Who won the Battle of Borodino. Battle of Borodino

The great battle took place on August 26. According to the new style - September 7. Official Day military glory Due to an error in the calculations, it is celebrated on the 8th. However, it makes sense to remember such a battle three or four times.

Lermontov’s “Borodino” is a miracle of Russian poetic heroism, we all remember its lines, but we often make mistakes in intonation, starting to recite: “Tell me, uncle, it’s not without reason...” After all, these are bitter lines! Lermontov and his hero mourn that they had to retreat, that they had to give up Moscow, that the heroic generation did not block the enemy’s road to the Mother See. Bitterness lived in Russian hearts throughout the summer of 1812.

Throughout the summer of 1812, Russia languished in anticipation. pitched battle. Prince Bagration proposed to lie down with bones on the banks of the Vistula, not allowing the enemy into central Russia. This is in the spirit of Peter's traditions offensive war, in the spirit of the Suvorov school, to which Bagration belonged. But the emperor approved a different tactic; the main task was to save the army during the loss of territories. Russia is not accustomed to defeats - and society poured out all the bitterness, reaching the point of hatred, on the Minister of War, who commanded the 1st Army - on Barclay.

The emperor, who did not have much confidence in the Russian commanders, was forced to nominate Kutuzov in order to restore the morale of the army and, no less important, the capital’s rear.

Not many people in all circles truly loved the cunning Mikhailo Illarionovich. But there was no more authoritative and politically astute commander in the Russian army at that time. It is generally accepted that he added nothing to Barclay's strategy, which is not in the best possible way took advantage of the army’s capabilities under Borodino... But you can’t rewrite it. And the glory of 1812 is largely associated for us with the image of a cautious but brave old man.

With the dream of a decisive battle, the army retreated closer and closer to Moscow. The warriors were ready to defend Belokamennaya steadfastly and selflessly. The militia was ready to join the army. Kutuzov quietly pacified the impulses of the patriots: he counted on a long campaign and did not even treat the Battle of Borodino as “the last, decisive battle.”

So, by the beginning of the battle, Barclay de Tolly’s 1st Army, consisting of 3 infantry, 3 cavalry corps and reserves (76 thousand people, 480 guns), was located on the right flank; the front of its position was covered by the Kolocha River. The left flank was held by Bagration's smaller 2nd Army (34 thousand people, 156 guns). There the landscape was less suitable for defense. No wonder Napoleon struck main blow precisely on the left flank.

Napoleon on the Borodino Heights. Artist Vereshchagin (1897)

From the first artillery salvo in the early morning of September 7, the French pressed on the left flank. Who stood that morning on the Borodino field, on the hills, in the copses? Students of the invincible Suvorov - Mikhail Kutuzov, Pyotr Bagration, Mikhail Miloradovich, Matvey Platov, Alexey Ermolov, Ivan Dorokhov. Generals accustomed to victories, eagles of the empire.

Perhaps the best commentator Patriotic War 1812 - Fyodor Glinka. Officer, poet, theologian. He wrote about the great Battle of Borodino in detail and at the same time artistically. Captured the elements of the battle. This is how Glinka described one of the key hours of the Battle of Borodino:

“Imagine a chemist’s working temple, imagine how he pours two hostile moistures from two vials into one vessel. Merged together, they hiss, bubble, swirl, until, both decomposed, they become numb, evaporate, leaving almost no traces behind them. Thus, two forces, two armies, Russian and French, merged into one cup of destruction, and, I dare to use the expression: they decomposed chemically, one destroying the other.”

We have become unaccustomed to such a writer's view. He has vigilance without posturing.

The Russian land had never seen such an intense battle. The bloodiest battle ensued around the Semyonov flushes, which are more often called Bagrationovs. Three fortifications were hastily built shortly before the battle. Artillery batteries were stationed there, and Bagration’s troops took up defensive positions around them.

The battle near the fortifications lasted six hours; Napoleon sent his main forces here. A powerful blow from the troops of Marshals Davout and Ney made the defenders of the flushes tremble. The French captured the fortifications. But there followed a counterattack by Russian grenadiers and cavalry led by Bagration. Flushes are beaten! 35 thousand French on this piece of land advanced like a hurricane. Bagration had 20 thousand.

Here the cavalrymen of General Dorokhov carried out a fierce counterattack. Here mortal wound received by General Bagration. General Tuchkov died here, having picked up the banner from the hands of a wounded standard bearer.

“As Bagration’s troops received reinforcements, they, over the corpses of the fallen, moved forward with the greatest determination to regain their lost positions. We saw how the Russian masses maneuvered like mobile redoubts, studded with iron and pouring down fire... As long as they had any strength left, these brave soldiers began their attacks again,” recalled French general, participant in the battle.

In the battle for Bagration's flushes, Napoleon lost about 30 thousand. As a result, the enemy occupied the fortifications, but did not break through the defenses. The Russians retreated only 400 steps.

Attack of the 1st Cavalry Corps of General Uvarov at Borodino. Artist Desarno

The Russian army retreated to Gorki and began to prepare for a new battle. It seemed that the stubborn battle would continue. But at 12 o'clock at night Kutuzov canceled preparations for a new battle. The commander-in-chief, who called the Battle of Borodino victorious, decided to withdraw the army beyond Mozhaisk in order to make up for human losses and better prepare for new battles. To wait, expecting mistakes from Napoleon, who had lost communications...

The French emperor did not feel like a winner: he understood that the Russian army was not defeated, there were very few prisoners, there was no disorderly retreat of the Russians...

Let us turn again to the notes of Fyodor Glinka:

“The hours were running out. The night came into its own more and more. The sun was setting as a red ball without rays. Some kind of sour, vinegary smell spread in the air, perhaps from the great decomposition of saltpeter and sulfur, perhaps from blood evaporation!

The smoke thickened and hung over the field. And in this night, half-artificial, half-natural, between the scattered French columns, still moving with the beating of drums and music, still unfurling their red banners, suddenly (and this was the last time) the earth rang under the hooves of the rushing cavalry. 20,000 sabers and broadswords crossed in different parts of the field. Sparks fell as if from a fire and faded away, like the lives of thousands who died in battle.

This slaughter, resumed for a minute, was the last outbreak of a dying fire, extinguished by blood. It was the King of Naples who rushed with his cavalry to the Russian line. But the day was gone, and the battle died down. The great question: “Who won?” remained unresolved."

IN next chapter In his narrative, Glinka will answer this question: by winter, the disgraced remnants of the Great Army were leaving Russia. They looked least like winners. History answered this question.

Who won the Battle of Borodino?

Maxim Shevchenko

In operational-tactical terms Battle of Borodino Of course, the French won. They occupied virtually all positions except the left flank, which was defended by the Russian army. But Napoleon did not decide main task defeat of the Russian army. So in strategic plan Napoleon lost not only this battle, but the entire war. It is incontinence complete victory in the Battle of Borodino was the beginning of a terrible defeat French army.

Andrey Zubov

Traditionally (especially in military theory late 18th - early 19th centuries) it was believed that the battle was won by the one who retained the battlefield. Obviously, the field remained with Napoleon, after which he occupied Moscow without any problems. But on the other hand, it is also obvious that, having won the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon lost the campaign: by December 1812, in the territory Russian Empire there was not a single prisoner left French soldier, and the starling of December has actually already begun Foreign trip Russian army and the war was fought on European territory. Thus, strategically, the Battle of Borodino was won by Emperor Alexander and Field Marshal Kutuzov. They saved the army and proved the correctness of this decision. Very little time will pass after September 8 and Napoleon will be stopped at Maloyaroslavets, he will be forced to retreat along the old Smolensk road. So it turns out that Borodino was won by Napoleon purely formally, but in fact by Kutuzov. And in Russian tradition This has always been the case. Although the French considered and continue to consider the battle “at the walls of Moscow” a victory for Napoleon.

Why is there no single point of view on who emerged victorious from the battle?

Maxim Shevchenko

It all depends on the fact that Russia, having lost the battle, won the war. War is not just one battle. I can give another example - Vietnam War. Vietnamese General Nguyen Giap lost all the battles to the Americans on the field, but ultimately won the war. Likewise, for the French, victory in the Battle of Borodino was tantamount to defeat. After this bloody battle, the French lost their mobility and were forced to winter in Russia. While the Russian army was on its own land, it had rear areas. Napoleon bet on a stunning victory, after which, as he hoped, Alexander would have to ask for peace, but a stunning victory did not work out.

Andrey Zubov

The thing is that Napoleon was characterized by a general battle, victory and surrender of the enemy. And what happened here? There was a general battle, there seemed to be a victory, but Emperor Alexander did not capitulate and the Russian Empire continued to exist. And Napoleon, having occupied Moscow, waited a very long time for this capitulation from Alexander. The French emperor even sent one of his own to St. Petersburg proxies in the hope that Alexander will go at least for negotiations. That's why not single point view: the battle was won, but not completely, and the campaign of 1812 was lost catastrophically.

How fair is it to talk about the so-called. “moral victory” of the Russian army?

Maxim Shevchenko

Of course, the Battle of Borodino is not the fruit of Stalinist propaganda. According to all the recollections of all participants and contemporaries (Raevsky, Glinka, etc.), this is the moment when the Russians realized that they could show unparalleled heroism and fight on equal terms with the best army peace. Napoleon himself understood this, for whom Borodino became a difficult lesson.

Andrey Zubov

“Moral victory” is a formulation of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Then, in 1812, no one talked about a moral victory - it was a tactical defeat and a strategic victory, because Borodin’s loss made it possible to preserve the Russian army and Russian statehood and, after 2-3 months, defeat Napoleon and expel him from Russia, which was simply unheard of those times.

Could Napoleon have achieved a single-handed victory at Borodino?

Maxim Shevchenko

Napoleon could do it. He had a chance. Napoleon certainly did not know the Russian reserves, but if he had taken a risk at the end of the day and thrown 40 thousand reserves of the old guard into battle, then, I think, the Russian army would have found itself in a difficult situation, squeezed near the Moscow River. And the consequences could be tragic for Kutuzov. But Napoleon did not dare, because the masculinity, perseverance, bravery, and heroism of the Russian army made Napoleon doubt such an outcome. But he had a trump card that he did not put on the table.

Andrey Zubov

I think Napoleon could have achieved victory if his opponent had not been Kutuzov, but a more traditionally thinking general who would have continued the battle until the very end. But Kutuzov withdrew the army, saving it. Otherwise, there would be nothing left of the Russian army in this battle. Napoleon would have suffered too big losses, but he would still have won the battle and after that he would have taken Russia with virtually his bare hands. This, in fact, is the genius of Kutuzov, that he abandoned the template of a general battle and battle to the last drop of blood and preserved the army. But Kutuzov could not win Borodino, since there was an inequality of strength and strategic potential.

Since Borodino became the bloodiest battle before all those that came before it, but the outcome of the battle is ambiguous. Can we say that both armies did not achieve their goal?

Maxim Shevchenko

From the point of view of classical strategies, the Russian army just achieved its goal. Napoleon counted on victory in the general battle and Alexander's surrender. Napoleon did not want to capture Russia and dismember it into parts - he needed to force Alexander to abandon the continental blockade. Napoleon did not achieve this goal. Kutuzov had a tactic to exhaust the French army. And Kutuzov completed this task: at Borodino the French bled to death. The tactical victory for Napoleon's army resulted in losses that the French were unable to compensate for during the subsequent war.

Andrey Zubov

In my opinion, if the Russian army had not fought a general battle at all and had given up Moscow completely without a fight, then here we could definitely talk about a moral defeat. In addition, it would have been a strategic defeat too, because the French army would have entered Moscow absolutely fresh and continued its movement further towards Yaroslavl to the Volga. What would have happened next is unknown. We should not forget that Napoleon carried a certain slogan on his bayonets - the liberation of the peasants, although the abolition of serfdom was not officially announced, but in fact this is what many French military leaders promised, and many Russian peasants gladly robbed the estates of their landowners as they approached French troops. So a pitched battle had to be fought for many reasons.

On September 7, 1812, one of the most brutal one-day battles took place. The French called it “Bataille de la Moskova”, the Russians called it the Battle of Borodino. Various names, unclear results - an ambiguous victory. 7 assessments of the “Russian victory” at Borodino.

Napoleon Bonaparte

“Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible. Of the fifty battles I have given, in the battle of Moscow the French showed the most valor and achieved the least success.”

J. Rapp (adjutant general to the emperor)

“The battle was won, but the fierce fire still continued. Napoleon's surgeon did the dressing for me. The Emperor himself visited me. “Again, so it’s your turn? How are you?” - “Your Majesty, I think you will have to use the guard.” - “I won’t do this; I don't want to risk it. I am confident that I will win the battle without her participation.” And indeed, the guard did not participate in the battle, with the exception of thirty guns, which performed miracles.”

A. De Caulaincourt (Emperor's Chief of Horse)

“At night it was clearly noticeable that the enemy had begun to retreat: the army was ordered to move after him. The next day, only the Cossacks could be found, and only two leagues from the battlefield. The enemy carried off the vast majority of his wounded, and we only got those prisoners of which I have already spoken, 12 guns of the redoubt taken by my unfortunate brother, and three or four others taken in the first attacks.”

L. De Bosse (palace prefect)

“Be that as it may, the victory was complete, so complete that the Russian army could not believe for a single minute in the possibility of defending its capital. But this did not stop them from serving prayer services there.”

M.I. Kutuzov (Field Marshal)

"This day will remain an eternal monument courage and excellent bravery Russian soldiers, where all the infantry, cavalry and artillery fought desperately. Everyone’s desire was to die on the spot and not yield to the enemy. The French army, led by Napoleon himself, being in superior strength, did not overcome the fortitude Russian soldier who sacrificed his life for his Fatherland."

D. N. Bolgovsky (duty staff officer)

“...We retreated the day after the battle, not defeated, but due to a lack of forces capable of fighting, while the enemy still had fresh troops at his disposal. But where is the reason for this obvious and inexplicable inaction of Napoleon? How can we understand that at the beginning of the battle he acted offensively and brought the matter to the end, and at three o’clock, at the moment when he managed to take possession of all the points that protected our front from the swiftness of his attacks, and, therefore, at the moment of achieving complete success he was more defensive than active."

A. B. Golitsyn (adjutant to M. I. Kutuzov)

“Kutuzov never intended to give battle the next day, but he said this out of pure policy. At night I drove around with Tol the position where our tired soldiers were fast asleep, and he reported that it was impossible to think of going forward, much less defending with 45 thousand those places that were occupied by 96 thousand, especially when Napoleon had an entire guards corps not took part in the battle. Kutuzov knew all this, but he was waiting for this report and, after listening to it, he ordered an immediate retreat, entrusting the rearguard to Platov. He retreated so quickly that at 2 o’clock he brought almost the entire French army to a position near Mozhaisk, where it was supposed to defend itself and not yield it to the French until another day, but this was not the case.”

Today marks 205 years since the Battle of Borodino, but even among historians there is no agreement on who won it - the Russians or the French.

The first declared themselves winners on the basis that they held the battlefield, retreating only slightly at a few points, while inflicting enormous losses on the enemy. According to all the canons of that time, if the commander-in-chief did not leave his observation post - and Kutuzov sat down in the morning on a high-rise near the village of Gorki and never left there - the field is not lost, which means the battle itself worst case“hesitantly,” as they said then, that is, no one’s. But after a long retreat from the border itself and almost to Moscow, it’s even a draw Russian command and the army was considered their victory.

For their part, the French also declared themselves winners. On the grounds that the Russians nevertheless retreated the night after the battle, and later surrendered Moscow. And losses, they say, are not important at all, the result is important.

And yet who?

Generally speaking, both options are a tribute to the traditions of the past, when the fate of wars was decided in one general battle. This was not always the case. The outcome of the same Hundred Years' War not a single general battle determined, even when the flower of chivalry, led by the king, was captured. But nevertheless, it was the Napoleonic wars that brought the axiom of the rule to its indisputable brilliance: defeat the army - win the war. And it was Kutuzov who opposed this with his principle: victory is a strategic result and is achieved through a number of battles and operations. And they don’t necessarily have to always be victorious. As long as they bring results, it is extremely possible to preserve your own army while inflicting the maximum possible damage to the enemy army.

This strategy runs like a red thread through all the actions of Field Marshal Kutuzov in the War of 1812, for which he was subjected to fierce criticism from many Russian generals, who did not understand such behavior - after all, they were used to achieving results now and immediately, and no matter how many lives of their soldiers.

And just the Battle of Borodino became practically the only example, when Kutuzov planned to achieve the strategic defeat of the enemy in one battle. But I couldn't achieve this. Because Napoleon figured out his plan. And he forced the course of the battle as we know it from history - a head-on collision of masses of troops, when at certain points up to 50 thousand people fought hand-to-hand at one time and when the French had a truly non-illusory chance of breaking through the Russian front. And then press them to the Moscow River and capture or destroy them.

But they were unable to break through the front. And this is the victory of the Russian army. Real, heroic and ultimately strategic wars.

But this is also the defeat of its commander, because his plan failed.

Position

The first thing Kutuzov had to evaluate was the position. It was too big for the Russian army, and simply stretching the troops along the front meant dooming them to defeat. It was, as the Russian commander admitted, “relatively good for Russia, which was generally poor in positions.” Namely: in front of the front, in a valley inconvenient for crossing, the Kolocha River flows, and along its right bank there are several heights convenient for defense.

At the same time, several problems arose. The new Smolensk road, convenient for the march of both armies, ran parallel to the river and, therefore, to the front. And a few miles away from it, the Old Smolensk Road ran parallel to it, which led straight to the rear of the defenders.

Thus, the convenience of the positions covered by the river had to be abandoned and the front turned almost 90 degrees in order to become perpendicular to both roads along which the enemy was approaching.

Not ideal, but also a good option: the right flank is covered by the river, therefore, it can be weakened in favor of the left and center flanks, in front of which there is an empty and unprotected plain, which is why the troops standing in virtually an open field face significant losses due to artillery fire and enemy cavalry attacks. Consequently, the bulk of the troops need to be concentrated in this place so that they can successfully repel enemy attacks.

Photo: www.globallookpress.com

What is Kutuzov doing? He does exactly the opposite. On the right flank, covered by the river, he places 70% of his army, and on the left flank, open to all winds and fires - accordingly, tears. In total there are about 24,500 bayonets and sabers.

Here lies the key to a true understanding of the Battle of Borodino, which for some reason few historians seek to insert into the door of truth. Or, not very cleverly (from the point of view of military art), they explain this by saying that Kutuzov wanted to store reserves in this way in order to transfer them to the left flank as necessary, or they simply bypass the topic. Or they accuse Kutuzov of mediocre battle planning, of incorrectly calculating his opponent’s plan.

Mediocrity

Not even a year has passed since exactly the same accusations were brought against Kutuzov in another war, with the Turks.

The war was difficult, the war was tiring, and most importantly, it was extremely dangerous on the eve of Napoleon's attack, about the inevitability of which no one had any illusions. The arduous task of capturing and abandoning fortresses and territories lasted for five years, but it was not possible to defeat the Turkish army and thereby end the war.

And in 1811, infantry general Mikhail Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief. What is he doing? Defeats the Turks in the battle of Rushchuk. And then... retreats to the other side of the Danube. Then his entire headquarters became enraged! But the commander insisted on his own.

Then the emboldened Turks are transported to the same bank of the Danube. But the Russians, by order of Kutuzov, do not interfere with them. Only redoubts are being built. Amphitheater.

Finally, when most Turkish troops crossed, and their own generals almost spat in the face of the Russian commander-in-chief, he sent General Markov’s corps to the opposite bank. He captures the Turkish camp along with the cannons, turns the cannons across the river and the Turks who find themselves in a strategic encirclement begin to nail them with their own former artillery.

Mikhail Kutuzov. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

It all ended naturally - with complete liquidation Turkish army killed and captured and the conclusion of peace, which saved Russia from the prospect of a war on two fronts in 1812.

And so the man who conceived and carried out such a combination, despite the resistance of his own generals, suddenly, on the Borodino field, his brain completely fails! But in 1805, in exactly the same operation, he did not destroy the corps of the French Marshal Mortier. And then suddenly he became dumb?

I can't believe it.

Concept

What should such a brilliant master of encirclement maneuver as Kutuzov, then not yet a field marshal, come up with?

First of all, prevent the unfavorable formation of both armies perpendicular to the roads. Somehow force Napoleon to attack in a position advantageous for the Russians - across the river and to the heights. And since the heights - near Gorki, the Central Kurgan, and near Shevardin - form something like an amphitheater above the swampy plain between them, moreover, cut by streams, it is convenient to build redoubts on them, saturated with artillery. Yes, build flashes in front of the Utitsky forest to increase the fire cover. And put troops on guard, of course.

And then let Napoleonic troops cross, and then take them into the fire bag. And if the French nevertheless break through the Russian front, they will run into the Utitsky forest. But the armies of that time did not know how to fight in the forests, and besides, Kutuzov planted three regiments of rangers there.

Thus, the French have only one direction left - to the Semenovsky ravine. So let them go there under fire from the flanks. And behind the ravine, the bulk of the troops of the 2nd Army will accept the enemy with soul when he overcomes the ravine.

But this, of course, is a rough diagram. Napoleon is not a fool; he will not march to Semyonovskoye under fire. The first thing he will probably do is suppress the redoubts. That's what it should be! They held out for three hours, allowing the French troops to be drawn into the battle. And at the climax of the battle, from the right flank, four corps fall upon Napoleon’s rear on the left bank of the Kolocha: Uvarov, Baggovut, Osterman and Lavrov! And what happens? It turns out the second Slobodzeya!

So Kutuzov does not destroy the bridge in the village of Borodino - on the contrary, he places a regiment of rangers in the bridgehead. And sappers guards crew placed on the right flank so that crossings could be quickly established and fords across Kolocha ordered to be scouted.

No, Napoleon, of course, will be stronger than the Turks. And such a trap will most likely break out. But very battered and beaten, forced to go to lick his wounds all the way to Smolensk, where he turned to the Tsar with peace proposals.

Not a bad idea? But it didn't work out. Why?

Napoleon. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Napoleon was still a genius

Yes, because Napoleon was still a brilliant commander. And his intelligence was good.

And he, apparently, guessed the plan of his no less brilliant opponent. speaks for it sudden change actions of the French army. If on September 4 the rearguard of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn quite confidently held the pressure of the Napoleonic vanguard, then the next morning they attacked him with such forces that he could not resist and almost on his shoulders brought the enemy to the not yet ready-made positions of his army.

Further, Napoleon - contrary to all the canons of that time - without deploying an army, marched with three corps at once across Kolocha and attacked the Shevardinsky redoubt, which had not yet been completely brought to defense.

The Russians fought bravely, even fiercely, but since their forces were not yet concentrated, and the French suppressed the battery at the redoubt almost immediately, after 8 hours of battle they still had to retreat. Already at night, Kutuzov ordered not to shed blood in vain, but to retreat to the village of Semyonovsky.

It was then that the positions of both armies at Borodino took on the form that we know today.

But judging by the fact that the Russian commander still did not strengthen the left flank, it seems that he did not abandon his plan. Bagration's army was supposed to delay French corps first on flushes (it was a one-time hand-to-hand fight of 50 thousand combatants), and then behind the Semyonovsky ravine. He could have held out for three hours.

Bagration's injury. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Bagration was a brave general, but did not have strategic thinking. He stubbornly clung to the advanced defensive fortification, which the flashes served as, which simultaneously excluded the artillery and infantry standing in positions behind the ravine from the battle, and drained his troops in senseless and merciless - primarily in relation to them - counterattacks on the flashes. Which the French climbed already in the first attack.

And as a result, at 8 am, Kutuzov began to transfer the corps prepared for the offensive from the right flank to the left, abandoning his plan. In addition, Napoleon, guessing, apparently, or knowing from intelligence that his opponent still wanted to fulfill his intention, in the very first act of the battle he sent an entire division to take away the crossing in Borodino from the Russians. The crossing was not taken away, but the bridge was destroyed.

And Kutuzov nevertheless outlined only a weak semblance of his idea in the middle of the day - he sent Cossacks and light cavalry on a raid on the left flank of the French. And despite the fact that the former immediately rushed to blow away the French convoys, and the latter took with them only six weak cannons of horse artillery, Napoleon took the danger so seriously that he stopped the attacks of his troops for two hours. And he even went to his left flank to understand the situation.

So, in purely human terms, commander Kutuzov showed commander Napoleon what he was going to do with him.

But as a military leader, Mikhail Kutuzov lost to Napoleon Bonaparte even before the battle...

September 7 – 206th anniversary great battle. And, as always, the question arises: what was it? Victory or defeat? Should we celebrate success or mourn failure?

Among those who claim that Russia lost in the Battle of Borodino, for some reason, people who do not like Russia predominate - strange, isn’t it?
Their main (and actually only) argument is that the battlefield remained with Napoleon, the Russian troops retreated the next day. And whoever has the field wins. Well, of course, if the goal of Napoleon’s campaign at the head of the greatest European army of all times, Russia was to capture the Borodino field, then, of course, he achieved his goal). But there is some doubt that this was precisely the goal of the Emperor of France.
But what was Napoleon's real goal - the real goal that he did not achieve, largely as a result of his failure (and our success) in the Battle of Borodino?
Napoleon's goal was not to capture the Borodino field. And not even take Moscow. Napoleon's goal was... to destroy Russia.
206 years ago, Napoleon set out to accomplish what Charles XII failed 100 years earlier, and Adolf Hitler failed 100 years later.
Napoleon's plans were to “restore Poland.” If with these words you thought about the Poland you see on modern map peace, then you somewhat underestimate Napoleonic plans. The “Poland” that he decided to restore from the ruins of the Russian Empire is the medieval Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, at least up to the Dnieper, and most likely further.
If Napoleon had managed to force Alexander I to sign a peace treaty, then this treaty would have been very reminiscent of the 1991 Belovezhskaya Accords. Russia would have lost Ukraine and Belarus - Poland would have been “restored” there. Finland and the Baltic states would go to Sweden. Turkey - Georgia, Moldova and Crimea.
But that wouldn't be the end of it. The restored Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would, at the first opportunity, attack the defeated Russia left without an army, and Napoleon’s empire, Sweden, Turkey and even Napoleon’s enemies, the British, would certainly provide all possible assistance in this holy cause of liberating Europe from Russian barbarians. And that's it...
This is what was decided on September 7, 1812 on the Borodino field. And it’s not at all about who gets the field.
But in order to force Alexander I to sign the death warrant for his country, it was necessary to destroy the Russian army. And then Napoleon’s troops would be able to calmly occupy any city, seize any booty, and supply themselves with everything they need. AND Russian state It would simply cease to function - with or without a contract.
How to destroy the Russian army? To do this you need:
1) Create more strong army- such that it is guaranteed to defeat the Russians.
2) Achieve battle.
3) Destroy the Russian army.
Napoleon approached the solution of this problem extremely responsibly. It is enough to compare his campaign with a frivolous adventure Charles XII– just heaven and earth. Of course, Bonaparte knew history. He was confident that he would defeat the Russians, but he wanted to act with 200 percent reliability so as not to leave us the slightest chance.
To begin with, he created Great Army. This was not the army of France (hardly half of them were French) - it was the army of Europe, NATO of that time: Germans, Austrians, Dutch, Italians, Poles... It was much stronger than all the Russian troops combined.
But that's not all. Napoleon had no intention of fighting the entire Russian army at once. He wanted to break our forces piece by piece without allowing them to unite. In addition, the Emperor of France, of course, took into account that Russia was at war with Turkey, and calculated that the Russian army, occupied in the south, would not be able to help the rest of the forces. Russo-Turkish War ended shortly before Napoleon’s invasion, but he assembled his armada for more than one day, and he began to prepare a plan even earlier, so this Kutuzov's quick and untimely (for Bonaparte) triumph in the south became an unpleasant surprise. But shouldn’t we cancel the invasion because of this, when everything is already ready?
Napoleon failed to defeat our armies individually - the Russian generals surpassed the Corsican genius and united. But still, even after this, the army of Europe was larger than the Russian one, better trained (we had many recruits straight from the plow) and controlled greatest commander of its time. It was impossible to defeat her in battle. If you were Kutuzov at least three times.
This means that it was necessary to avoid a general battle by all means, which Mikhail Illarionovich did, continuing to retreat. From a military point of view, Moscow also had to be surrendered without a fight, in which we risked losing the country. The problem was that the matter was not limited to the military point of view.
History knows many examples when huge armies retreated without a fight, retreated until they fled. It’s not Napoleon and Kutuzov who are fighting - hundreds of thousands of people are fighting, who must understand what they are doing, for the sake of which they are suffering hardships and going to their death. If the Russian army had surrendered Moscow without a fight, the soldiers would simply have gone home. It was necessary to win the moral right to surrender the capital. Kutuzov understood this. And Napoleon understood this, so he went to where the Russian army would be obliged to meet him.
When at Borodino Bonaparte realized that the main Russian army was taking the battle, he probably breathed a sigh of relief. He practically achieved his goal: he managed to create invincible army, saved it until the decisive battle and forced the enemy to accept a battle, the outcome of which was a foregone conclusion: the French were stronger in all respects. Tomorrow the Russians will be defeated: Napoleon knew how to do this and won in much more difficult situations. And then everything will be as always: the enemy fleeing in panic, corps surrendering, captured guns and banners, cities opening gates to the victors, rich booty, surrender agreements - and he, the ruler of everything, creating states and destroying them. And Russia - well, someday all empires perish...
And the next day none of this happened. There were no captured corps. There were no surrender agreements and no cities opening their gates. There was no defeated Russian army. All day long, the best French forces were smashed against Russian batteries in order, at the cost of enormous sacrifices, to conquer the field pitted with craters and empty Moscow, where they could loot a lot (after which Napoleon’s army finally turned into a gang of marauders, almost uncontrollable), but it was impossible to survive the winter... And The Russian army, having withstood the battle with honor, retreated in an orderly manner, still blocking the French from access to the rich areas of the state to food, fodder, and warm houses so necessary for this huge horde of conquerors. It was a disaster.
And every day of the next month, walking around the empty Kremlin and unsuccessfully waiting from Alexander I for at least some kind of answer to more and more ingratiating letters, Bonaparte understood better and better what a hopeless situation he found himself in. All attempts to move further were stopped by Russian troops, which grew stronger every day. There was nowhere to get food and fodder. Their own soldiers destroyed warehouses and convoys. And they had to flee to their lair along the Old Smolensk Road, which had been destroyed by their own troops. And behind, finishing off the remnants of the European conquerors, came the Russian army, which Napoleon never managed to destroy in the Battle of Borodino.
So who won then?