Cause of the Chechen war 1992. Causes of the Chechen war

First Chechen War


	Chechnya, also partially Ingushetia, Dagestan, Stavropol Territory
	Khasavyurt agreements, withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya.
Territorial changes:	De facto independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
Opponents

Russian Armed Forces	Chechen separatists
Internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia

Commanders
Boris Yeltsin Pavel Grachev Anatoly Kvashnin Anatoly Kulikov Victor Erin Anatoly Romanov Lev Rokhlin Gennady Troshev Vladimir Shamanov Ivan Babichev Konstantin Pulikovsky Bislan Gantamirov Said-Magomed Kakiev	Dzhokhar Dudayev † Aslan Maskhadov Akhmed Zakaev Zelimkhan Yandarbiev Shamil Basayev Ruslan Gelayev Salman Raduev Turpal-Ali Atgeriev Hunkar-Pasha Israpilov Vakha Arsanov Arbi Baraev Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiev Apti Batalov Aslanbek Ismailov Ruslan Alikhadzhiev Ruslan Khaikhoroev Khizir Khachukaev
Strengths of the parties
95,000 troops (February 1995)	3,000 (Republican Guard), 27,000 (regulars and militia)
Military losses
About 5,500 dead and missing (according to official figures)	17,391 dead and prisoners (Russian data)

First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian government forces (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991. Often called the “first Chechen war,” although the conflict was officially called “measures to maintain constitutional order.” The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.

Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya until the second Chechen conflict and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.

Background to the conflict

With the beginning of “perestroika” in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People, created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.

"Chechen Revolution" 1991

On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.

During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House.

More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.

On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation.

On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted and the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began from the republic, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: 2 missile launchers of the ground forces, 4 tanks, 3 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 armored personnel carrier, 14 lightly armored tractors, 6 aircraft, 60 thousand units of small automatic weapons and a lot of ammunition. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.

Collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1991-1992)

The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.

The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2010). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.

Period of de facto independence (1991-1994)

As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.

In reality, the state system of the ChRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994.

In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.

A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.

Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.

The period of Dudayev's rule is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murders, attacks and threats from Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being driven out of their homes, abandoning them or selling their apartments to Chechens at low prices. In 1992 alone, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, and 300 went missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was fueled by relevant literature, direct insults and calls from government platforms, and desecration of Russian cemeteries.

1993 political crisis

In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. The constitution adopted last year was amended and a regime of Dudayev's personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.

Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)

After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).

Beginning of the Civil War (1994)

Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.

The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.

In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, Dudayev’s supporters lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, B. Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.

On November 26, the opposition unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.

Progress of the war

Deployment of troops (December 1994)

Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya) and east (from the territory of Dagestan).

The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.

Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.

A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Division blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.

Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.

Assault on Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)

Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops did not even have maps of the city or normal communications.

The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade and the 81st Petrakuv motorized rifle regiment, under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. There they were surrounded and defeated - the losses of the Maykop brigade amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.

The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.

On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.

Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.

Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.

By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.

Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the border of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.

In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.

Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.

A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.

As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.

Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)

After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.

The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.

Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya) and entered into battle with the militant forces. It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). The losses of the militants amounted to more than 100 people, the Russians - 13-16 people killed, 50-52 wounded. During the battle for Samashki, many civilians died and this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.

On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.

By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.

Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.

The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.

Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.

Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times.

Terrorist attack in Budennovsk (June 14 - 19, 1995)

On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory (Russian Federation) in trucks and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.

The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.

Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.

After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.

The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded.

The situation in the republic in June - December 1995

After the terrorist attack in Budennovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.

From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.

Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.

On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.

In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to be in accordance with previously reached agreements.

On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.

On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.

The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.

On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.

On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.

Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation). The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.

The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.

Militant attack on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996)

On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.

Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996)

On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoy, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses.

Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)

From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.

On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.

By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

Negotiations with the separatists (May-July 1996)

Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.

On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.

On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.

The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.

On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.

On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.

Operation Jihad (6-22 August 1996)

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.

Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).

According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.

Khasavyurt Agreements (August 31, 1996)

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Republic of Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.

Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations

On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev”). . “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.

On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,

According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “because of his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.”

In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya.”

As part of the “Kovalyov mission”, representatives of various non-governmental organizations, deputies, and journalists traveled to the conflict zone. The mission collected information about what was happening in the Chechen war, searched for missing persons and prisoners, and contributed to the release of Russian military personnel captured by Chechen militants. For example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege of the village of Bamut by Russian troops, the commander of the militant detachments, Khaikharoev, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with the field commanders , Khaikharoev abandoned these intentions.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive relief program, providing more than 250,000 displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.

In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for residents of the North Caucasus.

In Grozny and other cities of Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, in which 7,000 people were provided with hot food every day. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and school supplies from the ICRC.

During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen militants in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.

In the fall of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. During the three months of operation, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, and almost six hundred surgical operations were performed. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was carried out on a hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After this, the ICRC was forced to withdraw foreign employees from Chechnya.

In April 1995, American humanitarian specialist Frederick Cuney, together with two Russian doctors from the Russian Red Cross Society and a translator, was organizing humanitarian aid in Chechnya. Cuney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Cuney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen militants and executed on the orders of Rezvan Elbiev, one of the heads of counterintelligence of Dzhokhar Dudayev, because they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, who thus dealt with Cuney at the hands of the Chechens.

Various women's movements ("Soldiers' Mothers", "White Shawl", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with military personnel - participants in combat operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims during military operations.

Results

The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the contract amount. Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

Losses

According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, and 19,794 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen). However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.

Commanders

Commanders of the United Group of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic

Mityukhin, Alexey Nikolaevich (December 1994)
Kvashnin, Anatoly Vasilievich (December 1994 - February 1995)
Kulikov, Anatoly Sergeevich (February - July 1995)
Romanov, Anatoly Alexandrovich (July - October 1995)
Shkirko, Anatoly Afanasyevich (October - December 1995)
Tikhomirov, Vyacheslav Valentinovich (January - October 1996)
Pulikovsky, Konstantin Borisovich (acting July - August 1996)

In art

Movies

“Cursed and Forgotten” (1997) is a feature-journalistic film by Sergei Govorukhin.
“60 Hours of the Maikop Brigade” (1995) - a documentary film by Mikhail Polunin about the “New Year’s” assault on Grozny.
“Blockpost” (1998) is a feature film by Alexander Rogozhkin.
“Purgatory” (1997) is a naturalistic feature film by Alexander Nevzorov.
“Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1996) is a feature film by Sergei Bodrov.
DDT in Chechnya (1996): part 1, part 2

Music

"Dead city. Christmas" - a song about Yuri Shevchuk's "New Year's" assault on Grozny.
Yuri Shevchuk’s song “The boys were dying” is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
The songs “Lube” are dedicated to the first Chechen war: “Batyanya Battalion Commander” (1995), “Soon demobilization” (1996), “Step March” (1996), “Ment” (1997).
Timur Mutsuraev - Almost all of his work is dedicated to the First Chechen War.
Songs about the First Chechen War occupy a significant part of the work of the Chechen bard Imam Alimsultanov.
The song of the group Dead Dolphins - Dead City is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
Blue berets - “New Year”, “Reflections of an officer at the hotline”, “Two turntables on Mozdok”.

Books

“Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1994) - story (story) by Vladimir Makanin
“Chechen Blues” (1998) - novel by Alexander Prokhanov.
May Day (2000) - story by Albert Zaripov. The story of the storming of the village of Pervomayskoye in the Republic of Dagestan in January 1996.
“Pathologies” (novel) (2004) - novel by Zakhar Prilepin.
I was in this war (2001) - novel by Vyacheslav Mironov. The plot of the novel is built around the storming of Grozny by federal troops in the winter of 1994/95.

The first Chechnya, or how we allowed the war to happen.

As a rule, when communicating with historians, they express the opinion that in order to evaluate a particular event, at least 20 years must pass. In the case of the first war in Chechnya, things are a little different. It seems that the authorities deliberately tried to hide everything that happened then, so that people would forget such bloody events in peaceful Russia.

Russian society should know about the losses that our troops suffered in this terrible bloodbath. Thousands of soldiers died at the hands of terrorists.

The events preceding the First Chechen War can be divided into two stages.

The period from 1990 to 1991, when our government had the strength and opportunity to overthrow the Dudayev regime formed at that time, without shedding a drop of blood on either side.

The period from the beginning of 1992, the time when the opportunity to resolve the problems that had arisen peacefully had already been missed, and the issue of bloodshed remained only a matter of time.

First stage.

It all started with Gorbachev's promise. He promised to give the union republics separated from the Soviet Union complete freedom (in leadership, in choice); further in his speech, Yeltsin also spoke about the independence of Chechnya.

After Yeltsin’s speech in 1990, a declaration was adopted and the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic declared its sovereignty. During the same period of time, Dzhokhar Dudayev appeared, a general of the Soviet army completely unknown to anyone; he had awards for services to the fatherland and was never a Muslim. Dudayev quickly gained popularity among the population. Under Dudayev, the Supreme Council of the Republic, headed by Doku Zavgaev, was overthrown. After the overthrow of the Supreme Council in September 1991, power in Chechnya as such ceased to exist. Warehouses with weapons that previously belonged to the KGB were looted, and criminals who had been in prison were released. At the same time, amnesty was given not only to people with minor offenses, but also to those who were serving sentences for murder and various serious crimes.

Against the backdrop of the events that took place in Chechnya, elections were held, and on October 26, Dudayev became president of the Chechen Republic. But none of the events that took place in Chechnya during that period of time pushed our government to take at least one step to stop the lawlessness. And only Rutskoi tried to restore order by introducing a state of emergency on the territory of the republic. But, unfortunately, his proposal was not supported. Soldiers of internal troops (about 300 people) were landed on the territory of a suburb of Grozny in Khankala; subsequently they were surrounded by militants and were surrounded for about a day. Of course, these 300 people could not physically complete the task - the overthrow of Dudayev. As a result, the fighters were taken outside the republic. And within a few days Dudayev became president.

Second phase.

After Dudayev came to power, the situation in the republic heated up with such force that it became more and more difficult day by day. The population of Grozny moved freely around the city with weapons, and Dudayev, in turn, openly said that all the weapons located on the territory of his republic belonged only to him. Although it remained here after the collapse of the USSR.

Only in May 1993 did the Russian government decide to take the first step towards negotiations by sending Defense Minister Grachev to Chechnya. As a result of the negotiations, it was decided to divide all weapons in half; already in June the last officer of the Russian army left the territory of Chechnya. Why this agreement was signed is still not clear. Leaving such a quantity of weapons in Chechnya entailed an inevitable war.

The policy pursued by Dudayev was extremely nationalistic. At this time, there was a mass exodus of the Russian population. A huge number of families left the Chechen Republic, abandoning their property acquired over decades.

In addition to the fact that Dudayev’s policies deprived many Russian residents of even a roof over their heads, Grozny was also a capital of corruption. Politicians and businessmen came here regularly. Before the arrival of such a person, Dudayev gave an order to his subordinates to purchase gold jewelry, thereby referring to the fact that this was the way he resolved issues with Moscow.

Realizing that this could no longer continue, Yeltsin instructed the head of FSK Sevastyanov to overthrow the Dudayev regime.
The first assault took place on October 15, 1994, our troops were just a little away from victory, an order was received from Moscow to retreat.

The second assault on November 26, 1994 also failed, and on November 29 Gorbachev decided to send troops into the republic.
It is still unclear who made the call to stop the assault. According to the information provided by Khasbulatov, the call came precisely from the organizer of the assault, Sevastyanov.

It is still not clear why other people’s children died. Due to the lack of coordination in the actions of the Russian government, a large number of families have lost sons and fathers.

There are many wars written into the history of Russia. Most of them were liberation, some began on our territory and ended far beyond its borders. But there is nothing worse than such wars, which were started as a result of the illiterate actions of the country’s leadership and led to terrifying results because the authorities solved their own problems without paying attention to the people.

One of such sad pages of Russian history is the Chechen war. This was not a confrontation between two different peoples. There were no absolute rights in this war. And the most surprising thing is that this war still cannot be considered over.

Prerequisites for the start of the war in Chechnya

It is hardly possible to talk about these military campaigns briefly. The era of perestroika, so pompously announced by Mikhail Gorbachev, marked the collapse of a huge country consisting of 15 republics. However, the main difficulty for Russia was that, left without satellites, it was faced with internal unrest that had a nationalistic character. The Caucasus turned out to be especially problematic in this regard.

Back in 1990, the National Congress was created. This organization was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former major general of aviation in the Soviet Army. The Congress set its main goal to secede from the USSR; in the future, it was planned to create a Chechen Republic, independent of any state.

In the summer of 1991, a situation of dual power arose in Chechnya, since both the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic itself and the leadership of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, proclaimed by Dudayev, acted.

This state of affairs could not exist for long, and in September the same Dzhokhar and his supporters seized the republican television center, the Supreme Council and the Radio House. This was the beginning of the revolution. The situation was extremely precarious, and its development was facilitated by the official collapse of the country carried out by Yeltsin. Following the news that the Soviet Union no longer existed, Dudayev's supporters announced that Chechnya was seceding from Russia.

The separatists seized power - under their influence, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the republic on October 27, as a result of which power was completely in the hands of ex-General Dudayev. And a few days later, on November 7, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree stating that a state of emergency was being introduced in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. In fact, this document became one of the reasons for the start of the bloody Chechen wars.

At that time, there was quite a lot of ammunition and weapons in the republic. Some of these reserves had already been captured by the separatists. Instead of blocking the situation, the Russian leadership allowed it to get even more out of control - in 1992, the head of the Ministry of Defense Grachev transferred half of all these reserves to the militants. The authorities explained this decision by saying that it was no longer possible to remove weapons from the republic at that time.

However, during this period there was still an opportunity to stop the conflict. An opposition was created that opposed Dudayev's power. However, after it became clear that these small detachments could not resist the militant formations, the war was practically already underway.

Yeltsin and his political supporters could no longer do anything, and from 1991 to 1994 it was actually a republic independent of Russia. It had its own government bodies and had its own state symbols. In 1994, when Russian troops were brought into the territory of the republic, a full-scale war began. Even after the resistance of Dudayev’s militants was suppressed, the problem was never completely resolved.

Speaking about the war in Chechnya, it is worth considering that the fault for its outbreak, first of all, was the illiterate leadership of first the USSR and then Russia. It was the weakening of the internal political situation in the country that led to the weakening of the outskirts and the strengthening of nationalist elements.

As for the essence of the Chechen war, there is a conflict of interests and an inability to govern a vast territory on the part of first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin. Subsequently, it was up to the people who came to power at the very end of the twentieth century to untie this tangled knot.

First Chechen war 1994-1996

Historians, writers and filmmakers are still trying to assess the scale of the horrors of the Chechen war. No one denies that it caused enormous damage not only to the republic itself, but to all of Russia. However, it is worth considering that the nature of the two campaigns was quite different.

During the Yeltsin era, when the first Chechen campaign of 1994-1996 was launched, Russian troops could not act coherently and freely enough. The country's leadership solved its problems, moreover, according to some information, many people profited from this war - weapons were supplied to the territory of the republic from the Russian Federation, and militants often made money by demanding large ransoms for hostages.

At the same time, the main task of the Second Chechen War of 1999-2009 was the suppression of gangs and the establishment of constitutional order. It is clear that if the goals of both campaigns were different, then the course of action was significantly different.

On December 1, 1994, airstrikes were carried out on airfields located in Khankala and Kalinovskaya. And already on December 11, Russian units were introduced into the territory of the republic. This fact marked the beginning of the First Campaign. Entry was carried out from three directions at once - through Mozdok, through Ingushetia and through Dagestan.

By the way, at that time the Ground Forces were led by Eduard Vorobiev, but he immediately resigned, considering it unwise to lead the operation, since the troops were completely unprepared for conducting full-scale combat operations.

At first, Russian troops advanced quite successfully. The entire northern territory was occupied by them quickly and without much loss. From December 1994 to March 1995, the Russian Armed Forces stormed Grozny. The city was built up quite densely, and Russian units were simply stuck in skirmishes and attempts to take the capital.

Russian Defense Minister Grachev expected to take the city very quickly and therefore did not spare human and technical resources. According to researchers, more than 1,500 Russian soldiers and many civilians of the republic died or went missing near Grozny. The armored vehicles also suffered serious damage - almost 150 units were damaged.

However, after two months of fierce fighting, federal troops finally took Grozny. Participants in the hostilities subsequently recalled that the city was destroyed almost to the ground, and this is confirmed by numerous photographs and video documents.

During the assault, not only armored vehicles were used, but also aviation and artillery. There were bloody battles on almost every street. The militants lost more than 7,000 people during the operation in Grozny and, under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, on March 6 they were forced to finally leave the city, which came under the control of the Russian Armed Forces.

However, the war, which brought death to thousands of not only armed but also civilians, did not end there. The fighting continued first on the plains (from March to April), and then in the mountainous regions of the republic (from May to June 1995). Argun, Shali, and Gudermes were taken successively.

The militants responded with terrorist attacks carried out in Budennovsk and Kizlyar. After varying successes on both sides, a decision was made to negotiate. And as a result, on August 31, 1996, agreements were concluded. According to them, federal troops were leaving Chechnya, the republic's infrastructure was to be restored, and the question of independent status was postponed.

Second Chechen campaign 1999–2009

If the country's authorities hoped that by reaching an agreement with the militants, they would solve the problem and the battles of the Chechen war would become a thing of the past, then everything turned out to be wrong. Over several years of a dubious truce, the gangs have only accumulated strength. In addition, more and more Islamists from Arab countries entered the territory of the republic.

As a result, on August 7, 1999, the militants of Khattab and Basayev invaded Dagestan. Their calculation was based on the fact that the Russian government at that time looked very weak. Yeltsin practically did not lead the country, the Russian economy was in deep decline. The militants hoped that they would take their side, but they put up serious resistance to the bandit groups.

The reluctance to allow Islamists into their territory and the help of federal troops forced the Islamists to retreat. True, this took a month - the militants were driven out only in September 1999. At that time, Chechnya was led by Aslan Maskhadov, and, unfortunately, he was not able to exercise full control over the republic.

It was at this time, angry that they failed to break Dagestan, that Islamist groups began carrying out terrorist attacks on Russian territory. Horrible terrorist attacks were committed in Volgodonsk, Moscow and Buynaksk, which claimed dozens of lives. Therefore, the number of those killed in the Chechen war must include those civilians who never thought that it would come to their families.

In September 1999, a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation” was issued, signed by Yeltsin. And on December 31, he announced his resignation from the presidency.

As a result of the presidential elections, power in the country passed to a new leader, Vladimir Putin, whose tactical abilities the militants did not take into account. But at that time, Russian troops were already on the territory of Chechnya, again bombed Grozny and acted much more competently. The experience of the previous campaign was taken into account.

December 1999 is another painful and terrible chapter of the war. The Argun Gorge was otherwise called “Wolf Gate” - one of the largest Caucasian gorges. Here, the landing and border troops carried out the special operation "Argun", the purpose of which was to recapture a section of the Russian-Georgian border from Khattab's troops, and also to deprive the militants of the weapons supply route from the Pankisi Gorge. The operation was completed in February 2000.

Many people also remember the feat of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. These fighters became real heroes of the Chechen war. They withstood a terrible battle on the 776th height, when they, numbering only 90 people, managed to hold back over 2,000 militants for 24 hours. Most of the paratroopers died, and the militants themselves lost almost a quarter of their strength.

Despite such cases, the second war, unlike the first, can be called sluggish. Perhaps that is why it lasted longer - a lot happened over the years of these battles. The new Russian authorities decided to act differently. They refused to conduct active combat operations carried out by federal troops. It was decided to exploit the internal split in Chechnya itself. Thus, Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov went over to the side of the federals, and situations were increasingly observed when ordinary militants laid down their arms.

Putin, realizing that such a war could last indefinitely, decided to take advantage of internal political fluctuations and persuade the authorities to cooperate. Now we can say that he succeeded. It also played a role that on May 9, 2004, Islamists carried out a terrorist attack in Grozny, aimed at intimidating the population. An explosion occurred at the Dynamo stadium during a concert dedicated to Victory Day. More than 50 people were injured, and Akhmat Kadyrov died from his injuries.

This odious terrorist attack brought completely different results. The population of the republic was finally disappointed in the militants and rallied around the legitimate government. A young man was appointed to replace his father, who understood the futility of the Islamist resistance. Thus, the situation began to change for the better. If the militants relied on attracting foreign mercenaries from abroad, the Kremlin decided to use national interests. The residents of Chechnya were very tired of the war, so they already voluntarily went over to the side of the pro-Russian forces.

The counterterrorism operation regime, introduced by Yeltsin on September 23, 1999, was abolished by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009. Thus, the campaign was officially over, since it was not called a war, but a CTO. However, can we assume that veterans of the Chechen war can sleep peacefully if local battles are still taking place and terrorist acts are carried out from time to time?

Results and consequences for the history of Russia

It is unlikely that anyone today can specifically answer the question of how many died in the Chechen war. The problem is that any calculations will only be approximate. During the period of intensification of the conflict before the First Campaign, many people of Slavic origin were repressed or forced to leave the republic. During the years of the First Campaign, many fighters from both sides died, and these losses also cannot be accurately calculated.

While military losses can still be more or less calculated, no one has been involved in ascertaining losses among the civilian population, except perhaps human rights activists. Thus, according to the current official data, the 1st war claimed the following number of lives:

Russian soldiers - 14,000 people;
militants - 3,800 people;
civilian population - from 30,000 to 40,000 people.

If we talk about the Second Campaign, the results of the death toll are as follows:

federal troops - about 3,000 people;
militants - from 13,000 to 15,000 people;
civilian population - 1000 people.

It should be borne in mind that these figures vary greatly depending on which organizations provide them. For example, when discussing the results of the second Chechen war, official Russian sources talk about a thousand civilian deaths. At the same time, Amnesty International (an international non-governmental organization) gives completely different figures - about 25,000 people. The difference in these data, as you can see, is huge.

The result of the war is not only the impressive numbers of casualties among killed, wounded, and missing people. This is also a destroyed republic - after all, many cities, primarily Grozny, were subjected to artillery shelling and bombing. Their entire infrastructure was practically destroyed, so Russia had to rebuild the capital of the republic from scratch.

As a result, today Grozny is one of the most beautiful and modern cities. Other settlements of the republic were also rebuilt.

Anyone interested in this information can find out what happened in the territory from 1994 to 2009. There are many films about the Chechen war, books and various materials on the Internet.

However, those who were forced to leave the republic, lost their relatives, their health - these people hardly want to immerse themselves again in what they have already experienced. The country was able to withstand this most difficult period of its history, and once again proved that dubious calls for independence or unity with Russia are more important for them.

The history of the Chechen war has not yet been fully studied. Researchers will spend a long time looking for documents about losses among military and civilians and rechecking statistical data. But today we can say: the weakening of the top and the desire for disunity always lead to dire consequences. Only the strengthening of state power and the unity of people can end any confrontation so that the country can live in peace again.

After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Central Government and Chechnya became especially tense. At the end of 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Expressing the will of the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), Dudayev dissolved the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia and announced the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

In connection with the reorganization of the former Soviet Army, Dudayev managed to take control of a significant part of the property and weapons of the Soviet troops in Chechnya, including aviation. Russia declared the “Dudaev regime” illegal.

The development and material support of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. 20% of the military equipment of the federal troops in Chechnya was completely faulty, 40% was partially faulty. What came as a surprise to Russian politicians and military officers was that Dudayev had a well-trained army. But most importantly, Dudayev skillfully played on national feelings and portrayed Russia as the enemy of the Chechen people. He managed to win over the population of Chechnya to his side. Dudayev turned into a national hero. Most Chechens perceived the entry of federal troops as an invasion by an enemy army seeking to take away their freedom and independence.

As a result, the operation to restore the rule of law, preserve the integrity of Russia, and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted, bloody war for Russian society. In the Chechen issue, the Russian government did not show statesmanship, patience, diplomatic skill, or understanding of the historical, cultural and everyday traditions of the mountain peoples.

1. The Russian government sought to eliminate the “independence” of General Dudayev and wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia.

2. With the loss of Chechnya, Chechen oil was lost and the supply of oil from Baku to Novorossiysk was disrupted. Oil exports decreased.

3. The outbreak of the war was facilitated by criminal financial structures interested in this war for “money laundering.”

Thus, oil and money became the real cause of the war.

First Chechen War (December 1994 - June 1996) was not supported by Russian society, which considered it unnecessary, and its main culprit was the Kremlin government. Negative attitudes rose sharply after the major defeat of Russian troops on New Year's Eve from 1994 to 1995. In January 1995, only 23% of respondents supported the use of the army in Chechnya, with 55% against. Most considered this action unworthy of a great power. 43% were in favor of an immediate cessation of hostilities.

A year later, the protest against the war reached an extremely large level: at the beginning of 1996, 80-90% of Russians surveyed had a purely negative attitude towards it. For the first time in the history of Russia, a significant part of the media systematically took an anti-war position, showed the monstrous destruction, disasters and grief of the population of Chechnya, and criticized the authorities and law enforcement agencies. Many socio-political movements and parties openly opposed the war. The mood of society played a role in ending the war.

Realizing the futility of a military solution to the Chechen problem, the Russian government began to look for options for a political settlement of the contradictions. In March 1996, B. Yeltsin decided to create a working group to end hostilities and resolve the situation in Chechnya. In April 1996, the withdrawal of federal troops to the administrative borders of Chechnya began. It is believed that Dudayev died in April 1996.

Negotiations began between the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic A. Lebed(he was the secretary of the Security Council) and the head of the headquarters of the armed formations A. Maskhadov. On August 31, in Khasavyurt (Dagestan), Lebed and Maskhadov signed a joint statement “On the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya” and “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” An agreement was reached to hold presidential elections in Chechnya. The final decision on the issue of the political status of Chechnya was postponed for five years (until December 2001). In August, federal troops began to withdraw from Grozny, which was immediately captured by militants.

In January 1997, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of the Chechen Republic- former chief of staff of the Chechen armed forces. He proclaimed a course for the national independence of Chechnya.

Russia lost the first Chechen war, suffering significant human losses and enormous material damage. The national economy of Chechnya was completely destroyed. The problem of refugees has arisen. Among those leaving were a lot of educated, qualified workers, including teachers.

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and A. Maskhadov coming to power, a real catastrophe began in Chechnya. For the second time in a short period of time, the Chechen Republic was handed over to criminal elements and extremists. The Constitution of the Russian Federation on the territory of Chechnya ceased to be in force, legal proceedings were eliminated and replaced by Sharia rule. The Russian population of Chechnya was subjected to discrimination and persecution. In the fall of 1996, the majority of the population of Chechnya lost hope for a better future and hundreds of thousands of Chechens left the republic along with the Russians.

After the end of the war in Chechnya, Russia was faced with the problem of terrorism in the North Caucasus. From the end of 1996 to 1999, criminal terror was accompanied by political terror in Chechnya. The Ichkerian parliament hastily adopted the so-called law, on the basis of which not only those who actually collaborated with federal authorities were persecuted, but also those who were suspected of sympathizing with Russia. All educational institutions found themselves under the strict control of self-appointed Sharia courts and all kinds of Islamic movements, which dictated not only the content of educational programs, but also determined personnel policies.

Under the banner of Islamization, the teaching of a number of disciplines was stopped both in schools and universities, but the basics of Islam, the basics of Sharia, etc. were introduced. Separate education for boys and girls was introduced in schools, and in high schools they were required to wear a burqa. The study of the Arabic language was introduced, and this was not provided with personnel, teaching aids and developed programs. The militants considered secular education to be harmful. There has been a noticeable degradation of an entire generation. Most Chechen children did not study during the war years. Uneducated youth can only join criminal groups. Illiterate people are always easy to manipulate by playing on their national and religious feelings.

Chechen gangs pursued a policy of intimidation of the Russian authorities: taking hostages, bombing houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buinaksk, and attacks on Dagestan. As a response, the Russian government led by V.V. Putin decided to use force in the fight against terrorists.

The Second Chechen War began in September 1999.

She appeared completely different in all major indicators:

By nature and method of conduct;

In relation to it, the population, citizens of the Russian Federation, including the civilian population of Chechnya itself;

In relation to citizens towards the army;

By the number of victims on both sides, including the civilian population;

Media behavior, etc.

The war was caused by the need to ensure security and tranquility in the Caucasus.

60% of the Russian population was for the war. It was a war in the name of protecting the integrity of the country. The Second Chechen War caused a mixed reaction in the world. Public opinion in Western countries regarding the second Chechen war was at odds with all-Russian opinion. It is typical for Westerners to perceive the events in Chechnya as Russia’s suppression of an uprising of a small people, and not as the destruction of terrorists. It was widely believed that Russia was guilty of human rights violations and that there was “ethnic cleansing” in Chechnya.

At the same time, the Western media hid the criminal actions of Chechen extremists, kidnapping and trafficking in people, the cultivation of slavery, medieval morals and laws. The Russian government made it clear to world public opinion that the actions of the federal troops are aimed, first of all, at carrying out a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. When entering the second Chechen war, Russia also took into account the fact that Turkey, the United States and NATO are pursuing their own interests in this region.

The group of federal forces in Chechnya numbered 90 thousand people, of which about 70 thousand were in military service, the rest served under contract. According to press reports, the number of militants was 20-25 thousand, the basis of which was 10-15 thousand professional mercenaries. A. Maskhadov was on their side.

By March 2000, the active phase of the Chechen war was over. But now the militants were actively carrying out terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Chechnya, and launched partisan actions. Federal forces began to pay special attention to intelligence. Cooperation between the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established.

By mid-2000, federal troops defeated most of the organized combat forces of the separatists and took control of almost all the cities and villages of Chechnya. Then the bulk of the military units were withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and power there passed from the military commandant’s offices to the Chechen Administration created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and its local bodies. They were led by Chechens. A huge work has begun to revive the economy and culture of the republic from the ruins and ashes.

However, this creative work began to be hampered by the remnants of militant gangs who had taken refuge in the inaccessible mountainous areas of Chechnya. They adopted the tactics of sabotage and terrorism, systematically organizing explosions on roads from around the corner, killing employees of the Chechen Administration and Russian military personnel. Only in the first half of 2001. More than 230 terrorist attacks were carried out, resulting in the death of hundreds of people.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian leadership continued its policy of establishing peaceful life on Chechen soil. The task was set to solve the problem of restoring socio-economic life and constitutional authorities in Chechnya in the shortest possible time. And in general, this task is being successfully accomplished.

After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Central Government and Chechnya developed especially tense. At the end of 1991ᴦ. General Dzhokhar Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Expressing the will of the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), Dudayev dissolved the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia and announced the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

Soon, a struggle for spheres of influence began among the Chechens themselves, which, with the intervention of federal authorities and security forces, resulted in a kind of civil war in 1994. On December 11, 1994, the operation of federal troops to capture Grozny began. The assault on Grozny on New Year's Eve, which left hundreds of Russian troops dead, was a disaster. The development and material support of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. 20% of the military equipment of the federal troops in Chechnya was completely faulty, 40% was partially faulty. What came as a surprise to Russian politicians and military officers was that Dudayev had a well-trained army. But most importantly, Dudayev skillfully played on national feelings and portrayed Russia as the enemy of the Chechen people. He managed to win over the population of Chechnya to his side. Dudayev turned into a national hero. Most Chechens perceived the entry of federal troops as an invasion by an enemy army seeking to take away their freedom and independence.

1. The Russian government sought to eliminate the “independence” of General Dudayev and wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia.

2. With the loss of Chechnya, Chechen oil was lost and the supply of oil from Baku to Novorossiysk was disrupted. Oil exports decreased.

3. The outbreak of the war was facilitated by criminal financial structures interested in this war for “money laundering”.

Τᴀᴋᴎᴍ ᴏϬᴩᴀᴈᴏᴍ, oil and money became the real cause of the war.

First Chechen War (December 1994 – June 1996) was not supported by Russian society, which considered it unnecessary, and its main culprit was the Kremlin government. Negative attitudes rose sharply after the major defeat of Russian troops on New Year's Eve from 1994 to 1995. In January 1995 ᴦ. Only 23% of respondents supported the use of the army in Chechnya, with 55% against. Most considered this action unworthy of a great power. 43% were in favor of an immediate cessation of hostilities. A year later, the protest against the war reached an extremely large level: at the beginning of 1996. 80-90% of Russians surveyed had a purely negative attitude towards it. For the first time in the history of Russia, a significant part of the media systematically spoke out from an anti-war position, showed the monstrous destruction, disasters and grief of the population of Chechnya, and criticized the authorities and law enforcement agencies. Many socio-political movements and parties openly opposed the war. The mood of society played a role in ending the war.

Realizing the futility of a military solution to the Chechen problem, the Russian government began to look for options for a political settlement of the contradictions. In March 1996 ᴦ. B. Yeltsin decided to create a working group to end hostilities and resolve the situation in Chechnya. In April 1996. the withdrawal of federal troops to the administrative borders of Chechnya began. It is believed that Dudayev died in April 1996.

Negotiations have begun between the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic A. Lebed(he was the secretary of the Security Council) and the head of the headquarters of the armed formations A. Maskhadov. On August 31, in Khasavyurt (Dagestan), Lebed and Maskhadov signed a joint statement “On the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya” and “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic”. An agreement was reached to hold presidential elections in Chechnya. The final decision on the issue of the political status of Chechnya was postponed for five years (until December 2001). In August, federal troops began to withdraw from Grozny, which was immediately captured by militants.

In January 1997 ᴦ. Colonel Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of the Chechen Republic– former chief of staff of the Chechen armed formations. He proclaimed a course for the national independence of Chechnya.

Russia lost the first Chechen war, suffering significant human losses and enormous material damage. The national economy of Chechnya was completely destroyed. The problem of refugees has arisen. Among those leaving there were a lot of educated, qualified workers, incl. and teachers.

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and A. Maskhadov coming to power, a real catastrophe began in Chechnya. For the second time in a short period of time, the Chechen Republic was handed over to criminal elements and extremists. The Constitution of the Russian Federation on the territory of Chechnya ceased to be in force, legal proceedings were eliminated and replaced by Sharia rule. The Russian population of Chechnya was subjected to discrimination and persecution. In the fall of 1996 ᴦ. The majority of the population of Chechnya lost hope for a better future and hundreds of thousands of Chechens left the republic along with the Russians.

After the end of the war in Chechnya, Russia was faced with the problem of terrorism in the North Caucasus. Since the end of 1996 ᴦ. to 1999 ᴦ. Criminal terror was accompanied in Chechnya by political terror. The Ichkerian parliament hastily adopted the so-called law, on the basis of which not only those who actually collaborated with federal authorities were persecuted, but also those who were suspected of sympathizing with Russia. All educational institutions found themselves under the strict control of self-appointed Sharia courts and all kinds of Islamic movements, which dictated not only the content of educational programs, but also determined personnel policies. Under the banner of Islamization, the teaching of a number of disciplines was stopped both in schools and universities, but the basics of Islam, the basics of Sharia, etc. were introduced. Separate education for boys and girls was introduced in schools, and in high schools they were required to wear a burqa. The study of the Arabic language was introduced, and this was not provided with personnel, teaching aids and developed programs. The militants considered secular education to be harmful. There has been a noticeable degradation of an entire generation. Most Chechen children did not study during the war years. Uneducated youth can only join criminal groups. Illiterate people are always easy to manipulate by playing on their national and religious feelings.

The second Chechen war began in September 1999. She appeared completely different in all major indicators:

· by nature and method of management;

· in relation to it the population, citizens of the Russian Federation, incl. the civilian population of Chechnya itself;

· in relation to citizens towards the army;

· by the number of victims on both sides, including the civilian population;

· media behavior, etc.

The war was caused by the extreme importance of ensuring security and tranquility in the Caucasus. 60% of the Russian population was for the war. It was a war in the name of protecting the integrity of the country. The Second Chechen War caused a mixed reaction in the world. Public opinion in Western countries regarding the second Chechen war was at odds with all-Russian opinion. It is typical for Westerners to perceive the events in Chechnya as Russia’s suppression of an uprising of a small people, and not as the destruction of terrorists. It was widely believed that Russia was guilty of human rights violations and that there was “ethnic cleansing” in Chechnya. At the same time, the Western media hid the criminal actions of Chechen extremists, kidnapping and trafficking in people, the cultivation of slavery, medieval morals and laws. The Russian government made it clear to world public opinion that the actions of the federal troops are aimed, first of all, at carrying out a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. When entering the second Chechen war, Russia also took into account the fact that Turkey, the United States and NATO are pursuing their own interests in this region.

By March 2000 ᴦ. the active phase of the Chechen war was completed. But now the militants were actively carrying out terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Chechnya, and launched partisan actions. Federal forces began to pay special attention to intelligence. Cooperation between the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established.

By mid-2000. Federal troops defeated most of the organized military formations of the separatists and took control of almost all the cities and villages of Chechnya. Next, the bulk of the military units were withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and power there passed from the military commandant’s offices to the Chechen Administration created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and its local bodies. They were led by Chechens. A huge work has begun to revive the economy and culture of the republic from the ruins and ashes. At the same time, this creative work began to be hampered by the remnants of militant gangs that had taken refuge in the inaccessible mountainous areas of Chechnya. They adopted the tactics of sabotage and terrorism, systematically organizing explosions on roads from around the corner, killing employees of the Chechen Administration and Russian military personnel. Only in the first half of 2001ᴦ. More than 230 terrorist attacks were carried out, resulting in the death of hundreds of people.