2. Group Theory and Social Theory Laing's first book, The Divided Self, was to contain two parts, Self and Others, eventually published as separate books as The Divided Self and Self and Others. Laing never thought of a pure theory of personality without a theory of communication.

Chapter II. GREEK WEAPONS AND TACTICS The bulk of the Greek army during the Persian Wars consisted of armored infantry armed with spears approximately 2 m long17, in a word, hoplites. The hoplite's safety armament consisted of a helmet, armor18,

Chapter III. TACTICS OF PIKE COLUMNS. Large infantry columns, armed with bladed weapons, were once formed by the Swiss in order to repel the attacks of knights in a defensive battle, and in an offensive battle to overthrow both knights and archers with a strong onslaught. Spreading

Dominant tactics conductingcombat of ground forces from the 15th to the 18th century, there were demonstration actions and active maneuvers by troops in order to outflank the enemy or go to the rear and carry out offensive actions. Also important was the desire to cut off the enemy from his stores, i.e. from food bases. Burdened with many convoys of food, such large armies (tens, or even hundreds of thousands of people) were poorly maneuverable and allowed marches of two or three days' march (10-20 km) from their stores. Leaving an army without provisions in those days was tantamount to defeat. For example, let’s take the defeat of the Swedes near Poltava (Northern War), without going into the details of the battle itself.

Northern War interception of the convoy, as Tsar Peter said, the mother of victory at Poltava

Let's look at the root causes loss of strategic convoy(going to the Swedish army, from Riga), then Tsar Peter used the scorched earth tactics (its initiator was PETER, not STALIN, for example, during the campaign of the Swedes, the city of Baturin was destroyed by advancing Russian troops, along with all the inhabitants, more so and was not revived).

Destruction of the city of Baturin by Menshikov's dragoons

Then winter, more than three thousand Swedes lost from frostbite. So by the Battle of Poltava, the Swedish army was so greatly weakened that our victory was a matter of technology. 9 hours of battle from two o'clock in the morning to 11 o'clock in the afternoon, and the Russian army turned the Swedes into a disorderly retreating crowd. Well, the second example is the invasion of Napoleon. , and then the battle for resources, who can name at least a couple more battles of that war right off the bat...? But I know everything about peasants lifting up pitchforks, French foragers.

Tcombat tactics of ground forces from the 15th to the 18th century, in an open offensive battle, according to the classical formation, the infantry was lined up in thirds (squares), artillery was located between them, and heavy (cuirassiers) and light cavalry were located on the flanks.
Cuirassiers (literally - men-at-arms, armor) are heavy cavalry, dressed in cuirasses.

They originated in the 16th century as an addition to the relatively small knightly cavalry. She was equipped with relatively inexpensive partial armor that covered a little more than half of the body - from the knees to the head - and was called cuirassier armor. With the development of firearms, by the 19th century the equipment was reduced to a cuirass and helmet.

cuirass of a French cavalryman 1854

Cavalry regiment officer cuirass 1880

At the moment of its inception, the main weapon, like that of a knight, was a knight's sword. Gradually it was replaced by a broadsword, and in some European armies a heavy saber was used.
The horses used were heavy breeds weighing up to 700 kg. Only strong and tall men from 170 cm and above were recruited into cuirassiers, keeping in mind that the average height of a European at that time was 160-165 cm.
In the battle, the cavalry played a secondary role, supporting the infantry. According to the rules of conducting those wars, she did not have the right to break away from the infantry by more than 100-150 steps. When the troops advanced, the artillery, due to its bulkiness, remained in place, causing damage to the enemy from a distance. It first began to take part in the offensive, accompanying the infantry, in the French troops of Napoleon Bonaparte, when a lightweight version of the guns was created. There were situations where the cavalry lined up in front of the infantry or behind it, depending on the conditions of the battle. And of course, the main task of the cavalry is to pursue and beat the demoralized enemy.

Having approached, they fired several volleys, then either retreated or began hand-to-hand combat

Approaching the enemy within firing distance, the infantry, on command, opened fire with flintlock rifles; after several volleys, one of the sides began to retreat, or launched a bayonet attack, developing into hand-to-hand combat. They used bayonets, rifle butts, sabers, broadswords, fists and everything that came to hand. The Battle of Borodino was where the largest number of hand-to-hand battles took place. A characteristic sign of participation in hand-to-hand combat is the almost complete destruction of a unit.
Smoothbore flintlock guns had a poor probability of hitting the target. Out of a hundred bullets fired, no more than 25 hit a target standing 50 meters away.

squeak battle tactics

squeaks of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich

Therefore, guns, as a rule, were used simultaneously as barrage fire. Of the mass of bullets fired, at least some of them hit the enemy’s manpower. What’s interesting is that an analysis of the shooting of a defending modern unit showed that about 25% of soldiers fire not only in the direction of the enemy, but often simply in the air.
Reloading the gun was an incredible challenge. It was necessary to execute up to one hundred commands. This was later, IN THE MIDDLE OF THE 18TH CENTURY, King Frederick William of Prussia introduced the requirement that “each soldier fire six bullets per minute with the seventh in the barrel.”

flintlock, for example, in the War of 1812, guns of more than 20 calibers were used

Combat tactics of ground forces from the 15th to the 18th century, in connection with this, in those days the coherence of the actions of soldiers in the ranks and the ability to wield a bayonet and butt were valued. It’s not for nothing that Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov once said: “A bullet is a fool, but a bayonet is a good fellow.” Let us note that even in the War of 1812, the Russian army did not have a single model of flintlock gun as such, although in 1809 a single caliber was introduced, in practice, guns of 28 (!) different calibers were in service at the same time.
For defense, the walls of fortresses, castles and cities were widely used, which the enemy besieged for months, trying to deprive the defenders of water and provisions based on the principle of survival. Cannonballs were fired at the walls with the aim of destroying them, or undermining was carried out to further undermine them. The powder charges that were placed under the walls were called firecrackers. Infantry burst into the gaps, carrying out single chaotic shooting with the transition to saber-bayonet and hand-to-hand combat. Direct assaults on the walls of fortresses were also carried out using rams, ladders, ropes with hooks, etc. One should not think that a besieged fortress was usually doomed. The besieged also had their own tactics, not many, but they did exist. As an example of successful defense, I have never heard of such an application. Let's call it city N for now (I'll describe it in more detail someday), it was surrounded by an enemy army, and a systematic siege began. The shelling of the wall began, with the aim of breaking it (a very non-trivial task). Meanwhile, those besieged around the emerging breach begin to build an internal wall, in the form of a bag. Then a breach, an attack, entry into the bag of the inner wall, and the almost complete destruction of those who broke in... but we’ll leave what happened next for later.
In defensive battles, as a rule, earthen or log redoubts, redans and flushes were built.

types of field fortifications redoubt lunette redan

A redoubt (shelter) is a closed-type fortification, not necessarily but usually earthen, with a ditch and rampart, used for all-round defense. Although the defense was circular, the redoubt most often had the shape of a quadrangle, although both five and hexagonal redoubts were erected. The length of the redoubt ranged from 50 to 200 steps, in accordance with the size of the unit. On average, the redoubt was built for 200-800 soldiers. The redoubt consisted of an outer ditch, a rampart with an earthen step to accommodate riflemen and cannons, and an inner ditch to provide shelter for the defenders. The passage to the redoubt, about six steps wide, was built from the gorge front (back side), and behind it there was an embankment for shelling the enemy if he tried to use the passage.
Front (face) is the side of something facing the viewer. In military affairs, the front is the side of the fortification facing the enemy (front). In the modern understanding, straight sections of trenches, anti-tank ditches and wire obstacles are also called fronts.
Redoubts appeared in the 16th century and became widespread as strongholds in the 17th-19th centuries.
Redan (ledge) or redant is a field fortification, consisting of two faces at an angle of 60-120 degrees, protruding towards the enemy (front). Small redans with an acute angle are called flushes.
Flashes (arrows) are field, sometimes long-term, fortifications. They consisted of two faces, each 20-30 m long, at an acute angle facing the enemy (front).

Flashes of Bagration

Flashes are essentially similar to redans, but unlike them they are smaller in size and have a larger angle of more than 60-120 degrees, which are characteristic of redans, and also protrude towards the enemy.

Siege of Plevna, capture of the Grivitsa redoubt

Artillery, one should not exaggerate its role in the Middle Ages.

Medieval guns, if you look closely, there are few differences between guns in the 18th century

Around the turn of the 16th-17th century (why is there such a gap in time, not all army commanders of that time equally place emphasis on artillery; in the same Battle of Poltava, Charles XII wanted to achieve victory practically without the use of guns), increasing the rate of fire and making guns lighter, improving artillery weapons, its role also increases until it becomes the dominant force on the battlefield, by the end of the 18th and early 19th centuries. It has yet to go through the carriage revolution, and it will take centuries to change the loading method.

3. Whatever specific actions, whatever measures we take, we always have a choice between the most daring and the most cautious decision. Some people believe that the theory of war always recommends caution. This is wrong. If theory advises anything at all, then the nature of war requires the most decisive, that is, the most daring actions. The theory, however, leaves it to the military leader to act in accordance with his own courage, enterprise and self-confidence. Therefore, make your choice according to this inner strength, but never forget that a commander without courage never became great.

War is a combination of many individual battles. This combination may or may not be wise, and success largely depends on it. And yet the most important point is the outcome of the battle. After all, only a combination of successful battles can lead to good results. The most important thing in war will always be the art of defeating the enemy in battle. Your Imperial Highness's full attention should be directed to this issue. I consider the following principles to be the most important:

1. Keep your troops hidden from the enemy for as long as possible. Since the likelihood of attack from the enemy is high, unless we attack ourselves, we should always be on guard and keep our troops hidden from the enemy as long as possible.

2. Do not bring all your troops into battle at once. Such actions indicate a lack of wisdom needed to fight a battle. Only if you have reserves of troops at your disposal can you turn the tide of the battle at the decisive moment.

3. Worry less or not worry at all about the length of our front. This in itself is not important, but the length of the front limits the depth of our formation (that is, the number of corps standing one behind the other). Troops left in the rear must always be ready for battle. They can be used either to restart the battle in the same area, or to bring them into battle in other areas located nearby. This principle is a consequence of the previous one.

4. When attacking, the enemy often seeks to simultaneously outflank and encircle us. Army corps located in the rear can repel this attempt and thus provide support for the main front, which is usually provided by natural obstacles on the ground. This arrangement of troops is better than extending the front line, since in this case it is more difficult for the enemy to outflank us. This principle is again a closer definition of the second.

5. If we have many troops in reserve, only part of them should be located directly in front of the front. The remaining troops should be hidden behind.

From this position they, in turn, can attack enemy columns seeking to surround us from the flanks.

6. The main principle is to never remain completely passive, but to attack the enemy from the front and flanks, even when he is attacking. Therefore, we should defend ourselves on this front simply in order to force the enemy to deploy his forces on the offensive on this front. We then, in turn, attack with those of our troops who were holding in the rear. The art of building fortifications, as Your Royal Highness once so admirably observed, is needed by the defender not in order to defend himself safely in a trench, but in order to attack the enemy more successfully. This idea should be applied to any passive defense. Such defense is nothing more than a means by which we can most effectively attack the enemy in a pre-selected and appropriately equipped area where we have deployed our troops.

7. An attack from a defensive position can be launched at the moment when the enemy is advancing or while he is still on the march. At the moment when you need to attack, you can pull back your troops, lure the enemy into unknown territory and attack him from both sides. An echelon order of battle, that is, an order in which only two-thirds, half, or even less of the army is advanced, and the remaining troops, if possible, directly or indirectly hidden, is very suitable for all movements. Therefore, the type of combat formation is of great importance.

8. If, for example, I had two divisions, I would prefer to keep one in the rear. If I had three, I'd keep at least one in the rear, and if I had four, I'd probably keep two. If I had five, I would keep at least two in reserve, and in many cases even three, etc.

9. Where we remain passive, we must use the art of building fortifications. This will require numerous works in compliance with strict rules for the construction of such structures.

10. When creating a battle plan, we must set ourselves a major goal, such as attacking a large enemy column or completely destroying it. If our goal is small and the enemy's goal is vast, we will naturally suffer a severe defeat because we will be petty and wasteful.

11. Having set ourselves a high goal in our defense plan (destroying an enemy column, etc.), we must direct all our energy and strength to its implementation. In most cases, the attacker will pursue his own target somewhere else. While we are attacking, for example, his right wing, he will try to gain decisive advantages on the left. If we weaken before the enemy, if we pursue our goal with less energy than he, he will achieve the full advantage, while we will achieve only half the advantage. Thus, he will have an advantage; victory will be his, and we will have to give up even partially won advantages. If Your Royal Highness carefully reads the history of the battles of Ratisbon and Wagram, all this will seem true and important to you.

12. Let me restate the last two principles. Their combination gives us a principle which must rank first among all instances of victory in the modern art of war: "Pursue one great decisive object with strength and perseverance."

13. True, in this case, if we are defeated, the danger will be even greater. But increasing caution at the expense of the achieved result is not the art of war. This is a false caution, which, as I have already said in my Principles of War in General, is contrary to the nature of war. For the sake of great goals, we must do daring things. When we are engaged in a daring enterprise, proper caution is not to neglect, through laziness, indolence, or carelessness, those measures which will help us to achieve our goal. An example is Napoleon, who, out of prudence, never pursued major goals timidly or hesitantly.

If you remember, most gracious sir, the few defensive battles that have ever been won, you will find that the best of them were fought in the spirit of the principles laid down here. After all, it was the study of the history of war that gave us these principles.

At Minden, Duke Ferdinand suddenly appeared when the enemy was not expecting him and went on the offensive, while at Thannhausen he defended passively behind earthworks. Under Rosbach, the army of Frederick II attacked the enemy in an unexpected place and at an unexpected moment.

At Liegnitz, the Austrians discovered the king at night in a position completely different from the one in which they had seen him the day before. He attacked the enemy column with his entire army and routed it before the rest could begin to fight.

Under Ratisbon (Regensburg), Marshal Davout defended himself passively, while Napoleon attacked the V and VI Army Corps with his right wing and completely defeated them.

Although the Austrians were mostly on the defensive at Wagram, on the second day they attacked the French with the bulk of their forces. Therefore, Napoleon could also be considered a defender. However, then the right wing of the French (Davout) had success against the left wing of the Austrians. At the same time, the Austrians were active against Napoleon's left wing and advanced as far as Essling, but were driven back by a counterattack by strong French reserves. Then MacDonald's strike force, advancing to the left of center, forced the Austrians to a general retreat, including from positions on the Russbach River.

Not all of the principles mentioned earlier are clearly evident in each of these battles, but they are all examples of active defense.

The mobility of the Prussian army under Frederick II was a means of achieving victory on which we can no longer count, because other armies are at least as mobile as ours. On the other hand, encirclement on the flanks was less common at that time, and a deep battle formation was therefore less necessary.

1. We must select for the attack one place of the enemy's position (i.e., one part of his troops - a division, a corps) and attack him with a huge advantage, leaving the rest of his army in uncertainty and keeping him under control. This is the only way that we can use equal or smaller forces to fight with an advantage and thus a chance of success. The weaker we are, the fewer troops we must use to distract the enemy with battles in unimportant sectors in order to preserve as many forces as possible for the battle in the decisive sector. Frederick II undoubtedly won the Battle of Leuthen only because he concentrated his small army in one place, and his army was more concentrated than the enemy's.

2. We must direct our main attack against the enemy's wing, attacking him from the front and flank, or completely surrounding him and attacking him from the rear. Only when we have cut off the enemy's path to retreat are we confident of major success and victory.

3. Even though we are strong, we still have to direct the main attack against only one area. This is the only way we can throw more forces into this area. After all, completely encircling an army is only possible in rare cases, and this requires incredible physical and moral superiority. However, cutting off the enemy's path to retreat on a separate section of his flank and thus achieving great success is an easier task.

4. In general, the main goal is confidence (a high degree of probability) of victory, that is, confidence that the enemy will be knocked out of the battlefield. The assurance of success must form the basis of the battle plan, since a won, although indecisive, battle can easily be turned into a decisive victory by vigorously pursuing the enemy.

5. Suppose the enemy has enough troops on one wing to turn the front in all directions. Our main forces should try to surround this wing, attacking from all sides. Surrounded troops will lose courage much more quickly; when put to the test, they will be upset, and it will be easier for us to put them to flight.

6. Encircling the enemy requires greater deployment of forces on the front line from the attacker than from the defender.

Rice. 1

If the body a, b And V launch an attack on the formation d enemy army in order to encircle it (see Fig. 1), they, of course, should stick together. But we should never bring all our troops into battle, making sure to provide a reserve. Not having it will be a huge mistake that will lead to defeat if the enemy is ready to be surrounded.

Rice. 2

If the buildings a, b And V will have to attack the enemy formation d, housing e And and should be kept in reserve. With such a deep battle formation, we are able to constantly disturb the same area. In the same case, if our troops are defeated at the opposite end of the line, we do not have to immediately stop fighting there, since we have reserves capable of resisting the enemy. This is what the French did at the Battle of Wagram. Their left wing, opposed to the right wing of the Austrians, deployed closer to the Danube, was relatively weak and suffered a crushing defeat. Even the French center at Adercla was not very strong, and the Austrians forced them to retreat on the first day of the battle. But none of this mattered, because Napoleon had a huge reserve of troops on his right wing, which he threw at the Austrian left wing. And then, having introduced MacDonald’s huge column (infantry, cavalry, artillery) into battle, Napoleon pushed back the Austrians on his left wing. Although he failed to defeat Archduke Charles, he at least achieved his goal of winning the battle.

7. Taking a defensive position, we must choose as the object of attack that section of the enemy army, the defeat of which will bring us decisive advantages.

8. In defense, as long as there are at least some resources left, we must not give up until we achieve our goal. If the defender remains active, if he attacks us from other sides, we will be able to achieve victory only if we surpass him in energy and courage. On the other hand, if he is passive, we are not in serious danger.

9. Long and continuous lines of troops should be completely avoided. They will only lead to parallel attacks, which are unacceptable today.

Each division attacks separately, having instructions from the highest command and therefore in coordination with each other. Yet one division (from 8,000 to 10,000 men) is never formed in one line, but forms two, three or even four lines. It follows that a long and continuous line is no longer possible.

10. Coordination of attacks between divisions and army corps should be achieved not by directing their actions from one point or by maintaining contacts with each other. After all, they can be far from each other or even be separated by enemy units. This is a false method of interaction, subject to a thousand accidents. With this method of management, one should not expect to achieve high results, but rather to be defeated by a strong, energetic opponent.

The correct method is to indicate to each commander of an army corps or division the main direction of his movement, to set the goal of action as the enemy, and the task of defeating him.

Each column commander, therefore, has an order with all his forces to attack the enemy where he meets him. He should not be held responsible for the success of the attack because this will lead to indecisiveness. But he is responsible for ensuring that his corps takes part in the battle with all its might, without stopping at any sacrifice.

11. A well-organized separate corps can withstand a strong attack for some time (several hours) and therefore cannot be destroyed in one moment. Thus, even if he prematurely gets involved in battle with the enemy and is defeated, it will not be in vain for the common cause. In a battle against this one corps, the enemy will waste his material and physical forces, giving the rest of our forces a good chance to counterattack him.

We will talk later about how the corps should be organized for this purpose.

So we ensure the cooperation of all forces, giving each corps a certain degree of independence, but ensuring that each finds the enemy and attacks him with all possible self-sacrifice.

12. One of the most important principles of offensive war is to hit the enemy with surprise. The more sudden the attack, the more successful it will be. To the surprise that the defender can create through the secrecy of his measures and the hidden disposition of his troops, the attacker can only respond by the surprise of his appearance.

However, this phenomenon is observed extremely rarely in modern wars, which depends partly on the improvement of security measures currently taken, and partly on the speed of waging war. Now in hostilities there is rarely a long pause during which the vigilance of one of the parties could weaken, which would provide the other side with an opportunity to make a surprise attack.

Under such circumstances, apart from night attacks, which are always possible (as at Hochkirch in 1758), it is possible to take the enemy by surprise only by moving troops to one flank or to the rear, and then unexpectedly turning them again and throwing them forward. Or, if we are far from the enemy, with the help of incredible energy and activity we can appear in the right place faster than he expects us (like, for example, Suvorov at Rymnik in 1789, when he covered 100 km in 2.5 days roads washed out by autumn rains, after which he defeated the Turks who did not expect his appearance (Turks out of 100 thousand lost 10 thousand killed and up to 10 thousand wounded, captured and drowned, Russians and Austrians out of 25 thousand about 1 thousand killed and wounded ); Suvorov in Italy, having covered 60 km in 38 hours, immediately entered into battle with the French (MacDonald) and with smaller forces (30 thousand versus 35 thousand for the French) over the next two days defeated them on the Trebbia River. The French lost 16 thousand, the Russians and Austrians - 6 thousand - Ed.).

13. A proper surprise attack (at night, as in Hochkirch) is the best way to get an effect with a small army. But the attacker, who is not as familiar with the terrain as the defender, takes a lot of risks. The less you know the terrain and enemy preparations, the greater the risk becomes. Therefore, such actions should be used only in extreme cases.

14. This type of attack requires more preliminary preparation and greater concentration of our troops than in daytime.

1. If you cannot do without firearms (and if you can, why promote their development?), they must be used in open combat. Cavalry should not be used until the enemy has suffered significantly from infantry and artillery. Therefore:

A) The cavalry must be placed behind the infantry. You should not easily get involved in open combat. Only when disorder in the enemy's ranks or his hasty retreat gives hope of success should we use our cavalry for a daring attack .

2. Artillery fire is much more effective than infantry fire. A battery of eight six-pounder (90 mm) guns occupied less than a third of the front line occupied by an infantry battalion; it has eight times fewer people than a battalion, but its fire is two or even three times more effective. On the other hand, artillery has the disadvantage of being less mobile than infantry. This applies even to the lightest horse artillery, because it cannot, like infantry, be used on rough terrain. Therefore, from the very beginning of the battle, it is necessary to direct artillery to the most important areas, since it cannot, like infantry, quickly regroup during the battle. A large battery of 20 to 30 guns usually decides the outcome of the battle in those areas where it is located(so, in the battle of Preisschi-Eylau in 1807, 2 horse artillery companies (36 guns), transferred by General Kutaisov from the right wing to the left, stopped the French advancing here with grapeshot volleys and forced them to lie down, after which the Russian infantry counterattacked and threw back the enemy, turning progress of the battle - Ed.).

3. From these and other visible characteristics follow the following rules for the use of various weapons:

a) the battle should begin with powerful artillery preparation. Only when we have a large number of troops at our disposal should we keep both horse and heavy artillery in reserve. Artillery must be used in large batteries concentrated against one area. From 20 to 30 guns, composing one battery, protect an important part of our positions or bombard that part of the enemy's positions which we are about to attack;

b) after this we use light infantry - riflemen - but in no case should too many forces be brought into battle at once. First we need to understand what lies ahead (because this can rarely be discovered in advance), how the course of the battle will turn, etc.

If such a line of fire is sufficient to counter the enemy's forces, and if there is no need for haste, it will be a mistake to use our remaining forces early. We must try, as much as possible, to weaken the enemy with this preliminary fight;

V) If the enemy brings so many troops into battle that our forces in the line of fire are about to retreat, or if for some other reason we have no doubt about the correctness of our actions, the entire line of infantry should be deployed. She will be 100–200 steps from the enemy and will shoot or load, depending on the circumstances;

G) this is the main purpose of the infantry. If, at the same time, the battle formation is sufficiently deep, and we have another line of infantry (formed in columns) as a reserve, we will have a fairly strong control of the situation in this sector. To achieve victory, this second line of infantry should, if possible, be used in columns only;

d) the cavalry located behind the fighting units during the battle should be as close to them as possible without heavy losses; that is, it must be out of the range of enemy grapeshot or rifle fire. On the other hand, it must be close enough to quickly take advantage of any favorable turn in the course of the battle.

4. While more or less strictly obeying these rules, we must never lose sight of the following principle, the importance of which cannot be overestimated:

you should never bring into action all your forces at random and at the same time, thus losing all the means of combat, but, if possible, weaken the enemy with small forces in order to save most of your troops for the critical moment, and, having brought into action, use them with with the greatest courage.

5. We must establish one order of battle (disposition of troops before and during battle) for the entire campaign or for the entire war. This order will serve us in all cases when there is no time for a special disposition of troops. This order, first of all, must be designed for defense. It will give some uniformity to the fighting of the armies, which will be useful and beneficial. Inevitably, most of the lower generals and other officers commanding small contingents have no special knowledge of tactics and, probably, no outstanding ability to conduct war.

Thus, instead of the art of war, when there is none, a certain methodism arises. In my opinion this largely applies to the French army.

6. After what I have said about the use of arms, this order of battle, applied to a brigade, looks approximately as follows (Fig. 3): a - b is the line of light infantry which begins the battle and which, in rough terrain, serves to some extent as the vanguard. . Then comes the artillery, c - d, which should be placed in advantageous positions. If this is not possible, it should be placed behind the first line of infantry d - e (in this case four battalions). The task of this line is to form up and open fire, and f - h - these are several regiments of cavalry. The second line of infantry i - l is kept in reserve for the decisive stage of the battle, and m - n is the cavalry. A strong corps is built according to the same principles and in the same manner. At the same time, the order of battle does not have to be exactly like this. It may vary slightly provided the above principles are followed. So, for example, in a normal battle formation, the first line of w-h cavalry can remain with the second line of m-n cavalry. It should only be promoted in special cases when this position is too remote.

Rice. 3

7. The army consists of several independent corps, each with its own general and headquarters. They are lined up and behind each other, as described in the general rules of combat. It should be noted here that if we do not lack cavalry, a special cavalry reserve should be created, which, of course, should be kept in the rear. The purpose of this is as follows :

A) attack the enemy as he retreats from the battlefield, and attack the cavalry with which he covers his retreat. If we defeat the enemy's cavalry, we are guaranteed a huge success, unless the enemy infantry shows miracles of courage. Small detachments of cavalry will not accomplish this task;

b) how quickly you can pursue the enemy if he retreats undefeated or continues to retreat the next day after a lost battle. Cavalry moves faster than infantry and has a greater demoralizing effect on retreating troops. After victory, pursuit is the most important thing in war;

V) in carrying out the great (strategic) turn, we must have, due to the need to move troops along roundabout routes, units that advance faster than infantry.

To make such a corps more independent in its actions, we should give it a significant amount of artillery - a combination of several types of armed forces will only give it additional strength.

8. The order of battle of the troops hitherto described was intended for battle; this was the order of battle for battle.

The order of movement is usually as follows:

a) each independent corps (brigade, division) has its own vanguard and rearguard and forms its own column. This, however, does not prevent some corps from following each other along the same road and thus forming one column;

b) the corps moves according to their position in the general battle formation. They walk side by side or behind each other, as if they were standing on a battlefield;

c) in the corps themselves, the following order is invariably observed: light infantry with one regiment of cavalry, forming the vanguard and rearguard, infantry, artillery and, finally, the rest of the cavalry.

This order remains if we move towards the enemy or behind him, or in parallel with him - then this is called natural order. In the latter case, it can be assumed that those units that were located one after another in battle order will march side by side. But when we have to draw up troops for battle, there will always be enough time to advance the cavalry and the second line of infantry to the right or left.

1. Terrain creates two advantages in war.

The first is creating obstacles for the approaching enemy. These obstacles either make his advance impossible in a given place, or force him to advance more slowly and maintain battle formation in columns, etc.

The second advantage is that by taking advantage of the terrain we can protect our troops.

While both benefits are very important, I think the second is more important than the first. In any case, we will certainly benefit from it, since in most cases even the simplest terrain more or less serves as protection for us. Previously, only the first of these advantages was more often used. Today, the greater mobility of all armies forces us to use the first less often and the second more often. The first of these two advantages is useful only for defense, the second for both attack and defense.

2. Terrain, as an obstacle to the advance of the enemy, serves mainly to reinforce our flanks and strengthen our positions.

3. To strengthen our position, this obstacle must be completely insurmountable, such as a wide river, lake, swamp. However, such obstacles are very rare, and therefore complete protection of our flanks is difficult to achieve. Today this is less common than before because we do not stay in one position for long, but move energetically, finding new positions in the theater of operations.

An obstacle that is difficult, but still surmountable, is in fact not a point d'appui for our flank, but reinforcement. In this case, the troops should be located behind it. But for them, in turn, it becomes an obstacle.

And yet it is always advantageous to secure our flank with such an obstacle, for in this case we will need fewer troops in this place. However, two dangers must be avoided: first, relying so heavily on this defense as to not keep a strong reserve in the rear; secondly, to surround ourselves on both flanks with similar obstacles, since they do not completely protect us, and therefore do not always prevent a battle on both of our flanks. Consequently, they are extremely detrimental to our defense, because they do not allow us to easily move to an active defense on one of the wings. We will have to defend under the most unfavorable conditions, when both flanks, a - d And c - b, thrown back (Fig. 4).

Rice. 4

4. As a result of observations, only new arguments in favor of deep construction arose. The fewer obstacles on the ground that provide reliable reinforcement for our flanks, the more corps we must have in the rear to encircle the enemy troops surrounding us.

5. All types of terrain that are insurmountable for troops marching in formation, all villages, all areas enclosed by hedges and ditches, swampy meadows and, finally, all mountains that can only be overcome with difficulty, represent this kind of obstacle. We can overcome them, but only slowly and with effort. Therefore, they increase the resistance of enemy troops located behind them. This list may include forests only if they are very dense or swampy. An ordinary forest can be traversed as easily as a plain. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that there may be an enemy hiding in the forest. If we also decide to hide in it, then both sides will find themselves in a dangerous position. Therefore, leaving unoccupied forests on our front or flank is a serious mistake. Barricades built as obstacles help little, as they are easy to tear down.

6. From all this it follows that we must use such obstacles on one flank in order to offer relatively strong resistance with few troops, while on the other flank we must carry out the planned offensive. It is very advantageous to combine the use of fortifications with natural obstacles, because then, if the enemy overcomes the obstacle, the fire from these fortifications will protect our weak troops from the enemy having too great an advantage and a major defeat.

7. When we are on the defensive, any obstacle on our front is of great value.

The mountains are occupied by troops only for this purpose. After all, a high position rarely has a significant impact on the effectiveness of our weapons, and often does not have any effect at all. But if we stand on a height, the enemy, in order to approach us, must climb it, climb it with difficulty. He will advance slowly, his battle formation will be disrupted, his soldiers will enter close combat exhausted. Given equal courage and strength, these advantages can be decisive. In no case should we lose sight of the moral effect of a swift onslaught (and the onslaught from above will be swift). It raises morale, while a soldier standing in one place loses his presence of mind. Therefore it is always very advantageous to place our first line of infantry or artillery on the mountain(in the Battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon, having occupied the dominant Pratzen heights, abandoned due to the erroneous decision of the allies (royal persons), with a swift onslaught from above, cut and crushed the allied army. The allies lost 27 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners (including 21 thousand Russians) out of 86 thousand, Napoleon 12 thousand out of 73 thousand - Ed.).

Often the mountain is so steep or the slope is so hilly and uneven that shelling becomes ineffective. In this case, we should not place our first line on the ridge of the mountain, but, as a last resort, only our snipers. We must place the entire line in such a way as to expose the enemy to effective fire at the moment when he reaches the top and gathers all his forces.

All other obstacles, such as small rivers, streams, ravines and the like, serve to disrupt the enemy’s front. He will have to rebuild his battle formation to overcome them, and this will be a delay. Therefore, approaches to such obstacles must be effectively shelled. large buckshot (from 400 to 600 steps), if we have little artillery in this place.

8. The fundamental law is the effective bombardment of any obstacles that strengthen our front. But it is important to note that we should never completely limit our resistance to such fire, but it is necessary to prepare a significant part of our troops (from 1/3 to?), arrayed in columns, for a bayonet attack. If we are very weak, we should organize only a firing line of riflemen and artillery at a distance from which it is convenient to effectively fire at the obstacle. The remaining troops, formed in columns, must be kept at a distance of 600 to 800 steps and, if possible, under the protection of folds of terrain, etc.

9. Another way to use these obstacles to protect our front is to leave them a little ahead. This will put them within the effective range of our artillery (1000 to 2000 paces), and we can attack the enemy columns from all sides as they appear. Duke Ferdinand did something similar at Minden in 1759. Thus, the obstacle contributes to the implementation of our active defense plan, and this active defense, which we spoke about earlier, will be carried out on our front.

10. Until now, we have considered such obstacles as earth and terrain primarily as obstacles in extended positions. Still, something needs to be said about individual, isolated areas.

In general, individual, isolated areas can only be protected with the help of fortifications or powerful obstacles such as terrain. We will not discuss the first here. The only obstacles that can persist on their own are the following:

a) isolated steep heights. Here, fortifications are also necessary, since the enemy can always move against the defender in a more or less extended battle formation. And in the end the defender will always be attacked and crushed from the rear, because we are rarely powerful enough to hold the front on both sides;

b) gorge. By this word we mean any narrow path that is the only one for the enemy to pass through. These also include bridges, dams (dams) and narrow gorges.

It should be noted that these obstacles are divided into two categories: those which the attacker cannot in any case avoid, such as bridges over wide rivers. In this case, the defender can safely position all his forces so as to fire at the crossing point as effectively as possible. And those that the enemy can bypass, such as bridges over small rivers and most mountain gorges. In this case, it is necessary to have significant forces in reserve (from 1/3 to?) for an attack in close formation;

c) settlements, villages, small towns and the like.

If troops fight with courage and enthusiasm, houses provide a unique defense for the few against the many. But if we are not confident in each soldier, it is preferable to occupy houses, gardens, etc. only with snipers and enter villages with artillery. Most of our troops (from? to?) should be built in close columns and sheltered in a populated area or behind him to attack the enemy when he attacks.

11. These isolated positions in major operations serve partly as outposts, in which case they do not constitute an absolute defense, but only a means of distracting the enemy. In addition, they help to hold points important for the operations we have planned for our army. It is also often necessary to establish such positions in a distant location to buy time for any active defensive measures we may have planned. But, if the place is remote, it is ipso facto isolated.

12. Two further points need to be made regarding individual obstacles. Firstly, troops should be positioned behind them, ready to receive the troops driven back. Secondly, whoever includes such isolated obstacles in his plan of defense should not rely too much on them, no matter how strong these obstacles may be. On the other hand, the commander who is entrusted with the defense of such an obstacle must always, even under the most unfavorable circumstances, try to hold out to the end. To do this, he must have the determination and spirit of self-sacrifice that flow only from ambition and enthusiasm. Therefore, people with these noble qualities should be selected for this mission.

13. The use of terrain to cover the disposition and advance of troops does not require detailed interpretation.

We should not occupy the ridge of the mountain that we are going to defend (as was often done in the past), but position ourselves behind it. You should take a position not in front of the forest, but inside it or behind it; the latter only if the forest is visible. We must keep our troops in columns to make it easier to find cover.. Troops can be hidden in villages, small forests and hilly areas. To advance, you should choose the most unexpected terrain, etc.

In terrain altered by economic activity, in which it is easy to carry out reconnaissance, there are almost no places where a significant part of the enemy troops could not hide if they used such terrain wisely. Here it is more difficult to stop the advance of the attacker, since he will be walking along the roads.

Using terrain to provide cover for troops, one must never lose sight of the objective and intended operations. First of all, you should not completely disrupt the battle order; you can only deviate slightly from it.

14. To summarize all of the above, the following is important for the defender when choosing a position:

a) support of one of its flanks;

b) open view in front and on the flanks;

c) obstacles in front of the defense front of one’s troops;

d) disguised disposition of troops;

e) rough terrain in the rear, so that in case of defeat, pursuit by the enemy would be difficult. When choosing terrain, you should beware of nearby river valleys (as at Friedland), as they cause delays in retreat and confusion.

15. It would be a mistake to believe that all these advantages can be found in any position we occupy during war. Not all positions are equally important: the most important are those that are most suitable for attacking us. It is here that we must have all these advantages, while in the rest we only need part of them.

16. When choosing terrain, the attacker must take into account two main points: the terrain should not be too difficult to attack and, on the other hand, difficult enough for the enemy to observe the advance of our troops.

17. I conclude these observations with a principle of great importance and which may be considered the cornerstone of the whole theory of defense:

never rely on the strength of the terrain and, therefore, never allow this advantageous terrain to tempt us with the possibility of passive defense.

After all, if the terrain is really so convenient that the attacker cannot knock us out of it, the enemy can bypass it, making the most inaccessible territory useless. We will be forced to fight on different terrain in a radically changed situation, as if the advantage of convenient terrain was not taken into account when drawing up our plans. But if the terrain is not very advantageous and an attack within its borders is still possible, then the advantageous terrain will never balance the disadvantages of passive defense. Consequently, all the obstacles afforded by the terrain should be used only for partial defense, in order to offer strong resistance with comparatively small forces and gain time to prepare for the offensive with which it is necessary to try to win a real victory in other sectors.

The term refers to the combination of individual battles to achieve a campaign or war objective.

If we know how to fight and win, great knowledge is not required. After all, combining positive results is easy. This is only a matter of experienced reflection and does not depend on the special knowledge needed to lead the battle.

Hence, the few principles that can be established in strategy and which rest on the organizational foundations of the state and the army can be essentially reduced to very brief provisions.

1. War has three main goals:

a) conquest and destruction of enemy armed forces;

b) mastery of material and other sources of power;

c) winning public opinion.

2. To achieve the first goal, the main forces are always directed - against the main forces of the enemy army, or at least against a significant part of the enemy forces. After all, only by defeating them can the other two goals be consistently implemented.

3. To capture the enemy’s material forces, military operations are aimed at those places where most of these resources are concentrated: large cities, warehouses and large fortresses. On the way to them, encounters with the main enemy forces, or at least a significant part of them, are possible.

4. Public opinion is won through major victories and the occupation of the enemy capital.

5. The first and most important rule necessary for the accomplishment of these purposes is to use all our powers with the greatest energy. Any moderation moves us away from the final goal. Even under very favorable circumstances, it is unwise to refuse to make every effort to achieve your goals. Such efforts never lead to negative results. They may be a heavy burden on the whole country, but it will not cause much damage, since the sooner the burden will be lifted from its shoulders.

The morale boost created by such actions is infinitely important. It gives confidence in success, and this is the best way to boost the morale of a nation.

6. The second rule is to concentrate as much force as possible on the area where the main blow is to be delivered. To increase your chances of winning in a decisive area, you may have to weaken other areas and suffer losses there, but victory will compensate for them.

7. The third rule is never waste time. If important advantages cannot be achieved by waiting, it is necessary to take decisive action. With speed you can nip in the bud many of the enemy’s activities and win public opinion to your side.

Surprise plays a much larger role in strategy than in tactics. This is the most important element of our victory. Napoleon, Frederick II, Gustav II Adolf, Caesar, Hannibal and Alexander the Great owe the brightest rays of their glory to surprise.

8. Finally, the fourth rule is to use the successes we have achieved with the greatest energy.

Only the pursuit of a defeated enemy will bring us the fruits of victory.

9. The first of these principles is the basis of the other three. By following it, we can, without putting everything at stake, apply the rest with the greatest boldness. It gives us the means to continuously form new forces in the rear, and with them we can make amends for any failure that has befallen us.

This is where true caution lies, and not in moving forward with timid steps.

10. Small states today cannot wage wars of conquest, but they have great capabilities for defensive wars. Therefore, I am firmly convinced that he who exerts all his strength to constantly replenish his army, who takes all measures to improve training, who concentrates his troops on the main direction and, thus armed, pursues a major goal with determination and energy, he will do everything , what is achievable with strategic leadership of the war. And if battle happiness does not change, then in the end he will invariably turn out to be the winner, since his opponent will lag behind him in the tension of strength and energy.

11. Subject to these principles, the form of transactions is ultimately of little importance. However, I will try to clarify the most important things in a few words.

In tactics, they always try to surround the enemy, and, moreover, that part of him against which the main blow is directed. This is done partly because the action of forces in concentric directions is more advantageous than with straight parallel fronts, and partly because only in this way we have the opportunity to cut off the enemy’s path to retreat.

If this question regarding the enemy and position is transferred from the field of tactics to strategy, to the theater of military operations, and therefore, taking into account the enemy’s supply, then it turns out that individual columns or armies aimed at encircling the enemy will, in most cases, be so far apart from each other from a friend that they will not be able to take part in the same battle. The enemy, being in the center, will have the opportunity to turn against each individual corps and defeat them one by one with the same army. The campaigns of Frederick II provide examples of this, especially in 1757 and 1758.

And since battle is the most important and decisive action, those carrying out operations along external lines, without a decisive superiority of forces, will lose in battle all those advantages that the enemy’s encirclement should have provided him with, because the impact on supply manifests itself extremely slowly, and victory, won in battle - extremely quickly.

Therefore, in strategy, the side surrounded by the enemy is better off than the side that surrounds its enemy, especially when the forces are equal or weaker.

Jomini was right about this, and if von Bülow demonstrated the opposite so plausibly, it was only because he attached too much importance to temporary delays in food supplies and completely denied the inevitable success of the war.

Of course, to cut off the enemy from retreat routes, strategic outflanking and encirclement are extremely effective means. But since the same goal can also be achieved through tactical encirclement, strategic encirclement can only be recommended if our forces (moral and physical) are so superior to those of the enemy that we remain strong enough to fight in the decisive sector even if distracted forces on the environment.

Emperor Napoleon never undertook a strategic encirclement, although he often, even almost always, had physical and moral superiority.

Frederick II used this technique only once: during his invasion of Bohemia (Czech Republic) in 1757. True, with this he achieved that the Austrians were able to fight their first battle only near Prague; However, what benefit did the conquest of Bohemia all the way to Prague without a decisive victory bring him? The battle of Colin forced him to abandon all his conquests - proof that battles are everything. Near Prague, he was undoubtedly in danger of being attacked by all the forces of the Austrian army before the approach of Schwerin. He would not have been exposed to this danger if he had marched with all his forces through Saxony. Then the first battle would probably have taken place at Budine nad Ohří, and it would have been as decisive as the battle at Prague. The reason for such a concentric attack on Bohemia was undoubtedly the winter deployment of the Prussian army in Silesia and Saxony. It is extremely important to note that in most cases it is this kind of consideration that plays a more significant role than the advantages of one or another form of grouping of forces, because the ease of execution of the operation contributes to the speed of execution, and the interference in the actions of such a huge machine as the army is so great that without much their needs should not be increased.

12. The principle we have just cited - to concentrate whenever possible on the decisive direction - in itself eliminates the idea of ​​strategic encirclement, and from here the grouping of our armed forces naturally follows. Therefore, I had the right to say that the form of this grouping is not particularly important. However, in one case, strategic influence on the enemy's flank leads to the same major consequences as in battle, namely, when the enemy, operating in a poor country, with great difficulty arranges his magazines, on the integrity of which the success of his operations undoubtedly depends. In such cases, one can even recommend not to go with the main forces towards the enemy’s main army, but to rush to his base. But this requires two conditions:

a) the enemy must move so far from his base that our movement will force him to a significant retreat;

b) we must be able to delay him on the main line of operations with small forces with the help of natural and artificial barriers, so that he cannot make conquests that can compensate him for the loss of his base.

13. Supplying troops with food is an inevitable condition for waging war, and therefore it has a great influence on operations, especially in that it allows concentration of masses only up to a certain limit and is a decisive factor in choosing the line of operations, determining the offensive zone in the theater of military operations.

14. In areas that to some extent allow the supply of troops from local resources, the latter are obtained through requisitions.

With the modern way of warfare, the army occupies much more space than before. The formation of separate corps in our army made this possible without putting us in a worse position compared to the enemy, who, as always, would concentrate from 70,000 to 100,000 people at one point. After all, the corps of a modern organization can, for some time, fight against an enemy twice or three times its size. In the meantime, the rest will come to the rescue, and even if the first corps turns out to be defeated, then it was not in vain that it fought, as was already indicated above on another occasion.

Therefore, now individual divisions and corps move separately, side by side or one after the other; if they form the same army, then their distance from each other is limited only by the consideration of joint participation in the general battle.

This makes it possible to feed troops directly, without their own stores. This arrangement of supplies is facilitated by the organization of the corps themselves with their headquarters and commissariat.

15. Unless more compelling reasons, such as the location of the main enemy army, are decisive, then the most fertile areas are chosen for operations, since ease of supply contributes to the speed of the operation. More important than supply issues can only be the location of the main enemy army with which we are about to clash, the position of the capital or fortress that we are trying to capture. All other reasons, for example the most advantageous form of grouping of forces, which we have already discussed, usually have much less importance.

16. Despite this new system of allowances, we are still far from being able to completely do without any stores. Therefore, a wise commander, even if the funds of the province are completely sufficient to supply the troops with food, will still not fail to set up stores in his rear in case of an unforeseen event, in order to be able to gain a stronger foothold in certain points. This precaution is one of those measures that does not come at the expense of the task at hand.

1. From a political point of view, a defensive war is a war waged to defend one’s independence. From a strategic point of view, a defensive war is a campaign in which I confine myself to fighting the enemy in the theater of military operations that I have prepared for myself for this purpose. Whether I fight offensive or defensive battles in this theater of operations does not change matters.

2. Strategic defense is chosen mainly in cases where the enemy is stronger than us. Naturally, fortresses and fortified camps, which should be looked upon as the basis for preparing a theater of military operations, present significant advantages; the latter also include familiarity with the area and having good maps. With the help of these advantages, a small army of a small state, possessing small means, will be more likely to be able to resist the enemy than without them.

Along with this, the following two reasons may prompt us to stop at a defensive war.

Firstly, if the provinces of the country adjacent to our theater of operations greatly hamper operations due to lack of food. In this case, by choosing a defensive war, we will avoid inconveniences that will fall entirely on the enemy. This, for example, is the current position (1812) of the Russian army.

Secondly, when the enemy surpasses us in the ability to wage war. In a prepared theater of military operations, which is familiar to us and where all incidental circumstances are favorable to us, it is much easier to wage war; You can't make that many mistakes here. In this case, that is, when we are prompted to a defensive war by the unreliability of our troops and generals, tactical defense is readily added to strategic defense, that is, battles are fought in previously prepared positions - again, because in these conditions fewer mistakes will be made.

3. In a defensive war, no less than in an offensive war, one must set a major goal. This can be nothing more than the destruction of the enemy army either through battle, or by creating conditions difficult for it to exist in, which leads it into disorder and forces it to retreat; during the latter she naturally suffers great losses. Examples of this include Wellington's campaigns of 1810 and 1811.

Consequently, defensive war is not reduced to mere idle waiting for events. One should wait only in anticipation of obvious and decisive benefits. What is extremely dangerous for the defender is the calm before the storm, during which the attacker gathers his strength for the decisive blow.

If the Austrians, after the battle of Aspern, had tripled their forces, as the French emperor did - and they had the opportunity to do this - then the period of calm preceding the battle of Wagram would have been useful for them, but only under this condition. Since they still did not do this, time was lost for them. It would have been much more prudent on their part to take advantage of Napoleon’s disadvantageous position in order to achieve complete victory at the Battle of Aspern.

4. The purpose of fortresses is to divert a significant part of the enemy forces to sieges. This period of time should be used to defeat the rest of the enemy army. Therefore, it is better to fight behind your fortresses, and not in front of them. But one should not stand by and watch them be taken, as Bennigsen did during the siege of Danzig.

5. Large rivers, that is, those over which building a bridge presents great difficulties (such as the Danube below Vienna and the Lower Rhine), form a natural defensive line. But troops should not be evenly distributed along the river in order to directly impede the crossing. It is very dangerous. On the contrary, we must observe it, and where the enemy has crossed, attack him from all sides at that moment when he has not yet had time to transfer all his forces and is still limited to a narrow space near the river. An example of such actions is the Battle of Aspern. In the battle of Wagram, the Austrians unnecessarily gave the French too much space, thereby saving the latter from the inevitable disadvantages of crossing the river.

6. Mountains constitute the second type of natural barriers that can serve as a good defensive line. There are two ways to use them. The first is to leave them in front of you, occupying them only with light troops and treating them to some extent as a river in order to allow the enemy to cross over them, and then, as soon as he begins to make a riot in separate columns from the mountain passes, fall with all his might on one of them . Another way is to bring the main forces into the mountains. In the latter case, individual mountain passes should be defended only by small detachments, and a significant part of the army (from one third to half) should be kept in reserve in order to attack with superior forces one of the enemy columns that would manage to break through. However, one should not disperse the forces of this large reserve, trying to completely block the exit of all columns. From the very beginning, you must set yourself the goal of attacking the column that is supposed to be the strongest. If in this way it is possible to defeat a significant part of the advancing army, then the remaining columns that have broken through will retreat on their own.

The structure of most mountain systems is such that among them there are usually more or less high plateaus, while the slopes facing the plains are usually crossed by deep, steep valleys that form mountain passes. Thus, the defender will find terrain in the mountains through which he can quickly move to the right and left, while the advancing columns are separated from each other by large and inaccessible ridges. Only in cases where the mountains are of this nature do they provide convenience for defense. If the mountains are harsh and impregnable in their entire depth, so that the defending troops find themselves scattered without mutual communication, then defending them with the main forces is a dangerous matter. All benefits under these conditions are on the side of the attacker, who has the opportunity to attack individual points with superior forces; and then not a single mountain pass or pass, not a single single point will be so strong that it cannot be quickly captured by superior forces.

7. In general, regarding mountain warfare, it should be noted that everything in it depends on the skill of individual commanders, officers, and even more on the spirit of the soldiers. It does not require great skill in maneuvering, but fighting spirit and dedication are required, for here everyone is more or less left to his own devices. This is why the people's militia is especially strong in mountain warfare, for, lacking the first, it possesses the last two qualities to the highest degree.

8. Finally, regarding strategic defense, it should be noted that, being stronger than the offensive, it should serve only to achieve the first major successes. But if they are achieved, and the world does not immediately follow them, further success can only be achieved through an offensive. After all, only those who constantly want only to defend themselves are at a disadvantage, always fighting at their own expense. No state can stand this for long. By being hit by the enemy and never returning a blow, the defender will undoubtedly eventually weaken and be beaten. We need to start with defense, so that we can end with an offensive.

1. A strategic offensive pursues the achievement of the political goal of war, for it is directly aimed at the destruction of enemy forces, while strategic defense attempts to achieve this political goal in part only in an indirect way. Therefore, the principles of the offensive are already contained in the “General Principles” of the strategy. Only two points deserve special mention here.

2. The first is the non-stop replenishment of troops and weapons. For the defender this is relatively easy due to the proximity of the sources of such replenishment. The attacker, although in most cases has the resources of a larger state, finds himself forced to deliver his resources from afar and with enormous difficulties. Therefore, in order to never experience a shortage of forces, he must take such measures that the recruitment of recruits and the transportation of weapons takes place long before they are needed. The roads of his line of operations must be continually busy with the movement of men and transport carrying all necessary supplies towards the army. Checkpoints should be set up on these roads to facilitate the fastest movement of transport.

3. Even under the most favorable conditions and with the greatest moral and physical superiority of forces, the attacker must never lose sight of the possibility of a major failure. Therefore, he must prepare points on his line of operations to which he could withdraw with his defeated army. These could be fortresses with fortified camps attached to them, or just fortified camps.

Large rivers are the best way to delay a pursuing enemy for a while. Therefore, crossings across them must be protected by bridgeheads, reinforced by a belt of strong redoubts.

To occupy such points, as well as the most significant cities and fortresses, a greater or lesser number of troops should be left, depending on the greater or lesser degree of danger that threatens from enemy attacks or from an uprising of the population. These troops, together with arriving reinforcements, form new corps, which, if things are successful, advance after the army, but in case of failure, they are stationed in fortified points to ensure retreat.

In organizing the rear of his army, Napoleon was always distinguished by extreme prudence, which is why his most risky operations were less risky than they seemed (in 1812 this did not help: having lost more than 570 thousand in Russia, including all the cavalry, almost all artillery, he had to recruit a new army, which only delayed the inevitable - on March 18 (30), 1814, after a difficult battle, the Russians and allies entered Paris. - Ed.).

The principles of the art of war are themselves extremely simple and are in complete agreement with common sense. Even if in tactics they rely on specialized knowledge to a greater extent than in strategy, this knowledge is still so limited that in terms of volume and variety it can hardly be compared with any other science. Neither scholarship nor particularly outstanding qualities of mind are required here. If, in addition to the ability to reason, any special property of the mind is required, then, most likely, cunning or resourcefulness. For a long time the exact opposite was asserted, but only because of an exaggerated reverence for the art of military leaders and because of the vanity of the authors who dealt with these issues. We are convinced of this by an impartial study of the art of warfare, confirmed by practical experience. Even during the period of revolutionary wars, many people who had not received any military education proved themselves to be skilled commanders, even commanders of the first magnitude. At the very least, the military education of Conde, Wallenstein, Suvorov and many others is very doubtful. (Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov received a “book” military education at home, from childhood studying artillery, fortification, military history under the guidance of his father - general-in-chief, senator, author of the first Russian military dictionary. And from 1748, Suvorov already began serving as a corporal in Semenovsky regiment. He completed his brilliant career with the rank of Generalissimo, awarded to him in 1799, died in 1800 - Ed.)

There is no doubt that waging war is difficult. But the difficulty is not that it requires special learning or great genius to grasp the true principles of the art of war. This is accessible to every properly developed brain, free from prejudice and somewhat familiar with the matter. Even applying these principles to a map and paper presents no difficulty, and it does not require much wisdom to sketch a good operating plan. The great difficulty is to remain true to the learned principles in practice.

To draw attention to this difficulty is the object of these concluding remarks, and to give your Royal Highness a clear idea of ​​it I consider the most important of all that I wished to achieve by these notes.

The conduct of war resembles the complex operation of a machine with enormous resistance, so that combinations that can be easily sketched on paper may require great effort to carry them out in practice.

Thus, the free will and thought of the commander encounter obstacles to their movements every minute, and special strength of spirit and mind is required to overcome these obstacles. Amid this resistance, one has to discard more than one successful thought and resort to simpler, more modest techniques, although more complex ones could yield greater results.

It is perhaps impossible to give an exhaustive list of all the reasons for this friction, but the most important of them are the following:

1. As a rule, there is much less data about the enemy’s position and his activities than is required for drawing up plans. At the moment of implementing the decision, countless doubts arise due to dangers threatening from everywhere if, when drawing up the plan, it was based on erroneous assumptions. Then we are overcome by a feeling of anxiety, which easily attacks a person when performing a big task, and from anxiety to indecision and from indecision to half-measures there is only a small, imperceptible step.

2. Added to the inaccuracy of information about the number of enemy forces is the fact that rumors (all information we receive from guard units and subunits, from spies and from random sources) are always exaggerated. The human crowd is fearful by nature, and therefore always exaggerates the danger. Thus, the commander has a false idea of ​​the strength of the enemy with whom he will have to deal; and this serves as a new source of his indecision.

It is difficult to overestimate the size of the disaster that can occur due to lack of awareness, and therefore it is especially important to prepare for it in advance.

If everything has been calmly thought out in advance, if without prejudice we have understood the situation and provided for the most likely turn of events, we should not immediately abandon the original plan. All information delivered must be subjected to strict criticism, compared with each other, sent for new ones, etc. Very often, incorrect information can be immediately refuted, and other data can be confirmed. In both cases we receive greater certainty and can adapt our decision to it. If we do not have complete certainty, then we must tell ourselves that in war nothing is done without risk, that the very nature of war does not make it possible to always foresee in advance where you are going; that the probable still remains probable, even if it does not appear to us in its entirety, and that with other prudent measures, complete destruction from one mistake will not immediately follow.

3. The uncertainty of the state of affairs at any given moment extends not only to the enemy, but also to one’s own army. The latter can rarely be so concentrated that one can clearly imagine the position of all its parts at any moment. If we are inclined to be cautious, then new doubts may arise on this basis. A desire to wait appears, and its inevitable consequence will be a delay in the overall action.

Therefore, it is necessary to trust that our general routine will live up to the results expected from it. In particular, you must trust your subordinate commanders. Therefore, people who can be relied upon should be appointed to these posts. This consideration must be placed above all others. Since we have wisely planned our activities and taken into account possible accidents, having taken all measures so as not to die immediately if these accidents occur, then we should boldly move forward in the darkness of the unknown.

4. If we decide to wage a war with great effort, then often subordinate commanders, as well as troops (especially if they are not drawn into the war) will consider the difficulties encountered on their way as insurmountable obstacles. It will seem to them that the marches are too long, the efforts too difficult, and the supply of food impossible. One has only to give faith to all these difficulties (Diffikultaten, as Frederick II called them) - and you will soon find yourself overwhelmed by them, and instead of acting strongly and energetically, you will become weak and inactive.

To face all this, you need to trust your insight and conviction. At these moments, such conviction has the appearance of stubbornness, but in fact it represents that strength of mind and character that we call firmness.

5. The results we hope for in war are never exactly what those who do not personally participate in it and are not accustomed to it imagine them.

They often make mistakes by many hours in calculating the march of a column, and it is impossible to even find out exactly why the delay occurred. Obstacles often arise that were impossible to foresee in advance. They often expect to reach a certain point with the army, but are forced to stop along the way for several hours. Often the detachment we have allocated offers much less resistance than we expected, while the enemy detachment offers much more resistance. Often the resources of a province turn out to be more modest than we expected, etc.

All such obstacles can be overcome only at the cost of great effort, which a commander can achieve only with severity bordering on cruelty. Only when he is convinced that everything possible will be done can he be sure that these minor difficulties will not acquire a great influence on the operations and he will not be too far from the goal he must achieve.

6. It can be taken for granted that the army will never be in the same state in which the one who monitors operations from his office imagines it. If he is disposed towards this army, he will imagine it to be a third or a half stronger and better. It is quite natural that a commander, drawing up a plan for upcoming operations for the first time, should find himself in such a position. But then he sees that his army begins to melt, which he did not expect, that his cavalry is losing its fighting ability. Therefore, what seems possible and easy to both the observer and the commander at the beginning of the campaign turns out to be difficult and unattainable when carried out. If the commander turns out to be a courageous man with a strong will, then, driven by high ambition, he will still pursue his goal; the average person will consider the condition of his army sufficient justification to refuse to achieve his goal.

In most cases the enemy army will be in the same position. Let us recall, for example, Wallenstein and Gustav II Adolf near Nuremberg, Napoleon and Bennigsen after the battle of Preussisch-Eylau. But the state of the enemy is not visible, and the suffering of one’s own army is before one’s eyes. Therefore, the latter have a stronger effect on an ordinary person, because in an ordinary person, sensory impressions take precedence over the voice of reason.

7. Supplying troops with food, no matter how it is done (from stores or by requisition), always presents such difficulties that when choosing a method of action, it must be taken into account first of all. Often supply interruptions disrupt military operations, as they force them to worry about food when it would be possible to achieve victory, the most brilliant success. Due to the need for food, the entire military machine becomes heavy, which is why its successes may lag behind the flight of broad plans.

A general who tyrannically demands from his troops extreme exertion and the greatest hardships; an army that has become accustomed to these sacrifices in long wars - what a huge advantage they will have over their enemy, how much sooner they will achieve their goal, despite all the obstacles! With equally good plans, how different the success will be!

8. It is difficult to overestimate the visual impressions obtained through direct participation in military operations, which are always more vivid than those we imagine upon mature reflection. But these impressions are often made only by the visible side of events, and, as we know, this rarely coincides with their essence. Therefore, there is a danger of forgetting about the results of mature reflections for the sake of primary impressions.

These initial impressions, as a rule, create fear and lead to excessive caution, which is characteristic of a person’s natural timidity, which makes him look at everything one-sidedly.

Consequently, one should treat initial impressions with caution and place more trust in the results of one’s previous thoughts. This approach will help strengthen yourself against the enervating effects of primary impressions.

Consequently, successful actions depend on the fidelity and firmness of one’s own convictions. That is why the study of military history is so important, because from it we learn everything about wars, the very course of events. The principles which theory gives us are only suitable to facilitate this study and to direct attention to what is most important in military history.

So, you must, Your Royal Highness, become familiar with these principles in order to test them in the study of the history of wars and to see for yourself where they coincide with the course of events and where these events introduce certain corrections into them or even refute them altogether.

Along with this, the study of military history, with a lack of personal experience, is able to give a clear idea of ​​what we called the resistance of the entire machine as a whole.

True, one should not dwell only on general conclusions, much less should one trust the reasoning of historians, but it is necessary, if possible, to study the details. Historians rarely set out to portray the ultimate truth. Usually they embellish the deeds of their army or prove the coincidence of historical facts with imaginary rules. They make up history instead of writing it. The above purpose does not require a history of many wars. A detailed look at a few individual battles is more useful than a quick look at many campaigns. Therefore, it is more useful to read more individual reports and diaries than historical works in the proper sense of the word. An example of such an unsurpassed report is the description of the defense of Menen in 1794, given in the memoirs of General von Scharnhorst. This narrative, especially the story of the sortie and breakthrough of the garrison, will provide Your Royal Highness with an example of how military history should be written.

Not a single battle like this strengthened my conviction that in war one cannot doubt success until the last minute. He proves that the influence of right principles, which never appears as often as we expect, suddenly makes itself felt again in the most distress, when all hope of their influence seemed to be lost.

It is necessary that some feeling inspire the great forces of the commander, be it the ambition of Caesar, hatred of the enemy of Hannibal, the proud determination to perish with the glory of Frederick the Great.

Open your heart to this feeling. Be bold and cunning in the formulation of your plans, firm and persistent in their execution, resolute in the pursuit of victory, and fate will crown your young head with the shining glory that is the adornment of princes, and your image will remain in the hearts of your descendants.

Notes:

Scharnhorst Gerhard Johann David (November 12, 1755, Bordenau, Hanover - June 28, 1813, Prague) - Prussian general (1807) and military reformer. From July 1807, he was the chief of the General Staff and chairman of the commission for the reorganization of the army, and from 1808 he headed the Ministry of War. Together with General A. Gneisenau, he carried out a military reform, as a result of which the introduction of conscription was prepared (since 1813), the organization of the army and the training of officers was improved, the service life was shortened, a trained reserve was created, weapons were improved, and the rear service was reorganized. During the war of liberation with Napoleonic France in 1813, he was chief of staff of the Silesian Army under General G. Blücher. (Note per.)

Posen is now Poznan in Poland. (Note per.)

Breslau is now Wroclaw in Poland. (Editor's note)

Schlieffen Alfred von (February 28, 1833, Berlin - January 4, 1913, ibid.) - German military leader, Field Marshal General (1911). He graduated from the Officers' School (1853) and the Military Academy (1861). As an officer of the General Staff, he participated in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. Since 1884, head of the department of the German General Staff, in 1891–1905. Chief of the General Staff. Retired since 1906. One of the ideologists of German militarism. Theoretically substantiated the so-called. a strategy of destruction aimed at achieving objectives through double envelopment, resulting in tactical encirclement. Author of the German war plan (the so-called Schlieffen plan, 1905). (Note per.)

Insight, intuition. (Note per.)

The battle of Leuthen (modern name Lutynia (Poland, Silesia) took place on December 5, 1757. The Prussian army (about 40 thousand, 167 guns) had a population more than one and a half times smaller than the army of Charles of Lorraine (up to 66 thousand, 300 guns). During the battle, Frederick II attacked the left flank of the Austrians, defeated it, and then the center of the Austrian forces, using an oblique battle formation. The Austrians lost 27 thousand prisoners, killed and wounded and all the artillery, the Prussians - 6.5 thousand killed and the wounded. (Editor's note)

Frederick II (the Great), born 1712, King of Prussia (1740–1786) is one of history's great military figures. The first half of his reign was largely devoted to wars with Austria, which was ruled by Maria Theresa (1717–1780), his main enemy in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756–1763).

Especially during the last war, when Prussia, in alliance with England, had to fight the superior forces of the coalition of Austria, France, Russia, Sweden and Saxony, Frederick proved his skill as a military leader and courage. One of the most brilliant and decisive victories was won near the village of Leuthen in Silesia (modern Lutynia in Poland) on December 5, 1757. The victory over the vastly superior Austrian army, led by Prince Charles of Lorraine, was as much due to military genius as to the superior morale of Frederick's officers and men. Before the battle, in the presence of the generals, the Prussian king made a famous speech illustrating Clausewitz's point. It ended with the words: “Gentlemen, the enemy, armed to the teeth, stands behind these fortifications. We must attack him and defeat him or die. There is no third. If you don't like it, you can resign and go home."

(Other significant battles of the Seven Years' War mentioned by Clausewitz were the battles of Rosbach, Liegnitz, Prague, Kolin, Hochkirch, Kunersdorf, Minden.)

The term "corps", as commonly used by Clausewitz, does not imply a specific unit (as, for example, a modern army corps), but simply any part of the army.

Ratisbon - more often called and called Regensburg, is located in Bavaria on the Danube. (Note per.)

Wagram is a village in Austria, 16 km northeast of Vienna, in the area of ​​which on July 5–6, 1809, during the Austro-French War of 1809, a decisive battle took place between the French army of Napoleon I (170 thousand, 584 guns ) and the Austrian army of Archduke Charles (110 thousand, 452 guns). The French are believed to have won, but the Austrians retreated in good order, and the losses of both sides were almost equal - 32 thousand for the Austrians and 27 thousand for the French. (Editor's note)

Both battles were part of Napoleonic campaign against Austria in 1809. At Eckmuhl, near Regensburg, in southern Germany, the French army under the command of Napoleon and his Marshal Davout defeated a strong Austrian army on April 22. This opened the way for Napoleon's invasion of Austria, where, near the village of Wagram, near Vienna, Napoleon managed to inflict such a serious blow on Archduke Charles on July 5–6 that Austria still had to ask for peace.

This refers to Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, Frederick's nephew, Prussian field marshal. (Note per.)

Near Minden in Westphalia, Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, one of Frederick II's generals during the Seven Years' War, won a significant victory over the French, commanded by Marshal Contade. He was preparing to attack the French positions in the early morning of August 1, 1759, when he learned that the French were in turn ready to attack him. He carried out his plan to prepare for the battle, thereby nullifying Contad's preparations for a surprise attack. In the ensuing battle, Ferdinand, commanding the combined English, Hanoverian and Prussian troops, won a decisive victory, as a result of which the French retreated beyond the Rhine and Main rivers.

At the same time, approximately a third of Ferdinand's army, organized as a separate corps under the command of General von Wangenheim, was stationed to the left of the main army, near the village of Thannhausen (also known as Tonhausen or Todthausen). This corps was not informed of the impending French attack. At approximately 5 o'clock in the morning, the enemy corps under the command of de Broglier opened fire on the fortifications of Wangenheim. However, the surprise attack failed, and Wangenheim had the opportunity to line up his troops and resist Broglier until the defeat of the main army under Contade forced the French to retreat.

At Rosbach, on November 5, 1757, the army of Frederick II, numbering 22,000 people, defeated the combined Franco-Austrian army, almost twice its size (43 thousand), under the command of the incompetent Marshal Prince de Soubise (France) and Prince Hildburghausen (Saxony). While his opponents, thinking that Frederick was hastily retreating, began to pursue him, the well-trained cavalry of Frederick II, under the command of General von Seydlitz, suddenly attacked their right flank. The enemy, who did not have time to build a battle formation, was defeated, losing 7,000 people (mostly prisoners), 67 guns, 22 banners and the entire baggage train. The Prussians lost over 500 people.

Frederick's victory had an incredible moral effect both in Germany and abroad. She restored his reputation, which had suffered greatly after the defeat at Colin.

At the Battle of Liegnitz, as before at the battles of Rossbach and Leuthen, Frederick II the Great's art of defeating an enemy of superior strength was demonstrated, using the high mobility of the army in a concentrated attack and hiding his intentions from the enemy for as long as possible.

Finding himself surrounded at Liegnitz (Saxony) by several Austrian armies numbering about 100,000 men, he carefully planned his retreat. On the night of August 14-15, 1760, he set up camp, leaving, however, burning fires in order to mislead the enemy, who planned a triangular attack on August 15. At dawn, the Prussian king surprised one of the detachments of the Austrian army under the command of Laudon on the Katzbach River and defeated 30,000 people with an army half the size.

Hohenlinden (Hohenlinden) is a village in Bavaria (east of Munich), near which on December 3, 1800, during the war of the 2nd European coalition of monarchical states against Republican France, the French army of J. Moreau defeated the Austrian army of Archduke John. After this, Austria signed the Peace of Luneville in 1801. (Note per.)

Moreau Jean Victor (1763–1813) - French military leader, division general (1794). Since 1789 in the National Guard, since 1791 volunteer in the revolutionary army. In 1792 he was elected battalion commander. Fought in the Netherlands. From 1794 he commanded the northern and, from 1796, the Rhine-Mosel armies, winning a number of victories over the Austrians. In 1799, inspector general, then commander of the French army in Italy, where A.B. was defeated. Suvorov. After the coup of the 18th Brumaire by Napoleon, he commanded the Army of the Rhine, where he won a victory at Hohenlinden. In 1804 he was accused of a royalist conspiracy against Napoleon and expelled from France. Moreau settled in America, from where he was invited by Tsar Alexander I in 1813. Moreau became a military adviser to the headquarters of the allied armies. At the Battle of Dresden, where Napoleon won a brilliant victory, on August 27, 1813, Moreau was mortally wounded by a French cannonball and died on September 2. There is a legend that the cannonball was fired from a cannon, which was aimed by Napoleon himself. (Editor's note)

During the Napoleonic campaign against the 2nd coalition (Great Britain, Austria and Russia), the French general Moreau concentrated his forces at the village of Hohenlinden (as in the atlas, but in military encyclopedias more often Hohenlinden), located in the center of a large forest area on a plateau east of Munich . Despite warnings from his generals, Archduke John of Austria entered the forest on December 2, 1800, to pursue what he believed were the retreating French. Meanwhile, Moreau, who had lined up his troops at the exit from the forest, during the battle with four columns of Austrians emerging from the forest, outflanked the Austrians with one division, and they found themselves between two fires. The Austrian army was defeated, losing about 14,000 people (including 9 thousand prisoners), almost all the artillery (87 guns), and Moreau (having lost 2.5 thousand) was able to continue the attack on Vienna, which forced Austria to conclude the unfavorable Treaty of Luneville of 1801.

Davout Louis Nicolas (1770–1823) is a representative of an impoverished aristocratic family. He graduated from the Paris military school (1788). During the Great French Revolution of 1789 he went over to the side of the revolutionary people. From 1794 to 1797 in the Army of the Rhine with the rank of brigadier general. Since 1804, Marshal of France, in 1804–1814. corps commander. In 1798–1799 participated in the Egyptian expedition, commanding the cavalry. In 1800–1801 commanded the cavalry of Napoleon's Italian army. In 1806 he defeated the Prussians at the Battle of Auerstedt, defeated the Prussian army and received the title of Duke of Auerstedt in 1808. In 1807–1809 successfully fought at Preussisch-Eylau, Wagram and Ekmühl, for which he was awarded the title of Prince of Ekmühl. During Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, Davout's corps took part in the assault on Smolensk and in the Battle of Borodino. During the retreat from Russia, he commanded the rearguard; after the defeat at Vyazma, he was replaced by Ney. In 1813–1814 led the defense of Hamburg against Prussian troops. During the Hundred Days, Minister of War. With the accession of Bourbon, he was deprived of his ranks and titles (but not shot, like Ney!), but in 1817 they were returned to him. Since 1819 peer of France. (Editor's note)

Frederick II achieved the necessary concentration of his troops with a special battle formation known as the “oblique battle formation.” Although it is by no means new (it has been used from time to time since ancient times), it was Frederick who consistently used this order in most of his battles. In his General Principles of War, written in 1748, Frederick described it as follows: “We ‘weaken’ one of our flanks before the enemy and strengthen the flank with which we intend to attack.” This will make it possible to defeat an enemy army that is significantly superior in strength: “An army of 100,000 men attacked in the flank in this way can be defeated by an army of 30,000 men.” The most successful example of Frederick's use of this "ledged" battle formation was the Battle of Leuthen.

At Hochkirch (Hochkirche), a village in Saxony, on October 14, 1758, the Austrian army of Marshal Daun* dealt a serious blow to the forces of Frederick II. Attacking at dawn, the Austrians took the arrogant King of Prussia by surprise and, with a force of 78,000 men, defeated his army of 40,000 men. The Prussian army suffered heavy losses. The Prussians lost approximately 9,000 men, and several of Frederick's generals were killed or wounded.

* Daun Leopold (1705–1766) - Austrian field marshal general. (Note per.)

The provisions in italics are considered by General Friedrich von Kochenhausen, a teacher at the German Air Force Academy, to be inapplicable in modern wars.

General Friedrich von Kochenhausen, in his notes to this book, notes that most of the rules concerning the cavalry reserve, although no longer applicable in modern warfare, can be applied almost word for word to mechanized units.

Support point (French).

Ipso facto (lat.). (Note per.)

The Battle of Friedland (East Prussia) on June 2 (14), 1807 ended in the defeat of the Russian army under the command of Bennigsen, who made a fatal mistake when he transported his army to the west bank of the river. Allais with the goal of moving along this bank to the rescue of Koenigsberg from Napoleon's troops. The crossing took place in the area of ​​Friedland (now Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad region), which Bennigsen occupied as a result of successful battles with French troops. Bennigsen's mistake was that he positioned all available troops in the bend of the river. Alla, leaving behind the only escape route - the bridges in Friedland. Napoleon, who also had a large numerical advantage (80 thousand versus 60 thousand for the Russians), immediately took advantage of the disadvantageous position of the Russian troops. As a result, the Russian army, after a stubborn battle, was defeated and suffered heavy losses at the crossings (the Russians burned the bridges behind them). (The Russians lost, according to various sources, from 10 to 25 thousand killed, drowned and captured, the French - 8 thousand - Ed.) Russia was forced to conclude the Peace of Tilsit with Napoleon. (Note per.)

On June 2 (14), 1807, during the Russian-Prussian-French war of 1806–1807, the Russian army under the command of Bennigsen (60 thousand) was defeated by Napoleon (80 thousand) in the Battle of Friedland, in East Prussia. Rushing to the aid of Koenigsberg, the Russians, having crossed the Alle on June 1 and occupied Friedland, had against them the only French corps under the command of Marshal Lannes*.

Bennigsen decided that this was an excellent chance to attack, but Lannes held out until Napoleon arrived with the main army. The Emperor delivered the main blow on the Russian left flank, separated from their right flank by a ravine with the Mühlenflus stream and lake. The only route for the retreat of the Russian troops of the left flank was a narrow defile between this ravine and the bend of the Alla River. Napoleon's artillery battery (36 guns), pushed forward at this point, inflicted great damage on the Russians before they managed to reach the bridges over the Allais. The situation was even worse on Gorchakov’s right flank. By 9 o'clock in the evening, his desperately fighting troops were thrown into the river by superior enemy forces and crossed under murderous fire. In total, Bennigsen lost from 10,000 to 25,000 (according to various sources> killed, wounded and drowned, Napoleon 8,000 (according to other sources, 12-14 thousand).

* The son of a groom, revolutionary soldier Jean Lannes (1769–1809), the future Duke of Montebello, was noticed by Napoleon as a battalion officer in the battle of Dego on April 15, 1796, and from that day he rapidly rose, ending the Italian campaign as a brigadier general. During the Egyptian campaign, Bonaparte commanded a division. At Montebello (1800) he held out until reinforcements arrived, contributing to the overall victory. Distinguished himself in 1805–1807. In February 1809, it was Lannes who stormed the heroically defending Zaragoza, after which he wrote to Napoleon about his opposition to such a war when civilians had to be killed. The historian J. Michelet considered Lannes a “great soldier” and a “great commander.” His comrades in arms considered him “the bravest in the army.” He was the first to break into enemy positions at the head of his hussars, fought alongside his soldiers on the streets of Zaragoza, and led them in the assault on Regensburg (1809). At the age of 40, already covered by 25 wounds, he was mortally wounded at the Battle of Aspern (Essling). Napoleon then cried - for the second and last time in his life. (Note per.)

During the Seven Years' War, Prussia found itself surrounded by enemies: Saxony and Austria in the south, France in the west, Sweden in the north and Russia in the east (Goebbels had approximately the same argument on June 22, 1941. The aggressors are similar. - Ed.). Frederick II overcame a difficult situation by fully taking advantage of the advantages that fighting on the “inner line” gives to a highly mobile army under the leadership of an enterprising commander. In 1756, he captured Saxony without declaring war. His invasion of Bohemia in 1757 was stopped by the Austrians under Colin, and he was forced to abandon his own territories. From there he moved with lightning speed, first to central Germany, where he defeated the French at the Battle of Rossbach, and then back to Silesia, where he defeated the Austrians at the Battle of Leuthen. On August 14 (25), 1758, he defeated the Russians near Zorndorf (“meat grinder” at Zorndorf, where the Russians lost over 16 thousand and 60 guns, and the Prussians over 11 thousand and 36 guns - a very dubious victory. Both sides, exhausted, could no longer fight. After the battle, the opponents dispersed in different directions, “licking their wounds.” In our literature it is written that the battle ended in a “draw.” Ed.). However, in the end the numerical advantage of the opponents became too great, and Frederick had to limit himself to a defensive strategy, while his tactics remained offensive.

Baron Antoine Henri Jomini (1779–1869), of Swiss origin, joined the French army in 1804, commanded a battalion, then aide-de-camp to Marshal Ney* and the chief of staff of his corps (1805–1809, 1813). With the French invasion of Russia in 1812, he was commandant of Vilna and governor of Smolensk. He distinguished himself in the successful Battle of Bautzen in 1813 for the French. Clashes with Napoleon's chief of staff, Berthier, forced Jomini to join the Russian army in August 1813. He was a member of the staff and retinue of Alexander I. He became famous for his very influential works on military theory, such as “Essays on the Art of War”, “Discourses on Great Military Actions or a Critical and Comparative Description of the Campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon...” and others. His main idea was that victory over the enemy should be achieved not by maneuvering without battle, but by decisive battle; Jomini considered strategy as the science of warfare, tactics as the science of battle and combat.

Baron Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow (1757–1807) – Prussian military writer and theorist. Served in the Prussian army (1772–1790). After retiring, he took part in the uprising in the Southern Netherlands (modern Belgium and Luxembourg) against Austrian rule. In 1799 he published the work “The Spirit of the Newest Military System”. In 1806, he wrote a pamphlet, “The Campaign of 1805,” which contained criticism of the actions of the Russian army in this campaign and offensive attacks against the Russian command. For this, at the request of the Russian government, he was arrested (1806) and sent by sea to Russia, but died on the way. Bülow's independent mind made him one of the most influential writers on the subject and coined many of the modern military terms. According to Bülow, wars are not decided by victories won on the battlefield, but rather by strategic maneuvers against enemy “operational lines” (i.e. lines of communication). Formulated an important thesis about the subordination of military strategy to politics, and tactics to strategy. Clausewitz objected to the dogmatism and geometric constructions of Bülow, who underestimated the significance of the battle.

* Marshal Ney Michel (1769–1815) - son of a cooper, Duke of Elchingen and “Prince of Moscow” (he was awarded the latter title by Napoleon for valor in the Battle of Borodino - his corps attacked the Semyonov flushes), hero of all Napoleon’s campaigns, a man extremely popular in the army . It was to him that Napoleon, although after the death of Lannes, gave the nickname Bravest of the Brave, which the army placed above all his titles. During the retreat of the French, he commanded the rearguard, which was almost completely destroyed in the battle of Krasny, where the French lost 32 thousand (including 26 thousand prisoners), and the Russians 2 thousand. During the Hundred Days, he was sent at the head of the royal troops against Napoleon, went over with his troops to the side of the former emperor. Now in Paris, on Observatory Square, where the French shot their Bravest of the Brave on December 7, 1815, there is a monument to Ney. (Note per.)

This statement is only partly true in relation to such battles as the battles of Jena, Ulm, Eckmühl, Marengo and Wagram.

In the spring of 1757, Frederick the Great invaded Bohemia (Czech Republic) with three separate armies. Two of them moved from Saxony (one was commanded by the king himself), and the third, under the command of the seventy-two-year-old Marshal Schwerin, from Silesia. The Austrian army under the command of Prince Charles retreated before the invaders and took a strong position near Prague. Schwerin's army was late, and when it finally arrived, the Prussians defeated the Austrians on May 6, 1757, but allowed a significant portion of the Austrian forces to retreat. On June 18, Frederick, although with smaller forces, again attacked the Austrian army, this time under the command of Marshal Daun, near Kolin. Frederick II was utterly defeated, mainly due to the numerical superiority of the Austrians, but also due to the talent and courage of Marshal Daun.

Kolin is a Czech city on the river. Labe (Elbe) at the crossroads of ancient trade routes. Near Kolin, on June 18, 1757, the army of Frederick II (34 thousand) was defeated by the Austrians of Daun (54 thousand). The Prussians lost 14 thousand and 45 guns. (Editor's note)

Duke of Wellington Arthur Wellesley (1769–1852) - English military and political leader, diplomat, field marshal (1813). In 1794–1795 participated in the war against Republican France in the Netherlands. In 1796–1805 served and fought in India. In 1806 he was elected to parliament. From 1808 he was commander of the allied forces in Portugal and Spain, liberating Spain from the French. In 1814 he occupied Southwestern France. He received the ducal title and became the first Duke of Wellington. He was appointed ambassador of England in Paris (1814). After Napoleon's return from Fr. Elbe and the beginning of a new war Wellington, together with Blucher, commanded the allied forces at the Battle of Waterloo. Wellington represented England at the Congress of Vienna. Later he held various government and diplomatic posts. Died in England in 1852. (Note per.)

Wellington's Campaign of 1810–11 was part of the Peninsular War, which aimed to liberate Spain and Portugal from Napoleon's rule. As in Russia during the Napoleonic campaign of 1812, the inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula voluntarily destroyed their possessions and supplies in order to make supplying the enemy army impossible and hasten its defeat. This "scorched earth" tactic, as it is called today, was a huge success in both cases.

Near Aspern and Essling, two villages near Vienna on the opposite, left bank of the Danube, on May 21–22, 1809, Napoleon suffered a major defeat. After defeating the Austrians near Ratisbon (Regensburg) on ​​April 19–23, Napoleon entered Vienna on May 13. The Austrian army under the command of Archduke Charles retreated to the left bank of the Danube, and Napoleon had to cross the river to attack it. Charles, in a mortal battle, defeated the French, who lost one of their most talented military leaders, Marshal Lannes. Having received large reinforcements, on June 4 Napoleon made another attempt to cross the Danube. This time he was successful, and on July 5–6 he won the Battle of Wagram, thus ending the war of liberation waged by Austria.

Count Bennigsen Leonty Leontyevich (1745–1826) - born in Brunswick. In 1759–1773 served in the Hanoverian army, and in 1773 he enlisted in the Russian army, where he made a successful career, receiving the rank of cavalry general in 1802. Participated in the Russian-Turkish wars of 1768–1774 and 1787–1791, the Polish campaign of 1792–1794, the Persian campaign of Russian troops in 1796. In the war against Napoleon in 1806–1807. successfully fought the battles of Pultusk, Preussisch-Eylau and Heilsberg. However, he suffered a crushing defeat at Friedland. During the Patriotic War he was the chief of staff of the Russian troops, took part in the Battle of Borodino and the Battle of Tarutino (he was removed from office for intrigues and opposition to Kutuzov). In 1813 he commanded the reserve army (until October), then the 2nd Russian army. In 1818 he left Russia. (Note per.)

In the spring of 1807, Napoleon ordered Marshal Lefebvre to begin the siege of the city of Danzig. The siege, which began in March, lasted until May. The Russian commander-in-chief Bennigsen, who was nearby, remained passive all this time, despite the fact that the surrender of Danzig gave Napoleon an important base and freed up some of his troops, which he soon used to great advantage in the Battle of Friedland.

See note. 45.

Debush - withdraw troops from a mountain gorge or gorge into open areas ( French). (Note per.)

Louis II of Bourbon, Prince of Condé (1621–1686), known as the Grand Condé, began a distinguished military career in 1640, towards the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). In 1643 he was given command of the French forces defending the north-eastern borders of France against the Spanish, and won a decisive victory at Rocroi, which made him, at the age of 22, one of the outstanding military leaders. Later he commanded French troops, fighting in Germany, Lorraine and Flanders. He took part in the “Fronde of Princes”, was defeated by Turenne in 1652, fled to the Netherlands and in 1653–1658, at the head of the Spanish army, fought against his own. He returned in 1660. In 1672–1675 he successfully led the French army in the war with Holland.

Albrecht von Wallenstein (1583–1634) was a Bohemian Czech nobleman of the Wallenstein family who was commander-in-chief (generalissimo) of the troops of the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years' War, although his military education, according to Clausewitz and modern standards, was short and superficial. During his two years in the army (1604–1606), he fought against the Turks and Hungarians, and from 1617 he commanded an increasing number of mercenaries (most of them hired by himself from his rapidly growing fortune) whom he placed at the disposal of Emperor Ferdinand II. He was called “the idol of troops and the scourge of nations.” Killed by conspiratorial officers (see also note 22).

Count Alexander Suvorov-Rymniksky, Prince of Italy (1729–1800) gained fame as the commander of Russian troops during the wars of Catherine II the Great with the Turks (1768–1774, 1787–1791). In 1799, he became commander-in-chief of the allied army in Italy and, having defeated, expelled the French from Northern Italy. Having received his baptism of fire at the Battle of Kunersdorf (1759), Suvorov took part in 63 battles and battles and won all of them. Suvorov took 609 banners, 2,670 guns and 50,000 prisoners from his opponents (Prussians, Poles, Turks, French). The last for Suvorov was the Swiss campaign, after the brilliant conduct of which the great commander soon died.

Massena Andre (1758–1817) - the illiterate son of a peasant, Duke of Rivoli and Prince of Essling, surpassed most other marshals in the gift of military improvisation and in general as a military leader. By the beginning of the revolution, he had reached the rank of sergeant major 14 years later. In 1791 he joined the revolutionary army and in 1792 became a battalion commander, and in 1793 a brigadier general. It was he who defeated the Russian-Austrian corps of A.M. on September 14-15 (25-26), 1799 in the battle of Zurich. Rimsky-Korsakov (38 thousand French against 24 thousand Russians), forced A.B. Suvorov to leave Switzerland and thereby saved France from the Russian-Austrian invasion that threatened it. In 1800, in Genoa, with 15 thousand French, he withstood a 1.5-month siege by 30 thousand Austrians and an English squadron. In 1805, commanding an army, he occupied Venice, Carinthia, Styria and the Kingdom of Naples. In the war of 1809 with Austria, he commanded a corps. At Wagram, being on the left flank, he withstood a strong counterattack by the Austrians, which contributed to the overall success. In 1810 he was appointed commander of the French troops in Portugal. For a series of defeats in 1811 he was removed from office. (Editor's note)

André Massena, Prince of Essling (1758–1817) was a prominent French general and marshal during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In military service since 1775, private. In 1789 he retired as a sergeant major. In 1791 he joined the revolutionary army. In 1793, Brigadier General. He showed himself in the battle of Rivoli (1796). In 1799 he defeated Rimsky-Korsakov's corps at Zurich. In the spring of 1800, Napoleon ordered him to defend the Italian city of Genoa against the Austrians. The latter suddenly attacked, split his army into two parts, and he and the remaining right flank had to retreat to the city. The Austrian General Ott began a siege of the city, and Massena did not give him rest with constant forays. Despite the increasing shortage of food, he held out for 1.5 months, giving Napoleon the opportunity to win a victory at Marengo.

In 1810, Masséna was given the position of commander-in-chief of the 70,000-strong French army that invaded Portugal to “throw into the sea” the British under Wellington. Once again he had to pit his willpower and determination against such a terrible enemy as hunger. British troops retreated into the interior of the country, leaving behind them mountainous, barren land, devoid of any food. Only one major battle was won by the French (at Boussaco). Most of the French casualties, 25,000, were due to disease and starvation. Even greater losses were largely avoided thanks to Masséna's skillful retreat.

During the Swedish invasion (1630–1632) of the Thirty Years' War, Albrecht von Wallenstein, leader of the Catholic and Imperial forces, and the Swedish king Gustavus II Adolf took up positions opposite each other near Nuremberg in southern Germany. After Wallenstein refused to fight several times, the Swedes attacked his camp on September 3, 1632. The battle continued into the night, with both sides suffering heavy casualties, but Gustavus II Adolf failed to dislodge Wallenstein. At the decisive battle of Lützen (November 6, 1632), Gustavus II Adolf defeated Wallenstein's imperial forces, but was killed.

On February 8, 1807, near Preussisch-Eylau in East Prussia, the French army (70 thousand) under the command of Napoleon and his marshals Davout and Ney won a victory (both sides attributed the victory to themselves. - Ed.) over the Russians under the command of Bennigsen (78 thousand, including 8 thousand Prussians). Thanks to the reinforcements that both Napoleon and Bennigsen received during the battles, luck during the battle turned to face one or the other army. But as night fell, no one had won a decisive victory (although Bennigsen could put the squeeze on the French). The losses of the French exceeded the losses of the Russians, who lost more than a third of their people (the Russians lost 26 thousand killed and wounded, the French from 23 to 30 thousand - Ed.). However, Bennigsen, fearing further strengthening of the French army, retreated, after which Napoleon declared his victory (and Bennigsen - his). This battle was the bloodiest of all those fought before by Napoleon (even bloodier Borodino and Leipzig were ahead). Everything was covered in blood. Marshal Ney, looking at all this, exclaimed: “What a massacre, and without any benefit!”

The Battle of Preussisch-Eylau (now the city of Bagrationovsk, Kaliningrad region) took place on January 26–27 (February 7–8), 1807 between the Russian-Prussian and French armies during the war with France against the countries of the 4th coalition (Russia, Prussia , England, etc.). At the beginning of January, the Russian army under the command of L.L. Bennigsen launched an offensive to the west with the goal of defeating the corps of Ney and Bernadotte. However, due to Bennigsen's indecisiveness, this opportunity was missed. Napoleon, having gathered troops from winter quarters (up to 70 thousand people, 450 guns), went on the offensive with the goal of cutting off the Russian army (78 thousand, including 8 thousand Prussians, 400 guns) from communications with Russia. The battle was not a decisive success for either side. Losses of the parties: the Russians lost 26 thousand killed and wounded, the French 23-30 thousand. However, Bennigsen at the end of the battle, having a fresh corps approaching, missed the opportunity to put the pressure on Napoleon’s army, the right flank of which was in complete disorder. (Editor's note)

General Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755–1813), famous for his reforms of the Prussian army, was a close friend and teacher of Clausewitz. With the rank of captain, he participated in the war of the 1st Coalition against revolutionary France and was among the heroic defenders of the city of Menin in Flanders. He described his observations in a work entitled “Defense of the City of Menen.”

For several days in April 1794, a force of 2,000 men under General Hammerstein defended this fortified city from a storm of 20,000 French under General Moreau. With Hammerstein's supplies of equipment and food depleted and the city burning, he made a successful breakthrough with his troops through enemy lines on April 30, losing more than one-fifth of his forces.

Encounter combat, tactical regroupings, etc.

Tactician- a person who chooses the desired line of behavior.

Development of tactics

In the development of these issues, a strict sequence is visible, determined by the historical evolution in the life of peoples. The trend and forms of military art of the ancient peoples (Ancient China, Hindus, Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, etc.) in the last period of their historical life (battle of Thimvra, 541 BC) were the same as those of the classical peoples (Greeks and the Romans), and the latter approached military affairs in the same way as the new peoples of our time. The order of development of ideas and forms in both is completely the same, which makes one come to the conclusion of the regularity of these phenomena, of the possibility of the existence of laws of war.

History shows that the most remarkable phenomena in the field of tactics, in general the highest state of military art, coincide with the time of the highest state of culture. To be creative in the field of tactics, morally and physically good soldiers are needed. Centuries of brilliant commanders are at the same time centuries of flowering of philosophy, sciences and arts.

The character of historical peoples is expressed differently in their tactical creativity: a kind of individuality is manifested here.

Ancient China

Ancient Japan

Ancient Greece

Thus, the Greeks carried out a mechanical theory in battles - the principle of concentrating forces at the point of impact, and the Romans - a spiritual theory of battle, distributing warriors in battle order according to their spiritual abilities for battle (hastati, young warriors - in front, principles - middle-aged warriors - for support them in the second line; in the general reserve, in the third line, there were gray-haired veterans - triarii).

Ancient Rome

The Romans carried out an energetic but uniform attack along the entire battle front. Only Julius Caesar applied the ideas of the mechanical theory of combat that he brought from Greece, but his art, having existed for only 30 years, went with him to the grave. It was incomprehensible to the Romans. In the development of forms and methods of combat, the following sequence is observed: everywhere it begins with the battle of heroes and their squads, then small armies appear, forming into a single mass - an offensive phalanx, with cavalry placed on the flanks. As the army grows, it begins to be divided for ease of movement (Xenophon in Greece, Marcus Furius Camillus in Rome). Noticing the importance of preparing an attack with throwing weapons, light troops are brought in to begin the battle (peltasts among the Greeks, velites, antesignans among the Romans). To be able to repeat the blow or restore the battle, the idea of ​​a reserve appears (three lines of the legion in the 2nd Punic War, two lines for Marius, the general reserve of Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar).

Towards the end of the historical life of peoples, during their old age, a degeneration is noticed in the forms and methods of combat: a great predilection for fighting with throwing weapons, for occupying fortified positions, a tendency towards defense begins to predominate (the defensive formation of the Egyptians in the battle of Thimvres, the Roman legion of the times of emperors, surrounded by throwing engines, Macedonian phalanx of Perseus).

Development of tactics in the Middle Ages

The new peoples, having founded states on the ruins of Rome and Greece, did not borrow anything from them at first, began the development of tactics anew and repeated in it the same forms that were once used by the peoples of classical antiquity. Due to the flat nature of Central Europe and some cultural features, the main branch of the army for a long time was the knightly cavalry, and the infantry was attached to the convoy. In the struggle of the Swiss and Flemings for independence, infantry was born that could fight knights, and it was built in massive columns. Simultaneously with the invention of firearms, which coincided with the revival of the sciences and arts, European peoples became acquainted with the ideas of the ancient military art of the Greeks and Romans. The Flemings were the first to use them, dividing the battle formation, like the Roman one, into three lines. Gustavus Adolf moved on to two, like Marius. Then the craze for firearms in connection with the recruiting system gave rise to a linear order of battle, in which the infantry was drawn up in thin lines to fire battle fire, and the cavalry formed on the flanks. The idea of ​​a reserve associated with a strong blow at the point of attack was almost forgotten. It appeared sometimes, in a weak form, only in Frederick the Great. The French Revolution caused a complete revolution in the field of tactics: the tactical ideas of the classical world were restored in their entirety. Napoleon Bonaparte proved himself to be the greatest classic: he combined into one whole the ideas of the mechanical theory of battle of the Greeks (powerful reserves of battle formation, terrible coup de collier at the decisive moment of the battle, the use of all means of combat among the masses: infantry, cavalry, fire) and the idea of ​​Rome (organization of voltigeurs - like velites, young and old guards - like the principles and triarii of the Roman legion, two preparations for a strike: artillery fire from afar and infantry volleys and single fire at close range).

Tactics in Russia

see also

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Rapid urbanization, characteristic of most states in general, forces us to pay special attention to the preparation of army and special units for combat operations in populated areas. Neglect of such preparation cost the Russian army unjustifiably large losses during the fighting in Grozny in the winter of 1995. The usual combined arms tactics of deploying units to conduct an offensive in the field turned out to be unsuitable for battles in the city. Obtaining the necessary skills was carried out immediately in practice, paid for abundantly in blood, and forced Russian strategists to think about the advisability of revising the combat training program.

The main reasons for the unpreparedness of the federal forces for an effective assault on Grozny (the most striking, but not the only sad example) were:

• underestimation of the militants' resistance, their weapons and training, including engineering;
• overestimation of one's own strengths. For example, the roles of armored vehicles, aviation and artillery in the assault on a city;
• lack of a unified strategy and management system for a heterogeneous group;
• terrible coordination and communication between departments;
• low training of personnel: general, special and psychological.

This list can be continued, but the purpose of this chapter is not a detailed analysis of the Chechen war, especially its political and ideological aspects. One thing is important - the city was taken only thanks to the courage of the Russian soldier. But something else is even more important: there was a need to learn lessons, in this case tactical ones.

One of the reasons that most of the Russian troops by the mid-90s were not ready for urban battles lies in the fact that the Afghan experience gave us a little in this regard. Here it would be more suitable to study the experience of the defense of Stalingrad during the Second World War. But now you can’t complain about the lack of experience in conducting combat operations in populated areas.

Of course, the city is the most complex theater of operations. Combat in a populated area quickly consumes forces, often without having any impact on success. Dense development limits the mobility of assault units, makes it difficult to maneuver in order to concentrate efforts in the right directions, limits reconnaissance actions, complicates the control of units during combat and target designation, reduces the effectiveness of radio communications, limits shelling, visibility, limits and modifies the use of various types of weapons and etc. Without a doubt, in a populated area it is much preferable to hold the defense than to storm. Especially if it is possible to prepare positions in advance.

For assault units, the main complicating factors may be:

• lack of a detailed map of a populated area (NP) and reliable intelligence information about the enemy and his defense system;
• the presence of an extensive network of underground communications;
• the presence in the city of civilians, whose fate is not indifferent to the assault forces;
• the presence in the NP of historical and architectural monuments, as well as other structures, the preservation of which is important for the attackers.

In this chapter, the assault on a populated area is considered from the point of view of regular troops.

Before storming a populated area, troops need to surround it and cut off all communication between the besieged and the outside world (which was not done during the capture of Grozny in 1995). Attempts to take it on the move can result in big losses for the attackers. Such tactics can be effective if there is accurate intelligence about the enemy's weak defenses.

In Chechnya, Russian troops, before storming a village occupied by militants, first announced their intention to carry out an invasion and invited the extremists to voluntarily lay down their arms and surrender, and for civilians to leave the danger zone along the provided corridor. Practice has shown that in most cases no one surrenders and not all civilians leave the village. Some were forcibly held by the militants, hiding behind them as hostages. Some refused to leave on their own. Many provided active assistance to extremists, which does not allow them to be defined as “civilians.” However, the use of such a practice can significantly reduce losses both among civilians and among attacking units.

When leaving a populated area before an assault, militants almost always try to infiltrate under the guise of civilians. This is done for various purposes, including to provide the besieging forces with a disintegration formation. Therefore, checking and searching all persons leaving the encirclement is mandatory.

Unlike the tactics of long, exhausting sieges of past centuries, when the garrison was reduced to exhaustion, in modern warfare such actions are excluded.

Firstly, a long siege causes political complications.

Secondly, the defenders usually have sufficient food supplies to remain isolated for a long time.

Thirdly, in this way a small garrison can bind a significant group.

Fourthly, the besieged have time to prepare engineering defensive lines. The assault on the village of Pervomaiskoye in Chechnya in January 1996 showed that several days were enough to establish good positions.

Bombing and artillery shelling of a populated area do not cause significant damage to the defenders, especially in a city with high-rise buildings and a network of underground communications. The actions of helicopters delivering targeted strikes on garrison positions are more effective. The senseless destruction of buildings usually does not cause the desired damage to the defenders, but can subsequently impede the advance of assault groups, since, together with the remaining buildings, favorable conditions are created for sheltering the defenders and their military equipment, building well-equipped strongholds, defensive areas and resistance centers. In addition, after the end of hostilities, everything may have to be restored, and the residents left without housing will become another headache that threatens a humanitarian catastrophe. Destruction of buildings is not excluded; it is often necessary. But such actions (as, indeed, other actions in war) must be justified and make sense.

When entering a populated area, troops quickly but carefully move along designated directions within the city and in its suburbs, seizing positions and consolidating there. While developing the pace of movement, the advancing groups should not break away from each other. This is fraught with the fact that the enemy, hiding, will dissect the attacking units, surround them and destroy them, using their positional advantage. The most obvious example of such tactics is the January assault on Grozny in 1995. Having launched columns of armored vehicles, the militants began to cut them off from the main forces and destroy them. Military equipment turned out to be incapable of effectively countering grenade launchers at close range.

The lack of knowledge of the city by federal forces also had an effect.

The rapid pace of the offensive is sometimes fraught with neglect of the danger of possible mining of possible advance routes. It is recommended to bypass strong strongholds of the defenders, which are difficult to capture with a frontal attack. The offensive should be developed in those directions where the enemy’s defenses are weaker. Subsequently, after isolating the most difficult defense nodes and their surroundings, the attackers can use the advantage gained. To break the active resistance of such strong points in the defense, weak points are found. Aviation, armored vehicles and artillery can also be used to capture them. Moreover, direct fire artillery fire will bring the greatest benefit.

If necessary, concentrate efforts in a certain direction or to capture important objects, attackers can land tactical airborne assault forces from helicopters. However, such a landing is a risky undertaking. In most cases, losses are inevitable both among helicopters and among troops.

The assault on a populated area is characterized by the fact that during its implementation the role of small units and each fighter is extremely high. In the German manual “Driving Troops” of 1933, combat in a populated area is characterized as follows: “It is played out at close ranges, and its outcome usually depends on the independent actions of junior commanders.” Therefore, the attacking group is divided into assault detachments ranging in size from a platoon to a battalion. Such groups (detachments) can be reinforced with tank, artillery and engineering units.

It is imperative to have a significant mobile reserve, which is assigned various tasks. The reserve can be sent to assist assault units that have encountered insurmountable resistance or suffered significant losses. The attackers may need the help of specific specialists - snipers, sappers, flamethrowers, grenade launchers, signalmen and others. Therefore, the reserve must be multifunctional and be able to meet any needs.

The reserve can also be sent to develop the offensive in the event of a slowdown in the rate of advance of any assault detachment in a certain direction. If the leading attacking units can advance successfully at a good pace without encountering stubborn resistance, the reserve can move in as a second wave, thoroughly checking captured areas and installations for mines and hidden enemies. In addition, in captured large houses and other buildings it is necessary to leave several soldiers who will guard it and control the rear space. This will protect forward units from attacks in the rear by infiltrated or hidden enemies. A prerequisite for such cover groups is the selection of positions that provide the best observation and the presence of communication with the main groups. Reserve fighters are usually assigned to cover groups.

Just as an attacking group is divided into assault detachments, so the overall plan of an offensive operation is divided into parts. That is, the capture of a populated area or part of it consists of the capture by troops of individual areas: microdistricts, neighborhoods, streets, squares, parks, enterprises, houses, etc.

Each assault squad is assigned its own tasks, final and current. For example, the ultimate task for a battalion is to reach a bridge and organize a strong point there. To achieve it, the battalion must go through three specified quarters, in which it is necessary to take possession of certain buildings and clear the territory of the enemy. The tasks of capturing individual buildings are distributed between companies and platoons of the battalion.

To successfully complete such a complex task, the commanders of assault units must have maps or diagrams of the populated area, know the assigned tasks and have reliable communication with the operation control center and among themselves.

The best for orientation in a populated area are large-scale maps (containing names of streets, squares, numbering of houses, etc.) and multi-color plans at a scale of 1:10,000 or 1:15,000. It is advisable that they be recent. More additional useful information will be provided by aerial photographs of defensive facilities (planned and perspective). A good addition to these documents may be: diagrams of underground and other communications; description of the city and suburbs; other information that gives an idea of ​​the characteristics of a given settlement as a whole and individual objects. In the future, undoubtedly, special units will make greater use of electronic maps in combination with satellite navigation devices, which not only help to navigate the city well, but also provide data on the position of their troops with high accuracy and speed.

The command must constantly have information about the progress of the offensive and coordinate the actions of all groups, since in urban conditions each unit is forced to act almost independently. Combat experience shows that the enemy can take advantage of inconsistency and uneven progress between units and infiltrate at the junctions between units. It is only possible to calculate the uniformity of progress in advance only approximately. Therefore, it is important to make frequent adjustments during the operation.

Another danger inherent in urban combat is the risk of coming under fire from nearby friendly units. At the beginning of the operation to capture Grozny in January 1995, the militants used such tactics. Taking advantage of the fact that the assault was carried out by many heterogeneous units, which usually had no direct connection with each other, no single command, and coordination issues took a lot of time, they provoked different units of the federal forces into fire contacts with each other. For example, using his knowledge of the area and having no signs of belonging to bandit formations, a militant made his way between two posts of federal forces and opened fire from small arms (usually a compact Chechen-made “Wolf” submachine gun) towards each post. After this, the militant left the area, often hiding his weapon and becoming a “civilian.” At first, the fighters at the posts opened a hurricane of unaimed fire in the direction of the shooting, that is, in fact, in the direction of the neighboring post. They, naturally, responded with fire. However, such tactics did not cause any significant losses among the federal forces and were very quickly exposed.

Armored vehicles move through the streets in sync with the advancing infantry. Getting ahead of the assault troops is fraught with destruction of the equipment. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers that have strayed from cover become easy prey for grenade launchers. Armored vehicles fire directly. Its cannons suppress enemy firing points, destroy heavy weapons, destroy obstacles and make passages in walls. Armored vehicles also cover infantry movements.

Artillery, tactical and army aviation can be used to destroy specific objects, create fires and suppress the enemy in defended structures. However, due to the fact that in a populated area the warring parties are at a short distance, there is a significant risk that friendly units will come under this fire.

The tactics of using tanks in the city has its own characteristics

Causing significant destruction during the assault on the city is not yet a guarantee of success for Grozny

To avoid this, it is necessary that artillery and aviation deliver targeted strikes only at the command of the commanders leading the assault operations, after agreeing on the time and place of the strike. Naturally, such interaction presupposes the presence of reliable communication channels. In Grozny in the winter of 1995, according to various estimates, losses from “friendly” fire ranged from 40 to 60%.

Infantry movement is carried out not only along the streets, but also through courtyards, parks, underground communications, breaks in walls, and roofs of houses. When advancing, accumulation of equipment and personnel should be avoided.

Assault groups must include sappers who search for and neutralize mines and booby traps, carry out demolition work in order to make passages in walls or other obstacles and barriers, as well as to clear barricades, rubble and destruction.

Group tactics

Now directly about the tactics that are used during an assault in small groups.

Action in pairs is the basis of combat coordination...

For better interaction, mutual control and mutual assistance, as well as to facilitate the management of the unit as a whole, groups are divided into pairs or triplets. Fighters in pairs or trios (hereinafter simply pairs) operate in close contact with each other, are constantly within line of sight and maintain voice communication. They must regularly supervise their comrades on the principle of “everyone is responsible for everyone else.” In order for such pairs to act effectively and have a high level of mutual understanding, it is necessary to form them in advance, during the preparation process. Thus, the fighters will develop not only friendly relations, but also a sense of understanding and anticipation of the actions of their comrade. During joint training, the couple will exchange experiences and develop common tactics of action, even developing their own language of communication. The same system, for example, operates in the French Foreign Legion, where military personnel are divided into pairs (binomials). However, snipers, machine gunners, grenade launchers, etc. operate in pairs as usual.

Communication between couples is also important. When carrying out any movements during the assault, it is necessary to organize mutual cover to ensure safety. One group provides cover, the second performs the maneuver. And vice versa.

The infantry moves in short bursts from cover to cover. A distance of four to seven meters must always be maintained between fighters and groups when moving. Even in the absence of enemy fire, fighters should be careful and not linger in open areas for more than two or three seconds. Inspection of potentially dangerous areas (windows, attics, breaches) should be carried out continuously.

The main cover of the units is provided by machine gunners, snipers and grenade launchers. Moreover, machine gunners can conduct “disturbing” fire at suspicious places where the enemy may be located. Snipers and grenade launchers shoot at identified enemy positions. After the advanced units pass the next line, it is consolidated in the occupied positions and ensures the approach of the cover group, which is pulled up to new positions.

Especially for snipers

When the unit moves on foot along the street, armored vehicles are used as cover. A distance must be maintained between infantrymen and combat vehicles and hilling must be avoided. The infantry moves along the walls, having previously distributed control of all directions, especially the opposite side of the street. Thus, when moving along a street with multi-story buildings, two columns of foot control the situation above each other.

Movement of columns only along the streets is the wrong tactic, which will most likely lead to heavy losses, if not complete destruction. Advancing with breaks in battle formations allows the defenders to go to the rear and flanks of the attackers and deliver effective attacks on them. In this case, the entire offensive strategy breaks down, which turns into a chaotic battle that is difficult to control. Defenders holed up in houses will receive a positional advantage, while troops caught on the street will be at a disadvantage. They will be shot from above and thrown with hand grenades. In addition, we should not forget about the danger of street mining.

To maintain a single line of attack, neighboring units must have constant communication with each other and coordinate their actions. Security guards are left in inspected buildings (this was discussed above).

Storming the building

Storm a big building, in which the enemy holds the defense, is a sure path to unjustifiably large losses. First you need to take positions opposite him, and if possible, around him. If possible, it is necessary to identify the defenders’ firing points and estimate the most optimal routes for the movement of assault groups. The least preferred paths of attack are the most natural ones.

Before directly entering the building, you must try to destroy the maximum number of enemies. This task is carried out mainly by snipers, machine gunners, grenade launchers and flamethrowers. They do not stop their actions even after the stormtroopers enter the building. However, the latter cannot be allowed to come under “friendly” fire. Therefore, as the infantry moves upward, the covering ones transfer fire to the upper floors and fire accurately. The machine gunners stop pouring fire on the suspected enemy locations.

Grenade throwers and flamethrowers must be especially careful. Snipers can bring the greatest benefit. In such conditions, it is desirable to achieve reliable communication and coordination between attack aircraft and the cover group, but in real combat it is very difficult.

To combat enemy firing points, armored vehicles and artillery can also be actively involved, firing direct fire. However, the fire stops before the stormtroopers advance. Under certain conditions, the commander may decide to attack a building without artillery preparation. This happens when the commander relies on the surprise and secrecy of the start of the assault.

Entering a building through natural and predictable means, through windows and doors, carries great risk.

Firstly, such paths are often mined, and secondly, in most cases they are under the gun of the defenders. Therefore, penetration must go through the gaps made. They are penetrated by fire from cannons, grenade launchers and ATGMs. To achieve greater surprise, stormtroopers can penetrate openings immediately after breaking through. In this case, the defenders will not have time to reorganize their formations. However, it is important that the assault units are not harmed when they are penetrated, so their starting positions should be placed at a safe distance.

The penetration tactics immediately after the formation of a breach are not always used. It is often safer to make a few breaches first and only then attack. If the enemy prevents the attack aircraft from approaching the target with targeted fire, the attack can be launched after setting up a smoke screen.

Haste when storming a building leads to heavy losses. Having reached the starting line, the assault squad needs to regroup and look around. The commander plans the order of further actions and communicates it to his subordinates.

Of course, the unit that purposefully prepared for combat operations in urban conditions will achieve the greatest success and the least losses. Each fighter and each pair must practice various options so that everyone does their job without a team and is ready to replace their comrades who are out of action. After all, the commander will not be able to control all the soldiers, especially since providing every soldier in the Russian Army with a personal radio station is an impossible dream.

Conducting negotiations over radio stations before the assault regarding the upcoming attack is permitted only if closed radio channels are used.

After taking the building, it is necessary to thoroughly check it and, if necessary, neutralize all found explosive devices. Now this building becomes the starting point for further offensive. The commander, having received a report that the building has been cleared, checks the personnel, identifies the dead and wounded, plans defensive actions and reports to headquarters. First of all, measures are taken for all-round defense, since the enemy may try to launch a counterattack in order to regain lost positions. This probability is especially high if the building is advantageous from a tactical point of view.

If possible, lower approaches are blocked using engineering methods. Particular attention should be paid to basements and various underground passages. During the assault on the city of Grozny, federal troops did not risk going underground, as this threatened large losses. Therefore, all exits to the surface were blocked and often mined. However, planting mines in a building that is used as a defensive line is a risky practice. It is likely that in the chaos one of his soldiers could blow himself up on them.

The assault group distributes positions on different floors and sectors of fire. The commander deals with prisoners (if any) and plans a further offensive. Thus, the assault group advances from building to building, leaving captured groups for protection, unless this function is taken over by a reserve.

The experience of the defense of Stalingrad, which, as is known, took place some of the heaviest street battles of the Second World War, is interesting.

To storm any object, assault groups, reinforcement groups and reserves were allocated. Designed to perform one task, they formed a single assault group in urban combat. The strength, composition and armament of each group could vary depending on the object and the assigned task.

The main strike core of the entire group were attacking groups of six to eight people each. They made up about 30% of the total composition of the urban combat assault group. They were the first to break into buildings and bunkers and independently fought inside the facility. Each group had its own specific task (area).

The remaining assigned forces, which included fighters of various specialties, ensured the advancement of the attacking groups, the development of the offensive and consolidation at the site. The reinforcement group was also divided into several subgroups, which rushed into the building from different directions following the attacking groups at the commander’s signal. Having penetrated the building and destroyed the firing points, they immediately began to create their own defenses and suppress all attempts by the enemy to recapture the building or come to the aid of the attacked garrison.

The reserve was used to replenish and strengthen attacking groups, to counter a possible enemy counterattack from the flanks and rear. If necessary, or in case of large losses, new, additional attacking groups could be quickly formed from the reserve and brought into battle.

The assault was carried out both with and without preliminary artillery preparation, with the expectation of surprise.

The experience of recent wars shows that assault groups achieve greater success after a preliminary artillery strike. An illustrative example is the 76th Airborne Division, whose regiment was unable to take a militant stronghold on the western outskirts of Grozny for 2.5 hours. After an artillery strike, the point was taken in 10 minutes with minimal losses.

Now about the assault operations at night. If the attackers have enough manpower, the preservation of which does not need to be particularly concerned, a night attack can have significant success. For the most part, the groups storming the building have a very rough idea of ​​its layout and the defending enemy. Especially about those “surprises” that the enemy prepared in the building. Therefore, there is a risk of large losses during a night assault.

This does not mean that you cannot storm buildings at all in the dark. But with the greatest chances of success and minimal losses (or no losses at all), a night capture of a building can only be carried out by a well-trained, professional unit. At the same time, it must have good intelligence information about the enemy’s defenses. In addition, all fighters and the group as a whole must have modern equipment and weapons: individual night vision devices, flashlights mounted on weapons, silent weapons, remote listening devices, etc.

Elite anti-terrorism and sabotage units are quite capable of carrying out such operations, which has been repeatedly proven in practice. But what can we say about the chances of success of an ordinary Russian motorized rifle platoon, where everyone has one night vision binoculars, and, at best, one flashlight per squad!

Darkness can be used to accumulate forces before an assault and pull them to the closest distance to the object, in order to launch an attack from new positions at dawn.

At night you should pay great attention to protecting your positions. Artillery positions are especially at risk of attack.

City defense

The defense of a populated area is organized not only with the goal of holding it, but also to achieve superiority over the enemy by taking advantage of the development, knowledge of the area and preliminary preparation of defense. A small garrison, even in the absence of heavy weapons, can bleed an assault force that is significantly larger in number and power of weapons.

If there is time to prepare for defense, the garrison will equip positions. These may be chaotically located pockets of resistance, which are located in the most convenient places for protection. But in most cases, the construction of defense is organized, systematic, with a unified command and coordination of the actions of all groups.

Most often, the city is divided into lines, strong points, resistance nodes (a union of several strong points), which are located in such a way that the terrain and development features maximize defensive actions and in every possible way impede offensive ones. Naturally, the garrison’s ability to provide defensive lines with firepower and personnel is taken into account. In many cases, the defenders occupy only the forward lines and, if they cannot hold them, retreat to the next line. In such cases, a reserve is allocated, which is directed to weak areas or to breakthrough points.

If the garrison has enough forces to cover all directions, then a layered defense is built. But even in this case, most of the personnel are located at the forefront. Up to 30% of the defenders can be in the second echelon. Reserve or second echelon forces are usually sent to close a breakthrough or carry out a counterattack. For example, to return advantageous positions captured by the enemy.

It is considered a tactical mistake if the forward defensive line coincides with the outskirts of a populated area. Moving the defense line in front of a populated area was practiced at the beginning of the 20th century, but with modern weapons this is a sure path to defeat. The most preferable location is the defensive line near the outskirts.

When planning defense, the garrison is divided into units. The units, in turn, are assigned to directions, sections, sectors, and strongholds. When choosing the location of positions, not only favorable engineering conditions are taken into account, but also the probable advance paths of enemy assault groups.

When artillery is located on the outskirts, fire is fired at troops advancing on a populated area in a normal field battle mode. If guns and armored vehicles are located deep in a populated area, they should be oriented towards direct fire. Typically, the most likely directions for artillery fire are along the streets. Moreover, the calculations are focused on shooting at large targets: armored vehicles and other vehicles. The tactics of a competent assault do not imply accumulations of infantry in open spaces. But, if an accumulation of manpower is noticed or suspected in any building, artillery can fire with the aim of collapsing this building.

Also, the fire of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and cannons can be used to suppress enemy firing points. But the possibility of using such tactics is limited, because in a real battle with dense buildings, the combat distances are very short. The firing points of the opposing sides are usually located no further than 100 meters from each other. Tanks and artillery cannot fire on the upper floors of high-rise buildings. In this situation, infantry fighting vehicles have a great advantage. But it is the heavy weapons that will become the first targets for the advancing enemy. Therefore, artillery must focus on meeting the enemy with fire immediately when he appears on the distant approaches. We must not forget that the maneuver of defending armored vehicles and artillery is not only limited, but often completely impossible. Therefore, to reduce the likelihood of damage, it is advisable to bury armored vehicles in the ground, drive them into caponiers, or use engineering structures for shelter. For example, low stone fences.

Defending troops can successfully use mortars to fire from indirect fire positions at close-in targets and partially compensate for the limitations in the use of field artillery guns. Mortar fire can be concentrated and barrage. Concentrated fire is conducted on areas of possible (or known) accumulation of enemy manpower and equipment, and barrage fire is used to cover open areas of defense. Mortars are also convenient from the point of view of the possibility of operational maneuver.

When preparing a settlement for an assault, the garrison actively uses mining. The most promising for laying is, naturally, the roadway. Its mining can be carried out using different types of explosive devices. In addition, when planning mining, it is necessary to calculate the most likely paths and directions of movement of the assault groups (gardens, flower beds, etc.). Promising places for planting explosive devices in premises are also places and areas where enemy forces are expected to gather that are convenient for setting up positions. They often use anti-personnel weapons installed with elements of “surprise”.

Checkpoint "Skala-37" two days before the militant attack on the city. These fighters spent the next four weeks surrounded

In a populated area, firing positions can be located in ordinary trenches in Grozny. February 1995

Powerful landmines are placed in buildings in such a way as to cause the collapse of structures when detonated. The methods for initiating such charges may vary, but radio control is preferred. In this case, the probability of detecting a charge is reduced or its operation is achieved with minimal effect. However, radio-controlled detonation can be complicated by limited visibility and some other factors. In addition to mining, defenders can set up artificial engineering obstacles that impede the actions of the attackers. It is also advisable to mine such barriers.

Since the fight against armored vehicles and other large enemy targets is a primary task, it is important for the defending forces to correctly distribute firepower to defeat them: grenade launchers, ATGM launchers, flamethrowers, etc. Their positions must meet certain requirements. They must allow visibility and fire in specified sectors, that is, in the places where enemy equipment is most likely to appear, conceal and protect the position as much as possible, and be able to quickly change it.

To organize a powerful and “sticky” defense, the garrison must make the most effective use of positions - both natural and artificial. To equip positions, it is recommended to use buildings with semi-basements and basements that provide the possibility of firing at the adjacent territory. Despite the fact that an attack is expected in a certain direction, they are all preparing for a perimeter defense with overlapping firing and observation sectors.

Underground communications are best suited for escape. Communication trenches are prepared to move infantry, carry out the wounded, and bring in ammunition through open, projectile space. Defensive positions should generally allow for frequent movement from one embrasure to another. Changing positions is especially important for snipers, machine gunners, flamethrowers and grenade launchers. For the latter, it is also important to have space behind them for the unobstructed exit of the jet stream.

In multi-story buildings, firing positions are located not only in depth, but also across floors, creating a multi-tiered system for simultaneous shelling of the enemy from the upper and lower floors. At the same time, most of the firepower is located in the lower floors of buildings and semi-basements. Buildings that interfere with shelling may be destroyed in advance. Firing positions are usually prepared behind stone fences and walls. For firing, not only building windows, but also artificial camouflaged breaches are used as embrasures. Such a position is more difficult for the enemy to detect and hit.

Individual actions in the city

It has already been said above that in urban combat the role of not only small units, but also each individual soldier increases significantly. This chapter provides recommendations for conducting individual actions in urban combat.

Before entering a city (village, town, etc.), it is necessary that each soldier has an idea of ​​the layout, if not of the entire settlement, then at least of that part of it in which he will have to operate. It is no secret that during the assault on Grozny in January 1995, federal troops had a very vague idea of ​​its layout and, even more so, the defense system. And this despite the fact that Grozny was its own, Russian city, and not the territory of another state. Moreover, before the assault, scouts from among the Chechens who supported the federal government were thrown into it. But at the time of the assault, the units of the federal forces had an insufficient number of fresh maps and diagrams and guides, including soldiers who had previously lived in Grozny.

Equipment Features

Equipment and equipment for urban combat differ slightly from ordinary ones. A simple fighter (machine gunner) requires an increased supply of hand grenades. The consumption of grenades for an under-barrel grenade launcher will also be increased, since its role in a populated area is greater than in a field or forest. In addition to fragmentation grenades, flash-noise and tear grenades will be useful (if it becomes necessary to take someone alive), as well as smoke bombs.

At short distances, the role and possibility of using additional weapons - pistols, knives - increases. They can be useful if it is impossible to fire from the main weapon (the reason does not matter). But additional weapons will only be useful if they are readily available and ready for immediate use. Therefore, the fighter should think about its placement in advance and practice quick snatching.

Wearing body armor is a controversial issue. It is covered in the chapter devoted to individual equipment. Most fighters wear it only when driving a vehicle or to perform a separate task. Wearing an armored helmet is completely justified.

Each unit and each fighter operating in the city may find themselves cut off from the main forces and will be forced to act independently for a long time. During the assault on the city of Grozny by bandit formations in August 1996, units of the federal forces, which found themselves surrounded “thanks” to the betrayal of the high command, were forced to fight for about a month. Many of them did not receive assistance from the main forces, either in ammunition, provisions, or personnel. Therefore, before the performance, it is necessary to take a reasonable supply of food, spare batteries for the devices used, etc.

Be sure to have a flashlight, even if you have to act during daylight hours.

If the enemy’s uniform is externally similar to the assault uniform, it is necessary to introduce a unified visual identification system for all of your soldiers. Each fighter must have a sign that is not typical of the traditional uniform, clearly visible from a distance. For example, during the storming of Grozny in January 1995, federal troops wore white bands on their left sleeves. If the operation drags on for a long time, the identification system may change periodically, since it may be used by the enemy. It is important to communicate the changes to all soldiers at the same time.

It is not recommended to wear sneakers or other light shoes with soft soles in the city. Under your feet there will be a large amount of broken glass, boards with nails and other sharp and dangerous objects. In addition, walking on stairs or simply uneven surfaces can lead to a sprained ankle. To reduce the likelihood of such an injury, you should wear high-top shoes and tighten the lacing tightly. Knee and elbow pads, special gloves, and dust glasses will be useful. During the battle, a lot of dust and construction debris rises among the buildings, which make it difficult not only to observe, but also to breathe. Therefore, a respirator may come in handy.

Movement

When moving in a populated area, an encounter with the enemy can happen at any minute. In this case, shooting will be carried out at a very short distance, and often at point-blank range. Therefore, the weapon must be ready for immediate use.

The machine gun must be loaded, the safety lever removed and a cartridge in the chamber. To be ready to immediately open aimed fire, you should move without lifting the butt of the machine gun from your shoulder, while the barrel moves down a little. When moving between houses, the trunk rises up, controlling the windows. Another way of holding is to rest the butt against the elbow. The barrel is directed upward. This method also has its adherents. The barrel turns in the same direction in which the fighter is looking.

In a populated area, the machine gun's sight is set at 100 m, and the safety is set to fire in single mode. Firing in bursts is only effective in certain cases. For example, when a group of enemies suddenly meets at close range. In most situations, it makes more sense to fire single shots. The effect is no less, and the savings in ammunition are significant.

When firing from a machine gun, there is no need to wait until the magazine is completely empty. If the magazine is partially empty and there is a pause in the battle, you can change the magazine. And you can finish off the missing cartridges. To do this, you need to carry loose cartridges in a special pocket that fastens securely. In order for the shooter to be able to control the consumption of cartridges when starting to load the magazine, three tracer cartridges must be inserted. You don't have to shoot them all. As soon as at least one tracer has flown, you need to change the magazine.

It’s even better if there is a cartridge left in the chamber, in which case you won’t have to waste time jerking the bolt. However, in the heat of battle, it seems doubtful that a soldier would think about such trifles as counting the ejected cartridges. In any case, it is better to change a magazine that is not completely used up than to waste time reloading at a critical moment.

Throwing away empty magazines will cause problems. But in a tense situation, it is better not to waste time placing them in an unloading vest or pouch. Moreover, in the heat of battle, you can confuse empty and full magazines. When firing from a stationary position, empty magazines must be thrown into one place. When a pause occurs, they must be equipped and placed on you.

A hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher (reusable) should also be ready for immediate use. However, it is not always possible to apply it exactly in the place where the need arose. This is due to the danger posed by the jet stream when fired from behind a grenade launcher. Therefore, the grenade launcher must not only be attentive to the choice of positions, but also, when moving, constantly have an idea of ​​​​the possibility of immediate firing. After all, comrades walking behind may suffer from a shot. When it rains, a bag is put on the grenade that does not interfere with shooting.

The underbarrel grenade launcher must also be ready for quick use, that is, it must be loaded. There is no need to put it on safety (at least the Russian GP-25), since firing already requires significant force, which practically eliminates the possibility of an accidental shot. You should not fire from the GP-25 at a distance closer than 40 meters, since in this case the grenade may not have time to arm itself. It is dangerous to shoot at the windows of a high-rise building while standing at its foot, because if you miss, the grenade will ricochet and fall back.

All actions must be performed in pairs (threes). Members of a couple must constantly see each other and know where the other comrades are. There are no such statistics, but many fighters died from the bullets of their own comrades, who confused them with the enemy. However, you should not gather in groups, putting others at risk.

You cannot remain motionless in an open place. You must either move or hide. Movements occur in quick short dashes from cover to cover. At the same time, one must not lose orientation in space. It is always necessary to remember which side is yours and which side is strangers. In conditions of dense buildings and uneven progress of different groups and individual fighters, the situation is changing very quickly. Therefore, if you shoot at everything that moves and suddenly appears, you can hit your own people.

For confident orientation, you need to stop more often (in the shelter) and look around. Movements should be planned, not chaotic.

Before running, you need to clearly understand the direction and goal, upon achieving which the fighter must again take a protected position. Only if you come under sudden enemy fire should you immediately take the nearest shelter. In case of dense fire, and in general, to reduce risk and increase secrecy, movements can be done crawling or on all fours. You need to move along walls, bushes, rubble and other objects, without running out into open places. Smoke is often used to overcome dangerous spaces. It saves you from aimed fire.

Any movements must take place under mutual cover. Coverage is provided not only when moving, but also when pauses occur for various reasons: providing assistance, reloading, etc. In this case, voice contact must be maintained. If you need to leave an active battle, you must inform your partner about this.

When moving through an unfamiliar settlement, you need to remember the road, since there is little hope for guides.

When passing under windows, you need to bend down and jump over windows located below waist level. When moving indoors, you should also avoid openings and openings in front of windows. The enemy may fire from another building or from another external position.

It is necessary to focus on the “left-hand rule”. It lies in the fact that physiologically it is more convenient and faster for a person to transfer fire to the left. This rule applies to right-handers. For a left-handed person the opposite is true. That is, the movement of a weapon outward, be it a pistol or a machine gun, is less natural and convenient. Shifting fire and conducting aimed shooting to the right (for a right-handed person) or to the left (for a left-handed person) involves the need to turn the body. The exception is shooting a pistol with one hand. Much follows from this rule, and it will be mentioned further.

When choosing a firing position or when observing, it is necessary (hereinafter everything is for a right-handed person) to look out and fire to the right of the object behind which you are hiding. Thus, almost the entire body will be protected, with the exception of the right shoulder and arm, as well as the right side of the head. When shooting to the left of an obstacle, the shooter is forced to open up completely. The appearance of a head above a protective object is generally unacceptable. The closer the head is to the ground, the less noticeable it will be to the enemy. It’s even better if there is a mirror (preferably on a rod), with which you can observe without leaning out.

However, the mirror can produce glare that unmasks the position. Therefore, when using it, you need to consider where the sun is. In general, if you have a choice of direction, it is better to set from the direction of the sun so that it blinds the enemy and not you.

If it is necessary to fire to the left of a protective obstacle, it is better to transfer the machine gun to the left hand. Although this is inconvenient and unusual, it is much safer. The same applies to pistol shooting.

When moving around any obstacle (for example, the corner of a building), this must be done on the right. In the event of a sudden meeting with the enemy and the need to immediately open fire, the weapon will be immediately directed at the enemy with minimal “openness” of the fighter’s body. To go around the corner on the left, you also need to transfer the machine gun to your left hand. You should not be afraid of inconvenience, since at such short distances it is difficult to miss with a machine gun even from an awkward position. Or you need to point the left-hander forward.

When going around corners, you need to stay away from them. Then the panorama will begin to open gradually and unpleasant surprises will be discovered in time. The bending must be done slowly. In this case, the fighter must be ready both to open fire and to quickly jump back.

In general, movement should be slow and careful. In addition to the frontal direction, various dormer windows, breaks and openings, which can be located both at the top and at the bottom, pose a danger. It is very difficult to detect the presence of the enemy in them until he gives himself away. In addition, there is always the danger of falling into mines. In a building environment these are mainly stretch marks and various “surprises”. Anything can be stretched. Doors and various valuables (for example, tape recorders, televisions) are especially often mined. The greatest risk is posed by items whose movement is logical and predictable. Mines are laid in places most convenient for a firing position. Piles of various objects and corpses are often mined. Since this is usually done in a hurry, the simplest methods are chosen. A grenade without a ring is placed under the corpse.

The movement of the body releases the trigger lever. The calculation is made that, upon seeing a comrade lying motionless, the first reaction will be to check whether he is wounded or killed.

All suspicious objects are caught by a grapple anchor on a rope and are displaced. In this case, it is necessary to be in shelter, since the explosion can be very powerful. If there is no rope, you can use a long pole or board. Closed doors are undermined or a lock (or other locking device) is shot off. In this case, safety precautions must be observed. And not only individual ones. We must not forget about comrades who may find themselves in the affected area from a ricochet or from the consequences of an explosion.

For prevention, it would be useful to flash the door with several shots. For the same reason, you cannot stand in front of the door yourself. You should be careful with metal doors, as there is a risk of ricochet, especially from small-caliber bullets with low penetration power. Kicking down doors is quite risky.

Modern ammunition has very high penetrating power and allows it to hit an enemy located behind walls made of certain materials and other, at first glance, durable structures. Psychologically, soldiers often perceive objects that can be easily shot through as reliable cover. You need to remember this when not only hiding from the enemy, but also trying to hit him through cover. Damaging fire can even be fired through a wooden floor or steps of a staircase.

Before entering a room or going around a corner, you need to throw a grenade there. The grenade should be thrown slowly. That is, after releasing the trigger lever, you need to hold it for two seconds and then throw it. Such actions require composure, but they won’t throw you back. After all, a deceleration of three to four seconds is enough time to take countermeasures or shelter from being hit by shrapnel. If comrades are in the affected area, some experts recommend warning them by shouting “Grenade!” or “Shards!” However, this shout also warns enemies. In addition, there is no guarantee that your comrades will hear the scream or have time to react to it in a timely manner.

Therefore, it would be more correct to throw a grenade, knowing for sure that none of your own will be harmed. And yet, conditional shouts are also needed in the event that the enemy throws grenades. Everyone who sees her must warn their friends about this with a loud cry. In this case, you yourself need to jump into the nearest shelter or dive around a corner and open your mouth so that your eardrums are not damaged by the blast wave.

Many instructors recommend literally throwing “pocket artillery” at all suspicious places. Theoretically, this is how it should be. But one fighter is unlikely to take more than 15-20 grenades with him. At the same time, you still need to set up tripwires and leave a few pieces to continue the fight. Therefore, all-out grenade throwing is permissible during a short-term assault, after which there will be an opportunity to replenish the supply.

Throwing tear gas grenades is not widely used in combat situations. After all, it not only does not hit the enemy, but also does not guarantee that the enemy is not capable of resistance. In addition, the enemy may have gas masks, and persons under the influence of alcohol or drugs are usually not affected by tear gas.

In addition, the attackers themselves need to take individual measures for protection. It is also difficult to predict how a gas cloud will behave. Tear gas grenades are most effective when used to force enemies in an enclosed area to surrender or leave. Flash-noise grenades produce a stunning effect when they explode and are used in cases where the enemy must be taken alive.

Immediately after the grenade explodes, you need to break into the room. It should be remembered that an explosion does not guarantee complete defeat. The enemy can take cover behind some durable object or hide in another room. Therefore, the calculation is made not only for the damaging effect of the grenade, but also for stunning and stunning the enemy. Having burst into a room, you must be prepared to immediately open fire. In a large room, you can open preventive fire at possible enemy hiding places. But indiscriminate shooting in all directions can lead to the defeat of your own fighters by a ricochet. Fire can be fired without entering the room through the doorway.

Entry into the room is made quickly, without delays in the background of the opening. The movement goes obliquely towards the wall.

All enemies hit must be checked. You cannot move on without making sure that all opponents are dead and searching them. Perhaps the search will reveal the necessary information. For example, maps of minefields, walkie-talkies tuned to enemy frequencies, defense plans, etc.

Moving forward, you cannot leave untested objects behind. The checked premises can be marked with conventional signs (usually with chalk) for the units coming behind and for yourself, since you may then have to return to the premises you have passed through. Mines discovered in the absence of sappers are marked. In simple cases, you can try to defuse the explosive device yourself using a “cat” or eliminate it by detonating it with another explosive device or shoot it from a safe distance. But it's still risky.

When moving around a building in the absence of loud background noise, you need to listen to extraneous sounds. Accordingly, the fighters themselves must move as quietly as possible. To mislead a possible enemy, you need to actively use distracting noises. At the same time, you yourself need to be critical of suspicious sounds. It is not so difficult to distinguish the sound of a thrown stone from the crunch of broken glass underfoot.

The assault on a building must be prepared in such a way that it can be accomplished on the first try. Practice shows that an unsuccessful assault strengthens the will of the defenders and undermines the morale of the attackers. And tactically, the enemy will be able to anticipate further methods and routes of attack and regroup accordingly. Therefore, once you start taking action, you can’t stop. Even with significant losses. Otherwise, they will then increase many times over, both during retreat and during the second attempt.

Colliding with an enemy at short range

Often a soldier comes under fire without understanding where the fire is coming from. At the moment, it is more important to hide, to get out of the line of fire. To do this, you need to quickly rush to the nearest shelter. In order not to waste time searching for it, even while moving, you should mark suitable places along the way and move between shelters in short throws. Under no circumstances should you run away, although for many this is the most natural, instinctive movement. In this case, the enemy will calmly shoot the fleeing person in the back.

In specialized literature and various articles devoted to urban combat, you can often find recommendations to move to the left (to the right of the enemy) when suddenly encountering an enemy. In this case, there is a reference to the “left-handed rule” mentioned above.

When you read such recommendations, doubts arise not only about the author’s relevant combat experience, but also about his theoretical training. This advice can actually work when facing an opponent armed with a pistol. But for a military conflict, where the main weapon is a machine gun, everything is different.

Yes, the “left-hand rule” applies, but besides it there are other factors that once again prove that mindlessly copying from each other is not always useful.

First, for most people, the most natural movement (roll) to the right is.

Secondly, according to the “left-hand rule”, transferring fire to the right (for a right-handed person) is more difficult and unnatural than to the left. But by putting your opponent in a difficult position, you are putting yourself in the same position. Moreover, a standing enemy has the ability to move the weapon to the right by turning the entire body, and you, being in motion, are unlikely to be able to do this without acrobatic training.

Thirdly, we must not forget about the inherent properties of automatic weapons. What does the enemy do when he meets you at a short distance? His most likely and dangerous reaction is to point the barrel of his machine gun at you and immediately open fire with a burst. What will the machine do? Having sent the first bullet towards the original direction, its barrel will begin to move to the right and up. Just in the direction in which some theorists recommend running away. Of course, the enemy can adjust the fire as you move, but there are only a few such professionals. The vast majority will shoot exactly as described above. Moreover, we should not forget that all this happens in a matter of moments.

Therefore, the first thing to do is to rush for cover. If you have the opportunity to shoot in the direction of the enemy on the move, great. In this case, there is no need to shoot accurately, as this will slow down the movement. The machine gun does not raise for aiming; fire is fired immediately from the starting position. It is important to confuse the enemy, frighten him, and make him think about his safety. If you don't get the shot, no big deal. The main thing is to survive the first seconds. Make active use of your peripheral vision.

The same “theorists” recommend throwing grenades at the enemy on the move. You can try it if you already have them ready to throw. But this is doubtful. It is unlikely that anyone will be able to simultaneously look for cover, move towards it, shift the machine gun and take out grenades, prepare them for throwing and throw them. All movements should be simple. But they need to be worked out in advance. Not a single person in such a situation will think or remember what was written about this in books. His body will think and act for him.

In any case, in any environment you need to immediately leave the line of fire. Even falling to the floor can save you from defeat, since the fire is usually fired at chest level. Opening fire without moving to the side is unacceptable, since the enemy may have an advantage in time and start shooting first. But even without this, there is always a great risk of suffering from bullets even from a wounded enemy.

In the opposite situation, when an enemy group comes under your fire, you must immediately prioritize hitting targets. The first to be destroyed are the enemies who are ready to immediately use a weapon (having opened it) or throw grenades. Secondly, there are obvious commanders, grenade launchers, snipers, machine gunners. Fleeing enemies are destroyed last. When destroying a group, it is advisable to start from the back. Then the front ones will not immediately understand that they have been detected, and will not immediately take adequate measures. In the noise of the surrounding battle, your shots may not be immediately recognized. Especially if silent weapons are used. If you kill the one running in front, then those behind, seeing him fall, will immediately react to this.

If a comrade is injured while the group is moving, he should be picked up by those running nearby, dragged to cover and given emergency assistance, or immediately handed over to the orderlies, if any are present. If a comrade is wounded in an open area under fire from the enemy, when moving to cover you should not immediately rush to help him out, otherwise you may come under fire yourself. Chechen snipers widely used such tactics. They deliberately wounded the serviceman in such a way that he could not move independently. Since for a Russian soldier from time immemorial the life of a comrade had no less value than his own, they immediately rushed to save the wounded. Snipers (snipers) also wounded these soldiers. When the rest of the comrades realized that there was no point in running to help, the snipers finished off the motionless wounded.

Therefore, to save a wounded comrade, it is necessary to immediately install a smoke screen. Snipers, grenade launchers and machine gunners must try to identify enemy sniper positions and suppress them. It is better to pull out a wounded person with the help of a rope thrown to him.

Snipers in the city are generally the most dangerous enemies. In preparation for battle, they choose (if necessary, equip) several positions for themselves: both for observation and for shooting. Snipers can operate alone, but more often with a partner or under the cover of several machine gunners. A group of snipers can also work.

Tactics for suppressing sniper points the enemy's barrage of indiscriminate fire does not justify itself. After shooting from deep within the room, the sniper changes position and usually remains invulnerable. To neutralize it, you need to calculate its position and destroy it when it appears. Snipers and grenade launchers cope best with this task. If an enemy sniper is not operating in territory under his control, small search groups are engaged in searching for him. When confronted with them, it is very difficult for a sniper pair (the most common practice) to resist the assault group.

Actions in the dark

In the dark you cannot act like a cavalry charge. Progress is made slowly and carefully. You should not enter a dark room until your eyes have adapted to the dark. This technique is used to speed up addiction. A few minutes before entering a dark room, one eye closes and opens in the dark.

If you have lights, the task becomes easier. In fact, it’s better not to go into the dark without them. If it is possible to illuminate the room from a safe place outside, this should be taken advantage of. For example, one soldier will illuminate the room (with safety precautions) through a dormer window and divert attention to himself. At this time, other fighters will penetrate. They themselves will be in the dark, but the main volume of the room will be illuminated. If you need to enter yourself, the lantern must be held to the side at arm's length.

This issue is now quite controversial. For example, some American police instructors recommend holding a flashlight in the hand crossed at the wrist with the hand holding the pistol. Thus, the flashlight beam is always directed in the same direction as the gun barrel. This is definitely a good thing. However, it is not always possible or convenient to fire with both hands. Holding a pistol with two hands somewhat restricts movement and limits spatial freedom (the term is not official). The main disadvantage of this method of holding is provoking the hidden enemy to shoot at the light source, that is, directly at the owner of the lantern.

Statements that “nowadays all criminals are literate and know that they need to shoot not at the light source, but nearby” do not stand up to criticism. Indeed, in such a situation, firing will most likely be conducted not according to knowledge, but according to instincts. This technique involves the use of a pistol, since automatic weapons abroad have long been equipped with special flashlights. However, Russian soldiers can only be asked to improvise themselves using ordinary flashlights.

When driving in the dark, you can improvise. For example, sit down, holding the lantern at arm's length. Either put it down, or throw it so that it illuminates the direction of the enemy’s supposed hiding place, and make a silent maneuver yourself. In this case, you can use distractions.

The most primitive is a throw towards an object. You can periodically turn on the flashlight, confusing and blinding the enemy. However, with such flashes you can lose orientation yourself. Moreover, for such actions, the flashlight must be turned on by pressing a button, and not by a slider or, even more so, by turning the “head”. After each flash, you need to change your position. This technique is very effective and less dangerous than moving with the light source constantly on. Some illuminated areas can be overcome with a dash. When moving in the dark, there is no need to make unnecessary noise, smoke, or reveal your presence and location by senseless shooting.

Based on the above, we can draw a conclusion about the requirements for the flashlight. Naturally, it must be compact, reliable, powerful and durable. It should be turned on either by a button (it lights up only when you hold it down) or by a constant light toggle switch. Of course, the flashlight must be shockproof.

The best solution is to use night vision devices and goggles. But we must not forget that night vision devices produce radiation that is detected by enemy optics.

The use of small arms that are not equipped with flame arresters or silent and flameless firing devices also greatly reveals the positions of shooters in the dark.

In the diversity of settlements and enemy locations, under the influence of dozens of different factors, a lot of different situations arise, each of which is unique. Conducting combat operations in a populated area requires special preliminary training: combat, physical and tactical. However, a soldier who does not know how to think, improvise and act in difficult situations will have a hard time even with special training. But it will be much worse for his comrades, since in the city interaction between soldiers and units is especially important.