Biographies Characteristics Analysis

Artillery of the Russo-Turkish War. About the war won, but unsuccessful

COURSE OF EVENTS

The impossibility of improving the position of Christians in the Balkans by peaceful means, the rise of national consciousness in the Balkan countries led to the fact that in April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. The Russian army crossed the Danube, captured the Shipka Pass, and after a five-month siege forced the Turkish army of Osman Pasha to surrender at Plevna.

The number of the Russian expeditionary force in the Balkans at the beginning of the war was about 185 thousand people, and by the end of the war it had reached half a million. The raid through the Balkans, during which the Russian army defeated the last Turkish units, led to the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the war.

As a result of the war, the San Stefano Preliminary Treaty was concluded. However, its terms provoked a sharply negative reaction from the great powers, who feared the enormously increased influence of Russia in the Balkans. They forced Russia to revise the treaty, and it was actually replaced by the Treaty of Berlin signed at the Berlin Congress on June 1/13, 1878. even received certain acquisitions from the war, in which they did not take part. The statehood of Bulgaria was restored, the territory of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania was enlarged. At the same time, Turkish Bosnia and Herzegovina retreated to Austria-Hungary.

Having occupied Tyrnov, General Gurko collected information about the enemy and on June 28 moved to Kazanlak, bypassing the Shipka Pass. In extreme heat and along mountain paths, the Advance Detachment traveled 120 miles in 6 days. Shipka's double attack from the north (July 5) and south (July 6) was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the news of Gurko's crossing over the Balkans had such an effect on the Turks that the detachment occupying Shipka left their excellent position, abandoned all their artillery on the pass and retreated to Philippopolis.

On July 7, Shipka was taken without a fight. We lost about 400 people and captured 6 guns and up to 400 prisoners at the pass. […]

By the evening of the 17th, Gurko's detachments came into contact with the enemy. On the 18th and 19th, a series of battles took place, for us, on the whole, successful. The 4th Rifle Brigade passed 75 versts in the mountains in a day on July 17-18. On July 18, near Yeni-Zagra, the riflemen shot down a Turkish detachment, capturing 2 guns and losing 7 officers, 102 lower ranks. On July 19, a stubborn battle took place near Juranly, where we lost 20 officers, 498 lower ranks, but killed up to 2000 Turks. Under Eski Zagra, the Bulgarian militia lost 34 officers and 1000 lower ranks, here lay the entire color of the officers of the Turkestan riflemen. However, we failed at Eski Zagra, where the Bulgarian militia was routed. On July 19, Gurko's troops retreated to Shipka and Khanikioy. They risked being in a hopeless situation, but Suleiman did not pursue, carried away by beating the Bulgarian population, and we could save Shipka. This was the only, but a major positive result of the summer crossing of the Balkans: by holding Shipka, we separated the actions of all three Turkish armies. Gurko's detachment, weak in numbers, did everything it could and got out of its predicament with honor. […]

Having lost 19 days after the case near Eski-Zagra (when he could take Shipka almost without hindrance), Suleiman on August 7 with 40,000 with 54 guns approached the Shipka Pass. Radetsky's troops, who defended the Balkans, and in addition had the task of covering the left flank of the Plevna group and the right flank of the Ruschuk detachment, were scattered on a front of 130 miles from Selvi to Kesarev. On Shipka itself there were 4,000 people (the Orlovsky regiment and the remnants of the Bulgarian militia) with 28 guns. Having spent another day, Suleiman stormed the strongest part of the Russian positions on the pass on August 9.

Thus began the famous six-day Shipka battle. Attacks followed attacks, the camp followed the camp. Having shot their cartridges, tormented by severe thirst, the defenders of the "Eagle's Nest" - Orlovtsy and Bryantsy - fought back with stones and rifle butts. On August 11, Suleiman was already triumphant, but then at the decisive moment, like thunder from a clear sky, “Hurrah!” 4th Infantry Brigade, a lightning march passed 60 miles in forty-degree heat. Shipka was saved - and on these hot cliffs the 4th Rifle Brigade earned its immortal name of the "Iron Brigade".

The 14th division of General Dragomirov arrived here, Radetsky himself personally began to control the battle, and on August 13 the buglers of the Suleiman camps began to play the retreat. By the evening of August 9, we had 6,000 people, the storming Turks had 28,000 and 36 guns. On August 10, Radetsky moved reserves to Shipka; the Turks, repulsed the day before, fought artillery battles all day. August 11 was a critical day. The Russian position was covered from three sides. The 16th rifle battalion arrived in time at a critical moment on the croup of Cossack horses, rushing from a place with bayonets. On August 12, the 2nd brigade of the 14th division approached, and on August 13, the Volynsky regiment. Radetsky went over to the counterattack (personally led a company of Zhitomirians on bayonets). On August 13 and 14, battles were fought with varying success. Dragomirov was wounded, and the commander of the 2nd brigade of the 9th division, General Derozhinsky, was killed. Our damage: 2 generals, 108 officers, 3338 lower ranks. The Turks showed theirs in 233 officers and 6527 lower ranks, but in fact it is twice as much - in a letter to Seraskiriat, Suleiman urgently demanded 12,000 - 15,000 people to replenish the loss. In order to have an idea of ​​the conditions for the defense of Shipka, it is enough to note that water for our wounded had to be delivered 17 miles away!

RESTRICTIONS ON THE SEA

Since the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Makarov's energy, ingenuity and perseverance found new uses. As you know, by virtue of the Paris Treaty of 1856, Russia was deprived of the right to have a combat fleet in the Black Sea, and although this treaty was annulled in 1871, nevertheless, to create a strong military fleet on the Black Sea by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war did not have time and, apart from floating batteries, wooden corvettes and several schooners, had nothing there. Turkey, by this time, had a large fleet with strong artillery. On the Black Sea, she could use 15 battleships, 5 screw frigates, 13 screw corvettes, 8 monitors, 7 armored gunboats and a large number of small vessels.

The balance of power in the Black Sea was far from in favor of Russia. It was necessary, given the small number of naval forces, to find effective methods of dealing with the strong fleet of Turkey. The solution to this problem was found by Makarov.

CAPTAIN LIEUTENANT MAKAROV

At the end of 1876, the inevitability of war with Turkey became clear. Makarov was given command of the steamer "Grand Duke Konstantin". After a stubborn struggle, he carried out his idea to arm the ship with fast mine boats lifted on special davits, and put artillery on it from 4-inch rifled guns and one 6-inch mortar.

At first, the boats were armed with pole and tow mines, for the use of which it was required that the boat approached very close to the enemy ship.

The first attack with such mines was made on May 12, 1877 on a Turkish patrol steamer. The mine touched its side, but did not explode due to a malfunction of the fuse (as the study showed, 30% of the fuses did not explode due to their careless manufacture). The Sulina attack on June 9 also failed. On August 24, a mine attack was carried out on the Sukhumi raid: the Turkish battleship was damaged, but did not sink and was taken by the Turks in tow to Batum. Although there were self-propelled mines [torpedoes] of Whitehead in Nikolaev, they were released to Makarov only in July 1877, i.e. almost four months after the start of the war, believing that the mines, which cost 12,000 rubles apiece, were "too expensive to waste."

The torpedo attack, undertaken on the night of December 28, failed: the torpedoes did not hit the enemy battleship and ran ashore. But the next torpedo attack was successful. On the night of January 26, 1878, a Turkish patrol steamer was attacked and sunk in the Batumi roadstead.

Makarov's most brilliant deed was to distract the enemy battleship assigned to guard the detachment of Colonel Shelkovnikov (the latter had to retreat under pressure from superior Turkish forces along a narrow road that ran along the edge of a sheer cliff that towered over the sea). Makarov caused the battleship to pursue the Konstantin, and at that time Shelkovnikov, not noticed, led his detachment without any losses.

For the brilliant actions of the Konstantin steamer, Makarov received the highest military awards in his rank (George of the 4th degree and a golden weapon) and, moreover, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant commander, and then captain of the 2nd rank and was awarded the rank of adjutant wing.

SAN STEFANO PRELIMINARY PEACE TREATY

The Sublime Porte will have the right to use the passage through Bulgaria for the transportation of troops, military supplies and provisions along certain routes to areas outside the Principality and back. Within three months from the date of ratification of this act, in order to avoid difficulties and misunderstandings in the application of the said right, the conditions for the use of it will be determined, by agreement of the Sublime Porte with the administration in Bulgaria, by a special charter providing, among other things, for the military needs of the Sublime Porte.

It goes without saying that the aforementioned right extends exclusively to Ottoman regular troops, while irregulars - Bash-Bouzuks and Circassians - will certainly be excluded from it. […]

ARTICLE XII

All fortresses on the Danube will be demolished. From now on, there will be no more fortifications on the banks of this river; there will also be no warships in the waters of the Romanian, Serbian and Bulgarian principalities, except for ordinary stationary and small ships intended for the needs of the river police and customs administration. […]

ARTICLE XXIV

The Bosporus and the Dardanelles will be open, both in time of war and in time of peace, to merchant ships of neutral powers coming from or going to Russian ports. As a result of this, the Sublime Porte undertakes to no longer establish an invalid blockade of the ports of the Black and Azov Seas, as inconsistent with the exact meaning of the declaration signed in Paris

San Stefano preliminary peace treaty of San Stefano, February 19 / March 3, 1878 // Collection of treaties between Russia and other states. 1856-1917. M., 1952 http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/FOREIGN/stefano.htm

FROM SAN STEFANO TO BERLIN

On February 19, 1878, a peace treaty was signed in San Stefano. Under its terms, Bulgaria received the status of an autonomous principality. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained full independence and significant territorial gains. South Bessarabia, which had been torn away under the Treaty of Paris, was returned to Russia, and the Kars region in the Caucasus was transferred.

The provisional Russian administration that ruled Bulgaria developed a draft constitution. Bulgaria was declared a constitutional monarchy. Individual and property rights were guaranteed. The Russian project formed the basis of the Bulgarian constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly in Tarnovo in April 1879.

England and Austria-Hungary refused to accept the terms of the San Stefano Peace. At their insistence, the Berlin Congress was held in the summer of 1878 with the participation of England, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey. Russia found itself isolated and forced to make concessions. The Western powers categorically objected to the creation of a unified Bulgarian state. As a result, Southern Bulgaria remained under Turkish rule. Russian diplomats managed to achieve only that Sofia and Varna were included in the autonomous Bulgarian principality. The territory of Serbia and Montenegro was significantly reduced. Congress confirmed the right of Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In a report to the tsar, the head of the Russian delegation, Chancellor A.M. Gorchakov wrote: "The Berlin Congress is the blackest page in my official career!" The king noted: "And in mine too."

The Congress of Berlin undoubtedly did not embellish the diplomatic history of not only Russia, but also the Western powers. Driven by petty momentary calculations and envy of the brilliant victory of Russian arms, the governments of these countries extended Turkish rule over several million Slavs.

And yet the fruits of the Russian victory were only partly destroyed. Having laid the foundations for the freedom of the fraternal Bulgarian people, Russia has written a glorious page in its history. Russo-Turkish War 1877–1878 entered the general context of the era of Liberation and became its worthy completion.

Bokhanov A.N., Gorinov M.M. from the beginning of the XVIII to the end of the XIX century, M., 2001. http://kazez.net/book_98689_glava_129_%C2%A7_4._Russko_-_ture%D1%81kaja_vojj.html

[…] ARTICLE I

Bulgaria forms a self-governing and tribute-paying principality, under the leadership of H.I.V. sultan; it will have a Christian government and a people's militia. […]

ARTICLE III

The prince of Bulgaria will be freely elected by the people and approved by the Sublime Porte with the consent of the powers. None of the members of the dynasties that reign in the great European powers can be elected prince of Bulgaria. In the event that the title of prince of Bulgaria remains unreplaced, the election of a new prince will be made under the same conditions and in the same form. […]

The following principles will be adopted as the basis of the state law of Bulgaria: The difference in religious beliefs and confessions cannot serve as a reason for the exclusion of someone, or the non-recognition of someone's legal capacity in everything that relates to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, access to public positions , official occupations and distinctions, or until the departure of various free occupations and crafts in any locality. All Bulgarian natives, as well as foreigners, are guaranteed freedom and outward celebration of all worship; also, no restrictions can be placed on the hierarchical structure of the various religious communities and on their relations with their spiritual heads. […]

ARTICLE XIII

To the south of the Balkans, a province is formed, which will receive the name "Eastern Rumelia" and which will remain under the direct political and military authority of H.I.V. Sultan on the terms of administrative autonomy. It will have a Christian governor-general. […]

ARTICLE XXV

The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. […]

ARTICLE XXVI

The independence of Montenegro is recognized by the Sublime Porte and by all those high contracting parties which have not yet recognized it. […]

ARTICLE XXXIV

The High Contracting Parties recognize the independence of the Principality of Serbia […]

ARTICLE LVIII

The glorious Porte cedes to the Russian Empire in Asia the territories of Ardagan, Kars and Batum, with the port of the latter, as well as all the territories between the former Russian-Turkish border and the next frontier line. […]

The valley of Alashkert and the city of Bayazet, ceded to Russia by Article XIX of the Treaty of San Stefano, are returned to Turkey. […]

Relying on the friendly neutrality of Russia, Prussia from 1864 to 1871 won victories over Denmark, Austria and France, and then carried out the unification of Germany and the creation of the German Empire. The defeat of France by the Prussian army allowed, in turn, Russia to abandon the embarrassing articles of the Paris Agreement (first of all, the ban on having a navy on the Black Sea). The pinnacle of the German-Russian rapprochement was the creation in 1873 of the "Union of the Three Emperors" (Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary). The alliance with Germany, with the weakening of France, allowed Russia to intensify its policy in the Balkans. The reason for intervention in Balkan affairs was the Bosnian uprising of 1875 and the Serbo-Turkish war of 1876. The defeat of Serbia by the Turks and their brutal suppression of the uprising in Bosnia aroused strong sympathy in Russian society, which wanted to help the "Slav brothers". But there were disagreements in the Russian leadership about the advisability of a war with Turkey. Thus, Minister of Foreign Affairs A.M. Gorchakov, Minister of Finance M.X. Reitern and others considered Russia unprepared for a serious clash that could cause a financial crisis and a new conflict with the West, primarily with Austria-Hungary and England. Throughout 1876, diplomats sought a compromise, which Turkey avoided in every possible way. She was supported by England, which saw in the kindling of a military fire in the Balkans an opportunity to divert Russia from affairs in Central Asia. In the end, after the Sultan's refusal to reform his European provinces, Emperor Alexander II declared war on Turkey on April 12, 1877. Previously (in January 1877), Russian diplomacy managed to settle the friction with Austria-Hungary. She remained neutral for the right to occupy Turkish possessions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia regained the territory of southern Bessarabia, lost in the Crimean campaign. It was also decided not to create a large Slavic state in the Balkans.

The plan of the Russian command provided for the end of the war within a few months, so that Europe would not have time to intervene in the course of events. Since Russia had almost no fleet on the Black Sea, repeating the route of Dibich's campaign against Constantinople through the eastern regions of Bulgaria (near the coast) became difficult. Moreover, in this area there were powerful fortresses Silistria, Shumla, Varna, Ruschuk, forming a quadrangle, in which the main forces of the Turkish army were located. Progress in this direction threatened the Russian army with protracted battles. Therefore, it was decided to bypass the ominous quadrangle through the central regions of Bulgaria and go to Constantinople through the Shipka Pass (a pass in the Stara Planina mountains, on the Gabrovo-Kazanlak road. Height 1185 m.).

Two main theaters of military operations can be distinguished: the Balkan and the Caucasian. The main one was the Balkan, where military operations can be divided into three stages. The first (until mid-July 1877) included the crossing of the Danube and the Balkans by Russian troops. The second stage (from the second half of July to the end of November 1877), during which the Turks carried out a number of offensive operations, and the Russians, in general, were in a state of positional defense. The third, final stage (December 1877 - January 1878) is associated with the offensive of the Russian army through the Balkans and the victorious end of the war.

First stage

After the outbreak of the war, Romania took the side of Russia, letting the Russian troops through its territory. By the beginning of June 1877, the Russian army, led by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (185 thousand people), concentrated on the left bank of the Danube. She was opposed by approximately equal in number of troops under the command of Abdul-Kerim Pasha. Most of them were located in the already indicated quadrangle of fortresses. The main forces of the Russian army concentrated somewhat to the west, near Zimnitsa. The main crossing over the Danube was being prepared there. Even further west, along the river, from Nikopol to Vidin, the Romanian troops (45 thousand people) were located. In terms of combat training, the Russian army was superior to the Turkish. But in terms of the quality of weapons, the Turks surpassed the Russians. In particular, they were armed with the latest American and British rifles. The Turkish infantry had more ammunition and trench tools. Russian soldiers had to save shots. An infantryman who used up more than 30 rounds of ammunition (more than half of the cartridge bag) during the battle was threatened with punishment. A strong spring flood of the Danube prevented the crossing. In addition, the Turks had up to 20 battleships on the river that controlled the coastal zone. April and May passed in the fight against them. In the end, Russian troops, with the help of coastal batteries and mine boats, inflicted damage on the Turkish squadron and forced it to take refuge in Silistria. It was only after this that the opportunity for the crossing arose. On June 10, units of the XIV Corps of General Zimmermann crossed the river near Galati. They occupied Northern Dobruja, where they stayed idle until the end of the war. It was a distraction. Meanwhile, the main forces secretly accumulated near Zimnitsa. Opposite it, on the right bank, lay the fortified Turkish point of Sistovo.

Crossing at Sistovo (1877). On the night of June 15, between Zimnitsa and Sistovo, the 14th division of General Mikhail Dragomirov crossed the river. Soldiers crossed in black winter uniforms to remain unnoticed in the dark. The first to land on the right bank without a single shot was the 3rd Volyn company, led by Captain Fock. The following units crossed the river already under heavy fire and immediately went into battle. After a fierce assault, the Sist fortifications fell. Russian losses during the crossing amounted to 1.1 thousand people. (killed, wounded and drowned). By June 21, 1877, sappers built a floating bridge near Sistovo, along which the Russian army crossed to the right bank of the Danube. The next plan was as follows. An advanced detachment under the command of General Iosif Gurko (12 thousand people) was intended for an offensive through the Balkans. To ensure the flanks, two detachments were created - the Eastern (40 thousand people) and the Western (35 thousand people). The eastern detachment, led by the heir Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich (future Emperor Alexander III), held back the main Turkish troops from the east (from the side of the fortress quadrangle). The western detachment, led by General Nikolai Kridiger, had the goal of expanding the invasion zone in a westerly direction.

The capture of Nikopol and the first assault on Plevna (1877). Carrying out the assigned task, on July 3, Kridiger attacked Nikopol, which was defended by a 7,000-strong Turkish garrison. After a two-day assault, the Turks capitulated. Russian losses during the attack amounted to about 1.3 thousand people. The fall of Nikopol reduced the threat of a flank attack on the Russian crossings at Sistovo. On the western flank, the Turks had the last large detachment in the Vidin fortress. It was commanded by Osman Pasha, who managed to change the initial stage of the war, which was favorable for the Russians. Osman Pasha did not wait in Vidin for further actions by Kridiger. Taking advantage of the passivity of the Romanian army on the right flank of the allied forces, the Turkish commander left Vidin on July 1 and moved towards the Western detachment of the Russians. Overcoming 200 km in 6 days. Osman Pasha took up defense with a 17,000-strong detachment in the Plevna region. This decisive maneuver came as a complete surprise to Kridiger, who, after the capture of Nikopol, decided that the Turks were finished in this area. Therefore, the Russian commander was inactive for two days, instead of immediately taking possession of Plevna. By the time he woke up, it was already too late. Danger loomed over the right flank of the Russians and over their crossing (Plevna was 60 km from Sistovo). As a result of the occupation of Plevna by the Turks, the corridor for the offensive of Russian troops in the southern direction narrowed to 100-125 km (from Plevna to Ruschuk). Kridiger decided to rectify the situation and immediately sent the 5th division of General Schilder-Schulder (9 thousand people) against Plevna. However, the allocated forces were not enough, and the assault on Plevna on July 8 ended in failure. Having lost about a third of his forces during the attack, Schilder-Schulder was forced to retreat. The damage of the Turks amounted to 2 thousand people. This failure influenced the actions of the Eastern Detachment. He abandoned the blockade of the Rushuk fortress and went on the defensive, since the reserves for his reinforcement were now transferred to Plevna.

Gurko's first Trans-Balkan campaign (1877). While the Eastern and Western detachments were settling in on the Sistov patch, parts of General Gurko quickly moved south to the Balkans. On June 25, the Russians occupied Tarnovo, and on July 2 they crossed the Balkans through the Heineken Pass. To the right, through the Shipka Pass, a Russian-Bulgarian detachment led by General Nikolai Stoletov (about 5 thousand people) advanced. On July 5-6, he attacked Shipka, but was repulsed. However, on July 7, the Turks, having learned about the capture of the Heineken Pass and the movement to the rear of Gurko's units, left Shipka. The way through the Balkans was open. Russian regiments and detachments of Bulgarian volunteers descended into the Rose Valley, enthusiastically received by the local population. The message of the Russian tsar to the Bulgarian people included the following words: “Bolgars, my troops crossed the Danube, where they fought more than once to alleviate the plight of the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula ... The task of Russia is to create, not to destroy. appease all nationalities and all confessions in those parts of Bulgaria where people of different origins and different faiths live together ... ". Advanced Russian units appeared 50 km from Adrianople. But this was the end of Gurko's promotion. He did not have enough forces for a successful massive offensive that could decide the outcome of the war. The Turkish command had reserves to repel this bold, but largely improvised onslaught. To protect this direction, the corps of Suleiman Pasha (20 thousand people) was transferred by sea from Montenegro, which closed the road to Gurko's units on the Eski-Zagra - Yeni-Zagra line. In fierce battles on July 18-19, Gurko, who did not receive sufficient reinforcements, managed to defeat the Turkish division of Reuf Pasha near Yeni-Zagra, but suffered a heavy defeat near Eski-Zagra, where the Bulgarian militia was defeated. Gurko's detachment retreated to the passes. This was the end of the First Trans-Balkan Campaign.

Second assault on Plevna (1877). On the day when Gurko's divisions fought under two Zagrams, General Kridiger with a 26,000-strong detachment undertook a second assault on Plevna (July 18). By that time, its garrison had reached 24 thousand people. Thanks to the efforts of Osman Pasha and the talented engineer Teutik Pasha, Plevna turned into a formidable stronghold surrounded by defensive fortifications and redoubts. The scattered frontal onslaught of the Russians from the east and south crashed against the powerful Turkish defense system. Having lost more than 7 thousand people in fruitless attacks, Kridiger's troops retreated. The Turks lost about 4 thousand people. Panic erupted at the Sistov crossing at the news of this defeat. The approaching detachment of Cossacks was mistaken for the Turkish vanguard of Osman Pasha. There was a shootout. But Osman Pasha did not attack Sistovo. He limited himself to an onslaught in a southerly direction and the occupation of Lovcha, hoping from here to come into contact with the troops of Suleiman Pasha advancing from the Balkans. The second Plevna, along with the defeat of the Gurko detachment at Eski-Zagra, forced the Russian troops to go on the defensive in the Balkans. The Guards Corps was called from St. Petersburg to the Balkans.

Balkan theater of operations

Second phase

In the second half of July, Russian troops in Bulgaria took up defensive positions in a semicircle, the rear of which rested on the Danube. Their lines passed in the area of ​​Plevna (in the west), Shipka (in the south) and east of the Yantra River (in the east). On the right flank against the corps of Osman Pasha (26 thousand people) in Plevna stood the Western Detachment (32 thousand people). In the Balkan sector, 150 km long, the army of Suleiman Pasha (brought to 45 thousand people by August) was held back by the Southern Detachment of General Fyodor Radetsky (40 thousand people). On the eastern flank, 50 km long, against the army of Mehmet Ali Pasha (100 thousand people), the Eastern Detachment (45 thousand people) was located. In addition, the 14th Russian Corps (25 thousand people) in Northern Dobruja was held back on the Chernavoda-Kyustenji line by roughly equal numbers of Turkish units. After the success at Plevna and Eski-Zagra, the Turkish command lost two weeks to agree on an offensive plan, thereby missing an opportunity to inflict a serious defeat on the upset Russian units in Bulgaria. Finally, on August 9-10, Turkish troops went on the offensive in the southern and eastern directions. The Turkish command planned to break through the positions of the Southern and Eastern detachments, and then, by joining the forces of the armies of Suleiman and Mehmet Ali, with the support of Osman Pasha's corps, throw the Russians into the Danube.

The first assault on Shipka (1877). At first, Suleiman Pasha went on the offensive. He struck the main blow at the Shipka Pass in order to open the road to Northern Bulgaria and connect with Osman Pasha and Mehmet Ali. As long as the Russians held Shipka, the three Turkish armies remained separated. The pass was occupied by the Orlovsky regiment and the remnants of the Bulgarian militia (4.8 thousand people) under the command of General Stoletov. Due to the approaching reinforcements, his detachment increased to 7.2 thousand people. Suleiman singled out the shock forces of his army against them (25 thousand people). On August 9, the Turks stormed Shipka. Thus began the famous six-day Battle of Shipka, which glorified this war. The fiercest battles unfolded near the rock "Eagle's Nest", where the Turks, regardless of losses, attacked the strongest part of the Russian positions in the forehead. Having shot the cartridges, the defenders of Orlinoye, suffering from terrible thirst, fought off the Turkish soldiers climbing onto the pass with stones and rifle butts. After three days of furious onslaught, Suleiman Pasha was preparing for the evening of August 11 to finally destroy a handful of still resisting heroes, when suddenly the mountains announced a resounding "Hurrah!" The advanced units of the 14th division of General Dragomirov (9 thousand people) arrived in time to help the last defenders of Shipka. Having marched more than 60 km at a fast pace in the summer heat, they attacked the Turks in a furious impulse and drove them back from the pass with a bayonet. The defense of Shipka was led by General Radetsky, who arrived at the pass. On August 12-14, the battle flared up with renewed vigor. Having received reinforcements, the Russians launched a counteroffensive and tried (August 13-14) to capture the heights west of the pass, but were repelled. The fighting took place in incredibly difficult conditions. Especially painful in the summer heat was the lack of water, which had to be delivered 17 miles away. But in spite of everything, desperately fighting from privates to generals (Radetsky personally led the soldiers into attacks), the defenders of Shipka managed to defend the pass. In the battles of August 9-14, the Russians and Bulgarians lost about 4 thousand people, the Turks (according to their data) - 6.6 thousand people.

Battle on the Lom River (1877). While the battles on Shipka were raging, an equally serious threat loomed over the positions of the Eastern Detachment. On August 10, the main army of the Turks, under the command of Mehmet Ali, twice outnumbered, went on the offensive. If successful, the Turkish troops could break through to the Sistovskaya crossing and Plevna, as well as go to the rear of the defenders of Shipka, which threatened the Russians with a real disaster. The Turkish army delivered the main blow in the center, in the Byala region, trying to cut the positions of the Eastern Detachment in two. After fierce fighting, the Turks captured a strong position on the heights near Katselev and crossed the Cherni Lom River. Only the courage of the commander of the 33rd division, General Timofeev, who personally led the soldiers into a counterattack, made it possible to stop the dangerous breakthrough. Nevertheless, the heir Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich decided to withdraw his battered troops to a position to Byala, near the Yantra River. On August 25-26, the Eastern Detachment skillfully retreated to a new defensive line. Having regrouped their forces here, the Russians reliably covered the Pleven and Balkan directions. Mehmet Ali's offensive was stopped. During the onslaught of Turkish troops on Byala, Osman Pasha tried on August 19 to go on the offensive towards Mehmet Ali in order to squeeze the Russians from both sides. But his strength was not enough, and he was repulsed. So, the August offensive of the Turks was repulsed, which allowed the Russians to resume active operations. Plevna became the main object of the onslaught.

The capture of Lovcha and the third assault on Plevna (1877). It was decided to start the Pleven operation with the capture of Lovcha (35 km south of Pleven). From here, the Turks threatened the Russian rear at Plevna and Shipka. On August 22, a detachment of Prince Imeretinsky (27 thousand people) attacked Lovcha. It was defended by an 8,000-strong garrison led by Rifat Pasha. The assault on the fortress lasted 12 hours. The detachment of General Mikhail Skobelev distinguished himself in it. Transferring his attack from the right flank to the left, he disorganized the Turkish defense and finally decided the outcome of a tense battle. The losses of the Turks amounted to 2.2 thousand people, the Russians - over 1.5 thousand people. The fall of Lovcha eliminated the threat to the southern rear of the Western Detachment and allowed the third assault on Plevna to begin. By that time, Plevna, well fortified by the Turks, the garrison of which had grown to 34,000, had become the central nerve of the war. Without taking the fortress, the Russians could not advance beyond the Balkans, as they experienced a constant threat of a flank attack from her side. The siege troops were brought up to 85 thousand people by the end of August. (including 32 thousand Romanians). The Romanian king Karol I took the overall command of them. The third assault took place on August 30-31. The Romanians, advancing from the east, took the Grivitsky redoubts. The detachment of General Skobelev, who led his soldiers to attack on a white horse, broke through close to the city from the southwestern side. Despite the deadly fire, Skobelev's soldiers captured two redoubts (Kavanlek and Issa-aga). The path to Plevna was open. Osman threw the last reserves against the broken parts. All day on August 31, a fierce battle was in full swing here. The Russian command had reserves (less than half of all battalions went on the assault), but Skobelev did not receive them. As a result, the Turks recaptured the redoubts. The remnants of the Skobel detachment had to retreat. The third assault on Plevna cost the Allies 16 thousand people. (of which over 12 thousand Russians.). It was the bloodiest battle for the Russians in all the previous Russian-Turkish wars. The Turks lost 3 thousand people. After this failure, the commander-in-chief, Nikolai Nikolayevich, offered to withdraw beyond the Danube. He was supported by a number of military leaders. However, Minister of War Milyutin spoke out strongly against it, saying that such a move would deal a huge blow to the prestige of Russia and its army. Emperor Alexander II agreed with Milyutin. It was decided to proceed to the blockade of Plevna. The blockade works were headed by the hero of Sevastopol Totleben.

Autumn Offensive of the Turks (1877). A new failure near Plevna forced the Russian command to abandon active operations and wait for reinforcements. The initiative again passed to the Turkish army. On September 5, Suleiman attacked Shipka again, but was repulsed. The Turks lost 2 thousand people, the Russians - 1 thousand. On September 9, the positions of the Eastern Detachment were attacked by the army of Mehmet-Ali. However, her entire offensive was reduced to an assault on the Russian positions at Chair-kioy. After a two-day battle, the Turkish army withdrew to its original positions. After that, Mehmet Ali was replaced by Suleiman Pasha. In general, the September offensive of the Turks was rather passive and did not cause any special complications. The energetic Suleiman Pasha, who took command, developed a plan for a new November offensive. It provided for a three-pronged onslaught. The army of Mehmet-Ali (35 thousand people) was supposed to advance from Sofia to Lovcha. The southern army, led by Wessel Pasha, was to take Shipka and move to Tarnovo. The main Eastern army of Suleiman Pasha attacked Elena and Tarnovo. The first attack was supposed to be on Lovcha. But Mehmet-Ali delayed the performance, and in a two-day battle near Novachin (November 10-11), Gurko's detachment defeated his advanced units. The Turkish attack on Shipka on the night of November 9 (in the area of ​​Mount St. Nicholas) was also repelled. After these unsuccessful attempts, the army of Suleiman Pasha went on the offensive. On November 14, Suleiman Pasha delivered a distracting blow to the left flank of the Eastern Detachment, and then went to his shock group (35 thousand people). It was intended for an attack on Elena in order to interrupt communication between the Eastern and Southern detachments of the Russians. On November 22, the Turks delivered a powerful blow to Elena and defeated the detachment of Svyatopolk-Mirsky 2nd (5 thousand people) stationed here.

The positions of the Eastern Detachment were broken through, and the way to Tarnovo, where there were large Russian warehouses, was opened. But Suleiman did not continue the offensive the next day, which allowed the heir to Tsarevich Alexander to transfer reinforcements here. They attacked the Turks and closed the gap. The capture of Elena was the last success of the Turkish army in this war. Then Suleiman again transferred the blow to the left flank of the Eastern Detachment. On November 30, 1877, a strike group of Turks (40 thousand people) attacked units of the Eastern Detachment (28 thousand people) near the village of Mechka. The main blow fell on the positions of the 12th Corps, commanded by Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich. After a fierce battle, the onslaught of the Turks was stopped. The Russians launched a counterattack and drove back those who were advancing behind Lom. The damage of the Turks amounted to 3 thousand people, the Russians - about 1 thousand people. For the Mechka, the heir Tsarevich Alexander received the St. George Star. In general, the Eastern Detachment had to hold back the main Turkish onslaught. In carrying out this task, considerable merit belongs to the heir to the Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich, who showed undoubted military leadership talents in this war. Interestingly, he was a staunch opponent of wars and became famous for the fact that Russia never fought during his reign. Ruling the country, Alexander III showed military abilities not on the battlefield, but in the field of solid strengthening of the Russian armed forces. He believed that Russia needed two faithful allies for a quiet life - the army and the navy. The battle at Mechka was the last major attempt by the Turkish army to defeat the Russian troops in Bulgaria. At the end of this battle, the sad news came to the headquarters of Suleiman Pasha about the surrender of Plevna, which radically changed the situation on the Russian-Turkish front.

Siege and fall of Plevna (1877). Totleben, who led the siege of Plevna, strongly opposed the new assault. He considered the main thing to achieve a complete blockade of the fortress. To do this, it was necessary to cut the Sofia-Plevna road, along which the besieged garrison received reinforcements. The approaches to it were guarded by the Turkish redoubts Gorny Dubnyak, Dolny Dubnyak and Telish. To take them, a special detachment was formed led by General Gurko (22 thousand people). On October 12, 1877, after a powerful artillery preparation, the Russians attacked Gorny Dubnyak. It was defended by a garrison led by Ahmet-Khivzi Pasha (4.5 thousand people). The assault was distinguished by stubbornness and bloodshed. The Russians lost over 3.5 thousand people, the Turks - 3.8 thousand people. (including 2.3 thousand prisoners). At the same time, the Telish fortifications were attacked, which surrendered only 4 days later. About 5 thousand people were taken prisoner. After the fall of Gorny Dubnyak and Telish, the garrison of Dolny Dubnyak left their positions and retreated to Plevna, which was now completely blocked. By mid-November, the number of troops near Plevna exceeded 100 thousand people. against the 50,000th garrison, whose food supplies were running out. By the end of November, food in the fortress remained for 5 days. Under these conditions, Osman Pasha tried to break out of the fortress on November 28. The honor of repulsing this desperate onslaught belonged to the grenadiers of General Ivan Ganetsky. Having lost 6 thousand people, Osman Pasha surrendered. The fall of Plevna dramatically changed the situation. The Turks lost their 50,000 army, while the Russians had 100,000 men freed. for the offensive. The victory came at a high cost. The total Russian losses near Plevna amounted to 32 thousand people.

Shipka seat (1877). While Osman Pasha was still holding out at Plevna, on Shipka, the former southern point of the Russian front, the famous winter sitting began in November. Snow fell in the mountains, the passes were covered with snow, and severe frosts struck. It was during this period that the Russians suffered the most severe losses on Shipka. And not from bullets, but from a more terrible enemy - an icy cold. During the "sitting" period, the damage of the Russians amounted to: 700 people from fighting, 9.5 thousand people from diseases and frostbite. Thus, the 24th Division, sent to Shipka without warm boots and sheepskin coats, lost up to 2/3 of its composition (6.2 thousand people) from frostbite in two weeks. Despite exceptionally difficult conditions, Radetzky and his soldiers continued to hold the pass. The Shipka seat, which required extraordinary stamina from the Russian soldiers, ended with the start of the general offensive of the Russian army.

Balkan theater of operations

Third stage

By the end of the year, favorable conditions had developed in the Balkans for the Russian army to go on the offensive. Its number reached 314 thousand people. against 183 thousand people. at the Turks. In addition, the capture of Plevna and the victory at Mechka secured the flanks of the Russian troops. However, the onset of winter sharply reduced the possibility of offensive operations. The Balkans were already covered with deep snow, and at this time of the year they were considered impassable. Nevertheless, at the military council on November 30, 1877, it was decided to cross the Balkans in winter. Wintering in the mountains threatened the soldiers with death. But if the army left the passes for winter quarters, then in the spring the Balkan steeps would have to be stormed again. Therefore, it was decided to descend from the mountains, but in a different direction - to Constantinople. For this, several detachments were allocated, of which the two main ones were Western and Southern. The western one, led by Gurko (60 thousand people), was supposed to go to Sofia with a stop at the rear of the Turkish troops at Shipka. The southern detachment of Radetsky (over 40 thousand people) advanced in the Shipka area. Two more detachments led by Generals Kartsev (5 thousand people) and Dellingshausen (22 thousand people) advanced respectively through Trayanov Val and Tvarditsky Pass. A breakthrough in several places at once did not give the Turkish command the opportunity to concentrate its forces in any one direction. Thus began the most striking operation of this war. After almost half a year of trampling near Plevna, the Russians suddenly took off and decided the outcome of the campaign in just a month, stunning Europe and Turkey.

Battle of the Sheins (1877). South of the Shipka Pass, in the area of ​​the village of Sheinovo, was the Turkish army of Wessel Pasha (30-35 thousand people). Radetsky's plan was to double the coverage of the army of Wessel Pasha with columns of generals Skobelev (16.5 thousand people) and Svyatopolk-Mirsky (19 thousand people). They had to overcome the Balkan passes (Imitlisky and Tryavnensky), and then, having reached the Sheinovo region, inflict flank attacks on the Turkish army stationed there. Radetsky himself, with the units remaining on Shipka, dealt a distracting blow in the center. The winter crossing of the Balkans (often waist-deep in snow) in -20-degree frost was fraught with great risks. However, the Russians managed to overcome the snow-covered steeps. On December 27, the column of Svyatopolk-Mirsky was the first to reach Sheinovo. She immediately entered the battle and captured the front line of the Turkish fortifications. The right column of Skobelev was delayed with the exit. She had to overcome deep snow in harsh weather conditions, climbing along narrow mountain paths. Skobelev's delay gave the Turks a chance to defeat Svyatopolk-Mirsky's detachment. But their attacks on the morning of January 28 were repulsed. To help his own detachment Radetzky rushed from Shipka in a frontal attack on the Turks. This bold onslaught was repelled, but fettered part of the Turkish forces. Finally, having overcome the snowdrifts, Skobelev's units entered the battle area. They swiftly attacked the Turkish camp and broke into Sheinovo from the west. This onslaught decided the outcome of the battle. At 15:00, the surrounded Turkish troops capitulated. 22 thousand people surrendered to captivity. The losses of the Turks killed and wounded amounted to 1 thousand people. The Russians lost about 5 thousand people. The victory at Sheinovo ensured a breakthrough in the Balkans and opened the way for the Russians to Adrianople.

Battle of Philippoly (1878). Due to a snowstorm that broke out in the mountains, Gurko's detachment, moving in a detour, spent 8 days instead of the expected two. Local residents familiar with the mountains believed that the Russians were going to certain death. But they came, in the end, to victory. In the battles of December 19-20, advancing waist-deep in the snow, Russian soldiers knocked down Turkish troops from their positions on the passes, then descended from the Balkans and occupied Sofia on December 23 without a fight. Further, at Philippopolis (now Plovdiv), there was the army of Suleiman Pasha (50 thousand people) transferred from eastern Bulgaria. This was the last major barrier on the way to Adrianople. On the night of January 3, the advanced Russian units forded the icy waters of the Maritsa River and entered into battle with the Turkish outposts west of the city. On January 4, Gurko's detachment continued the offensive and, bypassing Suleiman's army, cut off its retreat to the east, to Adrianople. On January 5, the Turkish army began to hastily retreat along the last free road to the south, towards the Aegean Sea. In the battles near Philippopolis, she lost 20 thousand people. (killed, wounded, captured, deserted) and ceased to exist as a serious combat unit. The Russians lost 1.2 thousand people. It was the last major battle of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. In the battles at Sheinovo and Philippopolis, the Russians defeated the main forces of the Turks beyond the Balkans. A significant role in the success of the winter campaign was played by the fact that the troops were led by the most capable military leaders - Gurko and Radetzky. On January 14-16, their detachments joined in Adrianople. The avant-garde, headed by the third brilliant hero of that war, General Skobelev, was the first to occupy it. On January 19, 1878, a truce was concluded here, which drew a line under the history of Russian-Turkish military rivalry in South-Eastern Europe.

Caucasian theater of operations (1877-1878)

In the Caucasus, the forces of the parties were approximately equal. The Russian army under the general command of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolayevich numbered 100 thousand people. Turkish army under the command of Mukhtar Pasha - 90 thousand people. Russian forces were distributed as follows. In the west, the area of ​​the Black Sea coast was guarded by the Kobuleti detachment under the command of General Oklobzhio (25 thousand people). Further, in the Akhaltsikhe-Akhalkalaki region, the Akhaltsikhe detachment of General Devel (9 thousand people) was located. In the center, near Alexandropol, were the main forces led by General Loris-Melikov (50 thousand people). On the southern flank stood the Erivan detachment of General Tergukasov (11 thousand people). The last three detachments made up the Caucasian Corps, which was led by Loris-Melikov. The war in the Caucasus developed similarly to the Balkan scenario. First came the offensive of the Russian troops, then their transition to the defensive, and then a new offensive and inflicting a complete defeat on the enemy. On the day war was declared, the Caucasian Corps immediately went on the offensive with three detachments. The offensive took Mukhtar Pasha by surprise. He did not have time to deploy troops and retreated behind Kars to cover the Erzrum direction. Loris-Melikov did not pursue the Turks. Having united his main forces with the Akhaltsikhe detachment, the Russian commander began to lay siege to Kars. Forward, in the Erzrum direction, a detachment was sent under the command of General Geiman (19 thousand people). South of Kars, the Erivan detachment of Tergukasov advanced. He occupied Bayazet without a fight, and then moved along the Alashkert valley towards Erzrum. On June 9, near Dayar, the 7,000-strong detachment of Tergukasov was attacked by the 18,000-strong army of Mukhtar Pasha. Tergukasov fought off the onslaught and began to wait for the actions of his northern colleague - Geiman. He did not keep himself waiting long.

Battle of Zivin (1877). Retreat of the Erivan detachment (1877). On June 13, 1877, Geiman's detachment (19 thousand people) attacked the fortified positions of the Turks in the Zivina region (halfway from Kars to Erzrum). They were defended by the Turkish detachment of Khaki Pasha (10 thousand people). The poorly prepared assault on the Zivin fortifications (only a quarter of the Russian detachment was brought into battle) was repulsed. The Russians lost 844 people, the Turks - 540 people. The Zivin failure had serious consequences. After her, Loris-Melikov lifted the siege of Kars and ordered to start a retreat to the Russian border. The Erivan detachment, which had gone far deep into Turkish territory, had a particularly hard time. He had to make his way back through the sun-scorched valley, suffering from heat and lack of food. “At that time, camp kitchens did not exist,” recalled officer A.A. Brusilov, a participant in that war, “When the troops were on the move or without a wagon train, like us, the food was distributed from hand to hand, and everyone cooked what he could. Soldiers and officers suffered in the same way." In the rear of the Erivan detachment was the Turkish corps of Faik Pasha (10 thousand people), which besieged Bayazet. And from the front, the numerically superior Turkish army threatened. The successful completion of this difficult 200-kilometer retreat was greatly facilitated by the heroic defense of the Bayazet fortress.

Defense of Bayazet (1877). In this citadel there was a Russian garrison, which consisted of 32 officers and 1587 lower ranks. The siege began on 4 June. The assault on June 8 ended in failure for the Turks. Then Faik Pasha proceeded to blockade, hoping that hunger and heat would be better than his soldiers to cope with the besieged. But despite the lack of water, the Russian garrison rejected offers of surrender. By the end of June, the soldiers were given only one wooden spoon of water a day in the summer heat. The situation seemed so hopeless that the commandant of Bayazet, Lieutenant Colonel Patsevich, spoke at the military council in favor of surrender. But he was shot dead by officers outraged by such a proposal. The defense was led by Major Shtokvich. The garrison continued to stand firm, hoping for help. And the hopes of the bayazets were justified. On June 28, units of General Tergukasov arrived in time to help them, who fought their way to the fortress and saved its defenders. The loss of the garrison during the siege amounted to 7 officers and 310 lower ranks. The heroic defense of Bayazet did not allow the Turks to go to the rear of the troops of General Tergukasov and cut off their retreat to the Russian border.

Battle of the Alagia Heights (1877). After the Russians lifted the siege of Kars and retreated to the border, Mukhtar Pasha went on the offensive. However, he did not dare to give the Russian army a field battle, but took up heavily fortified positions on the Aladzhian heights, east of Kars, where he stood all August. Standing continued in September. Finally, on September 20, Loris-Melikov, who had concentrated a 56,000-strong strike force against Aladzhi, himself went on the offensive against the troops of Mukhtar Pasha (38,000 people). The fierce battle lasted three days (until September 22) and ended in complete failure for Loris-Melikov. Having lost over 3 thousand people. in bloody frontal attacks, the Russians withdrew to their original lines. Despite his success, Mukhtar Pasha nevertheless decided to retreat to Kars on the eve of winter. As soon as the departure of the Turks was indicated, Loris-Melikov launched a second attack (October 2-3). This onslaught, which combined a frontal attack with a flank bypass, was crowned with success. The Turkish army suffered a crushing defeat and lost more than half of its composition (killed, wounded, captured, deserted). Its remnants retreated in disarray to Kars and then to Erzrum. The Russians lost 1,500 men during the second assault. The battle of Aladzhia became decisive in the Caucasian theater of operations. After this victory, the initiative completely passed to the Russian army. In the battle of Aladzha, the Russians made extensive use of the telegraph to control their troops for the first time. |^

Battle of Virgo-Bonnu (1877). After the defeat of the Turks on the Aladzhian heights, the Russians again laid siege to Kare. Forward, to Erzrum, Geiman's detachment was again sent. But this time Mukhtar Pasha did not linger on the Zivin positions, but retreated further to the west. On October 15, he joined near the town of Kepri-Key with the corps of Ishmael Pasha, who had previously acted against the Erivan detachment of Tergukasov, retreating from the Russian border. Now the forces of Mukhtar Pasha have increased to 20 thousand people. Following Ishmael's corps, the detachment of Tergukasov moved, which on October 21 joined with the detachment of Geiman, who led the combined forces (25 thousand people). Two days later, in the vicinity of Erzrum, near Deve Boinu, Geiman attacked the army of Mukhtar Pasha. Geiman began a demonstration of an attack on the right flank of the Turks, where Mukhtar Pasha transferred all the reserves. Meanwhile, Tergukasov decisively attacked the left flank of the Turks and inflicted a severe defeat on their army. Russian losses amounted to just over 600 people. The Turks lost b thousand people. (of which 3 thousand prisoners). After that, the way to Erzrum was opened. However, Geiman stood idle for three days and only on October 27 approached the fortress. This allowed Mukhtar Pasha to strengthen himself and put his disorderly units in order. The assault on October 28 was repulsed, which forced Geiman to move away from the fortress. In the conditions of the onset of cold weather, he withdrew his troops for the winter in the Passinskaya Valley.

The Capture of Kars (1877). While Geiman and Tergukasov were going to Erzrum, Russian troops besieged Kars on October 9, 1877. The siege corps was led by General Lazarev. (32 thousand people). The fortress was defended by a 25,000-strong Turkish garrison led by Hussein Pasha. The assault was preceded by the bombing of the fortifications, which lasted intermittently for 8 days. On the night of November 6, Russian detachments went on an attack, which ended with the capture of the fortress. General Lazarev himself played an important role in the assault. He led a detachment that captured the eastern forts of the fortress and repulsed the counterattack of Hussein Pasha's units. The Turks lost 3 thousand killed and 5 thousand wounded. 17 thousand people were taken prisoner. Russian losses during the assault exceeded 2 thousand people. The capture of Kars actually ended the war in the Caucasian theater of operations.

Peace of San Stefano and Congress of Berlin (1878)

Peace of San Stefano (1878). On February 19, 1878, a peace treaty was concluded in San Stefano (near Constantinople), which ended the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Russia received back from Romania the southern part of Bessarabia, lost after the Crimean War, and from Turkey the port of Batum, the Kars region, the city of Bayazet and the Alashkert valley. Romania took away the region of Dobruja from Turkey. The complete independence of Serbia and Montenegro was established with the provision of a number of territories to them. The main result of the agreement was the emergence in the Balkans of a new large and virtually independent state - the Bulgarian principality.

Berlin Congress (1878). The terms of the treaty provoked protests from England and Austria-Hungary. The threat of a new war forced Petersburg to revise the San Stefano Treaty. In the same 1878, the Congress of Berlin was convened, at which the leading powers changed the previous version of the territorial structure in the Balkans and Eastern Turkey. The acquisitions of Serbia and Montenegro were reduced, the area of ​​the Bulgarian Principality was cut almost three times. Austria-Hungary occupied Turkish possessions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From its acquisitions in Eastern Turkey, Russia returned the Alashkert valley and the city of Bayazet. Thus, the Russian side had, in general, to return to the variant of the territorial structure, agreed before the war with Austria-Hungary.

Despite the Berlin restrictions, Russia nevertheless regained the lands lost under the Treaty of Paris (with the exception of the mouth of the Danube), and achieved the implementation (though far from being in full) of the Balkan strategy of Nicholas I. This Russo-Turkish clash completes Russia's fulfillment of its lofty mission to liberate the Orthodox peoples from the oppression of the Turks. As a result of the age-old struggle of Russia for the Danube, Romania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria gained independence. The Berlin Congress led to the gradual formation of a new alignment of forces in Europe. Russo-German relations cooled noticeably. On the other hand, the Austro-German alliance strengthened, in which there was no longer a place for Russia. Its traditional focus on Germany was coming to an end. In the 80s. Germany forms a military-political alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy. Berlin's hostility is pushing St. Petersburg into partnership with France, which, fearing a new German aggression, is now actively seeking Russian support. In 1892-1894. a military-political Franco-Russian alliance is formed. He became the main counterbalance to the "Triple Alliance" (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy). These two blocs determined the new balance of power in Europe. Another important consequence of the Berlin Congress was the weakening of Russia's prestige in the countries of the Balkan region. The Congress in Berlin dispelled the Slavophile dreams of uniting the South Slavs into an alliance headed by the Russian Empire.

The death toll in the Russian army was 105 thousand people. As in the previous Russian-Turkish wars, the main damage was caused by diseases (primarily typhus) - 82 thousand people. 75% of military losses were in the Balkan theater of operations.

Shefov N.A. The most famous wars and battles of Russia M. "Veche", 2000.
"From Ancient Rus' to the Russian Empire". Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.

The defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-1856 and the subsequent Treaty of Paris significantly undermined Russia's influence in the Balkans and the Black Sea. Only after the annulment of the restrictive articles of this treaty did the Russian government seriously think about revenge. An opportunity soon presented itself.

In April 1876, an uprising against the Turks broke out in Bulgaria, which the Turkish troops suppressed with incredible cruelty. This caused outrage in European countries and especially in Russia, which considered itself the patroness of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Turkey rejected the London Protocol, signed on March 31, 1877 by Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany and Italy, which provided for the demobilization of the Turkish army and the beginning of reforms in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. And then a new Russian-Turkish war became inevitable. On April 24, Emperor Alexander II signed a manifesto on the war with Turkey.

ARMIES OF THE PARTIES

By the beginning of the war, the Russian Empire approached with a renewed army, rebuilt according to new principles. It was no longer a serf army of the times of the Crimean War, staffed by recruitment, but armed forces recruited on the basis of general military service. They also received new weapons, primarily modern Berdan rifles. The field artillery was equipped with rifled breech-loading guns - 4-pounder (2/3 foot batteries and all mounted) and 9-pounder (1/3 foot batteries). In 1870, rapid-fire 10-barreled Gatling and 6-barreled Baranovsky guns with a rate of fire of 200 rounds per minute were adopted by artillery brigades. The Turkish army was organizationally inferior to the Russian one. Most of her cavalry were Bashi-Bazouk irregulars. They were capable of repairing the massacre of the Bulgarian rebels, but useless against the regular army. The command dispersed about half of the infantry in the fortresses. Small arms were relatively modern - English and American-made rifles, but artillery was significantly inferior to Russian.

At sea, the situation was not in favor of Russia, which had not yet had time to restore the fleet after the abolition of the restrictive articles of the Paris Treaty. If Turkey had powerful armored forces on the Black Sea, then Russia had only a few mobilized steamships. This made it difficult for the Russian troops to supply supplies.

Instead of a sea route, supplies had to be transported by land, which, in the absence of railways, was not an easy task. To counter the Turkish fleet, Russian sailors widely used mine weapons, as well as a novelty of that time - "self-propelled mines" (torpedoes).

PLANS OF THE PARTIES

The Russian command focused its main attention on the Balkan theater of operations: here one could count on the support of the local population, whose liberation from Ottoman oppression was presented as the main goal of the war. In addition, the exit of the Russian army to Constantinople could mean the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire. But the path to this goal was blocked by two frontiers.

The first of them is the Danube River with powerful fortresses on its banks (Rushchuk, Silistra, Shumla, Varna) and a Turkish flotilla of 17 armored monitor ships. The second no less serious obstacle is the Balkan Range. Several passes led through it, which the enemy could easily block. It was possible to bypass the Balkan Range along the sea, but then one would have to take the well-fortified Varna by storm.

The Russian war plan, prepared in 1876 by General N. Obruchev, was based on the idea of ​​a lightning victory during one campaign. The army was supposed to cross the Danube in the middle reaches of the river, where the Turks had no fortresses, in an area populated by Russian-friendly Bulgarians. After the crossing, the army was to be divided into three equal groups. The first blocks Turkish fortresses in the lower reaches of the Danube, the second acts against Turkish forces in the direction of Vidin, the third crosses the Balkans and goes to Constantinople.

The Turkish side planned to resort to active defense. Having concentrated the main forces (about 100 thousand people) in the "quadrangle" of the fortresses Ruschuk - Shumla - Bazardzhik - Silistria, the Turkish military leaders were going to lure the Russians who had crossed to the Balkans, deep into Bulgaria, and then defeat them, falling on the left flank. At the same time, quite significant forces (about 30 thousand people) were concentrated in Western Bulgaria near Sofia and Vidin. This corps monitored Serbia and Romania and was supposed to prevent the connection of the Russian army with the Serbs. In addition, small detachments occupied the Balkan passages and fortifications along the Middle Danube.

PROGRESS OF BATTLE ACTIONS

The Russian army, by prior agreement with Romania, passed through its territory and in June crossed the Danube in several places.

To ensure the crossing of the Danube, it was necessary to neutralize the Turkish Danube flotilla in places of possible crossings. This task was accomplished by the installation of minefields on the river, covered by coastal batteries. Light mine boats deployed from the Baltic were also involved. On May 26, 1877, boats sank the Khivzi Rahman monitor. Since the coastal artillery sent the Lufti Celil monitor to the bottom two weeks earlier, the Turkish flotilla was paralyzed and could not interfere with the crossing of the Russian troops. However, not everything went without problems. If the Lower Danube detachment successfully crossed on June 22 near Galati and Brela and soon occupied Northern Dobruja, then the crossing of the troops of General M. Dragomirov near Zimnitsa, which began on June 27, took place under fierce shelling, which led to the death of 1100 soldiers. Only on July 3, when the sappers built a pontoon bridge near Zimnitsa, it was possible to start crossing the main forces of the army.

PLEVNA AND SHIPKA

On July 7, 1877, a detachment of General Gurko occupied Tarnovo and moved around the Shipka Pass. Fearing encirclement, on July 19 the Turks left Shipka without a fight. On July 15, Russian troops took Nikopol. However, a large Turkish army under the command of Osman Pasha, previously stationed in Vidin, entered Plevna, threatening the right flank and communications of the Russian army. On July 20, an attempt by a detachment of General Schilder-Schuldner to dislodge the Turks from Plevna was unsuccessful. Without capturing this fortress, the Russians could not continue their offensive beyond the Balkan Range. Plevna became the central point where the outcome of the campaign was decided.

On July 31, a detachment of General Kridner attacked the troops of Osman Pasha, but was defeated. In the meantime, another Turkish army under the command of Suleiman Pasha, transferred from Montenegro, defeated the detachments of the Bulgarian militias and launched an assault on Shipka on August 21. Fierce battles continued for four days. It came to bayonet fighting and hand-to-hand combat. Reinforcements approached the Russian detachment defending on the pass, and the Turks were forced to retreat.

On September 27, General Totleben was appointed commander-in-chief of the army, who began a systematic siege of Plevna. Suleiman Pasha's army unsuccessfully tried to break through the Balkans and release Plevna in November and early December.

On December 10, Osman Pasha launched a final attack to escape from the besieged fortress. The Turks passed two lines of Russian trenches, but on the third they were stopped and surrendered.

HIKING THROUGH CHURYAK

After the capture of Plevna, Russian troops, despite the harsh winter, immediately moved through the Balkan Mountains. On December 25, Gurko's detachment passed the Churyak Pass and on January 4, 1878 entered Sofia. In early January, the main forces overcame the Balkan Range near Shipka. On January 10, Russian troops defeated the Turks at Sheinovo and surrounded their detachment, which had previously besieged Shipka. 22 thousand Turkish soldiers and officers were captured.

On January 20, General Skobelev occupied Adrianople without a fight. The Turkish command no longer had any significant forces in the Balkan theater. On January 30, Russian troops came close to the last defensive positions in front of Istanbul. On January 31, 1878, an armistice was signed in Adrianople.

FIGHTING IN THE CAUCASUS

In May 1877, mountaineers, with the support of Turkish emissaries, raised a rebellion in Abkhazia. The Russians left Sukhum after a two-day bombardment of the city by a Turkish squadron, consisting of five battleships and several armed steamers, and an amphibious landing. By June, the entire coast of Abkhazia was occupied by the Turks. Turkish troops left Sukhum only on August 19 after reinforcements from Russia approached the Russian troops in Abkhazia.

In Transcaucasia, Russian troops occupied Bayazet on April 17, 1877, but on June 28, after a three-week siege, they were forced to leave it. In July-August, a lull continued here, but at the end of September, the Russian troops, having received reinforcements, resumed the offensive. On November 6, they took the fortress of Kare. The remnants of the Turkish army were besieged in Erzurum, where they managed to hold out until the signing of a truce.

RESULTS OF THE WAR

On March 3, 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed. According to this peace, in Transcaucasia, Kare, who was occupied during the war, as well as Ardagan, Batum and Bayazet, retreated to Russia. Russian troops remained in Bulgaria for two years. In addition, Southern Bessarabia returned to the Russian Empire. Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina received autonomy. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania were declared independent. Turkey had to pay Russia an indemnity of 310 million rubles. However, at the Berlin Congress of the Great Powers in June-July 1878, Russia's achievements were significantly curtailed. Bayazet and Southern Bulgaria were returned to Turkey. Bosnia and Herzegovina was occupied by Dvstro-Hungary, and Cyprus by Great Britain.

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The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was a war between the Russian Empire and Ottoman Turkey. It was caused by the rise of the national liberation movement in the Balkans and the aggravation of international contradictions in connection with this.

The uprisings against the Turkish yoke in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1875-1878) and Bulgaria (1876) caused a social movement in Russia in support of the fraternal Slavic peoples. Responding to these sentiments, the Russian government came out in support of the rebels, hoping, if they were successful, to increase their influence in the Balkans. Britain sought to pit Russia against Turkey and take advantage of the weakening of both countries.

In June 1876, the Serbo-Turkish War began, in which Serbia was defeated. To save her from death, Russia in October 1876 turned to the Turkish Sultan with a proposal to conclude a truce with Serbia.

In December 1876, the Constantinople Conference of the Great Powers was convened, which tried to resolve the conflict through diplomacy, but the Porte rejected their proposals. During secret negotiations, Russia managed to obtain guarantees of non-interference from Austria-Hungary in exchange for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austrians. In April 1877, an agreement was concluded with Romania on the passage of Russian troops through its territory.

After the Sultan rejected a new reform project for the Balkan Slavs, developed at the initiative of Russia, on April 24 (April 12, old style), 1877, Russia officially declared war on Turkey.

In the European theater of operations, Russia had 185 thousand soldiers, together with the Balkan allies, the number of the group reached 300 thousand people. In the Caucasus, Russia had about 100,000 soldiers. In turn, the Turks in the European theater had a 186,000-strong group, and in the Caucasus they had about 90,000 soldiers. The Turkish fleet almost completely dominated the Black Sea, in addition, the Port had the Danube Flotilla.

In the context of the restructuring of the entire internal life of the country, the Russian government was unable to prepare for a long war, the financial situation remained difficult. The forces allocated to the Balkan theater of operations were insufficient, but the morale of the Russian army was very high.

According to the plan, the Russian command intended to cross the Danube, cross the Balkans with a swift offensive and move on the Turkish capital - Constantinople. Relying on their fortresses, the Turks hoped to prevent the Russian troops from crossing the Danube. However, these calculations of the Turkish command were frustrated.

In the summer of 1877, the Russian army successfully crossed the Danube. The advance detachment under the command of General Iosif Gurko quickly occupied the ancient capital of Bulgaria, the city of Tarnovo, and then captured an important passage through the Balkans - the Shipka Pass. Further advance was suspended due to lack of forces.

In the Caucasus, Russian troops captured the fortresses of Bayazet and Ardagan, during the Avliyar-Aladzhin battle of 1877 they defeated the Anatolian Turkish army, and then in November 1877 captured the fortress of Kars.

The actions of the Russian troops near Plevna (now Pleven) on the western flank of the army unfolded unsuccessfully. Due to the gross mistakes of the tsarist command, the Turks managed to detain large forces of Russian (and somewhat later Romanian) troops here. Three times Russian troops stormed Plevna, while suffering huge losses, and each time unsuccessfully.

In December, the 40,000-strong garrison of Plevna capitulated.

The fall of Plevna caused the rise of the liberation movement of the Slavs. Serbia entered the war again. Bulgarian volunteers fought heroically in the ranks of the Russian army.

By 1878 the balance of power in the Balkans had shifted in favor of Russia. The Danube army, with the assistance of the Bulgarian population and the Serbian army, defeated the Turks when crossing the Balkans in the winter of 1877-1878, in the battle of Sheinovo, Philippopolis (now Plovdiv) and Adrianople, and in February 1878 reached the Bosphorus and Constantinople.

In the Caucasus, the Russian army captured Batum and blockaded Erzurum.

The ruling circles of Russia faced the specter of a big war with the European powers, for which Russia was not ready. The army suffered heavy losses, experienced difficulties in supply. The command stopped the troops in the town of San Stefano (near Constantinople), and on March 3 (February 19, old style), 1878, a peace treaty was signed here.

According to him, Kars, Ardagan, Batum and Bayazet, as well as South Bessarabia, departed from Russia. Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina received wide autonomy, and Serbia, Montenegro and Romania - independence. In addition, Turkey pledged to pay an indemnity of 310 million rubles.

The terms of the agreement provoked a negative reaction from the Western European states, who feared Russia's enormously increased influence in the Balkans. Fearing the threat of a new war, for which Russia was not ready, the Russian government was forced to revise the treaty at the international congress in Berlin (June-July 1878), where the Treaty of San Stefano was replaced by the Treaty of Berlin, which was unfavorable for Russia and the Balkan countries.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources

On the eve of the war, Russian artillery had 48 artillery brigades intended for operations with infantry divisions. Each brigade had six batteries - but 8 guns in each battery. The battery was a separate part and could act independently. The first division of the brigade (3 batteries) was armed with 9-lb cannons, the second - with 3-4-lb copper cannons loaded from the treasury! In four Caucasian artillery brigades, one battery each was armed with 3-foot mountain guns.

Horse artillery consisted of 26 regular and 22 Cossack batteries. Ver batteries were six-gun and were armed with rifled copper cannons loaded from the treasury. Each Caucasian division had 2 batteries. The siege artillery had 630 guns of various calibers.

Fortress artillery had 44 fortress battalions. The personnel in case of mobilization was intended for the acquisition of siege artillery, which in peacetime did not have its own personnel. In wartime, 48 spare artillery batteries were formed (according to the number of artillery brigades). In organizational terms, Russian artillery was superior to Turkish. The presence of 48 guns in the division made it possible for its commander to decisively influence the course of the battle. The independence of the batteries allowed them to operate in isolation from the rest of the brigade. In peacetime, a stock of materiel for 48 batteries was kept, and with the start of mobilization, 68 batteries could be formed. This event made it possible to quickly replenish the losses of artillery in the war. Attention is drawn to the careful thoughtfulness of the organization of artillery and its mobilization deployment. The Turks did not have a similar system in other armies of Western Europe. By the beginning of the war, the Russian army had 365 batteries with 2,808 rifled guns. In a short time, the artillery industry of Russia ensured the creation of ratios in our artillery - 4 guns per 1000 bayonets, in horse artillery - 6 guns per 1,000 sabers.

The Turks at that time had 2 guns per 1000 bayonets, and the cavalry had no artillery at all. Each gun had a supply of ammunition as part of one combat set, located in the limbers and charging boxes. The delivery was carried out by artillery limbers, which, during offensive operations, approached the troops. . In the Turkish campaign of 1877 - 1878, the Russian soldier again showed his valor, and the officers and generals - outstanding abilities. Russian artillery had a decisive influence on the entire course of the war. The first event that stunned Western Europe was the successful forcing of the Danube by the main forces of the Russian army at Ztsmnica, carried out in 3-4 days with minimal losses. Russian artillery skilfully secured this crossing, pinning down strong enemy groupings in the fortresses of Ruschuk and Nikopol and clearing the Danube of Turkish ships. In total, up to 100 siege and 100 field guns operating on a 160-kilometer front took part in ensuring the crossing of the Danube. The successful operation of the artillery was facilitated by a good supply of ammunition.

6 battles for Nikopol involved 1 ^ 6 field weapons, 33 siege weapons and 4 rapid-fire guns. The battles required a large number of shells. So, from June 25 to July 1, 1877, Russian artillery fired 3248 shells at the Ruschuk fortress, which ensured the blockade of the Turkish flotilla on the Danube.

A significant event was the military operations of the detachment of General Gurko on the Shipka Pass in Bulgaria. At first, Shipka had only 27 guns, while the Turks had 48. Turkish troops occupied commanding heights. However, they did not take the pass. By the end of August, there were already 55 guns and more than 15 thousand soldiers on the pass. Here the difficulty of supplying ammunition affected. On average, artillery had 130 shells per gun, the rest of the ammunition was in the rear. The struggle continued for four months, and the Turks, despite a number of obvious advantages, failed to capture the pass. Under very difficult conditions for the transport of ammunition, Russian artillery used 18,930 shells during the period of fighting on the pass, on some days the consumption exceeded 50 shells per gun. There were very few material losses, almost all damage was repaired at firing positions. In the history of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78, the struggle for Plevna occupies a special place. It began in July 1877 and continued until December 10. The first attack on Plevna involved 40 guns, which used up 1,980 shells. The attack failed. Up to 170 guns participated in the second attack, but due to the poor organization of the assault, the Russian troops again failed.

For the third time, a decision was made to first take possession of Lovcha, a large stronghold south of Plevna. August 3, 1877 Lovcha was taken. The attack on the Turkish positions was provided by 98 guns, which spent 5375 shells in one day, which averaged 58.5 shells per gun. The infantry used up 245 thousand rounds of ammunition - 14 rounds per rifle. The comparison needs no comment. During the third attack of Plevna, 424 guns were concentrated.

However, as a result of the inept use of artillery on September 7, only 152 guns fired, on September 8 - 214, on September 9 and 10 - 226 guns out of 424. The rest were in the second lines and were inactive. shells, which averaged 170 shells per gun. After that, the siege of Plevna began. By the end of the siege, the Russians had 349 guns in the battle line and 186 guns in reserve. The guns were serviceable, of good quality. December 10 Pleveysky garrison capitulated. Further, the Russian army crossed the Balkan mountains and put the Turkish army on the brink of disaster, which forced the Turkish government to request a truce. t. , January 6, 1878 in his order, referring to the soldiers, General Gurko wrote; “The passage through the Balkans is over.

You don’t know what to be more surprised at: your courage and courage in battles with the enemy, or your stamina and patience in enduring hard work in the fight against mountains, frosts and deep snow. Years will pass, and our descendants, having visited these childish mountains, will proudly and triumphantly say: “Russian troops passed here and resurrected the glory of the Suvorov and Rumyandev miracle heroes.” An important condition for the successful operations of artillery in the mountains was the provision of its shells. artillery supply successfully coped, despite the stretching of communications and lagging behind rears.Shells in sufficient quantities were accumulated in the preparatory period.Mobile parks were close to the troops.Each gun had stocks of shells in limbers and charging boxes.