The command staff of the Red Army in 1941. Iron Fist of the Red Army

At one time, after reading the military memoirs of Zhukov, Rodimtsev, Eremenko, Poppel and others, I got the impression of the mass heroic resistance of the Red Army to the German invasion in 1941. However, the truth turned out to be ambiguous and more complicated. Recently, with the declassification of the archives of those years and the emergence of access to them by modern historians, a completely different and ugly picture of the events of those distant years has appeared.
Panic and flight in the Red Army in the first months of the war was a mass phenomenon. For this reason, already seven days after the start of the war, Minsk was taken, the troops of the ZOVO (Western Special Military District) were surrounded and defeated. And there were the best parts of the Red Army and three powerful mechanized corps. No wonder the archives were banned for researchers of the history of the war. Interesting books with rich factography have recently appeared. Here are two of them:
1. "SCORE OF THE SECOND WORLD WORLD. WHO AND WHEN STARTED THE WAR?" The book is written
a group of historians and published by the Historical Perspective Foundation in cooperation with the Commission under the President of the Russian Federation on countering attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia's interests with the participation of the Historical Memory Foundation.
2. "DOUBLE MYSTERY OF 1941 - PANIC IN THE RKKA - CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, MYSTERIES". The author of the book is Alexander Muzafarov, historian, director of information and analytical programs of the Historical Perspective Foundation.

Of course, there are many false patriots who will accuse this author of being Russophobic and unpatriotic, but he presented only bare facts with references to sources and authors who were participants in the war. But this will not stop the critics, they will still scream - slander! This is how they are arranged (zombified), they accept only what they want as the truth - what they like is habitual and does not spoil the mood.
The general conclusion for those difficult years of the war suggests this - where there were skillful commanders who enjoyed authority, the soldiers did not panic and courageously repelled the enemy's rebuff and retreated only on orders.
But, unfortunately, a depressing picture is emerging - such commanders were an exception, regular commanders were repressed and dismissed by Stalin and Voroshilov. They are the "enemies of the people". The worst harm to the army could not be imagined. And the court of the Soviet people was avoided - the people were weaned from this. I just had to approve.
Panic arose objectively - because of the unexpectedness of the attack of the "German ally", his tank "pincers". Psychological shock - the Germans were counting on this. And he worked in the 41st, not only in the troops, but also in the leadership of the country.
Most of the units of the Red Army in 1941 did not know how to fight on the defensive and, when rumors of encirclement appeared, fled in panic to the east along with commanders, headquarters and political workers.

Below are some facts from Muzafarov's book confirming what has been said.
* Panic, as it were. As we mentioned above, this phenomenon was practically not considered in Soviet historiography. Only sometimes it was mentioned: “Yes, there was a panic, but ...”, followed by a story about the courage of those who did not succumb to panic. Only a few mentions in memoirs and documents published today have conveyed to us a description of a terrible tragedy.
* From the memoirs of Army General A.V. Gorbatov: “During that period of the war, especially in the first month, one could often hear:“ We were bypassed ”,“ We are surrounded ”,“ Paratroopers were thrown out in our rear, ”etc. only the soldiers, but also the commanders who had not been fired upon, were overly receptive to such facts, common in the course of modern warfare; many were inclined to believe exaggerated, and often simply ridiculous rumors.
* From the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky:
“There were cases when even entire units that fell under a sudden flank attack by a small group of enemy tanks and aircraft were subjected to panic ... Fear of encirclement and fear of imaginary enemy paratroopers for a long time was a real scourge. And only where there were strong cadres of command and political staff, people fought confidently in any situation, providing an organized rebuff to the enemy. As an example, I will cite a case that took place in the area occupied by the corps. In the afternoon, a general without weapons was delivered to the corps command post, in a torn tunic, exhausted and exhausted, who said that, following the instructions of the front headquarters to the headquarters of the 5th army to clarify the situation, he saw to the west of Rovno headlong rushing east one after another cars with our fighters. In a word, the general caught the panic and, in order to find out the reason that gave rise to it, decided to detain one of the cars. In the end, he succeeded. There were up to 20 people in the car. Instead of answering questions about where they were running and what unit they were, the general was dragged into the back and began to be interrogated in unison. Then, without hesitation, they declared him a saboteur in disguise, took away his documents and weapons, and immediately pronounced a death sentence. Having contrived, the general jumped out on the move, rolled off the road into thick rye. Forest reached our CP.
* A modern historian is forced to state: “In 6 days, the military unit traveled 300 km to the east, 50 (!!!) km a day. This is a pace that exceeds the standards for a forced march of a rifle division. The unpleasant word "escape" comes to mind"
* From the Gomel regional party committee, the Kremlin was informed: "... the demoralizing behavior of a very significant number of command personnel: the departure of commanders from the front under the pretext of escorting evacuated families, group flight from the unit has a corrupting effect on the population and sows panic in the rear."
* It is important to note that panic seized not only the rank and file, but also the command staff. Moreover, the Soviet leadership believed that it was the command staff that became the source of panic, which was directly announced to the troops in the USSR State Defense Committee resolution No. GOKO-169ss of July 16, 1941, which spoke of the trial of the military tribunal of 9 top generals of the Western Front, including the commander of the front, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov.
* Lieutenant Colonel Svetlichny, who led the units of the 134th Rifle Division after the flight of the staff of the corps headquarters, despite the presence of a sufficient number of firepower and people, continuing the criminal "tactics" of the command of the headquarters of the 25th Rifle Division, led the units to the east only at night and only through forests. It was strictly forbidden to come into contact with the enemy. All the time he praised the power of the German army, declaring the inability of the Red Army to defeat the Germans.

My personal opinion:
The confusion of command and rank and file is quite understandable - this is the result of Stalin's disorienting policy and propaganda dogmas - "On friendship with Germany", "If there is war, then we will beat the enemy on his territory."
Stalin kept repeating to military experts until the last days - "Hitler will not dare to wage war on two fronts and will not start a war against the USSR in 1941." Where did he see this second front, when all of Europe was in the hands of Hitler, and England was sitting quietly across the strait after the shock at Dunkirk?
The confusion and shock of the command on June 22 after such "political-psychological and military preparation of the army" is not surprising. After the war, General Petrov, military historian Meltyukhov analyzed the missed opportunities. In their opinion, if the enemy was met in 1941, fully and in a timely manner, the front would not have advanced further than the Dnieper. Khrushchev, a former representative of the Headquarters, also wrote about this.
The Red Army became fully capable of fighting only by the end of 1942, and then after order No. 227 "Not a step back" and the creation of detachments with machine guns. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky battles and the Battle of Stalingrad were not in vain.
Stalin, in his speeches after the war, justified his fatal strategic and political blunder by the "suddenness and treachery" of Hitler. There was no suddenness - Hitler concentrated his divisions near our borders for a whole year - every border guard saw this, and Stalin also knew about it very well. But he did not take into account Hitler's adventurism - to carry out the Blitzkrieg in six weeks.
It is still a mystery - how did he, Stalin, this cunning politician, not foresee Hitler's plans and lull the country with the impossibility of war in 1941? Or did he know about it and did not want to cause premature fear-mongering in the country? Rather, he did not believe in the possibility of war, as evidenced by the shock that he experienced after June 22 and retired to the country. Maybe he was thinking about suicide? Hitler outplayed him psychologically and strategically as a boy, and the "boy" was already over 60 years old. Unforgivable.
Everyone was perplexed after the outbreak of the war about this sudden reversal of the situation with the exact opposite.
The General Staff, the Politburo and the whole country were in a stupor. But intelligence about a possible attack by Hitler was enough. Some blinkers closed Stalin's eyes to reality - he did not trust anyone, even his personal intelligence. Psychopathology or crime?

But there was no trial of the people over the culprit, the intimidated Soviet people were not capable of this. And those who dared to criticize him (General Gordov, Marshal Kulik and others) paid with their lives. The leader must be infallible like Caesar's wife - "beyond suspicion." Such is the logic of any dictatorship.
With vain sacrifices, a sea of blood and colossal material losses, the Soviet people paid for this myopia of the leader of the peoples and his servile entourage. This pain still sits in the soul of the people. The archives will reveal many more secrets of that terrible catastrophe of 1941.
Sad analogies arise with 1905, when the half-witted Tsar Nikolashka II wanted to "throw the Japs" and 1914 - "we will give these Germans." Then Russia, unprepared for war, came up against mighty Germany. The half-wit ruined Russia and his family. But many close associates dissuaded, including the chief of staff, General Alekseev. Even Rasputin was against the war - "there will be the death of Russia."
The history of Orthodox Russia is sad. Could this be God's punishment? But glory to the Almighty - he taught us a hard lesson twice in one century and left a chance for correction. Will we justify the trust?

Back in 1940, the Soviet leadership and the General Staff, anticipating the inevitability of war with Germany, developed a number of military plans for 1940 - "Considerations on the fundamentals of the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union." The result of B.M. Shaposhnikov over the new border profile was reflected in a document dated August 19, 1940. In his opinion, planning should have been built around the following theses: “Considering that the main German attack will be directed north of the mouth of the San River, it is also necessary to have the main forces of the Red Army deployed north of Polissya.In the South, Western Ukraine and Bessarabia should be covered by active defense and the largest possible part of the German army should be pinned down.The main task of our troops is to defeat the German forces concentrating in East Prussia and in the Warsaw region: to defeat with an auxiliary strike enemy grouping in the area of Ivangorod, Lublin, Grubeshov, Tomashev".

In fact, the main idea of the plan is to reproduce the actions of the Russian army in 1914, storming the citadel of East Prussia with strikes from the northwest and bypassing the Masurian lakes. But after the change in the leadership of the General Staff, the Soviet military plans are also undergoing changes. K.A. Meretskov by that time already had the sad experience of storming the "Mannerheim Line" in the winter of 1939-1940, and storming the more advanced German fortifications in East Prussia was considered unpromising tasks. The center of gravity of Soviet military plans began to shift south. The next version appears on September 18, 1940. The main tasks of the troops are outlined in it in the following words: “The main forces of the Red Army in the West, depending on the situation, can be deployed either south of Brest-Litovsk so that a powerful blow in the directions of Lublin and Krakow and further to Breslau (Bratislav) in the first stage of the war, cut off Germany from the Balkan countries, deprive her of the most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of their participation in the war; or north of Brest-Litovsk with the task of defeating the main forces German army within East Prussia and take possession of the latter. The final decision to deploy will depend on the political situation that will develop by the beginning of the war, but in peacetime I consider it necessary to have both options developed. " In total, according to the "southern" deployment option, the Southwestern Front was supposed to have "70 rifle divisions; 9 tank divisions; 4 motorized rifle divisions; 1 cavalry division; 5 tank brigades; 81 aviation regiments." As part of the Western and Northwestern, respectively, "55 rifle divisions; 7 tank divisions; 3 motorized rifle divisions; 3 cavalry divisions; 6 tank brigades; 1 airborne brigade; 59 aviation regiments."

Thus, in September 1940, dualism is still observed, an attempt to draw up two plans. One option was to develop the ideas of B.M. Shaposhnikov, the second gave the first operation of the Soviet troops a fundamentally different form, shifting the center of concentration to the territory of Ukraine. But already in 1941, a plan based on the ideas of K. A. Meretskov was finally adopted, shifting the center of the main concentration of troops to Ukraine. In the "Considerations on the Basics of Strategic Deployment" dated May 15, 1941, the form of the operation in the Southwestern Front did not undergo fundamental changes: "The Southwestern Front - eight armies, consisting of 74 rifle, 28 tank, 15 motorized and 5 cavalry divisions , and a total of 122 divisions and 91 aviation regiments, with the immediate tasks: a) to surround and destroy the main enemy grouping east of the Vistula River in the Lublin region with a concentric strike by the armies of the right wing of the front; enemy forces in the Krakow and Sandomierz-Kielce directions and capture the areas of Krakow, Katowice, Kielce, meaning to further advance from this area in a northern or north-western direction to defeat the large forces of the northern wing of the enemy front and capture the territory of former Poland and East Prussia; c) firmly defend the state border with Hungary and Romania and be ready to deliver concentric strikes against Romania from regions of Chernivtsi and Chisinau, with the immediate goal of defeating the northern wing of the Romanian army and reaching the line of the river. Moldova, Iasi".

The document was written by A.M. Vasilevsky, and amended by G.K. Zhukov, who only intended to strengthen the strike of the Southwestern Front by the actions of the Western Front from the southern face of the Bialystok ledge, changing the direction of the strike from Warsaw to Radom.

But in order to implement these plans in practice, it was necessary to carry out the so-called mobilization deployment. For example, according to the peacetime staff, the field administration of the army should have consisted of 268 people, of which 225 people were commanding officers. In the event of a wartime deployment, the size of the administrative apparatus of the army increased to 1,530 people, of which 550 were commanding officers. With the announcement of mobilization, within a few days, the divisions from incomplete ones turned into full-fledged army formations. Reservists arrived within 1-3 days. Further, the units were knocked together, battalion and regimental exercises were carried out, and the finished army unit was sent to the front.

The same changes were undergone by the mechanisms of driving troops, army and corps administrations, rear services, communications, etc. The principle was the same: in peacetime the minimum necessary for training, in wartime - the organizational structure optimal for combat operations. This system was common for various states, the differences were not of a fundamental nature.

If we take the army as a whole, then according to MP-41 (the mobilization plan of February 1941), out of 303 rifle, motorized rifle, tank and motorized divisions of the Red Army, 172 divisions had terms of full readiness on the 2nd-4th day of mobilization, 60 divisions - on 4 -5th day, and the rest - on the 6-10th day.

The leadership of the USSR faced an intractable task: the choice between escalating the political conflict by declaring mobilization or entering the war with an unmobilized army. The declaration of mobilization, as the events of the First World War showed, was tantamount to a declaration of war.

Covert mobilization measures were also laid down in the Soviet plans for the deployment of troops: “The mobilization plan of 1941 provides for mobilization according to two options:

a) the first option provides for the mobilization of individual military districts, individual units and formations established by a special decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - in a hidden order, in the order of Big Training Camps (BUS). In this case, the call for military reserve, as well as the supply of vehicles and horse trains are produced by personal summonses, without announcing orders from NGOs.
b) the second option provides for a general mobilization of all the Armed Forces of the USSR or individual military districts in an open manner, i.e. when mobilization is announced by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Naturally, all these mechanisms were put into action in 1941. In April - May 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff decided to carry out a covert mobilization of the conscripted reserves under the cover of "Large Training Camps" (BUS). In total, over 802 thousand people were called up for training camps before the declaration of war, which was 24% of the assigned personnel according to the MP-41 mobilization plan, which was clearly not enough.

This made it possible to reinforce half of all rifle divisions of the Red Army (99 out of 198) located in the western districts, or divisions of the internal districts intended for transfer to the west. At the same time, the composition of the rifle divisions of the border districts, with a staff strength of 14,483 people, was increased: 21 divisions - up to 14 thousand people, 72 divisions - up to 12 thousand people and 6 rifle divisions - up to 11 thousand people. For the Southwestern Front, which numbered 764,941 people on the list as of June 22, 1941, "Large training camps" meant an increase of 142,105 people. Only 51,094 people were added to the Odessa Military District, which formed the 9th Army upon mobilization, with the list of troops of the district 113,577 people. The Kharkov Military District received 72,949 men under the BUS, in addition to the district's troop strength of 159,196. At the same time, 26,620 horses were delivered from the national economy to the army within the framework of the BUS. This is a small figure, given that according to the MP-41, "the need for horses to complete units up to wartime states is 671,770 horses." But, there was no announcement of mobilization until the start of hostilities on June 22, 1941, thereby significantly reducing the possibility of manning divisions with vehicles, horses and soldiers of rear units. The withdrawal of a significant number of vehicles from the economy was too noticeable and large-scale an event to hide it from prying eyes, and the Soviet leadership did not lose hope for a political resolution of the conflict until the very moment of the invasion of German troops.

The only example of a German way of starting a war, without a period of concentration and deployment, was Poland. There was no period of sluggish skirmishes on the border in the process of mobilization and deployment. The Wehrmacht immediately began operations with all the necessary forces, Poland, on the contrary, found itself in the face of an invasion with an unmobilized and underdeployed army.

Georgy Samoylovich Isserson, head of the Department of Operational Art at the Academy of the General Staff, wrote about the war in Poland: “At the same time, the old tradition is discarded, according to which it is necessary to warn about it before striking. War is not declared at all. It simply begins with armed forces deployed in advance. Mobilization and concentration does not refer to the period after the onset of the state of war, as it was in 1914, but imperceptibly, gradually carried out long before that.

A.M. Vasilevsky, in an interview given in 1965, says the following: “Based on the development of the plan, it would seem from the correct position that modern wars are not declared, but they simply begin with an enemy already prepared for hostilities, which was especially characteristically demonstrated by the fascist leadership of Germany in the first period of World War II, the leadership of our armed forces and the General Staff did not draw the appropriate correct conclusions from this situation for themselves and did not introduce any amendments to the operational plan in this regard.On the contrary, the plan in the old fashioned way provided for the so-called initial period of the war lasting -20 days from the start of hostilities to the entry into action of the main troops of the country, (allocated by Lutsenko) during which the troops of the cover echelons from the border military districts deployed along the borders, with their combat operations, were supposed to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces of our troops. At the same time, about active side, i.e. Fascist Germany, with her fully mobilized and already at war army, was placed in terms of the time required for her concentration and deployment against us, in the same conditions as our Armed Forces.

But, firstly, it is simply impossible to do without a period of mobilization and deployment. One way or another, the army must be mobilized, and its formations must be transferred by rail or on foot to the frontier. At the same time, the moment of the beginning of these events can be shifted to the pre-war period. Mobilization can be carried out covertly, at the expense of "Large Training Camps". The movement of troops can also begin and actually began before one of the parties started hostilities. Secondly, the moment from which the countdown to the first strikes begins is still chosen not by the military, but by the political leadership of the country. Accordingly, it is the country's political leadership that assesses the danger or necessity of using force.

So, Lieutenant General P.S. Klenov, chief of staff of the Baltic Special Military District, at a meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army in December 1940, said the following: “I recently looked through Isserson’s book New Forms of Struggle. Hasty conclusions are given there, based on the German war with Poland, that the initial period of the war it will be that the war for today is resolved simply - by the invasion of ready forces, as was done by the Germans in Poland, deploying one and a half million people. I consider such a conclusion premature. It can be allowed for a state like Poland, which, having become arrogant, has lost all vigilance and which had no reconnaissance of what the Germans were doing during the period of many months of concentration of troops.Each self-respecting state, of course, will try to use this initial period in its own interests in order to reconnoiter what the enemy is doing, how he is grouped, what his intentions, and prevent him from doing so."

The leaders of our country, of course, received different, often contradictory intelligence. Accordingly, it was assumed that the concentration of enemy troops would be revealed by reconnaissance and it would be possible to begin preparatory measures, which in one phase or another would develop into a war. At the same time, the preparatory period may be absent, or it may safely remain. It all depends on the moment of the official start of the conflict. Border incidents can escalate into an armed clash at any phase of mobilization and deployment. In addition, there are political signs of a brewing war, a period of diplomatic negotiations of varying degrees of ultimatums and political tensions in relations. For example, Germany had been making political demands on the Polish government since 1938. Probing the political ground in Finland was also begun by the Soviet leadership in 1938. This was followed by almost a year of negotiations in increasingly elevated tones, and only after that the guns rumbled. In 1941, none of this happened. Germany did not make any political demands on the USSR; it was difficult to guess that the Third Reich planned to invade the USSR in the name of intimidating England. The war with the USSR, in the opinion of the Soviet leadership (and this opinion turned out to be correct), was too large-scale and time-consuming undertaking to solve such an auxiliary task as forcing England to peace. Other motives were not visible at first glance. Moreover, a novelty applied in relation to the USSR was the deathly silence of the German diplomatic authorities.

Interrogation of prisoners of the Smolensk battle. Documents of the 3rd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht

NARA, T 313, R 224, f.f. 816 - 896

One soldier from the 166th regiment, who lived in Molotov (before and after - Perm), said the following:

His regiment suffered heavy losses at Polotsk and around July 4th came to the Nevel area. Responsibility for this retreat was assigned to the commander of the regiment, Major S. (Tatar by origin), and 05.07. he was shot personally by the commander of the division, major general G. (regiment number, division number, commander's surname are the same - M.S.). The mood in the troops is very tense. One mention of the possibility of being captured (surrendered) is enough for execution. Letters home are prohibited.

This testimony was confirmed by another prisoner from this regiment. In addition, he said that it was forbidden to listen to the regimental radio. During the German broadcasts in Russian, everyone was expelled from the premises.

From the same regiment, a political instructor of the reserve directly subordinate to the division was also taken prisoner. It was not possible to find out his last name, because. he threw away all the papers. According to him, he was supposed to teach history and geography in the company. He was shot (underlined by me - M.S.).

Another part of the prisoners was from the 19th regiment, formed in Zhytomyr and 19.07. who arrived in the Velikiye Luki region (a rifle regiment with such a number does not correspond to these circumstances - M.S.). This regiment was commanded by a senior lieutenant. The real commander of the regiment, together with the political commissar, fell behind (remained in Zhytomyr?). The regiment was broken. Lack of weapons and ammunition. Divisional affiliation is unknown. The commanders told the interrogated that the Germans treated the prisoners very badly. Therefore, one of them said that before his capture, he wanted to commit suicide.

In the afternoon of 20.07. near Savenka, the 19th TD repulsed an attack (314?) of the enemy division. The division formed in the Urals with an unknown number (314th?) arrived by train to Velikiye Luki, from there on foot to (...) and back. The division has not yet participated in the battles, it is very tired of the marches, it is armed with grenades against tanks, because. it was known that there were German tanks near Velikie Luki.

From noon 16.07. before noon on July 17, 152 prisoners were captured (most of them were defectors), among them 53 Ukrainians. Captured in the area of Usviaty...

The testimonies of the prisoners agree that the German leaflets have a great effect. It is necessary, however, to drop many more leaflets, because officers and political commissars burn everything they find. It is advised to drop leaflets in the rear in order to eliminate the fear of the German soldiers among the population.

In Verechye, about 7 km west of Lake Cösta, 6-7 thousand liters of fuel were captured.

A prisoner from 102 joint ventures showed:

08/01/41 the division was involved in the river. Howl at Yartsevo. They were told that there was only one German regiment there that needed to be knocked out, Smolensk was in the hands of the Russians, the Germans retreated far back, the German regiment located in Yartsevo was completely surrounded.

During the attack, the division suffered heavy losses. the regiment advanced along with a company of tanks, some of which were knocked out immediately during the first attack. The regiment supposedly had no anti-tank guns, but only 30-40 machine guns. Each received 90 rifle rounds.

During the attack, a chain of politically reliable people was created behind the attackers, who urged the attackers on with weapons. Therefore, it is difficult to surrender. they are shooting from behind.

The junior lieutenant from the 30th joint venture showed:

The regiment is part of the 64th Rifle Division (correctly - M.S.) Apparently, even before the current battles on the river. Vop south of the motorway, the regiment suffered heavy losses in the Vitebsk region and was replenished between Smolensk and Vyazma. There this lieutenant got into the regiment. There are very few active (real) officers in the regiment. He himself was a non-commissioned officer in the Lithuanian army and after several short courses was promoted to junior lieutenant.

The order for the new commissioning of the regiment said that on the river. Vop are the weak forces of the German airborne paratroopers, which must be destroyed. The regiment had to make at least 3 attacks. If they failed, they were threatened with execution. The deterrent and urging element are the communists. Unexpected pocket checks are often carried out in search of German leaflets. During a march without contact with the enemy, officers and commissars are at the end of the column to keep everything in hand. Officers and commissars went ahead in the attack (emphasis mine - M.S.). They acted selflessly.

The mood is depressed, there is no trust in the command. The battalion was provided with uniforms only by 50%. Some did not have boots or overcoats. Arming with rifles happened in the last hour. The machine gun company did not wait for its machine guns and was used as a rifle company.

The command transmits the testimony of the quartermaster (chief of logistics?) of the 25th rifle corps, taken prisoner in the sector of the 19th TD. The prisoner said:

Initially, he was a company commander, and then quartermaster for 11 years. He was accused of counter-revolution and sentenced for this to 10 years in prison, of which he served 3 years in a Kharkov prison, then was again taken into the army to his former position. Has the rank of major.

The 25th sk is part of the 19th Army. The 25th SC includes the 134th, 162nd and 127th Rifle Divisions (that's right - M.S.).

134th SD: formed in Mariupol before the Polish campaign as part of the 515th, 738th, 629th regiments of the 534th artillery howitzer. regiment (without one division), 410th light. artillery regiment, as well as one reconnaissance battalion, one btl. communications, one sapper and one autobtl.

There were no tanks in this or the other two divisions.

162nd Rifle Division: Formed in Artyomovsk in August 1939 as part of the 501st Rifle Regiment and one division of the 534th Art Howitzer. a shelf. Other units of this division are unknown to the prisoner.

127th Rifle Division: formed in Kharkov this year (1941) as part of the 395th Regiment. Other units of this division are unknown to the prisoner.

For mobilization to wartime states, all divisions between 01.-03.06. left the formation area and after 16 days on foot arrived in the replenishment areas: Zolotonosha, Lubny, Rzhishchev (that's right; the 19th Army, formed on the basis of the administration and troops of the North Caucasian Military District, was concentrated there, the Army headquarters in Cherkasy - M .WITH.). After replenishment of the entire body between 27.6. and 05.07. by rail was sent to the Smolensk region, the main part of the trains was sent from Darnitsa. There 05.07. unloading began and then marches on foot to the concentration area around Vitebsk. Corps command post in Yanovichi, 19th Army command post in Rudnya.

In addition, the corps includes the 248th light corps artillery regiment, the 248th sapper btl. and 263rd btl. connections.

Motor transport units are only in divisions, they are not in the corps. According to the state, the army should have a motor regiment. Since this regiment was never used, the prisoner believes that it de facto did not exist.

Food bases of 25 UK are located in Kyiv and Kremenchug. Food for 10 days (including for railway transport) was taken at the base. The missing should have been obtained at the army warehouses in Smolensk and Vitebsk. Because Smolensk and Vitebsk were repeatedly attacked by German aircraft, army food stores were moved to Liozno and Rudnya on the railway line Vitebsk - Smolensk (10.07.41). Food bases of the corps contain a stock of long-term stored products up to 14 days; perishable products are taken locally.

Military units have with them a supply of food for 4 days (according to the plan for 5 days), namely, a soldier for 1 day (iron ration) and one daily dacha in a company, battalion and regiment. The slaughter platoon had one vehicle with slaughtering equipment and one with a refrigerator. Live cattle for slaughter in the next 2 days chase after the part. In the future, livestock was received at the location. The baking company has a supply of flour for only one day, and then receives flour at the bases, which are provided with supplies for 3-4 days.

Commander of the 19th Army: Lieutenant General Konev.

Commander of the 25th Rifle Corps: Major General Chestokhvalov, who was allegedly taken prisoner in the battle on July 16-17. In any case, the corps from that moment was controlled only by the chief of staff Vinogradov. In the forest, 40 km south of Belaya, he is trying to collect and reorganize the remaining parts of the corps broken between Vitebsk and Smolensk.

The prisoner with his driver and car left the building on 07/20/41. Since then, he knows nothing about his corps. He moved through the forests to observe the attitude of the Germans towards the civilian population. On the basis of his, as he said, reassuring observations, he decided to surrender.

The mood in the troops during his departure was very gloomy. Desertion is common, as for soldiers, their own lives are more precious than the struggle for a misunderstood idea. Therefore, harsh measures are applied to deserters. Due to the flow of refugees and retreating military units in places, all conventional and railway lines are completely clogged. The departing trains with the civilian population also led to congestion on the railways, and in addition, they have a morally overwhelming effect on the troops they meet. Movement [of the civilian population] from place to place within the country is prohibited under the threat of severe punishment.

The German air and tank attacks have been especially terrifying for troops coming in from Siberia lately. The daily reports on the Russian radio about the increase in labor productivity, heard recently, are a propaganda device to support the mood, while in the German-occupied section of the Smolensk [region] there is a real increase in the harvest (income?)

Our leaflets dropped over the Russian front, in his opinion, are somewhat unsuccessfully worded. The arguments about Jewish power in Russia are not very impressive. In his opinion, a hint of a future solution of the agrarian question and a mention of the freedom of workers with better wages would have had a much greater success.

Those who are able to think independently and even most of the common people do not believe the information transmitted by radio about Russian losses.

The system of denunciations among commanders is especially highly developed. After a major "purge" among the commanders of the troops, reserve officers are placed in the vacant positions, even those who were previously considered politically unreliable, as in the case of himself.

Before making such a decision to surrender, he personally convinced himself in the villages occupied by us that the reports of Russian propaganda about the [cruel] behavior of the German troops and terror are false.

He does not believe in an imminent uprising of the Russian people, even in the event of further major setbacks [at the front]. Rather, there will be a [final] collapse of the Russian army.

12th TD reports:

The interrogation of the prisoners taken by the advance detachment of the 25th Infantry Division on August 4 revealed that the losses of the 89th Infantry Division had recently been very high. Only 300-400 people allegedly remained in the 400th regiment. The 390th and 400th regiments received reinforcements three times, in recent days, 30 people per company, and received officers. The reinforcements are made up of communists of all ages, mainly chairmen of collective farms, executive committees, and so on. Everything that is trustworthy has been collected. The Russians are allegedly waiting for the German offensive in order to be able to surrender.

translated by Vasily Risto

] that were in the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) of the Armed Forces of the USSR during World War II (1941-1945).

According to the dictionary of military terms, the front is an operational-strategic association of the armed forces, usually created with the outbreak of war. The front is intended to solve operational-strategic tasks in one strategic or several operational directions of the continental theater of military operations.

During the Second World War, the front was the most important link in the command and control system of the Soviet armed forces. As a rule, it included several armies, as well as, depending on the period of the war, various mechanized, tank, aviation, artillery and other formations. Usually, strategic operations were carried out by the forces of several (two, three or even four) fronts, and during the war, up to 90% of offensive and defensive strategic operations were carried out with the participation of just such groupings of troops. Front operations were carried out by the forces of one front, sometimes with the involvement of part of the forces of another front.

The front was the highest level of operational-strategic association, excluding 5 departments of directions, created in 1941 and did not justify themselves.

At the beginning of the war, 5 fronts were deployed on the Soviet-German front, in December 1941 there were 8, by the end of 1942 - 12, and in 1943 their number reached 13. These changes are associated with the expansion of the territory of the war and the need to break down the groupings of troops into in the interest of improving their management.

Depending on the developing strategic situation, individual front-line formations were disbanded, others were created again, some were renamed. For example, on July 12, 1942, the administration of the Southwestern Front was disbanded, and its troops became part of the created Stalingrad Front. On August 7, 1942, the Stalingrad Front was divided into two: Stalingrad itself and the South-Eastern Front, but already on August 10, 1942, the Stalingrad Front, remaining under its name, was subordinate to the South-Eastern Front. On September 28, 1942, the Stalingrad Front was renamed the Don Front, and the South-Eastern Front became the Stalingrad Front. In total, during the war, not counting the directorates of the air defense fronts, 24 front directorates were created.

In the second half of 1943, the number of fronts began to decrease and by the end of World War II it amounted to 8 fronts (Leningrad, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian ). This was due to both the reduction in the length of the front line, and the acquisition by military leaders of the experience of leading larger front-line formations in their composition.

The front, from the point of view of the subordinate troops, never had a permanent composition for a more or less long time, which cannot be said about the front management, which is maintained according to the approved staff. At the beginning of the war, the front departments were mainly deployed from the departments of the military districts, and later they could be formed on the basis of the disbanded departments, on the basis of the field departments of the armies, or anew. Troops subordinate to the front, depending on the situation in the theater of operations, could be withdrawn and transferred to another front or sent to the reserve of the Supreme High Command.

The table lists all front departments that existed during the war, excluding air defense front departments.

By and large, these conclusions were made back in the 60-70s, but due to the political slander and falsification of history that have flooded society since the mid-80s from the perestroika-liberal media, historians, politicians and politicians, these conclusions are so and did not reach the mass society.

For a start, as one particular example of what happened in the first days and months of the Great Patriotic War, we can cite excerpts from one front-line document:

"FROM THE REPORT OF THE ASSISTANT COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT FOR TANK TROOPS
ABOUT FAULTS IN MANAGEMENT OF COMBAT ACTIONS OF MECHANIZED CASES
8 AUGUST 1941
OWL. SECRET
TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR
Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops FEDORENKO
3. The headquarters of the armies completely forgot that the material part has certain engine hours, that it requires inspection, minor repairs, additional replenishment of fuel and ammunition, and the technical staff and the heads of the armored departments of the armies did not tell them this, and instead of withdrawing after completing the task the mechanized corps, having given it the time necessary for this purpose, the combined arms commanders demanded only “come on” and nothing more.
12. The training of crews in matters of preserving the material part is exceptionally bad: there were cases when crews left vehicles with ammunition; there were isolated cases when the crews left the cars and left themselves.
13. In all units and formations, there were no evacuation means, and the available ones could provide mechanized corps and tank divisions only in offensive operations.
14. The personnel of the new equipment did not master, especially the "KV" and "T-34" and were completely untrained in the production of repairs in the field. The repair facilities of the tank divisions were unable to provide repairs in such a type of battle as a withdrawal.
Assistant commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front for tank issues
Major General of Tank Troops VOLSKY
Head of the Armored Directorate of the Southwestern Front
Major General of Tank Troops MORGUNOV
Military Commissar of the Armored Directorate of the Southwestern Front
CHUCHUKALO"

In addition to the above, the new Soviet tanks T-34 and KV (1 and 2) had big problems in providing ammunition for their tank guns of 76 mm and 152 mm (for KV-2) caliber.

Generally speaking, the Soviet leadership foresaw that the new war that had been approaching the USSR since the late 1930s would be in many ways a war of motors. And they did everything possible to provide the army with these motors.

So in reality it turned out - tank formations became the main striking force of the German army during the attack on the USSR. However, it is known that on the eve of the war there were several times more tanks in the Soviet troops than in the German one. Based on this, many build various conspiracy theories about why this huge Soviet tank armada could not stop the aggressor. In fact, all these versions are only the fruit of the violent imagination of their authors.

To begin with, it is necessary to bring the numerical ratio of the parties to the moment the war began.

Germany (together with Romania and Finland):
the total number in the border groups - 5.000.000 Human
tanks and self-propelled guns - 4300 PCS.
planes - 4500 PCS.

THE USSR:
the total number in the border districts - 2.900.000 Human
tanks - 16.000 PCS. (including internal districts - Moscow, Orlovsky, Kharkov)
planes - 8500 PCS.

p.s.: The total strength of the German army is 8.5 million people, the total strength of the USSR army is 5.5 million people.

And now about the main striking force - about tanks.

Pz.II
gun caliber - 20 mm
frontal armor - 30 mm

BT-7
gun caliber - 45 mm
frontal armor - 13-22 mm

Pz.38
gun caliber - 37 mm
frontal armor - 25-50 mm

T-26
gun caliber - 45 mm
frontal armor - 15-20 mm

The BT-7 and T-26 tanks formed the basis of the Soviet tank forces, while in the German army the Pz.III tanks already formed the basis.

Pz.III
gun caliber - 50 mm
frontal armor - 50 mm

T-34
gun caliber - 76 mm
frontal armor - 45 mm

Pz.IV
gun caliber - 75 mm
frontal armor - 40-60 mm

KV-1
gun caliber - 76 mm
frontal armor - 75 mm

Thus, for tanks, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1) The BT-7 and T-26 tanks had more powerful weapons, but weak armor compared to their German "classmates" Pz.II and Pz.38, while there were about 2500 German vehicles of these types, while the Soviet troops several times more.
2) On the whole, the T-34 and KV-1 tanks were somewhat superior to their "classmates" Pz.III and Pz.IV, but there were few of ours (1300 units against 2000 units).

In many ways, these relationships predetermined the outcome of the border battles and the overall situation on the Soviet-German front in 1941. In addition, the German troops advanced in concentric strikes, while the defense of the Soviet troops was carried out in fact linearly. And, among other things, it was weakened by the almost complete air supremacy of the German Luftwaffe, which, having destroyed Soviet airfields in the very first hours of the attack, received an almost unhindered opportunity to bomb cities, bridges, railway junctions, fuel and ammunition depots, etc. Well, actually, the troops themselves. And anti-aircraft artillery in the Soviet troops was then very poorly developed.

Was it possible to prevent such a rout, which the Red Army suffered in 1941?

The order to bring the troops of the border districts to combat readiness came only 3-4 hours before the actual start of the war. Did not have time. Here it is necessary to take into account the scheme for building command and control in the troops. It was as follows: General Staff - District - Army - Corps - Division - Regiment. The transfer of the order was carried out by wired telephone and telegraph method, and each stage of data transfer required a certain time. So, the transfer of the order to the district level was completed only at 1 am on June 22.

The troops did not have enough means for rear maneuvering: the length of roads and railways, tractors for artillery, tankers ....

The army was in the process of modernization. In order to achieve it, a powerful developed industry was needed. The need for massive industrialization in the USSR was announced only in 1929, but in fact it began already in the early 1930s, 10 years before the war. Even despite the fact that it was done in an emergency manner and under constant strict control, they still didn’t manage to do much. And here a reasonable question arises: what did the Soviet leadership, the Soviet government, do in the previous whole decade - in the 20s? Yes, a massive electrification of the country was carried out - the famous GOELRO plan. In fact, this is the only thing that was done for industrial development in that decade. But after all, the industry was actively developing even before the revolution. And electricity in the then "tsarist" Russia already existed. In those years, this was also not enough, as the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War showed. But only in the First World War the Germans did not reach either Petrograd, or Moscow, or the Caucasus with the Volga. The front then passed approximately along the old Soviet border of the model until 1939. And only the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks at the end of 1917 finally destroyed the army and state administration and allowed the German army to approach Petrograd and occupy almost all of Little Russia with Novorossia and Belarus. And then, provoked by the usurpation of power by the Bolsheviks, the civil war finished off what had been done in Russia in the pre-war times, dropping the industrial development of the country to the level of the second half of the 19th century. But the West did not stand still in the 1920s. Even Germany, having fallen under the Versailles terms of surrender, was able to restore its economic potential faster in the 30s than the USSR did during Stalin's industrialization. Due to the higher base.

However, later it still did not help her. Despite the technical superiority of the German army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the stubborn resistance offered by the Soviet troops made it possible to evacuate hundreds of enterprises from Ukraine, Belarus and the western regions of the RSFSR to the east of the country, which in the shortest possible time were able to establish mass production of equipment and ammunition.