The main military operations of the eastern front. Major operations on the Eastern Front

While the Western Front was pushed back from the Atlantic Wall to the Western Wall, heavy fighting continued on the Eastern Front. On the southern sector of this front, it was not possible to stop the advance of the Russians. As a result of their offensive, which took place with short pauses, the entire territory of Romania, Bulgaria, and, finally, most of Hungary was captured. In Hungary, the Southern Ukraine Army Group under the command of Colonel General Frisner fought, which on September 25 changed its now inaccurate name "Southern Ukraine" to "South". In October, after stubborn fighting in the Debrecen area, where the counterattacks of our troops temporarily halted the enemy, the Siebenbürgen (Semikholmje) area was completely captured by the Russians.

In the area of ​​operations of Army Group Southeast, under the command of Field Marshal Baron von Weichs, Belgrade fell this month. Despite the fact that the Balkan Front had actually already merged with the Eastern \513\ Front, which was led by the High Command of the Ground Forces, this group continued to remain under the jurisdiction of the High Command of the Armed Forces. The border between the spheres of the command of the armed forces and the main command of the ground forces passed between the mouths of the Drava and Bai rivers. It was completely pointless. South of this border, on the northern flank of the South-East group, the Russians crossed the Danube, while the group commander turned his main attention to the weak sector of the front of his troops, located much to the south. On October 29, the Russians came close to Budapest, and on November 24 they crossed the Danube at Mohacs. At this time, when the German troops were still in Thessaloniki and Durazzo, the Moravian Valley was already in the hands of the enemy. Due to the guerrilla war in the Balkans, their purification became more and more complicated. On November 30, the Russians broke through the front of the Southeast group near the city of Pech, north of the river. Drava, went to the lake. Balaton and attacked the Danube sector, defended by Army Group South. Until December 5, they managed to come close to Budapest from the south. On the same day, they crossed the river north of Budapest, advanced to the city of Vac and were hardly stopped by us east of the river. Gron. Further to the northeast, they captured Myshkolts and went to the area south of Kashau (Kosice). Our troops in the Balkans withdrew to the line of Podgorica, Uzhitz and further north.

The offensive, launched on December 21, led on Christmas Day 1944 to the encirclement of Budapest. The enemy reached the line of the lake. Balaton, Shtulvansenburg (Szekesfehervar), west of Komarno, and also to the north. Danube to the river. Gron. From there, the front line ran almost along the Hungarian state border. On both sides, the fighting was fought with great ferocity. We suffered heavy losses.

On the sector of the front of the army group "Northern Ukraine" of Colonel-General Harpe, which from September \514\ became known as Army Group "A", the Russians, continuing the offensive, reached the Vistula at the end of July, coming close to Warsaw. To the south of it there were fierce battles between the San and Wisloka rivers. The army group at that time consisted of the 1st Panzer Army of Colonel General Heinrici, which was located in the Carpathians, the 17th Army of General Schultz in the area between the Carpathians and the Vistula, and the 4th Panzer Army of General Balk (later General Grezer began to command it) which stood on the Vistula. By August 1, the Russians had captured a number of bridgeheads across the Vistula, the most important of which was at Baranów, a smaller one at Pulawy, at Magnuszew, and a fourth in another area. The successes of the Russians in the mountains were, of course, smaller. The situation on August 5-9 at the bridgehead near Baranow became especially critical. Here the Russians could make a breakthrough any day. It was only thanks to the tireless energy and skillful leadership of General Bulk that a catastrophe was averted in this area. With fierce counterattacks lasting weeks, Balk managed to significantly narrow down a large bridgehead at Baranow, eliminate another small bridgehead and fortify at Pulawy. After that, the Russians transferred the main blow of their offensive to the mountains. At Sanok and Jaslo, they managed to penetrate our defenses, but failed to make a decisive breakthrough. The mountain range of the Eastern Beskids was held until the events in Hungary forced the 1st Panzer Army to turn to the Kashau (Kosice), Jaslo line. By the new year, the front line of this army group ran along the Slovak border to the area east of Kashau (Kosice), from there through Jaslo, west of Debica, west of Staszow, south of Opatuv, along the Vistula north of the mouth of the river. San to Warsaw (excluding the mentioned bridgeheads).

Army Group Center included the 9th Army of General von Forman, the 2nd Army of Colonel General Weiss, the 4th Army of General Gosbach and the 3rd Panzer Army of General Reinhardt, which he began to command from August 15 Colonel General Rous. This army group was commanded by Field Marshal Model, and after his transfer on August 15 to the Western Front, by Colonel General Reinhardt. In August, the enemy came close to Warsaw, then reached the line Ostrov (Ostrov-Mazowiecki), Sudauen (Suwalki), the East Prussian border, west of Siauliai, west of Mitava (Jelgava). In September, he moved northeast of Warsaw to the river. Narew, on which in October he created bridgeheads on both sides of Ostenburg (Pultusk). During the period from 5 to 19 October, the already mentioned breakthrough of the German front was made west of Siauliai. Army Groups "Center" and "North" were finally cut off from each other.

On October 19, Army Group Center turned its left flank to Memel (Klaipeda), leaving on October 22 the bridgeheads held on the northern bank of the river near Tilsit (Sovetsk) and Ragnit (Neman). From October 16 to October 26, the Russians advanced in East Prussia on the front of Gumbinnen (Gusev), Goldap. In heavy fighting, they were stopped and in some places pushed back a little. The events that took place here allowed the German people to get an idea of ​​​​what threatened them in the event of a Russian victory.

Army Group "North", as already mentioned, in the period from September 14 to 26 was withdrawn to the bridgehead in the Riga area with the aim of its rapid further transfer to Army Group "Center". This plan failed because of the contradictory decision of the commander of the army group, Colonel General Scherner. The latter delayed his armored forces in the area of ​​Riga, Mitava (Jelgava), instead of withdrawing them to the area west of Siauliai, and this enabled the enemy to make a breakthrough near the city of Siauliai, which finally cut off the army group from the main grouping of troops. The Army Group consisted of \516\ the 16th and 18th armies, that is, in this area we had at first twenty-six divisions, and then, after repeated evacuations, sixteen were left, which were so badly lacking for the defense of the Reich. After we left Riga from 7 to 16 October, the front line of the army group ran (almost unchanged until the end of the year) from the coast south of Libava (Liepaja) through Prekule, south of Frauenburg (Saldus), east of Tukums (Tukums) and up to coast of the Gulf of Riga.

The relative stability of the heavily stretched front between the Carpathians and the Baltic Sea made it possible to strengthen it and to allocate tank and motorized divisions to the mobile reserve. Of course, twelve weak divisions represented a very insignificant reserve for a gigantic front of 1200 km and in view of the great superiority that the Russians now possessed!

The construction of fortifications on the Eastern Front, meanwhile, was reduced to the creation of extended positions occupied by insignificant forces, strong enough for positional operations, but unable to withstand a strong enemy blow. We made every effort to use the experience of recent battles, while encountering resistance from Hitler.

One of the most important demands of the front was the arrangement behind the first line of defense (HKL - "Hauptkampflinie"), which was also created under normal combat conditions and the second line of defense ("Grosskampflinie"), which could be relied upon in major defensive battles. The front commanders demanded that strong, carefully camouflaged and occupied positions be erected approximately 20 km in the rear from the forward edge of the first line of defense for major battles. Further, they wanted to receive defensive instructions that would give them the right, immediately before the start of enemy artillery preparation, to withdraw with their main forces to the second line of defense, leaving only a small cover on the first \517\. Such a maneuver would have rendered its artillery preparation completely useless, would have brought to naught all the enemy's lengthy preparations for the deployment of his forces, would have forced him to run into a well-prepared line of defense and retreat. There is no doubt that this demand was well founded. I studied it and reported to Hitler. He lost his temper and completely refused to put up with such a situation, when they wanted to leave the territory 20 km deep without a fight. Hitler ordered the creation of the main line of resistance 2-4 km from the front line of defense. In issuing this senseless order, he fully lived with the memories of the First World War, and no arguments could force him to abandon his decision. This mistake made itself felt very strongly when, in January 1945, the Russians managed to make a breakthrough, and the reserves, again in accordance with Hitler's categorical order and against my advice, were brought close to the front line. The front line of defense, the main line of resistance and reserves - all at once fell under the blows of the Russians and were simultaneously overturned. Hitler's anger now turned on the people who built the fortifications, and when I began to object to him, also on me. He ordered a transcript of a meeting held in the autumn of 1944 at which the position of the main line of resistance was discussed, as he now began to claim that he always stood behind a distance of 20 km. "What fool would order such nonsense?" I drew his attention to the fact that he did it himself. They brought and began to read the transcript. But after a few sentences, he ordered the reading to stop. It was a clear self-incrimination. Unfortunately, there was no benefit in it, since the breakthrough of the front was a fait accompli.

We will return to Hitler's tactics in describing the major Russian offensive. Hitler still lived \518\ in the belief that only he was the only really fighting soldier in the main headquarters, and therefore believed that most of his military advisers were wrong, and only he was right. In addition, he suffered from megalomania, which was fueled by the laudatory chants of his "parteigenossen", starting from von Ribbentrop and Goering. All this led to the fact that Hitler considered himself a commander and therefore did not tolerate teaching: “You have nothing to teach me! I have been in command of the German ground forces on the fronts for five years, I have accumulated during this time such practical experience that gentlemen from the General Staff will never get it. I studied Clausewitz and Moltke and read Schlieffen's strategic deployment plans. I'm more in the know than you are!" This is one of his many remarks, which were made to me whenever I tried to explain to him the demands of the present moment.

Despite the fact that we had a lot of our own worries, here also the Hungarians gave us worries with their insufficient combat capability and dubious allied loyalty. I have already mentioned the position taken by Regent Horthy towards Hitler. Although this position was understandable from the Hungarian point of view, from our German point of view it was unreliable. The regent of Hungary hoped for cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon powers. He wanted to establish contact with them by air. Whether he tried to do this, whether the Anglo-Americans were inclined to this on their part, I do not know. But I know. that a group of senior Hungarian officers went over to the enemy. This was done on October 15 by General Miklós, whom I met in Berlin as a military attaché, and by the chief of the Hungarian General Staff, Veres, who shortly before that, being with me in East Prussia, gave assurances of his allied loyalty and received from me as a gift car. In this car, in my own "Mercedes", a few days later he and \519\ left for the Russians. The Hungarians could no longer be relied upon. Hitler overthrew the Horthy regime and replaced the latter with Salashi, a Hungarian fascist, mediocre and lacking energy. This happened on October 16, 1944. But this did not improve the situation in Hungary at all; the modest remnants of mutual trust and sympathy for each other disappeared.

In Slovakia, which at first fully supported us, the partisans had been active for a long time. The railroad became more and more dangerous. Passenger trains were stopped, passengers were searched, German soldiers, and especially officers, were killed. This forced them to take strict countermeasures. Hatred and murder reigned in Slovakia, which, unfortunately, also took place on an ever-increasing scale in other countries. The big powers waging war against us called for guerrilla action, the tactics of which were contrary to international law; this forced us to defend ourselves, and this defense was then declared criminal by the prosecutors and judges at Nuremberg, contrary to the norms of international law, although the Allied Powers, upon entering Germany, issued stricter punitive orders than the orders issued by the Germans in their time, moreover, disarmed and exhausted Germany did not give them a single reason to apply these orders.

To paint a fuller picture, you should touch on a little Italy. On June 4, 1944, allied troops entered Rome. Army Group "South" under the command of Field Marshal Kesselring defended the Apennines north of Rome, waging stubborn battles with superior enemy forces. This section of the front connected more than twenty divisions. Faithful to Mussolini, the Italians could not be considered a reliable force because of their weak combat capability, and therefore were used only for service in the Riviera. Basically, in the rear of the German front, a fierce guerrilla \520\ war was waged with all Italian cruelty. It forced us to take harsh countermeasures, since we could not leave the supplies of this army group to the mercy of fate and had to keep in touch with it. The military tribunals of the victorious powers, condemning these facts after the conclusion of the armistice, were guided by no means by a sense of justice, but solely by their own interests.

Offensive in the Ardennes

In early December, Hitler moved his main headquarters from East Prussia to Ziegenberg near Giessen, in order to be closer to the Western Front, where the last decisive German offensive was to begin,

All the forces of the German ground forces, which were able to put together in recent months, were to advance from the Eifel region to the river. Meuse, to break through the relatively weak front of the allied powers south of Luttich and then, by forcing the river in the direction of Brussels and Antwerp, complete this strategic breakthrough by encircling the enemy north of the breakthrough area. If this offensive were successful, Hitler expected a significant weakening of the Western powers, which would give him time to transfer large forces to the Eastern Front in order to repel the expected Russian winter offensive. He hoped in this way to gain time in order to destroy the hopes of his opponents for a complete victory, to force them to abandon their demands for unconditional surrender and to persuade them to conclude an agreed peace.

Unfavorable weather and delays in the preparation of new formations forced him to reschedule the strike, originally planned for mid-November, this time for 16 December. Finally, the attack was launched. \521\

The offensive grouping consisted of two tank armies; 5th Panzer Army under the command of General von Manteuffel and 6th Panzer Army under the command of SS-Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich. The main blow was delivered on the right flank by the 6th Panzer Army, manned by well-equipped formations of the SS troops. The 5th Panzer Army was advancing in the center. Ensuring the left flank of the advancing grouping was entrusted to the 7th Army of General Brandenberger, however, this army was not mobile enough to carry out such a difficult task.

The commander of the troops in the west, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, and the commander of Army Group B, Field Marshal Model, considered it more appropriate to give the advancing troops a limited task, since, in their opinion, the forces were insufficient to carry out the major operation conceived by Hitler. They wanted to defeat the enemy forces located on the eastern river. Meuse, between Aachen and Lüttich, and that's it. However, Hitler rejected their counter-proposals and insisted on his far-reaching plan.

So, on December 16, the offensive began, the 5th Panzer Army deeply wedged into the enemy defenses. The advanced tank formations of the ground forces - the 116th and 2nd tank divisions - went directly to the river. Maas. Separate units of the 2nd Panzer Division even reached the river. Rhine. The 6th Panzer Army was not so successful. Troop concentrations on narrow, icy mountain roads, delays in bringing the second echelon into battle in the sector of the 5th Panzer Army, insufficiently quick use of initial success - all this led to the fact that the army lost the momentum of the offensive - the most necessary condition for conducting any major operation. In addition, the 7th Army ran into difficulties, as a result of which it was necessary to turn the armored units of Manteuffel to the south in order to forestall the threat from the flank. After that, there could be no question of a major breakthrough. Already on December 22 \522\ it was necessary to recognize the need to limit the purpose of the operation. On this day, a large-minded command should have remembered the expected offensive on the Eastern Front, the situation of which depended on the timely completion of the already largely failed offensive on the Western Front. However, not only Hitler, but also the high command of the armed forces, and especially the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces, in these fateful days thought only of the Western Front. The tragedy of our military command became even more obvious after the failure of the offensive in the Ardennes before the end of the war.

On December 24, it was clear to every sane soldier that the offensive had finally failed. It was necessary to switch all our efforts to the east immediately, if it was not already too late.

Preparation of defense in the east

From my headquarters, which had been transferred to the Maybachlager near Zossen, I followed closely the course of the offensive in the west. In the interest of my people, I wished it to be a complete success. But when already on December 23 it became clear that it was impossible to achieve a major success, I decided to go to the Führer's main headquarters and demand an end to the dangerous tension and the immediate transfer of all forces to the Eastern Front.

More and more information came about the upcoming Russian offensive. We have established areas for the deployment of the main forces. Three main strike groups of Russians were identified:

1) At the bridgehead near Baranow, sixty rifle formations, eight tank corps, a cavalry corps and six other tank formations were on alert for the offensive.

2) Fifty-four rifle formations, six tank corps, a cavalry corps and nine other tank formations were concentrated \523\ north of Warsaw.

3) The grouping on the East Prussian border consisted of fifty-four rifle formations, two tank corps and nine other tank formations.

In addition, a grouping of fifteen rifle and two tank formations was located south of Jaslo, a group of eleven rifle formations, a cavalry corps and a tank corps - near Puławy, and a group of thirty-one rifle formations, five tank corps and three other tank formations - south of Warsaw.

We expected that the offensive would begin on January 12, 1945. The superiority of the Russians was expressed by the ratio: in infantry 11:1, in tanks 7:1, in artillery pieces 20:1. If we evaluate the enemy as a whole, then we could speak without any exaggeration of his 15-fold superiority on land and at least 20-fold superiority in the air. I do not suffer underestimation of the German soldier. He was an outstanding warrior, he could be thrown into the offensive against an enemy five times superior without any fear. With proper management, thanks to his brilliant qualities, he negated such a numerical superiority and won. But what lay ahead of him now, after five years of heavy fighting with superior enemy forces, in the face of reduced rations, deteriorating weapons and a faint hope of victory, was a monstrous burden. The High Command, and above all Hitler himself, had to do everything to make it easier for him to carry out this monstrous task. I was occupied with the question - whether all this was in human power at all. Believe me, this thought has oppressed me from the very beginning of the war against Russia and even before. And now she imperiously posed a dilemma: to be or not to be? \524\

And now millions of Germans stood before the enemy, ready to defend the German east from the worst thing that could happen - from the powerful onslaught of the Russians. Didn't our fate suddenly become clear after a small wedging of the Russians into East Prussia! This was as clear as it was to me, to all the soldiers. They knew - all the more so if they were East Germans - just as I did, that our age-old culture was at stake. Seven hundred years of labor and struggle of the Germans and their successes were at stake! Before such a future, the demand for unconditional surrender was cruelty, a crime against humanity, and for the soldiers also a disgrace that they did not want, and could not, take upon themselves until the last prospect of another opportunity for peace was gone.

Another possibility of concluding peace could be created only when it was possible somehow and somewhere to stop the upcoming Russian offensive. To do this, it was necessary to immediately transfer troops from west to east, create a strong reserve army in the area of ​​​​Litzmanstadt (Lodz), Hohensaltz (Inowroclaw) and begin maneuvering battles with the Russian armies of the breakthrough. In this type of battle, the German command and German troops still outnumbered the enemy, despite the duration of the war and the severe exhaustion of our forces.

Based on this, I intended to withstand the battle in the east, but for this it was necessary first of all to win the battle with Hitler for the release of the forces necessary for the Eastern Front. On December 24, I went to Giessen, and from there to report to the Fuhrer's main headquarters.

In addition to Hitler, as usual, Field Marshal Keitel, Colonel General Jodl, General Burgdorf and a number of young officers were present at the report on the situation on the fronts. In my report, I named the groupings of enemy forces and indicated the balance of forces, which was already mentioned above. The work of my department \525\ for the study of the foreign armies of the East was exemplary, its data were absolutely reliable. I already knew the head of this department, General Gehlen, quite well, so I could judge him and his employees, the methods of work and its results. Soon Gehlen's data was confirmed.

Historical fact - Hitler saw things differently. He stated that the data of the Department for the Study of Foreign Armies of the East of the General Staff of the Ground Forces are a bluff. He claimed that each Russian rifle formation had at most 7,000 men, while the armored formations had no tanks. "Yes, this is the most monstrous bluff since Genghis Khan," he exclaimed, "who dug up this nonsense?" After the assassination attempt, Hitler himself often resorted to a bluff of incredible proportions. He ordered the formation of artillery corps, which, in fact, were only brigades in their strength. Further, tank brigades of a two-battalion composition were created, i.e., equal in strength only to a regiment. And the anti-tank brigades consisted of only one division. In my opinion, in this way he introduced confusion into the organization of his own ground forces, but by no means misled the enemy about our real weakness.

Hitler's way of thinking became more and more strange and pushed him to the conclusion that the enemy was also trying to mislead him, Hitler, with the Potemkin villages and that in reality the Russians were not going to launch a serious offensive. Himmler, with whom I sat next to him, who was the commander of the reserve army and at the same time the Upper Rhine Army Group, created for the defense of the river, claimed the same thing at dinner. Rhine and to intercept defectors; at the same time, Himmler was Minister of the Interior, Chief of Police and Reichsführer SS. At that time, Himmler felt his importance. He \526\ believed that he had the same good military judgment that Hitler had, and, of course, much better than all the generals: "You know, dear Colonel General, I do not believe that the Russians will attack at all. This is all only a big bluff. The data of your department for the study of foreign armies in the East are incredibly exaggerated, they make you think too much. I am firmly convinced that nothing will happen in the east." There were no arguments for such naivete.

Significantly more dangerous for the movement of the main forces proposed by me to the east was the resistance of Jodl. Jodl did not want to lose the initiative in the west, allegedly seized from the enemy. He admitted that the offensive in the Ardennes had stalled, but he thought that thanks to this offensive, the enemy had lost the initiative in operational terms. He thought by an offensive on another, unknown and unexpected place for the enemy, to achieve a new partial success and hoped in this way to paralyze the enemy on the Western Front. To this end, he launched a new offensive on the northern border of Alsace-Lorraine. German troops were to advance on both sides of the Bitsch in a southerly direction towards Zabern. This offensive, which began on January 1, 1945, was also successful at first, but it was still very far from the goal - Zabern, then Strasbourg. Jodl, carried away by his plan, strongly protested when I demanded the withdrawal of troops from the Ardennes and the Upper Rhine. He repeatedly repeated his argument: "We have no right to refuse the initiative that has just been seized from the enemy." Hitler willingly supported him, since "in the east we can still sacrifice territory, but not in the west." My arguments did not help either, that the Ruhr area was already paralyzed by Western bomber raids, that transport was put out of action due to enemy air superiority, that this situation would not improve, but, on the contrary, would worsen more and more, that, on the contrary, the industry of Upper Silesia can still operate at full capacity, that the center of gravity of the German military industry has already shifted to the east of the country, that if we also lose Upper Silesia, we will lose the war in a few weeks.

I was refused everything and spent this extremely serious and mournful Christmas Eve in an atmosphere completely inappropriate for a solemn Christian holiday. The news of the encirclement of Budapest, received that evening, could not help to improve the mood. When I left this dinner, I was told that the Eastern Front should rely only on its own forces. When I again demanded the evacuation of Courland (the Baltic states) and the dispatch to the Eastern Front of troops that arrived from Norway, who had previously been in Finland, I was again disappointed. The troops that arrived from Norway were destined for combat operations in the Vosges; these were mountain units, and therefore were especially suitable for fighting in mountainous conditions. However, the region of the Vosges between Bitsch and Zabern was well known to me. I once served there as a lieutenant. It was in Bitsha that the first garrison was stationed, in which I served first in the rank of Fenrich, and then as a young lieutenant. One mountain division could not make a decisive coup there.

On December 25, the first day of Christmas, I took the train to Zossen. I was on the road when Hitler, behind my back, ordered the transfer of Gille's SS corps, which included two SS divisions, from the area north of Warsaw, where it was concentrated in the rear of the front as a reserve of Army Group Reinhardt, to Budapest to break through the encirclement around this city. Reinhardt and I were in despair. This move by Hitler led to an irresponsible weakening without \528\ that overly extended front. All protests went unheeded. Liberation from the blockade of Budapest was more important to Hitler than the defense of East Germany. He began to give foreign policy reasons when I asked him to cancel this unfortunate event, and sent me out. Of the reserves raised to repulse the Russian advance (fourteen and a half panzer and motorized divisions), two divisions were sent to another front. Only twelve and a half divisions remained on a 1,200 km front.

Returning to headquarters, I once again checked information about the enemy with Gehlen and discussed with him and with Wenck a way out of the situation, which still seemed possible. We came to the conclusion that only the cessation of all offensive operations in the west and the immediate transfer of the center of gravity of the war to the east can create little prospect of stopping the Russian offensive. Therefore, I decided once again on the eve of the New Year to ask Hitler about making this only possible decision. The second time I had to go to Ziegenberg. I intended to proceed with even more thorough preparation than the first time. Therefore, upon arrival in Ziegenberg, I first of all sought out Field Marshal von Rundstedt and his chief of staff, General Westphal, told them both about the situation on the Eastern Front, about my plans, and asked them to help me. Both Field Marshal von Rundstedt and his chief of staff showed, as before, a complete understanding of the importance of the "other" front. They gave me the numbers of three divisions on the Western Front and one division in Italy, which could be moved quickly to the east, since they were close to the railway. This required only the consent of the Fuhrer. With all caution, this was reported to the divisions. I notified the head of the military transportation department about this, ordering the trains to be prepared. Then I \529\ went with these modest data to report to Hitler. He had the same story as on the memorable Christmas evening. Jodl declared that he had no free forces, and that he had to keep the initiative in his own hands with the forces available to the West. But this time I could refute it with the data of the commander of the troops in the west. This apparently made an unpleasant impression on him. When I told Hitler the numbers of free divisions, he asked with obvious irritation from whom I heard about this, and fell silent, frowning when I told him the commander of the troops of his own front. There was really nothing to object to this argument. I received four divisions and none more. These four were, of course, only the beginning, but so far they remained the only ones that the high command of the armed forces and the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces were forced to give to the Eastern Front. But even this miserable help was sent by Hitler to Hungary!

On the morning of January 1, I again went to Hitler to report to him that Gille's SS Corps, as part of Balk's 6th Army, would launch an attack on Budapest that evening. Hitler had high hopes for this offensive. I was skeptical, because there was very little time to prepare the offensive, the command and troops did not have the impulse that they had before. Despite initial success, the offensive failed.

The results of the trip to the Fuhrer's main headquarters were very, very insignificant. New reflections began, new comparisons and verification of data about the enemy. I decided to go to Hungary and have a personal talk with the commanders, make sure of our prospects and find a way out of the current situation. Over the course of several days, from 5 to 8 January 1945, I visited General Wöhler, Frisner's successor as commander of Army Group South, General Bulk and SS General Gille, and discussed with them the continuation of operations in Hungary. I received information about the reasons for the failure of the attack on Budapest. In all likelihood, this was because the initial success of the evening battle on January 1 was not used at night to make a decisive breakthrough. We no longer had the officers and soldiers of 1940, otherwise we might have achieved success, allowing us to save our forces and stop the enemy offensive on the Danube front for some time.

From Hungary I went to Harpa in Krakow. He and his able chief of staff, General von Xylander, made clear and consistent their thoughts on defense against the Russians. Harpe suggested that the bank of the Vistula, which was in our hands, be handed over to the enemy just before the start of the Russian offensive, which was expected on January 12, in order to retreat about 20 km and take up less extended rear positions. This made it possible to remove several divisions from the front and thus create a reserve. His view was correct and well founded, but he had little prospect of favor from Hitler. I told Garpa about this. He, with his direct character, expressed a desire to have his proposals. in spite of everything, were reported to the Führer, even if it would backfire on him. The measures taken by the army group to organize the defense were expedient and covered everything that our means allowed.

Finally, I got in touch with Reinhardt by phone. He, like Harpe, made a similar proposal and wanted to abandon defensive positions on the river. Narew in order to withdraw to less extended positions along the East Prussian border and thereby create an opportunity to keep several divisions as a reserve. And, unfortunately, I could not promise him that I would get Hitler's consent to his proposal. \531\

And now, knowing all the needs and requests of the army groups, I decided once again at this difficult time to go to Hitler and try to make the Eastern Front the main front, free up forces on the Western Front and inform the Fuhrer of the desire of the army groups to move the fronts to the rear lines, because no there is no other way out at all for the timely creation of reserves.

On January 9, 1945, I was again in Ziegenberg. Determined not to make any concessions, I intended to show Hitler what responsibility he would otherwise assume. My report took place in front of a regular audience. This time my former chief of staff of the Armored Troops Inspectorate, General Tomale, was also present.

Gehlen very carefully prepared data on the enemy, compiled for clarity several maps and diagrams showing the balance of power. When I showed these developments to Hitler, he burst into rage, called them "completely idiotic" and demanded that I immediately send the compiler of these schemes to a lunatic asylum. I boiled with rage and told Hitler: “The developments were made by General Gehlen, one of the most capable officers of the General Staff. I would not show them to you if I did not consider them my own developments. me with him!" Hitler's demand to replace General Gehlen I decisively rejected. And then the hurricane hit. The report was not successful. Harpe and Reinhardt's proposals were rejected. The expected venomous remarks were made to the generals, who always understand by the term "operate" only a withdrawal to the next reserve positions. All of this was embarrassing in the extreme.

All efforts to create large operational reserves in the threatened sectors of the greatly stretched Eastern Front were shattered by the confused position of Hitler and Jodl. The mood of the high command of the armed forces \532\ was dominated by the unfounded opinion that our accurate information about the upcoming major Russian offensive could be just a big bluff. There, in general, they willingly believed only in what they wanted, and closed their eyes to the harsh reality. Ostrich policy and strategy of complacency and self-deception! For consolation, Hitler concluded the report: "The Eastern Front has never had so many reserves as it does today. This is your merit. I thank you for this." I objected: "The Eastern Front is like a house of cards. It is worth breaking through the front in one single place, the whole front will collapse, because the reserve of twelve and a half divisions for a front of such an enormous extent is very, very small!"

The reserves were located: the 17th Panzer Division near Pinchov (Pinchuv), the 16th Panzer Division south of Kielce, the 20th Motorized Division near Virtsonik and Astravets, the 10th Motorized Division (only combat units) near Kamennaya, the 19th Panzer Division near Radom , 25th Panzer Division at Mogelnitz, 7th Panzer Division at Zichenau (Ciechanow), Motorized Division "Grossdeutschland" at Horzele (Hozhele), 18th Motorized Division East Johannesburg (Pisch), 23rd Infantry Division (not in full combat readiness) at Nikolaiken (Mikolajki), the 10th Scooter-Jäger Brigade at Zensburg (Sendzbork), part of the Brandenburg Motorized Division (newly formed) south of Drengfurt; Panzer Corps "Hermann Goering": 1st Panzer Division "Hermann Goering" west of Gumbinnen (Gusev), 2nd Motorized Division "Hermann Goering" on the front in East Prussia southeast of Gumbinnen (Gusev), 5th Panzer Division near Bartenstein (Bartoshyce), 24th Panzer Division en route from Hungary to Rastenburg (Rastembork).

Greatly upset by Hitler's insulting instruction that "the East must rely only on its own strength and make do with what it has," I returned to my headquarters in Zossen. Hitler and Jodl \533\ knew for sure that the Eastern Front, if the expected offensive became a fact, would not be able to get by with what it had, and then even an immediate decision to transfer reserves to the east in the face of enemy air superiority, and therefore, slow moving transports will be too late. To what extent their origin (they came from provinces far from Prussia) contributed to their taking such a stupid position remains unclear, but that this had some influence on their reasoning, I was convinced of this during my last years. reports. For us, the inhabitants of Prussia, it was about a close homeland, created with such tension in battles and battles, about a country with centuries-old Christian, Western culture, about a land with the graves of our ancestors, about Prussia, which we loved. We knew that with a successful offensive from the east, we must lose her. Most of all, we were afraid for its inhabitants, we were afraid of what happened to the population of Goldap and Nemmersdorf. But even these fears of ours were not understood, they did not heed the proposals of the front for the evacuation of the civilian population from the threatened areas, since Hitler saw in this only an expression of defeatism, which allegedly overcame the generals. He was afraid that these defeatist sentiments would spread to the public. In this he was supported by the Gauleiters, especially the East Prussian Gauleiter Koch. This latter harbored some suspicion of the generals. The area of ​​​​combat operations of army groups was considered a narrow strip 10 km wide, passing behind the front line. Batteries of heavy guns were already in firing positions located on the territory of the so-called domestic regions subordinate to the Gauleiters, on the territory where you can’t equip a single firing position, you can’t cut down a tree without coming into conflict with civil authorities (i.e. with party authorities). \534\

70 years ago, the last major defensive operation of the Red Army against German troops began during the Great Patriotic War. It was carried out from March 6 to March 15, 1945 by part of the forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front with the assistance of the 1st Bulgarian and 3rd Yugoslav armies in the area of ​​Lake Balaton. During the battle, Soviet troops repelled the offensive of the Wehrmacht, codenamed "Spring Awakening" (German: Frühlingserwachen), which was the last major offensive operation of the German armed forces in World War II.

In February 1945, the head of the American military mission handed over to the Soviet General Staff important information about the plans of the Nazi command on the eastern front. From the data of American intelligence, it followed that the Germans were creating two groupings for a counteroffensive against the Red Army: one in Pomerania for an attack on Thorn, the second in the region of Vienna, Moravsk for an offensive in the direction of Lodz. At the same time, the inclusion of the 6th SS Panzer Army was supposed to be included in the southern grouping. Similar information a week earlier A.I. Antonov also received from the head of the army section of the British Military Mission in Moscow, Colonel Brinkman. These data received from the allies were of undoubted interest, since they confirmed the information received by the General Staff on January 27 from the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General I.I. Ilyichev. It would seem that all the information about the transfer of 6 TA SS to the Soviet-German front, both their own and transmitted in February 1945 by the British and Americans, coincided. However, on February 21, 1945, I.I. Ilyichev sent I.V. Stalin, N.A. Bulganin and A.I. Antonov an urgent special report, the data of which contradicted the materials that had been received the day before from the American General J.R. Dean, because it turned out that "the entire 6th SS Panzer Army was heading to Hungary."

An analysis of the situation led to the conclusion that a dangerous situation was developing on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. The enemy plans to launch a counteroffensive, and intends to achieve serious success. Immediately, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent instructions to the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front F.I. Tolbukhin: without stopping the preparation of an offensive operation on Vienna, take measures to repel a possible enemy counterattack. Thus, it became clear to the Soviet command that the German command decided to launch a counterattack in Hungary. It planned to push back the Soviet troops across the Danube, thereby eliminating the threat to Vienna and the southern regions of Germany. In addition, in the Balaton area there were some of the last oil fields available to the Germans, without which the German air force and armored forces were left without fuel. In the second half of February 1945, Soviet intelligence established the concentration of a large German tank group in the western part of Hungary. Having revealed the intentions of the German command, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task for the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts to carry out a defensive operation and defeat the enemy forces in the area of ​​Lake Balaton. At the same time, the directive of the Stavka demanded to continue preparations for an attack on Vienna.

Using the experience of the Battle of Kursk, an anti-tank defense in depth was created in the direction of the alleged main attack. Under the leadership of the head of the engineering troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, L. 3. Kotlyar, a large amount of defensive work was carried out to provide sheltered accommodation for people and equipment, equip roads to allow maneuvering reserves, and mine dangerous areas. Particular attention was paid to the fight against enemy tanks. To this end, 66 anti-tank areas were created on the 83-kilometer section from Gant to Lake Balaton and 65% of all front artillery was concentrated. In the most dangerous directions, the density of artillery reached 60-70 guns and mortars per one kilometer of the front. The depth of defense in some areas reached 25-30 km. The success of defensive actions largely depended on the timely delivery of ammunition and fuel to the troops. Therefore, in preparing the operation, much attention was paid to its logistics. Since the front-line warehouses were located on the eastern bank of the Danube, and the crossings across the river were violated by the actions of German aircraft and the spring ice drift, additional rope-suspension roads and a gas pipeline were built across the Danube to ensure the uninterrupted supply of the defending troops.

The German offensive began on the night of March 6 with attacks on the troops of the 1st Bulgarian and 3rd Yugoslav armies. German troops managed to force the Drava River and capture two bridgeheads each up to 8 km deep along the front and up to 5 km deep. The German troops struck the main blow between the lakes Velence and Balaton at 8 hours 40 minutes after a 30-minute artillery preparation. The 6th SS Panzer Army and the 6th Field Army went on the offensive in the sector of the 4th Guards and 26th Armies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. To break through the defenses, the German command used massive tank attacks. In some sectors of the front, 1.5-2 km wide, up to 50 tanks and assault guns simultaneously participated in the attacks. Fierce battles broke out. By the end of the day, the attackers advanced to a depth of 4 km, and captured the stronghold of Sheregeyesh.

The next morning, the attacks of the German troops resumed with renewed vigor. About 200 tanks and assault guns attacked in the zone of the 26th Army with the support of aviation. Constantly maneuvering along the front, the German command persistently looked for weaknesses in the defense of the Soviet troops. The Soviet command, in turn, promptly deployed anti-tank reserves to threatened areas.

For ten days of fierce fighting, the German troops managed to move forward by 20-30 km. However, the resistance of the Soviet soldiers and the strong defense they created did not allow the German units to break through to the Danube. The Germans did not have the necessary reserves to develop success. Having suffered heavy losses, on March 15, the German troops stopped the offensive.

Recalling the events in Hungary, I.V. Stalin wrote: “... in February of this year, General Marshall gave a number of important messages to the General Staff of the Soviet troops, where, based on the data he had, he warned the Russians that in March there would be two serious German counterattacks on eastern front, of which one will be sent from Pomerania to Thorn, and the other from the Moravska Ostrava region to Lodz. In fact, however, it turned out that the main attack of the Germans was being prepared and was carried out not in the above areas, but in a completely different area, namely in the area of ​​​​Lake Balaton, southwest of Budapest. As is now known, the Germans gathered up to 35 divisions in this area, including 11 tank divisions. It was one of the most serious blows during the war with such a large concentration of tank forces. Marshal Tolbukhin managed to avoid a catastrophe and then utterly defeated the Germans, among other things, because my informants revealed, however, with some delay, this plan for the main attack of the Germans and immediately warned Marshal Tolbukhin about it. Thus, I had the opportunity to once again be convinced of the accuracy and awareness of Soviet informants ... ".

1914. East Prussian operation (4 (17) August - 2 (15) September). The purpose of the operation is to defeat the German 8th Army with sweeping blows from the flanks, to capture East Prussia in order to develop an offensive deep into Germany. The inconsistency of the actions of the Russian armies led to the defeat and withdrawal of the Russian troops.

Battle of Galicia (5 (18) August - 8 (21) September). It became one of the biggest events of the war: the fighting was carried out on a 400 km long front. The Russian troops managed not only to repel the offensive of four Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia and Poland, but also to threaten an invasion of Hungary and Silesia. The enemy failed to impose a "blitzkrieg" on Russia and achieve decisive successes already at the initial stage of the war.

Warsaw-Ivangorod operation (September 15 (28) - October 26 (November 8)). Saving the allies from complete defeat, Germany transferred troops to Upper Silesia. Almost half of the Russian forces took part in repelling the offensive. As a result, the German offensive was stopped and the enemy was driven back to their original positions.

Lodz operation (October 29 (November 11) - November 11 (24). The command of the German army tried to encircle and destroy the 2nd and 5th Russian armies in the Lodz region. The Russians managed not only to resist, but also to push back the enemy.

1915 Winter Germany went over to the defensive on the Western Front and shifted the main military operations to the Eastern Front. Its main task was to withdraw Russia from the war. By the end of the 1915 campaign, Russian troops were forced to leave significant territories: Poland, part of the Baltic states, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.

1916 Narochskayaoperation (5 (18) - 16 (29) March). The need for this operation was caused by the desire to alleviate the situation of the French in the Verdun area. The operation did not lead to success, but the Germans were forced to transfer about four divisions to the Eastern Front.

Brusilovsky breakthrough (May 22 (June 4) - July 31 (August 13)). Russian forces under the command of General A.A. Brusilov carried out a powerful breakthrough of the front in the region of Lutsk and Kovel, in a short time they reached the passes of the Carpathian Mountains. Austro-Hungarian troops were defeated. Austria-Hungary was on the verge of complete defeat and exit from the war. Russian troops lost about 500 thousand people.

Mitavskaya operation (December 23–29 (January 5–11, 1917)). The offensive of the Russian troops in the Riga area was unexpected for the Germans. But they not only stopped the Russian 12th Army, but also forced it to retreat from its former positions. For Russia, the Mitav operation ended in vain.

1917 Juneoffensive (16 (29) June - 15 (28) July). Undertaken by the military command of the Provisional Government along the entire front. Due to the fall in discipline and the growth of anti-war sentiment in the troops, it ended in complete failure.

Riga operation (August 19 (September 1) - August 24 (September 6)). The offensive operation of the German troops with the aim of capturing Riga. On the night of August 21 (September 3), the 12th Russian army left Riga.

The reasons for military failures are related to the general socio-economic situation in Russia. The main reason is the inability of Russian industry and transport to meet the needs of the front Already after the overthrow of the autocracy, in June 1917, the Provisional Government tried to organize an offensive at the front. Due to the decline of military discipline, this offensive ended in complete failure. The inability to wage war, as well as the desire of the Bolshevik government to stay in power in any way, led to the signing March 3, 1918 humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany. On this day, Russia's participation in the First World War ended.

From December 1944 to January 1945, Germany lost up to 125,000 soldiers on the Western Front. The failure of the Ardennes operation turned out to be the destruction of aircraft for the Germans, ammunition and fuel were used up. The purpose of the allied forces was to capture the most important for the Third Reich Ruhr region. In the words of Eisenhower, the Ruhr was the "industrial heart" of the Third Reich, providing resistance to the Allied forces. When planning the operation, the fact that a significant part of the Wehrmacht's combat-ready formations was on the Eastern Front was taken into account.

Omar Bradley

The 12th American Army Group was commanded by Omar Bradley, who was distinguished by his brilliant organizational skills. The 21st British Army Group was led by an experienced military leader, Bernard Montgomery. The operation was scheduled for March 23, 1945. Her success was largely ensured by aviation training, which lasted almost 2 weeks. The main communications nodes were destroyed. The Ruhr region was actually cut off from Germany. The allied forces were opposed by 29 divisions, but they were only half completed. There was not enough food and fuel, which affected the mood of the soldiers in the most sad way. The German formations had 1,704 combat aircraft at their disposal, while the Allied forces had 9,000 aircraft at their disposal.

On the night of March 23, Allied troops captured bridgeheads on the right bank of the Rhine. In the morning, airborne divisions were landed in the Wesel area. Air cover was provided by more than 2,000 fighters.

On March 26, formations of the 12th American Army Group moved north. Deprived of resources, the German troops were unable to offer organized resistance. Joseph Goebbels wrote about the course of the operation in his diary: “The Americans managed to enter the rear of our troops defending on the Saar front. The army fighting on the Western Wall was withdrawn too late, and a significant part of it was taken prisoner. All this determined the morale of the soldiers. But even worse was the situation with the civilian population, which in a number of cases opposed its own troops and prevented them from holding the line. Even most of the anti-tank barriers erected in the rear were captured by the enemy without a fight.

On April 1, the 9th US Army linked up with the 1st. The enemy was surrounded. On April 12, the troops reached the Elbe, on the 19th they captured Leipzig. The road to Berlin was free. The commander of the German units, Field Marshal Model, convinced of the imminent defeat, disbanded the soldiers and committed suicide near Duisburg. More than 300,000 German soldiers were taken prisoner.