Defense of the Brest Fortress. Heroic defense of the Brest Fortress All about the Brest Fortress and its defenders

The events of 1941 and 78 years later keep many secrets. This fully applies to the history of the defense of the Brest Fortress, which, it would seem, has been thoroughly studied and has already become a kind of symbol of the tragedy.

An unknown senior lieutenant, captured in the Brest Fortress: judging by his haggard, haggard face, he could well have been one of its last defenders. Archival photos from the collection of Ilya Ryzhov

Research in recent years allows us to supplement the legend with new facts.

Not only infantry

Contrary to numerous films depicting the defenders as fierce “suicide bombers with sapper blades at the ready,” the Red Army soldiers on the first day of the war outnumbered the Germans not only in numbers, but also in means of combat. For example, the defenders could counter the anti-tank gun and infantry howitzer deployed by the Germans on June 22 with several surviving guns, anti-aircraft guns and mortars. And the battery of assault guns introduced into battle at noon included armored vehicles (with 45 mm guns) and T-38s (light amphibious tanks armed with machine guns).

However, the use of all this technology required a much greater level of organization than the legendary “attack with sapper blades.” Therefore, the use of armored vehicles and artillery did not give the necessary result. The sudden attack and lack of command staff prevented the organization of defense using “strong but complex” firepower.

Chechens, Uzbeks, Armenians - defenders of Brest

Beginning in 1939, the conscription into the ranks of the Red Army of representatives not only of the “worker-peasant strata” and a number of previously “non-conscripted” nationalities led to the fact that some formations began to have a significant layer of national minorities.

This especially applied to those formations that were deployed to full strength: the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions stationed in Brest were among them.

The scope of the “problem of a multinational state” is illustrated by the situation in the 455th Infantry Regiment, 40 percent of which (mostly natives of Central Asia and the North Caucasus) did not know Russian. This forced commanders to create “national units”, where sergeants of the same nationality who had mastered the Russian language could engage in combat training with conscripts more effectively.

Some soldiers drafted from Central Asia were not given a uniform (at least, this conclusion can be drawn based on this photograph, which was among the “Brest photos” of a German soldier who stormed the Brest Fortress)

The sudden start of the war and the absence of command personnel (usually living a few kilometers from the fortress) led to the fact that the garrison broke up into detachments formed on the basis of nationality and fraternities. It helped to coordinate the battle that many of the defenders were communists or Komsomol members and communicated with the Komsomol activists of other units.

The last defenders of Brest

At the end of July 1941, the military commandant Walter von Unruh, who arrived in Brest, began his activities with the final cleansing of the fortress. A certain “commander and his soldiers” were discovered and captured. Who they are is still unknown.

And a certain “water fort (Wasserfort) south of Brest” held out until mid-August. His defenders and their fate remain unknown. The author is sure that we are talking about the fifth fort, where, most likely, those who were able to previously break out of the fortress took refuge. But these are just assumptions.

USSR losses Total: about 962 people died. Losses of Nazi Germany Total: 482 killed, about 1,000 wounded.

Special project "Hero Cities". Photo archive of the Brest Fortress.

Defense of the Brest Fortress (defense of Brest)- one of the very first battles between the Soviet and German armies during the period Great Patriotic War.

Brest was one of the border garrisons on the territory of the USSR, it covered the path to the central highway leading to Minsk. That is why Brest was one of the first cities to be attacked after the German attack. The Soviet army held back the enemy's onslaught for a week, despite the numerical superiority of the Germans, as well as support from artillery and aviation. As a result of a long siege, the Germans were still able to take possession of the main fortifications of the Brest Fortress and destroy them. However, in other areas, the struggle continued for quite a long time - small groups remaining after the raid resisted the enemy with all their might.

The defense of the Brest Fortress became a very important battle in which Soviet troops were able to show their readiness to defend themselves to the last drop of blood, despite the enemy’s advantages. The defense of Brest went down in history as one of the bloodiest sieges, and at the same time, as one of the greatest battles that showed all the courage of the Soviet army.

Brest Fortress on the eve of the war

The city of Brest became part of the Soviet Union shortly before the start of the war - in 1939. By that time, the fortress had already lost its military significance due to the destruction that had begun, and remained as one of the reminders of past battles. The Brest Fortress was built in the 19th century and was part of the defensive fortifications of the Russian Empire on its western borders, but in the 20th century it ceased to have military significance.

By the time the war began, the Brest Fortress was mainly used to house garrisons of military personnel, as well as a number of families of the military command, a hospital and utility rooms. By the time of Germany’s treacherous attack on the USSR, about 8,000 military personnel and about 300 command families lived in the fortress. There were weapons and supplies in the fortress, but their quantity was not designed for military operations.

Storming of the Brest Fortress

The assault on the Brest Fortress began in the morning June 22, 1941 simultaneously with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The barracks and residential buildings of the command were the first to be subjected to powerful artillery fire and air strikes, since the Germans wanted, first of all, to completely destroy the entire command staff located in the fortress and thereby introduce confusion into the army and disorient it.

Despite the fact that almost all the officers were killed, the surviving soldiers were able to quickly find their bearings and create a powerful defense. The surprise factor did not work as Hitler expected and the assault, which according to plans was supposed to end by 12 noon, lasted for several days.

Even before the start of the war, the Soviet command issued a decree according to which, in the event of an attack, military personnel must immediately leave the fortress itself and take positions along its perimeter, but only a few managed to do this - most of the soldiers remained in the fortress. The defenders of the fortress were in a deliberately losing position, but even this fact did not allow them to give up their positions and allow the Germans to quickly and unconditionally take possession of Brest.

The progress of the defense of the Brest Fortress

Soviet soldiers, who, contrary to plans, were unable to quickly leave the fortress, were nevertheless able to quickly organize a defense and within a few hours drive the Germans out of the territory of the fortress, who managed to get into its citadel (central part). The soldiers also occupied barracks and various buildings located along the perimeter of the citadel in order to most effectively organize the defense of the fortress and be able to repel enemy attacks from all flanks. Despite the absence of a commanding staff, very quickly volunteers were found from among ordinary soldiers who took command and directed the operation.

22nd of June It was committed 8 attempts to break into the fortress from the Germans, but they did not produce results. Moreover, the German army, contrary to all forecasts, suffered significant losses. The German command decided to change tactics - instead of an assault, they now planned a siege of the Brest Fortress. The troops that broke through were recalled and sorted around the perimeter of the fortress in order to begin a long siege and cut off the Soviet troops' path to exit, as well as disrupt the supply of food and weapons.

On the morning of June 23, the bombardment of the fortress began, after which an assault was attempted again. Some groups of the German army broke through, but encountered fierce resistance and were destroyed - the assault failed again, and the Germans had to return to siege tactics. Extensive battles began, which did not subside for several days and greatly exhausted both armies.

The battle lasted for several days. Despite the onslaught of the German army, as well as shelling and bombing, Soviet soldiers held the line, although they lacked weapons and food. A few days later, the supply of drinking water was stopped, and then the defenders decided to release women and children from the fortress so that they would surrender to the Germans and remain alive, but some of the women refused to leave the fortress and continued to fight.

On June 26, the Germans made several more attempts to break into the Brest Fortress; they succeeded partially - several groups broke through. Only by the end of the month was the German army able to capture most of the fortress, killing Soviet soldiers. However, the groups, scattered and having lost a single line of defense, still continued to put up desperate resistance even when the fortress was taken by the Germans.

The significance and results of the defense of the Brest Fortress

The resistance of individual groups of soldiers continued until the fall, until all these groups were destroyed by the Germans and the last defender of the Brest Fortress died. During the defense of the Brest Fortress, Soviet troops suffered colossal losses, but at the same time, the army showed genuine courage, thereby showing that the war for the Germans would not be as easy as Hitler had hoped. The defenders were recognized as war heroes.

After the start of the Great Patriotic War, the garrison of the Brest Fortress heroically held back the onslaught of the 45th German Infantry Division, which was supported by artillery and aviation, for a week.

After a general assault on June 29–30, the Germans managed to capture the main fortifications. But the defenders of the fortress continued to fight courageously for almost three more weeks in certain areas in conditions of shortage of water, food, ammunition and medicine. The defense of the Brest Fortress became the first, but eloquent lesson that showed the Germans what awaited them in the future.

Fighting in the Brest Fortress

The defense of an old fortress that had lost its military significance near the city of Brest, incorporated into the USSR in 1939, is an undoubted example of perseverance and courage. The Brest Fortress was built in the 19th century as part of a system of fortifications created on the western borders of the Russian Empire. By the time Germany attacked the Soviet Union, it could no longer carry out serious defensive tasks and its central part, consisting of the citadel and three adjacent main fortifications, was used to house a border detachment, border covering units, NKVD troops, engineering units, a hospital and auxiliary units. At the time of the attack, there were about 8 thousand military personnel in the fortress, up to 300 families of command personnel, a number of persons undergoing military training, medical personnel and personnel of economic services - in all, in all likelihood, more than 10 thousand people.

At dawn on June 22, 1941, the fortress, primarily the barracks and residential buildings of the command staff, was subjected to powerful artillery fire, after which the fortifications were attacked by German assault troops. The assault on the fortress was led by battalions of the 45th Infantry Division.

The German command hoped that the surprise of the attack and powerful artillery preparation would disorganize the troops stationed in the fortress and break their will to resist. According to calculations, the assault on the fortress should have ended by 12 noon. However, the German staff officers miscalculated.

Despite the surprise, significant losses and the death of a large number of commanders, the garrison personnel showed courage and tenacity, unexpected for the Germans. The position of the fortress defenders was hopeless.

Only part of the personnel managed to leave the fortress (according to the plans, in the event of a threat of hostilities, the troops were to take positions outside it), after which the fortress was completely surrounded.

They managed to destroy the detachments that broke into the central part of the fortress (the citadel) and took up defense in strong defensive barracks located along the perimeter of the citadel, as well as in various buildings, ruins, basements and casemates both in the citadel and on the territory of the adjacent fortifications. The defenders were led by commanders and political workers, in some cases by ordinary soldiers who took command.

During June 22, the defenders of the fortress repelled 8 enemy attacks. The German troops suffered unexpectedly high losses, so by the evening all the groups that had broken through to the territory of the fortress were recalled, a blockade line was created behind the outer ramparts, and military operations began to take on the character of a siege. On the morning of June 23, after artillery shelling and aerial bombardment, the enemy continued to attempt an assault. The fighting in the fortress took on a fierce, protracted character, which the Germans did not expect. By the evening of June 23, their losses amounted to more than 300 people killed alone, which was almost double the losses of the 45th Infantry Division during the entire Polish campaign.

In the following days, the defenders of the fortress continued to resist steadfastly, ignoring the calls for surrender transmitted through radio installations and the promises of the envoys. However, their strength gradually dwindled. The Germans brought up siege artillery. Using flamethrowers, barrels of flammable mixtures, powerful explosive charges, and, according to some sources, poisonous or asphyxiating gases, they gradually suppressed pockets of resistance. The defenders experienced a shortage of ammunition and food. The water supply was destroyed, and it was impossible to get to the water in the bypass channels, because... the Germans opened fire on everyone who came into view.

A few days later, the defenders of the fortress decided that the women and children who were among them should leave the fortress and surrender to the mercy of the victors. But still, some women remained in the fortress until the last days of hostilities. After June 26, several attempts were made to break out of the besieged fortress, but only a few small groups were able to break through.

By the end of June, the enemy managed to capture most of the fortress; on June 29 and 30, the Germans launched a continuous two-day assault on the fortress, alternating attacks with artillery shelling and aerial bombardment using heavy aerial bombs. They managed to destroy and capture the main groups of defenders in the Citadel and the Eastern Redoubt of the Kobrin fortification, after which the defense of the fortress broke up into a number of separate centers. A small group of fighters continued to fight in the Eastern Redoubt until July 12, and later in the caponier behind the outer rampart of the fortification. The group was headed by Major Gavrilov and deputy political instructor G.D. Derevianko, being seriously wounded, was captured on July 23.

Individual defenders of the fortress, hiding in the basements and casemates of the fortifications, continued their personal war until the autumn of 1941, and their struggle is covered in legends.

The enemy did not get any of the banners of the military units fighting in the fortress. The total losses of the 45th German Infantry Division, according to the divisional report, on June 30, 1941, were 482 killed, including 48 officers, and over 1,000 wounded. According to the report, German troops captured 7,000 people, which apparently included everyone who was captured in the fortress, incl. civilians and children. The remains of 850 of its defenders are buried in a mass grave on the territory of the fortress.

Battle of Smolensk

In mid-summer - early autumn of 1941, Soviet troops carried out a complex of defensive and offensive operations in the Smolensk area aimed at preventing an enemy breakthrough in the Moscow strategic direction and known as the Battle of Smolensk.

In July 1941, the German Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal T. von Bock) sought to fulfill the task set by the German command - to encircle the Soviet troops defending the line of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, to capture Vitebsk, Orsha, Smolensk and open the way to Moscow .

In order to thwart the enemy's plans and prevent his breakthrough to Moscow and the central industrial regions of the country, the Soviet High Command concentrated troops of the 2nd strategic echelon (22nd, 19th, 20th, 16th and 21st) from the end of June. I army) along the middle reaches of the Western Dvina and Dnieper. At the beginning of June, these troops were included in the Western Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko). However, only 37 of the 48 divisions were in position at the start of the German offensive. 24 divisions were in the first echelon. Soviet troops were unable to create a strong defense, and the density of troops was very low - each division had to defend a strip 25–30 km wide. The second echelon troops deployed 210–240 km east of the main line.

By this time, formations of the 4th Tank Army had reached the Dnieper and Western Dvina, and the infantry divisions of the 16th German Army from Army Group North had reached the section from Idritsa to Drissa. More than 30 infantry divisions of the 9th and 2nd armies of the German Army Group Center, delayed by the fighting in Belarus, lagged behind the mobile forces by 120–150 km. Nevertheless, the enemy began the offensive in the Smolensk direction, having a 2-4 times superiority in manpower over the troops of the Western Front

and technology.

The offensive of German troops on the right wing and in the center of the Western Front began on July 10, 1941. A strike force consisting of 13 infantry, 9 tank and 7 motorized divisions broke through the Soviet defenses. The enemy's mobile formations advanced up to 200 km, surrounded Mogilev, captured Orsha, part of Smolensk, Yelnya, and Krichev. The 16th and 20th armies of the Western Front found themselves in operational encirclement in the Smolensk region.

On July 21, the troops of the Western Front, having received reinforcements, launched a counter-offensive in the direction of Smolensk, and in the zone of the 21st Army, a group of three cavalry divisions carried out a raid on the flank and rear of the main forces of Army Group Center. From the enemy side, the approaching infantry divisions of the 9th and 2nd German armies entered the fight. On July 24, the 13th and 21st armies were united into the Central Front (commander - Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov).

It was not possible to defeat the enemy’s Smolensk group, but as a result of intense battles, Soviet troops thwarted the offensive of German tank groups, helped the 20th and 16th armies escape from encirclement across the Dnieper River and forced Army Group Center to go on the defensive on July 30. At the same time, the Soviet High Command united all reserve troops and the Mozhaisk defense line (39 divisions in total) into the Reserve Front under the command of Army General G.K. Zhukov.

On August 8, German troops resumed their offensive, this time to the south - in the Central and then Bryansk Front (created on August 16, commander - Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko), in order to protect their flank from the threat of Soviet troops from the south. By August 21, the enemy managed to advance 120–140 km and wedge itself between the Central and Bryansk fronts. In view of the threat of encirclement, on August 19, the Headquarters authorized the withdrawal of the troops of the Central and the troops of the Southwestern Front operating to the south beyond the Dnieper. The armies of the Central Front were transferred to the Bryansk Front. On August 17, the troops of the Western Front and two armies of the Reserve Front went on the offensive, which inflicted noticeable losses on the Dukhshchina and Elninsk enemy groups.

The troops of the Bryansk Front continued to repel the advance of the 2nd German Tank Group and the 2nd German Army. A massive air strike (up to 460 aircraft) against the enemy’s 2nd Tank Group was unable to stop its advance to the south. On the right wing of the Western Front, the enemy launched a strong tank attack on the 22nd Army and captured Toropets on August 29. The 22nd and 29th armies retreated to the eastern bank of the Western Dvina. On September 1, the 30th, 19th, 16th and 20th armies launched an offensive, but did not achieve significant success. By September 8, the defeat of the enemy group was completed and the dangerous protrusion of the front in the Yelnya area was eliminated. On September 10, the troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts went on the defensive on the lines along the Subost, Desna, and Western Dvina rivers.

Despite the significant losses suffered during the Battle of Smolensk, the Soviet army managed to force German troops to go on the defensive in the main direction for the first time during World War II. The Battle of Smolensk was an important stage in the disruption of the German plan for a lightning war against the Soviet Union. The Soviet army gained time to prepare the defense of the capital of the USSR and subsequent victories in the battles near Moscow.

Tank battle in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne area

From June 23 to June 29, 1941, during border clashes in the Lutsk-Brody-Rovno area, a counter tank battle took place between the advancing German 1st Panzer Group and the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, which launched a counterattack, together with the combined arms formations of the front.

Already on the first day of the war, three corps that were in reserve received orders from front headquarters to move northeast of Rivne and strike, together with the 22nd Mechanized Corps (which was already there), on the left flank of von Kleist’s tank group. While the reserve corps were approaching the concentration site, the 22nd Corps managed to suffer heavy losses during battles with German units, and the 15th Corps, located to the south, was unable to break through the dense German anti-tank defense. The reserve corps approached one by one.

The 8th Corps was the first to arrive at the new location with a forced march, and it immediately had to go into battle alone, since the situation that had developed by that time in the 22nd Corps was very difficult. The approaching corps included T-34 and KV tanks, and the military contingent was well prepared. This helped the corps maintain combat effectiveness during battles with superior enemy forces. Later, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps arrived and also immediately entered into hostilities. The inexperienced crews of these corps, exhausted by 4-day marches and continuous German air raids, found it difficult to resist the experienced tank crews of the German 1st Panzer Group.

Unlike the 8th Corps, they were armed with old T-26 and BT models, which were significantly inferior in maneuverability to modern T-34s, and most of the vehicles were damaged during air raids on the march. It so happened that the front headquarters was unable to gather all the reserve corps simultaneously for a powerful strike, and each of them had to engage in battle in turn.

As a result, the strongest tank group of the Red Army lost its striking power even before the truly critical phase of the fighting on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front arose. Nevertheless, the front headquarters managed to preserve the integrity of its troops for a while, but when the strength of the tank units was running out, the headquarters gave the order to retreat to the old Soviet-Polish border.

Despite the fact that these counterattacks did not lead to the defeat of the 1st Panzer Group, they forced the German command, instead of attacking Kyiv, to turn its main forces to repel the counterattack and use its reserves prematurely. The Soviet command gained time to withdraw the Lvov group of troops that was under threat of encirclement and prepare defense on the approaches to Kyiv.

Perhaps the most well-known episode of the beginning Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 - feat of the defenders Brest Fortress . The official version read - "the small garrison pinned down significant enemy forces for a month".

However, this is not entirely true. And although it's a feat defenders of the Brest Fortress There are many books, films and articles devoted to this, I will risk giving my description of the events, using both Soviet and German sources.

As S.S. Smirnov wrote in the book :

"in the spring of 1941 on the territory Brest Fortress units of two rifle divisions of the Soviet Army were stationed. These were persistent, seasoned, well-trained troops... One of these divisions - 6th Oryol Red Banner- had a long and glorious military history... Another - 42nd Rifle Division- was created in 1940 during the Finnish campaign and has already managed to show itself well in battles on Mannerheim lines."

On the eve of the war, more than half of the units of these two divisions were withdrawn from the Brest Fortress to the camps for exercises - 10 of 18 rifle battalions, 3 of 4 artillery regiments, one of two anti-tank and air defense divisions, reconnaissance battalions and some other units. On the morning of June 22, 1941, the following were in the fortress:

84th Infantry Regiment without two battalions
125th Infantry Regiment
333rd Infantry Regiment without battalion and engineer company
44th Infantry Regiment without two battalions
455th Infantry Regiment without battalion and engineer company

according to the state, this should have been 10,074 personnel, in battalions there were 16 anti-tank guns and 120 mortars, in regiments there were 50 guns and anti-tank guns, 20 mortars. 131st artillery regiment

98th Anti-Tank Defense Battalion

393rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion

75th reconnaissance battalion

37th Signal Battalion

31st Autobat

158th Autobat

by state - 2,169 personnel, 42 artillery pieces, 16 light tanks, 13 armored vehicles.

rear units of the 33rd Engineer Regiment and 22nd Tank Division

132nd convoy battalion of the NKVD troops

3rd Border Commandant's Office of the 17th Detachment

9th border post

District Hospital (on the South Island. Most of the staff and patients were captured in the first hours of the war)

States NKVD battalion , border guards and hospitals are unknown to me. Of course the available strength in the units was significantly lower than the regular number . But in fact, on the morning of June 22, 1941, in the Brest Fortress there was a total incomplete division - without 1 rifle battalion, 3 sapper companies and a howitzer regiment. Plus the NKVD battalion and border guards. On average, the divisions of the Special Western Military District by June 22, 1941 actually had about 9,300 personnel, i.e. 63% from the state.

Thus, it can be assumed that only Brest Fortress on the morning of June 22nd it was more than 8 thousand soldiers and commanders , not counting hospital staff and patients.

On the front where it was located , as well as the railway line north of the fortress and the highway south of the fortress, the Germans were supposed to advance 45th Infantry Division(from the former Austrian army) of the 12th Army Corps, which had combat experience in the Polish and French campaigns.

The total staffing strength of this division was to be 17.7 thousand, and its combat units (infantry, artillery, engineers, reconnaissance, communications) were to be 15.1 thousand . Of these, 10.5 thousand are infantrymen, sappers, and reconnaissance officers (together with their own rear personnel).

So, the Germans had a numerical superiority in manpower (counting the total number of combat units). As for artillery, the Germans, in addition to the divisional artillery regiment (whose guns did not penetrate one and a half to two-meter walls of casemates) had two 600 mm self-propelled mortars 040 - the so-called "Carls". The total ammunition load of these two guns was 16 shells (one mortar jammed on the first shot). Also, the Germans in the area of the Brest Fortress had more 9 mortars of 211 mm caliber . And besides - regiment of multi-barrel rocket launchers (54 six-barreled Nebelwerfers of 158.5 mm caliber) - and such Soviet weapons were not yet available not only in the Brest Fortress, but in the entire Red Army...

The Germans decided in advance that Brest Fortress will have to be taken only by infantry - without tanks. Their use was hampered by forests, swamps, river channels and canals surrounding the fortress. (However, the Germans still had to use tanks inside the fortress; more on that below.)

The immediate task 45th Division was: the capture of the Brest Fortress, the railway bridge across the Bug north-west of the fortress and several bridges across the Bug and Mukhavets rivers inside, south and east of the fortress. In the first echelon of the division were 135th Infantry Regiment(supported by armored train No. 28) And 130th Infantry Regiment(without one infantry battalion, which was in the division's reserve). By the end of the day on June 22, 1941, the division was supposed to reach a line 7-8 km from the Soviet-German border.

According to the German plan, it was supposed to be taken within no more than eight hours.

The Germans began fighting June 22, 1941 at 3.15 am Berlin time - by artillery and rocket launchers. Every 4 minutes artillery fire was transferred 100 meters to the east. At 3.19 the assault squad ( infantry company and sappers) on 9 rubber motor boats headed to capture the bridges. At 3.30 another German infantry company with the support of sappers, the railway bridge across the Bug was taken.

By 4.00, the assault detachment, having lost two-thirds of its personnel, captured two bridges connecting the Western and Southern islands with the Citadel (the central part of the Brest Fortress). These two islands, defended only border guards and NKVD battalion , were taken two infantry battalions also by 4.00.

At 6.23 headquarters 45th Division reported to corps headquarters that North Island would soon be taken Brest Fortress. The report said that Soviet resistance had intensified, with the use of armored vehicles, but the situation was under control.

However, at 8.50 the fighting in the fortress continued. Command 45th Division decided to bring the reserve into battle - the 133rd Infantry Regiment. By this time the fighting was two of the five German battalion commanders were killed and the regimental commander was seriously wounded.

At 10.50 headquarters 45th Division reported to the corps command about heavy losses and stubborn fighting in the fortress. The report stated:

“The Russians are resisting fiercely, especially behind our attacking companies. In the Citadel, the enemy organized a defense with infantry units supported by 35-40 tanks and armored vehicles. The fire of enemy snipers led to heavy losses among officers and non-commissioned officers.”

Let me remind you that according to the state 75th reconnaissance battalion was supposed to have 16 T-38 light tanks and 13 BA-10 armored vehicles. T-38 tanks were armed with only one 7.62 mm machine gun and had 9 mm armor (bulletproof). The BA-10 armored vehicles were armed with a 45 mm cannon and two 7.62 mm machine guns, with 10 mm armor. These vehicles could act quite effectively against infantry.

No Soviet data could be found regarding the total number of Soviet armored vehicles in the Brest Fortress. Perhaps the fortress contained part of the armored vehicles of the second reconnaissance battalion or 22nd Panzer Division (its rear parts, possibly repair ones, were located in the fortress).

IN 14.30 commander 45th Infantry Division Lieutenant General Schlieper, being on the Northern Island, partially occupied by the Germans, decided at nightfall to withdraw the units that had already penetrated the Central Island, since, in his opinion, it was impossible to take the Citadel by infantry alone. General Schlieper decided that in order to avoid unnecessary losses, the Citadel should be starved out and subjected to constant shelling, since the railway line north of the Brest Fortress and the road south of it could already be used by the Germans to advance to the east.

At the same time, in the center of the Citadel, in the former fortress church, they found themselves surrounded by about 70 German soldiers from the 3rd battalion of the 135th infantry regiment. This battalion entered the Citadel from the Western Island in the morning, captured the church as an important stronghold, and moved to the eastern tip of the Central Island, where it was supposed to link up with the 1st Battalion of the 135th Regiment. However, the 1st Battalion failed to break into the Citadel from the South Island, and the 3rd Battalion, having suffered losses, retreated back to the church.

In battles for one day June 22, 1941 45th Infantry Division during the assault Brest Fortress suffered unprecedented losses for her - only killed 21 officer and 290 soldiers and non-commissioned officers.

Meanwhile 31st and 34th Infantry Divisions, advancing to the left and to the right 45th Division, advanced by the evening of June 22, 1941 by 20-25 kilometers.

June 23 from 5.00 the Germans began shelling the Citadel, while they had to try not to hit their soldiers surrounded in the church. The shelling continued all day. German infantry strengthened positions around the positions of the fortress defenders.

For the first time against Brest Fortress German tanks were used. More precisely, captured French tanks Somua S-35 - armed with a 47 mm cannon and a 7.5 mm machine gun, quite well armored and fast. There were 4 of them - included in armored train No. 28.

One of these tanks was hit by hand grenades at the Northern Gate of the fortress. The second tank broke through into the central courtyard of the Citadel, but was hit by a gun from the 333rd regiment. The Germans managed to evacuate both damaged tanks. The third tank was hit by an anti-aircraft gun at the Northern Gate of the fortress.

On the same day, the besieged on the Central Island discovered two large weapons depots - a large number of PPD machine guns, cartridges, as well as mortars with ammunition. The defenders of the fortress began to massively fire at German positions south of the Citadel.

In the North Island, as well as from the South Island, German vehicles with loudspeakers began calling on the defenders to surrender. At 17.15 the Germans announced a cessation of artillery shelling for an hour and a half - for those wishing to surrender. Several hundred people came out of the ruins, a significant part of them were women and children of commanding families.

As darkness fell, several groups of besieged tried to escape from the fortress. Like the day before, all these attempts ended in failure - those who broke through either died, were captured, or again took up defensive positions.

June 24 The Germans sent a battle group, which relieved those surrounded in the church, and then they left the Citadel. In addition to the Central Island, the eastern part of the North Island still remained under the control of the defenders of the fortress. The Germans continued shelling all day.

At 16.00 on June 24, headquarters 45th Division reported that the Citadel had been taken and that individual pockets of resistance were being cleared. At 21.40, the capture of the Brest Fortress was reported to the corps headquarters. However, fighting continued.

The Germans formed combat groups of sappers and infantry, which methodically eliminated the remaining pockets of resistance. For this purpose, demolition charges and flamethrowers were used, however June 25 The German sappers had only one flamethrower left (out of nine), which they could not use without the support of armored vehicles.

June 26 On the North Island, German sappers blew up the wall of the political school building. It was taken there 450 prisoners.

Only the East Fort remained the main center of resistance on the North Island. According to the testimony of the defector, 27th of June defended there until 400 soldiers and commanders headed by Major Gavrilov .

The Germans used the two remaining tanks from their fleet against the fort. armored train No. 28- French Somua tank and captured Soviet tank. These tanks fired at the embrasures of the fort, as a result, as stated in the headquarters report 45th Division, “The Russians began to behave more quietly, but the continuous shooting of snipers continued from the most unexpected places.”

On the Central Island, the remnants of the defenders, concentrated in the northern barracks of the Citadel, decided to fight their way out of the fortress June 26 . In the vanguard went a detachment from 100-120 fighters under the command of Lieutenant Vinogradov. The detachment managed to break through the fortress, losing half of its strength, but the rest of the besieged on the Central Island failed to do this - having suffered heavy losses, they returned back. On the evening of June 26, the remnants of Lieutenant Vinogradov’s detachment were surrounded by the Germans and almost completely destroyed. Vinogradov and several soldiers were captured.

Attempts to break out from Central Island continued on June 27 and 28. They were discontinued due to heavy losses.

June 28 the same two German tanks and several self-propelled guns, returning from repairs to the front, continued to fire at the East Fort on the North Island. However, this did not bring visible results, and the commander 45th Division turned to for support Luftwaffe. However, due to low cloud cover that day, no airstrike was carried out.

June 29 at 8.00 a German bomber dropped a 500-kilogram bomb on the Eastern Fort. Then another 500 kg bomb was dropped and finally an 1800 kg bomb. The fort was practically destroyed. By nightfall they were captured 389 people .

In the morning 30 June the ruins of the Eastern Fort were searched, several wounded defenders were found (Major Gavrilov was not found - he was captured only on July 23, 1941). Headquarters 45th Division reported on the complete capture of the Brest Fortress.

Command 45th Division The Wehrmacht did not expect that it would suffer such high losses from the defenders of the Brest Fortress. In the divisional report from June 30, 1941 it says: "The division took 7,000 prisoners, including 100 officers. Our losses were 482 killed, including 48 officers, and over 1,000 wounded."

It should be noted that the number of prisoners undoubtedly included medical staff and patients of the district hospital, and this was probably several hundred people who were physically unable to fight. The proportion of commanders (officers) among prisoners is also indicatively small (the number of 100 captured officers (commanders) obviously included military doctors and patients in the hospital).

The only senior commander (senior officer) among those defending in Brest Fortress was Commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment, Major Gavrilov . The fact is that in the first minutes of the war, command houses on the North Island were subjected to artillery shelling and rocket mortar fire - naturally, they were not as strong as the structures of the Citadel and forts, and as a result of this shelling, a significant number of commanders were put out of action.

For comparison, during the Polish campaign in 13 days the German 45th Division, having fought 400 kilometers, lost 158 killed and 360 wounded.

Moreover - total losses German army on the eastern front by June 30, 1941 there were 8886 killed . That is, the defenders Brest Fortress killed more than 5% of them.

And the fact that the defenders of the fortress were around 8 thousand , and not at all a “handful,” does not detract from their glory, but, on the contrary, shows that there were many heroes. More than the Soviet government for some reason tried to instill.

And still in books, articles and websites about heroic defense of the Brest Fortress The words “small garrison” constantly appear. Another common option is 3,500 defenders. But let's listen to the deputy director of the Brest Hero Fortress memorial complex, Elena Vladimirovna Kharichkova. When asked how many of the fortress’s defenders were still alive (in 1998), she replied:

“About 300 people, and on the eve of the war there were up to 8,000 military personnel and 300 families of officers in the Brest Fortress.”

And her words about the killed defenders of the fortress:

"962 buried under the slabs of the fortress."

Number 8 thousand confirmed by the memoirs of General L.M. Sandalov, at that time the chief of staff 4th Army , which included 6th and 42nd divisions . General Sandalov wrote that in the event of war in the Brest Fortress, according to the plan, only one battalion , all other units according to the plan were to be withdrawn from the fortress. However:

“Of the troops of the first echelon of the 4th Army, those who were stationed in the citadel of the Brest Fortress suffered the most, namely: almost the entire 6th Infantry Division (with the exception of the howitzer regiment) and the main forces of the 42nd Infantry Division, its 44th and the 455th Infantry Regiments.

I do not intend to talk in detail here about the heroic battles in the Brest Fortress. This has already been told a lot by people who were there themselves, as well as by writers S.S. Smirnov and K.M. Simonov. I will cite only two very interesting documents.

One of them is a brief combat report on the actions of the 6th Infantry Division in the first hours of the fascist attack. The report states:

“At 4 a.m. on June 22, hurricane fire was opened on the barracks and on the exits from the barracks in the central part of the fortress, as well as on the bridges and entrance gates of the fortress and the houses of the command staff. This raid caused confusion among the Red Army personnel, while the commanding personnel, who were attacked in their quarters, were partially destroyed. The surviving part of the command staff could not penetrate the barracks due to strong barrage fire... As a result, the Red Army soldiers and junior command staff, deprived of leadership and control, dressed and undressed, in groups and individually left the fortress independently, overcoming artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire bypass canal, the Mukhavets River and the rampart of the fortress. It was impossible to take into account the losses, since the personnel of the 6th Division mixed with the personnel of the 42nd Division. Many could not get to the conditional gathering place, since the Germans fired concentrated artillery fire at it.

Some commanders still managed to get to their units and units in the fortress, but they were unable to withdraw the units and remained in the fortress themselves. As a result, the personnel of units of the 6th and 42nd divisions, as well as other units, remained in the fortress as its garrison, not because they were assigned tasks to defend the fortress, but because it was impossible to leave it."

And here is another document: a report from the deputy commander for political affairs of the same 6th Infantry Division, regimental commissar M.N. Butin.

"To the concentration areas on alert due to continuous artillery shelling, suddenly launched by the enemy at 4.00 on 6/22/41, units of the division were compactly could not be withdrawn. Soldiers and officers arrived one by one, scantily clad. From those who concentrated it was possible to create the maximum up to two battalions. The first battles were carried out under the leadership of the regiment commanders, Comrades Dorodny (84 rifle regiments), Matveev (333 rifle regiments), Kovtunenko (125 rifle regiments)."

Yes, I foresee objections - the first passage is written too artistically for a military report, and the second generally uses unacceptable terms for 1941 - “soldiers and officers” in relation to Red Army soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. If there are complaints, then not to me.

I will repeat only one thing - in Brest Fortress it was not “a handful of fighters” who fought, but thousands of heroes . And the fact that many of them were captured does not detract from them feat .

About 200 defenders of the Brest Fortress were awarded orders and medals, only two received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union - Major Gavrilov and Lieutenant Kizhevatov (posthumously)...

In February 1942, on one of the front sectors in the Orel region, our troops defeated the enemy’s 45th Infantry Division. At the same time, the archives of the division headquarters were captured. While sorting through the documents captured in the German archives, our officers noticed one very interesting paper. This document was called “Combat Report on the Occupation of Brest-Litovsk,” and in it, day after day, the Nazis talked about the progress of the battles for the Brest Fortress.

Contrary to the will of the German staff officers, who, naturally, tried in every possible way to extol the actions of their troops, all the facts presented in this document spoke of exceptional courage, amazing heroism, and extraordinary stamina and tenacity of the defenders of the Brest Fortress. The last concluding words of this report sounded like a forced involuntary recognition of the enemy.

“A stunning attack on a fortress in which a brave defender sits costs a lot of blood,” wrote enemy staff officers. “This simple truth was proven once again during the capture of the Brest Fortress. The Russians in Brest-Litovsk fought exceptionally persistently and tenaciously, they showed excellent infantry training and proved a remarkable will to resist.”

This was the enemy's confession.

This “Combat Report on the Occupation of Brest-Litovsk” was translated into Russian, and excerpts from it were published in 1942 in the newspaper “Red Star”. Thus, actually from the lips of our enemy, the Soviet people for the first time learned some details of the remarkable feat of the heroes of the Brest Fortress. The legend has become reality.

Two more years passed. In the summer of 1944, during a powerful offensive by our troops in Belarus, Brest was liberated. On July 28, 1944, Soviet soldiers entered the Brest Fortress for the first time after three years of fascist occupation.

Almost the entire fortress lay in ruins. Just by the appearance of these terrible ruins one could judge the strength and cruelty of the battles that took place here. These piles of ruins were full of stern grandeur, as if the unbroken spirit of the fallen fighters of 1941 still lived in them. The gloomy stones, in places already overgrown with grass and bushes, beaten and gouged by bullets and shrapnel, seemed to have absorbed the fire and blood of the past battle, and the people wandering among the ruins of the fortress involuntarily came to mind how much these stones and how much they could tell if a miracle happened and they were able to speak.

And a miracle happened! The stones suddenly started talking! Inscriptions left by the defenders of the fortress began to be found on the surviving walls of the fortress buildings, in the openings of windows and doors, on the vaults of the basements, and on the abutments of the bridge. In these inscriptions, sometimes anonymous, sometimes signed, sometimes scribbled hastily in pencil, sometimes simply scratched on the plaster with a bayonet or a bullet, the soldiers declared their determination to fight to the death, sent farewell greetings to the Motherland and comrades, and spoke of devotion to the people and the party. In the ruins of the fortress, the living voices of the unknown heroes of 1941 seemed to sound, and the soldiers of 1944 listened with excitement and heartache to these voices, in which there was a proud consciousness of duty performed, and the bitterness of parting with life, and calm courage in the face of death, and a covenant about revenge.

“There were five of us: Sedov, Grutov I., Bogolyubov, Mikhailov, Selivanov V. We took the first battle on June 22, 1941. We will die, but we will not leave!” - was written on the bricks of the outer wall near the Terespol Gate.

In the western part of the barracks, in one of the rooms, the following inscription was found: “There were three of us, it was difficult for us, but we did not lose heart and will die as heroes. July. 1941".

In the center of the fortress courtyard there is a dilapidated church-type building. There really was once a church here, and later, before the war, it was converted into a club for one of the regiments stationed in the fortress. In this club, on the site where the projectionist’s booth was located, an inscription was scratched on the plaster: “We were three Muscovites - Ivanov, Stepanchikov, Zhuntyaev, who defended this church, and we took an oath: we will die, but we will not leave here. July. 1941".

This inscription, along with the plaster, was removed from the wall and moved to the Central Museum of the Soviet Army in Moscow, where it is now kept. Below, on the same wall, there was another inscription, which, unfortunately, has not been preserved, and we know it only from the stories of the soldiers who served in the fortress in the first years after the war and who read it many times. This inscription was, as it were, a continuation of the first: “I was left alone, Stepanchikov and Zhuntyaev died. The Germans are in the church itself. There's only one grenade left, but I won't go down alive. Comrades, avenge us!” These words were apparently scratched out by the last of the three Muscovites - Ivanov.

It wasn't just the stones that spoke. As it turned out, the wives and children of the commanders who died in the battles for the fortress in 1941 lived in Brest and its environs. During the days of fighting, these women and children, caught in the fortress by the war, were in the basements of the barracks, sharing all the hardships of defense with their husbands and fathers. Now they shared their memories and told many interesting details of the memorable defense.

And then an amazing and strange contradiction emerged. The German document I was talking about stated that the fortress resisted for nine days and fell by July 1, 1941. Meanwhile, many women recalled that they were captured only on July 10, or even 15, and when the Nazis took them outside the fortress, fighting was still going on in certain areas of the defense, and there was intense firefight. Residents of Brest said that until the end of July or even until the first days of August, shooting was heard from the fortress, and the Nazis brought their wounded officers and soldiers from there to the city where their army hospital was located.

Thus, it became clear that the German report on the occupation of Brest-Litovsk contained a deliberate lie and that the headquarters of the enemy 45th division hastened to inform its high command in advance about the fall of the fortress. In fact, the fighting continued for a long time... In 1950, a researcher at the Moscow museum, while exploring the premises of the Western barracks, found another inscription scratched on the wall. The inscription was: “I’m dying, but I’m not giving up. Farewell, Motherland! There was no signature under these words, but at the bottom there was a very clearly visible date - “July 20, 1941.” Thus, it was possible to find direct evidence that the fortress continued to resist on the 29th day of the war, although eyewitnesses stood their ground and assured that the fighting lasted for more than a month. After the war, the ruins in the fortress were partially dismantled, and at the same time, the remains of heroes were often found under the stones, their personal documents and weapons were discovered.

Smirnov S.S. Brest Fortress. M., 1964

BREST FORTRESS

Built almost a century before the start of the Great Patriotic War (the construction of the main fortifications was completed by 1842), the fortress had long lost its strategic importance in the eyes of the military, since it was not considered capable of withstanding the onslaught of modern artillery. As a result, the facilities of the complex served, first of all, to accommodate personnel who, in the event of war, were supposed to hold the defense outside the fortress. At the same time, the plan to create a fortified area, which took into account the latest achievements in the field of fortification, was not fully implemented as of June 22, 1941.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the garrison of the fortress consisted mainly of units of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions of the 28th rifle corps of the Red Army. But it has decreased significantly due to the participation of many military personnel in planned training events.

The German operation to capture the fortress was launched by a powerful artillery barrage, which destroyed a significant part of the buildings, killed a large number of garrison soldiers and initially noticeably demoralized the survivors. The enemy quickly gained a foothold on the South and West Islands, and assault troops appeared on the Central Island, but failed to occupy the barracks in the Citadel. In the area of the Terespol Gate, the Germans met a desperate counterattack by Soviet soldiers under the overall command of regimental commissar E.M. Fomina. The vanguard units of the 45th Wehrmacht Division suffered serious losses.

The time gained allowed the Soviet side to organize an orderly defense of the barracks. The Nazis were forced to remain in their occupied positions in the army club building, from where they could not get out for some time. Attempts to break through enemy reinforcements across the bridge over Mukhavets in the area of the Kholm Gate on the Central Island were also stopped by fire.

In addition to the central part of the fortress, resistance gradually grew in other parts of the building complex (in particular, under the command of Major P.M. Gavrilov at the northern Kobrin fortification), and the dense buildings favored the garrison fighters. Because of it, the enemy could not conduct targeted artillery fire at close range without running the risk of being destroyed himself. Having only small arms and a small number of artillery pieces and armored vehicles, the defenders of the fortress stopped the enemy’s advance, and later, when the Germans carried out a tactical retreat, they occupied the positions abandoned by the enemy.

At the same time, despite the failure of the quick assault, on June 22, the Wehrmacht forces managed to take the entire fortress into the blockade ring. Before its establishment, up to half of the payroll of the units stationed in the complex managed to leave the fortress and occupy the lines prescribed by the defensive plans, according to some estimates. Taking into account the losses during the first day of defense, in the end the fortress was defended by about 3.5 thousand people blocked in its different parts. As a consequence, each of the large centers of resistance could only rely on material resources in its immediate vicinity. The command of the combined forces of the defenders was entrusted to Captain I.N. Zubachev, whose deputy was Regimental Commissar Fomin.

In the subsequent days of the defense of the fortress, the enemy persistently sought to occupy the Central Island, but met organized resistance from the Citadel garrison. Only on June 24 did the Germans manage to finally occupy the Terespol and Volyn fortifications on the Western and Southern islands. Artillery shelling of the Citadel alternated with air raids, during one of which a German fighter was shot down by rifle fire. The defenders of the fortress also destroyed at least four enemy tanks. It is known about the death of several more German tanks on improvised minefields installed by the Red Army.

The enemy used incendiary ammunition and tear gas against the garrison (the besiegers had a regiment of heavy chemical mortars at their disposal).

No less dangerous for Soviet soldiers and the civilians with them (primarily the wives and children of officers) was the catastrophic shortage of food and drink. If the consumption of ammunition could be compensated by the surviving arsenals of the fortress and captured weapons, then the needs for water, food, medicine and dressings were satisfied at a minimum level. The fortress's water supply was destroyed, and manual water intake from Mukhavets and Bug was practically paralyzed by enemy fire. The situation was further complicated by the persistent intense heat.

At the initial stage of the defense, the idea of breaking through the fortress and joining the main forces was abandoned, since the command of the defenders was counting on a quick counterattack by the Soviet troops. When these calculations did not come true, attempts began to break the blockade, but they all ended in failure due to the overwhelming superiority of the Wehrmacht units in manpower and weapons.

By the beginning of July, after a particularly large-scale bombardment and artillery shelling, the enemy managed to capture the fortifications on the Central Island, thereby destroying the main center of resistance. From that moment on, the defense of the fortress lost its holistic and coordinated character, and the fight against the Nazis was continued by already disparate groups in different parts of the complex. The actions of these groups and individual fighters acquired more and more features of sabotage activity and continued in some cases until the end of July and even the beginning of August 1941. After the war, in the casemates of the Brest Fortress, the inscription “I am dying, but I do not give up. Goodbye Motherland. July 20, 1941"

Most of the surviving defenders of the garrison were captured by the Germans, where women and children were sent even before the end of organized defense. Commissioner Fomin was shot by the Germans, Captain Zubachev died in captivity, Major Gavrilov survived captivity and was transferred to the reserve during the post-war reduction of the army. The defense of the Brest Fortress (after the war it received the title of “hero fortress”) became a symbol of the courage and self-sacrifice of Soviet soldiers in the first, most tragic period of the war.

Astashin N.A. Brest Fortress // Great Patriotic War. Encyclopedia. /Ans. ed. Ak. A.O. Chubaryan. M., 2010.