Karl Dönitz. Secrets of the III Reich: Leaders

CHAPTER 8 DÖNITZ REPLACES REDER (December 1942-February 1943) By the end of 1942, the tide had already begun to ebb in Stalingrad and North Africa, but the successes of submarines in the fight against enemy convoys continued. Submarine teams entered the fourth year of the war with

Dönitz believed that the war could be won by sinking ships with more tonnage than the enemy could build. He stubbornly resisted Hitler's proposal to transfer part of the submarines to the Mediterranean Sea, because he knew that they could not return due to strong westerly currents in the Strait of Gibraltar.

Dönitz Karl. Admiral Dönitz created the German submarine fleet and tactics that allowed German submariners to jeopardize the transportation of England and the United States.

Dönitz was born on September 16, 1891 in Grünau, near Berlin. The youngest son of the optical engineer Emil Dönitz from the firm of Carl Zeiss in Jena, he lost his mother early. After high school and a real school, the young man entered the Imperial Naval School in Kiel in 1910. In 1912, he was transferred to the naval school in Mürvik, then, to complete his studies, he was appointed watch officer on the Breslau light cruiser, and in the fall of 1913 he was promoted to lieutenant. During the Balkan crisis, Breslau participated in the blockade of Montenegro. By the beginning of World War II, the cruiser was in the Mediterranean Sea, with the detachment of Souchon broke into the Black Sea and became part of the Turkish fleet. When in July 1915 the Breslau was blown up by a Russian mine near the Bosphorus and stood up for repairs, the lieutenant, as a pilot and air observer, took part in the fighting near Gallipoli. In February 1916, he was promoted to lieutenant, and in the summer he was sent to retrain as a submariner.

From October 1, 1916 to January 1917, Dönitz was trained in Germany. Then he was sent to the Adriatic Sea. On the submarine U-39 of Lieutenant Commander Walter Folstmann, Dönitz proved himself well and was seconded to Kiel for the courses of submarine commanders. In January 1918 he was placed in command of the UC-25 in the Mediterranean, a minelayer that could also be used in the torpedo version. In the first campaign, the young commander sank a steamer, then penetrated the roadstead of the port of Augusta (Sicily) and torpedoed an Italian collier. On the way back, the boat ran aground, and the Austrians had to ask for help. Nevertheless, the Kaiser awarded the sailor the Order of the House of Hohenzollern. After repairs in July, Dönitz laid mines off the island of Corfur and attacked 4 ships with torpedoes, one of which washed ashore and the others probably sank. The sailor could not watch their death: he had to leave the escort with which the British escorted the convoys.

As a reward for his successful cruising, Dönitz was placed in command of the more modern UB-68. On October 4, 1918, the commander attacked a British convoy, sank the Upek transport, but during the dive, due to the inexperience of the crew, the boat fell to a depth above the limit. Dönitz ordered the tanks to be blown through, the rudders to be placed in a horizontal position and to move. The boat was washed up on the surface in the center of the convoy, where it was attacked by British destroyers. It was not possible to dive (compressed air ran out). The chief lieutenant ordered the crew to leave the boat and flood it. Most of the crew were picked up by English ships.

In order to quickly return to his homeland, Dönitz, who ended up in the officers' camp at Riedmyer near Sheffield, feigned madness so naturally that the camp authorities believed him and repatriated him. In July 1919, Oberleutnant returned to Germany and served at the naval base in Kiel. Dönitz turned out to be one of the few former officers who remained in the small German fleet, which existed within the limits allowed by the Treaty of Versailles. Since the treaty forbade Germany to have submarines, in 1920 Dönitz became commander of the destroyer T-157 in Swinemünde (Pomerania), in 1921 he was promoted to lieutenant commander. Two years later, he returned to Kiel as an expert mine-torpedo reconnaissance inspection, participated in the development of a new depth bomb.

In the autumn of 1924, after completing courses for staff officers, Dönitz was sent to Berlin. He participated in the development of a new naval charter and regulations on military crimes. In 1928, Dönitz continued to serve as navigator of the Nymphe cruiser in the Baltic, and in November he was appointed commander of the 4th destroyer semi-flotilla. Having 4 destroyers, the sailor on maneuvers practiced tactics similar to the subsequent actions of submarines. At the autumn maneuvers, he distinguished himself by “defeating” the convoy of a mock enemy, and attracted the attention of Rear Admiral Walter Gladis, who led the secret preparations for submarine warfare. From the end of 1930 to 1934, Dönitz served in Wilhelmshaven, dealing with internal security. At the beginning of 1933, a sailor sent to the British and Dutch colonies visited Malta, the Red Sea, India, Ceylon, Batavia, Java, and Singapore. In October he was promoted to frigate captain. In 1934, Dönitz improved his English in England, and upon his return he became commander of the light cruiser Emden.

After Hitler came to power with his plan for the immediate start of naval expansion, Dönitz returned to the submarine fleet. On February 1, 1935, the Fuhrer ordered the construction of submarines to begin, after 6 weeks he refused to comply with the articles of the Versailles Treaty. On June 8, Dönitz was appointed "Fuhrer of submarines." He led the 1st Submarine Flotilla, which by September consisted of 11 small submarines. On October 1, the sailor was promoted to “captains of the zur see”.

Based on his own experience, as well as on foreign works on the strategy of the submarine fleet, Dönitz essentially created the German theory of submarine warfare. He himself supervised the design of submarines, took care of the improvement of engines, wrote manuals for the training of submariners. He had two main military concepts. Firstly, Dönitz convinced his superiors that the main goal of submarines should not be military, but merchant ships in order to disrupt the supply of the enemy. The second concept, which played a particularly significant role in the conduct of submarine warfare, was that submariners should operate in stable groups, which Dönitz called "wolf packs". At his insistence, the construction of submarines of the 7th series, suitable for operations in the ocean, began. Dönitz's activities were supported by the commander of the fleet, Ralf Karls. However, Admiral Raeder, an advocate of cruiser warfare against Great Britain, wrote negative resolutions on Dönitz's notes stating that U-boats could win the war.

Dönitz set a goal of building a fleet of 300 boats, but this work was slowed down by the limited resources of steel, which were also claimed by the regular navy and army. By the start of World War II, Dönitz had only 56 boats, of which less than half could fight in the Atlantic Ocean. Nevertheless, by the end of September, the loss of allied tonnage reached 175 thousand tons, and U-47 Prina, according to Dönitz's plan, sank the battleship Royal Oak on the night of October 14 in the harbor of Scapa Flow. Grand Admiral Raeder, who met the boat, promoted Dönitz to rear admiral right on the pier.

Shipyards produced only 2 submarines per month. There was nothing to replace the submarines that returned from the campaign. In October, the sunk tonnage amounted to 125,000 tons, in November - 80,000 tons, and in December - 125,000 tons. The total losses of Allied ships until March 31, 1940 amounted to 343,610 tons, which Great Britain, which had a tonnage of 24 million tons and launched 200,000 tons of ships monthly, could withstand. The use of submarines in the Norwegian operation and problems with torpedo fuses reduced the tonnage sunk in April to 80,000 tons. Only when, after the fall of France, Dönitz submarines began to leave French ports, the time of their combat patrols increased and the destroyed tonnage increased sharply, amounting to 343 ships with a displacement of 1 million 754 thousand 501 tons in 7 months, which had already begun to threaten the security of Great Britain, which did not managed to make up for the loss.

In August 1940, Vice Admiral Dönitz moved his headquarters to Paris, from where it was more convenient to lead submariners. He led a modest, measured life, took care of the life of sailors, met them after campaigns, gave them the opportunity to relax and relieve nervous tension, for which he was loved and called “Papa Karl” or “Lion”.

Only by the end of 1940 did the number of monthly submarines produced increase from 2 to 6. As of September 1, 1941, there were still only 57 submarines, counting them unusable. The British, on the other hand, organized the protection of convoys, began to use long-range anti-submarine aircraft, and the losses of German submariners began to grow.

Dönitz believed that the war could be won by sinking ships with more tonnage than the enemy could build. He stubbornly resisted Hitler's proposal to transfer part of the submarines to the Mediterranean Sea, because he knew that they could not return due to strong westerly currents in the Strait of Gibraltar. When, nevertheless, 10 submarines had to be sent to the Mediterranean Sea, this worsened the possibility of conducting operations in the Atlantic. Nevertheless, submariners and other military forces sank more ships than the Canadian and British shipyards built.

Hitler's declaration of war on the United States after Pearl Harbor sharply worsened Germany's situation, because the German fleet was not able to cope with the power of American industry. Nevertheless, Dönitz did everything possible to strengthen the resistance. The scope of the German submarine fleet expanded. The Americans did not think over the system of protection of their shipping. Already on January 15, 1942, Dönitz ordered the destruction of American ships off the coast of America; by May 10, 303 ships (2,015,252 tons) had been sunk. But in July, the Americans began to form convoys. The dispatch of part of the boats to the coast of Norway in early 1943 led to the fact that only 10-12 submarines were operating off the American coast at the same time. Dönitz felt powerless, and Hitler, as a consolation, promoted him to admiral in March 1942. When Raeder left the service, on January 30, 1943, Hitler appointed Dönitz commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine with the rank of Grand Admiral. Moreover, the sailor continued to be responsible for the development of the German submarine fleet at a new stage of the war. Now the advantage at sea and on land has passed to the allies. Submarines began to be detected using radar, the Allies learned to open German ciphers and determine the location of the “wolf packs”.

Dönitz moved to Berlin. He dissuaded Hitler from destroying the surface fleet and tried to use the ships to impede at least part of the ships of the English fleet. But still, he continued to lead the actions of the submariners, who were now commanded by Admiral Eberhard Goth. In March 1943, "wolf packs" sank 120 ships (627,300 tons), losing 11 boats, and Hitler awarded Grand Admiral the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross. But the losses of submariners grew due to the actions of the naval and base aviation of the American and British fleets on the boats that went to sea and returned. In May, German submariners sank 56 ships, but they themselves lost 41 submarines.

In the last years of the war, Dönitz tried to build as many submarines as possible and use them in areas where operations were less dangerous, but led to good success (Caribbean, Azores region). He hurried the development of scientific research, tried to oppose the efforts of the allies with snorkels that allowed submarines to charge batteries under water. The improvement of engines and torpedo systems continued. But the boats of the 21st series, capable, in the opinion of the commander-in-chief, of achieving victory, began to enter service too late. German submariners, who almost won the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942, could no longer effectively limit the flow of cargo across the ocean in the next. They began to sink fewer merchant ships than they lost boats. The attempt to attack the allied forces, which were landing in Normandy, ended in failure and heavy losses. Further attempts to massively use submarines could no longer bring success. Of the 820 boats that participated in the "Battle of the Atlantic" since 1939, 781 were lost, of the 39 thousand submariners - 32, mainly at the end of the war.

Despite the defeat of the German troops, Dönitz remained a supporter of Hitler, justified all his decisions and at times made propaganda statements in the spirit of Goebbels. He attended Hitler's last birthday. Apparently, because the Fuhrer, before his death, appointed Dönitz as his successor as Chancellor. On May 2, the grand admiral settled in the cadet corps in Mürwik near Flensburg, tried to quickly end the war with the West and take as many Germans out of the zone of Soviet influence by sea as possible. On May 23, 1945, he was arrested. On an IQ test, his IQ was 138, approaching that of a genius.

As Hitler's successor, Dönitz was put on trial. Allied experts recognized that the American navy had engaged in all-out submarine warfare from the very beginning and that it was not a crime to sink neutral ships in a declared danger zone. The judge pleaded not guilty to Dönitz on all counts. The grand admiral himself referred to the fact that he acted on orders. In the end, he received 10 years in prison - the most lenient sentence handed down at Nuremberg. He served his term in Spandau. After his release on October 1, 1956, Dönitz secured an Admiralty pension and lived comfortably with his wife. After the death of his wife on May 2, 1962, he lived alone in Aumül. The sailor devoted almost all his time to writing, writing the books “10 Years and 20 Days” (1958), “My Exciting Life” (1968), “German Naval Strategy in World War II” (1968). He died on December 24, 1980 in Aumül and was buried on January 6, 1981. The burial was attended by veterans - comrades in arms.

Youth and youth

Karl Dönitz was born on September 16, 1891 in Grünau near Berlin and was the second and last child of the optical engineer Emil Dönitz, who worked in the famous firm of Carl Zeiss in Jena. Children were left without a mother early. Emil Dönitz understood that only a good education provide his sons with a decent future. Karl studied first at the Zerbst Gymnasium, and then at real school in Jena. On April 1, 1910, the young Dönitz began his studies at the naval school in Kiel.

Seekadet Dönitz was a hard-working and reserved young man who considered "devotion to duty the main moral value." During his studies, he did not particularly stand out and did not enjoy the respect of his comrades. In 1912 he was transferred to the naval school in Mürwik, and then, to complete his studies, he was appointed as a watch officer on the light cruiser Breslau. In the autumn of 1913, Dönitz was promoted to lieutenant of the zur see. During the Balkan crisis, Breslau participated in the international blockade of Montenegro.

The outbreak of the First World War found the Breslau in the Mediterranean. He managed to get away from the British to Turkey, where the cruiser joined the fleet of the Ottoman Empire and fought in the Black Sea against the Russians. During one of the raids, the Breslau broke into the harbor of Novorossiysk, sank all the ships that were there and destroyed the oil storage facilities.

In July 1915, at the entrance to the Bosphorus Strait, the Breslau was blown up by a Russian mine. While the cruiser was being repaired, Dönitz got a job in the Air Force and, as a gunner and letnab, took part in the fighting at Gallipoli. In February 1916, he was promoted to lieutenant zur see, and in the summer he was recalled to Germany and sent to retrain as an officer of the submarine fleet, who was assigned big hopes. From October 1, 1916 to January 1917, Dönitz completed the necessary training and continued to serve in the Adriatic, in U-39, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Walter Folstmann, as a torpedo officer. Here Karl Dönitz acquired the necessary practical skills. He proved himself well, was called to Kiel, completed courses for submarine commanders there, and in January 1918 received a UC-25 with a displacement of 417 tons, which was both a mine layer and a torpedo submarine. Dönitz was ordered to operate in the Mediterranean.

By the time Dönitz took the boat out on its first patrol, it was clear that German all-out submarine warfare had failed and was defeated, as the British had developed a reliable convoy system and had powerful depth charges. Nevertheless, Dönitz excelled. First, he sank a steamer, and then boldly entered the inner roadstead of the Sicilian port of Augusta and sank a 5,000-ton Italian coal miner, who he mistook for the English floating workshop Cyclops. Even though, returning to base, Dönitz ran the boat aground, the Kaiser awarded him the Order of the House of Hohenzollern. To the great shame of Karl Dönitz, he was pulled aground by an Austrian destroyer.

UC-25 was repaired in July and Dönitz put her out to sea again. He laid mines in the area of ​​Cape Corfu and torpedoed 4 ships. One washed ashore, while the others apparently drowned. Dönitz did not have time to follow them, because he could be destroyed by a strong escort. This campaign was his great achievement, especially considering that the outdated UC-25 could only carry 5 torpedoes. As a reward, Dönitz received a faster and larger submarine UB-68. Unfortunately, the crew was inexperienced and the boat was unstable when submerged.

On October 4, 1918, Dönitz attacked a British convoy, sank the Upek transport (3883 tons) and ordered to sink. The inexperienced mechanic was confused, and the submarine, having taken a dangerous trim, went to the bottom like a stone. Fearing that the enormous pressure would crush the hull, Dönitz ordered the tanks to be blown through, given full speed, and the rudders placed in a horizontal position. The boat stopped at a depth of 102 meters - 32 meters below the maximum diving limit. Compressed air tanks cracked, and the out-of-control submarine was thrown to the surface of the sea. Peering out of the hatch, Dönitz found himself in the center of a British convoy with destroyers spewing fire at full speed towards him. He quickly battened down the hatch and ordered to dive, but the compressed air ran out, and it turned out to be impossible to do so. Since the shells were already falling a few meters from the hull of the boat, Dönitz ordered the crew to leave her. The mechanic opened the kingstones to flood the submarine, but hesitated and took her into the depths of the sea. The picture of his death haunted Dönitz until the end of his life. In addition to the mechanic, two more people drowned. The rest were picked up by the British.

Dönitz ended up in an officer's camp at Redmyer near Sheffield. His chances of getting a job in his homeland by profession would have been greater if he managed to repatriate before thousands of other officers. To do this, Dönitz feigned madness. According to Wolfgang Frank, he played like a child with empty tin cans and small china dogs until even the camp authorities thought he was crazy. Many years later, his former camp comrades resented when Dönitz, whom they remembered as insane, assumed the highest positions in the Kriegsmarine. Karl Dönitz was instantly cured of his "illness" in July 1919, as soon as he returned to Germany. He continued to serve at the military base in Kiel, but in his heart he longed to return to the submarine fleet, which was to be revived, despite the fact that the Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany to have one.

Career advancement
In 1920, Dönitz transferred to torpedo boats and became commander of the T-157 at the Swinemünde base on the Pomeranian coast. At the beginning of 1921, he became a lieutenant commander, and in 1923 he returned to Kiel, as an expert in the mine-torpedo-reconnaissance inspection and participated in the development of a new type of depth bomb. In the autumn of 1924, after a short staff officer course taught by Raeder, Dönitz was transferred to the naval command in Berlin. Here he participated in the development of a new naval charter and provisions on military crimes and fought against the penetration of Bolshevism into the fleet. Dönitz, by the nature of his work, was forced to maintain constant contact with the Reichstag, which developed in him an aversion to politics.

Working at the headquarters, Dönitz proved himself to be a diligent, self-critical, demanding workaholic servant. He was well aware of the steps taken by the leadership of the fleet to get around the prohibition clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. In August 1927, such information was leaked to the press, which caused the Loman scandal. What Dönitz knew about these violations remained a mystery, since he never said a word about it. In 1928 he continued his service in the Baltic as a navigator of the cruiser Nymph.

Involvement in the Loman case did not prevent Dönitz from being promoted. In November, he was appointed commander of the 4th torpedo semi-flotilla, which included 4 torpedo boats and 600 men under the command of 28 officers. Dönitz plunged headlong into work, practicing maneuvers very reminiscent of those used later by German submariners during attacks from the surface. After Dönitz distinguished himself in the autumn maneuvers of 1929 by "destroying" the convoy of a mock enemy, Rear Admiral Walter Gladisch, who led the secret preparations for submarine warfare, drew attention to him. From the end of 1930 to 1934, Dönitz served at the headquarters of the Severomorsky district, in Wilhelmshaven, where he was engaged in providing internal security(the fight against the communists). In early 1933, he was sent on a long voyage abroad. Dönitz visited the British and Dutch eastern colonies, Malta, the Red Sea, the coast of India, Ceylon, Batavia, Java, and Singapore. In October he was promoted to frigate captain. In 1934, in order to improve in English, Dönitz visited England, and when he returned, he received the command of the light cruiser Emden.

On February 1, 1935, Adolf Hitler ordered the construction of submarines to begin, and six weeks later refused to comply with the articles of the Versailles Treaty that limited Germany's military capabilities. On June 6, 1935, Karl Dönitz was appointed "Fuhrer of submarines" (Fuerer der U-boote, FdU) and led the 1st U-boat Flotilla. In September, Germany already had 11 small (258 tons) submarines. On October 1, Dönitz became captain of the zur see.

Karl Dönitz was at a disadvantage. In Berlin, supporters of the "big ships" had great power, believing that the submarines defeated in the First World War were outdated and of no particular value to the Kriegsmarine. Unlike Dönitz, they did not realize that since 1918 the capabilities of the submarine fleet had stepped far forward. Still, the OKM allowed Dönitz to build "his" submarine fleet and did not interfere (though did not assist) in his affairs. By 1938, Dönitz had developed the tactics of group underwater attacks ("wolf packs"). Now he needed 620-ton submarines (type VII) capable of operating in the Atlantic. But the admirals, prone to megalomania, conceived the construction of 2000-ton submarines, which, in their opinion, were more durable. Dönitz in the submarine was interested in other qualities of submarines: stealth, invulnerability to depth charges and low production costs. In the end, Dönitz was allowed to do what he wanted. World War II fully confirmed his correctness.

The U-boat Führer had the full support of Fleet Commander Ralph Karls, but Grand Admiral Raeder was planning a "cruiser war" against the United Kingdom and did not pay attention to building a submarine fleet. Dönitz bombarded Raeder with memos declaring that 300 submarines would win the Reich's war with Britain. Grand Admiral, as if mocking him, invariably politely refused.

War again
Unlike Raeder, Dönitz understood that the war would begin before 1944. He felt that Germany could not get off with the Polish campaign. On September 3, 1939, when Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, Dönitz was at his command post, which was a group of small wooden buildings in the suburbs of Wilhelmshaven. He met the news of the beginning of the war with a stream of obscene abuse. At this time, he had only 56 boats at his disposal, of which only 22 were large enough to wage submarine warfare in the ocean. Nevertheless, they were already patrolling at sea and laying minefields off the coast of England. On September 4, Lieutenant Commander Herbert Schulze, commander of U-48, reported that he had sunk the Royal Septre off the coast of Scotland. This ship was the first of 2,603 ​​Allied ships sunk to the bottom by German submarines. By the end of the month, the Dönitz submarine fleet had sunk many enemy ships, with a total displacement of 175,000 tons, proving to be very effective tool waging war at sea. However, the production of boats froze at the same level - 2 pieces per month.

Further more. Dönitz personally planned the operation in Scapa Flow, "the bedroom of His Majesty's fleet", which, on the night of October 13-14, was carried out on U-47 by Lieutenant Commander Günther Prien. The battleship Royal Oak was sunk, which is a phenomenal result. When U-47 returned to base, Grand Admiral Raeder was already there. He congratulated the crew on their success and immediately, on the spot, promoted Dönitz to Rear Admiral.

Dönitz could not ensure a constant increase in the tonnage of enemy ships sunk. When his submarines returned from their first combat patrol in the Atlantic, there were no others to send in to replace them. In addition, autumn storms, common in the North Atlantic, made it difficult to hunt for Allied ships. The tonnage of enemy ships sunk by the German fleet fell from 175,000 tons in September to 125,000 in October, 80,000 in November and 125,000 in December. From January 1 to March 31, Allied losses amounted to only 108 ships (343,610 tons). For the UK, these losses were quite acceptable. The total tonnage of all its ships was 24 million tons, and another 200,000 tons left the stocks of the English shipyards per month.

Dönitz hoped that in the spring his boats would again begin to destroy sea trade communications, but Raeder ordered him to support the invasion of Norway. Dönitz tried to protest, but it was all to no avail. April was the most unfortunate month for German submariners. The Allies suffered the smallest losses since the beginning of the war - only 20 ships (slightly more than 80,000 tons).

The torpedo crisis faded into the background in June 1940, when the fall of France gave Dönitz new bases much closer to British lines of communication and allowed longer combat patrols. Dark days have come for the UK. In June, 58 ships (284113 tons) were lost, in July-38 (195825 tons), in August - 56 (267618 tons), in September-59 (295335 tons), in October - 63 (352407 tons). Because of weather conditions November and December turned out to be less "productive" for the Germans - 32 ships (146,613 tons) and 37 ships (212,590 tons), respectively. These figures smacked of disaster for Britain: in 7 months they lost 343 ships with a total displacement of 1,754,501 tons.

The number of ships sunk exceeded the number built, despite the help Churchill received from his "cousin" in the White House. October has been a particularly troubling month. Once after the war, Churchill admitted that it was only during the "Battle of the Atlantic" that he felt a real threat to England.

In this regard, the number of submarines at the disposal of Dönitz is surprising. On September 1, 1941, under his command there were only 57 submarines. Their condition did not lend itself to any criticism at all. There was not enough time to repair the damage received from ice and depth charges. A few submarines in general could only be used as floating targets. Only by the end of 1940, the production of boats was increased from 2 to 6 per month. But even now there were not enough qualified specialists and materials thrown into the construction of large ships. Worsening and the fact that the distribution of resources was in charge of Hermann Goering. During the critical period of the "Battle of the Atlantic" Doenitz and his men had to wage the "War of the Poor".

In August 1940, Dönitz moved his command post to Paris. Even in the luxurious capital of France, his headquarters did not contain anything superfluous and ostentatious. The Spartan spirit and self-discipline did not allow him to do this. He never overate or overdrink, went to bed at 10 o'clock sharp (if the service allowed), but had nothing against his people having "all-night drinking parties". Doenitz personally met every boat returning to the base, attended the graduation of each class of the submarine school and arranged special sanatoriums for his people, where they could relieve the tension accumulated during long patrols. He made sure that the sanatoriums were regularly supplied with the best food and wine, which were sold at reduced prices. He also distributed salaries in francs to the submariners so that his wards could fully relax from the sea in beautiful France, which the submariners did by buying the best women and the best wine. For all this, he was loved by submariners. They called him "Vater Karl" ("Papa Karl") or "Der Loewe" ("Lion") behind his back.

As Dönitz (already Vice Admiral) suggested, the British improved the security of convoys and developed anti-submarine warfare techniques. In March 1941, 5 submarines were lost, and with them several of the best crews. In addition to everything, Royal Air Force"long-range" anti-submarine aircraft appeared, and Dönitz had to move the operational zone further west, to an area between British bases in Canada and Iceland, where aircraft did not reach.

Dönitz's submarine warfare strategy was extremely simple: sink as many enemy ships as possible and do it as quickly as possible. If his submarines can sink ships faster than the British can build them, the United Kingdom will be brought to its knees. Dönitz became angry when Hitler decided to send 20 U-boats to the Mediterranean, where they were to loosen the British stranglehold on the Axis lines of communication in North Africa. Dönitz knew that a submarine that entered the Mediterranean Sea would not return due to strong westerly currents in the Strait of Gibraltar. He managed to dissuade the Fuhrer from this step in the spring and summer, then Hitler reduced the number of boats to 10, but in the autumn Dönitz had to follow the order. Because of this, he was forced to turn large-scale actions in the North Atlantic. Nevertheless, until October 7, 1941, Dönitz could not say that the year was not successful. The Allies lost 1299 ships (4328558 tons). Raeder and his staff found that the Canadian and British shipyards produced only 1,600,000 tons annually. It became clear that Germany was winning the "battle of the Atlantic."

All hopes were buried by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Hitler made a very big stupidity, following the example of the eastern ally on December 11, by declaring war on the United States. Now the vast production capacities of American industrial enterprises were working against the Reich.

US entry into the second world war meant only one thing for the German submarine fleet: imminent defeat.

Near the end
Unlike Hitler, Göring, and most admirals, Dönitz was not inclined to underestimate the enormous potential of the US war machine. But America was still enjoying peace and was not fully prepared for war. In addition, the anti-British American Admiral Ernst J. King was in no hurry to use the experience gained by the British in the fight against German submarines. American ships sailed alone, without an escort, with their lights on, and without any anti-submarine security measures. On January 15, 1942, Dönitz ordered his submariners to sink enemy ships off the coast of America. In January alone, they sent 62 ships (327,357 tons) to the bottom. By May 10, 303 ships (2015252 tons) had already been sunk. Only in July did the Americans begin to form convoys. The fun times are coming to an end. On January 22, Hitler and the OKM decided that Norway was in danger of being invaded and ordered all submarines to be sent to its shores for reconnaissance. Enraged, Dönitz was able to persuade Hitler to cancel the order, but lost 20 boats.

Off the American shores, only 10 to 12 boats could now hunt. Dönitz felt his complete impotence. To console him, in March 1942, Hitler made him a full admiral.

The number of German submarines continued to grow slowly. In 1942, 20 submarines were supposed to leave the stocks every month. But production was behind schedule.

In the summer of 1942, Dönitz's boats began again attacking convoys in the North Atlantic. But doing this has become more difficult than before, as the Allies developed new anti-submarine tactics and acquired new technology. Radar-equipped aircraft, anti-submarine aircraft launched from ship catapults, a new radar that German submarines could not detect, HFDF (High Frequency Direction Finder - high-frequency direction finder, or "Huff-Duff"), were supposed to deal with the German submarine fleet to May 1943.

In January, Raeder retired and appointed his two possible successors, General Admiral Rolf Karls and Admiral Karl Dönitz. Hitler opted for the latter. At the court of the Fuhrer, Dönitz soon made powerful friends - Minister of Armaments Albert Speer and Admiral Puttkamer, Hitler's naval adjutant. Dönitz was promoted to the rank of Grand Admiral and on January 30, 1943 was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine. He received a grant of 300,000 Reichsmarks. The first thing Dönitz did in his new post was to immediately dismiss Karls, a former patron turned potential rival, and many of Raeder's appointees.

Karl Dönitz, who had grown from captain zur see to grand admiral in just 3 years, was at the pinnacle of power. But he was also on the brink of his worst defeat. He talked Hitler out of disbanding the surface fleet, arguing that the latter would tie up a disproportionate number of Allied ships that could otherwise use them to reinforce convoys and fight Japan.

Dönitz moved to Berlin, but in fact retained command of the submarine fleet (nominally the Führer of the submarines was Dönitz's permanent chief of staff, Admiral Eberhard Goth). In March 1943, German submarines, acting in "wolf packs", sank 120 ships (627300 tons), and Hitler, inspired by this success, awarded Dönitz oak leaves to the Knight's Cross. But the losses of the submariners were also great: 11 boats did not return to base. German submarines returning to bases located in the Bay of Biscay were now under constant attack by American strategic bombers taking off from aircraft carriers converted merchant ships and everything from which they could take off. Dönitz commissioned new submarines. In April, the Allies lost 64 ships (344,680 tons), but 15 submarines did not return to their bases. Losses had already exceeded the rate of production, but Doenitz continued to expand the war zone in the Atlantic. In May, the allies, using the latest technical innovations, attacked the German submarine fleet. They were defeated, losing 56 ships (299428 tons). But 41 German submarines were lost. Karl Dönitz was forced to withdraw the battered "wolf packs" from the Atlantic Ocean.
Dönitz's strategy in the last years of the war was as follows: 1. Building as much as possible more submarines. 2. The continuation of the submarine war in safer areas, for example, in the Caribbean Sea or southwest of the Azores. 3. Acceleration of scientific research capable of tipping the scales towards the Reich. His submarines continued to sink Allied ships in the North Atlantic, but the same number did not return to their bases. From June to August 1943, 60 Allied merchant ships were sunk against 79 dead German submarines.

German industry nevertheless "gave birth" to a submarine capable of crushing the allied convoy system ( type XXI), but Dönitz no longer needed it.

On the days of the Allied landings in France, Doenitz ordered for the last time to attack them with massive forces. 36 submarines participated in the battle, but less than half of them survived. But Dönitz did not calm down. He continued to throw more and more new boats into battle, apparently hoping in this way to turn the tide of the war. His stubbornness and recklessness caused the deaths of hundreds of German sailors. In the period from June 6 to August 31, 1944, the Germans sank 5 escort ships, 12 cargo ships (58845 tons) and 4 landing barges (8400 tons), losing 82 submarines.

Of the 820 German submarines that participated from 1939 to 1945 in the "Battle of the Atlantic", 781 died. Of the 39,000 submariners, 32,000 died. Most of them were in the last two years of the war.

During his time in power, Karl Dönitz was a loyal and enthusiastic supporter of Hitler, supporting him at every opportunity. He justified all the Fuhrer's most senseless military decisions: the decision to hold Tunisia in the spring of 1943 and the decision to defend the Courland pocket (October 1944 - April 1945) by the forces of the North group. Dönitz sometimes made propaganda statements in the style of Goebbels and Goering, called for a decisive offensive and ensured that the Kriegsmarine was ideologically "pure" (i.e., pro-Nazi). On April 19, 1945, Dönitz evacuated his headquarters, which was located in the suburbs of Berlin. A day later, Soviet tanks broke into it. On April 20, Dönitz visited Hitler and attended his 56th and final birthday. The Fuhrer committed suicide 10 days later. To everyone's surprise, he appointed Karl Dönitz as his successor.

On May 2, Dönitz was forced to move his headquarters and the capital of the Reich to the cadet corps in Mürwik near Flensburg. Here he pursued a policy consisting, firstly, in an attempt to end the war with the West as quickly as possible, and secondly, in an effort to save as many Germans as possible from Soviet occupation. To do this, Dönitz sent all the ships at his disposal to the Baltic ports, which were still in the hands of the Germans, with orders to take out all the refugees from there. The troops were ordered to cover the evacuation and then retreat to the west. According to rough estimates, 2 million people were saved from the Soviet occupation during the 8 days that the hostilities continued.

Karl Dönitz pretended to rule Germany until 9:45 am on May 23, when he was summoned to the steamship Patria by US Army Major General Lowell W. Rucke, a member of the Allied Control Commission. There was no reception with military honors, as before. Allied officers announced that they were henceforth considered war criminals. At the same time, troops from the 11th British Panzer Division occupied the Murvik enclave and occupied the seat of the provisional government. The military forces were significant, it was feared that the grand admiral with his guard battalion might start the last battle on land. Has come last hour and the path to captivity opened up. Many of Dönitz's fellow admirals foresaw this and passed away by taking poison. The Grand Admiral bore it all with stoic dignity. British soldiers did not shy away from the unpleasant procedure of personal search, and the hunt for so-called souvenirs often led to the loss of personal property, as, for example, happened with the grand admiral's marshal's baton.

Nuremberg Trials
Soon Dönitz appeared before the Nuremberg Tribunal. He was forced to take an intelligence quotient (IQ) test, which turned out to be 138 (almost a genius). Perhaps if Karl Dönitz had not become the "last Fuhrer", he would not have been included in the list of the main war criminals. On May 9-10, 1946, when testifying, he stated that he was simply following orders. Goering told others: "For the first time in 3 weeks, I felt great. Finally, we heard that in such cases a real soldier should speak."

To the credit of Karl Dönitz, it should be said that he preserved the archives of the German Navy at the end of the war. Doenitz believed that the fleet had nothing to hide. Its macabre reputation was mainly engendered by the famous "Laconia Order" (Nicbtrettungsbefebl) of September 17, 1942. It was interpreted as a cold-blooded order to shoot sailors who escaped from sunken ships. To understand what kind of order it was and why it appeared , it is necessary to go back to the third year of the war, when the wolf packs of German submarines roamed the blood-drenched expanses of the Atlantic.

On September 12, Lieutenant Commander Hartenstein, commander of U-156, patrolled approximately 250 miles northeast of Ascension Island. In the evening he spotted the British armed troop transport "Laconia" (19695 tons). On board were British soldiers, civilians, women, children and a large number of Italian prisoners taken in North Africa. Hartenstein attacked the transport and fired 2 torpedoes. The Laconia began to sink. Lifeboats were launched, and a mass of people jumped into the water. Hartenstein moved closer to his victim.

A few minutes later he rose to the surface and heard the screams of people trying to stay on the water. He immediately called the entire boat crew on deck and went even closer to the sinking ship, after which he began to pick up the survivors. From the intercepted SOS signal, he learned the name of the vessel. At 1.25, when Laconia had already disappeared under water, he sent a message to the headquarters of the submarine forces:
"Sunk by Hartenstein. British ship Laconia in square 7721, unfortunately along with 1500 Italian prisoners. Rescued 90 so far. Need instructions."

Doenitz was roused from his bed at 3.45, and he immediately sent a radiogram:
"Group Polar Bear: Mine, Wurdemann and Wilamowitz immediately proceed at full speed to Hartenstein, square 7721."
After 15 minutes, he asked Hartenstein:
"Did the ship use a radio? Survivors in boats or rafts? Radio details of the sinking."
Hartenstein replied:
"The ship has accurately transmitted its position by radio. I have 173 people on board, of which 21 are Englishmen. Approximately 100 people are sailing nearby on personal life-saving equipment. Offer diplomatic neutrality of the area. Radio message from a nearby steamer intercepted. Hartenstein."

At 6.00, when the sun rose over the sea, Hartenstein transmitted in clear text on the radio on waves of 25 and 600 meters:

"To all ships that can help rescue the crew of the Laconia in distress. I will not attack you unless I myself am attacked by ships or aircraft. I picked up 193 people.
German submarine commander

A little later, U-506 and U-507 appeared, having received Dönitz's orders. They joined Hartenstein, who was engaged in rescue work. German boats collected scattered lifeboats and helped British and Italian officers, women and children into them. In total, they picked up about 1,500 people who were accommodated in terribly crowded boats and life rafts. Several boats had sail spars. Some of the boats took on a lot of water during the descent, and now they were rocking like laundry troughs. The Germans dragged them to the side of the submarines and pumped out the water.

In the meantime, Dönitz had warned submarine commanders to take extra care of enemy aircraft and surface ships. He allowed to take on board only such a number of people that would not impair the maneuverability of the boats under water. At the same time, the headquarters of the submarine forces, located in Paris, turned to the Vichy government with a request to send a cruiser and several sloops from Dakar to pick up the survivors. A meeting point has been chosen, and german boats went north, leaving behind the floating wreckage of the Laconia. Hartenstein went first, towing a caravan of 4 boats loaded to the limit. The boats moved slowly against the oncoming wave. One night on September 16, the towing line burst, and Hartenstein had to collect the lost boats for several hours.

And in the morning there was an unpleasant incident. U-156 was 200 miles northeast of Ascension Island when an observer spotted a patrol bomber. Hartenstein immediately unfurled the two-meter Red Cross flag at the wheelhouse and broadcast over the radio in an open test:

"Where?"
A little later:
"Are there ships nearby?"

There was no answer. The plane flew northwest and disappeared. After 30 minutes, another similar plane arrived and began to circle over the boat, sometimes descending to a height of 100 meters. He flew over the bow of the boat and dropped 2 bombs.

Give away the moorings! shouted Hartenstein.

The plane returned and dropped another bomb, which exploded deep in the water and capsized one of the boats. Dozens of people ended up in the water. The fourth bomb fell quite far. After that, the plane gained altitude and disappeared. Then he returned and dropped 2 more bombs on U-156. They exploded almost directly under the cabin of the boat, raising a large cloud of spray. The Red Cross flag was torn down, and the boat spun like a piece of wood in a whirlpool. Anti-aircraft periscope, radar receiver loop and hydrophones were damaged. However, the boat remained intact and angry and disappointed Hartenstein took her under water.

Later, all who escaped from the Laconia were picked up, and this sad incident was entered into the annals of history. However, before entering history, Hartenstein reported the bombing of Dönitz. The Commander of the Submarine Force immediately forbade all submarine commanders from using the Red Cross flag as an international signal. He also pointed out that no leniency should be expected from the enemy in relation to the boats engaged in rescue work. On September 17, Dönitz issued his Laconia Order, which forbade submarine commanders from now on to pick up people from sunken ships, with the exception of captains and mechanics, who were treated as prisoners of war.

Unlike other trials, the defense presented its evidence first. After that, she could file objections in writing, and the court had the right not to consider them, making them completely useless. Dönitz managed to defend on high level. When asked if he was interested in using slave labor at the enterprises working for the fleet, he generally denied that he knew about its use, and added that he was only interested in the product itself, and not in how it was made. The defendant denied that he had anything to do with the concentration camps, but admitted that he ordered the ships of neutral countries that were in the combat zone to be sunk. Dönitz considered this order correct. “After all, they were warned to stay away,” he said. “But if they entered the zone, pursuing some of their goals, then they only had themselves to blame.” Even F. D. Roosevelt acknowledged this when he declared that merchant ship owners had no right to risk the lives of their crew members by sending them to a war zone for immediate profit.

Dönitz was also accused of planning the occupation of Spain (to take possession of its ports) and Gibraltar. He did not deny this, and justified his pro-Nazi statements by the fact that they were necessary to strengthen fighting spirit soldier. Unlike other defendants, Dönitz did not revile Hitler.

The accusation was based on the recognition of the illegitimacy of total submarine warfare. On this issue, Dönitz was supported by US Navy Admiral Chester A. Nimitz. He provided evidence that this method of naval warfare was used Pacific Fleet United States since December 8, 1941, so Nimitz should also be judged. Indeed, if in the actions of American submariners on pacific ocean and the Kriegsmarine submariners in the Atlantic, and you can see some difference, then it will not be in favor of the American sailors. It is not worth mentioning the British and Russians at all. The British fought the most merciless submarine war in the Mediterranean (the destruction of Oceania and Neptunia with several thousand dead), and Soviet submarines sank ships packed to capacity with refugees leaving East Prussia (Wilhelm Gustloff holds a grim record for the number of deaths in during one naval attack).

During the sessions of the Nuremberg Tribunal, many submariners arrived to speak in defense of Dönitz. One of them was Captain 1st Rank Winter, former commander 1st Submarine Flotilla. He prepared a letter that was signed by many boat commanders. Former officers urged the court to follow the dictates of "human and military conscience." The letter stated that Grand Admiral Dönitz never gave the order to kill sailors from torpedoed ships. He only ordered the boat commanders to remain submerged after the attack in order to evade enemy anti-submarine forces. "Within 5 years of brutal war we found out what kind of man Dönitz was. He never demanded something dishonorable from us."

Now, 50 years later, the Dönitz accusation seems to have been built on sand, but at the time, passions were running high. The British and Russians coveted Dönitz's scalp, but American judge Francis Biddy demanded that he be acquitted of all charges.

On October 1, 1946, after Goering and several other top Nazis were sentenced to death, Karl Dönitz appeared before the Nuremberg Tribunal. He learned that he was sentenced to 10 years in Spandau Prison.

The verdict was a compromise. But even this, the mildest sentence handed down at Nuremberg, outraged Major General J.F.C.

Old age
Dönitz served his sentence in Spandau. Brought up in spartan spirit, he endured the hardships of imprisonment more easily than others. His relationship with Raeder was cool, and his former friendship with Albert Speer degenerated into poorly concealed hatred. Having fully served his term, on October 1, 1956, Dönitz was released. He found his wife in the small town of Aumül, obtained an admiral's pension and lived in abundance (in another version, only the captain's pension. The West German government refused to pay the admiral's because Dönitz served Hitler)

Dönitz devoted almost all his time to literary work. He wrote books: "Mein wechselvoltes Leben" ("My Exciting Life") - 1968, "Deutsche Strtegie zur See in zweiten Weltkrieg" ("German Naval Strategy in World War II") - 1968, "10 Jahre und 20 Tage" ("10 years and 20 days") - 1958.

On May 2, 1962, his wife died, and Dönitz lived the rest of his life in solitude. He became a zealous Catholic, attended church every Sunday, and placed a huge cross on his wife's grave. Doenitz loved to visit old friends and receive them in his house. Towards the end of his life, Doenitz became more self-absorbed and quick-tempered. He was very offended by the government, which refused to give him a solemn funeral after his death and put him in a coffin in uniform. A man outlived his time, Karl Doenitz died on Christmas Eve. He was the last of the German Grand Admirals. Dozens of old comrades-in-arms attended his funeral, in Aumül, on January 6, 1981. Foreign naval officers also attended his funeral to pay their respects. However, they were not allowed to attend military uniform at the funeral.

Karl Dönitz (German Karl Dönitz; September 16, 1891, Berlin - December 24, 1980, Aumüle) - German statesman and military leader, Grand Admiral (1943). Commander of the submarine fleet (1935-1943), commander-in-chief of the German navy (1943-1945), head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Germany from April 30 to May 23, 1945.

Carl was born in 1891 near Berlin. From childhood, he was interested in military affairs, and in 1910 he was able to enter the Imperial Naval School. Three years later he graduated and began to serve in the German Navy. In 1916, he began to serve in the newly created submarine fleet. Dentz served as an officer on the U-68 submarine and later became its captain. In 1918, a submarine attacked an English convoy. The ships of the convoy sank her, and Karl and most of teams were captured. Dönitz arrived at home in 1919. Karl was one of the few officers still serving in the small fleet. Karl served on warships, since the Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany from having a submarine fleet. However, with the advent of Hitler to power, everything changed. Doenitz returned to the submarine fleet. In 1935, Admiral Raeder gave him the order to lead the submarine fleet and reorganize it. Charles took command, but the state of the fleet left much to be desired. Germany did not have its own submarines, teams, works on theory. Karl had to rely on his own experience and on foreign works on the strategy of the submarine fleet. Karl personally supervised the design of submarines. He himself wrote manuals for the training of submariners.

Karl set himself the goal of creating a submarine fleet of three hundred submarines. However, work was slowed down due to the fact that there was a limit on the steel resources that the regular navy and army needed. Doenitz had only 56 boats by the start of World War II. Of these submarines, less than half were capable of fighting in the Atlantic Ocean. In 1939, Karl's submarines sank 114 merchant ships. New resources kept coming and the number of submarines grew. In 1940, Hitler allowed Karl to conduct submarine warfare without restrictions. In four months, Charles sank another 285 ships.

In 1941, America entered the war, which meant the expansion of the scope of the German submarine fleet. In 1942, submarines destroyed 585 American ships. In 1943, Dönitz became Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. He continued to be responsible for the development of the German submarine fleet. Now submarines could be spotted with radar, and that was a problem. German submarines won the battle of the Atlantic in 1942, and the next they could no longer effectively restrict the movement of ships across the ocean. Karl continued to fight. He had 398 more submarines at his disposal. Germany lost about 32,000 submariners and 781 submarines during the war. It should be noted that Karl Doenitz was Hitler's successor. He ordered him to become Chancellor before committing suicide. On May 7, Karl Doenitz agreed to surrender. Soon he was arrested as a war criminal. However, Karl was not a member of the Nazi Party. Karl served 10 years in prison, and after that he lived quietly in Hamburg until his death in 1980. Both of his sons died in the navy during the war. Doenitz was an excellent naval commander who was well aware of the capabilities of his fleet.

• World War I :
• The Second World War :

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In December 1916, Dönitz returned to Germany, taking a course as a submarine officer. Served as a watch officer on U-39. On March 1, 1918 he was appointed commander of the submarine - UC-25 (type UC-II). During his command, the submarine achieved 4 victories (16 thousand brt). Then he was transferred to UB-68 (type UB-III), on which he made one combat campaign. On October 3, 1918, the submarine attacked a guarded convoy, hit the transport Oopack, but was counterattacked by depth charges, having received damage, surfaced, after which she was shot by naval artillery. The crew left the sinking boat and was taken prisoner (7 people from the crew died).

Between wars

Karl Dönitz personally planned the operation against the British naval base of Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands: On October 13-14, 1939, the German submarine U-47 under the command of Günther Prien, specially selected for the attack on Scapa Flow by Dönitz, entered Scapa harbor -Flow through the Kirk Sound, blocked by three blocks. As a result of three torpedo salvos from the submarine, the British battleship Royal Oak was sunk. U-47 returned safely to Wilhelmshaven on 17 October.

Karl Dönitz is credited with saving East Prussia in the spring of 1945 (largely based on his own memoirs). Researcher G. Schwendeman accuses him of the opposite. Only on May 6, 1945, Dönitz assigned the evacuation of civilians the highest priority and gave reserves of submarine fuel for the needs of evacuation (since April, transport ships had been without fuel), and about 120,000 people were evacuated in 2 days. And from January 23 to May 1 (that is, in almost 100 days), only 800,000 refugees, 355,000 wounded and 215,000 soldiers were evacuated, but at the same time, weapons were evacuated in full accordance with the concept of "war to a victorious end", vehicles etc.

As President

Before committing suicide, A. Hitler, in a political testament dated April 29, 1945, appointed Dönitz, who was then in northern Germany, as his successor as president and supreme commander. Having become the head of the country, on May 2, 1945, Dönitz moved his residence to the building of the naval school in Flensburg-Murwik in the north of Schleswig-Holstein. On the same day, Dönitz delivered an Appeal to the German People, in which he announced the death of Adolf Hitler and that he had become his successor, and at the same time formed a new German government headed by Count L. Schwerin von Krosig. In the face of the inevitable defeat of Germany, Dönitz made attempts to achieve an early conclusion of a truce with the Western Allies and to withdraw as many troops and civilians as possible from territories that could be occupied Soviet troops. On May 7, representatives of Dönitz signed the Act of Surrender of Germany in front of representatives of England, the USA and the USSR in Reims. On May 8, at the request of the Soviet side in Karlshorst, Field Marshal Keitel signed the act of unconditional surrender again.