash between the two largest powers - Russia and France - involved other independent European states in the war and led to the creation of a new system of international relations.

To explore this topic, the following literature was used: a textbook for secondary schools, gymnasiums, and universities by N.A. Troitsky. Lectures on Russian history of the 19th century; textbook edited by Fedorov V.A. History of Russia XIX - early XX centuries; and the book by I. A. Zaichkin and I. N. Pochkaev especially helped. Russian history From Catherine the Great to Alexander II.

So, what were the causes of the War of 1812, the course of the battles and the consequences? Which of the great commanders led armies? And was it possible to avoid war? The answers to these and other questions will be described in the test.

Chapter 1. Causes of the Patriotic War of 1812

The War of 1812, one of the most famous not only in Russian but also in world history, was generated by a number of reasons: Alexander 1’s personal grudge against Napoleon; the negative mood of court circles, who feared, in particular, the restoration of Poland; economic difficulties; inflammatory anti-French activities of the City of London, etc. But the main prerequisite for its emergence was the desire of the French bourgeoisie for world domination. The creator of this aggressive policy was Napoleon Bonaparte. He did not hide his claims to dominance and said about it: “Three more years, and I am the master of the whole world.” Having proven himself to be an outstanding military leader at the final stage of the Great French Revolution, he became consul in 1799, and in 1804 - emperor. By 1812, he managed to defeat the next, 5th anti-French coalition and was at the zenith of power and glory.

He considered England, which was the only country in the world economically more developed than France, to be a long-time rival of the French bourgeoisie. Therefore, Napoleon set as his ultimate goal the crushing of the economic and political power of England, but he could crush this enemy only after making the entire European continent dependent on himself. Russia remained on the path to achieving this goal. All other powers were either defeated by Napoleon or close to it (like Spain). Russian ambassador in Paris, Prince A.B. Kurakin wrote to Alexander 1 in 1811: “From the Pyrenees to the Oder, from the Sound to the Strait of Messina, everything is entirely France.” According to eyewitnesses, Napoleon, after the supposed victory over Russia, intended to make a campaign against India. Thus, at the beginning of the 19th century. The fate of the peoples of Europe, including England, largely depended on Russia, on whether it would withstand the unprecedented invasion of the French army.

Also, one of the reasons for the war was the conflict between Russia and France due to the continental blockade. Russia's participation in the continental blockade of England had a detrimental effect on the Russian economy, since England was its main trading partner. The volume of Russian foreign trade for 1808-1812. decreased by 43%. The new ally, France, could not compensate for this damage, since Russia’s economic ties with France were superficial (mainly the import of French luxury items to Russia). By disrupting Russia's foreign trade turnover, the continental system was disrupting its finances. Already in 1809, the budget deficit increased compared to 1801 from 12.2 million to 157.5 million rubles, i.e. almost 13 times. Things were heading towards financial ruin.

In August 1810, the French emperor increased duties on goods imported into France, which had an even worse impact on Russia's foreign trade. For his part, Alexander 1 in December 1810 signed a new tariff of a prohibitive nature, satisfying the interests of the nobility and bourgeoisie, but not beneficial for France, which caused the indignation of Napoleon. “To burn the Lyons materials,” he wrote regarding the new tariff, “means to alienate one nation from another. From now on, war will depend on the slightest breath of wind.”

The conditions of the Peace of Tilsit were also very difficult for Russia because this alliance obliged Russia to act against countries hostile to Napoleon and their allies.

The Peace of Tilsit seemed to usher in an era of calm, providing an opportunity to take care of internal affairs, but it became only a temporary respite before a new, even more dangerous military conflict with France. In 1810, Napoleon openly declared his desire for world domination, and also that Russia stood in the way of it.

Chapter 2. Course of events of the war

Paragraph 1. Preparation for war

Russia was aware of the impending danger. Both sides began intensive preparations for the upcoming war. Napoleon did not prepare any of his wars as carefully as the war against Russia, realizing that he would have to meet with a strong enemy. Having created a huge, well-armed and equipped army, Napoleon sought to isolate Russia politically, and to secure as many allies as possible, “to turn the idea of ​​a coalition inside out,” as A.Z. Manfred. He expected that Russia would have to fight simultaneously on three fronts against five states: in the north - against Sweden, in the west - against France, Austria and Prussia, in the south - against Turkey. But he only managed to conclude secret alliances with Austria and Prussia in February-March 1812. These countries were promised territorial gains at the expense of Russian possessions. Napoleon's attempts to create a threat to Russia from Sweden and Turkey were unsuccessful: in April 1812, Russia entered into a secret alliance with Sweden, and a month later signed a peace treaty with Turkey. If Napoleon's plan had come true, Russia would have found itself in a catastrophic situation. He didn't stop there. Through a series of trade privileges, he ensured that the United States of America on June 18, 1812, a week before the French invasion of Russia, declared war on England, Napoleon’s main enemy, naturally complicating its fight with France and assistance to Russia.

Indeed, Napoleon’s plan for the complete isolation of Russia and a simultaneous attack on it from three sides by the five powers was thwarted. Russia managed to secure its flanks. In addition, feudal Austria and Prussia were forced into an alliance with bourgeois France and “helped” Napoleon, as they say, under pressure, ready at the first convenient moment to go over to the side of feudal Russia, which they ultimately did .

However, the blow that in the summer of 1812 Russia took over, was of terrible force. Napoleon's allocations for military purposes amounted to 100 million francs. He carried out additional mobilization, which increased his army by 250 thousand people. For the campaign against Russia, he managed to form the so-called Great Army of over 600 thousand soldiers and officers. Its core was the 10,000-strong old guard, consisting of veterans who remembered the victory at Austerlitz. The army command staff had solid combat experience. The famous marshals: Davout, Ney, Murat - were great masters of military art. The cult of the “little corporal” still lived among the troops, as French soldiers and officers continued to affectionately call their emperor around bivouac fires, thereby maintaining a certain mood in the army. Troop control was well established, the headquarters worked smoothly.

Before the start of the offensive, the French carefully studied the features of the theater of the upcoming battles. Napoleon drew up his strategic plan for the campaign; it was simple and quite specific: with the entire mass of troops to wedge between the Russian armies, surround each one individually and defeat it in general battles as close to the western border as possible. The duration of the entire campaign was planned for no more than a month.

However, it would be wrong to over-exaggerate the military-economic power of the Napoleonic coalition. His army in 1812 had serious weaknesses. Thus, the motley, multi-tribal composition had a detrimental effect on it. Less than half of it was French. The majority were Germans, Poles, Italians, Dutch, porters, Portuguese and other nationalities. Many of them hated Napoleon as the enslaver of their fatherland, followed him to war only under duress, fought reluctantly and often deserted. With each new war, the morale of his army fell. The reasons that led to wars and the problems that were resolved during the wars became alien to the soldiers. The great writer F. Stendhal, who served for a long time under the banner of Napoleon, testified: “From republican, heroic, it became more and more selfish and monarchical.”

In St. Petersburg they not only knew about Napoleon’s preparations for war, but they themselves tried to implement a number of measures in the same direction. The War Ministry, headed by M.B. Barclay de Tolly, in 1810, developed a program that provided for the rearmament of the Russian army and strengthening of the western borders of the empire, in particular strengthening the defensive line along the Western Dvina, Berezina and Dnieper rivers. But this program was not implemented due to the difficult financial situation of the state. And the military fortifications partially built along the Neman, Western Dvina and Berezina were created hastily and did not become an obstacle to the invasion of the French army.

The problem of human resources was also not simple. The system of recruiting the Russian army by recruiting recruits from serfs, as well as the 25-year period of military service, did not allow for a sufficient number of trained reserves. During the war, it was necessary to create militias that needed training and weapons. So on July 6, 1812, Alexander 1 appealed to the population “to gather new forces that, while inflicting terror on the enemy, would constitute a second fence and reinforcement of the first (regular army).”

Despite the additional recruitment, the Russian army covering the western border at the beginning of the war numbered 317 thousand soldiers, who were divided into three armies and three separate corps. The number of Russian troops is indicated in the literature with amazing discrepancies. Meanwhile, the archive contains authentic records of the strength of the army and reserve corps. 1st Army under the command of the Minister of War, General M.B. Barclay de Tolly was stationed in the Vilna region, covering the St. Petersburg direction, and numbered 120,210 people; 2nd Army of General Prince P.I. Bagration, near Bialystok, in the Moscow direction, - 49,423 people; 3rd Army of General A.P. Tormasova, near Lutsk, in the Kiev direction, - 44,180 people. In addition, the corps of General I.N. was on the first line of resistance to the French near Riga. Essen (38,077 people), and the second line consisted of two reserve corps - generals E.I. Meller-Zakomelsky (27,473 people) and F.F. Ertel (37,539 people). The flanks of both lines were covered: from the north - the 19,000-strong corps of General F.F. Steingeil in Finland and from the south - the Danube Army of Admiral P.V. Chichagova (57,526 people) in Wallachia.

The Russian side began preparing a plan for upcoming military operations in 1810 in deep secrecy. Alexander 1, Barclay de Tolly and the Prussian general Fuhl took part in its development. However, it was not accepted in its final form and was refined during the course of hostilities. At the beginning of the war, Foule proposed an option according to which, in the event of a French attack on Barclay de Tolly’s army, it would have to retreat to a fortified camp near the city of Drissa and fight a general battle here. Bagration’s army, according to Fuhl’s plan, was supposed to act on the flank and rear of the enemy. From this option just

This resulted in the division of Russian troops into three separate armies.

However, the main problem of the Russian army at that time was not its small numbers, but the feudal system of its recruitment, maintenance, training and management. The impenetrable gap between the mass of soldiers and the command staff, drill and discipline based on the principle of “kill two, learn the third,” humiliated the human dignity of Russian soldiers. The famous soldier's song was composed just before the war of 1812:

I am the defense of the fatherland,

And my back is always beaten...

It's better not to be born in the world,

What is it like to be a soldier...

But one should not think that the Russians did not have capable officers and talented commanders. On the contrary, the traditions of Generalissimo Suvorov’s glorious military school of winning with small numbers, skill and courage still lived in the army. In addition, the experience of the wars of 1805-1807. forced Alexander 1 to study with Napoleon, which made the Russian army stronger. But the main sources of its military strength lay not in borrowings from outside, but in itself. Firstly, it was a national army, more homogeneous and united than the multi-tribal army of Napoleon; secondly, it was distinguished by a higher moral spirit: in their native land, the soldiers were inspired by a patriotic mood. For the Russian soldier, the concept of “homeland” was not an empty phrase. He was ready to fight until his last breath for his land, for his faith. Napoleon's army did not have significant quantitative and qualitative superiority in artillery and did not surpass the Russian in the number and fighting qualities of cavalry. Horse breeding in no other European country was as developed as in Russia. However, the rational use of enormous material resources was hampered by the large extent of the territory, low population density, lack of more or less passable roads, serfdom and the inertia of the tsarist administration.

Thus, while losing to the enemy in numbers, planning and organizing the strategic deployment of troops, the Russian army was not inferior to him in weapons and combat training.

Paragraph 2. Start of hostilities

On the night of June 12, 1812 Napoleon's army, without declaring war, began crossing the Neman, along which the western border of Russia then ran. Near Kovno, French covering detachments sailed in boats to the eastern shore and did not meet anyone there except Cossack patrols. The sappers built floating bridges along which the guard regiments, infantry and cavalry corps and artillery crossed the river. There were no Russian troops, no busy roads, no noisy camps anywhere to be seen. Early in the morning the vanguard of the French troops entered Kovno.

Napoleon's strategic plan at the beginning of the war was this: to defeat the Russian armies separately in border battles. He did not want to delve into the vast expanses of Russia.

Such a calculation by Napoleon could have been realized if the Russian armies had acted according to the plan drawn up by the military mentor of Alexander 1, General K. Foul.

The main forces of the Russian troops (Barclay de Tolly's army) were concentrated at that time 100 km southeast of the enemy crossing point. Since the time of the invasion of the Teutonic Order, the Lithuanian population tried to settle away from the borders of Prussia. Therefore, the eastern bank of the Neman seemed deserted. One of the participants in the hike later recalled: “Before us lay a desert, brown, yellowish land with stunted vegetation and distant forests on the horizon...”.

On that very day, June 12, when the French army began its crossing of the Neman, Alexander 1 was present at the holiday that Russian officers gave in his honor in the vicinity of Vilna, inviting the highest Vilna society to the celebrations. Here, in the evening, the Russian emperor learned about the enemy’s attack. On June 14, he left the city, having first sent his Minister of Police, Adjutant General A.D. Balashov to the French emperor with a proposal to begin negotiations on a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Napoleon received the latter already in Vilna, which the French occupied on the fourth day after crossing the Neman. Napoleon remained in Vilna for a full 18 days, which military historians later considered one of his fatal mistakes. But, as before in Dresden, he waited for new army units approaching him.

Barclay de Tolly, having learned about Napoleon's invasion, led his army from Vilna to the Drissa camp. He sent a courier to Bagration with an order on behalf of the Tsar, who was then at Barclay’s headquarters: to retreat to Minsk to interact with the 1st Army. Napoleon, following his plan, rushed with his main forces after Barclay, and in order to prevent Barclay and Bagration from uniting, he sent the corps of Marshal Davout between them. But his hopes of breaking in, forcing major battles on them, and defeating them one by one failed. Barclay, due to the unfavorable balance of forces, having become convinced of the weakness of his defensive fortifications and the unsuitability of his chosen position, promptly began to retreat through Polotsk to Vitebsk and further to Smolensk to join the 2nd Army. The blow planned by Napoleon against the troops of the 1st Army in the Vilna area fell on empty ground. In addition, he twice failed to defeat the 1st Russian Army at Polotsk and Vitebsk - he overtook Barclay, but he avoided the battle and retreated further.

The 2nd Army (Bagration) moved through Slutsk, Bobruisk, crossed the Dnieper, passed Mstislavl and headed towards Smolensk. Only great experience and skill allowed Bagration to escape the trap set by the talented French Marshal Davout. On July 22, both Russian armies united in Smolensk.

Thus, Napoleon's plan to defeat the scattered Russian troops one by one collapsed. Moreover, he was forced to disperse his forces: to the north against I.N. Essen detached the corps of J. -E. Macdonald; south against A.P. Tormasov - buildings Zh.L. Regnier and K.F. Schwarzenberg. Another corps (N.Sh. Oudinot) was allocated and then reinforced by the corps of L.G. Saint-Cyr for action against the troops of P.H. Wittgenstein, who defended St. Petersburg.

Having learned about the union of Barclay and Bagration, Napoleon consoled himself with the hope of involving the Russians in a general battle for Smolensk, as “one of the sacred Russian cities,” and defeating both of their armies at once. He decided to bypass Smolensk and go to the rear of the Russian troops.

The French offensive began on 1 August. Napoleon moved the corps of Marshal Ney and the cavalry of Marshal Murat around Smolensk. This was prevented by the troops of the 27th Division D.P. Neverovsky - they met the French at Krasny. Russian soldiers repelled enemy attacks with unprecedented tenacity. After the battle, only the sixth part of the division remained, which broke through the enemy ring, entered Smolensk and united with the main forces of the army. From August 4 to 6, corps N.N. Raevsky and D.S. Dokhturov defended the city from three enemy infantry and three cavalry corps approaching one after another. The city residents helped them. The city was burning. The Russians blew up the powder magazines, after which they abandoned Smolensk on the night of August 18.

When French troops entered the burning, dilapidated city, Napoleon again faced the question of further prospects for the war: only 135 thousand troops remained in his strike force. Marshal Murat advised his emperor not to go further. While remaining in Smolensk, Bonaparte tried to negotiate peace with Alexander 1. However, this proposal remained unanswered. Stung by the tsar's silence, he ordered a march from Smolensk to Moscow in pursuit of the Russian armies. Perhaps in this way he wanted to push Alexander 1 to agree to peace negotiations. Napoleon hoped that if the Russians fought so desperately for Smolensk, then for the sake of Moscow they would definitely go to a general battle and allow him to end the war with a glorious victory, like Austerlitz or Friedland.

After the joining of the armies of Barclay and Bagration, the Russians numbered about 120 thousand people in their ranks. French troops still outnumbered the Russians. Some generals, including Bagration, offered to give battle. But Barclay de Tolly, having learned about the approach of the Napoleonic army, gave the order to continue moving into the interior of the country.

The war was becoming protracted, and this was what Napoleon feared most. Its communications were stretched, losses in battles, losses from desertion, disease and looting grew, and convoys lagged behind. This alarmed Bonaparte, especially since another coalition was rapidly forming against him in Europe, which included, in addition to Russia, England, Sweden and Spain.

The French robbed the population, ravaged villages and cities. This, in turn, caused bitterness and stubborn resistance among local residents. When the enemy approached, they hid in the forests, burned food, stole livestock, leaving nothing for the enemy. The peasant partisan movement arose and expanded. “Every village,” the French recalled, “turned at our approach either into a fire or into a fortress.”

Public opinion condemned Barclay, who avoided major battles with the French and retreated to the east. The national liberation nature of the war required the appointment of a new commander-in-chief who would enjoy greater trust and authority. Such a person was M.I. Kutuzov, who at that time was the head of the St. Petersburg militia. The Russian emperor was confused and puzzled, because he did not like Kutuzov. But the nobility of both capitals unanimously called him the first candidate. He had already demonstrated his skill as a commander more than once and, most importantly, was popular in the army and in Russian society. He distinguished himself in more than a dozen campaigns, sieges, and battles and firmly established himself as a wise strategist and a brilliant diplomat.

On August 8, the appointment of Kutuzov to such an important and responsible post received approval from all of Russia. A proverb immediately became popular among the soldiers: “Kutuzov came to beat the French! »

Kutuzov took command under very difficult conditions. A large territory of Russia (600 km inland) was captured by the enemy; the French were superior in military strength. Beyond Smolensk, Russian troops no longer had a stronghold until Moscow itself. “The key to Moscow has been taken,” is how M.I. assessed the fall of Smolensk. Kutuzov. In addition, the government of Alexander 1 did not fulfill its promises: 100 thousand recruits, as well as a people’s militia of 100 thousand warriors. When the Russian army was already near Mozhaisk, it turned out that Kutuzov could actually receive only 15 thousand recruits and 26 thousand militia.

On August 29, the new commander-in-chief arrived at the headquarters of the Russian army, located in the town of Tsarevo-Zaymishche, where Barclay de Tolly was preparing to give a general battle with Napoleon. Kutuzov canceled this decision, adhering to the retreat tactics and considering it the only correct one for preserving the combat effectiveness of the army. The withdrawal of troops continued to the village of Borodina, located near Mozhaisk, 120 km west of Moscow. Here the battle with Napoleon’s army took place, which went down in history as a bright page.

It was no coincidence that Kutuzov chose the Borodino position for a large and important battle. It allowed Russian troops to conduct defensive operations against the advancing French with the greatest success. On a relatively narrow front, this position immediately blocked two roads to Moscow - Old Smolenskaya and New Smolenskaya, which connected at Mozhaisk. From the right flank, commanded by Barclay de Tolly, the troops were covered by the Kolocha River, which flows into the Moscow River. By the end of summer there was not much water in Kolocha, but its banks were steep and steep. The hilly terrain with streams and ravines made it possible to create strong points at prominent heights, install artillery and hide part of their troops from the enemy. The entire field was covered in places with bushes and small forests, and on the south and east it was bordered by continuous alder and birch forests. Kutuzov assessed the chosen position as “one of the best, which can only be found on flat places.”

To improve the position, Kutuzov ordered to further strengthen it. For this purpose, several embankments were erected on the right flank and cannons were installed on them. A battery of 18 guns, called Kurgan, was located on the central hill (the 7th Infantry Corps, commanded by General Raevsky, was stationed here during the battle). On the left flank, near the village of Semenovskaya, artificial earthen fortifications for artillery batteries were built on an open plain. They were angled towards the enemy and were called flushes.

The terrain forced the French to attack Russian troops head-on in a narrow area, overcoming the steep banks of Kolocha. This inevitably led to heavy losses among the attackers.

Kutuzov’s immediate task was to stop the enemy’s further advance, and then combine the efforts of all armies, including the Danube and 3rd Western, launching an active offensive. This plan stemmed from the military-strategic situation, which was presented to him in the documents of the War Ministry and letters from Rostopchin. He defined his task this way: “saving Moscow.” He took into account the possibility of both success and failure: “if the enemy forces successfully resist, I will give my own orders to pursue them. In case of failure, several roads are open along which the armies will have to retreat.”

Napoleon, who longed for a general battle from the first days of the war, did not think about possible failure. Anticipating victory, he exclaimed at dawn before the battle: “Here is the sun of Austerlitz! " His goal was to take Moscow and there, in the heart of Russia, dictate a victorious peace to Alexander 1. For this, it was enough, according to Napoleon, to win the Battle of Borodino. His plan was simple: to knock down Russian troops from their occupied positions, throw them into the “bag” at the confluence of the river. Kolochi with the Moscow River and defeat.

Paragraph 3. Battle of Borodino

The Battle of Borodino on August 26, 1812 is the only example in the history of wars of a general battle, the outcome of which both sides immediately announced and to this day celebrate as their victory, with good reason. Therefore, many questions of its history, from the balance of forces to losses, remain controversial. A new analysis of old data shows that Napoleon had 133.8 thousand people and 587 guns under Borodino, Kutuzov - 154.8 thousand people and 640 guns. True, Kutuzov had only 115.3 thousand regular troops, plus 11 thousand Cossacks and 28.5 thousand militias, but Napoleon’s entire guard (19 thousand best, selected soldiers) stood in reserve the entire day of the battle, then how Russian reserves were completely spent. Bonaparte hoped to counter the slight superiority of the Russians in artillery with his skill in command and control, swiftness of maneuver and crushing power of the blow.

When studying the Patriotic War, the question repeatedly arose: was there a need for the Battle of Borodino? And if “yes,” then for each of the warring parties this need was more important, more significant? L.N. answered this question in his own original and unambiguous way. Tolstoy. In the novel “War and Peace” he wrote: “Why was the Battle of Borodino fought? It didn’t make the slightest sense for either the French or the Russians. The immediate results were and should have been - for the Russians, that we were closer to the destruction of Moscow, and for the French, that they were closer to the destruction of the entire army.”

However, the Battle of Borodino could not have happened. It was inevitable. Kutuzov gave battle, firstly, because the retreating army wanted it. Secondly, excited public opinion would not forgive Kutuzov if he retreated all the way to Moscow without a decisive battle with the enemy. In addition, when deciding on the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov, with good reason, hoped to bleed the enemy, deprive him of hope for an easy victory, and thereby begin the shameful expulsion of the invaders from Russia. Napoleon had his own ideas. Considering his temporary superiority in forces, he hoped to defeat the Russian army in a general battle, force Alexander 1 to a forced peace and brilliantly finish the next campaign.

Having reached the Borodino area, Kutuzov positioned the Russian troops along the front as follows. He placed the more numerous and powerful 1st Army under the command of Barclay (about 70% of all forces) on the right flank, along the shore of Kolocha. Units of this army covered the road to Moscow. He placed Bagration's army on the left flank to the village of Utitsa. The role of a forward defensive point was performed by a pentagonal redoubt (a field fortification adapted for all-round defense), built in front of the entire position on the left flank near the village of Shevardino.

When Napoleon was informed that the Russian army was no longer retreating and was preparing for battle, he was very happy. Finally he had the opportunity to show the Russians his strength.

At noon on August 24, the French vanguard attacked the Shevardinsky redoubt. He interfered with the regrouping of French forces and the transfer of their troops from the New Smolensk road, where the 1st Army was located, to bypass the left flank occupied by Bagration's troops. It was important for the Russians to detain the enemy here for several hours. Napoleon unleashed about 30 thousand infantry and 10 thousand cavalry on 8 thousand Russian infantry and 4 thousand cavalry. Soon the firefight turned into a bayonet fight. The fortification changed hands several times. By evening the French took possession of it, but with a surprise attack the Russians drove them out of there. On the approaches to the redoubt and on its earthen ramparts, 6 thousand enemy corpses remained. Only by order of Kutuzov did the Russian troops leave the position they had occupied around midnight. After taking the fortifications, Napoleon was unable to move further.

The Battle of Borodino began on August 26 at half past five in the morning and lasted more than 12 hours. To divert the enemy's forces and attention, the French began the battle with a firefight on the right flank near the village of Borodino against a regiment of guards rangers. A small detachment left Borodino fighting and retreated across the Kolocha River.

An hour later, Napoleon's main attack was delivered on the left flank - Bagration's flushes (field fortifications). Napoleon's goal was to break through them, go to the rear of the Russian army and force it to fight with an inverted front. Here, on an area of ​​about 2 km, Napoleon concentrated 45 thousand soldiers and 400 guns. This offensive was led by the best generals - Ney, Davout, Murat and Oudinot.

The first attack was repulsed by Russian troops. In the second attack, the French managed to capture part of the fortifications, but the flushes were soon recaptured. Napoleon transferred new forces to the left flank. Almost all of his artillery operated in this sector. In order to pull part of the enemy forces away from Bagration’s troops, Kutuzov ordered the Cossacks of General M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of General F.P. Uvarov to carry out a raid on the left flank and behind the French. Part of the Commander-in-Chief's reserves was also sent to the flushes. Bagration again went on the offensive. But, having received fresh troops, the French launched an attack along the entire front and for some time captured the N.N. battery. Raevsky. Then General A.P. Ermolov led the troops in a counterattack and soon the enemy was knocked out of the battery. Only after the eighth attack were the flushes occupied by the enemy. However, Russian troops in this sector retreated only half a kilometer and did not allow the enemy to develop their success. Both sides suffered heavy losses. General Dokhturov, who replaced Bagration, who was mortally wounded by a cannonball fragment, quickly restored the defense behind the Semenovsky ravine.

Capturing flushes opened the way to Raevsky's battery. (There is an opinion that the attacks on Kurgan Heights - Raevsky’s battery - were carried out simultaneously with the battles for Bagration’s flushes). Having pushed back the defending flushes, Bonaparte installed guns there and in the afternoon began shelling the center of the Russian troops - the Kurgan Battery. He even decided to bring a division of the Young Guard into battle from his reserve. Having concentrated more than 35 thousand soldiers and about 200 guns, Napoleon prepared for a general attack. However, at this time (at two o'clock in the afternoon) the Russian cavalry under the command of Platov and Uvarov bypassed the left flank of the French, which diverted Napoleon's attention from the battery attack for 2 hours. He stopped his guards division and was forced to regroup his troops. Although this raid did not achieve its intended goal (the defeat of the rear of the French army), it suspended attacks on the Russian center for two hours, which gave Kutuzov the opportunity to pull up reserves and regroup.

The battle for the Kurgan Battery was fierce. The resilience of the Russians surprised the French. Only at four o'clock in the afternoon, having suffered huge losses, the French captured the redoubt on the central hill. Russian troops retreated approximately 1 km. But this was their last success. By evening, Kutuzov ordered his troops to retreat to a new line of defense. Dusk deepened and a light rain began to fall. Napoleon stopped the attacks and withdrew his troops to their original positions, which they occupied in the morning, limiting themselves to artillery cannonade. On this occasion, Kutuzov reported: “The batteries changed hands, and the end result was that the enemy did not win a single step of ground with his superior forces.” The losses suffered and delays in the arrival of the promised reserves did not allow Kutuzov to give a new battle.

The losses on both sides were enormous. The Russians lost, according to the materials of the Military Scientific Archive of the Russian General Staff, 45.6 thousand people (over 30% of the personnel); The French in this bloody battle lost, according to the Archives of the French War Ministry, 28 thousand people (Soviet historians raise this figure to 58-60 thousand people arbitrarily).

On September 1, a military council was assembled in the village of Fili, three miles from Moscow. Kutuzov raised the question for discussion: “Should we expect an attack in a disadvantageous position or should we cede Moscow to the enemy? "Opinions are divided. Kutuzov gave the order to leave Moscow in order to preserve the army.

On September 2, the French army entered the deserted city: out of 275,547 thousand Muscovites, about 6 thousand remained. Officers and soldiers were met by hostile residents, mostly simple and poor, who had nowhere to go. That same evening, fires broke out in different parts of the city and raged for a whole week. At first they were local in nature, but then became widespread. Many remaining residents became victims of the fire, as well as those wounded in hospitals. Historians and writers are still arguing about the causes and culprits. For serious researchers there is no question here, just as there was no question for Napoleon and Kutuzov: both of them knew that the Russians burned Moscow. Kutuzov and Moscow Governor-General F.V. Rostopchin ordered to burn numerous warehouses and shops and remove “the entire fire extinguishing shell” from the city, which already doomed the predominantly wooden Moscow to an unquenchable fire. In addition, the residents themselves burned the city, burning it according to the principle “don’t get it from the villain!” " By order of the French command, Russian patriots suspected of arson were seized and shot. However, some eyewitnesses of the events and historians considered the French themselves to be the culprits of the fires - during robberies and drunken revelry, they carelessly handled fire.

As a result, three-quarters of Moscow (out of 9,158 buildings - 6,532, including the most valuable historical and cultural monuments: palaces, temples, libraries) died in fire. The fire raged on Red Square, on Arbat, and in Zamoskvorechye. His terrible prey was Gostiny Dvor, Moscow University, and the Kudrinsky widow's house with 700 wounded Russian soldiers. On the night of September 4-5, a strong wind arose in Moscow, lasting more than a day. The fires intensified. The fire engulfed the city center near the Kremlin, and the Trinity Tower caught fire. For safety reasons, the French emperor was forced to take refuge in the suburban Peter's Palace for several days.

The course of the battle turned out in Napoleon's favor. He occupied all Russian positions from Borodin on the right to Utitsa on the left, including the stronghold Kurgan Heights in the center. Since the Russian army left Moscow after Borodin, he considered the Battle of Borodino won tactically and strategically. However, Bonaparte, despite all his hopes and plans, was unable to defeat the Russian army and put it to flight. He knew that the fall of Moscow would echo throughout the world as another of his main victories. But the fire immediately changed everything, putting the emperor from a winning position to a losing one. Instead of convenience and contentment, the French found themselves in ashes in the city. True, Kutuzov did not solve his main task: to save Moscow. He was forced to sacrifice the city. But he did this not so much by the will of Napoleon as of his own free will, not because he was defeated, but because he stood and believed in the victorious outcome of the war for Russia. The Battle of Borodino was a moral victory for the Russian army; it became the beginning of the end of the greatness of the French emperor and his army. And General Kutuzov received from Alexander 1 field marshal’s baton for the Battle of Borodino

Napoleon repeatedly returned to the memories of this battle in subsequent years, already on the island of St. Helena. In a conversation with General Gourgaud, he asked: what battle did he consider the most outstanding? The general replied that Austerlitz. To this Napoleon objected - no, he places the battle of Moscow much higher. In his memoirs, he emphasized: “The Battle of Moscow is my greatest battle: it is a battle of giants... One could say that it was one of those where the most was deserved, and the least results were obtained.”

Paragraph 4. End of the war

Continuing to remain in Moscow, Napoleon saw that his army had begun a dangerous process of moral decay; robberies and looting did not stop. Neither the emperor nor the governor-general and commandant of the city appointed by him were able to stop this. There was a problem with food. True, there were still supplies in the city, but they were running out and were not replenished. The peasants of the surrounding villages hid food from the enemy.

Now in the Moscow Kremlin, Napoleon realized that he was in danger of death and only peaceful negotiations could save everything that had been achieved. Remaining in Moscow for 36 days, he “generously” offered 1st peace to Alexander three times and received no answer three times.

In those days, the Tsar was pushed towards peace by his mother, brother Konstantin and the most influential dignitaries, including Arakcheev and Chancellor of the Empire N.P. Rumyantseva. Alexander, however, was adamant. He even expressed his readiness to retreat to Kamchatka and become the “Emperor of the Kamchadals,” but not to put up with Napoleon.

While Napoleon in Moscow was waiting for consent to peace, Kutuzov managed to prepare for a counter-offensive. Leaving Moscow, the field marshal demonstrated to the French for four days the appearance of a retreat along the Ryazan road, and on the fifth day he secretly turned at Krasnaya Pakhra onto the Kaluga road and on September 21 set up camp near the village. Tarutino, 80 km southwest of Moscow. Kutuzov’s famous Tarutino march-maneuver allowed him to avoid persecution by the French army led by Murat, control three southern directions at once and thereby block Napoleon’s path to the fertile southern provinces and cities with military reserves - Tula, Kaluga and Bryansk.

In Tarutino, Kutuzov’s army received reinforcements. Within two weeks, he gathered more than twice the enemy's forces of regular troops, Cossacks and people's militia - a total of 240 thousand people - against Napoleon's 116 thousand. Additional weapons were brought to the army (Kutuzov had more than 600 guns, Napoleon-569) and food, and more efficient communication was established with the partisans. The balance of power changed in favor of the Russians.

The army's stay in the Tarutino camp became a turning point in the course of the Patriotic War. And it is not at all by chance that Kutuzov himself wrote that the Nara River, flowing near Tarutin, will be “as famous for the Russians as the Nepryadva, on the banks of which countless Mamai militias died.”

On October 6, the famous Tarutino battle took place. Having made sure that Kutuzov with the main forces had gone to the west, Murat (he had 26 thousand soldiers and officers in the vanguard) also turned from the Ryazan road to Podolsk and stopped on the right bank of the Chernishni River. Near Tarutin he was attacked by Kutuzov. The movement of Russian units to the initial lines for the attack was carried out at night. At the same time, the Russian columns did not act in concert, as a result of which it was not possible to encircle and destroy the French. However, Murat lost about 5 thousand soldiers and was forced to retreat. This operation was the first victory of the Russian troops who launched the offensive.

Murat's defeat accelerated the retreat of the 110,000-strong French army from Moscow. On October 7, Napoleon left Moscow. Feeling an acute dislike for the Russians and their intractable emperor, before leaving, he gave the barbaric order to blow up the palaces, the Kremlin and St. Basil's Cathedral. Only the courage and resourcefulness of Russian patriots, who cut the lit wicks in time, and the beginning of the rain, saved outstanding cultural monuments from destruction. As a result of the explosions, the Nikolskaya Tower, the Ivan the Great Bell Tower and other structures on the territory of the Kremlin were partially damaged.

Napoleon went to Kaluga with the intention of retreating to Smolensk not along the Old Mozhaisk Road, which was completely destroyed, but along the New Kaluga Road. Kutuzov blocked his path at Maloyaroslavets. Here on October 12 a fierce battle broke out. The small town, burned to the ground, changed hands eight times and remained with the French. Kutuzov's troops left him only after they had taken a convenient position, retreating 2.5 km to the south, and reliably blocked the enemy's path to Kaluga. Bonaparte was faced with a choice: attack Kutuzov in order to break through to Kaluga or go to Smolensk along the ruined road through Mozhaisk. Having calculated his forces and weighed the chances, he chose retreat. So for the first time in his life, Napoleon himself abandoned a general battle, voluntarily turned his back to the enemy, and moved from the position of the pursuer to the position of the pursued. But after the battle of Maloyaroslavets, Kutuzov did not want new battles and avoided them. The strategy of the old commander was calculated on the fact that the French army itself would come to its death.

On October 13, the emperor abandoned Kaluga and went to Mozhaisk on the Old Smolensk Road. The French retreat from October 13 to December 2 was a complete disaster for them. The road was a scorched desert, where, according to eyewitnesses, “even a cat could not be found.” The French could not profit anywhere or anything on such a road. They had nowhere to turn from it: death awaited them everywhere at the hands of the Cossacks, partisans, and peasants. The scourge of the army was the massive death of horses. Cavalry and artillery turned into infantry, and guns had to be abandoned. Even before Smolensk, the famine had reached such catastrophic proportions that the French sometimes resorted to cannibalism. “Yesterday,” Kutuzov wrote to his wife on October 28, “they found two Frenchmen in the forest who were roasting and eating their third comrade.”

Fights and numerous minor skirmishes with the enemy arose spontaneously. The Russian army attacked the rearguard of the French army near Vyazma. The battle lasted 10 hours, as a result of which the enemy lost 7 thousand people and was forced to continue their hasty retreat. Since Kutuzov's main forces approached Yelnya, Napoleon had to leave Smolensk. Leaving Smolensk on November 2, his army numbered about 50 thousand people. About 30 thousand unarmed people followed the army.

After Vyazma, where the first truly winter frost hit, immediately at 18 degrees, a new enemy fell upon the “Great Army” - the cold. The winter of 1812 in Russia turned out to be the frostiest in many decades. Frosts, northern winds, and snowfalls weakened and destroyed the hungry French.

But the most formidable enemy remained the regular Russian troops. In addition to Kutuzov’s troops, the troops of Field Marshal P.Kh. were moving across the French from the north. Wittgenstein (previously his corps covered the direction to St. Petersburg), and from the south - the Danube Army of Admiral P.V. Chichagova. Thus, the danger threatening the retreating army increased every day.

On November 5, a three-day battle between Russian troops and the French who came out of Smolensk took place near Krasnoye. As a result of stubborn battles, Ney's corps was almost completely destroyed. The French left the Russians 116 guns, many prisoners and a huge convoy. There were about 5 thousand killed and wounded on the French side. The enemy lost almost all of their artillery and cavalry. For this battle, Field Marshal Kutuzov received the title of Prince of Smolensk, and Ataman Platov received the title of count.

Coming out of the battle near Krasnoye, Napoleon went through Orsha to Borisov. There he intended to cross the Berezina. It was here that Kutuzov predicted the “imminent extermination of the entire French army.”

Three Russian armies (Wittgenstein, Chichagov and the commander-in-chief himself) were supposed to surround the retreating Napoleon, prevent him from crossing to the right bank of the Berezina and defeat him. In accordance with this plan, Wittgenstein took Polotsk, Chichagov took Borisov, and Kutuzov himself followed the French. Everything foreshadowed success for the Russians. There were twice as many of them in the Berezina area as there were French. Admiral Chichagov prepared to take Napoleon himself prisoner. He even told his troops the signs of the emperor, emphasizing in particular his “short stature,” and then ordered: “For greater reliability, catch and bring to me all the short ones! "

Napoleon found himself in a catastrophic situation. To top off all his troubles, the Berezina River, which had long been frozen, now opened up again after a two-day thaw, and strong ice drift prevented the construction of bridges. In this hopelessness, Napoleon found the only chance of salvation. Taking advantage of the slowness of Kutuzov, who was three crossings behind, he, with a feigned maneuver, convinced Chichagov that he was going to undertake a crossing south of Borisov. In fact, the crossing took place from November 14 to 16 near the village of Studyanki, 12 versts above Borisov. But here too, Napoleon’s army suffered heavy losses. One of the two pontoon bridges they built broke during the passage of artillery. A significant part of the retreating enemy troops were unable to cross to the right bank of the river in time and were killed or captured by Wittgenstein and Kutuzov’s advanced units.

After the Berezina, the retreat of the remnants of the French army was a disorderly flight. About 20-30 thousand French crossed the Russian border - this is all that remains of the 600 thousand army that began the invasion of our land in June. Not only Napoleon survived, but also his guard, the officer corps, the generals and all the marshals. On November 21 in Molodechno, he compiled the “funeral”, as the French themselves would call it, the 29th bulletin - a kind of funeral eulogy for the “Grand Army” . Having admitted his defeat, Napoleon explained it by the vicissitudes of the Russian winter.

On the evening of November 23, in the town of Smorgon, the emperor left the remnants of his army, transferring command to I. Murat. He was in a hurry to Paris to determine the rumors around the 29th bulletin, and most importantly, to assemble a new army. On December 6, he arrived in Paris. The first to meet him was the Minister of Foreign Affairs G. -B. Mare. “Sir, what is the state of the army? "- asked the minister. Napoleon replied: “There is no more army.”

The crushing defeat that the hitherto invincible Napoleon suffered in Russia excited the whole world. No one expected that the “scourge of the universe,” who had already conquered Moscow, would flee Russia three months later and leave almost his entire “Great Army” in its snows. The Russians themselves were shocked by the enormity of their victory. Alexander 1 did not dare to explain it either by the patriotic upsurge of the people and army, or by his own firmness, but attributed it entirely to God: “The Lord walked ahead of us. He defeated the enemies, not us! "

Chapter 3. Consequences of the Patriotic War

Such a grandiose victory also had enormous consequences for Russia internationally - it marked the beginning of the liberation of the peoples of Central and Western Europe. On the one hand, it dispelled Napoleon’s plans for world domination and marked the beginning of the death of Napoleon’s empire, and on the other hand, more than ever, it raised the international prestige of Russia, which won the leading position on the world stage from France.

The historical significance of the War of 1812 was that it raised a new surge of patriotic feelings among all segments of the population - peasants, townspeople, soldiers. The fight against a cruel enemy awakened previously dormant forces and forced her to see herself in a new light. The victory caused a rapid growth of national self-awareness and sent the best people of the nation to the liberation struggle against autocracy and serfdom. The initiators of this struggle, the Decembrists, directly called themselves “children of 1812.” Of these, approximately a third directly participated in hostilities.

The war gave impetus to the development of Russian culture. Inspiration by patriotic feelings, the bitterness of loss and the valor of soldiers pushed the Russian people to create wonderful poems, songs, novels and articles. Poets and writers colorfully describe to us pictures of battles, exploits of the Russian people, and the thoughts of soldiers. The mood in the army was subsequently very well conveyed by M.Yu. Lermontov in the words of a seasoned veteran:

We retreated silently for a long time,

It was a shame, we were waiting for a fight,

The old people grumbled:

“What are we? for winter apartments?

Don't you dare, commanders?

Aliens tear up their uniforms

Kutuzov raised Russian military art to a new level of development. Thanks to a more flexible strategy, he exhausted the enemy in battles, forced retreats and finally defeated him. The leading people of the country, in particular, felt in a new way the greatness and power of their people.

The participation of the people in the war consisted not only in the fact that they replenished the army with recruits and militias. The people fed, clothed, shoed and armed the army. With his work, he helped overcome the shortcomings exhibited by the military department. It is important to note that at this time labor productivity increased noticeably and the rate of production increased in military factories, manufactories and craft workshops working for the army. The workers of not only the Bryansk Arsenal, the Tula Armory, the Shostkinsky Powder Factory and the Lugansk Foundry, but also other state-owned enterprises and “free masters” of Moscow, Kaluga, Tver, Vladimir and many other Russian cities worked selflessly.

That's why A.I. Herzen reasoned as follows: “Only 1812 reveals the true history of Russia; everything that happened before was just a preface.”

Conclusion

Starting with Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, whose work was written “at the highest command” of Nicholas 1 and edited by the Tsar, in Russian literature the war of 1812 began to be called the Patriotic War. Soviet historians, who at first (in the person of their leader M.N. Pokrovsky) discarded this name, returned to it again under Stalin. But it was not by chance that the war of the year received the name Patriotic in the history of Russia. It was named so, firstly, because the fate of Russia was decided in it, and, secondly, because it caused a hitherto unprecedented rise in patriotic feelings in the consciousness of the broad masses. Despite the confusion and sometimes inactivity of the tsarist government, despite the inertia of many nobles, frightened by the scale of the popular movement within the country, the common population of Russian villages and cities joined the fight against foreign invaders.

From the very beginning of the war, one thing became clear to the Russian people: a cruel and insidious enemy had come to their land, he was devastating the country and robbing its inhabitants. Resentment for the tormented homeland, the thirst for sacred revenge for the burned villages and destroyed cities, for the plunder of Moscow, for all the horrors of the invasion, the desire to defend Russia and punish the uninvited conquerors - these feelings gripped the entire people. Peasants, armed with axes, pitchforks, scythes and clubs, voluntarily united in small groups and detachments, caught lagging French soldiers and mercilessly killed them. If the French came for bread and fodder, the peasants fiercely resisted them, and in those cases when they could not defeat the visiting visitors, they themselves burned the bread and fodder and fled into the forests.

The national character of the war was also expressed in the formation of militia forces. Recruitment for the militia was announced on July 6 in 16 central provinces and in Ukraine. A Cossack militia was formed in the Don and Urals. The peasants willingly became warriors, especially since there were rumors that after the war the militias would be freed from serfdom. Despite poor training and insufficient weapons, they heroically fought side by side with soldiers on the battlefields. A striking example of popular activity was the partisan movement. It arose spontaneously, but was then directed from Kutuzov’s main headquarters. The partisans included soldiers, Cossacks, militias and peasant volunteers.

Soldiers and officers of the Russian army showed examples of selfless courage, stamina and endurance on the battlefields against Napoleon's hordes. The Russian people have always honored and still continue to honor their heroes.

Grateful descendants built 49 monuments to Russian military units that took part in the battle on the Borodino field. In 1912, on the centennial anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, the French, with the permission of the Russian government, erected a granite monument on the Borodino field, inscribing on it: “To the fallen of the Great Army.” In St. Petersburg in the Hermitage there is a unique portrait gallery of the Patriotic War of 1812. She was immortalized by the following lines from the poem by A.S. Pushkin’s “Commander”, carved on the wall of the hall:

The Russian Tsar has a chamber in his palace

She is not rich in gold or velvet...

The artist placed the crowd in a crowd

Here are the leaders of our people's forces,

Covered with the glory of a wonderful campaign

And the eternal memory of the twelfth year...

Bibliography

1. Geller M.Ya. History of the Russian Empire. - M.: MIC, 2001. - Volume 2. pp. 199-200.

2. Zaichkin I.A., Pochkaev I.N. Russian history From Catherine the Great to Alexander II. - M.: Mysl, 1994. pp. 477-503.

3. Pototurov V.A., Tugusova G.V., Gurina M.G. and others. History of Russia. - M.: Academic Project, 2002. pp. 294-300.

4. Troitsky N.A. Lectures on Russian history of the 19th century. - Saratov: Slovo, 1994. pp. 27-50.

5. Fedorov V.A. History of Russia XIX - early XX centuries. - M.: Academy, 2004. pp. 79 - 90.

Fedorov V.A. History of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. M., 2004. P.87.

Zaichkin I.A., Pochkaev I.N. Russian history From Catherine the Great to Alexander II. M., 1994. P.503.

The first Patriotic War in Russian history occurred in 1812, when Napoleon I Bonaparte, following his bourgeois ideas, attacked the Russian Empire. All segments of the population rose up against a single enemy, both old and young fought. For such a rise in the national spirit and the entire population with hostility, the war was officially dubbed the Patriotic War.

This event is firmly imprinted in the history of our country and the whole world. The bloody battle between the two great empires was reflected in literature and culture. Napoleon Bonaparte planned to quickly bleed the Russian Empire through quick and deliberate attacks on Kyiv, St. Petersburg and Moscow. The Russian army, led by the greatest leaders, took the battle in the very heart of the country and won, driving the French back beyond the Russian border.

Patriotic War of 1812. Minimum for the Unified State Examination.

At the end of the 18th century, an incident occurred in France that claimed thousands and thousands of lives and brought Napoleon I Bonaparte to the throne of the overthrown Bourbon dynasty. He glorified his name during the Italian and Egyptian military campaigns, establishing his fame as a valiant military leader. Having secured the support of the army and influential people, he disperses Directory, the main ruling body of France at that time, and appoints himself consul, and soon emperor. Having taken power into his own hands, the French emperor quickly launched a campaign aimed at the expansion of European states.

By 1809, almost all of Europe had been conquered by Napoleon. Only Great Britain remained unconquered. The dominance of the British fleet in the English Channel made the peninsula virtually invulnerable. Adding fuel to the fire, the British took away colonies in America and India from France, thereby depriving the empire of key trading points. The only correct solution for France would be to deploy a continental blockade to cut off Britain from Europe. But to organize such sanctions, Napoleon needed the support of Alexander I, Emperor of the Russian Empire, otherwise these actions would have been meaningless

Map: Napoleonic Wars in Russia 1799-1812. "The path of the Napoleonic wars before the war with Russia."

Causes

It was concluded in the interests of Russia World of Tilsit, which was, in essence, a reprieve for the accumulation of military power.

The main points of the agreement were:

• support for the continental blockade of Britain;
• recognition of all French conquests;
• recognition of the governors appointed by Bonaparte in the conquered countries, etc.

The deterioration of relations was caused by non-compliance with the points of the peace agreement, as well as the refusal to allow Napoleon to marry Russian princesses. His proposal was rejected twice. The French emperor needed to marry to confirm the legitimacy of his title.

Occasion

The main reason for the Russian-French war was the violation of the border of the Russian Empire by French troops. You need to understand that Napoleon did not intend to conquer the entire country. His worst enemy was the impregnable Great Britain. The purpose of the campaign against Russia was to inflict military defeat on her and make peace on her own terms against the British.

Participants

"Twenty Language", this is what the troops of the captured states who joined the French army were called. The name itself makes it clear that there were many countries participating in the conflict. There were not many allies on the Russian side.

Goals of the parties

The main reason for this war, as indeed for all conflicts, was the problem of dividing influence in Europe between France, Britain And Russia. It was in the interests of all three to prevent absolute leadership of one of the countries.

The goals were the following:

		Great Britain
Make peace with Russia on your own terms.	Throw back the enemy army beyond your borders.
Capture British colonies in India and win back their own, passing through Russian Asia.	Exhaust the enemy through the tactic of constant retreat into the interior of the country.	Keep Russia on your side, even after the Peace of Tilsit.
Weaken Russia's influence in Europe.	Do not leave any resources in the path of Napoleon's army, thereby exhausting the enemy.	Provide allied states with support in the war.
Use the Russian Empire as a source of resources.	Prevent France from setting up a continental blockade of Great Britain.
Return the old borders with Russia to the form they were before the reign of Peter I.	Deprive France of absolute leadership in Europe.
Block Great Britain on the island in order to further weaken it and seize territories.

Balance of power

At the time Napoleon crossed the Russian border, the military power of both sides could be expressed in the following figures:

At the disposal of the Russian army there was also a Cossack regiment, which fought on the side of the Russians with special rights.

Commanders and military leaders

The commanders-in-chief of the Grand Army and the Russian Army, Napoleon I Bonaparte and Alexander I, respectively, had the most talented tacticians and strategists at their disposal.

From the outside France The following commanders are especially noteworthy:

Louis-Nicolas Davout- “Iron Marshal”, Marshal of the Empire, who did not lose a single battle. He commanded the Guards Grenadiers during the war with Russia.

Joachim Murat- King of the Kingdom of Naples, commanded the reserve cavalry of the French army. He took direct part in the Battle of Borodino. Known for his ardor, courage and hot temper.

Jacques Macdonald- Marshal of the Empire, commanded the French-Prussian infantry corps. Served as the reserve power of the Grand Army. Covered the retreat of the French military forces.

Michelle Ney– one of the most active participants in the conflict. The Marshal of the Empire earned the nickname “bravest of the brave” in battle. He fought desperately in the Battle of Borodino, and then covered the retreat of the main parts of his army.

Russian Army She also had many outstanding military leaders in her camp:

Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly- at the beginning of the Patriotic War, Alexander I gave him the opportunity to be Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, with the words, - “I have no other army”. He held this post until the appointment of Kutuzov.

Bagration Pyotr Ivanovich- Infantry General, commanded the 2nd Western Army at the time the enemy crossed the border. One of Suvorov's most famous students. He insisted on a general battle with Napoleon. In the Battle of Borodino he was seriously wounded by a fragment of an exploding cannonball and died in agony in the infirmary.

Tormasov Alexander Petrovich- Russian general who commanded the cavalry of the Russian Army. In the south of the Empire, the 3rd Western Army was under his command. His task was to contain France's allies - Austria and Prussia.

Wittgenstein Peter Christianovich- Lieutenant General, commanded the first infantry corps. He stood in the way of the Great Army, which was moving towards St. Petersburg. With skillful tactical actions, he seized the initiative in the battle with the French and pinned down three corps on the way to the capital. In this battle for the north of the state, Wittgenstein was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield.

Golenishchev-Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich- Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army in the War of 1812. An outstanding strategist, tactician and diplomat. Became the first full holder of the Order of St. George. During World War II, the French nicknamed him "The old fox from the North." The most famous and recognizable person of the war of 1812.

Main stages and course of the war

Division of the Great Army into three directions: Southern, Central, Northern.

March from the Neman River to Smolensk.

March from Smolensk to Moscow.

• Reorganization of command: approval of Kutuzov to the post of commander-in-chief of the Russian army (August 29, 1812)

Retreat of the Great Army.

• Flight from Moscow to Maloyaroslavets

  Retreat from Maloyaroslavets to the Berezina

  Retreat from Berezina to Neman

Map: Patriotic War of 1812

Peace treaty

While in burning Moscow, Napoleon I Bonaparte tried three times to conclude a peace agreement with the Russian Empire.

The first attempt was made with the help of the captured Major General Tutolmin. Feeling his dominant position, Napoleon continued to demand from the Russian emperor a blockade of Great Britain, an alliance with France and the renunciation of lands conquered by Russia.

For the second time, the commander-in-chief of the Great Army sent a letter to Alexander I with the same negotiator offering peace.

The third time Bonaparte sent his general Lauriston to the Russian emperor with the words, “ I need peace, I need it absolutely, at all costs, save only honor».

All three attempts were ignored by the command of the Russian Army.

Results and consequences of the war

The Great Army lost about 580 thousand soldiers during the six months of the war on the territory of the Russian Empire. These include deserters, allied troops who fled to their homeland. Some 60 thousand people were sheltered by local residents and the nobility alone from Napoleon's army in Russia.

The Russian Empire, for its part, also suffered considerable losses: from 150 to 200 thousand people. About 300 thousand people were injured to varying degrees of severity and about half of them remained disabled.

At the beginning of 1813 The foreign campaign of the Russian army began, which passed through the lands of Germany and France, pursuing the remnants of the Great Army. By pinning Napoleon on his territory, Alexander I achieved his surrender and capture. In this campaign, the Russian Empire annexed the Duchy of Warsaw to its territory, and the lands of Finland were again recognized as Russian.

Historical significance of the war

Patriotic War of 1812 immortalized in the history and culture of many peoples. A large number of literary works are dedicated to this event, for example “War and Peace” by L.N. Tolstoy, “Borodino” by M.Yu. Lermontova, O.N. Mikhailov "Kutuzov". In honor of the victory, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was built, and in the hero cities there are memorial obelisks. On the Borodino field, a reconstruction of the battle is held every year, where an impressive number of people who want to plunge into the era take part.

References:

1. Alexey Shcherbakov - “Napoleon. The winners are not judged."
2. Sergey Nechaev – “1812. An hour of pride and glory."

The military events of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place on the territory of Russia between it and France. The reason was Alexander I's refusal to support the continental blockade, which Napoleon wanted to use as the main weapon against Great Britain. In addition, France's policy towards European states did not take into account the interests of the Russian Empire. And as a result, the Patriotic War of 1812 began. You will learn briefly but informatively about military operations from this article.

Background to the war

Due to the defeat of the Russian army in the Battle of Friedland in 1807, Alexander I concluded the Peace of Tilsit with Napoleon Bonaparte. By signing the agreement, the head of Russia was obliged to join the continental blockade of the United Kingdom, which, in fact, contradicted the political and economic interests of the empire. This world became a shame and humiliation - this is what the Russian nobility thought. But the Russian government decided to use the Peace of Tilsit for its own purposes to accumulate forces and prepare for war with Bonaparte.

As a result of the Erfurt Congress, the empire took Finland and a number of other territories, and France, in turn, was ready to capture all of Europe. After numerous annexations, Napoleon's army moved significantly closer to the Russian border.

Russian empire

The reasons for the Patriotic War of 1812 on the part of Russia were primarily economic. The terms of the Peace of Tilsit dealt a significant blow to the finances of the empire. For a clear example, here are a number of figures: before 1807, Russian merchants and landowners exported 2.2 million quarters of grain for sale, and after the agreement - only 600 thousand. This reduction led to a drop in the value of this product. At the same time, the export of gold to France in exchange for all sorts of luxury goods increased. These and other events led to the depreciation of money.

The territorial causes of the Patriotic War of 1812 are somewhat complicated due to Napoleon's desire to conquer the whole world. The year 1807 went down in history as the time of the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw from lands that at that time belonged to Poland. The newly formed state wanted to unite all the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. To fulfill the plan, it was necessary to separate from Russia part of the lands that once belonged to Poland.

Three years later, Bonaparte seized the possessions of the Duke of Oldenburg, who was a relative of Alexander I. The Russian emperor demanded the return of the lands, which, of course, did not happen. After these conflicts, talk began to appear about signs of a coming and inevitable war between the two empires.

France

The main reasons for the Patriotic War of 1812 for France were the obstacle to international trade, as a result of which the state of the country's economy noticeably deteriorated. In essence, Napoleon's main and only enemy was Great Britain. The United Kingdom captured the colonies of countries such as India, America and, again, France. Considering that England literally reigned at sea, the only weapon against it would have been a continental blockade.

The reasons for the Patriotic War of 1812 also lie in the fact that, on the one hand, Russia did not want to sever trade relations with Great Britain, and on the other, it was necessary to fulfill the conditions of the Tilsit Peace in favor of France. Finding himself in such a dual situation, Bonaparte saw only one way out - military.

As for the French emperor, he was not a hereditary monarch. In order to prove his legitimacy in holding the crown, he made an offer to the sister of Alexander I, which he was immediately refused. A second attempt to enter into a family union with the fourteen-year-old Princess Anne, who later became Queen of the Netherlands, was also unsuccessful. In 1810, Bonaparte finally married Mary of Austria. This marriage gave Napoleon reliable rear protection in the event of another war with the Russians.

The two-time refusal of Alexander I and Bonaparte's marriage to the princess of Austria led to a crisis of trust between the two empires. This fact served as the first reason due to which the Patriotic War of 1812 occurred. Russia, by the way, itself pushed Napoleon into conflict with its further controversial actions.

Shortly before the start of the first battle, Bonaparte told the Warsaw ambassador Dominique Dufour de Pradt that supposedly in five years he would rule the world, but for this all that remained was to “crush” Russia. Alexander I, constantly fearing the restoration of Poland, pulled several divisions to the border of the Duchy of Warsaw, which, in fact, was the second reason why the Patriotic War of 1812 began. Briefly, this can be formulated as follows: such behavior of the Russian ruler was perceived by the French emperor as a threat to Poland and France.

Further development of the conflict

The first stage was the Belarusian-Lithuanian operation, covering June-July 1812. At that time, Russia managed to protect itself from encirclement in Belarus and Lithuania. Russian troops managed to repel the onslaught of the French in the St. Petersburg direction. The Smolensk operation is considered the second stage of the war, and the third is the campaign against Moscow. The fourth stage is the Kaluga campaign. Its essence was the attempts of French troops to break through in this direction back from Moscow. The fifth period, which ended the war, saw the ousting of Napoleonic army from Russian territory.

Start

On June 24, at six in the morning, the vanguard of Bonaparte’s troops crossed the Neman, reaching the city of Kovno (Lithuania, modern Kaunas). Before the invasion of Russia, a large group of the French army numbering 300 thousand people was concentrated on the border.
As of January 1, 1801, the army of Alexander I numbered 446 thousand people. As a result of recruitment at the start of the war, the number increased to 597 thousand soldiers.

The Emperor addressed the people with an appeal for voluntary mobilization for the protection and defense of the Fatherland. Everyone had the opportunity to join the so-called people's militia, regardless of their type of activity and class.

Battle of Borodino

The largest battle took place on August 26 near the village of Borodino. More and more researchers are inclined to believe that the battle took place over 3 days (from August 24 to 26). In fact, this event marked the beginning of the defeat of Bonaparte's army.

In the battle, 135 thousand French fought with the 120 thousand army of Alexander I. The Russian army lost 44 thousand, while Napoleon lost 58 thousand people. During the battle, the army under the command of Bonaparte managed to capture the Russian positions, but after the end of hostilities, the French had to retreat to previously occupied lines. Thus, it is generally accepted that Russia won this battle. The next day, Commander-in-Chief M.I. Kutuzov ordered a retreat due to large human losses and Napoleon's presence of reserve troops rushing to help the French.

In 1839, a reconstruction of the events of the Battle of Borodino, carried out by Nicholas I, was created for the first time. 150 thousand military personnel ended up on the Borodino field. The centennial anniversary was celebrated no less richly. The film archive has preserved a small amount of chronicle footage of how Nicholas II walked around the formation of soldiers participating in the reconstruction.

Result

The battles of the Patriotic War of 1812 lasted from June 24 to December 26 (new style). And they ended with the complete destruction of Bonaparte’s Grand Army, which included soldiers from Prussia and Austria. On December 21, according to the official Hans Jacob von Auerswald, only a small part of the French soldiers returned back, and even those were in terrible condition. A little later, some of them died from multiple diseases and wounds in their homeland.

The results of the Patriotic War of 1812 cost Napoleon 580 thousand people and about 1200 guns. Historian Modest Bogdanovich estimated the losses of the Russian army at 210 thousand militias and soldiers. In 1813, the War of the Sixth Coalition began, in which European states fought against the plans of Napoleon and his allies. In October of the same year, Bonaparte was defeated in the battle of Leipzig, and in April of the following year he renounced the French crown.

Defeat of France

The reasons for the failure of Napoleon's plans were as follows:

An important role was played by Kutuzov’s military restraint and the political will of Alexander I;

A large number of patriots among the common people and nobility who donated their material resources for the maintenance of the Russian army and their lives for the sake of victory;

A persistent and stubborn guerrilla war, in which even women took part.

Command

The heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812 did everything possible to prevent the French from conquering Russian soil, thanks to which they won a well-deserved victory. Without the dedication of the people and the wisdom of the commanders, Emperor Alexander I would have lost this battle.

Among those who fought, such names as M. I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, S. Volkonsky, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, D. Golitsyn, D. S. Dokhturov, I. S. Dorokhov, P. Konovnitsyn, D. P. Neverovsky, D. V. Davydov, P. I. Bagration, M. I. Platov, A. I. Kutaisov, A. P. Ermolov, N. N. Raevsky, P. H. Wittgenstein and others.

But the main fighter against Napoleon’s aggression was the ordinary Russian people. Victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 belongs to the voluntarily mobilized population, which withstood all the hardships of a hitherto unprecedented war. Many award documents testify to the massive heroism of the soldiers. More than four dozen officers were personally rewarded by Kutuzov with the Order of St. George.

Human losses of France and Russia

The data given below was published by historian S. Shvedov on the 175th anniversary of the end of the battle. The history of the Patriotic War of 1812, written by different researchers of the theater of operations, has significant differences in the issue of human losses.

On average, we can confidently say that the number of war victims from Russia reached 300 thousand, most of whom (175 thousand) were the mobilized part of the population. There are many factors that led to this outcome:

Rapid exhaustion of people due to movement over long distances;

Unfavorable climatic conditions;

There is an urgent need for more water, food and warm clothing;

Diseases and epidemics.

As for France, for it the results of the Patriotic War of 1812 took on a more serious form. The number of French killed is much greater than that of Russians. At the beginning of the war, Napoleon's army that entered the territory of the empire numbered 480 thousand soldiers. At the end of the war, Bonaparte withdrew only 20 thousand survivors from Russia, leaving about 150 thousand prisoners and 850 guns.

About the name

The course of the Patriotic War of 1812 lasted 7 months. From the first day of the battles, it acquired a movement of national liberation from Napoleon's aggression. The national trend became the main reason for the victory of the Russian army over the French.

This war became a real test of the cohesion of the Russian people. All classes, regardless of state rank, material and property status, came to the defense of their Fatherland. This is where the name came from. One way or another, all the people who participated in the battles are real heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812.

● French soldiers never cooked or ate porridge, as the Russians do. Their field cuisine has different traditions.

● In Russia there is a lyceum, which bears the name of the ataman of the Patriotic War, Matvey Platov.

● On December 12, 1812, in honor of the victory over Bonaparte, Alexander I proclaimed the forgiveness of those people who helped the French army.

● M. Barclay de Tolly in 1812 created the first military intelligence service in Russia.