Tank battle Dubno Lutsk exactly. Tank battle near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody

In the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War, when the German tank spearheads of Army Groups “Center” and “North” closed their pincers near Minsk and rushed to Smolensk and Pskov (aiming at Moscow and Leningrad), on our Southwestern Front, repelling the attacks of the German Army Group "South", a grandiose tank battle unfolded. The largest tank battle in the history of World War II and the first tank battle of the Great Patriotic War took place on June 22 - July 10, 1941 and was clear evidence of the high offensive activity of the Soviet troops, their desire to wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy, which he seized as a result of an unexpected attack.

This battle is little covered in memoirs, and in military historical works it is usually referred to as the “battles of Brody” or simply “border battles.” However, it was by no means an ordinary event and not a private operation. The battle took place in several western regions of Ukraine, in a huge pentagon between the cities of Lutsk, Rivne, Ostrog, Kamenets, Brody with the center in Dubno. About 2,500 Soviet and German tanks clashed in oncoming battles. Its outcome had a significant impact on the disruption of the plans of the German command for the “lightning-fast” destruction of the Red Army in the south. The breakthrough of German troops on the move to Kyiv was thwarted. The encirclement and destruction of the troops of the Southwestern Front and the seizure of industrial regions of Ukraine did not take place as planned.

This work examines the battle from the point of view of the initial decisions of the Soviet and German high commands, which determined the course and results of the first tank battle. We want, as far as possible, to show the general course of the battle, the clash of ideas and plans, operational-tactical decisions and initiatives of the Soviet and German commanders of the formations and units that took part in the battle.

Ideas, plans, decisions

The German attack plan on the USSR and the Soviet defense plan were worked out and approved in final versions almost simultaneously, and this is not accidental. The coincidence in time is explained by the constantly increasing tension in the world caused by the successes of Germany at the beginning of the Second World War.

In December 1940 - January 1941. In Moscow, the Soviet leadership held a meeting with military leaders and operational games, and a little earlier in Berlin, the Nazi leadership of Germany held a similar meeting and games. Their result was the plans mentioned above.

The German Plan Barbarossa (Directive No. 21) formulated the general goal: “The main Russian forces located in Western Russia must be destroyed in operations through deep, rapid extension of tank wedges. The retreat of combat-ready enemy troops into the wide expanses of Russian territory must be prevented.”

German strategists, in accordance with the military doctrine of “blitzkrieg,” placed their main emphasis on the use of tank and mechanized formations. Army Group “South”, operating south of the Pripyat marshes, was given the task: “... through concentric attacks, with the main forces on the flanks, destroy the Russian troops located in Ukraine even before the latter reach the Dnieper. For this purpose, the main blow is delivered from the Lublin region in the general direction of Kyiv ... "

According to F. Paulus, one of the authors of the plan, a participant in the meeting and the head of the games, the final version of actions in Ukraine included two amendments. Hitler demanded that the Russians be encircled from the north, and Halder ordered tank wedges to prevent the Russians from retreating and creating a defense west of the Dnieper.

Based on these instructions, the headquarters of Army Group South (commander Field Marshal von Rundstedt) developed an offensive plan (Diagram 1).

Scheme 1. Plan of the German offensive north (Army Group Center) and south (Army Group South) of the Pripyat marshes.

His plan: with an enveloping blow from the Pripyat swamps to Kyiv, and then turning south along the Dnieper, to encircle the main forces of the South-Western Front, while cutting off the communications of the Southern Front, and with an auxiliary blow to Lvov (and further) to enclose the Soviet troops in a ring on the right bank Ukraine. The exit to Kyiv was planned in 3–4 days, the encirclement in 7–8 days.

The offensive zone for tank and motorized divisions in the direction of the main attack was carefully selected. German generals were attracted to the areas of Rivne - Lutsk - Dubno, where the forests along the river. The Goryns were interspersed with flat fields, and the plain extended to the southwest, from Rivne and Dubno, and to the northwest, to Lutsk. In the south, this fairly open area, quite suitable for tank operations, was protected by forests, and in the north, by the Polesie (or Pripyat) swampy lowland with almost complete roadlessness. It is not surprising that the main German attack, originally planned for Lvov, was moved to this zone. The main roads from the border to Novograd-Volynsky, Rivne and further to Zhitomir and Kyiv passed along it.

Army Group South deployed along the line Lublin - the mouth of the Danube (780 km). At the Wlodawa-Przemysl line there were the 6th and 17th field armies of Field Marshal Reichenau and General Stülpnagel, as well as the 1st Panzer Group (1st Tgr) of General Kleist. The Hungarian corps advanced to the border with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Three more armies (11th German, 3rd and 4th Romanian) occupied a line along the Prut and Danube rivers (Diagram 2).

The 6th Army of Reichenau and the 1st Tgr Kleist were given the task: in cooperation with the 17th Army, to attack the Russians from Wlodawa to Krystynopol and through Vladimir-Volynsky, Sokal, Dubno to break through to the Dnieper. Therefore, Rundstedt concentrated shock tank and motorized divisions in the Ustilug - Sokal - Krystyonopol sector, creating here, at the junction of the 5th and 6th Soviet armies, a three and even fivefold superiority in forces and means. The German 6th Field Army had 12 divisions, Kleist's tank group had 3 motorized corps (3rd, 14th and 48th), which included 5 tank divisions (9th, 11th, 13th, 14th). Yu and 16th) and 4 motorized (16th, 25th, SS Viking and SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler). In total, there were 57 divisions in Army Group South, they were supported by General Dör's 4th Air Fleet (1,300 aircraft).

On the night of June 18, Rundstedt began to move divisions into the waiting and starting areas, which for infantry divisions were 7–20 km from the border, and for tank divisions 20–30 km. The nomination ended on June 21. The initial positions were located closer to the border and were occupied on the night of June 22. The Germans managed to reach them by 3 o'clock in the morning.

On the evening of June 21, the commanders of the prepared German formations received a conditional password: “The Tale of Heroes. Wotan. Neckar 15” - the signal for the attack, transmitted at 4 o’clock in the morning. On the night of June 21-22, the commander of the 48th motorized corps reported to Rundstedt: “Sokal is not darkened. The Russians set up their pillboxes in full light. They don't seem to suggest anything..."

On June 22, 1941, at 4.00 Rundstedt launched simultaneous artillery and air strikes and at 4.15 moved the infantry divisions. At about 9 o'clock Kleist began to introduce tank divisions into battle. Halder wrote in his diary on June 22: “The offensive of our troops came as a complete surprise to the enemy... units (Soviet - Auto.) were taken by surprise in a barracks position, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin; the advanced units, suddenly attacked, asked the command what to do... After the initial “tetanus”... the enemy moved on to hostilities...” (F. Halder. Military Diary. Vol. 3, book 1).

Date and place
June 23-30, 1941, district of the cities of Dubno (now the regional center of the Rivne region), Lutsk (regional center of the Volyn region), Brody (district center of the Lviv region).
Characters
The Soviet Southwestern Front, deployed on the basis of the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO), was commanded by Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos (1892-1941; participated in the Civil War under the command of N. Shchors, commanded a regiment, 1935 brigade commander, 1939 division commander , in March of the following year, during the war with Finland, at the head of the 70th Infantry Division, he successfully bypassed the Vyborg fortified area on the ice of the Gulf of Finland, contributing to the capture of Vyborg, the same year, lieutenant general, commander of the Leningrad Military District, in the spring of 1941, colonel general, commander of KOVO ); the chief of staff of the front was a competent staff officer, Major General Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev (1894-1953, from 1939 the chief of staff of the KOVO, in the fall of 1941 the commander of the 3rd Shock Army, in August 1942 - April 1943 the commander of the Kalinin Front, in 1943-1945 he commanded the Far Eastern Front and the Far Eastern military district). A significant negative role in planning the timing and direction of the counterattack was played by Headquarters representative Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and corps commissar Nikolai Nikolaevich Vashugin (1900-1941; from 1920 to 1941. He went from commissar of a regimental school to a member of the military council of the Kyiv Special Military District, in June 1941 g.. was a member of the military council of the Southwestern Front, after the failure of the Soviet counterattack he shot himself).
The mechanized corps that carried out counterattacks were led by: 9th - in the future one of the best Soviet commanders Konstantin Konstantinovich (Ksaverievich) Rokossovsky (1896-1968), 15th - Major General Ignatius Ivanovich Karpezo (1898-1987), 8th - Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev (1894-1985), 19th - Lieutenant General Nikolai Vladimirovich Feklenko (1901-1951), 22nd - Major General Semyon Mikhailovich Kondrusov (1897-1941). The powerful 4th mechanized corps, which held back the attacks of the German 17th Army west of Brod, was commanded by one of the best Soviet commanders at the beginning of the war and the future commander of the ROA, Major General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov (1901-1946), among the commanders of tank divisions it should be noted one of the best future Soviet tank commanders, Colonel Mikhail Efimovich Katukov (1900-1976).
The German Army Group South was commanded by the experienced and conservative Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953; 1939 commanded Army Group South in the war with Poland, 1940 - Army Group A, which played a major role in the defeat of France, in During Operation Barbarossa from June to November 1941, the commander-in-chief of Army Group South, in November 1944 - March 1945, inflicted defeat on the Allies at Arnhem, despite initial successes, lost the Battle of the Ardennes), opposed Soviet tank commanders at the head of the 1st Tank Group Colonel General Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist (1881-1954; successfully acted against Poland, 1940 commanded the first tank army in history - Panzer Group Kleist, 1942 participated in the 2nd Battle of Kharkov, from November 1942 commanded the Army Group “A” in the Caucasus, after 1945 accused of war crimes, died in a Soviet prison). The corps were commanded by: 3rd Motorized - Cavalry General Eberhard von Mackensen (1889-1969), 48th Panzer - one of the best German tank commanders of World War II, Panzer General Werner Kempf (1886-1964).
Background of the event
From the very beginning of the war, the course of hostilities in the southern sector of the Soviet-German fort had a slightly different character than in the center and north. This was due to the noticeable advantage of the forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front over the Germans in artillery, large in tanks and noticeable in aviation. On June 22, the Soviet side was inferior in men, but the front received reinforcements during the fighting. The striking force of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) on this front were 8 mechanized corps of KOVO. Near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody, or in the Lviv direction, there were 6 of them, which were armed with 3.7 thousand tanks and 760 armored vehicles. The mechanized corps were not very well equipped with automobile transport - they had up to 9.8 thousand cars. On the German side, units of 5 tank divisions could be involved in the battle; they included 728 tanks and 84 assault guns. Significantly inferior in numbers, the Germans had a definite advantage in tanks in the directions of the main attack.
On June 22 at 3.30, fighting began along the entire front line. During the day, the German 11th Panzer Division successfully broke through the Soviet defenses at the junction of the 5th and 6th armies and began advancing towards Dubno and Ostrog, which created a serious threat of encirclement of the 5th Army. The front headquarters, under pressure from M. Vashugin and the Headquarters representative G. Zhukov, saw the only way out - powerful counterattacks.
Progress of the event
At dawn on June 24, the 24th tank regiment of the 20th tank division of Colonel M. Katukov from the 9th mechanized corps attacked units of the 13th German tank division on the move, capturing about 300 prisoners.
The 15th mechanized corps under Major General I. Karpezo advanced to Radzechów. During clashes with the German 11th Panzer Division, some of the tanks of the mechanized corps were immediately lost due to aviation and technical malfunctions. The 19th mechanized corps of Major General Feklenko on the evening of June 24 reached the Ikva River in the Melnichnaya area. The 43rd Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps rushed to the Rivne area, but suffered heavy air strikes. The Soviet 15th Mechanized Corps, exhausted by forced marches and partially drained of blood, failed to take Radzechów and stop the Germans. The same applies to the actions of the 22nd mechanized corps of Major General S. Kondrusov, which attacked the enemy west of Lutsk. 72% of the tanks and vehicles of the mechanized corps were lost on the march. The corps commander died in battle, the corps was virtually drained of blood. During the first three days of the war, the Germans advanced 100 km into the Soviet defense in some sectors of the front. On June 24, the 19th Tank and 215th Motorized Rifle Divisions of the 22nd Mechanized Corps went on the offensive north of the Vladimir-Volynsky-Lutsk highway. The attack was unsuccessful, as the division's tanks ran into German anti-tank defenses. The corps lost more than 50% of its tanks and began to retreat scatteredly to the Rozhishche area. The 1st anti-tank artillery brigade of K. Moskalenko also moved here, and successfully defended the highway.
From Lutsk and Dubno on the morning of June 25, the Soviet 9th and 19th mechanized corps attacked the left flank of von Kleist’s tank group, which rejected parts of the German 3rd motorized corps southwest of Rivne. The 43rd Tank Division of the 19th Mechanized Corps broke through the defensive positions of the German 11th Tank Division and at 6 o'clock in the evening broke into the outskirts of Dubno. But due to the retreat of its neighbors, both flanks of the 43rd Division became unprotected and it retreated. The German 11th Panzer Division, supported by the left flank of the 16th Panzer Division, at this time reached Ostrog, advancing deep into the rear of the Soviet troops.
From the south, from the Brod area, the 15th Mechanized Corps continued its difficult offensive towards Radzechow and Berestechko. The 37th Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps crossed the Radostavka River on June 25 and advanced forward. The 10th Panzer Division encountered German anti-tank defenses and was forced to withdraw. The corps formation was subjected to a massive German air raid, during which Corps Corps I. Karpezo was seriously wounded. German infantry units began to flank the corps' positions.
The 8th Mechanized Corps, having marched 500 km since the beginning of the war and left half of its tanks and artillery on the road from breakdowns and air strikes, found itself in the Busk area, southwest of Brody, on the evening of June 25. On the morning of June 26, the mechanized corps entered Brody with the task of advancing on Dubno. On the morning of June 26, the 12th Tank Division of Major General T. Mishanin attacked and captured the city of Leshnev before 16:00. By the end of the day, the divisions of the 8th Mechanized Corps advanced 8-15 km in the direction of Berestechko, displacing units of the enemy’s 57th Infantry and 16th Tank Divisions, retreated and consolidated behind the Plyashivka River. Realizing the threat to the right flank of their 48th Motorized Corps, the Germans transferred the 16th Motorized Division, the 670th Anti-Tank Battalion, and a battery of 88-millimeter guns to the area. By the evening, the enemy was already trying to counterattack parts of the mechanized corps, which on the night of June 27 received an order to withdraw from the battle.
Vlasov's 4th Mechanized Corps was used in units in fierce battles in various directions against the German army of Stülpnagel. On June 27, the commander of the 5th Army M. Potapov, by order of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, decided in the morning to launch an offensive of the 9th and 19th mechanized corps on the left flank of the German group between Lutsk and Rivne in a converging direction towards Mlynov and the 36th Rifle Corps on Dubno. Units of the 15th Mechanized Corps were supposed to leave for Berestechko and return to Dubno.
However, the Germans were faster again - during the night of June 26-27, they transported infantry units across the Ikva River and concentrated the 13th Tank, 25th Motorized, 11th Infantry and parts of the 14th Tank Division against the 9th Mechanized Corps. Finding fresh units in front of him, K. Rokossovsky did not attack. At the same time, the German 298th and 299th divisions began an offensive near Lutsk, supported by tanks of the 14th division. The Red Army had to transfer the 20th Panzer Division to this direction, which stabilized the situation until the beginning of July. M. Feklenko's 19th Mechanized Corps was also unable to go on the offensive, retreating to Rivne and then to Goshcha under attacks from the 11th and 13th Panzerwaffe divisions. During the retreat and under air strikes, some of the tanks, vehicles and guns of the mechanized corps were lost. The 36th Rifle Corps was weakened by the battles and was also unable to go on the attack. From the southern direction, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon on June 27, only the hastily organized combined detachments of the 24th Tank Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel P. Volkov and the 34th Tank Division under the command of Brigade Commissar M. Popel were able to go on the offensive, which achieved the greatest success during the battle.
The attack in the direction of Dubno came as a surprise to the Germans - having crushed the defensive barriers, M. Popel’s group entered the outskirts of Dubno in the evening, capturing the rear reserves of the 11th Panzer Division and several dozen undamaged tanks (which later had to be abandoned). During the night, the Germans transferred units of the 16th motorized, 75th and 111th infantry divisions to the breakthrough site and closed the breakthrough, interrupting the supply routes of Popel’s group. Attempts by units of the 8th Mechanized Corps to break through the German defenses failed, and the corps itself went on the defensive. On the left flank, having broken through the defenses of the 212th Motorized Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps, about 40 German tanks reached the headquarters of the 12th Panzer Division. The division commander, Major General T. Mishanina, sent a reserve to meet them - 6 KV tanks and 4 T-34s, which managed to stop the breakthrough, bringing the German tanks down and without suffering losses - the German tank guns could not penetrate their armor. The 8th Mechanized Corps managed to withdraw in an organized manner to the Zolochevsky Heights line, breaking through the German barriers. By the morning of July 5, the corps divisions had completed their concentration in Proskurov. On June 29, the 15th Mechanized Corps was ordered to change with units of the 37th Rifle Corps and retreat to the Zolochevsky Heights in the Bely Kamen - Zolochev - Lyatskaya area. M. Popel's detachment remained cut off deep behind enemy lines. Having taken up a perimeter defense in the Dubno area until July 2, after which, having destroyed the equipment, the remaining detachment successfully reached its own. The Soviet tank battle is no longer over.
Consequences of the incident
The result of the counterattacks was a week's delay in the advance of the 1st Tank Group and the disruption of the enemy's plans to quickly break into Kyiv and encircle the armies of the Southwestern Front in the Lvov salient. The German command managed to repulse the counterattack and defeat the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, without stopping its offensive. The Soviet side irretrievably lost up to 2.5 thousand tanks, von Kleist’s group suffered an order of magnitude smaller, but still large losses - at the time of the end of these battles there were up to 320 combat-ready tanks, but failed vehicles were quickly repaired. There is information about the irretrievable losses of the von Kleist group on September 4, 1941 - 186 vehicles, most of which were lost near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody. The human losses on both sides in this battle are unknown. The Southwestern Front lost 165.5 thousand people killed and captured, and up to 658 thousand wounded in all battles between June 22 and July 5. The German Army Group South (without the Romanians and Hungarians who acted with it) during the same period lost 5.5 thousand killed and missing, 17.2 thousand wounded.
Historical memory
In Soviet times, one of the largest tank battles in history was completely forgotten (for example, the IS-2 tank monument installed at the exit from Dubno has no relation to the battle). In the 1990s. Interest in the event has revived both in Ukraine and in Russia, primarily thanks to scientists, amateur historians, search groups, local historians, etc. Today in Ukraine, the battle is well known to lovers of national history; it is present in all textbooks and general works concerning the Second World War. world war. However, there are no noticeable events to honor the memory of those killed in the battle.

FROM BREST TO BERLIN

Poetic epic

Dubno, Lutsk and Brody remember, 1
Like a week in those places
The battle was fought by steel horses,
How they were pressed by a strong enemy.

Where are you tanks, our tanks?
Where are you, our corps?
You were torn like foot wraps,
They cut down like forests:

Eight hundred for those days
Out of two thousand eight hundred!
How many of you have died, sons!
Who will present the mournful account?

How many were killed
In the southwestern regions?
How many were burned alive?
In those desperate battles?

“How many tanks did we knock out?” –
“Almost two hundred.” - "Total?"
Or were we not taught that way?
Or didn’t you understand what?

Or Zhukov was not with us
And he didn’t direct 2
Those first battles
Where did the enemy beat us like that?

Or there were few tanks,
Few tank brigades
What the Nazis gave us
Firmly many times in a row?

Yes, really like that
The world did not know until then:
No matter the battle, we are beaten again,
No matter the tank, the fire burns.

And although four times
There were more tanks, we
So many times and even more
We were foolish in those days.

Member of the Military Council
He shot himself - he burned with shame. 4
Zhukov rushes to Moscow - he sees summer -
Stalin called on the carpet:

What a tank drama! –
“In front of Minsk at this hour
Surrounded as if in a hole,
Our armies now."

There is a different situation.
Here, further south, everything is different:
Enough strength and skill
Not enough for attacks.

Couldn't do it with one hit 5
Eight of our buildings
Go into battle. In the end for nothing
We put down the fighters.

Eight days - and counterattacks
We choked. That's how it is.
Consolation in this fight -
The enemy was detained for six days.

That's how we will be this summer
Retreat until the enemy
We won't learn to hit hard
From the General Staff to the shooter.

Surrendering millions into captivity,
Endlessly retreat
And under Russian swearing and groans
Water the earth with blood.

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1 The Battle of Dubno - Lutsk - Brody is the largest tank battle in world history, including the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, which took place in June 1941 in the triangle of cities of Dubno - Lutsk - Brody. About 3,200 tanks took part in the battle on both sides: 2,803 Soviet and 718 German. The 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd mechanized corps, 27th, 31st, 36th, 37th rifle corps, 109th infantry division and 14th cavalry division tried to flank destroy von Kleist's tank wedge with blows from the north and south. During the period from June 23 to June 30, 1941, our losses amounted to about 800 tanks, the Germans - 150 - 200.
2 By order of Stalin, the operation was led by Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, who arrived at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front on the evening of June 22 and left for Moscow on Stalin’s call on the evening of June 26, 1941.
3 G.K. Zhukov in his book “Memories and Reflections” wrote about this battle: “Our historical literature somehow in passing touches on this greatest border battle of the initial period of the war with Nazi Germany. It would be necessary to analyze in detail the feasibility of using here counterattacks of mechanized corps against the main enemy group that had broken through and the organization of the counterattack itself. Indeed, as a result of these very actions of our troops in Ukraine, the enemy’s plan for a rapid breakthrough to Kyiv was thwarted at the very beginning. The enemy suffered heavy losses and became convinced of the resilience of Soviet soldiers, ready to fight to the last drop of blood.” Zhukov did not write about our fourfold losses.
4 Unable to bear the shame of defeat, on June 28, 1941, Corps Commissar N.N., a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, shot himself. Vashugin.
5 The shock formations of the Southwestern Front were unable to carry out a unified offensive. The actions of the mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks in different directions. The result of the counterattacks was a week's delay in the advance of the 1st German Tank Group and the disruption of the enemy's plans to break through to Kyiv and encircle the 6th, 12th and 26th armies of the Southwestern Front in the Lvov ledge. The German command, through competent leadership, was able to repel a counterattack and defeat the armies of the Southwestern Front.

Above is the cover of Vladimir Tyaptin's new book. It includes 39 poems and 14 poems and songs dedicated to the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945, which reflect the main battles on all fronts of this great war, starting from the border battles of 1941 before the storming of Berlin and the Victory Parade in Moscow on June 24, 1945. The book is filled with extensive historical material, included in 309 notes. Essentially, these are two books - poetic and prose, united under one title. It presents 156 specific individuals, including 96 war heroes, from ordinary soldiers to Marshal Zhukov and Generalissimo Joseph Stalin. The book was designed by Yuri Lobanov, laureate of the State Prize of the Udmurt Republic.

Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody- one of the largest tank battles in history, which took place during the Great Patriotic War in June 1941 in the triangle of cities of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody. Also known as the Battle of Brody, the tank battle of Dubno, Lutsk, Rivne, the counterattack of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, etc. Time interval from June 23, 1941 to June 30, 1941. The battle pitted the Soviet 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd mechanized corps and the German 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th tank divisions.

22nd of June in these 5 Soviet corps there were 33 KV-2, 136 KV-1, 48 T-35, 171 T-34, 2.415 T-26, OT-26, T-27, T-36, T-37, BT -5, BT-7. A total of 2,803 Soviet tanks. That is, more than a quarter of the tank forces concentrated in the 5 western military districts of the USSR. [Military Historical Journal, N11, 1993] It is also worth noting that the Soviet 4th Mechanized Corps fought west of Brody - the most powerful of the Soviet ones - 892 tanks, of which 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34. On June 24, the 8th Tank Division (325 tanks, including 50 KV and 140 T-34s as of June 22) from its composition was reassigned to the 15th Mechanized Corps.

22nd of June in the opposing 4 German tank divisions there were 80 Pz-IV, 195 Pz-III (50mm), 89 Pz-III (37mm), 179 Pz-II, 42 BefPz. This is about a sixth of all German tanks allocated to the entire Eastern Front. In addition, from June 28, the 9th German Tank Division entered this battle (as of June 22 - 20 Pz-IV, 60 Pz-III (50mm), 11 Pz-III (37mm), 32 Pz-II, 8 Pz- I, 12 Bef-Pz)

(below, for the sake of distinction, Soviet units are called tank, German - panzer. Accordingly, Soviet - rifle and motorized rifle (formally - motorized), German - infantry and motorized)

June 23 The 10th and 37th tank divisions of the 15th mechanized corps of Major General I.I. Karpezo attacked the right flank of the German group with the goal of breaking the ring around the 124th Infantry Division in the Milyatin area. At the same time, the 212th Motorized Rifle Division of the corps had to be left in the rear due to a lack of trucks. Swampy terrain and Luftwaffe airstrikes slowed the advance of the armored divisions (the 19th Panzer Regiment was completely stuck in the swamp and did not take part in the fighting that day), and the German 197th Infantry Division managed to organize a strong anti-tank defense on its flank. An attack by a small number of T-34s threw the Germans into fear, but by the evening the 11th Panzer Division arrived in time.

June 24 The 11th Panzer Division advanced towards Dubno, overcoming the resistance of the 37th Panzer Division and inflicting heavy losses on it. The 10th Panzer Division, defending and counterattacking, was stopped near Lopatin by German infantry defenses. On the same day, the 8th Mechanized Corps was sent to the Brody area. According to the recollections of the corps commander, Lieutenant General. D.I. Ryabyshev, up to half of the light tanks were lost along the way (i.e., about 300 BT).

June 25 The 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions took Lutsk and began advancing towards Rivne. They encountered units of the 9th Mechanized Corps. At the same time, units of the badly damaged 22nd Mechanized Corps took up defensive positions near Lutsk along with the 27th Rifle Corps. The 20th, 35th, 40th, 43rd tank divisions of the 9th and 19th mechanized corps arrived in the Rivne area. They were supposed to attack the 11th Panzer Division. From another direction, the same division was to be attacked by the 12th and 34th tank divisions of the 8th mechanized corps.

June 26 The Soviet counter-offensive began. The actions of the mechanized corps were not coordinated, and not all units of the 9th and 19th mechanized corps managed to arrive at the site of the fighting. Only tank units took part in the battle with little support from motorized rifles. They managed to cut the Lutsk-Rovno road, and units of the 43rd Panzer Division took Dubno, but only after the main part of the 11th Panzer Division left it, heading east.

The Germans, sensing a threat, deployed the 13th Panzer Division south of Lutsk, contrary to the original plan to move east. In addition, the Germans sent the 75th, 111th, 299th Infantry Divisions to clear the communications of the 11th Panzer Division.

The 15th mechanized corps went to join the 8th mechanized corps. Meanwhile, the commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps ordered the 34th Panzer Division and the advance detachment of the 12th Panzer Division to cut the highway along which the 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions were supplied. And from the direction of Lvov, the 8th Tank Division of the 4th Mechanized Corps went east to join in the counterattack.

27th of June the offensive of the 9th mechanized corps of Rokossovsky and the 19th mechanized corps of Feklenko began to slow down. Their advanced units were almost destroyed and the remaining units were forced to retreat. The remnants of the forward detachments of the mechanized corps were cut off at a distance of about 10 kilometers. The 13th Panzer Division was sent to their final destruction, which flanked them and then turned east towards Rivne. It turned out that the 13th Panzer Division went to the rear of the remnants of four tank divisions, and in the next two days, Soviet units moved east after the German division. The 11th Panzer captured the main crossing in the Ostrog area and the Soviet command was forced to gather all possible (but small) reserves to block the 13th and 11th Panzer divisions.

On the southern flank of the German group, the Soviet offensive developed somewhat more successfully. There the 12th and 34th tank, 7th motorized rifle divisions of the 8th mechanized corps and the 14th cavalry division were assembled for the attack. The 8th Tank Division from the 4th Mechanized Corps finally arrived to replenish the 10th Tank Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps. However, only about half of the original number of tanks remained in these units (about 800 tanks). The 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions advanced approximately 5 kilometers, but were unable to penetrate the 111th Infantry Division's defenses. Then the Germans moved forward the 13th Panzer Division and after it the 111th Infantry Division. They were able to create a corridor between the 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which operated north of Dubno, and the 8th mechanized corps, which attacked south of Dubno. The 7th Motorized Rifle Division was attacked from the rear by the 16th Panzer, and the 75th Infantry struck the 12th Panzer, cutting off its main units from the forward detachments.

June 28 The 13th Panzer Division reached the Rovno area, but had no infantry support as the Germans threw infantry into the Dubno area. The 9th and 22nd mechanized corps were able to move away from Dubno and take up defensive positions north and southeast of Lutsk. This created a “balcony” that delayed Army Group South on its way to Kyiv. It is believed that as a result of this, Hitler decided to change the strategic decision and send additional forces to the south, removing them from the Moscow direction.

June 28 units of the 12th and 34th tank divisions fought west of Dubno, but the main tank units tried to retreat.

Meanwhile, the 5th mechanized corps arrived in the Ostrog area (as of June 22 - 1070 tanks, without KVs and T-34s. According to other sources, only the 109th motorized rifle division and the tank regiment of the 5th mechanized corps fought near Ostrog) which managed to stop the advance 11th Panzer Division. On the same day, the defense south of Brody was strengthened by units of the 37th Rifle Corps. But the Germans also sent the 9th Panzer Division to the left flank of the Soviet defense (in the Lvov area). This maneuver completely destroyed the left flank of the Soviet defense.

By this time, Soviet tanks had almost no ammunition and fuel left.

Difficulties turned into disasters June 29. In the morning, the 13th Panzer Division advanced east from Rivne, while Soviet troops were withdrawing north and south of the city, paralleling the German movement. Soviet tanks were increasingly left without fuel, and German infantry destroyed the remnants of the 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions.

June 30th The 9th Panzer Division attacked the remnants of the 3rd Cavalry Division. She then cut off the 8th and 10th Panzer Divisions, completing their encirclement. By this time, the commander of the 6th Soviet Army ordered all his units to withdraw to positions east of Lvov. And at that time the Germans were gathering units of the 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions south of Lutsk in order to create a fist for a strike in the direction of Zhitomir and Berdichev.

TO July 1 The Soviet mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front were practically destroyed. About 10% of the tanks remained in the 22nd, 10-15% in the 8th and 15th, and about 30% in the 9th and 19th. The 4th Mechanized Corps under the command of General A.A. Vlasov (the same one) found himself in a slightly better position - he managed to withdraw with about 40% of the tanks.

However, compared to other Soviet fronts, the South-Western was able to inflict significant damage on the Germans with its mechanized units.

In conclusion, a quote from the memoirs of those events by an officer of the 11th Panzer Division - at that time Senior Lieutenant Heinz Guderian.

« Personally, the Russian soldier was well trained and was a tough fighter. Shooting training was excellent - many of our soldiers were killed by shots to the head. His equipment was simple but effective. Russian soldiers wore earth-brown uniforms, which camouflaged them well. Their food was spartan, unlike ours. They had to face our professional tactics of the German armored divisions. That is, with maneuverability, surprise attacks, night attacks and the interaction of tanks and infantry.

As for Russian tactics in border battles. In our impression, Russian companies and platoons were left to their own devices. They did not have cooperation with artillery and tanks. No reconnaissance was used at all. There was no radio communication between headquarters and units. Therefore, our attacks were often unexpected for them«.

According to Colonel Glanz, fierce, although unsuccessful, Soviet counterattacks delayed the German Army Group South for at least a week. Thus, this helped force Hitler to redirect part of the forces of Army Group Center from the Moscow direction to strengthening the Ukrainian one. Colonel Glanz also points out that the border battles in Western Ukraine also showed that German tank crews are not invincible. This gave many Soviet commanders, such as Rokossovsky, expensive but useful experience in tank warfare.

The Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody (also known as the Battle of Brody, the tank battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Rovno, the counterattack of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, etc.) - the largest tank battle in history, which took place from June 23 to 30 1941. It was attended by five mechanized corps of the Red Army (2803 tanks) of the Southwestern Front against four German tank divisions (585 tanks) of the Wehrmacht Army Group South, united in the First Tank Group. Subsequently, another tank division of the Red Army (325 tanks) and one tank division of the Wehrmacht (143 tanks) entered the battle. Thus, 3,128 Soviet and 728 German tanks (+ 71 German assault guns) fought in an oncoming tank battle.

The Red Army formations, which had overwhelming technical superiority in this section of the front, were unable to inflict significant losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, and were also unable to seize the strategic offensive initiative and change the course of hostilities in their favor. The tactical superiority of the Wehrmacht and the problems in the Red Army (poorly organized supply system for tank corps, lack of air cover and complete loss of operational control) allowed the German troops to win the battle, as a result of which the Red Army lost a huge number of tanks.

Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno.

Armored vehicles of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army

On June 22, 1941, the entire German Army Group South, in the offensive area of ​​which this battle took place, had 728 tanks, including at least 115 unarmed “command tanks” Sd.Kfz. 265 and about 150 tanks armed with 20 mm cannons and/or machine guns and (T-I and T-II). Thus, the Germans actually had 455 tanks (T-38(t), T-III and T-IV) in the generally accepted sense of the word.

The total listed number of tanks in the mechanized corps of the Soviet Southwestern Front was 3,429 (in addition, a certain number of tanks were in the rifle divisions of the front). However, three of the six corps were practically at the stage of formation, and only the 4th, 8th and 9th mechanized corps could be considered as fully combat-ready formations. They included 1,515 tanks, which was more than three times the number of German cannon-armed tanks opposing them. In addition, these three combat-ready corps included 271 tanks of the T-34 and KV types, which were not only far superior in armament and armor to the best German tanks at that time, but were also almost invulnerable to standard Wehrmacht anti-tank weapons.

Previous events

On June 22, 1941, after a breakthrough in the zone of General Potapov’s 5th Army at the junction with Muzychenko’s 6th Army, Kleist’s 1st Tank Group advanced in the direction of Radekhov and Berestechko. The General Staff decided to encircle the main enemy grouping in the Southwestern Front with strikes in the direction of Rava-Russkaya Lublin and Kovel Lublin and subsequently help the Western Front.

The USSR NGO Directive No. 3 dated June 22, 1941, endorsed by Zhukov, stated:

d) The armies of the Southwestern Front, firmly holding the border with Hungary, with concentric attacks in the general direction of Lublin with forces 5A and 6A, at least five mechanized corps and all front aviation, encircle and destroy the enemy group advancing on the Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopol front, by the end of June 26, capture the Lublin region. Safely provide for yourself from the Krakow direction.

During the discussion of the directive at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, it was considered that an encirclement operation with access to Lublin was impossible.

The proposal of the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, General Purkaev, to withdraw troops and create a continuous line of defense along the old border, and then counterattack, was also rejected.

We decided to strike with three mechanized corps (15th, 4th, 8th mechanized corps) from the Radzekhov Rava-Russkaya front to Krasnostav and one mechanized corps (22nd mechanized corps) from the Verba Vladimir-Volynsky front to Krasnostav. The goal of the strike is not encirclement (as the directive required), but the defeat of the enemy’s main forces in a counter battle.

In pursuance of the decisions made, on June 23, the 15th mechanized corps of Karpezo moved from the south to Radzekhov without the 212th motorized rifle division, which was left to cover Brod. During clashes with the German 11th Panzer Division, units reported the destruction of 20 German tanks and armored vehicles and 16 anti-tank guns. The Radzekhs could not be held; in the afternoon the Germans captured the crossings on the Styr River near Berestechko.

The breakthrough to Berestechko forced the headquarters of the Southwestern Front to abandon its previous decision; the 8th MK from near Yavorov received an order to move to Brody at 15:30 on June 23.

During June 24, the front headquarters, together with the representative of the General Headquarters, Zhukov, decided to launch a counterattack on the German group with the forces of four mechanized corps while simultaneously creating a rear line of defense with rifle corps of front-line subordination - the 31st, 36th and 37th. In reality, these units were in the process of moving to the front and entered into battle as they arrived without mutual coordination. Some units did not take part in the counterattack. The goal of the counterattack of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front was to defeat the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist. During the subsequent battle, the German troops of the 1st Tgr and 6th Army were counterattacked by the Soviet 22nd, 9th and 19th mechanized corps from the north, and the 8th and 15th mechanized corps from the south, entering an oncoming tank battle with the German 11th, 13th, 14th and 16th Panzer Divisions.

Destroyed T-26 tanks of the 19th Tank Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps on the Voinitsa-Lutsk highway.

On June 24, the 19th tank and 215th motorized rifle divisions of the 22nd mechanized corps went on the offensive north of the Vladimir-Volynsky - Lutsk highway from the Voinitsa - Boguslavskaya line. The attack was unsuccessful; the division's light tanks ran into anti-tank guns deployed by the Germans. The 19th TD lost more than 50% of its tanks and began to retreat to the Torchin area. Moskalenko’s 1st anti-tank artillery brigade also moved here. The 41st Tank Division of the 22nd MK did not participate in the counterattack. The defense on the Styr River near Lutsk was occupied by the advanced 131st Motorized Division of the 9th Mechanized Corps of General Rokossovsky.

The 19th Mechanized Corps of Major General Feklenko advanced to the border from the evening of June 22, reaching the Ikva River in the Mlynov area with advanced units on the evening of June 24. On the morning of June 25, the reconnaissance battalion of the German 11th Panzer Division attacked the forward company of the 40th Panzer Division, which was guarding the crossing at Mlynov, and pushed it back. The 43rd Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps was approaching the Rivne area, subject to air attacks.

By the morning of June 26, 1941, the situation was as follows. The 131st Infantry Division, having retreated from Lutsk at night, occupied the front from Rozhishche to Lutsk; troops of the 19th Tank Division, 135th Infantry Division and 1st Artillery Brigade retreated behind its positions through Rozhishche. Lutsk was occupied by the German 13th TD, the 14th TD was located at Torchin. Further from Lutsk to Torgovitsa there was no defense; during the day the defense was to be occupied by the tank divisions of the 9th MK, which were located in the Olyka-Klevan area in the morning. The Germans brought the 299th Infantry Division to Merchant. From Torgovitsa to Mlynov, the motorized rifle regiment of the 40th TD of the 19th MK Red Army occupied the defense along the river. The rifle regiment of the 228th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division of the Red Army took up defense near Mlynov, and the German 111th Infantry Division acted against it. The tank regiments of the 40th TD and the infantry regiment of the 228th Infantry Division were in the forest near Radov in reserve. In the Pogoreltsy area the motorized rifle regiment of the 43rd TD operated, in the Mladechny area the rifle regiment of the 228th infantry regiment operated. The German 11th Tank Division occupied the Dubno-Verba area against them. Further from Surmichi to Sudobichi there was no defense; the 140th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division had not yet reached this line. Further, from Sudobichi to Kremenets, the 146th Infantry Division of the 36th Infantry Division defended. In the Kremenets area the defense was held by the 14th cavalry division of the 5th cavalry division.

On the morning of June 26, German divisions continued their offensive. In the morning, the German 13th TD threw back units of the 131st Infantry Division beyond the intersection of the Lutsk-Rovno and Rozhishche-Mlynov roads, and turned towards Mlynov. The positions near Lutsk were transferred to the 14th TD. Rokossovsky's tank divisions were supposed to reach the area of ​​the breakthrough of the German 13th TD in the afternoon, and before that the road was open. Moving along it, the 13th TD in the afternoon reached the rear of the Soviet 40th TD, which was fighting with the 299th Infantry Division at Torgovitsa and the 111th Infantry Division at Mlynov. This breakthrough led to the disorderly withdrawal of the 40th TD and the 228th SD regiment to Radov and further north.

The German 11th TD advanced in two battle groups, the tank group drove back the Soviet infantry of the 43rd TD and the 228th SD regiment to Krylov and Radov, and occupied Varkovichi. The German motorized brigade of the 11th TD, moving through Surmichi, met the marching columns of the Soviet 140th Infantry Division southeast of Lipa, which could not withstand the sudden collision and retreated in disarray to the south, to Tartak. The 43rd Tank Division of the 19th Mechanized Corps, with 79 tanks of the 86th Tank Regiment, broke through the defensive positions of the German 11th Tank Division and by 6 o'clock in the evening broke into the outskirts of Dubno, reaching the Ikva River. Due to the retreat on the left flank of the 140th Division of the 36th Rifle Corps, and on the right of the 40th Tank Division, both flanks of the 43rd Tank Division became unprotected, and units of the division, by order of the corps commander, began to retreat from Dubno after midnight to the area to the west Smooth. From the south, from the Toporov area, the 19th tank regiment of the 10th tank division of the 15th mechanized corps of General I. I. Karpezo was advancing on Radekhov with the task of defeating the enemy and connecting with units of the 124th and 87th rifle divisions surrounded in the Voinitsa area and Milyatin. In the first half of the day on June 26, the 37th Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps crossed the Radostavka River and advanced forward. The 10th Panzer Division encountered anti-tank defenses at Kholuyev and was forced to withdraw. The corps units were subjected to a massive German air raid, during which the commander, Major General Carpezo, was seriously wounded. The 8th Mechanized Corps of General D.I. Ryabyshev, having completed a 500-kilometer march since the beginning of the war and leaving half of the tanks and part of the artillery on the road due to breakdowns and air strikes, by the evening of June 25 began to concentrate in the Busk area, southwest of Brody.

On the morning of June 26, the mechanized corps entered Brody with the further task of advancing on Dubno. Corps reconnaissance discovered German defenses on the Ikva River and the Sytenka River, as well as parts of the 212th Motorized Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps, which had moved out from Brody the day before. On the morning of June 26, the 12th Tank Division of Major General Mishanin crossed the Slonovka River and, having restored the bridge, attacked and captured the city of Leshnev by 16.00. On the right flank, the 34th Tank Division of Colonel I.V. Vasilyev destroyed the enemy column, taking about 200 prisoners and capturing 4 tanks. By the end of the day, the divisions of the 8th Mechanized Corps had advanced 8-15 km in the direction of Berestechko, displacing units of the 57th Infantry and a motorized brigade of the 16th Tank Division of the enemy, which had withdrawn and consolidated behind the Plyashevka River. The tank regiment of the 16th TD continued the offensive in the direction of Kozin. The Germans sent the 670th anti-tank battalion and a battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns to the battle area. The 212th Motorized Rifle Division of the Red Army did not receive an order to support the attack of the 8th MK. By evening, the enemy was already trying to counterattack parts of the mechanized corps. On the night of June 27, the mechanized corps received an order to leave the battle and begin concentration behind the 37th sk.

The commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov, still in the midst of the battles of the previous day, not knowing about the breakthrough of the German 13th TD near Lutsk, gives the order to the tank division of the 9th MK, which was at that time in the Novoselki region -Olyka, stop moving west and turn south to Dubno. The corps completed the maneuver only at two o'clock in the morning on June 27, having taken the starting positions for the attack along the Putilovka River. On the morning of the same day, the 19th Mechanized Corps also received an order to resume a counterattack from Rivne to Mlynov and Dubno. Units of the 15th mechanized corps were supposed to reach Berestechko. On June 26-27, the Germans transported infantry units across the Ikva River and concentrated the 13th Tank, 299th Infantry, and 111th Infantry Divisions against the 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps.

At dawn on June 27, the 24th Tank Regiment of the 20th Tank Division of Colonel Katukov from the 9th Mechanized Corps attacked units of the 13th German Tank Division on the move, capturing about 300 prisoners. During the day, the division itself lost 33 BT tanks. The offensive of the 9th MK Red Army floundered after the German 299th Infantry Division, advancing in the direction of Ostrozhets-Olyk, attacked the open western flank of the 35th TD of the Red Army at Malin. The withdrawal of this division to Olyka threatened the encirclement of the 20th TD of the Red Army, which was fighting with the motorized infantry brigade of the 13th TD in Dolgoshey and Petushki. With fighting, the 20th TD breaks through to Klevan. The tank divisions of the 19th MK Red Army were unable to go on the offensive, and with difficulty repelled the attacks of the tank regiment of the reconnaissance battalion and the motorcycle battalion of the enemy's 13th TD on Rovno. The Soviet 228th Infantry Division, which had only a quarter of its ammunition on June 25, after two days of fighting found itself without ammunition, semi-encircled near Radov and during the retreat to Zdolbunov it was attacked by reconnaissance units of the German 13th and 11th TD and 111th Infantry Division; during the retreat it was All artillery was abandoned. The division was saved from defeat only by the fact that the German 13th tank division and 11th tank division attacked in diverging directions and did not seek to destroy the 228th division. During the retreat and under air strikes, some of the tanks, vehicles and guns of the 19th Mechanized Corps were lost. The 36th Rifle Corps was incapable of combat and did not have a unified leadership (the headquarters made its way through the forests to its divisions from near Mizoch), so it was also unable to go on the attack. The German 111th Infantry Division was approaching the Dubno district from Mlynov. Near Lutsk, the German 298th Infantry Division launched an offensive with the support of tanks from the 14th Panzer Division.

It was planned to organize an offensive from the southern direction, towards Dubno, by the forces of the 8th and 15th mechanized corps of the Red Army with the 8th tank division of the 4th mechanized corps. At two o'clock in the afternoon on June 27, only the hastily organized combined detachments of the 24th Tank Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Volkov and the 34th Tank Division under the command of Brigade Commissar N.K. Popel were able to go on the offensive. By this time, the remaining parts of the division were only being transferred to a new direction.

The attack in the direction of Dubno was unexpected for the Germans, and having crushed the defensive barriers, Popel’s group entered the outskirts of Dubno in the evening, capturing the rear reserves of the enemy’s 11th Panzer Division and several dozen intact tanks. During the night, the Germans transferred units of the 16th Motorized, 75th and 111th Infantry Divisions to the breakthrough site and closed the gap, interrupting the supply routes of Popel’s group. Attempts by the approaching units of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army to make a new hole in the defense failed, and under attacks from aviation, artillery and superior enemy forces, it had to go on the defensive. On the left flank, having broken through the defenses of the 212th Motorized Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps, about 40 German tanks reached the headquarters of the Soviet 12th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps. The division commander, Major General T. A. Mishanin, sent a reserve to meet them - 6 KV tanks and 4 T-34s, which managed to stop the breakthrough.

The offensive of the 15th MK Red Army was unsuccessful. Having suffered heavy losses from anti-tank gun fire, its units were unable to cross the Ostrovka River and were thrown back to their original positions along the Radostavka River. On June 29, the 15th Mechanized Corps was ordered to be replaced by units of the 37th Rifle Corps and retreat to the Zolochev Heights in the area of ​​Byala Kamen - Sasuv - Zolochev - Lyatske. Contrary to the order, the withdrawal began without a change of units of the 37th Rifle Corps and without notifying the commander of the 8th MK Ryabyshev, and therefore the German troops freely bypassed the flank of the 8th Mechanized Corps. On June 29, the Germans occupied Busk and Brody, held by one battalion of the Soviet 212th Motorized Division. On the right flank of the 8th Mechanized Corps, without offering resistance to the Germans, units of the 140th and 146th Rifle Divisions of the 36th Rifle Corps and the 14th Cavalry Division withdrew.

The 8th Mk Red Army, which found itself surrounded by the enemy, managed to retreat in an organized manner to the line of the Zolochev Heights, breaking through the German barriers. Popel's detachment remained cut off deep behind enemy lines, taking up a perimeter defense in the Dubno area. The defense continued until July 2, and only when the ammunition and fuel ran out did the detachment, having destroyed the remaining equipment, begin to break out of the encirclement. Having traveled more than 200 km behind enemy lines, Popel’s group and the units of the 124th Rifle Division of the 5th Army that joined it reached the location of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. In total, over a thousand people emerged from the encirclement, the losses of the 34th division and the units attached to it amounted to 5,363 people missing and about a thousand killed, the division commander, Colonel I.V. Vasiliev, died.

Factors

In comparison with German tank crews, Soviet tank crews in the first days of the 1941 war did not have any combat experience and had very little experience only in training, even the drivers of Soviet tanks had about 2-5 hours of driving practice, while the Germans at one time even in the Kazan tank school had about 50 hours of driving practice.

The superior armor of the T-34 and KV turned out to be untenable against German 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, which the Germans took advantage of, shooting up to 20-30 tanks at long distances in an hour. Subsequently, these guns were installed as standard on Tiger tanks and others.

The almost complete or complete absence of armor-piercing shells among the Soviet tank crews who participated in the battle.

The extremely inept and illiterate conduct of Soviet tank attacks in the absence of high-quality standard radio communications of groups and individual combat vehicles with general coordination of forces (in comparison with the qualitatively different state of radio communications in the German tank forces) led to large losses of Soviet crews and equipment, including march.

“The failures of the Soviet tank forces are not explained by the poor quality of materials or weapons, but by the inability of command and lack of maneuvering experience... […] brigade-division-corps commanders are not able to solve operational problems. This especially concerns the interaction of different types of armed forces...”, said during interrogation the former commander of the howitzer battery of the 14th Tank Division, Captain Ya. I. Dzhugashvili, who was captured near Senno.

Losses

Losses on June 30, 1941, SWF: 2648 tanks (85%) against German 260 vehicles. And if the Germans had the opportunity to repair their cars and had trophies (using them under white crosses), then the Soviet losses were irrevocable. During 15 days of the war, losses amounted to: 4381 tanks out of 5826.

German losses by September 4, 1941 (1st Panzer Group of Kleist): 222 repairable vehicles + 186 irreparable.

Consequences

The shock formations of the Southwestern Front were unable to carry out a unified offensive. The actions of the Soviet mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks in different directions. The result of the counterattacks was a week's delay in the advance of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group and the disruption of the enemy's plans to break through to Kyiv and encircle the 6th, 12th and 26th Armies of the Southwestern Front in the Lvov salient. The German command, through competent leadership, managed to repel the Soviet counterattack and defeat the armies of the Southwestern Front.

Unable to bear the shame of defeat, on June 28, 1941, Corps Commissar N.N. Vashugin, a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, shot himself.