Luftwaffe aces. Top aces

The Iron Curtain collapsed with a deafening roar, and a storm of revelations of Soviet myths arose in the media of independent Russia. The theme of the Great Patriotic War became the most popular - inexperienced Soviet people were shocked by the results of German aces - tank crews, submariners and, especially, Luftwaffe pilots.

...the squadron lost 80 pilots in a fairly short period of time,
of which 60 never shot down a single Russian aircraft
/Mike Speake “Luftwaffe Aces”/

Actually, the problem is this: 104 German pilots have a record of 100 or more downed aircraft. Among them are Erich Hartmann (352 victories) and Gerhard Barkhorn (301), who showed absolutely phenomenal results. Moreover, Harmann and Barkhorn won all their victories on the Eastern Front. And they were no exception - Gunther Rall (275 victories), Otto Kittel (267), Walter Nowotny (258) - also fought on the Soviet-German front.

At the same time, the 7 best Soviet aces: Kozhedub, Pokryshkin, Gulaev, Rechkalov, Evstigneev, Vorozheikin, Glinka were able to overcome the bar of 50 enemy aircraft shot down. For example, Three-time Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Kozhedub destroyed 64 German aircraft in air battles (plus 2 American Mustangs shot down by mistake). Alexander Pokryshkin is a pilot about whom, according to legend, the Germans warned by radio: “Akhtung! Pokryshkin in der luft!”, chalked up “only” 59 aerial victories. The little-known Romanian ace Constantin Contacuzino has approximately the same number of victories (according to various sources, from 60 to 69). Another Romanian, Alexandru Serbanescu, shot down 47 aircraft on the Eastern Front (another 8 victories remained “unconfirmed”).

The situation is much worse for the Anglo-Saxons. The best aces were Marmaduke Pettle (about 50 victories, South Africa) and Richard Bong (40 victories, USA). In total, 19 British and American pilots managed to shoot down more than 30 enemy aircraft, while the British and Americans fought on the best fighters in the world: the inimitable P-51 Mustang, P-38 Lightning or the legendary Supermarine Spitfire! On the other hand, the best ace of the Royal Air Force did not have the opportunity to fight on such wonderful aircraft - Marmaduke Pettle won all his fifty victories, flying first on the old Gladiator biplane, and then on the clumsy Hurricane.
Against this background, the results of Finnish fighter aces look completely paradoxical: Ilmari Yutilainen shot down 94 aircraft, and Hans Wind - 75.

What conclusion can be drawn from all these numbers? What is the secret of the incredible performance of Luftwaffe fighters? Maybe the Germans simply didn’t know how to count?
The only thing that can be stated with a high degree of confidence is that the accounts of all aces, without exception, are inflated. Extolling the successes of the best fighters is a standard practice of state propaganda, which by definition cannot be honest.

German Meresyev and his “Stuka”

As an interesting example, I propose to consider the incredible story of bomber pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel. This ace is less known than the legendary Erich Hartmann. Rudel practically did not participate in air battles; you will not find his name in the lists of the best fighters.
Rudel is famous for having flown 2,530 combat missions. He piloted the Junkers 87 dive bomber and at the end of the war took the helm of the Focke-Wulf 190. During his combat career, he destroyed 519 tanks, 150 self-propelled guns, 4 armored trains, 800 trucks and cars, two cruisers, a destroyer, and seriously damaged the battleship Marat. In the air he shot down two Il-2 attack aircraft and seven fighters. He landed on enemy territory six times to rescue the crews of downed Junkers. The Soviet Union placed a reward of 100,000 rubles on the head of Hans-Ulrich Rudel.

Just an example of a fascist

He was shot down 32 times by return fire from the ground. In the end, Rudel's leg was torn off, but the pilot continued to fly on a crutch until the end of the war. In 1948, he fled to Argentina, where he became friends with dictator Peron and organized a mountaineering club. Climbed the highest peak of the Andes - Aconcagua (7 kilometers). In 1953 he returned to Europe and settled in Switzerland, continuing to talk nonsense about the revival of the Third Reich.
Without a doubt, this extraordinary and controversial pilot was a tough ace. But any person accustomed to thoughtfully analyzing events should have one important question: how was it established that Rudel destroyed exactly 519 tanks?

Of course, there were no photographic machine guns or cameras on the Junkers. The maximum that Rudel or his gunner-radio operator could notice: covering a column of armored vehicles, i.e. possible damage to tanks. The dive recovery speed of the Yu-87 is more than 600 km/h, the overload can reach 5g, in such conditions it is impossible to accurately see anything on the ground.
Since 1943, Rudel switched to the Yu-87G anti-tank attack aircraft. The characteristics of this “laptezhnika” are simply disgusting: max. speed in horizontal flight is 370 km/h, rate of climb is about 4 m/s. The main weapons of the aircraft were two VK37 cannons (caliber 37 mm, rate of fire 160 rounds/min), with only 12 (!) rounds of ammunition per barrel. Powerful guns installed in the wings, when firing, created a large turning moment and rocked the light aircraft so much that firing in bursts was pointless - only single sniper shots.

And here is a funny report on the results of field tests of the VYa-23 aircraft gun: in 6 flights on the Il-2, the pilots of the 245th assault air regiment, with a total consumption of 435 shells, achieved 46 hits in a tank column (10.6%). We must assume that in real combat conditions, under intense anti-aircraft fire, the results will be much worse. What's a German ace with 24 shells on board a Stuka!

Further, hitting a tank does not guarantee its defeat. An armor-piercing projectile (685 grams, 770 m/s), fired from a VK37 cannon, penetrated 25 mm of armor at an angle of 30° from the normal. When using sub-caliber ammunition, armor penetration increased by 1.5 times. Also, due to the aircraft’s own speed, armor penetration in reality was approximately another 5 mm greater. On the other hand, the thickness of the armored hull of Soviet tanks was less than 30-40 mm only in some projections, and it was impossible to even dream of hitting a KV, IS or heavy self-propelled gun in the forehead or side.
In addition, breaking through armor does not always lead to the destruction of a tank. Trains with damaged armored vehicles regularly arrived in Tankograd and Nizhny Tagil, which were quickly restored and sent back to the front. And repairs to damaged rollers and chassis were carried out right on site. At this time, Hans-Ulrich Rudel drew himself another cross for the “destroyed” tank.

Another question for Rudel is related to his 2,530 combat missions. According to some reports, in the German bomber squadrons it was customary to count a difficult mission as an incentive for several combat missions. For example, captured captain Helmut Putz, commander of the 4th detachment of the 2nd group of the 27th bomber squadron, explained the following during interrogation: “... in combat conditions I managed to make 130-140 night sorties, and a number of sorties with a complex combat mission were counted towards me , like others, in 2-3 flights.” (interrogation protocol dated June 17, 1943). Although it is possible that Helmut Putz, having been captured, lied, trying to reduce his contribution to the attacks on Soviet cities.

Hartmann against everyone

There is an opinion that ace pilots filled their accounts without any restrictions and fought “on their own,” being an exception to the rule. And the main work at the front was performed by semi-qualified pilots. This is a deep misconception: in a general sense, there are no “averagely qualified” pilots. There are either aces or their prey.
For example, let’s take the legendary Normandie-Niemen air regiment, which fought on Yak-3 fighters. Of the 98 French pilots, 60 did not win a single victory, but the “selected” 17 pilots shot down 200 German aircraft in air battles (in total, the French regiment drove 273 aircraft with swastikas into the ground).
A similar picture was observed in the US 8th Air Force, where out of 5,000 fighter pilots, 2,900 did not achieve a single victory. Only 318 people recorded 5 or more downed aircraft.
American historian Mike Spike describes the same episode related to the actions of the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front: “... the squadron lost 80 pilots in a fairly short period of time, of which 60 never shot down a single Russian aircraft.”
So, we found out that ace pilots are the main strength of the Air Force. But the question remains: what is the reason for the huge gap between the performance of the Luftwaffe aces and the pilots of the Anti-Hitler Coalition? Even if we split the incredible German bills in half?

One of the legends about the inconsistency of the large accounts of German aces is associated with an unusual system for counting downed aircraft: by the number of engines. Single-engine fighter - one plane shot down. Four-engine bomber - four aircraft shot down. Indeed, for pilots who fought in the West, a parallel score was introduced, in which for the destruction of a “Flying Fortress” flying in battle formation, the pilot was credited with 4 points, for a damaged bomber that “fell out” of battle formation and became easy prey other fighters, the pilot was given 3 points, because He did the bulk of the work - breaking through the hurricane fire of the "Flying Fortresses" is much more difficult than shooting a damaged single aircraft. And so on: depending on the degree of participation of the pilot in the destruction of the 4-engine monster, he was awarded 1 or 2 points. What happened next with these reward points? They were probably somehow converted into Reichsmarks. But all this had nothing to do with the list of downed aircraft.

The most prosaic explanation for the Luftwaffe phenomenon: the Germans had no shortage of targets. Germany fought on all fronts with a numerical superiority of the enemy. The Germans had 2 main types of fighters: Messerschmitt 109 (34 thousand were produced from 1934 to 1945) and Focke-Wulf 190 (13 thousand fighter version and 6.5 thousand attack aircraft were produced) - a total of 48 thousand fighters.
At the same time, about 70 thousand Yaks, Lavochkins, I-16s and MiG-3s passed through the Red Army Air Force during the war years (excluding 10 thousand fighters delivered under Lend-Lease).
In the Western European theater of operations, Luftwaffe fighters were opposed by about 20 thousand Spitfires and 13 thousand Hurricanes and Tempests (this is how many vehicles served in the Royal Air Force from 1939 to 1945). How many more fighters did Britain receive under Lend-Lease?
Since 1943, American fighters appeared over Europe - thousands of Mustangs, P-38s and P-47s plowed the skies of the Reich, accompanying strategic bombers during raids. In 1944, during the Normandy landings, Allied aircraft had a six-fold numerical superiority. “If there are camouflaged planes in the sky, it’s the Royal Air Force, if they’re silver, it’s the US Air Force. If there are no planes in the sky, it’s the Luftwaffe,” German soldiers joked sadly. Where could British and American pilots get large bills under such conditions?
Another example - the most popular combat aircraft in the history of aviation was the Il-2 attack aircraft. During the war years, 36,154 attack aircraft were produced, of which 33,920 Ilovs entered the army. By May 1945, the Red Army Air Force included 3,585 Il-2s and Il-10s, and another 200 Il-2s were in naval aviation.

In a word, the Luftwaffe pilots did not have any superpowers. All their achievements can only be explained by the fact that there were many enemy aircraft in the air. The Allied fighter aces, on the contrary, needed time to detect the enemy - according to statistics, even the best Soviet pilots had an average of 1 air battle per 8 sorties: they simply could not meet the enemy in the sky!
On a cloudless day, from a distance of 5 km, a World War II fighter is visible like a fly on a window pane from the far corner of the room. In the absence of radar on aircraft, air combat was more of an unexpected coincidence than a regular event.
It is more objective to count the number of downed aircraft, taking into account the number of combat sorties of pilots. Viewed from this angle, Erich Hartmann's achievement fades: 1,400 combat missions, 825 air combats and "only" 352 aircraft shot down. Walter Novotny has a much better figure: 442 sorties and 258 victories.

Friends congratulate Alexander Pokryshkin (far right) on receiving the third star of the Hero of the Soviet Union

It is very interesting to trace how ace pilots began their careers. The legendary Pokryshkin, in his first combat missions, demonstrated aerobatic skill, audacity, flight intuition and sniper shooting. And the phenomenal ace Gerhard Barkhorn did not score a single victory in his first 119 missions, but he himself was shot down twice! Although there is an opinion that not everything went smoothly for Pokryshkin either: his first plane shot down was the Soviet Su-2.
In any case, Pokryshkin has his own advantage over the best German aces. Hartman was shot down fourteen times. Barkhorn - 9 times. Pokryshkin was never shot down! Another advantage of the Russian miracle hero: he won most of his victories in 1943. In 1944-45. Pokryshkin shot down only 6 German aircraft, focusing on training young personnel and managing the 9th Guards Air Division.

In conclusion, it is worth saying that you should not be so afraid of the high bills of Luftwaffe pilots. This, on the contrary, shows what a formidable enemy the Soviet Union defeated, and why Victory has such high value.

BO, Oleg Kaptsov

They don’t like to talk about traitors. Traitors are a shame for any country. And war, like a litmus test, brings out the true qualities of people. Regarding the history of the Great Patriotic War, of course, they remember more the Russian pilots who went over to the side of Germany. However, there were similar defectors among the German Luftwaffe pilots. Now it is difficult to say who actually voluntarily crossed the border and surrendered, and who did it forcedly. But for some people there is no doubt.

Count Heinrich von Einsiedel

The highest-ranking among them is Count Heinrich Einsiedel, who was the maternal great-grandson of the “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck. In 1939, at the age of 18, he voluntarily joined the German air force. When the war began, the Count was a Me-109 fighter pilot in the elite von Richthofen squadron, where he was known by the nickname Count. He shot down several British planes and, together with other pilots, thwarted a torpedo attack by British torpedo bombers on German ships. In June 1942, Einsiedel was transferred to the Eastern Front as an experienced fighter pilot in the Udet squadron. In just a month of fighting at Stalingrad, he shot down 31 Soviet aircraft, for which he was awarded the German Cross in gold.

Lieutenant Einsiedel was captured by the Soviets on August 30, 1942, his Messerschmitt 109F was shot down near Stalingrad, in the Beketovka area. In captivity, he wrote an open letter home, remembering the words of his grandfather Bismarck, spoken before his death: “Never go to war against Russia.” The pilot was sent to the Krasnogorsk camp, where other German prisoners were located. They were opposed to Hitler, and in November 1943 Einsiedel joined the anti-fascist organization Free Germany. After the war, the count became its vice-chairman and commissar of propaganda, and controlled the production of anti-fascist leaflets.

His mother, Countess Irene von Einsiedel, née von Bismarck-Schonhausen, wrote a letter to Joseph Stalin asking him to release her son from captivity, and in 1947 he received permission to return to East Germany. The following year, when Einsiedel wanted to go to his mother in West Berlin, a scandal broke out. The count was arrested on charges of espionage for the USSR. Due to lack of evidence, he was acquitted, but relations with the communists rapidly deteriorated. Einsiedel remained to live in Germany, worked as a translator and journalist, and published a book of memoirs, “The Diary of a German Pilot: Fighting on the Enemy’s Side.” At home, he was considered a traitor to the end, and the Soviet Union was indifferent to him.

Franz-Josef Beerenbrock

Franz-Josef Beerenbrock was born in 1920. His mother was Russian and taught her son to speak Russian well. Beerenbrock joined the Luftwaffe in 1938 and initially served in anti-aircraft aviation. At the beginning of 1941, he graduated from flight training with the rank of non-commissioned officer, and from June 22 he already participated in battles on the Eastern Front. Beerenbrock was a true Luftwaffe ace. Just a few months into the war with Russia, he was awarded the Knight's Cross with oak leaves, and at the beginning of December he had 50 aircraft shot down to his credit. In February 1942, Franz Josef was promoted to the rank of sergeant major, and in August to lieutenant. By that time, the number of his “victories” had exceeded a hundred. In early November, Beerenbrock was appointed commander of squadron 10./JG51.

On November 11, 1942, near the city of Velizh, Smolensk region, he shot down three fighters, but in the same battle his plane was shot down and the radiator was hit. Beerenbrock had to make an emergency landing behind the front line, where he was captured. In total, he made more than 400 combat missions and shot down 117 aircraft. His squadron comrades realized that the pilot had defected to the enemy when they noticed that Soviet pilots were using their tactics. In captivity, Beerenbrock and Walter von Seydlitz, former commander of the 51st Army Corps and artillery general, were among the founders of the anti-fascist organization “Union of German Officers”, created on September 12, 1943. Also in captivity, the Luftwaffe ace advised Soviet pilots on fighter combat tactics. Beerenbrock returned to Germany from captivity in mid-December 1949 and died in 2004.

Herman Graf

The son of a simple blacksmith, he worked in a factory before the war. In 1939 he graduated from military flight school, joined the Luftwaffe and was sent to the first group of the 51st fighter squadron, stationed on the western border. In 1941 he took part in the Balkan campaign, then was transferred to Romania, where he won his first victory. By May 1942, Graf had shot down about 100 planes, and Goering personally forbade him to participate in battles, but the pilot did not obey and soon shot down another plane. On May 17, 1942, the Count was awarded the Order of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves.

He distinguished himself in the battles of Stalingrad. On September 26, 1942, Graf was the first among all Luftwaffe aces to shoot down his 200th plane. From February 1943, he was appointed commander of the Vostok training group in France. In March 1943, he received the task of forming a special unit to combat Mosquito reconnaissance aircraft, called the South fighter group. From October 1944 until the end of the war, he commanded the 52nd Fighter Squadron, the most famous unit of the Luftwaffe.

On May 8, 1945, Graf was captured by the American military and handed over to the Soviet command. In total, during the war he made about 830 combat missions and shot down 202 aircraft on the Soviet-German front. The count spent five years in Soviet captivity, collaborating with the Bolsheviks. Upon returning to Germany in 1950, he was expelled from the Luftwaffe pilots' association for his actions in captivity.

Harro Schulze-Boysen

Harro Schulze-Boysen was born in 1912 into a wealthy German nationalist family. His father was chief of staff of the German naval command in Belgium during World War I, and his mother came from a prominent family of lawyers. From his earliest youth, Schulze-Boysen participated in opposition organizations, and in the summer of 1932 he joined the circle of national revolutionaries in Berlin who opposed all political power. During the war he was a member of the anti-fascist organization "Red Chapel".

In 1936, he married Libertas Haas-Neuhe, and Marshal Goering himself acted as a witness at the wedding. At the same time, Boysen began working at the Goering Research Institute, where he met many communists and began to collaborate with Soviet intelligence, transmitting information about the progress of the war in Spain.
Even before the war, Schulze-Boysen was recruited by the NKVD and worked under the pseudonym “Starshina”. From January 1941, he served in the Luftwaffe Operations Headquarters with the rank of Oberleutnant, on the headquarters of Reichsmarschall Goering, where the most secret units were located. Schulze-Boysen was then transferred to the air attache group, and in effect became an intelligence officer. At the new location, the Soviet spy photographed secret documents received from the Luftwaffe attaché at German embassies abroad.

Schulze-Boysen had an excellent ability to make the right connections, and thanks to this he had access to a wide variety of secret information, including the development of new aircraft, bombs, torpedoes, as well as the losses of German aviation. He managed to obtain information about the location of chemical weapons arsenals on the territory of the Reich. Schulze-Boysen had a confidential relationship even with one of Goering’s favorites, Erich Geurts, who headed the 3rd group of the instructions and training aids sector of the training department. The Soviet agent's informants were a construction inspector, the head of the construction sector, and a lieutenant in the Abwehr department responsible for carrying out sabotage.

Schulze-Boysen conveyed information about many reconnaissance flights of German ghost planes, but the Soviet leadership did not attach much importance to them.

The Germans discovered the traitor, and on August 31, 1942, Harro Schulze-Boysen was arrested. A few days later, the Gestapo also took away his wife. A military court sentenced him to death, and on December 22, Boysen and his wife were executed by hanging in a Berlin prison.

Eberhard Carisius

Carisius was the first Luftwaffe pilot to be captured by the Soviets. During his first combat mission towards the USSR on June 22, 1941, five hours after the start of the war, his plane’s engine failed and Carisius had to make an emergency landing in the Tarnopol area. The navigator shot himself out of fear, and the rest of the crew, led by Eberhard, surrendered. Carisius declared his "disagreement with Hitler's war against the Soviet Union." The rest of his crew died in captivity.

Later, the German pilot himself offered his services and arrived at the front in the winter of 1943. With his knowledge of the German army from the inside, he helped the 7th department of the PU of the 3rd Ukrainian Front to establish meaningful propaganda. With the active participation of Carisius, 32 German prisoners wrote an anti-fascist appeal to the population of Germany. He joined the members of the Free Germany organization, one of whose main tasks was to carry out anti-fascist educational work among German soldiers at the front. Propaganda was carried out with the help of leaflets, newspapers, and records with recordings of speeches by the leaders of the organization. Participants also had the right to talk with captured German soldiers and invite them to cooperate.

After the war, Carisius graduated from the military academy in Moscow and then commanded tank formations of the German national army. He retired with the rank of lieutenant general and was awarded the Order of Karl Marx. He served in the Thuringian border police, rising to the rank of colonel and chief of police. He taught Russian in Dresden, where he died in 1980.

Willie Frenger

Willy Frenger was considered the best pilot on the Northern Front, a real ace. By the time of his capture, he had flown 900 combat missions and shot down 36 aircraft. Awarded the German Cross in gold. Oberfeldwebel Willy Frenger, a Luftwaffe ace from the 6th Squadron of the 5th Fighter Squadron, was shot down by fighter pilot Boris Safonov near Murmansk on May 17, 1942. He managed to bail out and was captured. During interrogation, Frenger willingly answered all the questions, but at the same time he behaved self-confidently, and claimed that he was shot down not by Soviet fighters, but by his own. Gave valuable information about the location of German airfields.

In 1943, Frenger was thrown into the German rear as a saboteur to steal the new Messerschmitt Bf109G, but as soon as Willie found himself on German territory, he immediately surrendered to his own. After a check and confrontation with the former commander, Frenger was reinstated and returned to service, transferred to the Western Front. His personality is quite dark and little is known about him.

Edmund "Paul" Rossman

Having loved aviation since childhood, Rossman graduated from flight school in 1940 and was assigned to the 7th Squadron of the 52nd Fighter Squadron. Participated in the French campaign and the Battle of England, shooting down 6 aircraft. In June 1941, Rossmann was transferred to the Soviet-German front, and by the end of that year he already had 32 victories to his name. He was wounded in his right arm, and could no longer conduct maneuver battles as before. From 1942, Rossmann began flying with a wingman, Erich Hartmann. Hartmann is considered the most successful ace of the Luftwaffe. By the end of the war, he had 352 victories, and no one managed to break this record.

On July 9, 1943, the Messerschmitt of Rossmann and Hartmann was shot down in the Belgorod area. By this time, Edmund Rossman had 93 victories to his name and was awarded the Knight's Iron Cross. During interrogation, he willingly answered all questions and talked about new models of German aircraft. According to Rossman, one of his pilots flew over the front line, and he made an emergency landing to pick up the pilot. But then Soviet anti-aircraft gunners arrived and took Rossman prisoner. However, according to another version, the flight across the border was intentional. Rossman actively collaborated with the Soviet authorities and was released from captivity in 1949. Died in Germany in 2005.

Egbert von Frankenberg und Scholitz

Born in 1909 in Strasbourg, into a military family. He graduated from flight school and became a member of the SS in 1932. He volunteered in the Spanish Civil War as a Luftwaffe commander. In 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Frankenberg was sent to the Eastern Front with the rank of major, commodore.

In the spring of 1943, Frankenberg was captured and immediately agreed to cooperate with the Soviets. After some time, the Germans heard his speech on the radio, in which he called on the German troops not to fight on the side of the “criminal regime,” but to unite with the Russians and together build a new, socialist life. Frankenberg soon became one of the founders of the National Committee of Free Germany, as well as the Association of German Officers. Both organizations later played an important role in the formation of the government of post-war East Germany.
Frankenberg returned to Germany in 1948 and until 1990 was active in politics as part of the Democratic Party of Germany.

The Luftwaffe is a huge organization, including not only fighter pilots, but also mechanics, technicians, engineers, radio operators, signalmen and so on. In addition, anti-aircraft and airborne troops also belonged to the Luftwaffe. This military organization consisted of tens and hundreds of thousands of people. Here are only the most well-known facts of the betrayal of the Germans, and how many there really were is now difficult to answer. The personal files of many German officers are stored in the archives of the Ministry of Defense and can certainly provide many more interesting materials about the Great Patriotic War.
Author Maria Romakhina

Although a rough calculation of the number of enemy aircraft shot down in itself cannot serve as a measure of a pilot’s skill. Without questioning the number of downed aircraft, in this article we are talking specifically about best aces of the Luftwaffe in Germany.

There will, of course, be articles about our Russian pilots, who, without having such impressive scores, were undoubtedly the best aces of the Second World War.
The contribution of our grandfathers to the victory is much more significant than the Western allies.
45 0000 THE ENEMY'S PLANES WERE DESTROYED BY OUR PILOTS, against 25 000 shot down by our Western allies. And so that these numbers are not just numbers, a slight retreat.
The most effective fighter on the eastern front, equipped the best aces of the Luftwaffe in Germany there was an air group JG54.
At the beginning of the war on June 22, 1941, this elite “Green Heart” unit consisted of 112 pilots of the highest flying qualifications. By the end of the war, only four of these ace pilots remained alive.
For reference, table of Luftwaffe victories and losses.

The best German aces	Number of aircraft shot down	Comments	Awards	Air connection name	East	West	Pilot's plane
Erich Hartmann	352	First shot down November 1942, was shot down on the third mission, 11 shot down in one day	KCOSD	JG 52	352	-	Bf 109
Gerhard Barkhorn	301		KCOs	JG 52, 6, SP 44	301	-	Bf 109
Gunther Rall	275	two wounds	KCOs	JG 52, 11, 300	272	3	Bf 109
Otto Kittel	267	583 sorties, shot down and killed February 45 by our fighter	KCOs	JG 54	267	-	Fw 190
Walter Nowotny	258	died November 44	KCOSD	JG 54, Kdo.November	255	3	Fw 190
Wilhelm Batz	237	-	KCOs	JG 52	232	5	Bf 109
Erich Rudorffer	222	1000+ missions, 16 times shot down	KCOs	JG 2, 54, 7	136	86	Fw 190
Heinz Baer	220	shot down 18 times	KCOs	various	96	124	different
Herman Graf	211	830+ sorties	KCOSD	various	201	10	Fw 190
Heinrich Ehler	209	-	RUC	JG, 5, 7	209	-	Bf 109
Theodor Weissenburger	208	500+ sorties	RUC	JG 77, 5, 7	175	33	Bf 109
Hans Philipp	206	October 43rd, shot down by Robert S. Johnson	KCOs	JG 76, 54, 1	177	29	Fw 190
Walter Schuck	206	-	RUC	JG 5, 7	198	8	Bf 109
Anton Hafner	204	-795 sorties, died October 44th	RUC	JG 51	184	20	-
Helmut Lipfert	203	-	RUC	JG 52, 53	199	4	Bf 109
Walter Krupinksi	197	-	RUC	JG 52	177	20	Bf 109
Anton Hakl	192	-	KCOs	JG 77	130	62	Bf 109
Joachim Brendel	189	-	RUC	JG 51	189	-	Fw 190
Max Stotz	189	-August 43 shot down near Vitebsk	RUC	JG 54	173	16	Fw 190
Joachim Kirchner	188	-	RUC	JG 3	167	21	Bf 109
Kurt Br? ndle	180	-	RUC	JG 53, 3	160	20	Bf 109
Gunter Josten	178	-	RUC	JG 51	178	-	-
Johannes "Maki" Steinhoff	176	-	KCOs	JG 52	148	28	Bf 109
Gunther Schuck	174	-	RUC	JG 51	174	-	-
Heinz Schmidt	173	-	RUC	JG 52	173	-	Bf 109
Emil "Bully" Lang	173	18 in one day	RUC	JG 54	148	25	Fw 190
Hans-Joachim Marcel	158	388 combat missions - killed in September 1942	KCOSD	JG 27	-	158	Bf 109
Adolf Galland	104	-	KCOSD	JG.26, JG.27, JV.44	-	104	Bf 109, Me 262
Knight's Cross (KC) with oak leaves (O), swords (S), and diamonds (D).

About 2,500 aces served - pilots who shot down five or more enemy aircraft. And the most successful Allied pilot, Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub, shot down 62 German aircraft, while the personal tally of eight German pilots exceeded 100 aircraft. This partly explains the fact that Luftwaffe pilots fought continuously for years, unlike their opponents, who were usually shot down after 30-40 sorties.

Walter Nowotny, 1920-1944, Günter Rall, Heinrich zu Sein-Wittgenstein

Walter Nowotny became the first fighter pilot to achieve 250 kills in 442 missions. In February 1944, he was transferred from the Eastern Front to head the flight school. He was then given command of the world's first jet aircraft unit. On November 8, 1944, he flew his Me-262 against a group of bombers. The jet was shot down in battle, Novotny's parachute did not fully open.

Erich - "Boobie" Hartman
1922-1993 on the left, and commander Gerhard Barkhorn

The best ace of the Luftwaffe , the most successful fighter pilot in history, scored 352 victories in 1,425 missions. Remarkably, he achieved most of his victories in the last two years of the war.
His plane was shot down 16 times and he bailed out twice, but he was never wounded himself.
Having received ten years of strict regime, upon his release he returned to the Air Force and became the commander of the first jet wing in Germany.

Hans Schnaufer, 1922-1950 With his 126 victories, Schnaufer became the world's most successful night fighter pilot ace. Known as the "Night Haunter", he flew the Me-110 and his squadron shot down approximately 700 Allied bombers. His fighter with victory marks was put on display in Hyde Park after the war.
Schnaufer died in a car accident near Biaritz.

Joachim Marseille, 1920-1942

A most talented ace, seven of his 158 victories were in North Africa. He was awarded diamonds to the Knight's Cross after destroying 17 (!) British aircraft in one day. On September 30, 1942, the engine of his Bf-109G-2 caught fire. Marseille directed the plane away from his territory. He then left the car. Having hit the tail of the plane, in an unconscious state, he never opened his parachute.

Adolf Galland, 1911-1994

Galland honed his skills in Spain, flying 280 missions in the Condor Legion. He switched from attack aircraft to fighter and became an ace in the Battle of Britain, achieving 57 victories. Appointed Inspector General of Fighter Aviation after the death of Werner Moldepca in 1941. By this time He had 96 victories and continued to personally fly fighter missions, disobeying orders. He was known for his penchant for good brandy, expensive cigars and women who were attracted to his fame. After Hitler fired him as a scapegoat for the failures of the German air defense , he commanded a squadron of jet fighters. Their belated success proved that Galland was right in advocating their production at one time.

Werner Mölders, 1913-1941

Upon joining, Mölders became an ace with 14 victories in the Condor Legion. He was also the first fighter pilot to achieve 100 victories during World War II. An outstanding leader and super pilot, Mölders created a new fighter tactics that gave Luftwaffe had a distinct advantage over the Royal Air Force during the Battle of Britain. In 1941 he became the first person to be awarded the Diamonds to the Knight's Cross and the Oak Leaves and Swords. Appointed Inspector of Fighter Aviation in 1941, he died in a plane crash while on his way to the funeral of General Ernst Udet .

Content

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..3

1. Air war on the eastern front 1941-1945, its features...7

2.German Luftwaffe aces brief overview……………………………………………………...10

3. Soviet pilots aces of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945................................................... ........................................................ ..............................12

4.Methodology for calculating victories in the Luftwaffe……………………………………………………...17

5. Debunking myths about the victories of the Luftwaffe………………….………..21

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..28

Used literature and sources……………………………………..29

Introduction.

We will talk about one of the persistent myths of the Second World War - the myth of the total superiority of German pilots over their opponents. For example, English historians R. Toliver and T. Constable write: “... the best pilots of World War II fought in the ranks of the Luftwaffe... The top ten Luftwaffe aces are led by Erich Hartmann and Gerhard Barkhorn, who each won more than 300 air victories. Toliver and Constable go on to state: “Within the ranks of the German pilots themselves there is a clear distinction between victories on the Russian Front and victories in the West. A pilot with a hundred British or American aircraft shot down stood much higher on the hierarchical ladder than a pilot who scored two hundred victories against the Russians. The Germans usually explain this by saying that the best pilots were in the west.”

Here it is necessary to note the different approaches to the use of aviation. If in the Red Army the main task was to escort and cover Il-2 bombers and attack aircraft. The Luftwaffe allowed the use of free hunting tactics in the form of a tactical unit of a pair, and one can doubt the objectivity of the actions of this type of combat unit. Some Russian aviation historians write about the same thing. Here's an example: "... the Luftwaffe command believed that it was easier to shoot down Russian planes on the Eastern Front than to fight Mustangs, Thunderbolts and Mosquitoes in the West...".

But what then to do with the fact that the best English ace, Colonel D. Johnson, shot down only 38 German planes, and the best French ace, Lieutenant (Lieutenant Colonel of the British Air Force) P. Klosterman, shot down only 33 German planes. While Ivan Nikitich Kozhedub, flying exclusively on Soviet aircraft, shot down 62 German aircraft since 1943. What to do with the fact that in the Royal Air Force of Great Britain only 3 (three) pilots shot down 32 aircraft or more, and in the Soviet Air Force there were 39 (thirty-nine) such pilots. To this we must add that the British and French allies fought the Germans one and a half times longer than the Red Army pilots.

What to do with Gerd Barkhorn’s confession in the book “Horrido”: “...At the beginning of the war, Russian pilots were careless in the air, acted constrained, and I easily shot them down with attacks that were unexpected for them. But we still have to admit that they were much better than the pilots of other European countries with whom we had to fight.”

2.German Luftwaffe aces brief overview

There is an opinion that the Luftwaffe aces who fought on the Eastern Front were “fake” - it appeared during the Cold War and appears from time to time in modern times. It fits very well into the “black myth” about the “backwardness” of the Russians. According to this myth, “Russian plywood” with “poorly trained” Stalinist falcons were much easier to shoot down than Anglo-Saxon pilots with Spitfires and Mustangs. When the aces from the Eastern Front were transferred to the Western Front, they quickly died.

The basis for such fabrications was statistics on a number of pilots: for example, Hans Philipp, an ace pilot from the 54th Fighter Squadron “Green Hearts,” scored about 200 aerial victories, 178 of them on the Eastern Front and 29 on the Western Front. On April 1, 1943, he was appointed commander of the 1st Fighter Squadron in Germany, and on October 8, 1943, he shot down one bomber and was shot down and killed. In 6 months he was able to shoot down only 3 enemy aircraft. There are other similar examples: the first Reich ace E. Hartmann shot down only 7 (according to other sources 8) US Air Force P-51 Mustang fighters over Romania and in the skies over Germany (352 victories in total). Hermann Graf - 212 victories (202 in the East, 10 in the West). Walter Novotny shot down 258 aircraft, of which 255 were in the East. True, Novotny spent most of his time in the West mastering the new Me-262 jet, struggling with its shortcomings and practicing tactics for its use.

But there are other examples when German aces fought quite successfully on both fronts, for example, Walter Dahl - only 128 victories (77 - Eastern Front, 51 - Western Front), and in the West he shot down 36 four-engine bombers. An even distribution of victories in the West and East is characteristic of the Luftwaffe aces. In total, he scored 192 victories, including 61 victories in North Africa and on the Western Front, including 34 B-17 and B-24 bombers. Ace Erich Rudorfer shot down 222 aircraft, of which 136 on the Eastern Front, 26 aircraft in North Africa and 60 on the Western Front. Ace Herbert Ihlefeld shot down 132 aircraft in total: 9 in Spain, 67 on the Eastern Front and 56 on the Western Front, including 15 B-17 bombers.

Some German aces fought successfully on all fronts and on all types of aircraft, for example, Heinz Baer scored 220 victories in the air: 96 victories on the Eastern Front, 62 victories in North Africa, Baer shot down approximately 75 British and American aircraft in Europe, of which 16, piloting the Me 262 jet.

There were pilots who won more victories in the West than in the East. But to say that it was easier to shoot down the Anglo-Saxons than the Russians is just as stupid as the opposite. Herbert Rollweig, out of 102 aircraft shot down, only shot down 11 on the Eastern Front. Hans "Assi" Hahn scored 108 victories, 40 of them in battles in the East. He was one of the leading pilots in the Battle of Britain in the 2nd Fighter Squadron; fought in the East since the fall of 1942, on February 21, 1943, due to engine failure (possibly after an attack by Senior Lieutenant P.A. Grazhdaninov from the 169th Fighter Aviation Regiment) he made an emergency landing, after which he spent 7 years in Soviet captivity.

Commander of the 27th Fighter Squadron Wolfgang Schellmann - 12 victories in the skies of Spain (the second most successful ace of the Condor Legion). By the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, he had 25 victories and was considered a specialist in maneuver combat. On June 22, 1941, at 3.05, the Messers of the 27th fighter squadron, led by Schellmann, took off and were ordered to carry out assault strikes on Soviet airfields in the area of ​​the city of Grodno. For this purpose, containers with SD-2 fragmentation bombs were suspended from the Messerschmitts. It is also necessary to take into account the difference in air battles in the West and the East. The Eastern Front stretched over hundreds of kilometers and there was a lot of “work”; Luftwaffe fighter squadrons were thrown from battle to battle. There were days when 6 flights were the norm. In addition, in the East, an air battle usually consisted of German fighters attacking a relatively small group of attack aircraft and their cover (if any); usually the German aces could achieve a numerical advantage over the escort of “bombers” or attack aircraft.

In the West, real “air battles” took place; for example, on March 6, 1944, Berlin was attacked by 814 bombers under the cover of 943 fighters; they were in the air almost the entire day. Plus, they were concentrated in a relatively small space, resulting in something similar to a “general battle” between the attacking side and air defense fighters. German fighters had to attack a dense group of aircraft; such battles were rare on the Eastern Front. German fighter pilots were forced not to look for “prey” as in the East, but to play by someone else’s rules: attack “flying fortresses”, at which time Anglo-Saxon fighters could “catch” them themselves. A tough battle, without the ability to maneuver or retreat. Therefore, it was easier for the Anglo-American Air Force to use their numerical advantage.

3. Soviet pilots aces of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

In Tsarist Russia, and then in the newly created Air Force of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the concept of “ace” was used quite rarely, and it meant something different than in the rest of the world. If abroad pilots who had, first of all, a significant personal account of downed enemy aircraft were called aces, then in domestic literature and the press the term “ass” (at first they were written exactly like that, with two “s”) meant, as a rule, a desperate brave man, daredevil. Perhaps, not least of all, this was due to the low intensity of air battles (and therefore the small number of aircraft shot down) both on the Eastern Front of the First World War and on the fronts of the Civil War. However, unfortunately, 20 years after the end of World War I, Soviet pilots no longer had a shortage of air combat...

Beginning in the fall of 1936, when it was decided to send Soviet volunteers to help the Republican government of Spain in the outbreak of the Civil War, a whole series of large and small wars and conflicts followed - China, Khalkhin Gol, Poland, Finland - in which the pilots of the Red Army Air Force honed their skill. Already as a result of these battles, the first Soviet aces appeared in our usual sense of the word, with several downed enemy aircraft to their credit. When the Great Patriotic War began on June 22, 1941, the number of successful fighter pilots began to be measured in hundreds and thousands - history has not known such a large-scale air war with a huge number of aviation units and formations participating in it until now. It is to the Soviet ace pilots who scored 10 or more personal victories in 1941–1945 that this reference publication is dedicated.

What is meant by air victory? A victory, or, more precisely, a “credited” or “confirmed victory,” is an enemy aircraft shot down according to the report of the fighter pilot (that is, “claimed”), confirmed by witnesses and approved by higher authorities - the headquarters of an aviation regiment, division, etc. d. To confirm an aerial victory, it was necessary to present evidence from other pilots - participants in the battle, ground eyewitnesses, “material evidence” in the form of debris from a downed plane, photographs from the site of its crash, or photographs of a photo machine gun. Changing on paper during the war, these requirements generally migrated from order to order. As an example, we can cite an excerpt from the “Regulations on awards and bonuses for personnel of the Red Air Force Army, Long-Range Aviation, Air Defense Fighter Aviation, Navy Air Force for combat activities and preservation of materiel,” signed by the commander of the Space Forces Air Force Marshal Novikov on September 30, 1943:

“Shooting down in air combat or destroying aircraft on the ground, as well as damage caused to the enemy, is counted towards one of the following indicators:

a) in the presence of written confirmation from ground troops, ships, partisan detachments or agent reports;

b) in the presence of written confirmation from the local population, certified by local authorities;

c) if there are photographs confirming the downing of an aircraft or other damage caused to the enemy;

d) in the presence of confirmation from VNOS posts and other guidance and warning systems;

e) in the presence of written confirmation of two or more crews of aircraft operating in a given group, or a crew sent to control the successful bombing, provided that it is impossible to obtain another type of confirmation;

f) personal report of a single hunter-fighter or attack torpedo bomber, as approved by his air regiment commander...” (1)

You should pay attention to the words “whenonefrom the following indicators.” The reality of the air war turned out to be such that a necessary and sufficient condition for crediting a fighter with a victory was the testimony of other pilots - it was by this criterion that the vast majority of aerial victories were officially confirmed not only by Soviet fighters, but also by pilots from other countries participating in the war.

All other types of evidence played a role in various kinds of controversial situations when, for example, the pilot fought alone. In addition, the reliability of all other evidence was most often low, and sometimes it was simply technically impossible. Reports from ground observers were often devoid of practical value, since even if the battle took place directly above the observer, it was quite problematic to determine who exactly shot down the plane, what type, and even establish its identity. In addition, a significant part of the air battles took place behind the front line or over the sea, where there were simply no witnesses. For the same reasons, very often it was impossible to present the wreckage of a defeated enemy - downed planes fell into rivers and swamps, into forests, behind the front line. Those found were often destroyed during the fall to such an extent that their identification was impossible. Photo-machine guns on Soviet fighters were installed in extremely small quantities almost until the very end of the war, and if they were available, very often there were no consumables for them - film, developing reagents, etc. And the developed footage in most cases did not allow us to unambiguously confirm the fact destruction, recording only the presence of the enemy in the sights or hits on him.

Naturally, a “confirmed victory,” for many different reasons, in some cases, if not most, is completely different from an actual downed enemy aircraft. The objectivity of the reports of the pilots, both the authors of the victory and its witnesses, was not for the better influenced by the very conditions of a dynamic group air battle, which took place with sharp changes in speeds and altitudes - in such a situation it was almost impossible, and often unsafe, to monitor the fate of the defeated enemy , since the chances of immediately turning from a winner into a loser were very high. In addition, one cannot ignore the notorious “human factor” - manipulation of the results of battles for various reasons was quite common (attempts to “show off” the command, to hide one’s own unsuccessful actions and high losses, the desire to receive a reward, etc.) . As an illustration, we can cite a characteristic quote from a telegram from the commander of the 16th Air Army S.I. Rudenko, sent by him to the commanders of the 1st Guards, 234th, 273rd and 279th Iad after the first days of the Battle of Kursk:“Over the course of all these days, a meager number of bombers were shot down, and more fighters were “stuffed” than the enemy even had. ... It’s time, comrade pilots, to stop disgracing Soviet fighters.” .

It is quite clear that many of the “downed” enemy planes counted according to all the rules in the pilots’ accounts, often completely unharmed, returned safely to their airfields. In turn, in some cases the picture could be the opposite: an attacked aircraft, the fall of which was not observed, was not carried onto the plane. the fighters were reported as shot down, when in fact they crashed somewhere or made an emergency landing on our territory due to damage received in battle. However, there were immeasurably fewer such episodes than those described above. On average, the ratio of recorded pilots to actually destroyed aircraft for all air forces of the warring parties fluctuated between 1:3–1:5, reaching 1:10 or more during periods of grandiose air battles.

Therefore, establishing the number of enemy aircraft actually destroyed, even for an individual pilot, is a very difficult task, and compiling a global picture of the Soviet Air Force as a whole for a small team of researchers becomes almost impossible. It is also necessary to dwell on the classification of air victories adopted by the Red Army Air Force. In Soviet fighter aviation, unlike the USSR's allies in the anti-Hitler coalition (Great Britain and the USA), it was not customary to count air victories won in group battles in fractional numbers. There were only two categories of downed enemy aircraft - “personally” and “in a group” (although sometimes in the latter case, but not always, there was a clarification - “in a pair”, “in a group”). However, preferences regarding which category to classify a claim for a downed aircraft changed significantly as the war progressed. In the initial period of hostilities, when there were much fewer successful air battles than defeats, and the inability of our pilots to interact in battle became one of the main problems, collectivism was encouraged in every possible way. As a result of this, as well as to raise the morale of the pilots, all (or almost all) enemy aircraft declared shot down in an air battle were often recorded as group victories at the expense of all participants in the battle, regardless of their number. In addition, such a tradition has operated in the Red Army Air Force since the battles in Spain, Khalkhin Gol and Finland. Later, with the accumulation of combat experience and the advent of a system of awards and monetary incentives clearly tied to the number of aircraft shot down on a fighter pilot’s account, preference began to be given to personal victories. It is worthwhile to dwell in more detail on the system of rewarding successful actions of the air force of the spacecraft, which included an award system and a system of cash payments. If in the initial period of the war the reward system as such simply did not exist, then by mid-1942 it was quite clearly developed. For fighter pilots, this system was focused primarily on the destruction of enemy strike aircraft - for example, in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin dated June 17, 1942, the amount of cash payments was differentiated depending on the type of enemy aircraft destroyed - if for a downed fighter the author of the victory received 1000 rubles, then for a bomber they paid twice as much (previously the amount of payments was the same).

The order also stipulated that a pilot who shot down 5 enemy bombers was eligible to be awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union - to receive the “Star,” he had to “shoot” twice as many fighters.

As Soviet pilots felt more and more confident in the sky, the “standards” for downed aircraft to be nominated for awards grew and were finally fixed in September

It also regulated the presentation of awards and monetary payments for successful combat missions to escort strike aircraft and cover objects:

“…For combat sorties to escort attack aircraft, bombers, mine-torpedo aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft and spotters, as well as for combat sorties to cover combat formations of ground troops on the battlefield, naval bases, communications and other objects: for the first award - for 30 successful combat sorties ; to subsequent awards - for every next 30 successful combat missions. For combat sorties for assault operations and reconnaissance of enemy troops: for the first award - for 20 successful combat sorties; to subsequent awards - for every next 30 successful sortiesSeparate payments and awards were awarded for the destruction of ground targets, as well as to wingmen of successful pilots and commanders of all levels for the successful actions of the units entrusted to them. It was stipulated that in the event of a group victory, the bonus money should be evenly divided between the participants.

Despite the clearly defined conditions for nomination for awards, there were exceptions, and quite often. Sometimes the factor of personal relationships between the pilot and the command came first, and then the nomination for awarding the “obstinate” ace could be “held back” for quite a long time, or even “forgot” about him altogether. Even more frequent were the cases when pilots were not awarded because they were “fine” in some way, and the planes they shot down were used as a means of “paying off” criminal records and penalties imposed. The opposite situation was also not uncommon, when a pilot could receive the highest award for some significant one-time achievement, without having proven himself in any way either before or after it, and then “heroes of one feat” appeared. In addition, according to the recollections of veterans, it also happened that the command, pursuing the goals of the prestige of a unit or formation, artificially “made” a Hero, deliberately recording to one person personally the victories won in the group (or even planes shot down individually by other pilots).

When comparing the awards of each pilot with the number of victories credited to him, it is necessary to take into account that the specific nature of the use of fighter aviation provides air fighters with unequal conditions for self-realization. Not all fighter pilots had the opportunity to distinguish themselves - air defense fighters and pilots who were mainly engaged in escorting attack aircraft, as well as air reconnaissance specialists (in the KAAF during the war there were a number of aviation regiments that nominally remained fighters) had much less chance of increasing their combat scores. , but in fact they performed mainly reconnaissance functions - 31st GIAP, 50th IAP, etc.).

4. Methodology for calculating victories in the Luftwaffe

It is curious that on the Eastern Front at the beginning of the war, Oak Leaves for the Knight's Cross were given to a pilot for 40 “victories” (downed planes???), but already in 1942 - for 100, in 1943 - for 120, and by the end of 1943 - for for 190. How do you understand this?

It is clear that at the beginning of the war our pilots were much worse prepared than the German ones, but then their training improved dramatically. Both our veterans and German ones write about this in their memoirs. The training of German pilots became worse and worse. - They also write about this German veterans themselves. A number of authors put forward the assumption: the Germans were engaged in postscripts, exaggerating the losses of the opposing side. There are reasons for such assumptions.

It is known that 40 “victories” were required to be awarded the Knight’s Cross. And the German pilots of the Western Front, H. Lent and G. Jabs, received these Crosses after shooting down 16 and 19 aircraft. These are really planes, and not “victories,” since the biographies of the pilots give the brands of downed planes. That is, 40 points or 40 “victories” actually meant 16-19 aircraft shot down.

Another fact: in the middle of the war, in the battles in Kuban, our aviation lost 750 aircraft (of which 296 fighters) in air battles, from ground enemy fire and for other reasons. And at that time the German aces filled out reports for the 2,280 of our aircraft they shot down in the Kuban. Can we trust our statistics? Maybe Soviet statistics should also be reduced? There is nowhere to shorten it anymore. For example, Pokryshkin believed that he shot down 70 planes, but they still count him down to only 59. It is no coincidence that during the war, fighter pilot Vasily Stalin became a lieutenant general from a senior lieutenant, but he only had 3 (three) downed planes. If the USSR Air Force had had records of downed planes (not in the Sovinformburo - they were credited there mercilessly), then they would have been credited to Vasily Stalin, if only to make him an ace.

In addition, one cannot help but pay attention to the German method of counting downed vehicles using film-photo machine guns: if the route was along the plane, it was believed that the pilot had won, although often the vehicle remained in service. There are hundreds, thousands of cases where damaged aircraft returned to airfields. When the good German film-photo machine guns failed, the score was kept by the pilot himself. Western researchers, when talking about the performance of Luftwaffe pilots, often use the phrase “according to the pilot.”

For example, Hartmann stated that on August 24, 1944 he shot down 6 aircraft in one combat mission, but there is no other evidence of this.

And here is what the famous Soviet ace, who became the prototype of two heroes of the film “Only Old Men Go to Battle” - “Maestro” and “Grasshopper”, twice Hero of the Soviet Union V.I. Popkov, recalled: “... with the ace... The count, who shot down more than five planes at Stalingrad - he himself was shot down there - we talked in a train compartment when we were traveling to Volgograd. And in that compartment we also checked the number of planes shot down by the German pilot using the “Hamburg account”. There were 47 of them, not 220..."

Why were such postscripts needed? First of all, in order to justify the large number of losses on their part. In Russia, the Luftwaffe suffered huge losses. From the moment of the attack on the Soviet Union to December 31, 1941, combat losses of fascist aviation in the East amounted to 3,827 aircraft (82% of losses). “...difficulties with replenishing losses began, someone had to bear responsibility. The first scapegoat was General Udet, who was responsible for aircraft production at the Reich Air Ministry. Unable to bear the weight of the accusations that fell on him, on November 17, 1941, Udet shot himself.”

Here are just some data on Luftwaffe losses on the Eastern Front.

From December 1, 1942 to April 30, 1943 (for five months), the German Air Force was missing 8,810 aircraft, including 1,240 transport aircraft, 2,075 bombers, 560 dive bombers, and 2,775 fighters. During the period from April 17 to June 7, 1943 (a month and twenty days), the enemy lost almost 1,100 aircraft, more than 800 of them were destroyed in the air.

During the period from July 5 to August 23, 1943 (a month and 18 days), the Nazis lost 3,700 aircraft on the Soviet-German front. It was a disaster, and I think many Luftwaffe leaders understood its consequences. Thus, General Eschonnek, without waiting for “organizational conclusions” for the failure of his mission in the Battle of Kursk, committed suicide on August 18. The Luftwaffe's system of counting aerial victories assumed one aircraft shot down, accurately identified by a photo-machine gun or one or two other witnesses. In this case, the plane was recorded on a personal account only if it was recorded as having collapsed in the air, engulfed in flames, abandoned by its pilot in the air, or if it was recorded falling to the ground and being destroyed.

To register the victory, the Luftwaffe pilot filled out an application consisting of 21 points.

It stated:

1. Time (date, hour, minute) and location of the plane crash.

2. Names of crew members who submitted the application.

3. Type of aircraft destroyed.

4. Nationality of the enemy.

5. The essence of the damage caused:

The squadron commander signed the form. The main points were 9 (witnesses) and 21 (other units).

The application was accompanied by a personal report from the pilot, in which he first indicated the date and time of takeoff, the threshold and beginning of the battle, and then only declared victories and listed them from the time the attack began, including altitude and range. Then he indicated the nature of the destruction, the nature of the fall, his observation and the recorded time.

The report on the downed plane was accompanied by a report on the battle, written by a witness or eyewitness. All this made it possible to double-check the pilot’s reports of victory. The commander of a group or squadron after receiving reports from other pilots, data from ground observation posts, deciphering films of a photo-machine gun, etc. wrote his conclusion on a form, which, in turn, served as the basis for official confirmation or non-confirmation of the victory. As official recognition of his victory, the Luftwaffe pilot received a special certificate, which indicated the date, time and place of the battle, as well as the type of aircraft he shot down. According to German sources, the Germans did not share victories. “One pilot - one victory,” said their law. For example, Allied pilots divided victories like this: if two pilots fired at one plane and it was shot down, each of them would score half.

As subsequent events of the Great Patriotic War showed, Nazi Germany was never able to make up for the losses suffered by aviation. The answer is clear - for the purpose of propaganda on the Eastern Front, German pilots were allowed postscripts. And not by just 10–20%, but several times. And so that their Oak Leaves with Swords are not called Salad with Spoon and Fork in the West, the number of “downed” aircraft required for an award in the East constantly increased both in relation to the downed aircraft in the West, and simply as the command assessed the size of the attributions . The coefficient of additions can be estimated. In the middle of the war, in the battles in Kuban, our aviation lost 750 aircraft (of which 296 fighters) in air battles from ground enemy fire and for other reasons. And at that time the German aces filled out forms for the 2,280 of our aircraft they shot down in the Kuban. Therefore, we will not be mistaken if we divide the numbers of the “brilliant” victories of German pilots on the Eastern Front into numbers from three to six - after all, this is what the German command did when they were awarded.

What kind of German aces can we talk about if our air penalties dealt with their squadron in a couple of days? One of the best pilots of the USSR, Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Evgrafovich Fedorov, nicknamed the Anarchist, led a penal air group for some time during the war. So, the most resounding victory of this group, which caused not only colossal combat damage, but also insurmountable moral damage to the Luftwaffe, was the victory over the famous group of German ace pilots led by Colonel von Berg. The fact is that the creation of Fedorov’s penal group coincided with the appearance of Colonel von Berg’s group on the sector of the front where the former fought. Subsequently, Fedorov recalled: “Their commander, Colonel von Berg, had a three-headed dragon on his stabilizer. What were these aces doing? If our people fight well on some part of the front, they will fly in and beat them. Then they fly to another area... So we were instructed to stop this disgrace. And in two days we killed all the German aces of this group! But this group included 28 Luftwaffe aces! Well, what kind of aces were they, if, as I. E. Fedorov elegantly put it, they were caught in two days?!

Of course, everything stated above should not create the impression that the enemy, in this case the Luftwaffe, was weak. In no case. There was an enemy, but there is no reason to consider almost all of them as aces, as Goebbels’s propaganda, and after the war as well as Western ones, tried to present it during the war. By the way, Western propaganda brazenly steals German pilots shot down on the Eastern Front, presenting their downing as an achievement of Anglo-American aviation!? Per one Soviet squadron, an average of 3 to 5 downed German pilots are stolen. It is possible to understand Western cheaters. It is necessary to somehow show the successes of the Anglo-Saxons in that war, otherwise, apart from the barbaric bombing of the civilian population of Germany, they have little to show for it! For example, even according to Goebbels, by the end of 1944, Anglo-American aviation killed 353 thousand civilians, injured 457 thousand people, and left millions homeless! The author, of course, is very far from sincere sympathy for the German burghers - after all, but they themselves chose their brown “happiness”, and for that they received it in full. But still, the Anglo-Saxons declared war on the Nazi regime, and not on the Germans as a nation. Nevertheless, first of all, they bombed the civilian population, and they did it defiantly and deliberately. And at the same time, the damned allies bombed the Reich’s military industry in such an “original” way that it increased production volumes every month!? And so it continued until the Soviet bomber aviation took over.

But in general, it must be said that in a situation of at least relative impunity, the Luftwaffe pilots behaved like real barbarians. But as soon as a force appeared that could “smudge their faces” in the bloodiest way, and even send them to their forefathers, they preferred not to deal with such a threat. Especially on the Eastern Front. They dragged themselves away from our pilots so that their heels only sparkled.

However, in reality everything was different. Veteran pilots always especially note that in reality this was very strict at the front - things were difficult with confirmation of downed German planes. Moreover, with each year of the war it becomes stricter and stricter. It was necessary to confirm the fall of the downed German plane by the VNOS post, photo control, infantrymen, intelligence data, including behind-the-front reconnaissance, as well as other sources, including reconnaissance groups that were temporarily behind the front line and saw the air battle and its result. As a rule, all this is combined. From the second half of 1943, this approach no longer existed “as a rule,” but as a strictly observed principle. The testimonies of wingmen and other pilots were not taken into account, no matter how many there were. The principle was observed so strictly that even Stalin’s son Vasily has only three planes shot down by him personally during the entire war. But they could easily attribute it to someone else, and find the required number of corresponding confirmations. However, there was nothing of the kind. I emphasize that this principle was observed very, very strictly.(1)

In addition, I would like to draw attention to the particularly clear gradation of the types of combat work of pilots, which appears in the cited orders. It was this gradation that was the first barrier to the possible temptation of postscripts. Because the pilot’s flight books and other documents always and immediately reflect all his flights, indicating the nature of the mission and the time of day during which they carried out the combat mission. There is no confusing day and night here.

In addition, not only the sortie that ended in an air battle was considered a combat mission. Flights to escort bombers or attack aircraft, as well as on reconnaissance missions, also fell into this category. So there was no time for temptation. Not to mention the fact that at all levels they extremely strictly monitored the true state of affairs with the effectiveness of the Air Force’s combat activities.

That is why our pilots, including aces, have a significantly lower number of German aircraft shot down. Despite the fact that Stalin was extremely fond of aviation and pilots, the strictness in the Air Force was exceptional. And what kind of aces our falcons really were has already been shown above.

Conclusion

The only thing that can be stated with a high degree of confidence is that the accounts of all aces, without exception, are inflated. Extolling the successes of the best fighters is a standard practice of state propaganda, which by definition cannot be honest.

So, even a cursory glance at the “achievements” of German pilots in World War II shows that these achievements are nothing more than a product of German propaganda and Western historians would have dealt with them long ago and ridiculed them, but since 1946 the “Cold War” with the USSR began, and the West also needed Goebbels’ anti-Soviet propaganda. The purpose of this propaganda is obvious: to inspire Western pilots (the Germans shot down hundreds of Russians) and to undermine the morale of then Soviet and now Russian pilots. But the real facts about catastrophic losses in manpower and equipment in Luftwaffe units indicate the opposite. On this note, we were able to draw the following conclusions to a certain extent. Further research on this topic will show how objective all this is.

List of used literature and sources.

1. Bykov M.Yu. “Aces of the Great Patriotic War. The most successful pilots of 1941-1945”: Yauza, Eksmo; Moscow;314с 2007

1. Mukhin Yu. Aces and propaganda.480s M. Yauza Eksmo 2004.

2. Rusetsky A.FW-190 A, F, Ghistory, description, drawings.64 p. Minsk 1994.

6. Speak. M. Aces of the Luftwaffe. Smolensk: Rusich, 432 p. 1999,

3. Yakubovich N..Yak-3 fighter "Victory" ed. Yauza Moscow 95s.2011.

4. YakubovichN.La-5 Nightmare dream of aces of diamonds. izd96s. Yauza Moscow 2008.

periodicals.

1. Magazine "Aviamaster." A.Mardanov p.2-40/No.2 2006/

2. "Aviamaster." A.Mardanov p.2-41./No.1 2006/

Internet resources.

1. taiko2.livejournal.com village 25.05.2013

Bykov M.Yu. “Aces of the Great Patriotic War. The most successful pilots of 1941-1945”: Yauza, Eksmo; Moscow; 2007

German Armed Forces (German) Luftwaffe der deutschen Wehrmacht and in 1935-1945).
Luftwaffe(German) Luftwaffe — air force) - the name of the German air force in the Reichswehr, Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr. In Russian, this name is usually applied to the Wehrmacht Air Force (1933-1945).
In fact, the formation of this type of armed forces began in 1933. In March 1935, the Luftwaffe numbered 1888 combat vehicles and 20 thousand personnel
The commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht Luftwaffe forces was Hermann Goering (March 9, 1935 - April 23, 1945), later Field Marshal and Reich Marshal, who also headed the Reich Ministry of Aviation. The latter managed the aviation industry, civil aviation and aviation sports organizations
It should be noted that the term Luftwaffe or Druckluftwaffe in German also means air gun.
Best pilot Luftwaffe is Erich Hartmann

Erich Alfred "Boobie" Hartmann(German) Erich Alfred Hartmann; born September 19, 1922; died September 20, 1993) - German ace pilot, considered the most successful fighter pilot in the history of aviation. During World War II he committed 1525 combat missions, winning 352 air victories (of which 345 were over Soviet aircraft) in 825 air battles. For his short stature and youthful appearance he received the nickname Bubi - Baby. Blonde Knight(according to other sources "Blonde Beast")

A pre-war glider pilot, Hartmann joined the Luftwaffe in 1940 and completed pilot training in 1942. Soon he was sent to the 52nd Fighter Squadron (German). Jagdgeschwader 52) to the Eastern Front, where he came under the tutelage of experienced Luftwaffe fighter pilots. Under their guidance, Hartmann developed his skills and tactics, which eventually earned him the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds, for the 301st, on 25 August 1944 confirmed aerial victory.
Erich Hartmann achieved his 352nd and last air victory on May 8, 1945. Hartmann and the remaining troops from JG 52 surrendered to American forces, but were handed over to the Red Army. Formally accused of war crimes, but in fact - for the destruction of enemy military equipment on an especially large scale, in wartime, sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment in maximum security camps, Hartman will spend 10 and a half years in them, until 1955. In 1956 he joined the rebuilt West German Luftwaffe, and became the first commander of the JG 71 Richthoffen squadron. In 1970, he left the army, largely due to his rejection of the American fighter Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, which was then equipped with German troops, and constant conflicts with his superiors.
Erich Hartmann died in 1993.

Luftwaffe paratroopers

a little parachute...

Listen to their marches. They sound very patriotic.

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Luftwaffe badge

Monument at the 2nd Parachute Division Cemetery “They flew so that Germany could live”. Italy, 1943
War through the eyes of German pilots