Soviet-Finnish war 1919-1921. Time for great hopes
First Soviet-Finnish War- fighting between the White Finnish troops and units of the Red Army on the territory of Soviet Russia (March 1918 - October 1920).
background
1918
On February 23, 1918, while at the Antrea station (now Kamennogorsk), referring to the troops, the Supreme Commander of the Finnish Army, General Carl Gustav Mannerheim, delivered his speech on it, the “sword oath”, in which he stated that “he will not sheathe his sword, ... before Lenin's last warrior and hooligan is expelled from both Finland and East Karelia. However, there was no official declaration of war from Finland. The desire of General Mannerheim to become the savior of "old Russia" in Finland was treated negatively. At a minimum, they demanded the support of Western countries and guarantees that white Russia would recognize Finnish independence. , the white movement failed to create a united front, which sharply reduced the chances of success. Other leaders of the white movement refused to recognize the independence of Finland. And for more active actions, without risk to their country, allies were needed.
On February 27, the Finnish government sent a petition to Germany that, as a country at war against Russia, considering Finland as an ally of Germany, it would demand that Russia make peace with Finland on the basis of joining East Karelia to Finland. The future border with Russia proposed by the Finns was to run along the line of the Eastern coast of Lake Ladoga - Lake Onega - the White Sea.
By the beginning of March, a plan was developed at Mannerheim's headquarters to organize "national uprisings in Eastern Karelia" and special Finnish instructors were allocated - military personnel to create centers of uprising.
On March 6-7, an official statement by the head of the Finnish state, regent Per Evind Svinhufvud, appeared that Finland was ready to make peace with Soviet Russia on "moderate Brest conditions", that is, if East Karelia, part of the Murmansk railway, were transferred to Finland and the entire Kola Peninsula.
On March 7-8, Emperor Wilhelm II of Germany responded to the request of the Finnish government that Germany would not wage war for Finnish interests with the Soviet government, which signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and would not support Finland's military actions if they moved them beyond its borders.
On March 7, the Finnish Prime Minister claims Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula, and on March 15, Finnish General Mannerheim approves the "Wallenius plan", which provides for the capture of part of the former territory of the Russian Empire up to the Petsamo (Pechenga) - Kola Peninsula - White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir river - Lake Ladoga.
In May, the White Guard troops in Estonia began hostilities, threatening Petrograd.
In May and June, on the eastern and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, Red Army detachments held back the offensive of the Finnish volunteers. In May-June 1919, Finnish volunteers advanced on the area of Lodeynoye Pole and crossed the Svir.
At the end of June 1919, the counteroffensive of the Red Army began in the Vidlitsky direction and on July 8, 1919, in the Olonets sector of the Karelian front. Finnish volunteers were thrown back over the border line.
On May 18, 1920, units of the Red Army liquidated the North Karelian state with its capital in the village of Ukhta (Arkhangelsk province), which received financial and military assistance from the Finnish government. Only in July 1920, the Finns were driven out of most of eastern Karelia. Finnish troops remained only in the Rebolsk and Porosozersk volosts of Eastern Karelia.
Notes
see also
Literature and sources
- For Soviet Karelia, 1918-1920: memories of the civil war / Sat, ed. V. I. Mazeshersky. Petrozavodsk, Karelian prince. publishing house, 1963-535 pp.
- Karelia during the civil war and foreign intervention 1918-1920. Sat, documents and materials / ed. d.ist. n. Ya. A. Balagurov, V. I. Mazeshersky. Petrozavodsk, Karelian prince. publishing house, 1964-648 p.
Links
- Pokhlebkin V.V.
Everything that I will talk about further, I have collected bit by bit from the memoirs and letters of our relatives in France, England, as well as from the stories and memoirs of my relatives and friends in Russia and Lithuania.
To my great regret, I was able to do this only after my father's death, after many, many years ...
Their grandfather's sister Alexandra Obolenskaya (later Alexis Obolensky) was also exiled with them, as well as Vasily and Anna Seryogin, who voluntarily went, who followed grandfather by their own choice, since Vasily Nikandrovich for many years was grandfather's attorney in all his affairs and one of the most his close friends.
Alexandra (Alexis) Obolenskaya Vasily and Anna Seryogin
Probably, one had to be a truly FRIEND in order to find the strength in oneself to make such a choice and go of one's own free will to where one was going, as one goes only to one's own death. And this "death", unfortunately, was then called Siberia ...
I was always very sad and hurt for our, so proud, but so mercilessly trampled by Bolshevik boots, beautiful Siberia! ... And no words can tell how much suffering, pain, lives and tears this proud, but exhausted to the limit, land absorbed ... Is it because it was once the heart of our ancestral homeland, "far-sighted revolutionaries" decided to denigrate and destroy this land, choosing it for their diabolical purposes?... After all, for many people, even after many years, Siberia still remained a "cursed" land, where someone's father died, someone's brother, someone then the son ... or maybe even someone's whole family.
My grandmother, whom I, to my great chagrin, never knew, at that time was pregnant with my father and endured the road very hard. But, of course, there was no need to wait for help from anywhere ... So the young Princess Elena, instead of the quiet rustle of books in the family library or the usual sounds of the piano, when she played her favorite works, this time listened only to the ominous sound of wheels, which, as it were menacingly they were counting the remaining hours of her life, so fragile and turned into a real nightmare... She was sitting on some sacks at the dirty carriage window and staring at the last miserable traces of the “civilization” so well known and familiar to her going farther and farther...
Grandpa's sister, Alexandra, with the help of friends, managed to escape at one of the stops. By common agreement, she was supposed to get (if she was lucky) to France, where this moment her whole family lived. True, none of those present could imagine how she could do this, but since this was their only, albeit small, but certainly the last hope, it was too much luxury to refuse it for their completely hopeless situation. At that moment, Alexandra's husband, Dmitry, was also in France, with the help of whom they hoped, already from there, to try to help the grandfather's family get out of that nightmare into which life had so ruthlessly thrown them, with the vile hands of brutalized people ...
Upon arrival in Kurgan, they were settled in a cold basement, without explaining anything and without answering any questions. Two days later, some people came for grandfather, and stated that they allegedly came to “escort” him to another “destination” ... They took him away like a criminal, not allowing him to take any things with him, and not deigning to explain where and for how long they are taking it. Nobody ever saw Grandpa again. After some time, an unknown military man brought grandfather's personal belongings to the grandmother in a dirty coal sack ... without explaining anything and leaving no hope of seeing him alive. On this, any information about grandfather's fate ceased, as if he had disappeared from the face of the earth without any traces and evidence ...
The tormented, tormented heart of poor Princess Elena did not want to accept such a terrible loss, and she literally bombarded the local staff officer with requests to clarify the circumstances of the death of her beloved Nikolai. But the "red" officers were blind and deaf to the requests of a lonely woman, as they called her - "from the noble", who was for them just one of the thousands and thousands of nameless "numbered" units that meant nothing in their cold and cruel world ... It was a real hell, from which there was no way back to that familiar and kind world in which her home, her friends, and everything that she was accustomed to from an early age, and that she loved so much and sincerely .. And there was no one who could help or even gave the slightest hope of surviving.
The Seryogins tried to keep their presence of mind for three, and tried by any means to cheer up Princess Elena, but she went deeper and deeper into almost complete stupor, and sometimes sat for days in an indifferently frozen state, almost not reacting to the attempts of her friends to save her heart and mind from final depression. There were only two things that briefly brought her back to the real world - if someone started talking about her unborn child, or if any, even the slightest, new details came about about the alleged death of her beloved Nikolai. She desperately wanted to know (while she was still alive) what really happened, and where her husband was, or at least where his body was buried (or abandoned).
Unfortunately, there is almost no information left about the life of these two courageous and bright people, Elena and Nikolai de Rohan-Hesse-Obolensky, but even those few lines from the two remaining letters from Elena to her daughter-in-law, Alexandra, which somehow survived in Alexandra's family archives in France show how deeply and tenderly the princess loved her missing husband. Only a few handwritten sheets have survived, some lines of which, unfortunately, cannot be made out at all. But even what has been achieved screams with deep pain about a great human misfortune, which, without having experienced it, is not easy to understand and impossible to accept.
April 12, 1927 From a letter from Princess Elena to Alexandra (Alix) Obolenskaya:
“I am very tired today. She returned from Sinyachikha completely broken. The wagons are full of people, it would be a shame even to carry cattle in them………………………….. We stopped in the forest – it smelled so delicious of mushrooms and strawberries there… It’s hard to believe that these unfortunate people were killed there! Poor Ellochka (meaning the Grand Duchess Elizaveta Feodorovna, who was the relative of my grandfather along the line of Hesse) was killed nearby, in this terrible Staroselim mine ... what a horror! My soul cannot accept this. Remember, we said: “Let the earth be down”?.. Great God, how can such a land be down?!..
Oh, Alix, my dear Alix! How can you get used to such horror? ...................... ..................... I'm so tired of begging and humiliating myself... Everything will be completely useless if the Cheka does not agree to send a request to Alapaevsk ...... I will never know where to look for him, and I will never know what they did to him. Not an hour passes without me thinking about such a familiar face for me ... What a horror it is to imagine that he lies in some abandoned pit or at the bottom of a mine! .. How can you endure this everyday nightmare, knowing that already I will never see him?!.. Just as my poor Vasilek (the name that was given to my father at birth) will never see him... Where is the limit of cruelty? And why do they call themselves human?
My dear, kind Alix, how I miss you!.. If only I knew that everything is all right with you, and that Dmitry, dear to your soul, does not leave you in these difficult moments........... ................................... If I had even a modicum of hope of finding my native Nicholas I think I could take it all. The soul seems to have gotten used to this terrible loss, but it still hurts very much ... Everything without him is different and so deserted.
May 18, 1927 An excerpt from a letter from Princess Elena to Alexandra (Alix) Obolenskaya:
“The same nice doctor came again. I can’t prove to him that I simply don’t have more strength. He says that I must live for the sake of little Vasilka ... Is it so? .. What will he find on this terrible land, my poor baby? .................................. Cough resumed, sometimes it becomes impossible to breathe. The doctor always leaves some drops, but I am ashamed that I cannot thank him in any way. .................................. Sometimes I dream about our favorite room. And my piano... God, how far away it all is! And was it all? ............................... and cherries in the garden, and our nanny, so affectionate and kind. Where is all this now? ................................ (out the window?) I don’t want to look, it’s all covered in soot and only dirty boots are visible … I hate damp.”
My poor grandmother, because of the dampness in the room, which was not heated even in summer, soon fell ill with tuberculosis. And, apparently weakened from the shocks, starvation and illness, she died during childbirth, never seeing her baby, and not finding (at least!) The grave of his father. Literally before her death, she took the word from the Seryogins that, no matter how difficult it was for them, they would take the newborn (if he, of course, survives) to France, to his grandfather's sister. Which, at that wild time, to promise, of course, was almost “wrong”, since the Seryogins, unfortunately, had no real opportunity to do this ... But they, nevertheless, promised her that at least somehow alleviate last minutes her, so brutally ruined, still very young life, and so that her soul, tormented by pain, could, even with little hope, leave this cruel world ... And even knowing that they would do everything possible to keep their word given to Elena, Seryogin everything but in their hearts they didn’t really believe that they would ever be able to bring this whole crazy idea to life ...
So, in 1927, in the city of Kurgan, in a damp, unheated basement, a little boy was born, and his name was Prince Vasily Nikolaevich de Rohan-Hesse-Obolensky, Lord Sanbursky (de Rohan-Hesse-Obolensky, Lord of Sanbury) ... He was the only son of Duke de'Rogan-Hesse-Obolensky and Princess Elena Larina.
Then he still could not understand that he was completely alone in this world and that his fragile life now completely depended on the goodwill of a man named Vasily Seregin ...
And this kid also didn’t know that on the paternal side, he was presented with a stunningly “colorful” Family Tree, which his distant ancestors wove for him, as if preparing the boy in advance to accomplish some special, “great” deeds ... and, thus, laying on his, then still quite fragile shoulders, a huge responsibility to those who once so diligently weaved his “genetic thread”, uniting their lives into one strong and proud tree ...
He was a direct descendant of the great Merovingians, born in pain and poverty, surrounded by the death of his relatives and the ruthless cruelty of the people who destroyed them ... But this did not change who this little man who had just been born really was.
And his amazing family began from the 300th (!) Year, from the Merovingian king Conon the First (Sonan I). (This is confirmed in the handwritten four-volume book-manuscript of the famous French genealogist Norigres, which is in our family library in France). His Family Tree grew and expanded, weaving into its branches such names as the Dukes of Rohan in France, the Marquises of Farnese in Italy, the Lords of Strafford in England, the Russian princes Dolgoruky, Odoevsky ... and many, many others , some of which could not be traced even by the world's most highly qualified genealogists in the UK (Royal College of Arms), who jokingly said that this is the most "international" family tree that they have ever had to compose.
And it seems to me that this “mixture” also did not happen so accidentally ... After all, all the so-called noble families had very high-quality genetics, and its correct mixing could positively affect the creation of a very high-quality genetic foundation of the essence of their descendants, which, according to happy circumstances, and my father appeared.
Apparently, “international” mixing gave a much better genetic result than purely “family” mixing, which for a long time was almost an “unwritten law” of all European noble families, and very often ended in hereditary hemophilia ...
But no matter how “international” my father’s physical foundation was, his SOUL (and I can say this with full responsibility) until the end of his life was truly Russian, despite all, even the most amazing, genetic combinations ...
But let’s return to Siberia, where this “little prince”, born in the basement, in order to simply survive, with the consent of the broad and kind soul of Vasily Nikandrovich Seregin, one fine day became just Seregin Vasily Vasilyevich, a citizen of the Soviet Union ... By whom he lived his entire conscious life, died, and was buried under a tombstone: “The Seryogin Family”, in the small Lithuanian town of Alytus, far from his family castles, which he had never heard of ...
I learned all this, unfortunately, only in 1997, when dad was no longer alive. I was invited to the island of Malta by my cousin, Prince Pierre de Rohan-Brissac, who was looking for me for a very long time, and he also told me who I and my family really are. But I will talk about this much later.
In the meantime, let's go back to where in 1927, at kindest soul people - Anna and Vasily Seregins, there was only one concern - to keep the word given to dead friends, and, by all means, take little Vasilka out of this "cursed by God and people" land to at least some safe place, and later, try to fulfill their promise and deliver it to France, far away and completely unfamiliar to them ... So they began their difficult journey, and, with the help of local connections and friends, they took my little dad to Perm, where, as far as I know, they lived some years.
The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, Finnish talvisota - Winter War, Swedish vinterkriget) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.
On November 26, 1939, the government of the USSR sent a note of protest to the government of Finland about the artillery shelling, which, according to the Soviet side, was carried out from Finnish territory. Responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was fully assigned to Finland. The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The USSR included 11% of the territory of Finland (with the second largest city of Vyborg). 430,000 Finnish residents were forcibly resettled by Finland from the frontline areas inland and lost their property.
According to some historians, this offensive USSR vs Finland refers to World War II. In Soviet historiography, this war was viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict, which is not part of the Second World War, as well as the battles at Khalkhin Gol. The outbreak of hostilities led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR, as an aggressor, was expelled from the League of Nations.
background
Events 1917-1937
On December 6, 1917, the Finnish Senate declared Finland an independent state. December 18 (31), 1917 Council people's commissars The RSFSR addressed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) with a proposal to recognize the independence of the Republic of Finland. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to recognize the independence of Finland. In January 1918, a civil war began in Finland, in which the “Reds” (Finnish socialists), with the support of the RSFSR, opposed the “Whites”, supported by Germany and Sweden. The war ended with the victory of the "whites". After the victory in Finland, the troops of the Finnish "whites" supported the separatist movement in East Karelia. The first Soviet-Finnish war that began during the already civil war in Russia lasted until 1920, when the Tartu (Yurievsky) peace treaty was concluded. Some Finnish politicians, such as Juho Paasikivi, regarded this treaty as "too good world believing that great powers only compromise when absolutely necessary. K. Mannerheim, former activists and separatist leaders in Karelia, on the contrary, considered this world a shame and a betrayal of their compatriots, and the representative of Rebol Hans Haakon (Bobi) Siven (Fin. H. H. (Bobi) Siven) shot himself in protest. Mannerheim, in his “sword oath”, publicly spoke out in favor of the conquest of Eastern Karelia, which had not previously been part of the Principality of Finland.
Nevertheless, relations between Finland and the USSR after the Soviet-Finnish wars of 1918-1922, as a result of which the Pechenga region (Petsamo), as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula, went to Finland in the Arctic, were not friendly, however, openly hostile too.
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the idea of general disarmament and security, embodied in the creation of the League of Nations, dominated government circles. Western Europe especially in Scandinavia. Denmark disarmed completely, and Sweden and Norway significantly reduced their armaments. In Finland, the government and the majority of parliamentarians have consistently cut spending on defense and armaments. Starting from 1927, military exercises were not carried out at all to save money. The allocated money was barely enough to support the army. Parliament did not consider the costs of providing weapons. There were no tanks or military aircraft.
Nevertheless, the Defense Council was created, which on July 10, 1931 was headed by Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim. He was firmly convinced that while the Bolshevik government was in power in the USSR, the situation in it was fraught with the most serious consequences for the whole world, primarily for Finland: “A plague coming from the east may be contagious.” In a conversation that same year with Risto Ryti, then Governor of the Bank of Finland and a well-known figure in the Progressive Party of Finland, Mannerheim outlined his thoughts on the need for the speedy creation of a military program and its financing. However, Ryti, after listening to the argument, asked the question: “But what is the use of providing the military department with such large sums if war is not expected?”
In August 1931, after inspecting the fortifications of the Enckel Line, established in the 1920s, Mannerheim became convinced of its unsuitability for the conditions of modern warfare, both due to its unfortunate location and destruction by time.
In 1932, the Tartu Peace Treaty was supplemented by a non-aggression pact and extended until 1945.
In the Finnish budget of 1934, adopted after the signing of the non-aggression pact with the USSR in August 1932, the article on the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus was deleted.
V. Tanner noted that the Social Democratic faction of the parliament “... still believes that such a progress in the well-being of the people and general conditions his life, in which every citizen understands that it is worth all the costs of defense.
Mannerheim described his efforts as "a futile attempt to pull a rope through a narrow and pitch-filled pipe." It seemed to him that all his initiatives to rally the Finnish people in order to take care of their home and ensure their future meet a blank wall of misunderstanding and indifference. And he filed a petition for removal from his post.
Negotiations 1938-1939
Yartsev's negotiations in 1938-1939
The negotiations were initiated by the USSR, initially they were held in secret mode, which suited both sides: the Soviet Union preferred to officially maintain "freedom of hands" in the face of an unclear prospect in relations with Western countries, and for Finnish officials, the announcement of the fact of negotiations was inconvenient from the point of view of view of domestic politics, since the population of Finland was generally negative about the USSR.
On April 14, 1938, second secretary Boris Yartsev arrived at the USSR Embassy in Finland in Helsinki. He immediately met with Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and outlined the position of the USSR: the USSR government is confident that Germany is planning an attack on the USSR and these plans include a side strike through Finland. Therefore, the attitude of Finland to the landing of German troops is so important for the USSR. The Red Army will not wait at the border if Finland allows a landing. On the other hand, if Finland resists the Germans, the USSR will provide her with military and economic assistance, since Finland is not capable of repelling a German landing on her own. Over the next five months, he held numerous conversations, including with Prime Minister Cajander and Finance Minister Väinö Tanner. The guarantees of the Finnish side that Finland would not allow violating its territorial integrity and invading Soviet Russia through its territory were not enough for the USSR. The USSR demanded a secret agreement that, in the event of a German attack, its participation in the defense of the Finnish coast, the construction of fortifications on the Åland Islands and the deployment of Soviet military bases for the fleet and aviation on the island of Gogland (Fin. Suursaari) was mandatory. Territorial requirements were not put forward. Finland rejected Yartsev's proposals at the end of August 1938.
In March 1939, the USSR officially announced that it wanted to lease the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Powerful), Tytyarsaari and Seskar for 30 years. Later, as compensation, Finland was offered territories in Eastern Karelia. Mannerheim was ready to give up the islands, since they were still practically impossible to defend or use to protect the Karelian Isthmus. However, the negotiations were fruitless and ended on April 6, 1939.
On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany signed a non-aggression pact. According to the secret additional protocol to the Treaty, Finland was assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR. Thus, the contracting parties - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - provided each other with guarantees of non-intervention in case of war. Germany started World War II with an attack on Poland a week later, on September 1, 1939. Soviet troops entered Poland on 17 September.
From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance treaties with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases.
On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Government of Finland stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany has already eliminated the main reason for the demands of the Soviet Union to Finland - the danger of a German attack through the territory of Finland.
Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland
On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for talks "on specific political issues." The negotiations were held in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4 and November 9.
For the first time, Finland was represented by an envoy, State Councilor J. K. Paasikivi, Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen. On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added on the third trip.
At these talks for the first time there was talk about the proximity of the border to Leningrad. Joseph Stalin remarked: “We cannot do anything with geography, just like you ... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border away from it.”
The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side looked as follows:
Finland moves the border 90 km from Leningrad.
Finland agrees to lease the Hanko peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a 4,000-strong military contingent there for its defense.
The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohya (Fin.) Russian.
Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Powerful), Tyutyarsaari and Seiskari to the USSR.
The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.
Both states are disarming their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.
The USSR transfers to Finland the territory in Karelia with a total area twice the amount received by Finland (5,529 km²).
The USSR undertakes not to object to the arming of the Aland Islands on your own Finland.
The USSR proposed an exchange of territories, in which Finland would receive more extensive territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboly and Porajärvi.
The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Having concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, Germany advised the Finns to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the demands for military bases should be accepted and Germany's help should not be hoped for.
The State Council did not comply with all the requirements of the USSR, as public opinion and parliament were against it. Instead, a compromise option was proposed - the Soviet Union was offered the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Powerful), Bolshoi Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Birch) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main navigable fairway in the Gulf of Finland, and the territories closest to Leningrad in Terioki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deepened into Soviet territory. Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939.
Earlier, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland, on the other hand, chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers were called up from the reserve for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.
Sweden made clear its position of neutrality, and there were no serious assurances of assistance from other states.
From the middle of 1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the operational plan for an attack on Finland was discussed at the Main Military Council of the USSR, and from mid-September, the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.
In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, which practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attachés were invited, except for the Soviet one.
The Finnish government refused to accept the Soviet conditions - since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issue of ensuring the security of Leningrad - while at the same time trying to conclude a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the consent of the USSR to arm the Åland Islands, whose demilitarized status was regulated Åland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the "Mannerheim Line".
The Finns insisted on their own, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the alleged garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Are you trying to provoke a conflict?” /AT. Molotov/. Mannerheim, supported by Paasikivi, continued to press his parliament for a compromise, stating that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.
On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was allegedly caused by the intervention of outside states. The Finnish public, having learned about the demands of the Soviet side for the first time, categorically opposed any concessions.
The talks resumed in Moscow on November 3, immediately reached an impasse. From the Soviet side, a statement followed: “We, civilians, have not made any progress. Now the word will be given to the soldiers.”
However, Stalin made concessions the next day, offering instead of renting the Hanko Peninsula to buy it or even rent some coastal islands from Finland instead. Tanner, who was then Minister of Finance and part of the Finnish delegation, also believed that these proposals opened the way to an agreement. But the Finnish government stood its ground.
On November 3, 1939, the Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote: “We will cast aside any game of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what, we will ensure the security of the USSR, regardless of anything, breaking all and sundry obstacles on the way to the goal ". On the same day, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Baltic Fleet received directives on the preparation of military operations against Finland. At the last meeting, Stalin, at least outwardly, showed a sincere desire to reach a compromise on the issue of military bases. But the Finns refused to discuss it, and on November 13 they departed for Helsinki.
There was a temporary lull, which the Finnish government considered confirmation of the correctness of its position.
On November 26, Pravda published an article “Jester Gorokhovy as Prime Minister”, which became a signal for the beginning of the anti-Finnish war. propaganda campaign. On the same day, artillery shelled the territory of the USSR near the village of Mainil. The leadership of the USSR blamed this incident on Finland. In the Soviet information agencies, the terms “White Guard”, “White Pole”, “White emigre” were widely used for naming hostile elements with a new one - “White Finn”.
On November 28, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland was announced, and on November 30, the Soviet troops were ordered to go on the offensive.
Causes of the war
According to the statements of the Soviet side, the goal of the USSR was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border and in the event of a war (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably have been captured in the first days (or even hours). In 1931, Leningrad was separated from the region and became a city of republican subordination. Part of the borders of some territories subordinated to the Leningrad City Council was at the same time the border between the USSR and Finland.
“Did the Government and the Party act correctly in declaring war on Finland? This question specifically concerns the Red Army.
Could the war have been avoided? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not produce results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, because its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country.
Speech by I.V. Stalin at a meeting of the commanding staff on 04/17/1940 "
True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require the transfer of the border. Demands for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, increased the security of Leningrad. Only the following was constant in the demands: to receive military bases on the territory of Finland and near its coast and to oblige it not to ask for help from third countries.
Already during the war, there were two concepts that are still being discussed: one, that the USSR pursued the stated goals (ensuring the security of Leningrad), the second - that the Sovietization of Finland was the true goal of the USSR.
However, today there is a different division of concepts, namely: according to the principle of classifying a military conflict as a separate war or part of the Second World War, which, in turn, represent the USSR as a peace-loving country or as an aggressor and ally of Germany. At the same time, according to these concepts, the Sovietization of Finland was only a cover for the preparation of the USSR for a lightning-fast invasion and the liberation of Europe from German occupation, followed by the Sovietization of all of Europe and the part of African countries occupied by Germany.
M. I. Semiryaga notes that on the eve of the war, both countries had claims against each other. Finns were afraid Stalinist regime and were well aware of the repressions against Soviet Finns and Karelians in the late 1930s, the closure of Finnish schools, and so on. In the USSR, in turn, they knew about the activities of ultra-nationalist Finnish organizations that aimed to "return" Soviet Karelia. Moscow was also worried about Finland's unilateral rapprochement with Western countries, and above all with Germany, which Finland, in turn, went for because it saw the USSR as the main threat to itself. Finnish President P. E. Svinhufvud declared in Berlin in 1937 that "the enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland." In a conversation with the German envoy, he said: “The Russian threat to us will always exist. Therefore, it is good for Finland that Germany will be strong.” In the USSR, preparations for a military conflict with Finland began in 1936. On September 17, 1939, the USSR expressed support for Finnish neutrality, but literally on the same days (September 11-14) began partial mobilization in the Leningrad Military District, which clearly indicated the preparation of a military solution.
According to A. Shubin, before the signing of the Soviet-German pact, the USSR undoubtedly sought only to ensure the security of Leningrad. Stalin's assurances of his neutrality were not satisfied with Stalin, since, firstly, he considered the Finnish government to be hostile and ready to join any external aggression against the USSR, and secondly (and this was confirmed by subsequent events), the neutrality of small countries in itself did not guarantee that they could not be used as a springboard for an attack (as a result of the occupation). After the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the demands of the USSR became tougher, and here the question already arises of what Stalin really aspired to at this stage. Theoretically, presenting his demands in the fall of 1939, Stalin could plan to carry out in the coming year in Finland: a) Sovietization and inclusion in the USSR (as happened with other Baltic countries in 1940), or b) a radical social reorganization with the preservation of formal signs of independence and political pluralism (as was done after the war in the so-called Eastern European "countries of people's democracy", or c) Stalin could only plan for the time being to strengthen his positions on the northern flank of a potential theater of operations, not yet risking interfering in the internal affairs of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. M. Semiryaga believes that in order to determine the nature of the war against Finland, “it is not necessary to analyze the negotiations in the autumn of 1939. To do this, you just need to know general concept the world communist movement of the Comintern and the Stalinist concept - great-power claims to those regions that used to be part of the Russian Empire ... And the goals were - to annex the whole of Finland as a whole. And there is no point in talking about 35 kilometers to Leningrad, 25 kilometers to Leningrad ... ". The Finnish historian O. Manninen believes that Stalin sought to deal with Finland according to the same scenario that was eventually implemented with the Baltic countries. “Stalin's desire to 'solve problems in a peaceful way' was a desire to peacefully create a socialist regime in Finland. And at the end of November, starting the war, he wanted to achieve the same with the help of the occupation. “The workers themselves” had to decide whether to join the USSR or establish their own socialist state.” However, notes O. Manninen, since these plans of Stalin were not formally fixed, this view will always remain in the status of an assumption, not a provable fact. There is also a version that, putting forward claims to border lands and a military base, Stalin, like Hitler in Czechoslovakia, sought to first disarm his neighbor, taking away his fortified territory, and then capture him.
An important argument in favor of the theory of the Sovietization of Finland as the goal of the war is the fact that on the second day of the war a puppet Terijoki government headed by the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen was created on the territory of the USSR. On December 2, the Soviet government signed an agreement on mutual assistance with the government of Kuusinen and, according to Ryti, refused any contact with the legal government of Finland, headed by Risto Ryti.
With a high degree of certainty, we can assume: if things at the front were going according to the operational plan, then this “government” would arrive in Helsinki with a specific political goal - to unleash a civil war in the country. After all, the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland directly called […] to overthrow the “government of executioners”. In Kuusinen's appeal to the soldiers of the "Finnish People's Army" it was directly stated that they were entrusted with the honor of hoisting the banner of the "Democratic Republic of Finland" on the building of the President's Palace in Helsinki.
However, in reality, this "government" was used only as a means, although not very effective, for political pressure on the legitimate government of Finland. It fulfilled this modest role, which, in particular, is confirmed by Molotov’s statement to the Swedish envoy in Moscow, Assarsson, on March 4, 1940, that if the Finnish government continues to object to the transfer of Vyborg and Sortavala to the Soviet Union, then subsequent Soviet peace conditions will be even tougher and the USSR will then go to a final agreement with the "government" of Kuusinen
M. I. Semiryaga. “Secrets of Stalinist diplomacy. 1941-1945"
A number of other measures were taken, in particular, among the Soviet documents on the eve of the war there are detailed instructions on the organization of the "People's Front" in the occupied territories. M. Meltyukhov, on this basis, sees in the Soviet actions the desire to Sovietize Finland through an intermediate stage of the left "people's government". S. Belyaev believes that the decision to Sovietize Finland is not evidence of the original plan to capture Finland, but was made only on the eve of the war due to the failure of attempts to agree on changing the border.
According to A. Shubin, Stalin's position in the fall of 1939 was situational, and he maneuvered between the minimum program - ensuring the security of Leningrad, and the maximum program - establishing control over Finland. At that moment, Stalin did not aspire directly to the Sovietization of Finland, as well as the Baltic countries, since he did not know how the war in the West would end (indeed, in the Baltics, decisive steps towards Sovietization were taken only in June 1940, that is, immediately after how the defeat of France was indicated). Finland's resistance to Soviet demands forced him to go for a hard power option at a disadvantageous moment for him (in winter). In the end, he secured at least the completion of the minimum program.
According to Yu. A. Zhdanov, back in the mid-1930s, Stalin in a private conversation announced a plan (“distant future”) to transfer the capital to Leningrad, while noting its proximity to the border.
Strategic plans of the parties
USSR plan
The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of hostilities in three directions. The first of these was on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was supposed to lead a direct breakthrough of the Finnish defense line (which during the war was called the "Mannerheim Line") in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga.
The second direction was central Karelia, adjacent to that part of Finland, where its latitudinal extent was the smallest. It was supposed here, in the Suomussalmi-Raate Region, to cut the country's territory in two and enter the city of Oulu on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. The selected and well-equipped 44th division was intended for the parade in the city.
Finally, in order to prevent counterattacks and a possible landing of troops from the western allies of Finland from the Barents Sea, it was supposed to conduct military operations in Lapland.
The main direction was considered to be the direction to Vyborg - between Vuoksa and the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Here, after successfully breaking through the line of defense (or bypassing the line from the north), the Red Army got the opportunity to wage war on a territory convenient for the operation of tanks, which did not have serious long-term fortifications. Under such conditions, a significant advantage in manpower and an overwhelming advantage in technology could manifest itself to the maximum in full. It was supposed, after breaking through the fortifications, to carry out an offensive on Helsinki and achieve a complete cessation of resistance. In parallel, the actions of the Baltic Fleet and access to the border of Norway in the Arctic were planned. This would allow for a quick capture of Norway in the future and stop deliveries iron ore to Germany.
The plan was based on a misconception about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to resist for a long time. The assessment of the number of Finnish troops also turned out to be incorrect: “it was believed that the Finnish army in wartime would have up to 10 infantry divisions and a dozen and a half separate battalions.” Besides, Soviet command did not have information about the line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, by the beginning of the war, having only "fragmentary intelligence data" about them. So, even at the height of the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus, Meretskov doubted that the Finns had long-term structures, although he was informed about the existence of the Poppius (Sj4) and Millionaire (Sj5) pillboxes.
Plan of Finland
On the direction of the main attack correctly determined by Mannerheim, it was supposed to delay the enemy for as long as possible.
The Finnish defense plan north of Lake Ladoga was to stop the enemy on the Kitel line (Pitkyaranta region) - Lemetti (near Lake Syuskyjärvi). If necessary, the Russians were to be stopped north of Lake Suojärvi in echeloned positions. Before the war, a railway line was built here from the Leningrad-Murmansk railway line and large stocks of ammunition and fuel were created. Therefore, a surprise for the Finns was the introduction of seven divisions into battles on the northern coast of Ladoga, the number of which was increased to 10.
The Finnish command hoped that all the measures taken would guarantee a quick stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern section of the border. It was believed that the Finnish army would be able to independently contain the enemy for up to six months. According to the strategic plan, it was supposed to wait for help from the West, and then conduct a counteroffensive in Karelia.
The armed forces of the opponents
|
divisions, |
Private |
guns and |
tanks |
Aircraft |
|
|
Finnish army |
|||||
|
Red Army |
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|
Ratio |
The Finnish army entered the war poorly armed - the list below shows how many days of the war the stocks available in the warehouses were enough for:
- cartridges for rifles, machine guns and machine guns - for 2.5 months;
- shells for mortars, field guns and howitzers - for 1 month;
- fuels and lubricants - for 2 months;
- aviation gasoline - for 1 month.
The military industry of Finland was represented by one state cartridge factory, one gunpowder factory and one artillery factory. The overwhelming superiority of the USSR in aviation made it possible to quickly disable or significantly complicate the work of all three.
The Finnish division included: headquarters, three infantry regiments, one light brigade, one field artillery regiment, two engineering companies, one signal company, one sapper company, one quartermaster company.
The Soviet division included: three infantry regiments, one field artillery regiment, one howitzer artillery regiment, one anti-tank gun battery, one reconnaissance battalion, one communications battalion, one engineering battalion.
The Finnish division was inferior to the Soviet one both in numbers (14,200 versus 17,500) and in firepower, as can be seen from the following comparative table:
|
Weapon |
Finnish |
Soviet |
|
Rifles |
||
|
submachine gun |
||
|
Automatic and semi-automatic rifles |
||
|
Machine guns 7.62 mm |
||
|
Machine guns 12.7 mm |
||
|
Anti-aircraft machine guns (four-barreled) |
||
|
Dyakonov rifle grenade launchers |
||
|
Mortars 81-82 mm |
||
|
Mortars 120 mm |
||
|
Field artillery (guns caliber 37-45 mm) |
||
|
Field artillery (75-90 mm guns) |
||
|
Field artillery (guns caliber 105-152 mm) |
||
|
armored vehicles |
The Soviet division in terms of the combined firepower of machine guns and mortars was two times superior to the Finnish one, and in terms of firepower of artillery - three times. The Red Army was not armed with submachine guns, but this was partially offset by the presence of automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Artillery support for Soviet divisions was carried out at the request of the high command; they had at their disposal numerous tank brigades, as well as an unlimited amount of ammunition.
On the Karelian Isthmus, Finland's defense line was the "Mannerheim Line", consisting of several fortified defensive lines with concrete and wood-and-earth firing points, communications, and anti-tank barriers. In a state of combat readiness there were 74 old (since 1924) single-loop machine-gun bunkers of frontal fire, 48 new and modernized bunkers, which had from one to four machine-gun embrasures of flanking fire, 7 artillery bunkers and one machine gun-artillery caponier. In total - 130 long-term firing structures were located along a line about 140 km long from the coast of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. In 1939, the most modern fortifications were created. However, their number did not exceed 10, since their construction was at the limit of the financial capabilities of the state, and the people called them “millionaires” because of their high cost.
The northern coast of the Gulf of Finland was fortified by numerous artillery batteries on the coast and on the coastal islands. A secret agreement was concluded between Finland and Estonia on military cooperation. One of the elements was to be the coordination of the fire of the Finnish and Estonian batteries in order to completely block the Soviet fleet. This plan did not work: by the beginning of the war, Estonia provided its territories for the military bases of the USSR, which were used by Soviet aircraft for air strikes on Finland.
On Lake Ladoga, the Finns also had coastal artillery and warships. The section of the border north of Lake Ladoga was not fortified. Here, preparations were made in advance for partisan operations, for which there were all conditions: a wooded and swampy area where the normal use of military equipment is impossible, narrow dirt roads and ice-covered lakes, on which enemy troops are very vulnerable. At the end of the 30s, many airfields were built in Finland to receive aircraft from the Western Allies.
Finland began the construction of the navy with the laying of coastal defense ironclads (sometimes incorrectly called "battleships"), adapted for maneuvering and fighting in skerries. Their main measurements are: displacement - 4000 tons, speed - 15.5 knots, armament - 4 × 254 mm, 8x105 mm. The battleships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen were laid down in August 1929 and accepted into the Finnish Navy in December 1932.
Cause for war and rupture of relations
The official reason for the war was the “Mainil incident”: on November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the government of Finland with an official note stating that “On November 26, at 15:45, our troops, located on the Karelian Isthmus near the border of Finland, near the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly fired upon from Finnish territory by artillery fire. In total, seven gunshots were fired, as a result of which three privates and one junior commander were killed, seven privates and two of the commanders. Soviet troops, having strict orders not to succumb to provocation, refrained from firing back.. The note was drafted in moderate terms and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops 20-25 km from the border in order to avoid a repetition of incidents. In the meantime, the Finnish border guards hastily conducted an investigation into the incident, especially since the border posts were witnesses of the shelling. In response, the Finns stated that the shelling was recorded by Finnish posts, the shots were fired from the Soviet side, according to the observations and estimates of the Finns from a distance of about 1.5-2 km southeast of the place where the shells fell, that the Finns have only border guards on the border troops and no guns, especially long-range ones, but that Helsinki is ready to start negotiations on a mutual withdrawal of troops and start a joint investigation into the incident. The response note of the USSR read: “The denial on the part of the Government of Finland of the fact of the outrageous artillery shelling of the Soviet troops by the Finnish troops, which resulted in casualties, cannot be explained otherwise than by the desire to mislead public opinion and mock the victims of the shelling.<…>The refusal of the Government of Finland to withdraw the troops that committed the villainous shelling of the Soviet troops, and the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Finnish and Soviet troops, proceeding formally from the principle of equality of arms, reveal the hostile desire of the Government of Finland to keep Leningrad under threat.. The USSR announced its withdrawal from the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland, arguing that the concentration of Finnish troops near Leningrad poses a threat to the city and is a violation of the pact.
On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow, Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen (Fin. Aarno Yrjo-Koskinen) was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin handed him a new note. It said that, in view of the current situation, the responsibility for which lies with the Government of Finland, the Government of the USSR recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland. This meant a break in diplomatic relations. On the same day, the Finns noted an attack on their border guards near Petsamo.
On the morning of November 30, the last step was taken. As stated in the official announcement, “by order of the High Command of the Red Army, due to new armed provocations by the Finnish military, the troops of the Leningrad Military District at 8 am on November 30 crossed the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas”. On the same day, Soviet aircraft bombed and machine-gunned Helsinki; at the same time, as a result of the mistake of the pilots, mainly residential working quarters suffered. In response to the protests of European diplomats, Molotov claimed that Soviet planes were dropping bread on Helsinki for the starving population (after which Soviet bombs began to be called "Molotov's bread baskets" in Finland). However, there was no official declaration of war.
In Soviet propaganda, and then historiography, the responsibility for the start of the war was assigned to Finland and the countries of the West: “ The imperialists were able to achieve some temporary success in Finland. They managed at the end of 1939 to provoke the Finnish reactionaries to war against the USSR».
Mannerheim, who, as commander in chief, had the most reliable data on the incident near Mainila, reports:
... And now the provocation that I have been expecting since mid-October has come true. When I personally visited the Karelian Isthmus on October 26, General Nennonen assured me that the artillery was completely withdrawn behind the line of fortifications, from where not a single battery was able to fire a shot beyond the border ... ... We did not have to wait long for the implementation of Molotov's words uttered on Moscow negotiations: "Now it will be the turn of the soldiers to talk." On November 26, the Soviet Union organized a provocation, now known as “Shots at Mainila”… During the war of 1941-1944, captured Russians described in detail how the clumsy provocation was organized…
N. S. Khrushchev says that in late autumn (in the sense of November 26), he dined in Stalin's apartment with Molotov and Kuusinen. Between the latter there was a conversation about the implementation of the already adopted decision - the presentation of an ultimatum to Finland; at the same time, Stalin announced that Kuusinen would lead the new Karelian-Finnish SSR with the annexation of the "liberated" Finnish regions. Stalin believed "that after Finland is presented with ultimatum demands of a territorial nature and if she rejects them, military operations will have to be started", noticing: "today this will start". Khrushchev himself believed (in agreement with Stalin's mood, as he claims) that "it's enough to tell them loudly<финнам>, if they don’t hear, then shoot from the cannon once, and the Finns will raise their hands up, agree with the demands ”. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal G. I. Kulik (artilleryman) was sent to Leningrad in advance to organize a provocation. Khrushchev, Molotov and Kuusinen sat for a long time at Stalin's, waiting for the Finns' answer; everyone was sure that Finland would get scared and agree to the Soviet terms.
At the same time, it should be noted that internal Soviet propaganda did not advertise the Mainilsky incident, which served as an openly formal pretext: it emphasized that the Soviet Union was committing liberation campaign to Finland to help the Finnish workers and peasants overthrow the oppression of the capitalists. A striking example is the song "Accept us, Suomi-beauty":
We're here to help you get it right
Pay back the shame.
Accept us, Suomi is a beauty,
In a necklace of transparent lakes!
At the same time, the mention in the text of the “low sun autumn” gives rise to the assumption that the text was written ahead of time, counting on an earlier start of the war.
War
After the rupture of diplomatic relations, the Finnish government began the evacuation of the population from the border areas, mainly from the Karelian Isthmus and the Northern Ladoga region. The bulk of the population gathered in the period November 29 - December 4.
The beginning of the battles
The period from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 is usually considered the first stage of the war. At this stage, the offensive of the Red Army units was carried out on the territory from the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Barents Sea.
The grouping of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in northern and central Karelia, the 14th - in Petsamo.
The offensive of the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Isthmus Army (Kannaksen armeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman. For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only "fragmentary intelligence data on the concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus." As a result, the forces allocated to break through the "Mannerheim Line" turned out to be completely insufficient. The troops turned out to be completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy pillboxes. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were only able to overcome the line support zone and reach the front edge of the main defense zone, but the planned breakthrough of the line on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations near Lake Tolvajärvi. Until the end of December, attempts to break through continued, which did not bring success.
The 8th Army advanced 80 km. She was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IV armeijakunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen. Part of the Soviet troops was surrounded. After heavy fighting, they had to retreat.
The offensive of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by the Northern Finland Task Force (Pohjois-Suomen Ryhmä) under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army was advancing from the White Sea Karelia. She wedged into the enemy defenses for 35-45 km, but was stopped. The forces of the 14th Army, advancing on the Petsamo region, achieved the greatest success. Interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas and the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.
Some researchers and memoirists are trying to explain the Soviet failures, including the weather: severe frosts (down to −40 ° C) and deep snow - up to 2 m. However, both meteorological observations and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, on On the Karelian Isthmus, the temperature ranged from +1 to -23.4 °C. Further, until the New Year, the temperature did not fall below -23 ° C. Frosts down to -40 ° C began in the second half of January, when there was a lull at the front. Moreover, these frosts prevented not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim wrote about. There was also no deep snow until January 1940. Thus, the operational reports of the Soviet divisions of December 15, 1939 testify to the depth of the snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.
Significant problems for the Soviet troops were caused by the use by Finland of mine-explosive devices, including improvised ones, which were installed not only on the front line, but also in the rear of the Red Army, on the routes of movement of troops. On January 10, 1940, in the report of the authorized people's commissariat of defense, commander of the II rank Kovalev to the people's commissariat of defense, it was noted that, along with enemy snipers, mines cause the main losses to infantry. Later, at a meeting of the commanding staff of the Red Army to collect experience in military operations against Finland on April 14, 1940, the head of engineers of the North-Western Front, brigade commander A.F. Khrenov noted that in the front action zone (130 km) the total length of minefields was 386 km, with In this case, mines were used in combination with non-explosive engineering barriers.
An unpleasant surprise was the massive use by the Finns against Soviet tanks of Molotov cocktails, later nicknamed the “Molotov cocktail”. During the 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.
During the war, the Soviet troops were the first to use radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.
Terijoki government
On December 1, 1939, the Pravda newspaper published a message stating that the so-called "People's Government" had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In historical literature, the government of Kuusinen is usually referred to as "Terijoki", since it was, after the outbreak of war, in the village of Terijoki (now the city of Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.
On December 2, negotiations were held in Moscow between the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by V. M. Molotov, at which a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.
The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to the Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease of Hanko). In exchange, significant territories in Soviet Karelia were transferred to Finland and monetary compensation was provided. The USSR also undertook to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The contract was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if none of the parties announced its termination a year before the expiration of the contract, it was automatically extended for another 25 years. The Treaty came into force from the moment it was signed by the parties, and ratification was planned "as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki."
In the following days, Molotov met with official representatives of Sweden and the United States, at which the recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.
It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and therefore was no longer in charge of the country. The USSR declared in the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.
Accepted Com. Molotov on December 4, the Swedish envoy, Mr. Winter, announced the desire of the so-called "Finnish government" to start new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Tov. Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called "Finnish government", which had already left the city of Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore there could be no question of any negotiations with this "government" now. The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.
The "People's Government" was formed in the USSR from Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that the use in propaganda of the fact of the creation of a "people's government" and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with it, indicating friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining the independence of Finland, would make it possible to influence the Finnish population, increasing the decay in the army and in the rear.
Finnish People's Army
On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the "Finnish People's Army" (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called "Ingermanland", which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District, began.
By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand military personnel who wore their national uniform (sewn from khaki cloth and looked like the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; allegations that it was a trophy uniform of the Polish armies are erroneous - only part of the overcoats were used from it).
This "people's" army was to replace the occupation units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military backbone of the "people's" government. "Finns" in confederates held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they would be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. In the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a draft instruction was prepared “Where to start the political and organizational work of the communists (note: the word „ communists“crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from the power of the whites”, which indicated practical measures to create a popular front in the occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these activities.
Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to solve combat missions. Throughout January 1940, scouts of the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd FNA SD carried out special sabotage missions in the 8th Army sector: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of the Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units participated in the battles for Lunkulansaari and in the capture of Vyborg.
When it became clear that the war was dragging on and the Finnish people did not support the new government, Kuusinen's government faded into the background and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When the Soviet-Finnish consultations began in January on the issue of concluding peace, it was no longer mentioned. Since January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legal government of Finland.
Foreign military assistance to Finland
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from around the world began to arrive in Finland. In total, more than 11 thousand volunteers arrived in Finland, including 8 thousand from Sweden (“Swedish volunteer corps(English) Russian"), 1 thousand from Norway, 600 from Denmark, 400 from Hungary ("Sisu Detachment"), 300 from the USA, as well as citizens of Great Britain, Estonia and a number of other states. A Finnish source gives a figure of 12,000 foreigners who arrived in Finland to take part in the war.
- Among those who fought on the side of Finland were Russian white emigrants: in January 1940, B. Bazhanov and several other Russian white emigrants from the Russian General Military Union (ROVS) arrived in Finland, after a meeting on January 15, 1940 with Mannerheim, they received permission to form anti-Soviet armed groups from captured Red Army soldiers. Later, several small "Russian People's Detachments" were created from the prisoners under the command of six white émigré officers from the ROVS. Only one of these detachments - 30 former prisoners of war under the command of "Staff Captain K." for ten days he was on the front line and managed to take part in the hostilities.
- Jewish refugees who arrived from a number of European countries joined the Finnish army.
Great Britain delivered to Finland 75 aircraft (24 Blenheim bombers, 30 Gladiator fighters, 11 Hurricane fighters and 11 Lysander reconnaissance aircraft), 114 field guns, 200 anti-tank guns, 124 automatic small arms, 185 thousand artillery shells, 17,700 bombs, 10,000 anti-tank mines and 70 Beuys anti-tank rifles, model 1937.
France decided to supply 179 aircraft to Finland (donate 49 fighters and sell another 130 aircraft). various types), however, in fact, during the war, 30 M.S.406C1 fighters were donated and six more Caudron C.714 arrived after the end of hostilities and did not participate in the war; 160 field guns, 500 machine guns, 795 thousand artillery shells, 200 thousand hand grenades, 20 million rounds of ammunition, 400 sea mines and several thousand sets of ammunition were also transferred to Finland. Also, France became the first country to officially allow the registration of volunteers to participate in the Finnish war.
Sweden supplied Finland with 29 aircraft, 112 field guns, 85 anti-tank guns, 104 anti-aircraft guns, 500 automatic small arms, 80,000 rifles, 30,000 artillery shells, 50 million rounds of ammunition, as well as other military equipment and raw materials. In addition, the Swedish government allowed the country's campaign "Finnish's cause is our cause" to collect donations for Finland, and the State Bank of Sweden provided a loan to Finland.
The Danish government sold Finland about 30 pieces of 20-mm anti-tank guns and shells for them (at the same time, in order to avoid accusations of violating neutrality, the order was called "Swedish"); sent a medical convoy and skilled workers to Finland, and authorized a fundraising campaign for Finland.
Italy sent 35 Fiat G.50 fighters to Finland, but five aircraft were destroyed during their transfer and development by personnel. Also, the Italians handed over to Finland 94.5 thousand Mannlicher-Carcano rifles mod. 1938, 1500 Beretta pistols mod. 1915 and 60 Beretta M1934 pistols.
The Union of South Africa donated 22 Gloster Gauntlet II fighters to Finland.
A representative of the US government issued a statement that the entry of American citizens into the Finnish army does not contradict the US neutrality law, a group of American pilots was sent to Helsinki, and in January 1940, the US Congress approved the sale of 10 thousand rifles to Finland. Also, the United States sold 44 Brewster F2A Buffalo fighters to Finland, but they arrived too late and did not have time to take part in the hostilities.
Belgium supplied Finland with 171 MP.28-II submachine guns, and in February 1940, 56 Parabellum P-08 pistols.
Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano in his diary mentions the assistance to Finland from the Third Reich: in December 1939, the Finnish envoy to Italy reported that Germany "unofficially" sent a batch of captured weapons to Finland captured during the Polish campaign. In addition, on December 21, 1939, Germany concluded an agreement with Sweden in which it promised to supply Sweden with the same amount of weapons as it would transfer to Finland from its own stocks. The agreement was the reason for the increase in the volume of military aid from Sweden to Finland.
In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles and other weapons, as well as 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million rounds of ammunition were delivered to Finland.
Fighting in December - January
The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of control and supply of the Red Army troops, the poor preparedness of command personnel, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary for waging war in the winter in Finland. By the end of December, it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was a relative calm at the front. Throughout January and the beginning of February, the troops were strengthened, material supplies were replenished, and units and formations were reorganized. Subdivisions of skiers were created, methods were developed for overcoming mined terrain, obstacles, methods for dealing with defensive structures, and personnel were trained. To storm the Mannerheim Line, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and a member of the military council of the LenVO Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies. Enormous work was carried out in the border areas to hastily build and re-equip communication lines for the uninterrupted supply of the army in the field. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.
To destroy the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line, the divisions of the first echelon were assigned groups of destruction artillery (AR) consisting of one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups had 14 divisions, in which there were 81 guns with a caliber of 203, 234, 280 m.
The Finnish side during this period also continued to replenish the troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. Formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along the roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, then in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used the tactics of guerrilla warfare: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked troops moving along the roads, mainly at night, and after the attacks went into the forest, where bases were equipped. Snipers inflicted heavy losses. According to the firm opinion of the Red Army soldiers (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish), the greatest danger was represented by “cuckoo” snipers who fired from trees. The formations of the Red Army that had broken through forward were constantly surrounded and broke through backwards, often abandoning equipment and weapons.
The Battle of Suomussalmi was widely known in Finland and beyond. The village of Suomussalmi was occupied on December 7 by the forces of the Soviet 163rd Infantry Division of the 9th Army, which was given the responsible task of striking at Oulu, reaching the Gulf of Bothnia and, as a result, cutting Finland in half. However, thereafter the division was surrounded by (smaller) Finnish forces and cut off from supplies. The 44th Infantry Division was put forward to help her, which, however, was blocked on the road to Suomussalmi, in a defile between two lakes near the village of Raate, by the forces of two companies of the 27th Finnish regiment (350 people). Without waiting for her approach, the 163rd division at the end of December, under the constant attacks of the Finns, was forced to break out of the encirclement, while losing 30% of its personnel and most of the equipment and heavy weapons. After that, the Finns transferred the released forces to encircle and eliminate the 44th division, which by January 8 was completely destroyed in the battle on the Raat road. Almost the entire division was killed or captured, and only a small part of the military managed to get out of the encirclement, leaving all the equipment and convoy (the Finns got 37 tanks, 20 armored vehicles, 350 machine guns, 97 guns (including 17 howitzers), several thousand rifles, 160 vehicles , all radio stations). The Finns won this double victory with forces several times smaller than those of the enemy (11 thousand, according to other sources - 17 thousand) people with 11 guns against 45-55 thousand with 335 guns, more than 100 tanks and 50 armored vehicles. The command of both divisions was given under the tribunal. The commander and commissar of the 163rd division were removed from command, one regimental commander was shot; before the formation of their division, the command of the 44th division was shot (brigade commander A. I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov).
The victory at Suomussalmi had enormous moral significance for the Finns; strategically, it buried plans for a breakthrough to the Gulf of Bothnia, which were extremely dangerous for the Finns, and so paralyzed the Soviet troops in this sector that they did not take active actions until the very end of the war.
At the same time, south of Suomussalmi, in the Kuhmo area, the Soviet 54th rifle division was surrounded. The winner at Suomussalmi, Colonel Hjalmar Siilsavuo, who was promoted to major general, was sent to this sector, but he was never able to liquidate the division, which remained encircled until the end of the war. At Lake Ladoga, the 168th Infantry Division, which was advancing on Sortavala, was also surrounded until the end of the war. In the same place, in South Lemetti, in late December and early January, the 18th Infantry Division of General Kondrashov, along with the 34th Tank Brigade of Brigade Commander Kondratiev, were surrounded. Already at the end of the war, on February 28, they tried to break out of the encirclement, but at the exit they were defeated in the so-called "valley of death" near the city of Pitkyaranta, where one of the two outgoing columns completely perished. As a result, out of 15,000 people, 1,237 people left the encirclement, half of them wounded and frostbitten. The brigade commander Kondratiev shot himself, Kondrashov managed to get out, but was soon shot, and the division was disbanded due to the loss of the banner. The death toll in the "valley of death" was 10% of total who died in the entire Soviet-Finnish war. These episodes were vivid manifestations of the tactics of the Finns, called mottitaktiikka, the tactics of motti - “ticks” (literally, motti is a log of firewood that is placed in the forest in groups, but at a certain distance from each other). Taking advantage of the advantage in mobility, detachments of Finnish skiers blocked the roads clogged with sprawling Soviet columns, cut off the advancing groups and then exhausted them with unexpected attacks from all sides, trying to destroy them. At the same time, the encircled groups, unable, unlike the Finns, to fight off the roads, usually huddled together and occupied a passive all-round defense, without making any attempts to actively resist the attacks of the Finnish partisan detachments. Only the lack of mortars and heavy weapons in general made it difficult for the Finns to completely destroy them.
On the Karelian Isthmus, the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began thorough preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line", conducted reconnaissance of the defense line. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparations for a new offensive with counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses.
On January 3, 1940, at the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden), with 50 crew members, the Soviet submarine S-2 under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov sank (probably hit a mine). S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.
On the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2080 people were evicted from the regions of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the zone of combat operations of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 years old - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were placed in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Interposyolka of the Pryazhinsky district, in the village of Kovgora-Goymay of the Kondopozhsky district, in the village of Kintezma of the Kalevalsky district. They lived in barracks and without fail worked in the forest at logging sites. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.
February offensive of the Red Army
On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, having brought up reinforcements, resumed the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus along the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was inflicted in the direction of the Sum. Art preparations also began. From that day on, daily for several days, the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko brought down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but could not succeed.
On February 6, the offensive began on the Summa strip. In the following days, the front of the offensive expanded both to the west and to the east.
On February 9, the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, commander of the first rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops, according to which, on February 11, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front were to go on the offensive.
On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, created in October 1939, operated together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.
Since the attacks of the Soviet troops on the Summa region did not bring success, main blow was moved to the east, to the direction of Lyakhde. In this place, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery preparation and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.
During three days of intense fighting, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Mannerheim Line, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.
On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski Dam, and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.
By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second line of defense, and the 13th Army - to the main line of defense north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.
On the final stage Operations The 13th army advanced in the direction of Antrea (modern Kamennogorsk), the 7th - to Vyborg. Finns provided fierce resistance but were forced to retreat.
England and France: plans for military operations against the USSR
Great Britain has provided assistance to Finland from the very beginning. On the one hand, the British government tried to avoid turning the USSR into an enemy, on the other hand, it was widely believed that because of the conflict in the Balkans with the USSR, "you would have to fight one way or another." The Finnish representative in London, Georg Achates Gripenberg, applied to Halifax on December 1, 1939, for permission to supply war materials to Finland, on the condition that they not be re-exported to Finland. Nazi Germany(with which Great Britain was at war). The head of the North Department (en: Northern Department) Laurence Collier (en: Laurence Collier) at the same time believed that British and German goals in Finland could be compatible and wished to involve Germany and Italy in the war against the USSR, while speaking, however, against the proposed Finland used the Polish fleet (then under British control) to destroy Soviet ships. Thomas Snow (English) Thomas Snow), the British representative in Helsinki, continued to support the idea of an anti-Soviet alliance (with Italy and Japan), which he expressed before the war.
Against the backdrop of government disagreements, the British Army began supplying armaments in December 1939, including artillery and tanks (while Germany refrained from supplying heavy weapons to Finland).
When Finland requested the supply of bombers to attack Moscow and Leningrad, and to destroy the railroad to Murmansk, the latter idea received support from Fitzroy MacLean in the Department of the North: helping the Finns to destroy the road would allow Britain to "avoid the same operation later, independently and under less favorable conditions. McLean's superiors, Collier and Cadogan, agreed with McLean's reasoning and requested additional delivery of Blenheim aircraft to Finland.
According to Craig Gerrard, the plans for intervention in the war against the USSR, which were then being born in Great Britain, illustrated the ease with which British politicians forgot about the war they were currently waging with Germany. By the beginning of 1940, the view prevailed in the Department of the North that the use of force against the USSR was inevitable. Collier, as before, continued to insist that it was wrong to appease the aggressors; now the enemy, in contrast to his previous position, was not Germany, but the USSR. Gerrard explains the position of MacLean and Collier not with ideological, but with humanitarian considerations.
Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris reported that there was a desire in "circles close to the government" to support Finland in order to reconcile with Germany and send Hitler to the East. Nick Smart believes, however, that on a conscious level, the arguments for intervention did not come from an attempt to trade one war for another, but from the assumption that German and Soviet plans were closely linked.
From the French point of view, the anti-Soviet orientation also made sense because of the collapse of plans to prevent the strengthening of Germany with the help of a blockade. Soviet deliveries of raw materials caused the German economy to continue to grow, and the French began to realize that after a while, as a result of this growth, winning the war against Germany would become impossible. In such a situation, although the transfer of the war to Scandinavia presented a certain risk, inaction was an even worse alternative. Head of the French general staff Gamelin gave instructions for planning an operation against the USSR with the aim of waging war outside French territory; plans were soon prepared.
Britain did not support some French plans: for example, an attack on the oil fields in Baku, an attack on Petsamo using Polish troops (the Polish government in exile in London was formally at war with the USSR). However, Great Britain was also approaching the opening of a second front against the USSR.
On February 5, 1940, at a joint war council (at which Churchill was present but did not speak), it was decided to seek the consent of Norway and Sweden for a British-led operation in which the expeditionary force was to land in Norway and move east.
French plans, as the situation in Finland worsened, became more and more one-sided.
On March 2, 1940, Daladier announced his readiness to send 50,000 French soldiers and 100 bombers to Finland for the war against the USSR. The British government was not informed in advance of Daladier's statement, but agreed to send 50 British bombers to Finland. The coordination meeting was scheduled for March 12, 1940, but due to the end of the war, the plans remained unfulfilled.
The end of the war and the conclusion of peace
By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite the demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the Allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete seizure of the country, followed by either joining the USSR or changing the government to a pro-Soviet one.
Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and already on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, retreated to the USSR, Soviet troops stormed the city on the morning of March 13.
According to J. Roberts, Stalin's conclusion of peace on relatively moderate terms could have been caused by the realization of the fact that an attempt to forcibly sovietize Finland would run into massive resistance from the Finnish population and the danger of Anglo-French intervention to help the Finns. As a result, the Soviet Union risked being drawn into a war against the Western powers on the side of Germany.
For participation in the Finnish war, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 412 servicemen, over 50 thousand were awarded orders and medals.
The results of the war
All officially declared territorial claims of the USSR were satisfied. According to Stalin, the war ended after 3 months and 12 days, only because our army did a good job, because our political boom set before Finland turned out to be right».
The USSR gained full control over the waters of Lake Ladoga and secured Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula).
In addition, under the peace treaty, Finland assumed the obligation to build on its territory a railway connecting the Kola Peninsula through Alakurtti with the Gulf of Bothnia (Tornio). But this road was never built.
On October 11, 1940, the Agreement between the USSR and Finland on the Aland Islands was signed in Moscow, according to which the USSR had the right to place its consulate on the islands, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone.
For unleashing the war on December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. The immediate reason for the expulsion was the mass protests of the international community over the systematic bombing of civilian targets by Soviet aircraft, including with the use of incendiary bombs. US President Roosevelt also joined the protests.
US President Roosevelt declared a "moral embargo" on the Soviet Union in December. On March 29, 1940, Molotov told the Supreme Soviet that Soviet imports from the United States had even increased compared to the previous year, despite the obstacles put in place by the American authorities. In particular, the Soviet side complained about the obstacles to Soviet engineers with admission to aircraft factories. In addition, under various trade agreements in the period 1939-1941. The Soviet Union received 6,430 machine tools from Germany for 85.4 million marks, which compensated for the decline in supplies of equipment from the United States.
Another negative result for the USSR was the formation among the leadership of a number of countries of the idea of the weakness of the Red Army. Information about the course, circumstances and results (a significant excess of Soviet losses over Finnish ones) of the Winter War strengthened the positions of supporters of the war against the USSR in Germany. In early January 1940, the German envoy to Helsinki, Blucher, presented a memorandum to the Foreign Ministry with the following assessments: despite superiority in manpower and equipment, the Red Army suffered one defeat after another, left thousands of people in captivity, lost hundreds of guns, tanks, aircraft and decisively failed to conquer the territory. In this regard, German ideas about Bolshevik Russia should be reconsidered. The Germans were making false assumptions when they thought that Russia was a first-class military factor. But in reality the Red Army has so many shortcomings that it cannot cope even with a small country. In reality, Russia does not pose a danger to such a great power as Germany, the rear in the East is safe, and therefore it will be possible to speak with the gentlemen in the Kremlin in a completely different language than it was in August - September 1939. For his part, Hitler, following the results Winter War, called the USSR a colossus with feet of clay.
W. Churchill testifies that "failure of the Soviet troops" called in public opinion England "contempt"; “In English circles, many congratulated themselves on the fact that we did not try very zealously to win the Soviets over to our side.<во время переговоров лета 1939 г.>and were proud of their foresight. People too hastily concluded that the purge ruined the Russian army and that all this confirmed the organic rottenness and decline of the state and social system of the Russians..
On the other hand, the Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in the winter, on a wooded and marshy territory, the experience of breaking through long-term fortifications and fighting an enemy using guerrilla warfare tactics. In clashes with Finnish troops equipped with the Suomi submachine gun, the importance of submachine guns that had been taken out of service before was clarified: the production of PPD was hastily restored and the terms of reference were given to create a new submachine gun system, resulting in the appearance of PPSh.
Germany was bound by an agreement with the USSR and could not publicly support Finland, which she made clear even before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation changed after the major defeats of the Red Army. In February 1940, Toivo Kivimäki (later ambassador) was sent to Berlin to probe possible changes. Relations were cool at first, but changed dramatically when Kivimäki announced Finland's intention to accept help from the Western Allies. On February 22, the Finnish envoy was urgently arranged for a meeting with Hermann Göring, the second man in the Reich. According to the memoirs of R. Nordström of the late 1940s, Goering unofficially promised Kivimäki that Germany would attack the USSR in the future: “ Remember that you should make peace on any terms. I guarantee that when in a short time we go to war against Russia, you will get everything back with interest". Kivimäki immediately reported this to Helsinki.
The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one of the factors that determined the rapprochement between Finland and Germany; in addition, they could in a certain way influence the leadership of the Reich in relation to plans to attack the USSR. For Finland, rapprochement with Germany became a means of containing the growing political pressure from the USSR. Finland's participation in World War II on the side of the Axis was called the "Continuation War" in Finnish historiography, in order to show the relationship with the Winter War.
Territorial changes
- Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to build fortifications along the new border line (Salpa Line) at an accelerated pace, thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km.
- Part of Lapland (Old Salla).
- Part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas (the Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland).
- Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island).
- Lease of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for 30 years.
In total, as a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the Soviet Union acquired about 40 thousand km² of Finnish territories. Finland again occupied these territories in 1941, in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War, and in 1944 they again went to the USSR (see the Soviet-Finnish War (1941-1944)).
Finnish losses
Military
According to 1991 data:
- killed - ok. 26 thousand people (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 85 thousand people);
- wounded - 40 thousand people. (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 250 thousand people);
- prisoners - 1000 people.
Thus, the total losses in the Finnish troops during the war amounted to 67 thousand people. brief information about each of the victims from the Finnish side is published in a number of Finnish publications.
Up-to-date information on the circumstances of the death of Finnish military personnel:
- 16,725 died in action, remains evacuated;
- 3433 died in action, the remains were not evacuated;
- 3671 died in hospitals from wounds;
- 715 died for non-combat reasons (including from disease);
- 28 died in captivity;
- 1727 missing and declared dead;
- the cause of death of 363 military personnel is unknown.
A total of 26,662 Finnish soldiers died.
Civil
According to official Finnish data, during the air raids and bombing of Finnish cities (including Helsinki), 956 people were killed, 540 were seriously and 1300 slightly injured, 256 stone and about 1800 wooden buildings were destroyed.
Losses of foreign volunteers
During the war, the Swedish Volunteer Corps lost 33 people dead and 185 wounded and frostbite (with frostbite being the vast majority - about 140 people).
Two Danes were killed - pilots who fought in the LLv-24 fighter air group, and one Italian who fought in the LLv-26.
USSR losses
Monument to the Fallen in the Soviet-Finnish War (St. Petersburg, near the Military Medical Academy)
The first official figures of Soviet losses in the war were made public at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 26, 1940: 48,475 dead and 158,863 wounded, sick and frostbite.
According to reports from the troops on 03/15/1940:
- wounded, sick, frostbitten - 248,090;
- killed and died at the stages of sanitary evacuation - 65,384;
- died in hospitals - 15,921;
- missing - 14,043;
- total irretrievable losses - 95,348.
name lists
According to the lists of names compiled in 1949-1951 by the Main Directorate of Personnel of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Headquarters of the Ground Forces, the losses of the Red Army in the war were as follows:
- died and died from wounds at the stages of sanitary evacuation - 71,214;
- died in hospitals from wounds and diseases - 16,292;
- missing - 39,369.
In total, according to these lists, irretrievable losses amounted to 126,875 military personnel.
Other loss estimates
In the period from 1990 to 1995, new, often contradictory data on the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies appeared in Russian historical literature and in journal publications, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses from 1990 to 1995 and a decrease in Finnish ones. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryaga (1989), the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Aptekar in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, according to P. A. Aptekar, their number is more than double the results of the study of Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people. According to the Soviet military archives and hospitals, sanitary losses amounted to (by name) 264,908 people. It is estimated that about 22 percent of the losses were from frostbite.
Losses in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. based on the two-volume “History of Russia. XX century»:
|
the USSR |
Finland |
|
|
1. Killed, dead from wounds |
around 150,000 |
|
|
2. Missing |
||
|
3. POWs |
about 6000 (returned 5465) |
825 to 1000 (about 600 returned) |
|
4. Wounded, shell-shocked, frostbitten, burned |
||
|
5. Aircraft (in pieces) |
||
|
6. Tanks (in pieces) |
650 destroyed, about 1800 shot down, about 1500 out of action for technical reasons |
|
|
7. Losses at sea |
submarine "S-2" |
auxiliary patrol ship, tug on Ladoga |
"Karelian question"
After the war, local Finnish authorities, provincial organizations of the Karelian Union, created to protect the rights and interests of the evacuated residents of Karelia, tried to find a solution to the issue of returning the lost territories. During the Cold War, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen repeatedly negotiated with the Soviet leadership, but these negotiations were unsuccessful. The Finnish side did not openly demand the return of these territories. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of transferring territories to Finland was raised again.
In matters relating to the return of the ceded territories, the Karelian Union acts jointly with the foreign policy leadership of Finland and through it. In accordance with the program “Karelia” adopted in 2005 at the congress of the Karelian Union, the Karelian Union seeks to encourage the political leadership of Finland to actively monitor the situation in Russia and start negotiations with Russia on the return of the ceded territories of Karelia as soon as a real basis arises. and both sides will be ready for it.
Propaganda during the war
At the beginning of the war, the tone of the Soviet press was bravura - the Red Army looked perfect and victorious, while the Finns were portrayed as a frivolous enemy. On December 2 (2 days after the start of the war), Leningradskaya Pravda writes:
You involuntarily admire the valiant fighters of the Red Army, armed with the latest sniper rifles, shiny automatic light machine guns. The armies of the two worlds collided. The Red Army is the most peaceful, the most heroic, powerful, equipped with advanced technology, and the army of the corrupt Finnish government, which the capitalists are forcing to saber rattling. And the weapon is, frankly, old, worn. Not enough for more powder.
However, a month later the tone of the Soviet press changed. They began to talk about the power of the "Mannerheim Line", difficult terrain and frost - the Red Army, losing tens of thousands killed and frostbite, got stuck in the Finnish forests. Starting with Molotov's report on March 29, 1940, the myth of the impregnable "Mannerheim Line", similar to the "Maginot Line" and "Siegfried Line", begins to live, which so far have not been crushed by any army. Anastas Mikoyan later wrote: “ Stalin is smart capable person, in order to justify the failures during the war with Finland, invented the reason that we “suddenly” discovered the well-equipped Mannerheim line. A special motion picture was released showing these installations to justify that it was difficult to fight against such a line and quickly win.».
If Finnish propaganda depicted the war as defending the homeland from cruel and merciless invaders, connecting communist terrorism with traditional Russian great power (for example, in the song “No, Molotov!”, the head of the Soviet government is compared with the tsarist Governor-General of Finland Nikolai Bobrikov, known for his Russification policy and struggle against autonomy), then the Soviet Agitprop presented the war as a struggle against the oppressors of the Finnish people for the sake of the freedom of the latter. The term White Finns, which was used to designate the enemy, was intended to emphasize not the interstate and not the interethnic, but the class nature of the confrontation. “Your homeland has been taken away more than once - we are coming to return it”, says the song "Take us, beautiful Suomi", in an attempt to fend off accusations of capturing Finland. The order for the LenVO troops dated November 29, signed by Meretskov and Zhdanov, states:
We are going to Finland not as conquerors, but as friends and liberators of the Finnish people from the oppression of the landowners and capitalists.
We are not going against the Finnish people, but against the Cajander-Erkno government, which oppresses the Finnish people and provoked a war with the USSR.
We respect the freedom and independence of Finland gained by the Finnish people as a result of the October Revolution.
Mannerheim line - alternative
Throughout the war, both Soviet and Finnish propaganda significantly exaggerated the significance of the Mannerheim Line. The first is to justify a long delay in the offensive, and the second is to strengthen the morale of the army and the population. Accordingly, the myth of the "incredibly heavily fortified" "Mannerheim Line" was firmly entrenched in Soviet history and penetrated into some Western sources of information, which is not surprising, given the chanting of the line by the Finnish side in the literal sense - in the song Mannerheimin linjalla("On the Mannerheim Line"). The Belgian General Badu, a technical adviser for the construction of fortifications, who participated in the construction of the Maginot Line, stated:
Nowhere in the world were natural conditions so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. In this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. From wood and granite, and where necessary - from concrete, the famous "Mannerheim Line" was built. The greatest fortress"Mannerheim lines" are given by anti-tank obstacles made in granite. Even twenty-five-ton tanks cannot overcome them. In granite, the Finns, with the help of explosions, equipped machine-gun and gun nests, which are not afraid of the most powerful bombs. Where there was not enough granite, the Finns did not spare concrete.
According to the Russian historian A. Isaev, “in reality, the Mannerheim Line was far from the best examples of European fortification. The vast majority of the long-term structures of the Finns were one-story, partially buried reinforced concrete buildings in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors. Three pillboxes of the “millionth” type had two levels, three more pillboxes - three levels. Let me emphasize, exactly the level. That is, their combat casemates and shelters were located at different levels relative to the surface, casemates slightly buried in the ground with embrasures and completely buried, connecting their galleries with barracks. Structures with what can be called floors were negligible.” It was much weaker than the fortifications of the Molotov line, not to mention the Maginot line with multi-storey caponiers equipped with their own power plants, kitchens, rest rooms and all amenities, with underground galleries connecting pillboxes, and even underground narrow gauge railways. Along with the famous gouges made of granite boulders, the Finns used gouges made of low-quality concrete, designed for obsolete Renault tanks and turned out to be weak against the guns of the new Soviet technology. In fact, the "Mannerheim Line" consisted mainly of field fortifications. The bunkers located on the line were small, located at a considerable distance from each other and rarely had cannon weapons.
As O. Mannien notes, the Finns had enough resources to build only 101 concrete bunkers (from low-quality concrete), and they took less concrete than the building of the Helsinki Opera House; the rest of the fortifications of the Mannerheim line were wood-earthen (for comparison: the Maginot line had 5800 concrete fortifications, including multi-storey bunkers).
Mannerheim himself wrote:
... The Russians, even during the war, set in motion the myth of the "Mannerheim Line". It was asserted that our defense on the Karelian Isthmus was based on an unusually strong and state-of-the-art defensive wall, which can be compared with the Maginot and Siegfried lines and which no army has ever broken through. The breakthrough of the Russians was “a feat that has not been equaled in the history of all wars” ... All this is nonsense; in reality, the situation looks completely different ... Of course, there was a defensive line, but it was formed only by rare long-term machine-gun nests and two dozen new pillboxes built at my suggestion, between which trenches were laid. Yes, the defensive line existed, but it lacked depth. The people called this position the Mannerheim Line. Its strength was the result of the stamina and courage of our soldiers, and not the result of the strength of the structures.
- Mannerheim, K. G. Memoirs. - M.: VAGRIUS, 1999. - S. 319-320. - ISBN 5-264-00049-2.
perpetuation of memory
monuments
- The "Cross of Sorrow" is a commemorative memorial to the Soviet and Finnish soldiers who fell in the Soviet-Finnish War. Opened June 27, 2000. It is located in the Pitkyarantsky district of the Republic of Karelia.
- The Kollasjärvi Memorial is a commemorative memorial to the fallen Soviet and Finnish soldiers. Located in the Suoyarvsky district of the Republic of Karelia.
Museums
- School Museum "Unknown War" - opened on November 20, 2013 in the Municipal Educational Institution "Secondary School No. 34" of the city of Petrozavodsk.
- The Military Museum of the Karelian Isthmus was opened in Vyborg by historian Bair Irincheev.
Artistic works about the war
- Finnish song of the war years "No, Molotov!" (mp3, with Russian translation)
- "Accept us, beautiful Suomi" (mp3, with Finnish translation)
- Song "Talvisota" by Swedish power metal band Sabaton
- "Song of Battalion Commander Ugryumov" - a song about Captain Nikolai Ugryumov, the first Hero of the Soviet Union in the Soviet-Finnish War
- Alexander Tvardovsky."Two Lines" (1943) - poem, dedicated to memory Soviet soldiers who died during the war
- N. Tikhonov, "Savolak huntsman" - a poem
- Alexander Gorodnitsky, "Finnish Border" - song.
- film "Front girlfriends" (USSR, 1941)
- film "Behind enemy lines" (USSR, 1941)
- film "Mashenka" (USSR, 1942)
- film "Talvisota" (Finland, 1989).
- x / f "Angel's Chapel" (Russia, 2009).
- film "Military Intelligence: Northern Front (TV series)" (Russia, 2012).
- Computer game"Blitzkrieg"
- Computer game Talvisota: Ice Hell.
- Computer game Squad Battles: Winter War.
Documentaries
- "The Living and the Dead". Documentary film about the "Winter War" directed by V. A. Fonarev
- "Mannerheim Line" (USSR, 1940)
- "Winter War" (Russia, Viktor Pravdyuk, 2014)
After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Germany started a war with Poland, and relations between the USSR and Finland began to splinter. One of the reasons is a secret document between the USSR and Germany on the delimitation of spheres of influence. According to it, the influence of the USSR extended to Finland, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and Belarus, and Bessarabia.
Realizing that a big war was inevitable, Stalin sought to protect Leningrad, which could be fired upon by artillery from the territory of Finland. Therefore, the task was to push the border further north. For a peaceful solution of the issue, the Soviet side offered Finland the lands of Karelia in exchange for moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but any attempts at dialogue were suppressed by the Finns. They did not want to agree.
Reason for war
The reason for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was the incident near the village of Mainila on November 25, 1939 at 15:45. This village is located on the Karelian Isthmus, 800 meters from the Finnish border. Mainila was subjected to artillery fire, as a result of which 4 representatives of the Red Army were killed and 8 were wounded.
On November 26, Molotov called the Finnish ambassador in Moscow (Irie Koskinen) and handed a note of protest, stating that the shelling was carried out from the territory of Finland, and only the fact that the Soviet army had an order not to succumb to provocations saved from starting a war.
On November 27, the Finnish government responded to the Soviet note of protest. Briefly, the main points of the answer were as follows:
- The shelling really was and lasted approximately 20 minutes.
- The shelling was carried out from the Soviet side, approximately 1.5-2 km southeast of the village of Mainila.
- It was proposed to create a commission that would jointly study this episode and give it an adequate assessment.
What actually happened near the village of Mainila? This is an important question, since it was as a result of these events that the Winter (Soviet-Finnish) War was unleashed. It can only be unequivocally stated that the shelling of the village of Mainila really took place, but it is impossible to document who carried it out. Ultimately, there are 2 versions (Soviet and Finnish), and you need to evaluate each. The first version - Finland shelled the territory of the USSR. The second version was a provocation prepared by the NKVD.
Why did Finland need this provocation? Historians speak of 2 reasons:
- The Finns were an instrument of politics in the hands of the British, who needed a war. This assumption would be reasonable if we consider the winter war in isolation. But if we recall the realities of those times, then at the time of the incident there was already a world war, and England had already declared war on Germany. England's attack on the USSR automatically created an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and sooner or later this alliance would strike with all its might against England itself. Therefore, to assume such a thing is tantamount to assuming that England decided to commit suicide, which, of course, was not.
- They wanted to expand their territories and influence. This is a completely stupid hypothesis. This is from the category - Liechtenstein wants to attack Germany. Brad. Finland had neither the strength nor the means for the war, and everyone in the Finnish command understood that their only chance of success in the war with the USSR was a long-term defense that exhausted the enemy. With such layouts, no one will disturb the bear's den.
The most adequate answer to the question posed is that the shelling of the village of Mainila is a provocation by the Soviet government itself, which was looking for any excuse to justify the war with Finland. And it was this incident that was later presented to Soviet society as an example of the perfidy of the Finnish people, who needed help to carry out the socialist revolution.
The balance of forces and means
It is indicative how the forces were correlated during the Soviet-Finnish war. Below is a brief table that describes how the opposing nations approached the Winter War.
In all aspects, except for the infantry, the USSR had a clear advantage. But to conduct an offensive, surpassing the enemy by only 1.3 times, is an extremely risky undertaking. In this case, discipline, training and organization come to the fore. With all three aspects, the Soviet army had problems. These figures once again emphasize that the Soviet leadership did not perceive Finland as an enemy, expecting to destroy it in the shortest possible time.
The course of the war
The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War can be divided into 2 stages: the first (December 39th - January 7, 40th) and the second (January 7, 40th - March 12, 40th). What happened on January 7, 1940? Timoshenko was appointed commander of the army, who immediately set about reorganizing the army and putting things in order in it.
First stage
The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939, and the Soviet army failed to hold it briefly. The army of the USSR actually crossed the state border of Finland without declaring war. For its citizens, the justification was as follows - helping the people of Finland to overthrow the bourgeois government of the warmonger.
The Soviet leadership did not take Finland seriously, believing that the war would be over in a few weeks. Even the figure of 3 weeks was called as a deadline. More specifically, there should be no war. The plan of the Soviet command was approximately as follows:
- Bring in the troops. We did it on November 30th.
- Creation of a workers' government controlled by the USSR. On December 1, the Kuusinen government was created (more on that later).
- Lightning offensive on all fronts. It was planned to reach Helsinki in 1.5-2 weeks.
- Declination of the real Finnish government towards peace and complete surrender in favor of the Kuusinen government.
The first two points were implemented in the first days of the war, but then problems began. Blitzkrieg failed and the army got stuck in the Finnish defense. Although in initial days of the war, until about December 4, it seemed that everything was going according to plan - the Soviet troops were moving forward. However, very soon they came across the Mannerheim Line. On December 4, the armies came to her eastern front(near Lake Suvantojärvi), December 6 - the central front (direction Summa), December 10 - western front(The Gulf of Finland). And it was a shock. A huge number of documents indicate that the troops did not expect to meet a well-fortified line of defense. And this is a huge question for the intelligence of the Red Army.
In any case, December was a disastrous month, which frustrated almost all the plans of the Soviet Headquarters. The troops moved inland slowly. Every day the pace of movement only decreased. Reasons for the slow advance of Soviet troops:
- Locality. Almost the entire territory of Finland is forests and swamps. In such conditions, it is difficult to apply equipment.
- Aviation application. Aviation in terms of bombing was practically not used. There was no point in bombing the villages attached to the front line, as the Finns retreated, leaving scorched earth behind. It was difficult to bomb the retreating troops, since they retreated with civilians.
- Roads. Retreating, the Finns destroyed roads, arranged landslides, mined everything that was possible.
Formation of the Kuusinen government
On December 1, 1939, the people's government of Finland was formed in the city of Terijoki. It was formed on the territory already occupied by the USSR, and with the direct participation of the Soviet leadership. The Finnish People's Government included:
- Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs - Otto Kuusinen
- Minister of Finance - Maury Rosenberg
- Minister of Defense - Aksel Antila
- Minister of the Interior - Tuure Lehen
- Minister of Agriculture - Armas Eikia
- Minister of Education - Inkeri Lehtinen
- Minister of Affairs of Karelia - Paavo Prokkonen
Outwardly - a full-fledged government. The only problem is that the Finnish population did not recognize him. But already on December 1 (that is, on the day of formation), this government concluded an agreement with the USSR on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FDR (Finland Democratic Republic). On December 2, a new agreement is signed - on mutual assistance. From that moment on, Molotov says that the war continues because a revolution has taken place in Finland, and now it is necessary to support it and help the workers. In fact, it was a clever trick to justify the war in the eyes of the Soviet population.
Mannerheim line
The Mannerheim Line is one of the few things that almost everyone knows about the Soviet-Finnish war. Soviet propaganda said about this system of fortifications that all world generals recognized its impregnability. It was an exaggeration. The line of defense was, of course, strong, but not impregnable.
The Mannerheim Line (it received such a name already during the war) consisted of 101 concrete fortifications. For comparison, the Maginot Line, which Germany crossed in France, was about the same length. The Maginot Line consisted of 5,800 concrete structures. In fairness, the difficult terrain of the Mannerheim Line should be noted. There were swamps and numerous lakes, which made movement extremely difficult and therefore the defense line did not require a large number of fortifications.
The largest attempt to break through the Mannerheim line at the first stage was made on December 17-21 in the central section. It was here that it was possible to take the roads leading to Vyborg, gaining a significant advantage. But the offensive, in which 3 divisions took part, failed. This was the first major success in the Soviet-Finnish war for the Finnish army. This success became known as the "Miracle of the Sum". Subsequently, the line was broken through on February 11, which actually predetermined the outcome of the war.
Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations
On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. This decision was promoted by England and France, who talked about Soviet aggression against Finland. Representatives of the League of Nations condemned the actions of the USSR in terms of aggressive actions and unleashing a war.
Today, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations is cited as an example of the limitation of Soviet power and as a loss in image. In fact, everything is a little different. In 1939, the League of Nations no longer played the role that it was assigned at the end of the First World War. The fact is that back in 1933, Germany withdrew from it, which refused to fulfill the requirements of the League of Nation for disarmament and simply withdrew from the organization. It turns out that at the time of December 14 de facto the League of Nations ceased to exist. After all, what kind of European security system can we talk about when Germany and the USSR left the organization?
Second phase of the war
January 7, 1940 Headquarters of the North-Western Front was headed by Marshal Timoshenko. He had to solve all the problems and organize a successful offensive of the Red Army. At this point, the Soviet-Finnish war took a breather, and active operations were not conducted until February. From February 1 to 9, powerful strikes began along the Mannerheim Line. It was assumed that the 7th and 13th armies were to break through the defense line with decisive flank attacks and occupy the Vuoksi-Karhul sector. After that, it was planned to move to Vyborg, occupy the city and block the railways and highways leading to the West.
On February 11, 1940, a general offensive of the Soviet troops began on the Karelian Isthmus. This was the turning point of the Winter War, as units of the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and begin to advance inland. They advanced slowly due to the specifics of the terrain, the resistance of the Finnish army and severe frosts, but most importantly, they advanced. In the beginning of March Soviet army was already on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay.
On this, in fact, the war ended, since it was obvious that Finland did not have a lot of forces and means to contain the Red Army. Since that time, peace negotiations began, in which the USSR dictated its conditions, and Molotov constantly emphasized that the conditions would be tough, because the Finns were forced to start a war, during which the blood of Soviet soldiers was shed.
Why did the war drag on so long
The Soviet-Finnish war, according to the plan of the Bolsheviks, was to be completed in 2-3 weeks, and the troops of the Leningrad District alone were to give a decisive advantage. In practice, the war dragged on for almost 4 months, and divisions were assembled throughout the country to suppress the Finns. There are several reasons for this:
- Poor organization of troops. This refers to the poor work of the command staff, but a big problem- coherence between branches of the military. She was practically non-existent. If you study archival documents, then there are a lot of reports according to which some troops fired at others.
- Bad security. The army was in need of almost everything. The war was also fought in the winter in the north, where the air temperature dropped below -30 by the end of December. And while the army was not provided with winter clothing.
- Underestimation of the enemy. The USSR did not prepare for war. It was plinthed to quickly suppress the Finns and solve the problem without a war, blaming everything on the border incident of November 24, 1939.
- Support for Finland by other countries. England, Italy, Hungary, Sweden (first of all) - provided assistance to Finland in everything: weapons, supplies, food, aircraft, and so on. The greatest effort was made by Sweden, which itself actively helped and facilitated the transfer of assistance from other countries. In general, in the conditions of the Winter War of 1939-1940, only Germany supported the Soviet side.
Stalin was very nervous because the war was dragging on. He repeated - The whole world is watching us. And he was right. Therefore, Stalin demanded the solution of all problems, the restoration of order in the army and the speedy resolution of the conflict. To some extent, this has been done. And fast enough. The offensive of the Soviet troops in February-March 1940 forced Finland to peace.
The Red Army fought extremely undisciplined, and its management does not stand up to criticism. Almost all reports and memos on the situation at the front were with an addition - "an explanation of the reasons for the failures." Here are some quotes from Beria's memorandum to Stalin No. 5518 / B dated December 14, 1939:
- During the landing on Saiskari Island, a Soviet aircraft dropped 5 bombs that landed on the Lenin destroyer.
- On December 1, the Ladoga flotilla was fired twice by its own aircraft.
- During the occupation of the island of Gogland, during the advance of the landing units, 6 Soviet aircraft appeared, one of which fired several bursts of shots. As a result, 10 people were injured.
And there are hundreds of such examples. But if the situations above are examples of the exposure of soldiers and troops, then further I want to give examples of how the Soviet army was equipped. To do this, let's turn to Beria's memorandum to Stalin No. 5516 / B dated December 14, 1939:
- In the Tulivara area, the 529th Rifle Corps needed 200 pairs of skis to bypass the enemy's fortifications. It was not possible to do this, since the Headquarters received 3000 pairs of skis with broken mottling.
- In the replenishment that arrived from the 363rd communications battalion, 30 vehicles require repair, and 500 people are dressed in summer uniforms.
- To replenish the 9th Army, the 51st Corps Artillery Regiment arrived. Missing: 72 tractors, 65 trailers. Of the 37 tractors that arrived, only 9 were in good condition, and 90 of the 150 tractors. 80% of the personnel were not provided with winter uniforms.
It is not surprising that against the background of such events, there was desertion in the Red Army. For example, on December 14, 430 people deserted from the 64th Infantry Division.
Help Finland from other countries
In the Soviet-Finnish war, many countries provided assistance to Finland. To demonstrate, I will cite Beria's report to Stalin and Molotov No. 5455 / B.
Helping Finland:
- Sweden - 8 thousand people. Mostly reserve staff. They are commanded by regular officers who are on vacation.
- Italy - the number is unknown.
- Hungary - 150 people. Italy demands to increase the number.
- England - 20 fighter planes are known, although the actual figure is higher.
The best proof that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was supported by the Western countries of Finland is the speech of the Minister of Finland Greensberg on December 27, 1939 at 07:15 to the English agency Gavas. The following is a literal translation from English.
The Finnish people are grateful to the English, French and other nations for their help..
Greensberg, Minister of Finland
Obviously, the Western countries opposed the USSR's aggression against Finland. This was expressed, among other things, by the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations.
I also want to give a photo of Beria's report on the intervention of France and England in the Soviet-Finnish war.
Making peace
On February 28, the USSR handed over to Finland its conditions for concluding peace. The negotiations themselves took place in Moscow on March 8-12. After these negotiations, the Soviet-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. The terms of the peace were as follows:
- The USSR received the Karelian Isthmus along with Vyborg (Viipuri), the bay and the islands.
- Western and Northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, together with the cities of Kexholm, Suoyarvi and Sortavala.
- Islands in the Gulf of Finland.
- The island of Hanko with the maritime territory and the base was leased to the USSR for 50 years. The USSR annually paid 8 million German marks for rent.
- The agreement between Finland and the USSR of 1920 has lost its force.
- On March 13, 1940, hostilities ceased.
Below is a map showing the territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the signing of the peace treaty.
USSR losses
The question of the number of dead Soviet soldiers during the Soviet-Finnish war is still open. official history does not answer the question, speaking covertly about "minimal" losses and focusing on the fact that the tasks have been achieved. In those days, they did not talk about the scale of the losses of the Red Army. The figure was deliberately underestimated, demonstrating the successes of the army. In fact, the losses were huge. To do this, just look at report No. 174 of December 21, which provides figures on the losses of the 139th Infantry Division for 2 weeks of fighting (November 30 - December 13). Losses are as follows:
- Commanders - 240.
- Privates - 3536.
- Rifles - 3575.
- Light machine guns - 160.
- Machine guns - 150.
- Tanks - 5.
- Armored vehicles - 2.
- Tractors - 10.
- Trucks - 14.
- Horse composition - 357.
Belyanov's memorandum No. 2170 dated December 27 talks about the losses of the 75th Infantry Division. Total losses: senior commanders - 141, junior commanders - 293, privates - 3668, tanks - 20, machine guns - 150, rifles - 1326, armored vehicles - 3.
This is data for 2 divisions (much more fought) for 2 weeks of fighting, when the first week was a “warm-up” - the Soviet army advanced relatively without losses until it reached the Mannerheim Line. And for these 2 weeks, of which only the last one was really combat, OFFICIAL figures- loss of more than 8 thousand people! A huge number of people got frostbite.
On March 26, 1940, at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, data on the losses of the USSR in the war with Finland were announced - 48,745 killed and 158,863 injured and frostbitten. These figures are official, and therefore greatly underestimated. Today, historians call different figures for the losses of the Soviet army. It is said about the dead from 150 to 500 thousand people. For example, the Book of Records of Combat Losses of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army states that 131,476 people died, went missing or died of wounds in the war with the White Finns. At the same time, the data of that time did not take into account the losses of the Navy, and for a long time people who died in hospitals after wounds and frostbite were not taken into account as losses. Today, most historians agree that about 150 thousand soldiers of the Red Army died during the war, excluding the losses of the Navy and border troops.
Finnish losses are called the following: 23 thousand dead and missing, 45 thousand wounded, 62 aircraft, 50 tanks, 500 guns.
Results and consequences of the war
The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, even with a brief study, indicates both absolutely negative and absolutely positive moments. Negative - a nightmare of the first months of the war and a huge number of victims. By and large, it was December 1939 and the beginning of January 1940 that demonstrated to the whole world that the Soviet army was weak. So it really was. But there was also a positive moment in this: the Soviet leadership saw the real strength of their army. We have been told since childhood that the Red Army has been the strongest in the world almost since 1917, but this is extremely far from reality. The only major test of this army is Civil War. We will not analyze the reasons for the victory of the Reds over the Whites now (after all, we are talking about the Winter War), but the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks lie not in the army. To demonstrate this, it is enough to cite one quote from Frunze, which he voiced at the end of the Civil War.
All this army rabble must be disbanded as soon as possible.
Frunze
Before the war with Finland, the leadership of the USSR hovered in the clouds, believing that it had a strong army. But December 1939 showed that this was not the case. The army was extremely weak. But starting from January 1940, changes were made (personnel and organizational) that changed the course of the war, and which in many ways prepared a combat-ready army for the Patriotic War. It is very easy to prove this. Almost the entire December of the 39th Red Army stormed the Mannerheim Line - there was no result. On February 11, 1940, the Mannerheim Line was broken through in 1 day. This breakthrough was possible because it was carried out by another army, more disciplined, organized, trained. And the Finns did not have a single chance against such an army, so Mannerheim, who served as Minister of Defense, already then began to talk about the need for peace.
Prisoners of war and their fate
The number of prisoners of war during the Soviet-Finnish war was impressive. At the time of the war, it was said about 5393 captured Red Army soldiers and 806 captured White Finns. The captured fighters of the Red Army were divided into the following groups:
- political leadership. It was precisely political affiliation that was important, without highlighting the title.
- Officers. This group included persons equated to officers.
- junior officers.
- Privates.
- National minorities
- Defectors.
Particular attention was paid to national minorities. The attitude towards them in Finnish captivity was more loyal than towards the representatives of the Russian people. The perks were minor, but they were there. At the end of the war, a mutual exchange of all prisoners was carried out, regardless of their belonging to one group or another.
On April 19, 1940, Stalin orders everyone who has been in Finnish captivity to be sent to the Southern Camp of the NKVD. Below is a quote from the Politburo resolution.
All those returned by the Finnish authorities should be sent to the Southern Camp. Within three months, ensure the fullness of the necessary measures to identify persons processed by foreign intelligence services. Pay attention to dubious and alien elements, as well as those who voluntarily surrendered. In all cases, take cases to court.
Stalin
The southern camp, located in the Ivanovo region, began work on April 25. Already on May 3, Beria sent a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Timoshchenko, announcing that 5277 people had arrived in the Camp. On June 28, Beria sends a new report. According to him, the Southern Camp "accepts" 5157 Red Army soldiers and 293 officers. Of these, 414 people were convicted of treason and treason.
The myth of war - Finnish "cuckoos"
"Cuckoos" - so soviet soldiers called snipers who continuously fired at the red army. It was said that these are professional Finnish snipers who sit on trees and hit almost without a miss. The reason for such attention to snipers is their high efficiency and the inability to determine the point of the shot. But the problem in determining the point of the shot was not that the shooter was in a tree, but that the terrain created an echo. It disorientated the soldiers.
Stories about "cuckoos" is one of the myths that the Soviet-Finnish war gave rise to in large numbers. It is hard to imagine in 1939 a sniper who, at temperatures below -30 degrees, is able to sit on a tree for days, while making accurate shots.
75 years ago, on November 30, 1939, the Winter War (Soviet-Finnish War) began. The winter war was almost unknown to the inhabitants of Russia for quite a long time. In the 1980s-1990s, when it was possible to blaspheme the history of Russia-USSR with impunity, the point of view dominated that "bloody Stalin" wanted to capture "innocent" Finland, but small, but proud northern people rebuffed the northern "Evil Empire". Thus, Stalin was blamed not only for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, but also for the fact that Finland was "forced" to enter into an alliance with Nazi Germany in order to resist the "aggression" of the Soviet Union.
Many books and articles denounced the Soviet Mordor, which attacked little Finland. They called absolutely fantastic numbers of Soviet losses, reported heroic Finnish machine gunners and snipers, nonsense Soviet generals and much more. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the Kremlin were completely denied. They say that the irrational malice of the "bloody dictator" is to blame.
In order to understand why Moscow went to this war, it is necessary to remember the history of Finland. Finnish tribes for a long time were on the periphery of the Russian state and the Swedish kingdom. Some of them became part of Russia, became "Russians". The fragmentation and weakening of Russia led to the fact that the Finnish tribes were conquered and subjugated by Sweden. The Swedes pursued a colonization policy in the traditions of the West. Finland did not have administrative or even cultural autonomy. The official language was Swedish, it was spoken by the nobility and the entire educated population.
Russia , having taken Finland from Sweden in 1809, in fact, gave the Finns statehood, allowed the creation of basic state institutions, and the formation of a national economy. Finland received its own authorities, currency and even an army as part of Russia. At the same time, the Finns did not pay general taxes and did not fight for Russia. Finnish language, while maintaining the status of the Swedish language, received the status of the state. The authorities of the Russian Empire practically did not interfere in the affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland. The policy of Russification in Finland was not carried out for a long time (some elements appeared only in late period but it was too late). The resettlement of Russians in Finland was actually prohibited. Moreover, the Russians living in the Grand Duchy were in an unequal position in relation to the local residents. In addition, in 1811, the Vyborg province was transferred to the Grand Duchy, which included the lands that Russia recaptured from Sweden in the 18th century. Moreover, Vyborg was of great military and strategic importance in relation to the capital of the Russian Empire - Petersburg. Thus, the Finns in the Russian “prison of peoples” lived better than the Russians themselves, who bore all the hardships of building an empire and defending it from numerous enemies.
The collapse of the Russian Empire gave Finland its independence. Finland thanked Russia by first entering into an alliance with Kaiser Germany, and then with the powers of the Entente ( Read more in a series of articles - How Russia Created Finnish Statehood; Part 2; Finland allied with Imperial Germany against Russia; Part 2; Finland is in alliance with the Entente against Russia. First Soviet-Finnish war; Part 2 ). On the eve of World War II, Finland was in a hostile position towards Russia, leaning towards an alliance with the Third Reich.
For the majority of Russian citizens, Finland is associated with a "small cozy European country", with civilians and cultural residents. This was facilitated by a kind of "political correctness" in relation to Finland, which reigned in the late Soviet propaganda. Finland, after the defeat in the war of 1941-1944, received good lesson and made the most of its proximity to the vast Soviet Union. Therefore, in the USSR they did not remember that the Finns attacked the USSR three times in 1918, 1921 and 1941. They chose to forget about this for the sake of good relations.
Finland was not a peaceful neighbor of Soviet Russia.The separation of Finland from Russia was not peaceful. The Civil War began between the white and red Finns. White was supported by Germany. The Soviet government refrained from large-scale support for the Reds. Therefore, with the help of the Germans, the White Finns prevailed. The victors created a network of concentration camps, unleashed the White Terror, during which tens of thousands of people died (during the hostilities themselves, only a few thousand people died on both sides).In addition to the Reds and their supporters, the Finns "cleaned up" the Russian community in Finland.Moreover, the majority of Russians in Finland, including refugees from Russia who fled from the Bolsheviks, did not support the Reds and the Soviet government. Exterminated former officers of the tsarist army, their families, representatives of the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, numerous students, the entire Russian population indiscriminately, women, old people and children . Significant material assets belonging to the Russians were confiscated.
The Finns were going to put a German king on the throne of Finland. However, Germany's defeat in the war led to Finland becoming a republic. After that, Finland began to focus on the powers of the Entente. Finland was not satisfied with independence, the Finnish elite wanted more, claiming Russian Karelia, the Kola Peninsula, and the most radical figures made plans to build a "Greater Finland" with the inclusion of Arkhangelsk, and Russian lands up to the Northern Urals, Ob and Yenisei (Urals and Western Siberia considered the ancestral home of the Finno-Ugric language family).
The leadership of Finland, like Poland, was not satisfied with the existing borders, preparing for war. Poland had territorial claims to almost all of its neighbors - Lithuania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Germany, the Polish lords dreamed of restoring a great power "from sea to sea." This is more or less known in Russia. But few people know that the Finnish elite raved about a similar idea, the creation of a "Greater Finland". The ruling elite also set the goal of creating a Greater Finland. The Finns did not want to get involved with the Swedes, but they claimed Soviet lands, which were larger than Finland itself. The appetites of the radicals were boundless, stretching all the way to the Urals and further to the Ob and Yenisei.
And for starters, they wanted to capture Karelia. Soviet Russia was torn apart by the Civil War, and the Finns wanted to take advantage of this. So, in February 1918, General K. Mannerheim declared that "he would not sheathe his sword until East Karelia was liberated from the Bolsheviks." Mannerheim planned to seize Russian lands along the line of the White Sea - Lake Onega - the Svir River - Lake Ladoga, which was supposed to facilitate the defense of new lands. It was also planned to include the region of Pechenga (Petsamo) and the Kola Peninsula into Greater Finland. They wanted to separate Petrograd from Soviet Russia and make it a "free city" like Danzig. May 15, 1918 Finland declared war on Russia. Even before the official declaration of war, Finnish volunteer detachments began to conquer Eastern Karelia.
Soviet Russia was busy fighting on other fronts, so she did not have the strength to defeat her arrogant neighbor. However, the Finnish attack on Petrozavodsk and Olonets, the campaign against Petrograd through the Karelian Isthmus failed. And after the defeat of the white army of Yudenich, the Finns had to make peace. From July 10 to July 14, 1920, peace negotiations were held in Tartu. The Finns demanded that Karelia be handed over to them, the Soviet side refused. In the summer, the Red Army drove the last Finnish detachments out of Karelian territory. The Finns held only two volosts - Rebola and Porosozero. This made them more accommodating. There was no hope for Western help either; the Entente powers had already realized that the intervention in Soviet Russia had failed. On October 14, 1920, the Tartu Peace Treaty was signed between the RSFSR and Finland. The Finns were able to get the Pechenga volost, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula, and most of the Sredny Peninsula and the islands, west of the boundary line in the Barents Sea. Rebola and Porosozero were returned to Russia.
This did not satisfy Helsinki. The plans for the construction of "Greater Finland" were not abandoned, they were only postponed. In 1921, Finland again tried to solve the Karelian issue by force. Finnish volunteer detachments, without declaring war, invaded Soviet territory, the Second Soviet-Finnish War began. Soviet forces in February 1922 fully liberated the territory of Karelia from invaders. In March, an agreement was signed on the adoption of measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border.
But even after this failure, the Finns did not cool down. Situation on Finnish border was constantly tense. Many, remembering the USSR, imagine a huge mighty power that defeated the Third Reich, took Berlin, sent the first man into space and made the entire Western world tremble. Like, how little Finland could threaten the huge northern "evil empire." However, the USSR 1920-1930s. was a great power only in terms of territory and its potential. The real policy of Moscow then was extra-cautious. In fact, for quite a long time, Moscow, until it got stronger, pursued an extremely flexible policy, most often giving in, not climbing on the rampage.
For example, the Japanese plundered our waters near the Kamchatka Peninsula for quite a long time. Under the protection of their warships, Japanese fishermen not only fished out all the living creatures from our waters worth millions of gold rubles, but also freely landed on our shores for repair, processing of fish, obtaining fresh water, etc. Until Khasan and Khalkin-gol, when The USSR gained strength thanks to successful industrialization, received a powerful military-industrial complex and strong armed forces, the red commanders had strict orders to contain Japanese troops only on their territory, without crossing the border. A similar situation was in the Russian North, where Norwegian fishermen fished in the internal waters of the USSR. And when the Soviet border guards tried to protest, Norway took warships to the White Sea.
Of course, in Finland they no longer wanted to fight the USSR alone. Finland has become a friend of any power hostile to Russia. As the first Finnish Prime Minister Per Evind Svinhufvud noted: "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland." Against this background, Finland made friends even with Japan. Japanese officers began to come to Finland for training. In Finland, as in Poland, they were afraid of any strengthening of the USSR, since their leadership based their calculations on the fact that a war of some great Western power with Russia was inevitable (or a war between Japan and the USSR), and they would be able to profit from Russian lands . Inside Finland, the press was constantly hostile to the USSR, conducted almost open propaganda for attacking Russia and seizing its territories. On the Soviet-Finnish border, all kinds of provocations constantly took place on land, at sea and in the air.
After the hopes for an early conflict between Japan and the USSR did not come true, the Finnish leadership headed for a close alliance with Germany. The two countries were linked by close military-technical cooperation. With the consent of Finland, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center (the Cellarius Bureau) was created in the country. His main task was carrying out intelligence work against the USSR. First of all, the Germans were interested in data on the Baltic Fleet, formations of the Leningrad Military District and industry in the northwestern part of the USSR. By the beginning of 1939, Finland, with the help of German specialists, built a network of military airfields, which was capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. Very indicative is the fact that even before the start of the war of 1939-1940. identification mark Finnish Air Force and armored forces had the Finnish swastika.
Thus, by the beginning of the big war in Europe, we had a clearly hostile, aggressive-minded state on the northwestern borders, whose elite dreamed of building a “Great Finland at the expense of Russian (Soviet) lands and was ready to be friends with any potential enemy of the USSR. Helsinki was ready to fight with the USSR both in alliance with Germany and Japan, and with the help of England and France.
The Soviet leadership understood everything perfectly and, seeing the approach of a new world war, sought to secure the northwestern borders. Of particular importance was Leningrad - the second capital of the USSR, a powerful industrial, scientific and cultural center, as well as the main base of the Baltic Fleet. Finnish long-range artillery could bombard the city from its border, and ground troops get to Leningrad in one jerk. The fleet of a potential enemy (Germany or England and France) could easily break through to Kronstadt, and then to Leningrad. To protect the city, it was necessary to move the land border on land, as well as to restore the distant line of defense at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, having received a place for fortifications on the northern and southern shores. The largest fleet of the Soviet Union, the Baltic, was actually blocked in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. The Baltic Fleet had a single base - Kronstadt. Kronstadt and Soviet ships could be hit by long-range coastal defense guns in Finland. This situation could not satisfy the Soviet leadership.
With Estonia, the issue was resolved peacefully. In September 1939, an agreement on mutual assistance was concluded between the USSR and Estonia. A Soviet military contingent was introduced into the territory of Estonia. The USSR received the rights to create military bases on the islands of Ezel and Dago, in Paldiski and Haapsalu.
It was not possible to agree with Finland in an amicable way. Although negotiations began in 1938. Moscow has tried literally everything. She offered to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance and jointly defend the Gulf of Finland zone, give the USSR the opportunity to create a base on the Finnish coast (Hanko Peninsula), sell or lease several islands in the Gulf of Finland. It was also proposed to move the border near Leningrad. As compensation, the Soviet Union offered much larger areas of Eastern Karelia, preferential loans, economic benefits, etc. However, all proposals were categorically refused by the Finnish side. It is impossible not to note the instigating role of London. The British told the Finns that it was necessary to take a firm stand and not succumb to pressure from Moscow. This encouraged Helsinki.
Finland began a general mobilization and evacuation of the civilian population from the border areas. At the same time, left-wing activists were arrested. Incidents have become more frequent at the border. So, on November 26, 1939, there was a border incident near the village of Mainila. According to Soviet data, Finnish artillery shelled Soviet territory. The Finnish side declared the USSR to be the culprit of the provocation. On November 28, the Soviet government announced the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland. On November 30, the war began. Its results are known. Moscow solved the problem of ensuring the security of Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet. We can say that only thanks to the Winter War, the enemy was not able to capture the second capital of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.
Finland is currently drifting towards the West, NATO again, so it's worth keeping a close eye on it. The "cozy and cultured" country can again recall the plans of "Great Finland" up to the Northern Urals. Finland and Sweden are thinking about joining NATO, and the Baltic states and Poland are literally turning into advanced NATO springboards for aggression against Russia before our very eyes. And Ukraine is becoming a tool for war with Russia in the southwestern direction.
Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–40 (another name is winter war) took place from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.
The formal reason for the hostilities was the so-called Mainil incident - shelling from the Finnish territory of the Soviet border guards in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, which occurred, according to the Soviet side, on November 26, 1939. The Finnish side categorically denied any involvement in the shelling. Two days later, on November 28, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact, concluded in 1932, and on November 30 began hostilities.
The underlying causes of the conflict were based on a number of factors, not the least of which was the fact that in 1918-22 Finland twice attacked the territory of the RSFSR. According to the results of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 and the Moscow Agreement on the adoption of measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border of 1922 between the governments of the RSFSR and Finland, the primordially Russian Pecheneg region (Petsamo) and part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas were transferred to Finland.
Despite the fact that in 1932 a non-aggression pact was signed between Finland and the USSR, relations between the two countries were rather tense. In Finland, they feared that sooner or later the Soviet Union, which had strengthened many times since 1922, would want to return its territories, and in the USSR they were afraid that Finland, as in 1919 (when British torpedo boats attacked Kronstadt from Finnish ports), could provide its territory to another hostile country to attack. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the second most important city in the USSR - Leningrad - was only 32 kilometers from the Soviet-Finnish border.
During this period, the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland and secret consultations were held with the governments of Poland and the Baltic countries on joint actions in the event of a war with the USSR. In 1939, the USSR signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In accordance with the secret protocols to it, Finland retreats to the zone of interests of the Soviet Union.
In 1938-39, during lengthy negotiations with Finland, the USSR tried to achieve an exchange of part of the Karelian Isthmus for twice the area, but less suitable for agricultural use, in Karelia, as well as the transfer of the USSR to lease several islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula for military bases. Finland, firstly, did not agree with the size of the territories given to it (not least because of the unwillingness to part with the line of defensive fortifications built in the 30s, also known as the Mannerheim Line (see Fig. and ), and secondly, she tried to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the right to arm the demilitarized Aland Islands.
The negotiations were very difficult and were accompanied by mutual reproaches and accusations (see: ). The last attempt was the proposal of the USSR on October 5, 1939 to conclude a Mutual Assistance Pact with Finland.
Negotiations dragged on and reached an impasse. The parties began to prepare for war.
On October 13-14, 1939, general mobilization was announced in Finland. And two weeks later, on November 3, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to start preparing for hostilities. Newspaper article "Truth" on the same day reported that the Soviet Union intended to ensure its security at any cost. A massive anti-Finnish campaign began in the Soviet press, to which the opposite side immediately responded.
Less than a month remained before the Mainilsky incident, which served as a formal pretext for war.
Most Western and a number of Russian researchers believe that the shelling was a fiction - either it did not exist at all, and there were only allegations of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, or the shelling was a provocation. Documents confirming this or that version have not been preserved. Finland proposed a joint investigation of the incident, but the Soviet side firmly rejected the proposal.
Immediately after the start of the war, official relations with the Ryti government were terminated, and on December 2, 1939, the USSR signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship with the so-called « People's Government Finland", formed from communists and led by Otto Kuusinen. At the same time, in the USSR, on the basis of the 106th Mountain Rifle Division, began to form "Finnish People's Army" from Finns and Karelians. However, she did not take part in the hostilities and was eventually disbanded, like the Kuusinen government.
The Soviet Union planned to deploy military operations in two main directions - the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line of fortifications from the north), the Red Army got the opportunity to make the most of the advantage in manpower and the overwhelming advantage in technology. In terms of time, the operation had to meet the period from two weeks to a month. The Finnish command, in turn, counted on the stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern sector, believing that the army would be able to independently hold the enemy up to six months and then wait for help from Western countries. Both plans turned out to be an illusion: the Soviet Union underestimated the strength of Finland, while Finland placed too much stake on the help of foreign powers and on the reliability of its fortifications.
As already mentioned, by the beginning of hostilities in Finland, general mobilization took place. The USSR, however, decided to confine itself to parts of the LenVO, believing that additional involvement of forces would not be required. At the start of the war, the USSR concentrated 425,640 personnel, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, and 2,446 aircraft for the operation. They were opposed by 265,000 people, 834 guns, 64 tanks and 270 aircraft.
As part of the Red Army, units of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies advanced on Finland. The 7th army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in Karelia, the 14th - in the Arctic.
The most favorable situation for the USSR developed on the front of the 14th Army, which, interacting with the Northern Fleet, occupied the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea. The 9th Army penetrated the Finnish defenses to a depth of 35-45 km and was stopped (see. ). The 8th Army initially began to successfully move forward, but was also stopped, and part of its forces were surrounded and forced to withdraw. The most difficult and bloody battles unfolded in the sector of the 7th Army, advancing on the Karelian Isthmus. The army was to storm the Mannerheim Line.
As it turned out later, the Soviet side had fragmentary and extremely scarce data about the enemy opposing it on the Karelian Isthmus, and, most importantly, about the line of fortifications. The underestimation of the enemy immediately affected the course of hostilities. The forces allocated to break through the Finnish defenses in this area turned out to be insufficient. By December 12, units of the Red Army, with losses, were able to overcome only the support strip of the Mannerheim Line and stopped. Until the end of December, several desperate attempts to break through were made, but they were also unsuccessful. By the end of December, it became obvious that it was pointless to attempt an offensive in this style. There was a relative calm at the front.
Having understood and studied the reasons for the failure in the first period of the war, the Soviet command undertook a serious reorganization of forces and means. Throughout January and early February, there was a significant strengthening of the troops, their saturation with large-caliber artillery capable of fighting fortifications, replenishment of material reserves, and reorganization of units and formations. Methods were developed to combat defensive structures, mass exercises and training of personnel were carried out, assault groups and detachments were formed, work was carried out to improve the interaction of military branches, to raise fighting spirit(cm. ).
The USSR learned quickly. To break through the fortified area, the North-Western Front was created under the command of the commander of the 1st rank Timoshenko and a member of the military council of the LenVO Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies.
Finland at that moment also carried out measures to increase the combat capability of its own troops. Both captured in battles and new equipment and weapons delivered from abroad, the units received the necessary replenishment.
Both sides were ready for the second round of the fight.
At the same time, fighting in Karelia did not stop.
The most famous in the historiography of the Soviet-Finnish war during that period was the encirclement of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the 9th army near Suomussalmi. From mid-December, the 44th division advanced to help the encircled 163rd division. In the period from January 3 to 7, 1940, its units were repeatedly surrounded, but, despite the difficult situation, they continued to fight, having superiority in technical equipment over the Finns. In conditions of constant fighting, in a rapidly changing situation, the division command incorrectly assessed the current situation and gave the order to leave the encirclement in groups, leaving heavy equipment. This only made the situation worse. Parts of the division still managed to break out of the encirclement, but with heavy losses ... Subsequently, the division commander Vinogradov, the regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the chief of staff Volkov, who left the division at the most difficult moment, were sentenced by a military tribunal to capital punishment and shot in front of the ranks.
It is also worth noting that since the end of December, the Finns have been trying to counterattack on the Karelian Isthmus in order to disrupt the preparations for a new Soviet offensive. Counterattacks were not successful and were repulsed.
On February 11, 1940, after a massive multi-day artillery preparation, the Red Army, together with units of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, launched a new offensive. The main blow fell on the Karelian Isthmus. Within three days, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Finns and introduced tank formations into the breakthrough. On February 17, Finnish troops, by order of the command, retreated to the second lane due to the threat of encirclement.
On February 21, the 7th Army reached the second line of defense, and the 13th Army - to the main line north of Muolaa. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive along the entire length of the Karelian Isthmus. Finnish troops retreated, putting up fierce resistance. In an attempt to stop the advancing units of the Red Army, the Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, but this did not help either: on March 13, Soviet troops entered Vyborg.
Parallel to the fighting, there were also battles on the diplomatic front. After the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line and the entry of Soviet troops into the operational space, the Finnish government understood that there was no chance of continuing the struggle. Therefore, it turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was signed.
As a result of the war, the Karelian Isthmus and the large cities of Vyborg and Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga became an inland lake of the USSR. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region captured during the fighting was returned to Finland. The USSR leased part of the Khanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.
At the same time, the reputation of the Soviet state in the international arena suffered: the USSR was declared an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations. Mutual distrust between the Western countries and the USSR reached a critical point.
Recommended literature:
1. Irincheev Bair. Forgotten front of Stalin. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. (Series: unknown wars 20th century.)
2. Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 / Comp. P. Petrov, V. Stepakov. SP b .: Polygon, 2003. In 2 volumes.
3. Tanner Väinö. Winter war. Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland, 1939-1940. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
4. "Winter War": work on the mistakes (April-May 1940). Materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on the generalization of the experience of the Finnish campaign / Ed. comp. N. S. Tarkhova. SP b., Summer Garden, 2003.
Tatiana Vorontsova
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