Battle of Kursk, Prokhorov tank battle, 1943. Battle of Prokhorovka Museum Guide "Prokhorovka Tank Battle"
What actually happened on the Prokhorovsky field on that ill-fated day?
The policy of hushing up or vice versa - all kinds of protrusion of certain plots of military history in the Soviet era did not always work in an obvious way: once they lost, they hushed it up, and if they won, they inflated and replicated it in every possible way. Very often, the key influence was exerted not at all by ideological, but by departmental factors, not to mention the purely psychological factors associated with career and personal growth.
In addition, we should not forget that the same principle works in war as in everyday life - a single person sees only a very small piece of reality. Only with time, learning more and more about the event, of which he was a participant, does a person begin, as it were, to embed himself and his place in the past into this historical construction, thereby adjusting his vision to the overall picture. But this, in turn, leads to some inevitable consequences, which are most pronounced when interacting with veterans decades after the end of the war:
Overlapping the personal on the general;
- crowding out the personal by the common;
- replacing the personal with the common.
Ultimately, this leads to the fact that people who survived the war, many years later, are simply unable to distinguish what they really experienced from what they generally know about the war. Hence, one often hears from the participants in the events general phrases about war and victory, about the role of politicians and commanders, as well as relaying products of outright myth-making and propaganda, instead of stories from real life, which makes them, in the eyes of ideologists, and simply outright manipulators, ideal candidates to the role of defenders of the "truth of history" 1 .
Back in 2000, the Russian publicist Boris Sokolov published a short note on the pages of the popular Izvestia, which made a lot of noise and very clearly showed how the above principles work. It was timed to coincide with the next anniversary of the start of the Prokhorov battle in 1943 and was published on July 12. In it, the author, relying on published German materials, made a stunning statement that Prokhorovka was an imaginary victory for Soviet weapons, that the Soviet side, having a threefold superiority in tanks, suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy, ultimately losing several dozen times more technology! As a result, he was sued as a "detractor of national history." The plaintiffs involved as witnesses war veterans from the Union of Veterans, who, as patriotic publicists wrote, “submitted detailed documents with battle maps, including German sources” (of course, this was not about original documents from the archives, but about maps, diagrams, published in cropped form in Soviet books about the war). Yes, the trouble is, the year 2000 was in the yard - the times of "spiritual bonds" had not yet come, so the court dismissed the claim, realizing the absurdity of the charges. And this is despite the authority of the veteran community in covering the events of the war! 2
It is interesting that two years earlier a book was published by a professional military man, veteran of the Second World War, retired major general G.A. Oleinikov, who, relying on other sources, came to similar conclusions: myth, the losses of the enemy are exaggerated, while the Soviet ones, on the contrary, are underestimated 3 . But no one dared to argue with such a person. It is understandable - it is one thing to argue with a specialist, a war veteran, and another thing with a publicist who does not hide his political views.
But the main thing in this story is different - the instigator of this process was not the authorities at all, but “representatives of the public” (which speaks in favor of the version that it was rather the authorities of the Russian Federation that reacted to the public request, returning in the 2000s to Soviet mythology about the war as the only unifying beginning), and veterans were invited as "bearers of truth", and not always even direct participants in the battle itself. In any case, whoever they were, they could not know in any way about the general scale of losses, and they drew information from the books available to them and were, at best, only witnesses of what an ordinary soldier saw directly from a trench or tank. The generals, who saw all this from a slightly different perspective, by that time had long been sleeping in the damp earth.
Another important point for understanding the problem of silence / protrusion is the so-called "Pekingham effect". This concept was introduced into scientific circulation by the military historian A. Isaev, who described it as follows: “The English officer Pekingham was an observer on the Japanese squadron in the Tsushima battle. In a note compiled after the battle, he claims that the Russian ships fired more often and better. In turn, the participants in the battle from among the surviving officers and sailors of the 2nd Pacific Squadron said the same about the shooting of the Japanese. For certain psychological reasons, it often seems to a direct participant in the battle that the enemy is better armed, shoots better and more often, has a huge numerical superiority and inexhaustible reserves. The non-obvious effect of their actions on the enemy led to an incorrect assessment of the actions themselves. Turning to the problems of the Second World War, the author adds: “At the same time, the latest research shows that it was just worth hushing up the beating of Soviet tanks near Prokhorovka, and not the actions of the Southern Front on the Mius River in July 1943, many documents on which are still are classified as "secret" 4 .
I do not presume to judge how much the “Pekingham effect” influenced the emergence of the myth of the grandiose tank battle near Prokhorovka, but one cannot but agree that, logically, this very plot from the history of the war certainly should not have become part of the narrative about the “Great Patriotic War ". But he not only did not fall out of it, but also took one of the key places among other "great victories and courageous achievements of the Soviet people and their heroic Red Army." Personal interests of a career nature in this process played a decisive role, as was written at the beginning. And the main figure behind the formation and approval of this myth was none other than General Pavel Rotmistrov, who in July 1943 commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army near Prokhorovka. In 1960, the book of his memoirs “The Tank Battle near Prokhorovka” was published, in which the main provisions of this myth about the allegedly largest tank battle of the past war, which played a decisive role in the Battle of Kursk as a whole, were stated.
Its reference points are three statements, far from real historical events, but firmly entrenched in literature, the media and the mass consciousness. Firstly, that in the clash that occurred on July 12, 1943 on a tiny field cut by deep ravines southwest of Prokhorovka, according to various sources, from 1200 to 2000 tanks and self-propelled guns (in the canonical version 1500) participated. Secondly, that it was a victorious event for the Red Army, which turned the tide of the Battle of Kursk. Thirdly, that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps operating there that day was utterly defeated and swiftly thrown back to its original positions to Belgorod 5 . Added to this was the assertion that the Germans had a lot of brand new Panthers and Ferdinands and almost hundreds of Tigers in this direction. In reality, the first two types of armored vehicles were not at all near Prokhorovka, and there were at most 15 Tigers. In general, nature clearly did not deprive the imagination of the Soviet military - they would write novels, not command. According to later statements by Rotmistrov himself: “During the day, both sides suffered serious losses, about 300 tanks each ...” 6 Soviet propaganda books for children, such as The Book of Future Commanders, even managed to claim that the Nazi invaders had lost up to 400 tanks, and "we" 300 - 100 tanks less!
And although some Soviet military leaders, who knew firsthand about what had happened, repeatedly expressed their disagreement with such a presentation, this did not change much. For example, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov generally believed that on July 12, 1943, something very significant that influenced the results of the war did not happen at the station. He also argued that the military operations, which were secondary both in scope and scale, were so widely known only through the efforts of Rotmistrov, and urged him to be more modest. The marshal even included a rather sharp rebuke to the former commander in the book of his memoirs “Memories and Reflections”, although the censorship did not let her through. The whole piece of text thrown out at that time was published only in the 10th edition of his book of memoirs (supplemented according to the author's manuscripts), already in the period of "perestroika" 7 .
But after 1962, it became simply impossible to challenge Rotmistrov’s version - Pavel Alekseevich holds the post of Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces, and a year earlier his version, set out in the 3rd volume of the History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945, becomes the official version Soviet historiography. In the conditions of total secrecy of archival documents, try to refute, try to prove the opposite! The propaganda hype peaked at the beginning of the 1970s, when the myth of Prokhorovka became canonical, gradually acquiring quasi-religious forms. This became especially noticeable after the grand opening of the first memorial to the participants in the "legendary battle" in 1973. 8
What happened in reality on the Prokhorovsky field on that ill-fated day? On the morning of that day, the 18th and 29th tank corps, as well as some units from other formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army (had up to 514 tanks and self-propelled guns), were at the forefront of the main blow. The main blow fell on the SS division "Adolf Hitler" (taking into account tanks and assault guns from neighboring formations, the German side had up to 210 armored vehicles in this direction), the advanced units of which were located two kilometers southwest of Prokhorovka. This division was part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of Paul Hausser, a far-sighted military leader and competent tactician who sought to fulfill his tasks not at any cost, but based on the emerging operational situation. Many people mistakenly imagine a “oncoming tank battle” as a dashing cavalry attack that runs into the same enemy attack - wall to wall. In reality, Prokhorovka did not immediately become "oncoming". From 8:30 until noon, Rotmistrov's army was busy breaking into the enemy's solid defenses with continuous frontal attacks. Tanks, assault guns and anti-tank artillery of the German division opened fire from a place, from well-prepared during the night, camouflaged, dispersed among strongholds and echeloned to a depth of 7 km behind the front line of positions, shooting at attacking Soviet tanks, as if on a training ground, from closed positions.
The situation was further aggravated by the fact that Soviet tanks were trapped in a gorge to the west of the station, between the floodplain of the Psyol River, deep gullies and the Storozhevoye tract. That is, the Soviet tank attack took place at first in a section 900 meters wide! "Steam roller", as Rotmistrov planned, failed to create. Broken tanks made the task of the crews following them even more difficult. Moreover, the Soviet driver-mechanics did not notice the anti-tank ditch located in front, up to 4.5 m deep, dug shortly before by their own sappers, who were preparing fortifications on the orders of the command. The first T-34 tanks hit him right. At the sight of danger, the tanks following them scattered the formation, colliding with each other in a panic. The main losses in Soviet tanks fell just at that time on German anti-tank weapons.
From descriptions, orders and reports it is clear that only about a quarter of the Soviet units and subunits fought for real, to the limit of their capabilities; they suffered the most losses. Half of them acted passively indifferently, with some kind of doom, without making "excessive movements", even if it was necessary for self-preservation. Another quarter even tried to avoid any contact with the enemy and was easily "scattered" by them. By the end of the day, Prokhorovka had turned into a real graveyard of Soviet tanks.
On the night of July 13, the command of the Voronezh Front received data indicating that the 5th Guards Tank Army, due to huge losses, was actually incapacitated. The best tank formation, which was aimed at a breakthrough to the Dnieper, was killed in ten hours at a small station, advancing two kilometers in the center and retreating 4.5 kilometers on the flanks. The neighboring 5th Guards Army of Lieutenant General Alexei Zhadov, who also participated in the counterattack, was also in a difficult situation.
The loss of such a significant number of tanks aroused the wrath of Stalin, who threatened to give Rotmistrov to the tribunal. This issue was dealt with by a special commission chaired by GKO and Politburo member Georgy Malenkov. The result of her work was a report in which there was an unequivocal conclusion that Rotmistrov's attack was "a model of an unsuccessful operation" 10 . But saving himself, the general agreed with his commander, General Nikolai Vatutin, as well as with a member of the Military Council of the front, Nikita Khrushchev, who stated that the tanks were lost during the largest battle in which more than 400 German tanks were destroyed by the heroic troops of the Red Army. Stalin, who himself did not object to the use of Rotmistrov's army in a counterattack, was forced to accept this report. The circumstance that the global victorious outcome of the Battle of Kursk also calmed Stalin somewhat, sharply weakening the intensity of his indignation at Rotmistrov's actions, also played a role. As a result, a long-lived legend was born that the battle of Prokhorovka was "the greatest tank battle in history." In fact, this battle represented one of the most catastrophic defeats in military history. Apparently not in vain, the German historian Karl-Heinz Friser called this battle a "kamikaze attack", which turned into hell for the Soviet troops 11 .
Today we have extensive research by military historians based on previously classified Soviet documents from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation - Lev Lopukhovsky 12 , as well as Valery Zamulin. The conclusions of the latter, as the largest specialist in this matter, are of the greatest interest: “Now there is no doubt that the legend of a grandiose oncoming tank battle involving hundreds of combat vehicles was invented and replicated for decades with the sole purpose of hiding the frontal in shape, thoughtless and essentially suicidal attack, undertaken without proper reconnaissance and suppression of fire weapons by artillery and aircraft on a prepared anti-tank area of \u200b\u200bthe enemy ... It was not possible to find confirmation of this invented “were” in any operational document ... No matter how bitter it sounds, but the results of the strike 5- and Guards TA for us turned out to be catastrophic without exaggeration” 13 .
The authors analyzed in detail the preparation, course and results of the counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front on July 12, 1943, and its impact on the results of the defensive operation in the south of the Fiery Arc as a whole. Zamulin himself was dismissed from the post of deputy for science at the Prokhorovskoye Pole Museum for publishing his research findings. In fact, simply for their honest and reasoned books. It came to insanity with the centralized buying of his books in the Kursk region, so that people would by no means read the sedition!
In recent years, other previously unknown plots and facts have been revealed. For example, that, according to the original plan, the strike of the 5th Guards Tank Army was intended for a completely different purpose - not at all for a counterattack on an enemy ready for an offensive. The forces entrusted to Rotmistrov were to break through the German front and, building on success, move to Kharkov, thus becoming the flagship in the Soviet offensive to drive the Wehrmacht out of Ukraine.
We also became aware that the encirclement of the Soviet 48th Rifle Corps of the 69th Army, consisting of four rifle divisions, which suffered huge losses in the Prokhorovka area, including up to 11 thousand prisoners of war alone, was completely ousted from the official Soviet/Russian narrative 14 .
On the basis of documents from TsAMO RF, it was established with high accuracy that Soviet losses in one day of fighting amounted to 237 tanks and 17 self-propelled guns irretrievably, or slightly more than 69% of all available equipment at the time the attack began 15 . 4190 fighters and commanders of the Red Army died, were injured and went missing for the whole day on July 12 in two tank corps and two rifle divisions drawn into this meat grinder. At the same time, 968 people were taken prisoner.
If we imagine that on a battlefield about 4.5 km wide, plowed up with thousands of shells and bombs, where before that there were already hundreds of corpses and piles of broken equipment destroyed in previous battles, and on July 12 another 237 only Soviet tanks and 17 self-propelled guns appeared and several thousand bodies of the dead on both sides, it is not surprising that all the participants in those events testify that they have never seen such a horrific picture in their lives.
Only one commander of the 7th tank company of the 1st SS tank regiment Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler" Rudolf von Ribbentrop (son of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nazi Germany) destroyed 12 Soviet tanks that day, for which he was subsequently awarded the Knight's Cross.
In general, the Prokhorov battle lasted from July 10 to 16, and July 12 was only its culmination. During this time, the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army and the 48th Rifle Corps of the 69th Army, which participated in the Battle of Prokhorovka, lost a total of about 36 thousand people killed, wounded, captured. (24 percent of the total losses of the Voronezh Front during the entire Battle of Kursk). The total losses for all reasons of the two German tank corps participating in the Prokhorovka battle (2nd SS Panzer Corps and 3rd Panzer Corps) amounted to about 7 thousand people. Thus, the ratio of casualties in people in the battle of Prokhorovka was 5 to 1.
1. There was no oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, there was a beating of Soviet tanks that fell into an anti-tank ambush. Everything else is a flight of fancy of the Soviet general Pavel Rotmistrov and director Yuri Ozerov, who created the necessary ideological picture in the film epic "Liberation".
2. Two Soviet tank brigades were completely defeated on July 12, 1943. Up to 235 tanks out of a total of 514 were knocked out, and about 150 more needed serious repairs. However, a significant part of the wrecked combat vehicles ended up on enemy-controlled territory, and the Germans simply blew them up.
3. The German side lost 3 tanks irrevocably as a result of enemy action. In total, several dozen German tanks were damaged, but they were subject to restoration. By controlling the battlefield, the Germans managed to evacuate most of their damaged vehicles to the rear, and subsequently safely repair and return them to the front. We know all this thanks to extensive research by the German historians Karl-Heinz Frieser and Roman Töppel, who carefully studied German losses in the Battle of Kursk 16 .
To understand the different scale of the losses of the German and Soviet sides, let's turn to a detailed study of the Ukrainian military historian Roman Ponomarenko. It follows from it that in the period from July 5 to July 17, 1943, the SS division "Das Reich", which was also part of the Hausser corps, irrevocably lost only 9 armored vehicles. And this is for the 12 most fierce days of the Battle of Kursk! 17
Another recent article on the topic, published in July this year by Professor Mark Edel of the University of Melbourne, sums up some conceptual results of discussions about Prokhorovka and the Battle of Kursk in general. The author asks a difficult question about how the Red Army managed to eventually emerge victorious from the battle with such heavy losses in people and equipment. The author does not make any discoveries, but only states the general opinion that has been entrenched in Western historiography: the Soviets won because of their huge superiority in human and material resources, including thanks to Lend-Lease supplies. The Wehrmacht, which lost several times less than the Red Army in the battle and inflicted colossal damage on it, turned out to be unable to crush the enemy, which was much larger in number, and did not take into account its own losses at all 18 .
And finally, I would like to remind readers that in reality the largest tank battle of the Second World War did not take place in the summer of 1943 near Prokhorovka, it took place from June 23 to June 30, 1941 in the Brody - Dubno - Lutsk region with the participation of 3128 Soviet and 728 German tanks. And although the Soviet side then lost, but still the losses incurred in this battle on the territory of Western Ukraine cannot be called completely in vain, since the German plan for the rapid capture of Kiev was thwarted19. To understand why it was necessary to introduce the myth into the mass consciousness and continue to cling to it many years later, having at hand a real plot, albeit not a particularly advantageous one, can only be analyzed by analyzing the Soviet narrative about the “Great Patriotic War” as a whole. And most importantly, given the fact that all its fabric is woven from myths, which makes it completely unsuitable for use in academic research, since something that does not have solid foundations in the foundation cannot maintain some integrity. Not to mention the fact that this narrative is simply, by definition, not congruent to the narrative of the Second World War, and it is simply impossible to fit one into the other as an “integral part”. You can either continue to believe in a myth, or you can refuse it. The third, in our deep conviction, is not given.
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1 What distinguishes the same German soldier's memories of the Prokhorov battle can be seen in the example of V. Res, who, narrating what happened, clearly stipulated: “I am talking, however, only about our unit and about what I heard over the radio.”
2 Kara-Murza S.G. On the assessment of the role of the media as a political and social institution in scientific texts // Problem analysis and state management design. Issue 2. 2015. P.11-12.
3 Oleinikov G.A. Battle of Prokhorovka (July 1943). What really happened near Prokhorovka (military history essay). SPb., 1998.
4 Isaev A.V. Georgy Zhukov: The king's last argument. M., 2006. P.8.
6 Rotmistrov P.A. Some remarks on the role of armored forces in the Battle of Kursk / Battle of Kursk: Collection of articles. M., 1970. P. 188.
7 Zamulin V.N. Prokhorovka: Technology of the myth // Motherland. 2013. No. 7. S.4-7.
9 Zamulin V.N. Battle of Prokhorovka: Myths and Reality // Military Historical Archive. 2002. No. 9. - S.48-93; https://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2018/07/20/776023-rodilsya-prohorovke
10 Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History. F.83. Op.1. D.16. L.61-65.
12 Lopukhovsky L.N. Prokhorovka: Not classified. M., 2006.
13 Zamulin V.N. The Secret Battle of Kursk: Secret Documents Testify, 2007. P. 407, 428.
14 Zamulin V.N. Environment near Prokhorovka // Motherland. 2015. No. 5. S.98-102.
15 Recently, the author claims that the Soviet troops most likely lost even more - up to 340 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns. Some other final data have also been revised. See: Zamulin V.N. The Bitter Truth About Prokhorovka: "The Greatest Tank Battle" or Tank Battle? M., 2013.
19 See: Vіyna i mіf: Invisibility of the friend of the world. H., 2016. S.77-80. Isaev A.V. Dubno 1941: The Greatest Tank Battle of World War II. M., 2009.
On July 12, 1943, one of the central events of the Great Patriotic War took place - a tank battle near the Prokhorovka station. When Stalin found out about the losses of the Soviet troops in this battle, he was furious. “The Supreme Commander decided to remove me from my post and almost put me on trial,” recalled Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov. Only the intervention of the Chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky saved the commander from the tribunal. What made the generalissimo so angry?
Preparing for a tank battle: losses on the march On July 5, 1943, according to the Citadel plan, German troops went on the offensive in the direction of Kursk and Belgorod. In the zone of action of the Voronezh Front, the enemy managed to advance 35 kilometers. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses: from July 5 to July 8, 527 tanks were hit, 372 of them burned down.
Having exhausted the defensive potential, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin, on July 6, turned to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) with a request to strengthen the front. It was decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov to the battle area.
It was necessary to redeploy an entire tank army over a distance of 350 kilometers in just 3 days. Despite Stalin's urgent advice, Rotmistrov decided not to use the railway, but to transport combat vehicles under his own power. The advantage of this solution was that the tanks could immediately join the battle. This is what happened afterwards. A significant drawback was the development of motor resources and the inevitable breakdowns on the road.
Tank columns stretched for many kilometers were practically not attacked from the air. Perhaps the well-coordinated work of Soviet aviation helped in this.
However, non-combat losses were impressive. During the redeployment, more than 30% of tanks and self-propelled artillery systems (ACS) failed. By July 12, only half of the broken equipment was restored. 101 combat vehicles lagged behind for various reasons. One tank hit a mine. In addition, one officer of the 25th tank brigade was killed on the march and two motorcyclists were injured.
However, in general, the redeployment of 40 thousand people and about a thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and other equipment was carried out successfully, and by the time of the counteroffensive near Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army was fully combat-ready.
Resources before the fight
The oncoming tank battle on the field near Prokhorovka is considered a turning point in the Kursk defensive operation. However, in the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, this counterattack was perceived as a failure. And the point is not only that the assigned combat missions were not fulfilled, but also in the huge amount of broken, burned military equipment and human losses.
Before the start of the battle, the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. A. Rotmistrov had 909 tanks, of which 28 were heavy Mk. IV Churchill Mk.IV, 563 T-34 medium tanks and 318 T-70 light tanks. However, after the march, only 699 tanks and 21 self-propelled guns remained on the move.
They were opposed by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks and self-propelled assault guns, of which only 273 combat vehicles were in combat readiness, including 22 T-VIE "Tiger".
Thus, 232 heavy and medium tanks of the Wehrmacht and 699 light and medium tanks of the Red Army collided near Prokhorovka - a total of 931 combat vehicles.
Losses in the battle of Prokhorovka
N. S. Khrushchev in his memoirs describes the situation when they, together with Georgy Zhukov and the commander of the 5th tank army, Rotmistrov, passed in the vicinity of Prokhorovka. “In the fields one could see many wrecked tanks of both the enemy and ours. There was a discrepancy in the assessment of losses: Rotmistrov says that he sees more wrecked German tanks, but I saw more of ours. Both are, however, natural. There were tangible losses on both sides,” Khrushchev noted.
The calculation of the results showed that there were much more losses on the part of the Soviet army. With the impossibility of maneuvering on a field clogged with armored vehicles, light tanks were unable to use their advantage in speed and one after another died under long-range artillery shells and heavy enemy combat vehicles.
The reports of the commanders of tank units testify to the large losses of personnel and equipment.
The 29th Panzer Corps lost 1,033 men killed and missing, 958 men wounded. Of the 199 tanks that participated in the attack, 153 tanks burned down or were knocked out. Of the 20 self-propelled artillery mounts, only one remained on the move: 16 were destroyed, 3 were sent for repair.
The 18th Panzer Corps lost 127 people killed, 144 people missing, 200 people wounded. Of the 149 tanks that participated in the attack, 84 burned out or were knocked out.
The 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 162 people killed and missing, 371 people were wounded. Of the 94 tanks that participated in the attack, 54 burned out or were knocked out.
Of the 51 tanks that took part in the counterattack, the 2nd Panzer Corps irretrievably lost 22, that is, 43%.
Thus, summing up the reports of the corps commanders, Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army lost 313 combat vehicles, 19 self-propelled guns and at least 1466 people killed and missing.
The official data of the Wehrmacht are somewhat different from the above. So, according to the results of the reports of the German headquarters, 968 people were captured; 249 Soviet tanks were knocked out and destroyed.
The discrepancy in numbers refers to those combat vehicles that were able to leave the battlefield under their own power, and only then completely lose their combat capability.
The Nazis themselves did not suffer great losses, having lost no more than 100 pieces of equipment, of which most were restored. The very next day, judging by the reports of the commanders of the divisions "Adolf Hitler", "Dead Head" and "Reich", 251 pieces of equipment were ready for battle - tanks and self-propelled assault guns.
The vulnerability of Soviet tanks, so clearly revealed in the battle of Prokhorovka, made it possible to draw the appropriate conclusions and gave impetus to the reorientation of military science and industry in the direction of developing heavy tanks with a long-range cannon.
The further the event is from us, the easier it is to almost unrecognizably change its meaning, meaning, result. Witnesses and participants in the tank battle near Prokhorovka leave, but leave behind memories, diaries, official documents. Much remains secret, but the seeker will find. There are military historians who devote decades to studying that battle of 1943, and there are constant discussions among them about who won the battle and at what cost, how much equipment was on both sides. It is known that in our history the data on the number of German tanks were exaggerated, and losses were greatly underestimated. As for the Germans, one fairly well-known military historian underestimated the losses of compatriots in that battle to 3-5 tanks (data vary in different sources). Could this figure have been given out by a sane person, or is someone ascribes these words to him? If this was announced, what is it if not an attempt to cover up the memory of the Victory of the Soviet troops near Prokhorovka with a proofreader?
In order to dispel the fog of time and refresh the historical memory of new generations, a few impartial figures and facts should be given:
- The generally accepted date is 07/12/1943, but it was only the most heated and dramatic day of the tank oncoming battle, while the beginning of the confrontation for Prokhorovka was July 10. Already at the end of July 16, German formations began to retreat;
- The Kursk Bulge is a large-scale and intense operation of the USSR. It was carefully prepared for, many new approaches and methods of fighting were used. "Citadel" - an offensive operation of the Germans near Kursk, sometimes called Hitler's adventure. The oncoming tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka was part of this grandiose undertaking, designed to restore the military prestige of the Nazi troops. The Fuhrer's statement is widely known: "The victory at Kursk should become a torch for the whole world," which came true in every sense, but only the Soviet soldiers, their unbroken and unbending spirit became famous;
- From documents declassified at the end of the 20th century, it can be assumed that about 1000 armored vehicles took part in the battle from both sides. These are approximately 670 Soviet and 330 German vehicles (however, one cannot vouch for the 100% accuracy of these figures);
- As for the losses, the greatest damage to the Soviet troops was inflicted by experienced enemy artillery. The number of equipment destroyed on July 12, irretrievably or not, differs greatly in different sources. It is likely that the most plausible and documented figures are about 160 vehicles from the Germans, with about 25 irretrievable, long-term losses; 360 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns, of which about 200 are irretrievable (the Germans left the battlefield, blowing up the equipment left by our crews);
- The confrontation near Prokhorovka is, first of all, the battle of the formations of the 5th Guards. tank army and personnel of the 2nd SS corps. There were mistakes and miscalculations, due to which the Soviet units failed to defeat the Germans, but the victory was for our courageous, steadfast, often selfless soldiers, because the plan to destroy the Soviet army in this direction was completely thwarted. This was the last offensive operation of the Wehrmacht.
Any event is also people making history. It is a sacred duty to honor them and remember who and how fought for our future, defended the right to life in a free and undefeated unique country.
July 12 is one of the most important memorable dates in the history of the Fatherland. On this day in 1943, in the turning point battle near Prokhorovka, the largest battle between the tank formations of the USSR and Nazi Germany took place during the Second World War, which became the climax during the battle on the Kursk Bulge.
Despite the fact that 76 years separate us from this epoch-making event, public attention is still riveted to it. The tank battle near Prokhorovka and some of its battles are reflected in the memoirs of the commanders, in fiction, cinema, and even in the most powerful video clip of the Swedish heavy-power metal band Sabaton "Panzerkampf".
Adequate historians and lovers of “gluing tanks” have long figured out the details of the battle: what events preceded it, who and what made mistakes, as well as losses.
The conclusion, it would seem, should not leave room for discrepancies and interpretations: Soviet tankers, having shown military prowess, courage and will, won this difficult and bloody battle. The battlefield was left to our troops. The enemy did not pass. On the Kursk Bulge and near Prokhorovka, the back of the fascist armies was broken. The time remaining until the end of the war, they only snapped, inexorably rolling back to the west, already clearly understanding that the end of the war and retribution were inevitable.
It was not the Victory yet, but the beginning of the Liberation.
Nevertheless, on the eve of May 12, with regularity and perseverance, worthy of better use, all kinds of murky "experts" from the category of darn propagandists and falsifiers of history emerge in the media with another revelation: "near Prokhorovka, everything was not so simple."
The most “savvy” of the “experts” even cite some references, usually related to memoirs (equated to hoodlit) of beaten Nazi generals, from the category: “how I almost won the war.”
The “expert wave” could be ignored and pounded if not for its consequences that stimulated the aggravation of underage and overage degenerates in social networks and the secondary press, who are firmly convinced that “everything is being hidden from us.”
What becomes the reason for the pandemonium, which has become disgusting over the past 30 years, “yes, they won, but they threw corpses”, “near Prokhorovka five Soviet tanks were burned for one German tank”, and similar feeble-minded “analytics”.
The year 2019 was no exception. On the eve of the 76th anniversary of the Battle of Prokhorovka, the editor of the historical section of the newspaper Die Welt, Sven Felix Hellerhof, suddenly stuck out his muzzle with an article in which he demanded (!) To demolish the memorial on Prokhorovka Field - on the grounds that “the latest research based on undoubtedly real photographs , confirm: Prokhorovka did not have a Soviet victory, not even a grandiose tank battle.
If the article had appeared in some far-right pro-fascist newspaper, it could have been safely ignored. But Die Welt is a daily publication of a completely different level, forming public opinion (over 700 thousand subscribers), and even a member of the LENA creative alliance, which includes seven major European newspapers.
The fact that the editor of the historical section of an influential publication judges a historical event not by documents, but on the basis of "the latest research on undoubtedly real photographs" raises the suspicion that Die Welt is recruiting not professionals, but some gullible laymen from among the ardent fans of the program. "The fight of extrasensories".
Going into details, Kellerhof is trying to argue with Brezhnev's interpretation of the events of July 12, which has long lost its relevance, from the multi-volume History of the Second World War:
The modern multi-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War" does not agree with the overly optimistic assessment of Brezhnev's historians and dryly asserts that:
“As a result of the oncoming battle in the Prokhorovka area, none of the parties was able to solve the tasks assigned to it ... The reflection of the most powerful blow of the troops of Army Group South was achieved as a result of the joint efforts of the formations and troops of the Voronezh Front with the participation of strategic reserves” (T. 3. pp. 544-547)
And now let's try to figure out what is behind the condensed phrase "in the Prokhorovka area, neither side was able to solve the tasks assigned to it."
The direct command of tank formations during the battle was carried out by Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov from the Soviet side and SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser from the German side. None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.
As Major General G. A. Oleinikov, a direct participant and researcher of those events, clarifies in his military-historical essay “The Battle of Prokhorov (July 1943)”:
“Of course, we won near Prokhorovka, not allowing the enemy to break into the operational space, forced him to abandon his far-reaching plans and forced him to retreat to his original position. Our troops withstood the four-day fierce battle, and the enemy lost his offensive capabilities. But the Voronezh Front also exhausted its forces, which did not allow it to immediately go on the counteroffensive.
But then, the Voronezh Front managed to pull up and bring reserves into battle, but the Germans did not have these reserves! It was in the battle of Prokhorovka that the Nazis lost most of their tanks, which influenced the outcome of the entire Battle of Kursk.
If in the zone of the Soviet Central Front, after the start of their offensive on July 5, 1943, the Germans were not able to penetrate deeply into the defense of our troops, then a critical situation developed on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Here, on the first day of the battle, the enemy brought into the battle up to 700 tanks and assault guns, supported by aircraft. Having met with a rebuff in the direction of Oboyan, the enemy shifted his main efforts to the Prokhorovka direction, trying to capture Kursk with a blow from the southeast.
The Soviet command decided to launch a counterattack on the enemy grouping that had penetrated. The Voronezh Front was reinforced with Stavka reserves (5th Guards Tank Army, 45th Guards Armies and two tank corps).
On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, the second largest tank battle of the Second World War took place (the first took place near Dubno, in Western Ukraine, on June 23-29, 1941, in which five corps of the Red Army and four German tank divisions not inferior in number to them), which on both sides involved up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
It should be borne in mind that by the beginning of the summer military campaign of 1943, the Germans had a qualitative advantage in tanks, having replenished their tank formations with the latest Tiger and Panther vehicles, while Soviet tankers fought on T-34-76 and KV-1s vehicles, which were inferior to German in terms of the power of guns and sights. There was still a year left before the mass appearance of our best "thirty-fours" T-34-85 and heavy tanks IS-2 in the troops.
Soviet tank units sought to engage in close combat, "grabbing the enemy by the belt", since the distance of destruction of the 76 mm T-34 and KV-1s guns was no more than 800 m, while the 88 mm guns of the Tigers and Ferdinands could shoot our vehicles from a distance of 2000 m. At a distance, our tankers suffered heavy losses.
On the other hand, knowing the advantage of the Germans, the Soviet troops transferred the battles with the tank fists of the Nazis to another plane: many German tanks were stopped by mines, anti-tank artillery, burned by infantry and aircraft.
Both sides suffered huge losses near Prokhorovka. In this battle, Soviet troops lost 500 tanks out of 800 (60%). The Germans irretrievably lost 300 tanks out of 400 (75%). For them, it was tantamount to disaster. After the battle of Prokhorovka, the most powerful strike force of the Germans was bled to death. General Guderian, at that time Inspector General of the Wehrmacht's tank troops, wrote:
“The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in people and equipment ... and there were no more quiet days on the Eastern Front.”
On July 12, 1943, there was a turning point (and not a collapse, according to the interpretation of Brezhnev historians) in the development of the defensive battle on the southern face of the Kursk salient. The main enemy forces went on the defensive. On July 13-15, German troops continued their attacks only against units of the 5th Guards Tank and 69th Armies south of Prokhorovka. The maximum advance of German troops on the southern face reached 35 km. On July 16, they began to withdraw to their original positions.
If 800 wrecked and burnt tanks on the Prokhorovsky field, as well as the funeral conclusion of Heinz Guderian for the editor of the historical section of the Die Welt newspaper, “nothing special happened, and the Russians did not win”, then this is his personal stupid point of view, nothing more.
Of course, the publication with the feeble-minded "military expert" does not express the point of view of German historians, but expresses the opinion of certain political circles and parts of German society, trying to belittle the contribution of the Soviet people to the victory over fascism, and at the same time get rid of the complex of historical guilt in order to consolidate the ordnung Pax Germanica in Europe.
Of course, you can’t shut up every stinking Hellerhof, and you can’t throw a scarf over every “expert” mouth. But we must oppose the rampant demonism and dancing on the graves of the defenders of the Motherland with the historical truth, no matter how bitter it may be, protect and disseminate it in every possible way so that the generation of kol-iz-urengoy does not grow up with us ...
Moscow, Alexander Rostovtsev.
lieutenant general
SS Gruppenfuehrer
| The Great Patriotic War |
|---|
| Invasion of the USSR Karelia arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkov Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikiye Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right-Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomierz Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians the Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague |
Battle of Prokhorovka- a battle between parts of the German and Soviet armies during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk. Considered one of the largest armored battles in military history. It happened on July 12, 1943 on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge near the Prokhorovka station on the territory of the Oktyabrsky state farm (Belgorod region of the RSFSR).
The direct command of the troops during the battle was carried out by Lieutenant General of the Panzer Troops Pavel Rotmistrov and SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser.
None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.
The situation on the eve of the battle
Initially, the main attack of the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the operational line Yakovlevo - Oboyan. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and the Kempf Army Group went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, on the positions of 6- 1st and 7th Guards Armies on the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions. On July 6, two counterattacks were delivered against the advancing Germans from the side of the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (north) - Kalinin area by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repulsed by the forces of the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
To assist Katukov's 1st Panzer Army, which was fighting heavy battles in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 11 pm on July 7, the front commander signed directive No. 0014 / op on readiness for the transition to active operations from 10:30 am on the 8th. However, the counterattack inflicted by the forces of the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the brigades of the 1st TA, did not bring tangible results.
Having not achieved decisive success - by this moment the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command on the evening of July 9 decided, without stopping the offensive on Oboyan, to shift the tip of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka and go to Kursk through the bend of the river Psyol.
By July 11, the Germans took up their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army had concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defenses at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. It was planned to launch a counterattack from this area with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack, the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Against the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st division of the Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".
It should be noted that by this time the German offensive on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge had already begun to dry up - from July 10, the advancing units began to go on the defensive.
Major General Mikhail Ovsyannikov recalls:
Side forces
Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1500 tanks participated in the battle: about 800 from the Soviet side and 700 from the German side (eg TSB). In some cases, a slightly lower figure is indicated - 1200.
Many modern researchers believe that the forces brought into battle were probably much smaller. In particular, it is indicated that the battle took place in a narrow area (8-10 km wide), which was limited on one side by the river Psel, and on the other - by a railway embankment. It is difficult to introduce such significant masses of tanks into such a sector.
Germany
From the western direction, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (2nd SS TC) advanced on Prokhorovka, while the Adolf Hitler division operated in the strip between the Psyol River and the railway, and from the south - the 3rd SS Panzer Corps (3 TC). The presence of tanks and assault guns in the divisions of the 2nd SS TC as of the evening of July 11 and 3 TC as of the morning of July 12 is indicated in the table.
| Number, connection name | Pz.II | Pz.III 50/L42 |
Pz.III 50/L60 |
Pz.III 75 mm |
Pz.IV L24 |
Pz.IV L43 and L48 |
Pz.VI "Tiger" | T-34 | Total tanks and StuG | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2nd SS Panzer Corps | |||||||||||
| TD Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler" (at 19.25 11.07) | 4 | - | 5 | - | - | 47 | 4 | - | 10 | 7 | 77 |
| TD SS "Das Reich" (at 19.25 11.07) | - | - | 34 | - | - | 18 | 1 | 8 | 27 | 7 | 95 |
| TD SS "Totenkopf" (at 19.25 11.07) | - | - | 54 | - | 4 | 26 | 10 | - | 21 | 7 | 122 |
| 2nd SS Panzer Corps, total | 4 | - | 93 | - | 4 | 91 | 15 | 8 | 58 | 21 | 294 |
| 3rd Panzer Corps | |||||||||||
| 6th Panzer Division (on the morning of 11.07) | 2 | 2 | 11 | ? | - | 6 | - | - | - | 2 | 23 (?) |
| 7th Panzer Division (on the morning of 12.07) | - | - | 24 | 2 | 1 | 9 | - | - | - | 3 | 39 |
| 19th Panzer Division (on the morning of 12.07) | - | - | 7 | 4 | - | 3 | - | - | - | 1 | 15 |
| 503rd separate heavy tank battalion (on the morning of 11.07) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 23 | - | - | - | 23 |
| 228th separate battalion of assault guns (on the morning of 12.07) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 19 | - | 19 |
| 3rd Panzer Corps, total | 2 | 2 | 42 | 6 | 1 | 18 | 23 | - | 19 | 6 | 119 |
the USSR
The Soviet group included the following forces:
- 5th Guards Tank Army
- 18th Panzer Corps (18 TK)
- 29th Tank Corps (29th TK)
- 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (5th Guards MK)
- The 5th Guards Tank Army was also reinforced with formations
- 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (2nd Guards TTK)
| Combat vehicles | 29 tk | 18 tk | 2 tk | 2 Guards tk | 5 Guards mk | army units | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-34 | 120 | 68 | 35 | 84 | 120 | 36 | 436 |
| T-70 | 81 | 58 | 46 | 52 | 56 | 8 | 301 |
| Mk IV | - | 18 | 4 | 3 | - | - | 25 |
| SU-122 | 12 | - | - | - | 10 | - | 22 |
| SU-76 | 8 | - | - | - | 7 | - | 15 |
| Total tanks and self-propelled guns | 221 | 134 | 85 | 139 | 193 | 44 | 826 |
| On the way to st. Prokhorovka | 13 | 33 | - | - | 51 | 4 | 101 |
| Under repair | 2 | 6 | 9 | - | 1 | 6 | 24 |
| Total armored units | 236 | 183 | 94 | 139 | 245 | 54 | 951 |
G. A. Oleinikov, as of July 10, has 850 tanks in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 260 T-70, 501 T-34, 31 Mk IV Churchill and 57 SU-152.
The assessment of the forces of the parties very much depends on the geographical scope of the battle. In the area of the Oktyabrsky state farm, the 18th and 29th tank corps advanced - a total of 348 tanks.
Side Plans
1. The enemy in the Belgorod direction, having introduced large forces of tanks into battle, is trying to develop success in the sowing. direction - to Oboyan, Kursk (up to 400 tanks) and to the east. direction - to Aleksandrovsky, Skorodnoye, Stary Oskol (up to 300 tanks).
Near Pokrovka, Yakovlevo, Bol. Beacons marked up to 100 enemy tanks.
2. 5th Guards. tank army with 2 shopping malls, 2 guards. TTK, 10th IPTBR, 27th Cannon Artillery Brigade (Pabr), 522nd and 1148th High Power Howitzer Artillery Regiment (Gap), 26th Zen. div., 16 and 18 gmp (guards. mortar regiment), 1329 sap (self-propelled artillery regiment) from 10.00 12.07.43 strikes in the band: on the right - Beregovoe, Andreevka (excl.), Krasnaya Polyana, Krasnaya Dubrava; on the left - Right-hand, Belenikhino, elev. 232.0, mound with elev. +1.1 (3 km southeast. Yakovlevo) and in cooperation with the 5th Guards. A and 1 Guards. TA destroys the enemy grouping that has broken through in the area: Pokrovka, Greznoye, Kochetovka, preventing it from retreating to the south.
By the end of the day, it reaches the line: Krasnaya Dubrava, elev. 254.5, Yakovlevo, meaning to further advance in the south-west. direction.
Starting position at the turn: Polesnoe, Storozhevoe, Mal. Yablonovo - to take by 24.00 11.07.43
Attack readiness - 03.00 12.07.43
The beginning of the attack is an additional order.
3. 18 shopping malls with 80 gmp, one 76-mm iptap, one 57-mm iptap, 10 iptabr - break the enemy's resistance at the turn: Andreevka, a grove, which is north-west. state farm "Komsomolets", and destroy the enemy in the area: Krasnaya Dubrava, Bol. Moyachki, Krasnaya Polyana, turning the front to the north, to ensure the offensive operations of the army to the south.
4. 29 shopping mall from 76 GMP, 1529 SAP - to break the enemy's resistance at the turn: a grove (which is 1 km north of the Komsomolets state farm). Destroy his grouping in the area of Luchki, Bolshoi Mayachki, Pokrovka.
By the end of July 12, 1943, go to the area of Pokrovka and the groves west. and south. Pokrovki, in the future be ready for action to the south.
Before the start of the attack, the corps is supported by 378 gaps.
5. 2 Guards. TTK with 16 GMP, one 76-mm Iptap, 10 Ipeabr to break the enemy’s resistance at the turn: Yasnaya Polyana, Belenikhino, destroy his grouping in the Yakovlevo area and the forests to the east and be ready for an offensive to the south. direction.
8. Artillery
C) Tasks
a) a ten-minute fire attack along the front line in the area: Vasilievka, the Komsomolets state farm, Ivanovsky Vyselok, Belikhino;
b) five-minute methodical fire in the depths of the enemy;
c) a five-minute fire attack along the front line and depth of the enemy (fire is opened on objects, according to the requests, requirements of the corps commanders).RS Group:
a) a salvo of fire along the front line of the enemy’s defense at the moment of the beginning of enemy artillery treatment;
b) the second salvo - at the objects of the front line, the end of the artillery treatment.
The attack time was postponed several times and finally set to 8.30:
Commander of the 29th TC, Lieutenant General T. Kirichenko
1. The task of the body is the same ...
2. The beginning of the attack - 8.30 on 12.07.43. The beginning of artillery preparation from 8.00.
3. I allow you to use the radio from 07.00 7.00 12.07.43. Commander of the 5th Guards. TA Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov
2nd SS TC defeats the enemy south. Prokhorovka and thus creates the prerequisites for further advancement through Prokhorovka. Division assignments:
Division "MG" go on the offensive from the bridgehead at dawn, capture the heights of the north-east. and first of all go to the road Prokhorovka, Kartashevka. Take control of the river valley. Psyol with an attack from the southwest, securing the left flank of the AG division.
The AG division, holding the occupied line on the left flank, on the right flag, take Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, the department of the Stalinskoye state farm and x. Pits, as well as heights of 2 km east. With the onset of the threat from the river valley. Psyol, together with parts of the "MG" to capture Prokhorovka and height 252.4.
Division "R", holding the achieved lines on the right flank, take Vinogradovka and Ivanovka. After mastering the right-flank units of the "AG" division Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, using their success, transfer the main efforts in the direction of the south-west heights. Right-handedness. Hold the new frontier Ivanovka, heights southwest. Right-hand, heights 2 km east. Watchtower (suit).
The course of the battle
The first clash in the Prokhorovka area took place on the evening of 11 July. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o'clock, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, he discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by the forces of two tank brigades.
At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.
At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers received a significant advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west.
Very soon the battle formations mixed up. The high density of the battle, during which the tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tankers got the opportunity to accurately hit the most vulnerable places of heavily armored German vehicles.
One of the participants in this battle, Hero of the Soviet Union, Yevgeny Shkurdalov later recalled:
The battle formations were mixed up. From a direct hit by shells, the tanks exploded at full speed. Tore off the towers, caterpillars flew to the sides. No single shots were heard. There was a complete roar. There were moments when in the smoke we could distinguish our own and German tanks only by their silhouettes. Tankers jumped out of the burning vehicles and rolled on the ground, trying to put out the flames.
South of the main battle, the German tank group "Kempf" was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet grouping on the left flank. The threat of coverage forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.
At about 1 pm, the Germans withdrew the 11th Panzer Division from the reserve, which, together with the "Dead Head" division, attacked the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to help them, and the attack was repulsed.
By 2 p.m., the Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy to the west. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.
There are other versions of this battle.
Version based on the memoirs of German generals
Based on the memoirs of German generals (Guderian, Mellenthin, etc.), about 700 (some probably lagged behind on the march - "on paper" the army had more than a thousand vehicles) Soviet tanks took part in the battle, of which about 270 were knocked out (meaning only the morning battle on July 12). Aviation did not take part in the battle, even scouts did not fly from the German side. The clash of tank masses was unexpected for both sides, since both tank groupings were solving their offensive tasks and did not expect to meet a serious enemy.
According to Rotmistrov's memoirs, his army was supposed to break through the front and move to Kharkov (this is indirectly confirmed by the qualitative composition of the army, half consisting of light vehicles and almost no heavy ones), bypassing the German tank cluster, located, according to intelligence, 70 km from Prokhorovka and "Successfully attacked" at that moment by attack aircraft.
The groups were moving towards each other not "head on" but at a noticeable angle. The Germans were the first to notice the Soviet tanks and managed to regroup and prepare for battle. Light and most of the medium vehicles attacked from the flank and forced Rotmistrov's tankers to attract all the attention, who began to change the direction of the attack on the move. This caused inevitable confusion and allowed a company of Tigers, supported by self-propelled guns and part of medium tanks, to attack unexpectedly from the other side. Soviet tanks were under crossfire, and only a few saw where the second attack was being carried out.
The tank dump took place only in the direction of the first German strike, the "tigers" fired without interference, as in a shooting range (individual crews claimed up to 30 victories). It wasn't a fight, it was a beating.
Nevertheless, Soviet tankers managed to disable a quarter of the German tanks. The corps was forced to stop for two days. By that time, the counterattacks of the Soviet troops on the flanks of the German strike groups had begun, and the further offensive of the corps became unpromising. As at Borodino in 1812, a tactical defeat eventually became a victory.
Other versions
Results
According to the study of A. V. Isaev:
The counterattack of the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area was an expected move for the Germans. Back in the spring of 1943, more than a month before the offensive, the option of repelling a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area was being worked out, and units of the II SS Panzer Corps knew perfectly well what to do. Instead of moving to Oboyan, the SS divisions "Leibstandarte" and "Dead Head" were substituted under the counterattack of the army of P. A. Rotmistrov. As a result, the planned flank counterattack degenerated into a head-on collision with large German tank forces. The 18th and 29th tank corps lost up to 70% of their tanks and were actually taken out of the game ...
Despite this, the operation took place in a very tense situation, and only offensive, I emphasize, offensive actions of other fronts made it possible to avoid a catastrophic development of events.
However, the German offensive ended in failure, and the Germans did not undertake such large-scale attacks near Kursk.
According to German data, the battlefield remained behind them and they were able to evacuate most of the wrecked tanks, some of which were subsequently restored and put back into battle.
In addition to their cars, the Germans "pulled off" several Soviet ones. After Prokhorovka, there were already 12 “thirty-fours” in the corps. The losses of Soviet tankers amounted to at least 270 vehicles (of which only two tanks were heavy) in the morning battle and a couple of dozen more during the day - according to the memoirs of the Germans, small groups of Soviet tanks and even individual vehicles appeared on the battlefield until evening. Probably, it was the stragglers who were pulling up on the march.
Nevertheless, having disabled a quarter of the enemy tanks (and given the qualitative balance of forces of the parties and the unexpectedness of the strike, this was extremely difficult), the Soviet tankers forced him to stop and, ultimately, abandon the offensive.
| According to the military archive of Germany, from July 10 to July 16, the 2nd SS TC lost 4178 people (about 16% of the combat strength), including 755 killed, 3351 wounded and 68 missing. In the battle on July 12, he lost: killed - 149 people, wounded - 660, missing - 33, total - 842 soldiers and officers. 3 TC from July 5 to 20 lost - 8489 people, of which on the outskirts of Prokhorovka from July 12 to 16 - approximately 2790 people. Based on the above data, both corps (six tank and two infantry divisions) from July 10 to 16 lost about 7 thousand soldiers and officers in the battles near Prokhorovka. The ratio of losses in people is about 6:1 in favor of the enemy. Disappointing numbers. Especially when you consider that our troops were on the defensive, possessing superiority in forces and means over the advancing enemy. Unfortunately, the facts show that by July 1943 our troops had not yet fully mastered the science of winning with little bloodshed (Lopukhovsky). |
According to the research of A. Tomzov, referring to the data of the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV tanks and 2 - Pz. III, in the short term - 15 tanks Pz.IV and 1 - Pz.III. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS TC on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf Division.
| Compound | Personnel, total | Dead Losses | Source of loss | Tanks and self-propelled guns in the ranks | Participated in battle | Losses (burned out / knocked out) | Source of loss of tanks and self-propelled guns | In service at 13.00 13.07.43 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18 tk | 471 | 271 | TsAMO RF, f. 18 shopping mall, op. 2, d. 5, l. 125 | 183 | 149 | 84 (35/49) | TsAMO RF f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. 75, l. 32 | 33 |
| 29 tk | 1991 | 1033 | TsAMO RF, f. 332, op. 4948, d. 80, l. 7 | 215 | 199 | 153 (103/50) | TsAMO RF f. 332, op. 4948, house 46 | 51 |
| 2 tk | 124 | 36 | 59 | 52 | 22 (11/11) | TsAMO RF f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. 67, l. 12 l. 70 l. 203 | 44 | |
| 2 Guards tk | 550 | 145 | 140 | 138 | 54 (29/25) | TsAMO RF f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. 75, l. 20,28,34 | 80 | |
| 5 Guards mk (at 18.00) | 405 | ? | 158 | 66 | 15 (5/10) | TsAMO RF f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, d. 70, l. 137 arr. | 158 |
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