Identification marks of ss divisions. What were the armed forces of the Third Reich at the beginning of the war with the USSR

Thanks to Soviet films about the war, most people have a strong opinion that the mass small arms (photo below) of the German infantry during the Second World War is an automatic machine (submachine gun) of the Schmeisser system, which is named after its designer. This myth is still actively supported by domestic cinema. However, in fact, this popular machine gun was never a mass weapon of the Wehrmacht, and Hugo Schmeisser did not create it at all. However, first things first.

How myths are created

Everyone should remember the shots from domestic films dedicated to the attacks of the German infantry on our positions. Brave blond guys walk without bending down, while firing from machine guns “from the hip”. And the most interesting thing is that this fact does not surprise anyone, except for those who were in the war. According to the movies, the "Schmeissers" could conduct aimed fire at the same distance as the rifles of our fighters. In addition, the viewer, when watching these films, had the impression that the entire personnel of the German infantry during the Second World War was armed with machine guns. In fact, everything was different, and the submachine gun is not a mass small arms weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it is impossible to shoot from it “from the hip”, and it is not called “Schmeisser” at all. In addition, to carry out an attack on a trench by a submachine gunners unit, in which there are fighters armed with magazine rifles, is an obvious suicide, since simply no one would have reached the trenches.

Debunking the Myth: The MP-40 Automatic Pistol

This Wehrmacht small arms in WWII is officially called the MP-40 submachine gun (Maschinenpistole). In fact, this is a modification of the MP-36 assault rifle. The designer of this model, contrary to popular belief, was not the gunsmith H. Schmeisser, but the no less famous and talented craftsman Heinrich Volmer. And why is the nickname “Schmeisser” so firmly entrenched behind him? The thing is that Schmeisser owned a patent for the store that is used in this submachine gun. And in order not to violate his copyright, in the first batches of MP-40, the inscription PATENT SCHMEISSER was stamped on the store receiver. When these machine guns came as trophies to the soldiers of the allied armies, they mistakenly thought that the author of this model of small arms, of course, was Schmeisser. This is how the given nickname was fixed for the MP-40.

Initially, the German command armed only command staff with machine guns. So, in the infantry units, only the commanders of battalions, companies and squads should have MP-40s. Later, drivers of armored vehicles, tankers and paratroopers were supplied with automatic pistols. Massively, no one armed the infantry with them either in 1941 or after. According to the archives in 1941, the troops had only 250 thousand MP-40 assault rifles, and this is for 7,234,000 people. As you can see, a submachine gun is not at all a mass weapon of the Second World War. In general, for the entire period - from 1939 to 1945 - only 1.2 million of these machine guns were produced, while over 21 million people were called up in the Wehrmacht.

Why were the infantry not armed with the MP-40?

Despite the fact that experts later recognized that the MP-40 is the best small arms of the Second World War, only a few of them had it in the infantry units of the Wehrmacht. This is explained simply: the aiming range of this machine gun for group targets is only 150 m, and for single targets - 70 m. This despite the fact that Soviet soldiers were armed with Mosin and Tokarev (SVT) rifles, the aiming range of which was 800 m for group targets and 400 m for single targets. If the Germans fought with such weapons, as shown in domestic films, then they would never have been able to reach the enemy trenches, they would simply have been shot, as in a shooting gallery.

Shooting on the move "from the hip"

The MP-40 submachine gun vibrates a lot when firing, and if you use it, as shown in the films, the bullets will always miss the target. Therefore, for effective shooting, it must be pressed tightly against the shoulder, after unfolding the butt. In addition, this machine gun was never fired in long bursts, as it quickly heated up. Most often they were beaten in a short burst of 3-4 rounds or fired single shots. Despite the fact that the tactical and technical characteristics indicate that the rate of fire is 450-500 rounds per minute, in practice this result has never been achieved.

Advantages of the MP-40

It cannot be said that this rifle was bad, on the contrary, it is very, very dangerous, but it must be used in close combat. That is why sabotage units were armed with it in the first place. They were also often used by scouts of our army, and the partisans respected this machine gun. The use of light, rapid-fire small arms in close combat provided tangible advantages. Even now, the MP-40 is very popular with criminals, and the price of such a machine is very high. And they are delivered there by “black archaeologists”, who excavate in places of military glory and very often find and restore weapons from the Second World War.

Mauser 98k

What can you say about this rifle? The most common small arms in Germany are the Mauser rifle. Its aiming range is up to 2000 m when firing. As you can see, this parameter is very close to the Mosin and SVT rifles. This carbine was developed back in 1888. During the war, this design was significantly upgraded, mainly to reduce costs, as well as to rationalize production. In addition, this Wehrmacht small arms were equipped with optical sights, and sniper units were equipped with it. The Mauser rifle at that time was in service with many armies, for example, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Sweden.

Self-loading rifles

At the end of 1941, the first automatic self-loading rifles of the Walther G-41 and Mauser G-41 systems entered the infantry units of the Wehrmacht for military trials. Their appearance was due to the fact that the Red Army was armed with more than one and a half million such systems: SVT-38, SVT-40 and ABC-36. In order not to be inferior to the Soviet fighters, the German gunsmiths urgently had to develop their own versions of such rifles. As a result of the tests, the G-41 system (Walter system) was recognized and adopted as the best. The rifle is equipped with a trigger-type percussion mechanism. Designed for firing only single shots. Equipped with a magazine with a capacity of ten rounds. This automatic self-loading rifle is designed for aimed fire at a distance of up to 1200 m. However, due to the large weight of this weapon, as well as low reliability and sensitivity to pollution, it was released in a small series. In 1943, the designers, having eliminated these shortcomings, proposed an upgraded version of the G-43 (Walter system), which was produced in the amount of several hundred thousand units. Before its appearance, Wehrmacht soldiers preferred to use captured Soviet (!) SVT-40 rifles.

And now back to the German gunsmith Hugo Schmeisser. He developed two systems, without which the Second World War could not have done.

Small arms - MP-41

This model was developed simultaneously with the MP-40. This machine was significantly different from the Schmeisser familiar to everyone from the movies: it had a handguard trimmed with wood, which protected the fighter from burns, was heavier and longer-barreled. However, this Wehrmacht small arms were not widely used and were not produced for long. In total, about 26 thousand units were produced. It is believed that the German army abandoned this machine in connection with the lawsuit of ERMA, which claimed that its patented design was illegally copied. Small arms MP-41 was used by parts of the Waffen SS. It was also successfully used by Gestapo units and mountain rangers.

MP-43, or StG-44

The next weapon of the Wehrmacht (photo below) was developed by Schmeisser in 1943. At first it was called MP-43, and later - StG-44, which means "assault rifle" (sturmgewehr). This automatic rifle in appearance, and in some technical characteristics, resembles (which appeared later), and differs significantly from the MP-40. Its range of aimed fire was up to 800 m. The StG-44 even provided for the possibility of mounting a 30 mm grenade launcher. For firing from cover, the designer developed a special nozzle, which was worn on the muzzle and changed the trajectory of the bullet by 32 degrees. This weapon entered mass production only in the fall of 1944. During the war years, about 450 thousand of these rifles were produced. So few of the German soldiers managed to use such a machine gun. StG-44s were supplied to the elite units of the Wehrmacht and to Waffen SS units. Subsequently, this weapon of the Wehrmacht was used in

FG-42 automatic rifles

These copies were intended for parachute troops. They combined the fighting qualities of a light machine gun and an automatic rifle. The Rheinmetall company took up the development of weapons already during the war, when, after evaluating the results of airborne operations carried out by the Wehrmacht, it turned out that the MP-38 submachine guns did not fully meet the combat requirements of this type of troops. The first tests of this rifle were carried out in 1942, and at the same time it was put into service. In the process of using the mentioned weapon, shortcomings were also revealed, associated with low strength and stability during automatic firing. In 1944, the upgraded FG-42 rifle (Model 2) was released, and Model 1 was discontinued. The trigger mechanism of this weapon allows automatic or single fire. The rifle is designed for the standard 7.92 mm Mauser cartridge. Magazine capacity is 10 or 20 rounds. In addition, the rifle can be used to fire special rifle grenades. In order to increase stability when firing, a bipod is fixed under the barrel. The FG-42 rifle is designed for firing at a range of 1200 m. Due to the high cost, it was produced in limited quantities: only 12 thousand units of both models.

Luger P08 and Walter P38

Now consider what types of pistols were in service with the German army. "Luger", its second name "Parabellum", had a caliber of 7.65 mm. By the beginning of the war, the units of the German army had more than half a million of these pistols. This small arms of the Wehrmacht was produced until 1942, and then it was replaced by a more reliable "Walter".

This pistol was put into service in 1940. It was intended for firing 9 mm rounds, the magazine capacity is 8 rounds. Sighting range at "Walter" - 50 meters. It was produced until 1945. The total number of P38 pistols produced was approximately 1 million units.

Weapons of World War II: MG-34, MG-42 and MG-45

In the early 30s, the German military decided to create a machine gun that could be used both as an easel and as a manual one. They were supposed to fire at enemy aircraft and arm tanks. The MG-34, designed by Rheinmetall and put into service in 1934, became such a machine gun. By the beginning of hostilities, the Wehrmacht had about 80 thousand units of this weapon. The machine gun allows you to fire both single shots and continuous. To do this, he had a trigger with two notches. When you click on the top, shooting was carried out with single shots, and when you click on the bottom - in bursts. It was intended for Mauser rifle cartridges 7.92x57 mm, with light or heavy bullets. And in the 40s, armor-piercing, armor-piercing tracer, armor-piercing incendiary and other types of cartridges were developed and used. This suggests the conclusion that the impetus for changes in weapons systems and tactics for their use was the Second World War.

The small arms that were used in this company were replenished with a new type of machine gun - MG-42. It was developed and put into service in 1942. The designers have greatly simplified and reduced the cost of the production of these weapons. So, in its production, spot welding and stamping were widely used, and the number of parts was reduced to 200. The trigger mechanism of the machine gun in question allowed only automatic firing - 1200-1300 rounds per minute. Such significant changes adversely affected the stability of the unit during firing. Therefore, to ensure accuracy, it was recommended to fire in short bursts. Ammunition for the new machine gun remained the same as for the MG-34. The range of aimed fire was two kilometers. Work on improving this design continued until the end of 1943, which led to the creation of a new modification, known as the MG-45.

This machine gun weighed only 6.5 kg, and the rate of fire was 2400 rounds per minute. By the way, not a single infantry machine gun of that time could boast of such a rate of fire. However, this modification appeared too late and was not in service with the Wehrmacht.

PzB-39 and Panzerschrek

PzB-39 was developed in 1938. This weapon of the Second World War was used with relative success at the initial stage to combat tankettes, tanks and armored vehicles with bulletproof armor. Against heavily armored B-1s, British Matildas and Churchills, Soviet T-34s and KVs), this gun was either ineffective or completely useless. As a result, it was soon replaced by anti-tank grenade launchers and reactive anti-tank guns "Pantsershrek", "Ofenror", as well as the famous "Faustpatrons". The PzB-39 used a 7.92 mm cartridge. The firing range was 100 meters, the penetration ability made it possible to "flash" 35-mm armor.

"Panzerschreck". This German light anti-tank weapon is a modified copy of the American Bazooka rocket-propelled gun. German designers provided him with a shield that protected the shooter from hot gases escaping from the grenade nozzle. Anti-tank companies of motorized rifle regiments of tank divisions were supplied as a matter of priority with these weapons. Rocket guns were exceptionally powerful weapons. "Panzershreki" were weapons for group use and had a service crew consisting of three people. Since they were very complex, their use required special training in calculations. In total, in 1943-1944, 314 thousand units of such guns and more than two million rocket-propelled grenades were produced for them.

Grenade launchers: "Faustpatron" and "Panzerfaust"

The early years of the Second World War showed that anti-tank guns could not cope with the tasks set, so the German military demanded anti-tank weapons with which to equip an infantryman, acting on the principle of "shot and thrown." The development of a disposable hand grenade launcher was started by HASAG in 1942 (chief designer Langweiler). And in 1943 mass production was launched. The first 500 Faustpatrons entered the troops in August of the same year. All models of this anti-tank grenade launcher had a similar design: they consisted of a barrel (smooth-bore seamless pipe) and an over-caliber grenade. An impact mechanism and an aiming device were welded to the outer surface of the barrel.

"Panzerfaust" is one of the most powerful modifications of the "Faustpatron", which was developed at the end of the war. Its firing range was 150 m, and its armor penetration was 280-320 mm. The Panzerfaust was a reusable weapon. The barrel of the grenade launcher is equipped with a pistol grip, in which there is a firing mechanism, the propellant charge was placed in the barrel. In addition, the designers were able to increase the speed of the grenade. In total, over eight million grenade launchers of all modifications were manufactured during the war years. This type of weapon inflicted significant losses on Soviet tanks. So, in the battles on the outskirts of Berlin, they knocked out about 30 percent of armored vehicles, and during street fighting in the capital of Germany - 70%.

Conclusion

The Second World War had a significant impact on small arms, including the world, its development and tactics of use. Based on its results, we can conclude that, despite the creation of the most modern weapons, the role of rifle units is not decreasing. The accumulated experience of using weapons in those years is still relevant today. In fact, it became the basis for the development and improvement of small arms.

The German Wehrmacht became a symbol of World War II.

Aftermath of Versailles

The victory of the Entente over Germany was crowned with the Treaty of Versailles, signed in Compiègne at the end of 1918. The incredibly difficult terms of surrender were supplemented by the demand for the virtual liquidation of the army. The German Republic was allowed to have a small professional army, with a total strength of one hundred thousand people, and an equally reduced naval force. The military structure created on the remains of the army was called the Reichwehr. Despite such a small number, the Reichwehr under the control of General von Seeckt managed to become the base for the deployment of the new army of the Third Reich and soon there were no those who did not know what the Wehrmacht was.

The revival of the army

The coming to power of the National Socialists led by Hitler in 1933 was aimed at getting Germany out of the rigid framework of the Treaty of Versailles. The Reichwehr had a well-trained and highly motivated manpower to transform it into a real army. The law on the Wehrmacht, adopted soon after Hitler took power, sharply expanded the scope of military development. Despite the planned increase in the armed forces by five times, in the early years it was not completely clear what the Wehrmacht was. Its appearance has not yet taken shape, which stands out for its dynamic aggressiveness, high discipline and readiness to fight with any enemy in any conditions. The Wehrmacht adopted the best traditions of the Prussian and German Imperial Army, receiving in addition to them a powerful ideological base based on the ideology of National Socialism.

Military ethics in the era of fascism

Nazi ideology had a significant impact on the personnel and fate of the Wehrmacht. Many perceive him as a party army, whose main task was to spread National Socialism to the occupied territories. To some extent, it was. But life is more complicated than dogmas, and inside the Wehrmacht the old Prussian and German military traditions remained in force. It was they who made him such a formidable adversary and a powerful instrument of Nazi domination. It is very difficult to formulate what the Wehrmacht is ideologically. It bizarrely combined soldier camaraderie and party fanaticism. Protecting the Fatherland and building a new ideological Empire. The creation of the SS troops, which accumulated the most fanatical elements, contributed to the preservation of the corporate spirit of the Wehrmacht.

The only war of the Wehrmacht

The war demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the army of Nazi Germany. When World War II began, the Wehrmacht represented the most powerful land army in the world. An excellent personnel base and the highest motivation were complemented by the industrial and scientific potential of Germany and Austria. The course of the war proved the highest combat capabilities of this army. But with maximum clarity, it became obvious that the best tool is useless to achieve adventurous goals. The history of the best army at the beginning of World War II warns against the temptation of repeating the sad experience. The Reich wanted war, and its army was the symbol of the word "war". The Wehrmacht as we know it today would not exist without her. The losses suffered during the battles changed the personnel composition. Instead of a highly professional army, the Wehrmacht was increasingly acquiring features. The adventurous line of the Reich leadership set before it the same overwhelming tasks. The restructuring of thinking from war for the conquest of territories to the defense of one's own country in such conditions turned out to be impossible. As the fronts were reduced, the rhetoric of propaganda changed, but its meaning did not change. The decline in professionalism, as a result of large losses, was not compensated by the influx of soldiers tuned in to the defense of the state. At the end of the war, the Wehrmacht looked like a loose conglomeration of separate combat-ready units, blurred by a demoralized mass of conscripts and Folssturmists. They did not have time to adopt Prussian military traditions in order to become soldiers, and did not have the motivation to die for

Defeat and consequences

The defeat of Nazi Germany by 1945 became inevitable. When the Second World War ended, the Wehrmacht ceased to exist. Together with him, much of what was the basis of the combat capability of the German army went into the past. Despite the declared anti-fascism, the Soviet Union most fully preserved the traditions and spirit of the Prussian army in the recreated army of the GDR. Perhaps this is due to the deep commonality inherent in Russian even before the First World War. Many soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht continued to serve in passing on old traditions to her. They managed to demonstrate this during the suppression of the Czechoslovak uprising in 1968. This event reminded what the Wehrmacht is. The German army underwent a greater transformation to interact with the Anglo-American troops, which had a completely different structure and history.

For some reason, it is believed that in June 1941, no less than 5 million Wehrmacht soldiers crossed the border with the USSR. This common myth is easily refuted.

The strength of the Wehrmacht in June 1941 reached:

7,234 thousand people (Müller-Gillebrandt) including:

1. active army – 3.8 million people

2. Reserve Army – 1.2 million people

3 . air force – 1.68 million people

4. SS troops – 0.15 million people

Explanation:

The reserve army of 1.2 million people did not participate in the aggression against the USSR. It was intended for military districts in Germany itself.

Hivi civilians were taken into account in the total number indicated above. At the beginning of the Second World War, they did not actively participate in battles.

WHERE WERE THE WEHRMACHT TROOPS?

The Wehrmacht in June 1941 had about 700,000 soldiers in France, Belgium and Holland, in case the Allies landed.

In the rest of the occupation zones—Norway, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, Crete, and Poland—nothing less than 1,000,000 soldiers were taken away from the Wehrmacht.

Riots and uprisings broke out regularly and a large number of Wehrmacht troops in the occupied territories were needed to maintain order.

The African corps of General Rommel had about 100,000 people. The total number of Wehrmat troops in the Middle East region reached 300,000 people.

HOW MANY WERMATE SOLDIERS CROSSED THE BORDER FROM THE USSR?

Müller-Hillebrandt, in his book German Land Army 1933-1945, gives the following figures for forces in the East:

1. In army groups (i.e. "North", "Center", "South" - ed. note) - 120.16 divisions - 76 infantry, 13.16 motorized, 17 tank, 9 security, 1 cavalry, 4 light , 1 mountain rifle division - the "tail" in 0.16 divisions arose due to the presence of formations that were not reduced in the division.

2. At the disposal of the OKH behind the front of the army groups - 14 divisions. (12 infantry, 1 mountain rifle and 1 police)

3. In the reserve of the Civil Code - 14 divisions. (11 infantry, 1 motorized and 2 tank)

4. In Finland - 3 divisions (2 mountain rifle, 1 motorized, 1 more infantry arrived at the end of June, but we will not count it)

And in total - 152.16 divisions, out of 208 divisions formed by the Wehrmacht. They include 99 infantry, 15.16 motorized, 19 tank, 4 light, 4 mountain rifle, 9 security, 1 police and 1 cavalry divisions, including SS divisions.

The real army

According to Muller-Gilebrandt, out of 3.8 million active army, 3.3 million people were concentrated for operations in the East.

If you look into Halder's "War Diary", we find that he defines the total number of the active army as 2.5 million people.

In fact, the figures of 3.3 million people. and 2,5 million people do not strongly contradict each other, since in addition to the actual divisions in the Wehrmacht (as in any other army) there were a sufficient number of units listed in the active army but essentially non-combat (builders, military doctors, etc., etc. ).

3.3 million Muller-Gillebrandt include both combat and non-combat units, and 2.5 million people. Halder - only combat units. So we will not be much mistaken in assuming the number of combat units of the Wehrmacht and the SS on the eastern front at the level of 2.5 million people.

Halder determined the number of combat units that in June could participate in hostilities against the USSR at 2.5 million people.

Echeloned formation

Before the attack on the USSR, the German army had a clearly defined echelon formation.

The first, strike echelon - army groups "North", "Center" "South" - included 120 divisions, incl. 3.5 SS motorized divisions.

The second echelon - so to speak, the operational reserve - was located directly behind the fronts of the army groups and consisted of 14 divisions.

The third echelon is the reserve of the main command, also consisting of 14 divisions.

That is, the attack went in three streams.

ALLIES OF THE WEHRMACHT

Most of them entered the war later than Germany and their participation at the very beginning was limited to only a few divisions.

Later, in 42-43, the number of the allied contingent reached 800,000 people.

Most of the allied troops were on the eastern front in 1943

RESULTS

In June 1941, 2.5 million soldiers crossed the border with the USSR. They were opposed by 1.8 million soldiers of the Red Army.

Directive No. 1 only supplemented the order to bring the troops to full combat readiness ... but the generals sabotaged it.

On June 20, they sent most of the flight squadrons on vacation, and on June 21, and most of the combat units - on "weekends", with festivities, etc.

In aviation, tanks and other weapons, the Red Army was many times superior to the Wehrmacht.

The myth of the overwhelming superiority of the Wehrmacht can be considered destroyed.

A total of 1,327 German soldiers were taken prisoner, a spokesman for the Canadian Second Army Corps told Allied High Command Europe after an exceptionally fierce battle for the city of Caen in early August 1944. Although almost a quarter of the fighters on the German side belonged to Waffen-SS units, among the prisoners there were no more than eight representatives of these special units of the Third Reich - that is, no more than 3% of the statistically expected number.

This is probably due to two reasons: On the one hand, the Waffen-SS units fought particularly fiercely, and the SS men were even more indoctrinated than soldiers from other units. On the other hand, they were especially feared and hated by their Allied opponents. As a result, soldiers from Waffen-SS units were often not taken prisoner at all.

A surrendered SS man was more likely to die on the way to the collection points for prisoners of war than ordinary German soldiers who did not have a double runic sign. In Caen, especially French-speaking Canadians of the Régiment de la Chaudière, this is how they vented their hatred.

The reason was that the units of the Waffen-SS were considered among their opponents on the Western and Eastern Fronts to be especially cruel, treacherous and fanatical National Socialists. It is true that the military units of Heinrich Himmler's "Black Order" took part in the most famous war crimes - for example, on the Western Front during the massacre in Oradour-sur-Glane or in Malmedy.

Historian Bastian Hein, who, with his doctoral thesis on the "General SS" (Allgemeine SS), has already significantly expanded our understanding of this part of the Nazi system, now in his new book, published in the popular scientific series by C.H. Beck, gives interesting assessments of Himmler's apparatus.

As a result of the study, Bastian Hein came to the conclusion that the reputation of the Waffen-SS as a "military elite" that has survived to this day may well be questioned. Hine gives three reasons. First, a clear distinction should be made between some of the well-equipped "exemplary units" of the Waffen-SS with such sonorous names as the "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" or the "Totenkopf" division. In quantitative terms, however, especially in the second half of the war, those SS divisions that were formed from ethnic Germans living abroad, and sometimes forcibly from foreigners substituted under arms, were of greater importance. Often they were armed only with captured weapons, were poorly trained and not fully equipped. In total, there were 910 thousand people in the Waffen-SS, of which 400 thousand were the so-called imperial Germans, and 200 thousand were foreigners.

Secondly, the most famous “successes” of the Waffen-SS units fall on the second half of the war, when “after the failure of the“ blitzkrieg ”against the Soviet Union and after the entry of the United States into the war,“ the final victory ”was already objectively excluded,” Hein notes, who currently works in the office of the Federal Chancellor. However, the most important, apparently, is the third conclusion: the Waffen-SS units suffered more serious losses in comparison with the regular units of the Wehrmacht, not because they fought more stubbornly. On the contrary - if spread over time - the losses, according to Hine, were the same. "Only in the final phase of the war, in 1944-1945, did the Waffen-SS units fight more desperately and suffer greater losses than the Wehrmacht units."

At the same time, Bastian Hein confirms the prevailing opinion about a higher level of indoctrination in the ranks of the Waffen-SS. Recruits were purposefully processed by experienced SS men in the spirit of the "Black Order". In addition, the Waffen-SS, faster than the Wehrmacht, had centralized training programs. Wehrmacht soldiers received a similar ideological corset only after the so-called National Socialist Leading Officers (NSFO) were sent to the army at the end of 1943.

The misconception that Waffen-SS units were more capable than Wehrmacht units was the result of intense propaganda. Every time the elite divisions of Himmler's subordinate SS apparatus took part in the fighting, there were especially many war correspondents on the spot, and such Nazi publications as Illustrierter Beobachter and Das Schwarze Korps were especially active in reporting their "heroic deeds". In fact, according to Hine, the result of such actions was the same: "They only dragged out a militarily hopeless war."

Nevertheless, the following perception turned out to be true: the SS carried out more massacres and other crimes than the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, who often fought indiscriminately themselves. Hein quotes the military historian Jens Westemeier as rightly describing the Waffen-SS involvement in the fighting as "an endless chain of violent crimes". However, it does not follow from this that every single SS man was a criminal. This also applies to the much larger Wehrmacht.

It must be borne in mind that at no time did the number of active members of the Waffen-SS exceed 370,000 - while the regular Wehrmacht had about 9 million soldiers. That is, soldiers with runes made up about 4% of the total number of the German army.

However, Hein also refutes a convenient lie that is still common in right-wing extremist circles: parts of the Waffen-SS supposedly have nothing to do with concentration camps. The management of these camps, indeed, was carried out by another part of Himmler's "state within a state".

However, out of the 900,000 members of the Waffen-SS between 1939 and 1945 - and almost half of them were not citizens of the German Reich - about 60,000 people "at least temporarily served in the concentration camp system" - this applies, for example, to a native of the Baltic states Hans Lipschis and Hartmut H. from the Saarland.

The more closely we look at the Waffen-SS, the more bleak the picture becomes. Bastian Hein presented all this in a concise and visual form - this is the merit of his pocket book.

There is an opinion that the Germans are punctual people, and therefore the control system of the fascist army differed from other armies of the world in perfect accuracy and accuracy. But is this statement true? Let's figure it out.

The leader of the German people, Hitler held many different positions. He was party leader, chancellor, president of Germany, minister of war, supreme commander of the Wehrmacht, commander in chief of the ground forces. Something similar happened with Stalin. He was the General Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Supreme Commander.

But in whatever capacity Joseph Stalin acted, all the levers of power converged in his secretariat. Any reports, reports, denunciations fell on the table of the assistant to the leader of the peoples, Poskrebyshev. He processed the information, reported to his boss and received appropriate instructions. And Hitler had a separate office for each of his positions. In total, the Fuhrer had five such structures, and each of them had its own apparatus of employees.

It is quite clear that each such structure aspired to leadership. She gave orders and orders on behalf of the leader of the German people and at the same time was not interested in the orders and orders of the other four structures. All this gave rise to chaos, confusion and squabbling between employees of different administrative apparatuses.

The control system of the armed forces of fascist Germany worked on a similar principle. Every army in the world has a brain - General base. And in the fascist army there was not one, but as many as three brains, that is, three absolutely independent General Staffs from each other. The ground forces, aviation and navy had their own General Staffs, and each of them planned its own military operations. There were also SS troops who were subordinate only to Himmler, who was directly subordinate to the Fuhrer.

It is quite understandable that the three General Staffs and the command of the SS troops could not coordinate their actions thoroughly and precisely. Each proceeded from personal departmental interests and tried to wage the war that was convenient only for him. Each command organ planned its operations and deployed its command and communications systems. All this had the most negative impact on the conduct of both offensive and defensive military operations.

Stalin had nothing of the sort. His control system was simple and efficient. The front was considered the main organizational unit. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, there were five Soviet fronts against Germany, at the end of the war there were ten. At the head of each front was a commander with his staff. It was the front commander who led the combat operations of the combined arms, tank armies and aviation. Therefore, both the ground forces and aviation acted according to a single plan.

Such an organization of leadership made it possible to control tanks, artillery, aviation, and infantry from a single center. If, for example, infantry with artillery and tanks is on the defensive, and aviation is engaged in air battles, then all the means of the front are sent to support its actions, according to the order of the commander. And if the rifle divisions and tank corps moved forward, and aviation is not needed, then communications, transport, fuel reserves and everything else work for the attackers.

The fascist army had a completely different control system. If in some area of ​​hostilities the pilots had huge reserves of fuel, and the tankers had almost none, then there was no mechanism capable of providing such information, and even more so, taking the surplus from aviation and transferring them to the tank unit. And all because the ground forces had their commanders, and their aviation. And they did not obey each other in any way. Therefore, the issue of transferring fuel could only be resolved through the Fuhrer.

The commander of the army group of the ground forces was supposed to contact Hitler's headquarters, and there he could be asked and wait for several hours until the supreme commander of the Wehrmacht decides some other issues. Then, having received the information, Hitler had to contact Goering and give him the order to allocate excess fuel to the tank unit. Goering, in turn, had to contact the commander of the air fleet and give the order to him. The latter had to give an order to the squadron commander, and only after that the tankers' fuel trucks would be refueled.

Yes, there is discipline and order, but who needs them in difficult combat conditions, when the situation changes hourly. True, there was a second option. The commander of the tank unit could directly contact the commander of the air unit and ask for help with fuel. But precisely ask and petitioners are often denied.

This shows that in the fascist army, land, aviation, naval commanders and commanders of the Waffen-SS troops had to negotiate among themselves, like traders in a bazaar. Is this a military approach? Could the Nazis have won with such a control system? And so they had it everywhere - in Africa, Greece, Italy, France.

But we must pay tribute to Adolf Hitler. He thought about how to properly and effectively organize the interaction of three independent General Staffs. And, in the end, he came up with. Above these headquarters, he placed two more headquarters, but made it so that they did not obey each other either. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, headed by General Field Marshal Keitel, and the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht, headed by Colonel General Jodl, appeared. All this led to even greater confusion in the fascist army.

The new headquarters, in an effort to prove their necessity, began to interfere in military operations on individual fronts, sent orders, directives, often contradicting the orders and directives of the General Staffs. As a result, disputes began to arise between competing headquarters. They became more and more fierce as the situation on the Eastern Front worsened.

Any comparisons with the Soviet system of government are not in favor of Germany. It should also be taken into account that the SS troops were not at all subordinate to all these heaps of headquarters. And their forces were impressive: the SS cavalry division "Florian Geyer", the SS division "Adolf Hitler", the SS mountain rifle division "Skanderbeg", the motorized division "Reichsführer SS", the SS division "Totenkopf", the grenadier division of the SS.

In total, there were 43 such divisions, and among them were tank, cavalry, infantry, mountain rifle, and others. Himmler even had the 6th SS Panzer Army under his command. Also, under the personal control of the Reichsfuehrer SS, there were 50 Volkssturm divisions. In total, he commanded 93 divisions. This entire armada fought on the fronts, but had nothing to do with the General Staffs and ignored their orders. By the way, the SS fought very bravely, but the losses in their ranks were the largest.

Thus, the fascist army, with its control system, could not resist the clear, simple and perfectly tuned Stalinist system. A huge number of German headquarters could not find a common language among themselves. In fact, all these military structures lived among themselves in the same way as the cardinal's guards lived with the royal musketeers from Dumas' novel. Each structure rowed everything for itself and supplied only itself. That is, the German army consisted of hostile clans. And how could she win in such a situation?

At the end of the war, even Goebbels recognized the superiority of the Soviet system of government over the German one. He declared that the German pyramids of orders and instructions ruined Germany. Who would argue with the Minister of Propaganda. Indeed, the German army simply drowned in confusion and chaos. She could not resist a more progressive system and suffered a complete collapse..