Antipov A. General Rokhlin: life and death Antipov A.V. Lev Rokhlin: Life and death of a general

Not only during his short life, but also after his death, General Rokhlin attracted the close attention of the people. He passed his life's journey in striving and struggle aimed at improving the quality of life of the entire country. A strong army, developed science, a stable economy - all for the benefit of humanity.

Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin was born on June 6, 1947 in Kazakhstan. The mother raised the future general, like his three brothers, alone. Rokhlin's father was detained for political reasons shortly after the birth of his son. In the 10th year of Lev’s life, the Rokhlin family moved to Tashkent. It was there that the future famous general spent his youth.

Starting from school, Rokhlin was distinguished by high academic performance and efficiency. This allowed him to receive his subsequent education at the Higher Combined Arms Command School in Tashkent, and his higher education at the Academy named after. Frunze, as well as at the Academy of the General Staff.

Having received a combined arms qualification, the young officer refused the required leave and immediately went to service. He was assigned to a group of Soviet troops in East Germany. The service took Rokhlin from the Arctic to the Turkestan district.

From 1982 to 1984, the future General Rokhlin served in Afghanistan. He started as a regimental commander, but in the second year of service he had a division under his command. He personally took part in battles and was seriously wounded several times. Nevertheless, the command decided that he could not cope with one military operation and, as a result, in 1983 he was removed from his post and appointed deputy commander of a motorized rifle regiment. But for impeccable service, in less than a year the general is restored to his previous position.

The end of 1994 - the beginning of 1995 included service in the Chechnya region. He headed a separate corps on the territory of the republic, participated in a number of operations to capture areas of Grozny and in campaigns organized for negotiations with militants. Having numerous awards received over the years of service, General Rokhlin refused the title “Hero of the Russian Federation” for participating in the battles in Grozny.

Not stopping there, he begins work on his political career. Already in 1995, he was elected to the State Duma of the second convocation. In 1996, General Rokhlin joined “Our Home is Russia”. This tandem brought him a position in defense.

September 1997 was a turning point in the general's career. He makes the fateful decision to create his own political party. He was one of the strongest opposition leaders of the time, who was worried about the fate of the army and the country as a whole. However, conversations among Rokhlin's colleagues and associates that he was preparing a coup to remove Russian President Boris Yeltsin from office led to Rokhlin being removed from his position.

On the night of July 3, 1998, the politician died in a country house located in the Moscow region. The accusation was brought against his wife, Tamara, but who killed General Rokhlin was not precisely established.

As a result of lengthy trials, Tamara Rokhlina, who refuses to admit her guilt, was sentenced to 4 years of suspended imprisonment and 2.5 years of probation.

Some facts regarding the life and death of the general remain in question. Whether he wanted to carry out a coup, who killed L. Ya. Rokhlin and for what purpose, this worries the people of Russia to this day.

In the Prionezhsky region of the Republic of Karelia, a monument to General Rokhlin was erected. For all this time, he deserved more than one fair award, which marked his courage and selfless service for the good of his Motherland.

Antipov A.V.

Lev Rokhlin: The life and death of a general.

The echo of the shot that ended the life of General Lev Rokhlin will continue to sound for a very long time. In the firmament of Russian public life in recent years, the figure of Rokhlin stood out for its originality and authority, so as to immediately draw a line under his life and the mysterious circumstances of his death. A combat “trench” general, he also acted in politics like a soldier - directly and honestly, not afraid of difficulties and despising danger. Rokhlin's life was cut short during takeoff. He was too inconvenient; many influential people were interested in eliminating him. Rokhlin knew about this interest and spoke about it several times.

PREFACE

This book was actually written before the tragic death of General Rokhlin. Lev Yakovlevich was cool about the idea of ​​writing a book about him. And, after reading the manuscript, he made every effort to ensure that the book included the names of as many people as possible with whom he had to serve and fight. Our last conversation on this topic took place two weeks before the general’s death.

After the death of Lev Yakovlevich, the author did not change anything that would speak of the general in the past tense. No other significant changes were made to the text that existed at that time. After all, the author in almost all assessments relied on the opinion of the general. And it was impossible to allow this opinion, even with the best intentions, to be subject to free interpretation. But the author’s assessments of Rokhlin’s own personality remained unchanged. Is that the negative today is perceived differently and does not seem as significant as it seemed during the life of Lev Yakovlevich. The scale of this personality becomes more and more clear with every day that moves us away from him: “Face to face, you can’t see the face,” said the poet. “What’s great is seen at a distance.”

Russian society, unfortunately, has yet to fully understand who General Rokhlin was and what part of society itself he represented.

Today we still underestimate people's biographies. We are always looking for something special that we ourselves cannot understand or feel. We fall into despair when the people we hoped for, trusted, and even loved, suddenly turn out to be completely different. In recent years, these disappointments have haunted us constantly.

The secret of our disappointments is simple: we know little about the biographies of our heroes. After all, if you look at it, today among the well-known politicians in the country there are not many whose lives could become an example to follow. Most of today's political idols glided through life with ease and ease. Fate did not beat them, did not break them, did not test the strength of their characters and beliefs. The height of their courage was some “cool” words said in the next interview or at an authorized rally. At best, they have become brave enough to participate in some adventures, the outcome of which is known and can only cause a feeling of regret.

As for the persons vested with state power today (meaning members of the government), their biographies are practically unknown to society, and even if they are known, they can cause nothing but bewilderment. These are biographies of ordinary officials who know life from newspapers and their work from textbooks. There is nothing built on their account, there is nothing experienced in their lives, there is nothing in their destinies that could arouse interest and suggest what can be expected from these people.

The situation is no better among professional military personnel. But there are two components here. Firstly, the policy of the current leadership of the country has led to the fact that people in uniform today are judged either by those who in the center of Moscow shoot from tanks at the citizens of their country, or by those who have built multi-storey mansions for themselves and drive Mercedes. . But more often for those who meekly whine at the empty cash registers of units and units, begging for money to feed their families. And secondly, the military themselves, despite their by no means easy fates, managed to adapt to present life in their own way. Adapt in such a way that few people believe that military service strengthens characters and shapes personalities.

Against this background, the life and fate of General Lev Rokhlin is almost a legend. His life had everything - the pain of loss and the bitterness of disappointment. There was hard work, full of dangers, and the joy of victories. There was struggle, there was love. There were mistakes and misconceptions. There was everything.

There was only one thing missing - betrayal. He never betrayed his faith in Russia, in its people and in their better lot. He devoted himself entirely to serving this faith. And I never adapted to the circumstances that life imposed.

Coming into politics literally from the trenches, Rokhlin with amazing speed became one of the most prominent political figures in Russia. And this despite the fact that by that time it seemed: all the places on the political field had already been taken, all the roles had been distributed. The general broke this idea, and soon it became clear to everyone: the army, despite all its problems, gave the country a new leader of all-Russian scale, a leader who was able to give people hope, instill faith and encourage action. At the same time, it frightened those who had long been established in the political kitchen and took places in the power structures. Rokhlin was loved and hated in equal measure. He became the only politician whom Boris Yeltsin promised to “sweep away.” And the only one whose death, despite all the talk about how it came, exposed the cruelty of the political confrontation in the country.

I first wrote about the general in 1995 in the ninth issue of the magazine "Warrior", known to most readers as "Soviet Warrior". The essay was called "Professional".

At that time, Lev Yakovlevich was not yet widely known in the country and the army. But they have already talked about it.

I, the author of this essay, wanted to convey to readers the image of a Russian general, a man of an unusual and difficult fate, complex character and indomitable energy. An image that sharply contrasts with the one that has developed in the Russian public consciousness in recent years and which we talked about...

This opportunity was provided not only by the war in Chechnya, where Rokhlin showed remarkable leadership abilities, but also by the personality of the general himself, whose life was full of events directly related to the fate of the country and its army.

The book brought to your attention is an attempt to continue this story. But the basis is based on qualitatively different material that has been collected over the past years.

And the main ones of these materials concern the “strange” war in the Caucasus. A war that revealed all the ulcers of Russian society of the last decade. A war that was the result of the irresponsible policies of the authorities and the depravity of the government system they created. And finally, the war, which demonstrated the organizational and technical collapse of the Russian Army, the decay of the moral foundations on which it had rested from time immemorial.

The first part of the book tells about the path that Lev Rokhlin took before the Chechen events, about how the character of the future general was formed, his views and habits, and how he acquired combat experience.

In the second part of the book, with the help of General Rokhlin, we will dwell in detail on the events that took place in Chechnya in December 1994 - February 1995. Let's talk about how the fighting went on in Grozny and what happened on the eve of its assault. At the same time, we will first of all talk about purely military issues, about the problems of command and control and interaction of troops in particular and law enforcement agencies in

The war hero, Lev Rokhlin, who refused to take the highest award for participation in the unleashed civil war, as he said, slammed his fist on the table with all his might, making the whole country hear him. He literally burst into big politics as a lone hero, but very quickly realized that it was impossible to help the army, the military-industrial complex and science without changing the situation in the country. Not being a professional politician, Rokhlin nevertheless knew how to fight and precisely, in a military way, formulate the slogans of the moment. There cannot be a strong army in an economically weak state. Simple, simple words. True, in every word there is an absolute lack of desire to show off. The people saw this and believed him. Rokhlin essentially led the entire Russian protest movement, and by the summer of 1998 the country was on its hind legs & a huge wave of protest was emerging, which should and could then sweep away the rotten Yeltsin regime. The people then saw in Rokhlin the leader they had been waiting for a long time - brave, honest, incorruptible.
This book was actually written before the tragic death of General Rokhlin. Lev Yakovlevich was cool about the idea of ​​writing a book about him. And, after reading the manuscript, he made every effort to ensure that the book included the names of as many people as possible with whom he had to serve and fight. Our last conversation on this topic took place two weeks before the general’s death.
After the death of Lev Yakovlevich, the author did not change anything that would speak of the general in the past tense. No other significant changes were made to the text that existed at that time. After all, the author in almost all assessments relied on the opinion of the general. And it was impossible to allow this opinion, even with the best intentions, to be subject to free interpretation. But the author’s assessments of Rokhlin’s own personality remained unchanged. Is that negativity today is perceived differently and does not seem as significant as it seemed during the life of Lev Yakovlevich. The scale of this personality becomes more and more clear with every day that moves us away from him: “Face to face, you can’t see the face,” said the poet. “What’s great is seen at a distance.”
Russian society, unfortunately, has yet to fully understand who General Rokhlin was and what part of society itself he represented.
Today we still underestimate people's biographies. We are always looking for something special that we ourselves cannot understand or feel. We fall into despair when the people we hoped for, trusted, and even loved, suddenly turn out to be completely different. In recent years, these disappointments have haunted us constantly.
The secret of our disappointments is simple: we know little about the biographies of our heroes. After all, if you look at it, today among the well-known politicians in the country there are not many whose lives could become an example to follow. Most of today's political idols glided through life with ease and ease. Fate did not beat them, did not break them, did not test the strength of their characters and beliefs. The height of their courage was some “cool” words said in the next interview or at an authorized rally. At best, they have become brave enough to participate in some adventures, the outcome of which is known and can only cause a feeling of regret.
As for the persons vested with state power today (meaning members of the government), their biographies are practically unknown to society, and even if they are known, they can cause nothing but bewilderment. These are biographies of ordinary officials who know life from newspapers and their work from textbooks. There is nothing built on their account, there is nothing experienced in their lives, there is nothing in their destinies that could arouse interest and suggest what can be expected from these people.
The situation is no better among professional military personnel. But there are two components here. Firstly, the policy of the current leadership of the country has led to the fact that people in uniform today are judged either by those who in the center of Moscow shoot from tanks at the citizens of their country, or by those who have built multi-storey mansions for themselves and drive Mercedes. . But more often for those who meekly whine at the empty cash registers of units and units, begging for money to feed their families. And secondly, the military themselves, despite their by no means easy fates, managed to adapt to present life in their own way. Adapt in such a way that few people believe that military service strengthens characters and shapes personalities.
Against this background, the life and fate of General Lev Rokhlin is almost a legend. His life had everything - the pain of loss and the bitterness of disappointment. There was hard work, full of dangers, and the joy of victories. There was struggle, there was love. There were mistakes and misconceptions. There was everything.
There was only one thing missing - betrayal. He never betrayed his faith in Russia, in its people and in their better lot. He devoted himself entirely to serving this faith. And I never adapted to the circumstances that life imposed.
Coming into politics literally from the trenches, Rokhlin with amazing speed became one of the most prominent political figures in Russia. And this despite the fact that by that time it seemed: all the places on the political field had already been taken, all the roles had been distributed. The general broke this idea, and soon it became clear to everyone: the army, despite all its problems, gave the country a new leader of all-Russian scale, a leader who was able to give people hope, instill faith and encourage action. At the same time, it frightened those who had long been established in the political kitchen and took places in the power structures. Rokhlin was loved and hated in equal measure. He became the only politician whom Boris Yeltsin promised to “sweep away.” And the only one whose death, despite all the talk about how it came, exposed the cruelty of the political confrontation in the country.
I first wrote about the general in 1995 in the ninth issue of the magazine "Warrior", known to most readers as "Soviet Warrior". The essay was called "Professional".
At that time, Lev Yakovlevich was not yet widely known in the country and the army. But they have already talked about it.
I, the author of this essay, wanted to convey to readers the image of a Russian general, a man of an unusual and difficult fate, complex character and indomitable energy. An image that sharply contrasts with the one that has developed in the Russian public consciousness in recent years and which we talked about...
This opportunity was provided not only by the war in Chechnya, where Rokhlin showed remarkable leadership abilities, but also by the personality of the general himself, whose life was full of events directly related to the fate of the country and its army.
The book brought to your attention is an attempt to continue this story. But the basis is based on qualitatively different material that has been collected over the past years.
And the main ones of these materials concern the “strange” war in the Caucasus. A war that revealed all the ulcers of Russian society of the last decade. A war that was the result of the irresponsible policies of the authorities and the depravity of the government system they created. And finally, the war, which demonstrated the organizational and technical collapse of the Russian Army, the decay of the moral foundations on which it had rested from time immemorial.
The first part of the book tells about the path that Lev Rokhlin took before the Chechen events, about how the character of the future general was formed, his views and habits, and how he acquired combat experience.
In the second part of the book, with the help of General Rokhlin, we will dwell in detail on the events that took place in Chechnya in December 1994 - February 1995. Let's talk about how the fighting went on in Grozny and what happened on the eve of its assault. At the same time, we will first of all talk about purely military issues, about the problems of command and control and interaction of troops in particular and law enforcement agencies in general. These issues have been little studied and are practically not covered in the media. Therefore, few people have any idea what the specific reasons for the army’s defeat at the first and second stages of the military operation were, or how and in what ways the defects in the system of command and control of troops and their training manifested themselves in recent years.
In the third part we will talk about why General Rokhlin, on the eve of the elections to the State Duma, joined the government movement “Our Home is Russia” (NDR), about his relationship with Viktor Chernomyrdin, about his meeting with Boris Yeltsin and about the illusions in which a “trench” general was staying. In addition, we will tell you about what was done by the State Duma Defense Committee, which he headed, in order to change the situation that inevitably pushed and continues to push the Russian Army and the entire defense of the country to collapse. And not even on the fields of war. And right in the barracks.
Here we come to the question of how it happened that the generals beaten by Chechen militants, the authors of failed plans for military operations, the culprits of the death of thousands of soldiers and officers, who neglected all the rich combat experience of our army, ended up making a dizzying military career, actually standing at the helm of the Russian security forces... Here we will make an attempt to understand how the defense policy of the authorities, the military reform allegedly carried out by them, and the defeat of the army in Chechnya are connected.
And finally, the reader will learn about why the general left the NDR, starting the creation of a political movement in opposition to the authorities, “In support of the army, defense industry and military science.”
Memories, assessments, comments and reflections of the general himself will form the basis of our narrative.
And episodes from his life and service will be further confirmation of the fact that in Russia there are people who, in spite of everything, have retained a sense of responsibility for the fate of the country and its soldiers, that the Russian military school has trained commanders who can teach much to the vaunted military experts of any army from countries about which it is customary to speak with delight today.
The documents collected in appendices, almost all written by Lev Rokhlin, will add details to the story.
In conclusion, we recall some of the events that preceded and that occurred immediately after the death of the general. These events provide a serious reason not to follow any of the versions, especially the version of a domestic murder, which not only the leaders of the investigative team seized upon with enviable enthusiasm...
The general was too extraordinary and an authoritative person, in whose elimination many people might be interested. Rokhlin knew about this interest and spoke about it several times...

5.30. KK (corps commander - author) clarified the tasks of the unit commanders for the assault on Grozny.

6.30. Checking communications equipment.

6.45. Start of movement.

7.50. We passed the Tersky ridge.

9.01. 131st Omsbr (separate motorized rifle brigade from Maykop. - Author): the Rodina agricultural farm is covered from the northern, western and southern sides... In our direction the neighbors are fighting. Specify.

9.30. On the north-eastern outskirts of the Russian cemetery, a self-propelled artillery unit (self-propelled artillery unit - author) - ours - was hit."

We knew that they were waiting for us. We could move either along the Petropavlovskoye Highway, or in a detour, off-road, past the Severny airport, and then through the Russian cemetery,” says Rokhlin. - We had information from the opposition that two gas stations on the highway were prepared for an explosion, a large number of grenades and Molotov cocktails had been collected. There is also an ambush at the Russian cemetery. It was not placed there by accident. In the battle near the village of Petropavlovskaya, I forbade artillery and tanks to fire at the mosque, where the militants’ stronghold and their fire spotters were located. The problem was solved by snipers and machine gunners. And the enemy thought that since I didn’t destroy the mosque, then I wouldn’t fire cannons at the Russian cemetery. In short, they were waiting for us in all possible directions. Then I assigned the task to the commander of the 33rd regiment, Colonel Vladimir Vereshchagin, to capture the bridge over the Neftyanka River on the Petropavlovskoe Highway and prepare a crossing for the passage of the main forces.

But I didn’t even tell him that this was a false route.

On December 31, the main forces went around and approached the Russian cemetery. I did not launch an artillery strike on the cemetery in advance. This would give away our intentions. But when they opened fire from the cemetery, our artillery began to fire along the road passing through it. And the column actually went between shell explosions.

Somewhat earlier, when we reached the bridge at the Severny airport, I withdrew the 33rd regiment from the bridge on the Petropavlovskoe highway and assigned part of its units to reserve to simulate that I would still take this route.

The Russian cemetery became the last frontier for many Chechen fighters who perished in Russian graves.

Units of the 8th Corps entered the city.

When they ask me whether there are ethical norms and moral rules in war, says Rokhlin, I don’t know what to answer. But I have long been convinced that attempts to comply with these norms and rules in war have to be paid in blood.

War, according to Leo Tolstoy, requires a certain limitation from a person. Including in feelings, in the perception of what is happening. Without this limitation, the writer believed, there cannot be a real military man, there cannot be a true commander.

Some will say it's scary. But why then does humanity and its leaders refuse to give up achieving their goals by force? And why doesn’t civilization, the development of education and culture lead even the richest and most prosperous nations to renounce the use of the means and methods of this violence, but only improve them, making them more and more terrible and sophisticated?

It is not a soldier who starts a war, nor even a general. The war is started by politicians, the same ones who wince in disgust at the smell of sweat and don’t know what still-warm blood smells like, who flaunt elegant manners and claim the right to lead people to the heights of education and culture.

The soldier and the general are least interested in war. Because they know: they are the ones who will have to live by its rules and die in war.

FROM THE "WORKBOOK OF THE OPERATIONAL GROUP OF THE 8th Guards AK COMBAT CONTROL CENTER":

10.02. We reached the southern edge of the cemetery. Find 81st motorized rifle regiment (motorized rifle regiment - Author). Let them report where they are.

10.14. On the street A "hail" of militants has been installed at the hippodrome. Brought to the attention of the CC (corps commander - Author). Strike with artillery.

10.15. 81 SME went to the street. Trade union. 255 SME went to the street. Circular and Mayakovsky.

11.40. The 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade attacks in the direction of elevation. 123.5.

12.25. Colonel General Kulikov reported the procedure for the Ministry of Internal Affairs: as soon as part of the city is passed, Vorobyov’s people approach and, with part of their forces, clear the houses in the opposite direction.

12.40. There is a battle in the Zagryazhskoye area.

12.50. The 104th Airborne Division is located on the eastern outskirts of the city along the railway.

14.12. KVO13 set the task of introducing reserves to speed up the movement towards the palace and block it with its neighbor. Simultaneously place blocks along the breakthrough corridors."

The most difficult thing, says Rokhlin, and ultimately the most important thing is the preparation for the battle, its concept, tactical calculations, training of the troops, their plan of action and the organization of control. Everything else depends on this. Such preparation requires dedication of all efforts and time. My heart aches. You don't sleep or eat. You only think about it. You count, measure, double-check the information a hundred times. It's a hell of a job.

General Rokhlin did not participate in the development of what was called "an operation to disarm illegal armed groups in Chechnya."

But, as we know, he was not mistaken about the wording borrowed from the arsenals of police terminology.

The march of corps units to Grozny was the best confirmation of this.

Before the storming of the city,” says Rokhlin, “I decided to clarify my tasks. Based on the positions we occupied, I believed that the Eastern group, which I was offered to command, should be led by another general. And it is advisable to appoint me to command the Northern group. I had a conversation with Kvashnin on this topic. He appointed General Staskov14 to command the Eastern group. “And who will command the Northern?” - I ask. Kvashnin replies: “I am. We will deploy a forward command post in Tolstoy-Yurt. You know what a powerful group this is: T-80 tanks, BMP-3. (There were almost no such things in the troops then.)” - “What is my task? " - I ask. “Go to the palace, occupy it, and we will come.” I say: “Did you watch the speech of the Minister of Defense on television? He said that tanks do not attack the city.” This task was removed from me. But I insist: “What is my task anyway?” “You will be in reserve,” they answer. “You will cover the left flank of the main group.” And they assigned a route.

Rokhlin objected to the idea of ​​locating the PKP (forward command post) of the Northern group in Tolstoy-Yurt.

The PKP should be located directly behind the combat formations of the troops, he explains. - And Tolstoy-Yurt is to the side, to the left. In addition, I knew that if the group’s PKP was placed at my place, I would be left without means of communication. And I won’t be able to control it on my own.

The general, it seems, even then did not trust Kvashnin’s management abilities and tried in every possible way to protect himself from his participation in the management of units of his corps. Later, he would characterize Anatoly Vasilyevich as follows: “An energetic, kind, hospitable person, absolutely not professional in military affairs.”

In the Northern group, Rokhlin continues his story, according to Kvashnin, there was one problem: the fighters were not ready. But it was believed that there was time and it was possible to conduct classes and teach. It seemed strange to me that in a few days it was supposed to teach people what usually takes several months and even years. I even thought then that if everything happened as planned, I would have to reconsider all my experience, all my views on combat training and planning combat operations.

Later, after becoming a State Duma deputy and starting to study the causes of the mass death of military personnel in Chechnya, Rokhlin would discover: the opinion that in a few days it was possible to prepare people for combat operations was shared by almost all senior leaders of the Ministry of Defense and the main commands of the military branches. Without a shadow of a doubt, they gave orders to send soldiers from technical air defense units, the Air Force, sailors from Navy ships, and even soldiers from construction battalions to the troops fighting in Chechnya. They were taught to hold a machine gun in their hands for several days and thrown into battle. In military parlance, such soldiers are called “cannon fodder.” The situation was no better with those who joined the troops voluntarily, under a contract. They were generally considered already prepared, if they had already served their military service at one time.

What kind of training could we talk about for these people, asks Rokhlin, if by that time practically no one in the army had been engaged in combat training for ten years?

In short, these were people, most of whom differed from conscript soldiers only in age. Moreover, perhaps, because, having drank the delights of the era of change, they were ready to risk their lives in the hope of somehow improving their financial situation and the situation of their families. But if conscripts were trained for at least a few days, these were sometimes thrown into battle the next day after the conclusion of the contract.

The officer corps of many units only joined the ranks of the doomed. In the 81st motorized rifle regiment ("Samara", as journalists nicknamed it), out of 56 platoon commanders, 49 were graduates of civilian universities, called up for two years. There is no need to talk about the level of their training. Almost all of them died in Grozny, sharing the fate of their soldiers.

Deputy Rokhlin's questions on this matter and his attempts to find out the guilt of high-ranking commanders earned him the reputation of a troublemaker. And his appeal to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, where he called Yeltsin actually the main culprit for the collapse of the army and its tragedy in Chechnya, turned the entire presidential army and the absolute majority of the media against the general, who brought down streams of lies and slander on Rokhlin. Few people remembered his role in the Chechen war. But that will come later.

The idea of ​​​​an attack on the day before the holiday did not raise any particular doubts in me, continues Rokhlin. - After all, holidays are holidays. They could become a reason for people to relax. But it was impossible to relax. I didn’t know then that there was actually no general plan. And the date was set in connection with the birthday of the Minister of Defense...

The general himself continued to prepare his troops for the most unexpected turns of events.

To understand how carefully the action plan was developed, here is a detailed record:

FROM "WORKBOOK OF THE OPERATIONAL GROUP OF THE 8th Guards AK COMBAT CONTROL CENTER":

13.00. Meeting with the corps commander.

2. Complete the assigned task. We must prepare very conscientiously. See each soldier personally.

The task is as follows:

1. Walk along Sunzha.

2. Cut a corridor, provide passage along it and go to the city center, providing a flank for the main group.

How should we proceed?

1. Explore places where we are not expected.

2. Conduct artillery strikes on those points where the enemy is expected.

3. We act in three groups:

1st - 255 SMEs. Based on the tasks, it has... (the military equipment in the regiment is listed. - Author). Shooting down everything with fire, go 2/3 of the way.

2nd - 33rd MRR (the equipment located in the regiment is also listed. - Author). Follows the 255th MRR. Blocks this part of the path. Selects the tallest buildings. Equips strong points on them. Think about what kind of bags of earth you can prepare. Holds bridges, ensures the supply of ammunition (ammunition - author).

3rd - orb (separate reconnaissance battalion - author). Follows 1 msb on the left and right to the maximum depth. Behind him comes 2 MSB. Each officer has a 1:50,000 card. The main forces will advance here. Along two streets. And here the 81st Regiment and the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade will attack. (Rokhlin showed on the map. - Author)

What problems need to be solved?

1. Blocking. For each block, numbers of armored personnel carriers and a list of calculations by name. The platoon commander knows the task.

2. Distribute responsibilities.

3. The 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment has the same assault groups as the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment.

4. Who and when to release from tasks.

5. Check the equipment of the l/s (personnel - Author).

6. “Flies” (grenade launchers. - Author) - shoot everyone.

7. Training of APC drivers (who to take and who not).

8. Armored personnel carriers must be filled with ammunition.

9. Create an armored group to remove the wounded. Provide communication.

10. Place observers along the entire advance route. Find places.

The command post is in the center of the battle formations. Here, in the area (Tolstoy-Yurt. ~ Author), artillery and 2 tanks remain - a reserve group.

All objects will be plotted on the city plan - p/p-k Pozdeev15. Prepare two cards for me. Every officer should have a diagram.

After 18 o'clock we hear who did what.

Intelligence reports 12/28.

A written decision must be issued by 20.00."

Much of the document is written illegibly and is therefore omitted. But, I think, the essence is clear: the general, like a true professional, did not expect a miracle.

It is unlikely that anywhere else, lists of personnel of each checkpoint were prepared by name and the task of each platoon commander was determined.

This is the only way to achieve clarity of control and responsibility of commanders, says Rokhlin.

Units of the 8th Corps moved with the greatest caution. The commanders studied the city, put street names on maps, many of which were renamed by the new authorities. Roadblocks were set up at each occupied line. The closer the center of Grozny was, the less equipment remained in the units left at these roadblocks. The infantry walked forward. Everything was done according to plan. But this was just a reserve plan, as they were ordered to be.

And on the air, says Rokhlin, one could hear joyful reports from neighbors: they passed such and such a street, took such and such a line.

According to the map on which the operational situation was plotted, it turned out that the units of the 8th Corps were far from ahead.

Having occupied the cannery, we learned that the Minister of Defense was dissatisfied: “Why is this vaunted Afghan lagging behind?”

Rokhlin received the command to pull up and occupy the hospital complex, which is located almost in the center of the city. It was separated from the Council of Ministers and the Presidential Palace by only one block, where the buildings of the Institute of Oil and Gas were located.

By the way, the “go ahead” method of leading troops was also used in relation to other units. The commanders who controlled from Mozdok did not know and did not want to know how the situation was developing. To force the troops to move forward, they blamed the commanders: everyone has already reached the city center and is about to take the palace, and you are marking time...

As the commander of the 81st regiment, Colonel Alexander Yaroslavtsev, later testified, in response to his request regarding the position of his neighbor on the left - the 129th regiment of the Leningrad Military District - he received the answer that the regiment was already on Mayakovsky Street. “This is the pace,” the colonel thought then (Red Star, January 25, 1995). It could never have occurred to him that this was far from true...

Moreover, the closest neighbor on the left of the 81st regiment was the combined detachment of the 8th corps, and not the 129th regiment, which was advancing from the Khankala area. Although it is on the left, it is very far away. Judging by the map, this regiment could have ended up on Mayakovsky Street only after passing the city center and passing the presidential palace. Therefore, it is not clear whether the group’s command did not look at the map at all and did not understand what Colonel Yaroslavtsev was asking, or whether the commander of the 81st regiment himself did not know who his closest neighbor was, or perhaps the journalists who took from Yaroslavtsev interview, got everything mixed up? In any case, this suggests that no one really had a clear picture of what was happening, and the interaction was established in such a way that it misled not only the participants in the battles, but also those who later undertook to study their progress...

At the cannery, units of the 8th Corps left some more equipment and went forward.

When the command was carried out, about 600 people remained in the advance detachment.

The neighbors, urged on by the bosses sitting in distant Mozdok, blocked the streets with armored vehicles, which could not turn around on the narrow streets of the city.

And from the basements and windows of nearby houses, Dudayev’s experienced fighters were already catching the sides of tanks in the sights of grenade launchers, examining the faces of soldiers and officers through the powerful optical sights of imported sniper rifles.

“Don’t trust the quiet, don’t be afraid of the fast,” says the Chechen proverb.

It was dusk. And the militants pulled the triggers. Their grenade launchers shot at armored vehicles at point-blank range. Mortars showered the troops with a hail of mines. The tanks hit directly.

First, the equipment at the head and tail of the column was burned, says Rokhlin, and then the blow fell on the middle. The equipment was deprived of the ability to maneuver. And it burned like a candle.

The beating continued until complete darkness and then resumed at dawn. The attackers did their best.

“I was later told,” Rokhlin recalls, “that the militants tied grenades to parachutes from signal flares and threw them from the windows of houses onto columns. The grenade explodes in the air and hits a large area...

FROM "WORKBOOK OF THE OPERATIONAL GROUP OF THE 8th Guards AK COMBAT CONTROL CENTER":

2 MSB 81 MSB - around the palace.

1 MSB... (inaudible).

131st Omsbr - two battalions occupy defense near the railway. station".

This is the last record of the position of these units on the first day of the assault.

The 131st brigade had no mission,” says Rokhlin. - She was in reserve. One can only guess who ordered her to seize the railway station.

FROM THE LETTER OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION YU.I. SKURATOV TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE DUMA G.N. SELEZNEV No. 1-GP-7-97 DATED 15.01.97:

"In accordance with the State Duma Resolution of December 25, 1996 No. 971-11 GD "On consideration of the circumstances and causes of the mass death of military personnel of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Chechen Republic in the period from December 9, 1994 to September 1, 1996 and measures to strengthen defense country and state security" I inform:... an investigation is being carried out into the circumstances of the death of personnel of the 131st separate motorized rifle brigade (military unit 09332), which stormed the city of Grozny on December 31, 1994 - January 1, 1995, during which 25 officers and warrant officers were killed , 60 soldiers and sergeants, and 72 servicemen of the brigade were missing.

From the explanations of the participants in these events, documents seized during the inspection, it follows that at the end of December 1994 in the city of Mozdok, the high command of the Russian Defense Ministry set the general task of liberating the city of Grozny.

The specific task of sending troops into the city, movement routes and interaction was set by Colonel General A. V. Kvashnin (at that time a representative of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation).

The 131st brigade was tasked with concentrating two kilometers east of Sadovaya by December 27, 1994, in order to provide passage to the city of Grozny for other troops. Subsequently, the brigade occupied the line along the Neftyanka River and remained there until 11 o’clock on December 31, after which Lieutenant General Pulikovsky K.B., who commanded the “North” group at that time, gave the order by radio to enter Grozny. The brigade did not receive any written combat or graphic documents. After passing along Mayakovsky Street by the corps headquarters, the brigade was ordered to take the railway station, which was not originally planned.

Having captured the station, the brigade found itself in a dense ring of fire from illegal armed groups and suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment.

As can be seen from the inspection materials, the issues of thorough preparation of the operation should have been resolved by Pulikovsky, but this was not done in full, which was one of the reasons for the death of a large number of personnel of the 131st brigade.

Pulikovsky’s actions show signs of a crime under Art. 260-1 in paragraph “c” of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, namely, the negligent attitude of an official towards the service, resulting in grave consequences.

However, a criminal case cannot be initiated, since the State Duma declared an amnesty on April 19, 1995 in connection with the 50th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, and the offense committed by Pulikovsky fell under its scope."

Pulikovsky says that he did not give the command to the 131st brigade to seize the station, says Rokhlin. - The forward command post of the Northern group was never deployed. They commanded from Mozdok. Therefore, it is difficult to find out who gave the command. The Prosecutor General's Office is confident in its version. But I know that, unlike me, Pulikovsky did not know until the last moment whether he would command anything at all. After all, Kvashnin himself declared himself the commander of everything. Pulikovsky could not draw up a detailed plan of action and give the necessary orders. Kvashnin decided everything.

Another thing is strange here: the Prosecutor General’s Office in the above document indicates that “the specific task of sending troops into the city, movement routes and interaction was set by Colonel General A.V. Kvashnin,” but its investigators for some reason ignored that obvious to everyone It is a military fact that only the one who commands these troops can assign specific tasks to the troops. Kvashnin, if you believe the same document, was “at that time a representative of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.”

Therefore, it turns out that the Russian Themis introduces a new understanding of command and control into military practice: any “representative” (of God, the devil, the General Staff, etc.) can assign a specific task to the troops, and the one who is appointed to the extreme will be specifically responsible. And the Prosecutor General of Russia, Yuri Skuratov, had to sign up for this innovation. I wonder if he did it of his own free will or not?

Be that as it may, Pulikovsky, Rokhlin and all the other military men considered Kvashnin to be the commander. Kvashnin, according to Rokhlin and according to the entry he made in his personal workbook and given above, not only served as commander of the North Caucasus Military District, but was also the commander of the entire group of federal troops in Chechnya, and plus the commander of the “North” group (aka the Northern Group, as it was more often called). Or maybe Rokhlin and others were mistaken? And Anatoly Vasilyevich Kvashnin was just an impostor?

In any case, all this managerial leapfrog only confirms: no one wanted to take responsibility, even the one who declared himself the boss. And the army management system, which over the years of many years of “reforms” had turned into something that is difficult to describe in an elegant style, completely made it possible to avoid this responsibility.

Here you can’t even determine right away what is worse - the position of people like Mityukhin, who at least honestly demonstrated their helplessness, or those like Kvashnin, who, without much torment, took command of everyone and everything...

At 19.20 Rokhlin ordered the position of the 81st motorized rifle regiment and the 131st separate motorized rifle brigade to be clarified through the command of the group of troops in Chechnya. In the "Workbook of the operational group of the combat control center of the 8th Guards AK" the words of the corps commander are recorded: "Gen. Shevtsov16 should have assigned them the task so that they would give the position of the troops around the palace."

The general did not receive any information.

Three years later, on December 28, 1997, the host of the “Actually” program of the TV Center channel, Mikhail Leontyev, will blame General Leonty Shevtsov for the death of the 131st brigade, who, according to the journalist, gave it that same ill-fated order - go to the train station...

Rokhlin will be accused of the death of this brigade even earlier - in December 1996. We will also talk about this later...

Now let’s just note that the level of troop control in Chechnya for many years to come will not only be the topic of journalistic investigations, but primarily the subject of political intrigue, the edge of which can be turned in any way and against anyone. The latter is possible because no one to this day has undertaken to seriously study the military side of what was happening in Chechnya...

However, any researcher of this topic will have to face what the prosecutors faced - the lack of documents confirming the powers of the military leaders, and with... - how can I put it mildly... - the cunning, probably, of the main characters. General Kvashnin did not admit that it was not Pulikovsky, but it was he who commanded the “North” group in the first days of the battles for Grozny... And he will, obviously, never admit it.

At 20.45, the corps combat control center received information about the actions of the Eastern group: the 129th motorized rifle regiment and the parachute battalion of the 98th Airborne Division, advancing from the Khankala area, ran into rubble from reinforced concrete blocks and, having met strong enemy resistance, moved to all-round defense in the area of ​​the Rodina cinema. Engineering equipment to clear the rubble never arrived. The units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were supposed to ensure the installation of checkpoints in the rear of the group, also got lost somewhere.

And the units of the 104th Airborne Division, which were supposed to support the offensive of the 129th regiment if its actions were successful, remained in the same area. The 129th Regiment had 15 killed and 55 wounded. 18 pieces of equipment were burned.

There was still no information about the 81st Regiment and the 131st Brigade. And soon a company of the 81st regiment broke through to the location of the 8th Corps. Following her, other groups of this regiment began to leave in this or that sector. Torn apart, depressed, having lost their commanders, the soldiers looked terrible. Only 200 paratroopers, who were transferred to the regiment at the last moment, escaped a sad fate. They simply did not have time to catch up with the regiment and join it. Reinforcements were supposed to be received on the march...

It was night, says Rokhlin, and the situation remained unclear. Complete confusion in management. When they learned about the position of the 131st brigade, my reconnaissance battalion tried to break through to it, but lost many people. The railway station, where the brigade units took up defensive positions, was about two kilometers full of militants.

Rokhlin then already realized that his guards were the only ones who managed not only to get close to the city center, but also to gain a foothold without allowing themselves to be defeated.

All night and the morning of the New Year they waited for the 3rd battalion of the 276th motorized rifle regiment, which was supposed to replace the 33rd regiment of the corps at the checkpoints on the street. Lermontovskaya. Lieutenant Colonel Valery Barnovolokov several times went to the intersection of Mayakovsky and Bogdan Khmelnitsky streets, where the battalion was supposed to arrive.

“We were completely unaware of the senior commander’s plan,” says the chief of staff of this battalion, Major Yevgeny Piterimov.

At 3.00, when Lieutenant Colonel Barnovolokov was waiting for the battalion at the crossroads, the battalion began to retreat from the city and an hour later went over to the defensive at the Rodina state farm. Another hour later, the chief of staff of the 34th division, which includes the 276th regiment, finally set the task of going into the city and, in cooperation with the internal troops, setting up checkpoints along the street. Lermontovskaya and, storming the most important buildings, capture the areas adjacent to the Sunzha River and st. Pervomayskaya.

Major Piterimov is still surprised to this day that the higher command, when setting the task, did not provide even the most superficial information about the enemy and the nature of his actions. The major had the impression that the command, even at that time, continued to believe that the militants were weak and incapable of resistance. He himself and his subordinates had already seen by that time that this was far from the case.

Be that as it may, the battalion finally set up checkpoints along Lermontovskaya Street. And the 33rd regiment moved forward to the hospital complex, where 255 infantry regiments and a reconnaissance battalion were already entrenched.

Rokhlin pulled together his forces, knowing that now the militants would attack him.

At 7.55 on January 1, information was received from the group commander. In the “Workbook of the operational group of the combat control center of the 8th Guards AK” it is written as follows:

This entry can be deciphered as follows: “Gen. (all named are generals. - Auth.) Kulikovsky (correctly - Pulikovsky. - Auth.), Petrik (correctly - Petruk. - Auth.), Semenyuta. (either a period here, or a comma... More like a period. - Author.) Babich (correctly Babichev. - Author) at 10.00 with two airborne battalions (parachute battalion. - Author), with TV (probably a tank platoon. - Author) and measures (this is how a motorized rifle company is usually designated, but it is difficult to say exactly here. - Author) from the Lenin Park along the railway will go to unblock two blocks at the railway station. From the south, 503 MRR (motorized rifle regiment - author) along Ordzhonikidze Ave. advances to the palace, blocks everything and stands up. Pulikovsky will lead the MSRB (considering the last letters of "Br", this could be the 131st motorized rifle brigade, or rather, what is left of it. - Author) along Pervomaiskaya street to the center. There is a strong corridor between Pervomaiskaya and Ordzhonikidze. It turns out a continuous corridor: from Pervomaiskaya to the Sunzha river, railway station, B. Khmelnitsky, Pervomaiskaya. Pulikovsky should transfer the SMEs (perhaps this is hastily the same 131st brigade is designated. - Author) Rokhlin (need to call). Report your decision in an hour."

If you look at the map, the named streets are actually continuations of each other, crossing the city from north to south: st. B. Khmelnitsky goes to st. Mayakovsky, then Ordzhonikizde Avenue, which abuts the railway station... Where the command in Mozdok got the idea that a “continuous” and “solid” corridor had been created along these streets, one can only guess. And the order in which these streets, other objects and geographical names are listed indicates that when dictating information and giving instructions, these bosses did not even look at the map. It is possible, of course, that the operator at Rokhlin’s headquarters, who received the information, himself got something wrong. But it’s unlikely he got that much wrong. His work was purely automatic, and he could not write everything down backwards...

Meanwhile, the enemy did not sleep and did not confuse anything... His maneuverable groups struck here and there. They used all means of transportation - from armored personnel carriers to cars with cut off roofs and motorcycles, managing to concentrate maximum forces and resources in any area in a matter of minutes. Radio interception data indicated that militant reconnaissance groups were tasked with searching for and seizing damaged equipment and single vehicles. And there was something to capture.

According to the final data, the 131st brigade alone lost 20 of its 26 tanks and 102 of the 120 infantry fighting vehicles that entered the city.

If you believe the information about the number of personnel of the brigade that entered the city (446 people), it turns out that only crews were in the vehicles. There was no infantry. Therefore, it was possible to take the damaged equipment with bare hands.

Meanwhile, neighbors from the Eastern group were overtaken by another misfortune.

At 8.30, the Minister of Defense (according to other sources - General Kvashnin) ordered the commander of this group, General Nikolai Staskov, to retreat to the original area. And forty-five minutes later, units of this group were struck by federal aircraft. Two Su-25 attack aircraft fired their entire supply of unguided rockets at the moment when the fighters took their places in the vehicles. About fifty people were killed and wounded. The majority were officers of the 129th Regiment, who supervised the boarding of personnel onto vehicles.

The authors of the study "Russian Armed Forces in the Chechen Conflict. Analysis. Results. Conclusions" N. N. Novichkov, V. Ya. Snegovsky, A. G. Sokolov and V. Yu. Shvarev quote General Kvashnin, claiming that it was he who gave the order retreat. It seems that Anatoly Vasilyevich did not know what happened after this order was given. Then, the question arises, who gave the other order: to launch an air strike on the area in which the forces of the Eastern Group were located? After all, it is clear to the uninitiated that within forty-five minutes after receiving the order, a large mass of troops fighting the heaviest battle in the city could not leave the area. Or was the aviation commanded by all and sundry? And if not, and Kvashnin had everything under control, then Rokhlin is right when he speaks of the absolute lack of professionalism of General Kvashnin...

In any case, this once again confirms that the troops were controlled in any way and by anyone. The only thing that explains this managerial leapfrog is the desire of the bosses to evade responsibility by confusing the situation as much as possible.

During an air raid on the Eastern group, the group's intelligence chief, Colonel Vladimir Selivanov, a legendary paratrooper who was twice nominated for the title of Hero in Afghanistan, was also killed.

The intelligence officer, who risked his life hundreds of times, hardly suspected that fate had prepared for him death from the mediocrity of his own superiors.

The anti-aircraft gunners fired angrily after the planes. But, thank God, they didn’t hit. Otherwise it would only add to the tragedy.

Shortly before his death, Selivanov left information to the chief of staff of the Eastern group, Colonel Yuri Gorsky, that there were not two or three hundred acting against the group, as previously stated, but more than two thousand militants organized and controlled by a single command. Not counting the small detachments that attacked here and there. He took other information with him to the grave.

The fact is that on the eve of the offensive, an officer group of the 45th Airborne Special Forces Regiment disappeared. The colonel went out to look for her. He did not have time to report the result of the search to anyone.

And three years later, the English journalist Carlotta Goll will report that, according to her information received from the Chechens, a group of the 45th regiment tried to penetrate the presidential palace and was partly destroyed and partly captured. A journalist, who was writing a book about the war in Chechnya at that time, tried to find out from Rokhlin what he knew about this matter. The general could not answer. After all, the group did not act from his direction...

As for Colonel Selivanov, the command again nominated him for the title of Hero (posthumously). But, like the first two, this performance remained just a performance.

It soon became clear (this is recorded in the “Journal of Combat Operations”...) that the militants captured a map where all the coordinates of the troops were marked. The card was probably taken from one of the wounded or killed commanders. No matter how bad the maps with which the troops were supplied, the militants who knew their city could determine something from them.

In addition, they intercepted and took control of aviation and artillery control networks.

At 20.55, the headquarters of the 8th Corps received information that the militants had carried out reconnaissance of the security of the headquarters and other units of the corps. An attack was planned at 21.10.

By this time, Rokhlin had already managed to bring up all his available forces, those same 600 soldiers and commanders of the 255th and 33rd regiments, the reconnaissance battalion and some other units. And he gave the command to collect everything and everyone who survived in the broken columns.

On the night of January 1 to 2, when the Eastern group retreated, the Western group got bogged down in battles and stood up, the Northern group, represented by the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment, was defeated. The militants concentrated all their fire on the general's units.

The concrete ceiling of the basement, where the forward command post was located, shook from the explosions of mines and shells. They lay one on one, threatening to bring the ceiling down on the heads of the soldiers and commanders. And Rokhlin could not help but decide to move the command post to the depths of his battle formations - to the cannery.

But the situation continued to be catastrophic.

The calculation of enemy forces, says Rokhlin, based on intelligence data and radio interceptions, showed: for every soldier and officer there were from 6 to 10 militants. The enemy had complete freedom of maneuver and could achieve an even greater superiority of forces in certain areas.

During two days of fighting in the city, corps losses amounted to 12 killed and 58 wounded. However, the guards did not allow themselves to be defeated.

What saved us from defeat was that we were in no hurry to carry out the orders of the command, says Rokhlin, and acted as experience and the situation dictated.

The general never had to reconsider his views on combat training and planning of combat operations.

The Minister of Defense, oddly enough, too.

On February 9, 1995, in Alma-Ata, Pavel Grachev stated: “... the operation to capture the city was planned suddenly and carried out with minimal losses... But the losses occurred, here I honestly want to tell you, due to the absent-mindedness of some lower-level commanders who we felt an easy victory and simply relaxed.”

More than 17 years have passed since a killer bullet ended the life of State Duma deputy, military general and simply wonderful person Lev Yakovlevich Rokhlin. He fought in Afghanistan, went through the First Chechen War, was seriously wounded and shell-shocked, but still survived. And he was shot in peacetime, in bed, at his own dacha in the Moscow region. What was Lev Rokhlin like and what did he want? The life and death of the general, as well as versions of his death - read about all this further.

The beginning of the way

He was the youngest of three children. His father, Yakov Lvovich Rokhlin, went through the Great Patriotic War and, returning home to Aralsk (Kazakh SSR), could not get a job at the school where he worked before the war, he had to get hired in a fishing artel. On June 6, 1947, his second son was born, who, following Jewish traditions, was named after his grandfather. In 1948, when Lev was not even eight months old, his father was arrested, and since then nothing has been known about him. Most likely, he died in the Gulag, like thousands of Soviet citizens illegally convicted. The mother, Ksenia Ivanovna, was forced to raise three children alone.

About ten years after the above events, the mother’s relatives helped the Rokhlins move to Tashkent. Here Lev Yakovlevich graduated from school and went to work at an aircraft factory, from where he was drafted into the army. Having served the required term, he returned to his native land and, like his older brother, entered the Tashkent military school in 1967. When submitting documents, Vyacheslav and Lev Rokhlin either deliberately hid, or did not know, that their father was a Jew, since according to the documents they themselves were listed as Russian. If they had told the truth, the brothers would no longer be able to count on a good promotion, since such a background was not welcomed in those days.

Military career

The future General Rokhlin graduated from the Tashkent School with honors in 1970. He was among the top ten cadets. By that time, Lev Yakovlevich had been married for two years. He was immediately assigned to serve in a group of Soviet troops stationed in the GDR, in the city of Wurzen. After 4 years, he entered the Military Academy named after. Frunze. Like previous educational institutions, he graduated with honors in 1977. After this, Rokhlin served in the Turkestan, Transcaucasian and Leningrad military districts, as well as in the Arctic.

Afghan period

In 1982, the future General Rokhlin went to fight in Afghanistan. There he commanded one of the motorized rifle regiments stationed east of Fayzabad. It is worth noting that he took part in many military special operations carried out on Afghan territory, and was always distinguished by courage, determination and resourcefulness.

But in April of the following year, Rokhlin was removed from his position, demoted and sent to another regiment. His fault was that he made, in the opinion of the high command, the wrong decision. The fact is that one of the battalions of his regiment was ambushed by the Mujahideen in some mountain gorge. Then the regimental commander realized that his soldiers were in a disadvantageous position and would not be able to continue the battle without suffering heavy losses. To avoid unnecessary casualties, Rokhlin gave the order to blow up the blocked equipment and retreat. As a result, the battalion escaped the trap with minimal losses.

After this, Lev Yakovlevich served as deputy commander of the 191st motorized rifle regiment located in Ghazni. In the winter of 1984, his boss was put on trial for abandoning his soldiers to certain death in a headquarters surrounded by rebels, and he himself shamefully escaped using a helicopter. Meanwhile, Rokhlin took command and led his subordinates out of the deadly ring. After this incident he was reinstated. Under his command, the regiment fought very successfully. Take, for example, the operation carried out in the fall of 1984. It consisted of capturing a rebel base located in the Urgun area.

Seriously wounded

This operation was the last one carried out by Lev Rokhlin on the territory of Afghanistan. While flying over the area where the fighting took place, his helicopter was shot down. This time, the death of General Rokhlin was bypassed, and he survived. However, the wound turned out to be serious: his spine was damaged, his legs were broken, etc. First he was treated in Kabul and then in Tashkent hospitals.

The doctors' verdict was disappointing: to be discharged from the army for health reasons. But since Rokhlin did not imagine his life in the entire ranks of the armed forces, he somehow got a different wording from the doctors and still remained in the service. By the way, his wife, Tamara Pavlovna, was a nurse. She got a job at the hospital where her husband was being treated and was by his side throughout the course of treatment.

Further service

After being discharged from the hospital, Rokhlin was appointed deputy division commander in the Turkestan garrison of Kizil-Arvat. By that time he had a daughter and an eight-month-old son, who soon fell ill with encephalitis, which immediately affected his general development. After this, Tamara Pavlovna had to leave her job and run around hospitals with a disabled child.

Two years later, Lev Rokhlin is transferred to serve in Azerbaijan, where he becomes involved in the suppression of the rebellious Baku nationalists who provoked the massacre of Armenian families in Sumgait. When the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred, he decided to return to Russia. In 1993, Rokhlin entered the General Staff Academy and, as usual, graduated with “excellent” marks. After he became a major general, he was offered the position of commander of the 8th Volgograd Corps.

First Chechen War

From December 1994 to February 1995, Lev Yakovlevich and his soldiers participated in military operations in Chechnya. The facts speak about how General Rokhlin, whose biography was already full of military exploits, led his subordinates. The actions of his 8th Guards Corps were among the most effective and also suffered the least losses. This spoke only of one thing: their commander was a skilled and talented military leader.

Before the war, Rokhlin was considered by some to be a tyrant, since he paid great attention to combat training. As time has shown, he was right, and Suvorov’s well-known saying “hard in training, easy in battle” fully justified itself. In Grozny, General Rokhlin fought along with his soldiers. Together with them he celebrated the New Year 1995. Of the 2,200 Volgograd residents who fought with him in Chechnya, 1,928 soldiers were nominated for awards, but only about half received them. Rokhlin himself considered it right to refuse the title of Hero of Russia. He explained his action by saying that he could not accept rewards for the shed blood of his fellow citizens.

Political activity

It must be said that General Lev Rokhlin did not fight for the sake of any career achievements, and he received his awards not by sitting in the rear and pleasing his superiors, but by performing selfless service for the good of his country. While fighting in Chechnya, he realized that the Russian army itself was in dire need of protection, and above all, from insatiable officials and incompetent authorities.

In 1995, on the eve of the State Duma elections, one of the parties called “Our Home is Russia” took advantage of his unlimited authority. It was then that his career as a politician began. He entered this highest body of power, joined the NDR faction and was soon elected chairman of the Duma Defense Committee. It took him very little time to understand the main thing - the government led by President Yeltsin was deliberately destroying the army. Therefore, two years later he leaves his party, and then the NDR faction.

New movement

In 1997, General Rokhlin became the initiator and main organizer of a new political force. It became known as a movement in support of the army, defense industry and science. The purpose of this organization was not only to protect, but also to revive the Armed Forces of the state. It was very difficult to do this under the conditions of that time. The goal of this movement was to ensure that all citizens of Russia, without exception, strictly observe the Constitution, and the government, in turn, undertakes to fully ensure all the rights and freedoms prescribed in it. In addition, the new force demanded that the authorities carry out democratic reforms.

Quite quickly the movement grew into a national front, which openly opposed the then existing Yeltsin regime. Rokhlin himself turned from an ordinary military general into one of the most famous and influential political figures in Russia. This movement frankly frightened the entire government leadership. Its leader began to be called a provocateur, pushing the army to carry out a military coup in the country. But, despite this, Rokhlin’s authority grew every day, and not only in army circles, but also among the population. He was rightfully recognized as the most active opposition politician of 1997-1998.

Elimination of an objectionable general

Passions were brewing. The climax was the night of July 2-3, 1998. The next morning the news announced that General Rokhlin had been killed at his dacha, located in the village of Klokovo near Moscow. According to the official version, his sleeping wife, Tamara, shot him while he was sleeping, and the reason for this was a banal family quarrel.

At the end of autumn 2000, the Naro-Fominsk City Court found the wife of General Rokhlin guilty of the death of her husband. Tamara Pavlovna appealed to the relevant authorities with a complaint that the period of pre-trial detention was too long, as well as the deliberate delay of the trial. Her claim was satisfied and monetary compensation was paid. Five years later, a new trial took place, where she was found guilty of murder for the second time and sentenced to four years probation.

The real reasons for the tragedy

There are still several versions about how the murder of General Rokhlin occurred. As mentioned above, the first and official one is a family quarrel. But how can you believe this? General Rokhlin's wife, Tamara Pavlovna, who had been following him unfailingly all these years to the military garrisons where he had to serve, and raising two children, one of whom is disabled, suddenly, for no apparent reason, kills her husband because of an ordinary family quarrel. ... Although the woman was convicted, convincing evidence of her guilt was never presented.

The second version of the murder is political, in which Russian special services are involved. In this regard, there is information that the GRU and the KGB operated special departments that were engaged in the direct liquidation of people who had become objectionable or dangerous to the authorities.

The second version is also supported by the fact that not a single fingerprint, including that of the general’s wife, was found on the murder weapon - the pistol. This suggests that professionals acted, and not an ordinary woman who had once again quarreled with her husband.

In the Rokhlin murder case, there were two fairly strong pieces of evidence that there were strangers in the house. The first of them is the closed front door before the murder and open after it. The second evidence is that three charred corpses were found in a forest belt not far from the general’s dacha, and, according to the testimony of local residents, they were not there before Rokhlin’s murder. This means only one thing: they appeared there immediately after the murder of Lev Yakovlevich. The conclusion suggests itself that the bodies in the forest belt could belong to Rokhlin’s killers, who were removed after the crime they committed.

Protecting the honor and dignity of the family

The life and death of General Rokhlin is still in the news. Information about those who ordered and organized the murder was never made public. And, as time has shown, nothing has changed in the vertical of power over these 17 years. The same Yeltsin formula still applies: it’s either bad or nothing about the Rokhlins. Therefore, no one was surprised when another dirty material about their family appeared in Express Newspaper.

This time, the daughter of General Rokhlin, Elena, filed a lawsuit against the corrupt media for the protection of honor and dignity. In court, the authors of the slander dodged as best they could, having absolutely no evidence regarding their fabrications. In addition, they were stalling for time in every possible way by not appearing at the meetings. As a result, the court ordered the newspaper to publish a refutation. But for this to happen, the general’s daughter had to walk around the bailiffs’ offices for a whole year and a half!

Conclusion

It should be noted that after Lev Yakovlevich, an equal opposition leader did not appear in Russia. And this is not surprising, because no one else had such popularity among the civilian population and military personnel. He enjoyed what is called real authority among the people.

This was Lev Rokhlin. The life and death of the general should serve as an example for modern false patriots who are engaged in inflating a non-existent problem concerning the so-called “enemies” of Russia, without taking any concrete action. It is necessary to remember what this man did for the Russian army and for the country as a whole. And also try to implement and even increase everything that General Rokhlin stood for and was killed for.