Coastal defense ships. Monarch-class battleships of the Coast Guard

Artillery on sailing ships began to fully manifest itself only in the 16th century. Although the appearance of the first guns on ships is noted in 1336-1338. One of the first mentions speaks of a cannon that fired miniature cannonballs or crossbow arrows, which was installed on the English royal ship.
The first use of naval artillery was recorded in 1340 during the Battle of Sluys, which, however, was not noticed by most of the participants in the battle. Not only in the 14th century, but also throughout the 15th century, artillery in the navy was a rare and little-tested weapon. So, on the largest ship of that time, the English karakke "Grace Dew" ("Grace of God", years of service: 1418-1439), only 3 guns were installed. Presumably in 1500, the French shipbuilder Descharges first used cannon ports on the Charentes carrack.
Following this event, in the first quarter of the 16th century, large carracks appeared in England - “Peter Pomigrenite” (1510), “Mary Rose” (1511), “Henry Grace e” Dew (“Grace of God Henry”, 1514). The latter was the largest of them and carried 43 cannons and 141 small swivel guns of the hand cooler class.

Until the end of the 16th century, catapults and ballistae were still used on ships. The first naval artillery gun was bombard. From the middle of the 15th century, cast-iron cannonballs began to be used in artillery, and red-hot cannonballs began to be used to set fire to enemy ships.
Boxes with bombards were usually placed without fasteners so as not to damage the deck during recoil, tying them to the board with a pair of ropes, and small wheels were attached to the end of the box to return to their original position. The presence of wheels was a precursor to machine tools on wheels, which proved necessary when the guns gradually moved from the main deck below the waterline. With the development of metallurgy, tools began to be made not only from copper and wrought iron, but also from cast iron. Compared to forged ones, cast iron guns turned out to be easier to manufacture and more reliable in operation, therefore, by the 17th century, forged guns were completely out of use.

Bombards of the 15th century.

In the era of the sailing fleet, it was not so easy to sink a wooden ship, even loaded with guns and ammunition. In addition, the effectiveness, range and accuracy of the guns of that time left much to be desired. In many cases, the success of the battle was decided by boarding, so the main goal of naval artillery was to defeat the crew and rigging of the ship to deprive it of the ability to control. By the end of the 15th century, mortars appeared on the decks of ships, which existed in an almost unchanged form until the middle of the 19th century.

Mortar 1727.

In the 16th century, guns 5-8 calibers long appeared - howitzers, which were adapted for firing buckshot and explosive shells. At about the same time, the first classification of guns appeared depending on the ratio of their barrel length to caliber: in order of increasing - mortars, howitzers, cannons, coolers. The main types of ammunition also appeared: cast-iron cannonballs, explosive, incendiary, buckshot. Gunpowder was also improved: instead of the usual powder mixture (charcoal, saltpeter, sulfur), which had a number of inconveniences in use and a significant drawback in the form of the ability to absorb moisture, granular gunpowder appeared.

Bronze ship coolers of the 16th century.

Since the 16th century, artillery has become the subject of scientific work, and this affects its development - a quadrant and an artillery scale appear. Gun ports appeared on the sides of ships, and guns began to be placed on several decks, which significantly increased the power of a broadside salvo. In addition to increasing the number of guns on board, the invention of the gun port made it possible to install artillery of a larger caliber without disturbing the stability of the ship by placing them closer to the waterline. By that time, artillery on ships still differed insignificantly from coastal ones, but by the 17th century the types, caliber, length of guns, accessories and methods of firing were gradually determined, which led to the natural separation of naval artillery, taking into account the specification of firing from a ship.

Fragment of the lower battery of a sailing ship.

There are machines with wheels for easy reloading, vineyards to limit rollback, a number of special accessories. The introduction of aimed shooting begins, and ballistics is also developing. The main goal of naval artillery is still to defeat the enemy crew, and all naval battle tactics are reduced to the production of a successful volley. In the 18th century, gunpowder was improved, guns were charged in caps and cartridges, and flintlocks for ignition appeared. The result is an increase in rate of fire. Knippels, explosive bombs, brandskugels and grenades appear. A new weapon has been introduced - the ship's "unicorn". In 1779, a gun called a carronade was designed specifically for the fleet. It became the lightest naval gun, which was located on the upper deck, had a length of 7 calibers and a small powder charge, and also had no trunnions.

A weapon fixed in the stowed position.

In the 19th century, the tasks of naval artillery changed - now the main goal is not the crew, but the ship itself. To solve such problems, the introduction of bomb cannons in the fleet was called for - these are short large-caliber cannons that fire explosive projectiles. The demonstration of Peksan guns by Commodore Perry during his expedition to Japan in 1854 convinced the Japanese authorities of the need to accept an unequal trade treaty with America and end the policy of isolating the state.
With the introduction of these guns, the armament of the ships changed markedly, and their armoring also began. By the 19th century, the development of smooth-bore naval artillery reached its highest level. Improvements affected not only the guns themselves, but also machine tools, accessories, powder charges, ammunition, as well as methods and methods of firing. Together with the armor of ships, a turret system for placing guns and an increase in caliber are introduced. The weight of the installations reached 100 tons. To control such heavy and powerful tools, steam traction, hydraulics and electric motors began to be used. But the main step in naval artillery was the introduction of rifled guns in the second half of the 19th century.

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By the time the Fury was laid down, the completion of four coastal defense battleships was in full swing. Since they stood out as the most unfortunate ironclad ever to fly the white British naval ensign, the reasons for their construction are best explained by a quote from Spencer Robinson:

"During the panic of 1870, when our country was in danger of being drawn into the war, and our ports were in danger of being attacked by the enemy, the Council had to deal with the question of local defense of the coasts from any types of ships (more or less heavily armed) that could to attempt the destruction of the great commercial and industrial centers on our coast. No heavily armored, deep-draft warships could come close even to the most defenseless of these harbors. A serious attack was feasible [only] by light ships - most likely a common group of armored and non-armored ships ... and it is easy to see that superiority in all respects remains with the class of ships adopted by the Admiralty as part of the coastal defense system. To implement this frivolous defensive policy, the Council decided to ensure the safety of the coasts through four "harbor protection" monitors, and, based on considerations of both economy and expediency, the Cerberus project was chosen as the most suitable for the emergency program, slightly modifying it.

All four were launched very soon (the Cyclops slipped into the Thames 10 months after laying), but when the immediate need for them weakened, the construction slowed down, and only after a few years they went into operation, although they were nominally handed over by contractors and accepted to the navy in 1872.

"Cyclops". General view and booking distribution scheme

As warships they aroused the ridicule of the entire fleet and one of the members of the Council who had previously stood at the origins of their creation later wrote in The Times: could swim in shallow water, could not move from port to port except after a careful study of the barometer, but could easily sink to the bottom during a storm, and for a variety of other reasons, and which ended up with minimal offensive power with maximum defensive power. the department of the chief builder solved the problem very correctly and with great intelligence, giving us "coastal defense" ships that cannot protect our coasts ... then what does a "coastal defense" ship generally mean? Although built according to a design developed specifically for a harbor defense ship, they were classified as "coastal defense ships", capable of arriving anywhere on the coast - where and when their presence was required, and as such capable of safely going to sea. Before their construction was completed, the Projects Committee, examining the diversity and differences of ships of that period, unanimously declared that "without the use of a certain superstructure along the sides of these ships for a significant part of the length of the hull, they can safely move from port to port only in good weather", and recommended for this to expand the parapet to the sides and cover it with a deck, as a measure both to improve stability and create better conditions for the crew.

The Chief Builder's Department has already proposed a similar expansion of the parapet as a precautionary measure, since the available data for calculating the stability of low-sided ships on the high seas have not yet received practical confirmation. However, for the reason that any constructive changes were decided only by the Council, which was quite satisfied with the already existing situation, they were completed in accordance with the original project, and the prescribed changes followed only in 1886-1889. The added superstructure, which housed the commander's quarters, additional cockpits for the crew, a reading room, an infirmary, etc., made the ships more stable, and their habitability much better.

Armament

If on the Rupert the ratio of weight of weapons to displacement was the lowest of all coastal defense ships, then the ships of the Cyclops class were the opposite extreme, since for each ton of their weapons they had only 48 tons of displacement. Four 10" 18-ton guns were mounted on Scott's mixed-design rigs on a side pin, were equipped with hydraulic drives instead of levers, and were much more efficient in terms of aiming and maintenance than any of the earlier ones in the fleet. During the modernization, an anti-mine battery was installed on the hinged deck four 47mm guns and five shotguns, as well as two searchlights.

Booking

The freeboard was fully protected by armor, the total weight of which in the load was as high as the proportion of weapons, and approximately equal to that of the Glatton, where it was a third of the displacement. However, carrying two towers and a parapet of large sizes, the Cyclopes also had a relatively larger area that had to be protected by armor, and the frontal plates of the towers reached the greatest thickness on them - 254 mm. But, since they were not expected to encounter anything more serious than light ships in shallow water, this level of armor was regarded as quite sufficient.

The belt along the waterline had a thickness of 203 mm in the middle and thinned to 152 mm towards the extremities; the ram was not reinforced with side armor. The height of the parapet above the waterline was 2.97 m, it was armored with 229 mm plates from the sides and 203 mm on the roundings from the extremities, where it was installed along the gun turret protected by 229 mm armor (254 mm in the frontal part). Both the upper deck and the parapet deck had a thickness of 38 mm, the skin - a thickness of 25-32 mm.

rigging

As a relic of the original Cerberus design, the Cyclops and Hekate retained a small mast in the bow forward of the turret, somewhat to the left of it, which was used as a support for the boat shot guy lines. "Gorgon" and "Hydra" had only a mainmast.

Seaworthiness

As might be expected, these ships did not take much part in the life of the fleet, and year after year they were spinning at their anchorages in the waters of the shipyards. In April 1878, they were not distributed between the ports, but attached to Sir Cooper Key's Special Service Squadron, assembled on the Portland roadstead, and remained there for four months during the period of tension associated with the Russo-Turkish war. In 1887, all four ships were equipped for maneuvers and they made sea crossings, the Gorgon withstood the storm off Queenstown and, according to Admiral Ballard, turned out to be "not as bad as a torpedo gunboat, but scoured the course a lot." Although their habitability left much to be desired, they were regarded by their crews as quite reliable ships. After the expansion of the parapet, the situation improved significantly, but at sea they were subject to the same inconveniences as the Devastation, since they received the same "stern bags" (semicircular deck cabin superstructures) on the poop. The angle of greatest stability was 25°, the rollover angle was 39°15\

Modernization

All four ships were taken out of action for modernization between 1885 (Hecate) and 1889, during which they were fitted with additional superstructures around the parapet, and the parapet decks and upper deck received additional reinforcements. A watertight bulkhead and an additional platform were added to the nose, a false keel appeared. Since rapid-fire guns appeared on the hinged deck, it had to be somewhat expanded.

Coastal defense battleships of the "Cyclops" class

Builder

Launched into the water

Commissioned

Price

"Tams Iron Works"

"Gorgon"

"Palmers"

Dimensions, m

68.6 x 13.72 x 4.94

Displacement, t

3480 (after modernization 3560), hull and armor 2730, equipment 750

Armament

4 10" 18-ton muzzle-loading rifled (side salvo weight 744 kg)

Armor, mm

belt 152-203, parapet 178-229, turrets 229-254, conning tower 203-229, deck 38, plating 25-32, lining 230-280 (teak) (total booking weight 1130 t)

Mechanisms

"Cyclops", "Hydra": 2 sets of compounds ("John Elder"), 2 high pressure cylinders (diameter 787 mm), 2 cylinders low pressure (diameter 1448 mm), piston stroke 686 mm, "Cyclops": indicated power 1660 hp, 11 knots, "Hydra": indicated power 1472 hp, 11.2 knots,

"Hecate", "Gorgon": 2 sets of horizontal 4-cylinder simple expansion, direct action ("Ravenhill"), bore 1143 mm, piston stroke 610 mm, "Gorgon": indicated power 1670 hp, 11 knots, " Hecate": indicated power 1755 hp, 10.9 knots,

Fuel reserve, t

Crew, pers.

156 (after modernization 191)

"Cyclops"

Towed for completion to Devonport in January 1872 and placed until ready in April 1877 in the 1st Division of the Reserve, then attached to the Special Service Squadron (April-August 1878), after which it was withdrawn to the reserve at Chatham. Modernization in 1887-1889 in Portsmouth: superstructures along the sides, net protection, rapid-fire guns. Participated in maneuvers in 1887, 1889, 1890 and 1892, then transferred to the Reserve Fleet. In 1901, he was excluded from the lists of the active fleet.

"Gorgon"

Towed in April 1872 and placed in reserve at Devonport. She served as a Cambridge tender from 1874 to 1877, after which she was commissioned for the Special Service Squadron for the period April-August 1878. Since 1878, the Cambridge tender again. Modernization in 1888-1889, participated in the maneuvers of 1887, 1889, 1890 and 1892. After that, as part of the Reserve Fleet in Devonport until delisting in 1901.

"Hecate"

Came to Devonport in April 1872 and was completed until 1877. Commissioned for the Special Service Squadron in April 1878, in August 1878 put into reserve at Devonport. Modernized in 1885-1886, participated in the maneuvers of 1887, 1889, 1890 and 1892, then with the Reserve Fleet at Devonport until delisting in 1901.

"Hecate" in 1878

"Hydra"

She came to Devonport in August 1872 and was slowly completed until 1877. In April 1878 she was commissioned for the Special Service Squadron, in August 1878 she was put into reserve in Sheerness. She served as Duncan's tender, docked for the winter. Modernization in 1888-1889, participated in the maneuvers of 1887, 1889, 1890 and 1892. She was in the Reserve Fleet in Chatham until delisting in 1901.

"Hydra" after entry into service

Battleship "Hydra"

All four ships were sold for scrap in 1903 at £8,400. for every.

The coastal defense battleship Pingyuan can be called the first full-fledged Chinese armored ship. In the spring of 1886, Wei Han (1851-1929), a graduate of the Fuzhou Technical School, was sent to France to purchase ship steel and other materials.
The 35-year-old engineer used his stay in Europe to improve his technical knowledge. Returning home in the autumn of the same year, he enlisted the support of the head of the Fuzhou Admiralty, Pei Yinsen (1823-1895), and on December 7, 1886, laid the keel of a new ship on the slipway.

January 29, 1888 the battleship was launched. The ceremony was honored by the presence of the head of the Fuzhou arsenal, who performed traditional rites in honor of the goddess Matsu - the Lady of the Sea, the spirit of the Minjiang River and the patron spirit of the ship. After that, it was the turn of completing the construction of the battleship afloat, which lasted until the spring of 1889. Thus, the construction of the Longwei took a little more than two years. The cost of the ship was 524,000 silver liang.

On May 15, 1889, the battleship went on sea trials, in which the admiralty authorities again took part. Forcing the course, the mechanics managed to disperse the Longwei to 12.5 knots, significantly exceeding the design speed. Perhaps such a load was excessive. Shortly after noon, the armadillo's hull was suddenly shaken by a strong vibration, and its walking speed dropped sharply.
When inspecting the stern by a diver, it turned out that the ship had lost its right propeller. With difficulty reaching the plant, Longwei got under repair, which lasted for three whole months.
He went to re-tests only on September 28, 1889 - this date should be considered the beginning of the battleship's service. The first commander of the ship was Lin Yongmo. Together with the crew (at different times - from 145 to 204 people), he constantly had to deal with problems of varying severity.

By this time, the battleship had the following weapons: one 260-mm Krupp barbette gun of the 1880 model, two 150-mm Krupp guns on side sponsons, four 47-mm Hotchkiss rapid-fire cannons and two 10-barrel Gatling mitrailleuses. The barrel length of the 260 mm gun was 22 calibers. The weight of the barrel was 21.7 tons, about 15 tons more fell on the share of the machine.
The gun used three types of shells weighing about 162.1 kg - armor-piercing, high-explosive and shrapnel. The weight of the powder charge was 48 kg. The firing range reached 7400 m at a maximum elevation angle of 16.5 °; at the muzzle, an armor-piercing projectile pierced 391 mm of iron armor. According to some reports, "Pingyuan" was armed with two 450-mm mine vehicles.

This statement seems doubtful, since the German “pipes” of Schwarzkopf, which had a smaller caliber, were adopted in the Chinese fleet of that time. Thus, two 350-mm vehicles were probably installed at the ends of the battleship.

The ship had a characteristic and not too elegant appearance: sides with a noticeable obstruction inward, a low forecastle and a high bridge resembling a whatnot. A single mast and tall chimney completed the picture. On April 10, 1889, the battleship moved from Fuzhou to Shanghai. From there, the ship was to proceed to Tianjin.

On May 8, 1890, a detachment of ships from the Beiyang Fleet, led by the battleship Dingyuan, entered Fuzhou. When they went to sea on the 28th of the same month, the Pingyuan was already taking its place in the convoy. Upon the arrival of the fleet in Weihaiwei, Li He, a graduate of the Fuzhou Naval School, was appointed commander of the battleship.

The main event in the battleship's career was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The victories won by the Japanese in Korea forced the Chinese command to attend to the urgent transfer of reinforcements. For this purpose, it was decided to use chartered steamers bound for the port of Dadongou, at the mouth of the river. lu. The death of the Koushing (Gaosheng) transport, shot down by the Japanese cruiser Naniwa on July 25, 1894, forced Admiral Ding Zhuchang to use the main forces of the fleet to cover the transportation.
On September 12, the fleet left Weihaiwei and four days later arrived at the mouth of the Yalu. The Pingyuan, the light cruiser Guangbing, two alphabet gunboats, and a pair of destroyers entered the river to guard the landing site. The remaining ships of the squadron anchored 12 miles from the coast. At 10 am on September 17, 1894, thick smoke appeared in the south. It soon became clear that the entire Japanese squadron was approaching the parking lot. The twelve capital ships of the Beiyang fleet were opposed by the admiral's eleven cruisers.

Ito Sukeyuki. The Japanese did not have ironclads, so Ding Ruchang's side had an advantage in tonnage, armor, and the number of heavy guns. Perhaps that is why the Chinese admiral was in no hurry to call the Pingyuan from the river.

At 12.30 the Japanese flagship "Matsushima" raised the topmast flag, which meant the signal to start the battle. Surpassing the Chinese in rapid-fire artillery, the Japanese divided into two squads and actively maneuvered, showering the enemy with a rain of shells. The speed advantage was also on the side of the Mikado sailors.

Closer to 1400, the Chinese ships at the mouth of the Yalu finally made out the signal ordering them to join the squadron. Acting in pairs, Pingyuan and Guangbin went to sea and ended up on the right wing of the Chinese battle formation.
At 14.30, the battleship started a battle with the Matsushima cruiser at a distance of 2300 m. The Japanese flagship, which was subjected to the most intense shelling in the battle, already had several hits. Gradually approaching, the ships fought an artillery duel, during which the gunners of the Pingyuan managed to achieve success. A 260-mm projectile hit the middle part of the left side of the Matsushima and ended up in a wardroom, turned into a dressing station. Flying through it, he broke through an inch bulkhead and hit the mine compartment of the port side. Having ripped off a loaded (!) mine apparatus from the machine and killed 4 sailors, the projectile pierced another bulkhead and disabled the locking mechanism of the 320-mm cruiser gun facing the stern. At the same time, the projectile cracked, but the explosion did not occur.

Only a miracle saved the Japanese from detonating their own ammunition. In total, during the battle, the Matsushima cruiser received 13 hits from heavy shells and lost about 100 crew members. A shell from the Pingyuan caused him the most serious damage, forcing Admiral Ito to transfer his flag to the sister cruiser Hasidate. Meanwhile, "Pingyuan" at about 15.30 hit the cruiser "Itsukushima". After that, he himself came under concentrated fire from the Japanese and caught fire. Her 260-mm gun was disabled and at about 16.30 the battleship left the battle, fighting numerous fires and slowly leaving in the direction of Port Arthur. An hour later, the cannonade subsided, and the battle ended.

After the priority repairs, the Pingyuan moved from Port Arthur to Weihaiwei, where it remained until the end of the war. On February 12, 1895, after the surrender of the remnants of the Beiyang fleet, the battleship passed into the hands of the victors. Due to the identity of the hieroglyphics, the Japanese easily adopted the Chinese name of the ship, which in their mouths began to sound like "Heien".
In addition, the battleship retained decorations in the form of massive carved dragons, fixed in the middle part of the hull, near the chimney. They favorably distinguished the trophy and flattered the vanity of the winners. On March 21, 1898, the ship was classified as a 1st class gunboat and received new weapons.

Instead of the old Krupp 150-mm cannons, the Heien received 6-inch Armstrong rapid-fire guns with a barrel length of 40 calibers, and two 120-mm guns were installed in place of the 47-mm bow pair (according to some reports, by the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war, the latter were removed). On the aft superstructure housed two 47-mm guns with shields.

Under the command of Captain 2nd Rank K. Asabane, as part of the 7th detachment of the Imperial Navy, he took part in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. She was destined to be the last event in the fate of the ship. September 18, 1904 "Heien" was at the island of Iron (Chinese name - Tedao), at the entrance to Pigeon Bay, which is west of Port Arthur.
The Japanese sailors did not know that two days earlier the Russian destroyer Skory (commander - Lieutenant P.M. Plen) secretly set up a 16-minute barrage in this area. At 7:45 a.m. In the evening, a powerful explosion rocked the starboard side of the Heyen.
Regarding its consequences, there are two versions. According to the first, the ship died in a matter of minutes, taking 198 people to the bottom.
According to other sources, the Heyen sank in shallow water and could have been saved if not for the storm that broke out the next morning.

The appearance in the Russian fleet of the battleship "General-Admiral Apraksin", which became widely known due to the extraordinary circumstances of its rescue in the harsh winter of 1899/1900, became possible as a result of curious transformations of the five-year (1891 - 1895) plan for reinforced shipbuilding.

The original version of this plan, known in the literature as the interim program of 1890, was presented by Admiral N.M. Chikhachev and approved by Emperor Alexander III on November 24 of this year. It provided for the construction of 10 armored cruisers. However, already next year, the increase in the size and cost of ocean-going armored ships led the very author of the program, N.M. Chikhachev, to the idea of ​​replacing some of them with “small” armored ships, or “coastal battleships”.

In 1892, at the expense of the allocated appropriations, along with ships of the Poltava and Sisoy Veliky types, the battleships Admiral Senyavin and Admiral Ushakov were laid in St. Petersburg with a normal displacement of only 4126 tons according to the project. At the end of 1893 , when the actual dimensions and cost of all the ships of the program became clear, and it became clear that the limited capabilities of the St. Petersburg port did not allow it to be completed in a timely manner, Admiral N.M. ”, decided to build a third coastal defense battleship of the Admiral Senyavin type. Probably, the energetic manager of the Naval Ministry secured the oral consent of the tsar and the admiral general. It is possible that such a free execution of the highest plans of 1890 did not have scandalous consequences only due to the change of government in 1894, when the place of Alexander III, who died in Boza, was replaced by his son, Nicholas II. Battleships of the "Admiral Senyavin" type were designed in 1889-1891 at the Marine Technical Committee (MTK) under the guidance of the famous shipbuilder E.E. Gulyaev. During the construction of the first two ships on stocks (1892-1894), practical drawings were drawn up by the senior shipbuilder P.P. Mikhailov (the builder of Senyavin) and the senior assistant shipbuilder D.V. Skvortsov (overseeing the construction of Ushakov), while significant changes were made to the original project. Therefore, Mikhailov and Skvortsov can be considered Gulyaev's "co-authors" in the design of ships. The English firms Models, Sons and Field and Humphreys Tennant and Co. (suppliers of the main mechanisms for Ushakov and Senyavin), MTK gunners, mainly S.O. Makarov and A .F. Brink (selection and design of large guns), as well as the Putilov Plant - a supplier of hydraulically driven turrets. As a result, both in terms of the composition of weapons and in appearance, the battleships differed significantly from the original project, and in terms of the design of the main machines (and the height of the chimneys) they also differed from each other.

In December 1893, simultaneously with the order to build the third coastal defense battleship, Admiral Chikhachev ordered to order machines and boilers for him from the Franco-Russian plant in St. Petersburg, which was supposed to manufacture them according to the drawing of Maudsley's "Ushakov" mechanisms. Therefore, the new ship, which received the name "General-Admiral Apraksin", in many documents was called an battleship of the "Admiral Ushakov" type.

Preparatory work on the hull began in February 1894, and on October 12, the first pounds of metal were put on the slipway of the wooden boathouse of the New Admiralty, liberated after the launch of the Sisoya the Great. The official laying of the "General-Admiral Apraksin" took place on May 20 of the following year, and D.V. Skvortsov, one of the most energetic and talented Russian ship engineers at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, became its builder.

It seemed that the construction of the third coastal defense battleship according to the already worked out and corrected prototype drawings would not cause any particular difficulties and would not require adjustments to the project. However, in practice, everything turned out differently precisely because of the additions to the 1891 project of the year, which caused an overload of the first two ships, and also because of the desire to improve the 254 mm turret system. In February 1895, D.V. Skvortsov calculated the load of the Admiral Ushakov, the draft of which in a normal load exceeded the design one by 10 "/2 inches (0.27 m). In order to avoid overloading the General-Admiral Apraksin, the builder proposed to reduce the thickness of the entire side armor by 1 inch (25.4 mm), “destroy the turret installations of 10-inch guns by placing the guns on the benches behind the barbette and covering them with spherical shields”, cover the supply of shells and charges with thick armor (barbettes) and carry out using electric winches .

Even earlier, on July 15, 1894, the gunners of the MTK, led by Rear Admiral S.O. Makarov, in the conditions for the design of two-gun installations of 254-mm guns, for the first time put forward the requirements to ensure the loading speed of each gun is not more than 1.5 minutes and an elevation angle of 35 °. The design by three plants of such units with a hydraulic drive (for the battleship Rostislav) in the autumn of the same year showed the possibility of providing the specified parameters. However, in February 1895, the MTC, also for the first time, chose a more promising one for the Apraksin towers - an electric drive with similar loading speeds and elevation angles, but with a decrease in the thickness of the vertical armor of the tower to 7 inches (178 mm), a barbette - to 6 (152 mm) and roofs - up to 1.25 inches (about 32 mm). The total mass of the tower with armor protection should not exceed 255 tons.

In June 1895, according to the results of a competitive design, it was decided to give the order for tower installations for General Admiral Apraksin to the Putilov Plant, although the project of the Metal Plant, which had been developing electric drives since 1892, had "the same merits." Probably the Metalworks had a better chance of completing the order successfully, but asked for a higher price. Somewhat earlier, electric turret mechanisms were also chosen for the battleship Rostislav (order - to the Obukhov plant), and later similar towers were ordered for the battleships Oslyabya and Peresvet. Therefore, it was Rostislav and General-Admiral Apraksin (and not battleships of the Peresvet type) that became the first ships in the Russian fleet with electric tower installations. At the same time, for the last battleship, in order to reduce overload, the MTC in April-May 1895 approved the installation of one 254-mm gun in the aft turret instead of two. The Putilov Plant was obliged to hand over both Apraksin towers by the end of September 1897.

Thus, the MTK rejected Skvortsov's proposal to replace the towers with barbettes and reduced the number of large-caliber guns by a quarter. To compensate for the increased weight of the new towers in comparison with the hydraulic ones, it was decided to reduce the side armor by 1.5 inches.

By the beginning of 1896, D.V. Skvortsov brought the readiness of "Apraksin" in the hull to 54.5%. The launch of the ship took place on April 30, 1896, and the first exit to the trial of machines took place in the fall of 1897. The manufacture of the main mechanisms at the Franco-Russian plant was led by engineers P. L. One and A. G. Arkhipov, who were present at the tests of Maudslay machines on the Admiral Ushakov. Sea trials of the "General-Admiral Apraksin" ended in the fall of 1898, and experimental firing from 254-mm towers - only in August of the next.

The normal displacement of "General-Admiral Apraksin" was 4438 tons (according to the design of the prototype - 4126 tons) with a maximum length of 86.5 m (according to the GVL - 84.6 m), a width of 15.9 and an average draft of 5.5 m.

The load of the battleship was distributed as follows: the hull with armor lining, practical things, systems, devices and supplies - 2040 tons (46.0% of the normal displacement, the hull itself accounted for about 1226 tons or 29.7%), armor - 812 tons (18.4%), artillery weapons - 486 tons (11%), mines - 85 tons (1.9%), vehicles and boilers with water - 657 tons (14.8%), normal coal supply - 214 tons (4 .8%), boats, anchors, chains - 80 tons (1.8%), crew with luggage - 60 tons (1.3%).

The displacement of the ship with a full supply of coal (400 tons) reached 4624 tons.

The launch weight of the Apraksin hull (fore draft - 1.93 m, stern - 3.1 m) did not exceed 1500 tons. with a load of 446 tons of coal and about 200 tons of fresh water, Apraksin, with an average draft of about 5.86 m, had a displacement of 4810 tons.

The riveted hull of the ship was divided into 15 main compartments by watertight bulkheads that reached the armored (aka battery) deck. For 15-59 frames there was a double bottom (10 double-bottom waterproof compartments). The stems, steering frame (weighing 3.5 tons) and propeller shaft brackets were cast at the Obukhov plant. The drainage system, which included a main pipe with a diameter of 457 mm, was carried out at the Admiralty Izhora Plants.

Armor protection included the main armor belt along the waterline with a length of 53.6 m and a width of 2.1 m (with immersion in water by 1.5 m) from "garve" plates with a thickness in the upper part of 216 mm (9 plates in the middle of each side) and 165 mm (6 end plates each). The armored citadel was closed by bow (165 mm) and stern (152 mm) traverses, and was protected from above by a 38 mm armored deck (25.4 mm armor plates on 12.7 mm steel decking). Under the protection of the citadel were placed the main mechanisms and ammunition cellars. The bow and stern ends were partially protected by a carapace deck with a total thickness of 38 to 64 mm. The conning tower was formed by two 178-mm armor plates with an entrance to it through a hatch in the spardeck deck. The same armor protected the turrets of large-caliber guns, the bases (barbettes) for which were armored with 152-mm plates.

The main mechanisms of the battleship included two vertical triple expansion machines (cylinders with a diameter of 787, 1172 and 1723 mm) with a design power of 2500 hp each. each (at 124 rpm) and four steam cylindrical boilers (operating steam pressure 9.1 kgf/cm2). Five steam dynamos produced a direct current of 100 V. Ten coal pits could hold 400 tons of coal. In 1896-1897, about 34 tons of “oil” (fuel oil) in the amount of about 34 tons was taken into the coal pit between 33 and 37 frames as an experiment. overflowed into the adjacent coal pit through the top due to leaks in the connection of the bulkhead with the armored deck. The planned oil heating of the boilers on the Apraksin, as well as on some other Baltic battleships, was not actually used.

The installation of the main machines, boilers and smoke work on the ship was completed in November 1896, at the same time (November 18) the machines were tested on mooring trials. The steam pressure in three boilers was increased to 7.7 kgf/cm2. shaft speed up to 35-40 rpm. Sea trials of "General-Admiral Apraksin" began only in the autumn of 1897, when the battleship under the command of Captain 1st Rank N.A. Rimsky-Korsakov spent his first campaign in the detachment of ships assigned for trials (flag of Rear Admiral V.P. Messer). However, all three factory tests (from October 11 to 21) ended in failure: the machines developed power from only 3200 to 4300 hp, and the tests themselves had to be interrupted each time due to malfunctions (knock in the cylinder, an error in the drawing of the steam regulator, steam pressure drop in boilers).

The board of the Franco-Russian plant saw the reasons for this situation in the poor quality of coal and the inexperience of factory stokers, but the next year the tests were repeatedly postponed due to various problems. Finally, on October 14, 1898, on the official 6-hour test of the armadillo car, they developed 4804 hp, and the average speed (over four runs per measured mile) was only 14.47 knots (maximum - 15.19 knots). The English prototype machines ("Ushakov") at one time developed more than 5700 hp, having worked for almost 12 hours and providing a speed of over 16 knots. Therefore, Vice-Admiral P.P. Tyrtov, head of the Naval Ministry, ordered the Apraksin sample to be repeated, which was done on October 20 of the same year after coating the steam pipes and receiving coal.

This time, for 7 hours at full speed, the battleship showed an average speed of 15.07 knots with a total power of 5763 hp. and a displacement (at the beginning of the tests) of 4152 tons. Why the 16-knot speed was not reached is not entirely clear, but the leadership of the ministry rated the results of the test as “brilliant”, and in a number of documents it was noted that the maximum speed reached 17 knots, which, in principle could be with such a significant excess of design capacity.

The estimated cruising range of the Apraksin at full (15 knots) speed with a normal (214 tons) coal supply reached 648 miles, with a 10-knot speed - 1392 miles. Consequently, a full supply of coal provided a cruising range of about 2,700 miles at a speed of 10 knots.

Artillery armament of the battleship included three 254-mm, four 120-mm, ten 47-mm, twelve 37-mm guns and two 64-mm Baranovsky landing guns. Two 254-mm guns were located in the bow turret (total weight of the installation is 258.3 tons) and one in the stern (217.5 tons). The savings are small as a result. The towers were provided with electric and manual (backup) drives. The bow two-gun turret had eight electric motors of the Gramm and Siemens systems: two each for the swivel and lifting mechanisms, lifting the chargers and operating the breaker. The total power of the electric motors reached 72.25 kW (98 hp). The aft turret was powered by four 36.15 kW (49 hp) electric motors.

The Apraksin was equipped with 254-mm guns 45 calibers long, designed by A.F. Brink, somewhat improved compared to the guns of the first two battleships. The mass of the barrel of one gun was 22.5 tons (as on Rostislav and Peresvet). The initial velocity of the projectile (225.2 kg), as for the Ushakov and Senyavin guns, had to be limited to 693 m / s. The elevation angle of the guns reached 35 °, while for firing at elevation angles above 15 °, parts of the armored roof above the embrasures were hinged, which ensured a firing range of up to 73 kb.

The 120-mm Kane cannons, which had a firing range of 54 kb, were located on the upper deck in the corners of the superstructure (spardeck) without armor protection and without shields.

Two 47-mm guns of the Hotchkiss system stood on the sides in the "captain's hall" - a large room in the aft part on the battery deck, two - between the 120-mm guns on the upper deck in the superstructure, the rest - on the spardeck and bridges. Eight 37-mm Hotchkiss guns on swivel mounts were located on the combat mars of the foremast, two on the bridge, and two more were used to arm the boats.

Mine armament included four 381-mm bronze surface mine vehicles: bow, stern (in the captain's hall), two side and three combat searchlights. The obstacle mines (30 pieces) provided for by the 1891 project of the year were removed from the armament during the construction of the first battleships of this type, but the anti-mine nets that had been canceled were restored during the tests of the ship. Two 34-foot ship steam boats had mine launchers.

The artillery of "General-Admiral Apraksin" was tested by shooting on July 23 and 24, 1899 by the commission of Rear Admiral F.A. Amosov. The shooting was quite successful, although the shutters of the ports of the 120-mm guns required some alteration, and the towers showed a tendency to "settle" (as on battleships of the "Poltava" type). The loading speed of 254-mm guns "in electric" was 1 min 33 s (the interval between shots). The "settlement" of the towers, fortunately, did not subsequently progress. However, the turrets themselves, under intensive use (up to 54 shots per campaign), caused quite a lot of criticism. So, there were breakages of the gear teeth of the coupling, failures of the electric drive due to poor insulation of the wires.

The quality of the hull work of the New Admiralty also left much to be desired. Commission V.P. Messera found missing rivets, some of the remaining holes were clogged with wooden chops. Vice-Admiral S.O. Makarov drew attention to the shortcomings of the drainage system, having studied in detail the first two battleships of the same type.

In terms of tactical and technical elements, "General-Admiral Apraksin" was not only not inferior to ships of its class in the German, Danish and Swedish fleets (for 1899), but also had a number of advantages due to the relatively advantageous combination of the caliber of the main artillery, the system for its placement and protection . In the conditions of the Baltic, the battleship fully satisfied its purpose, and its entry into service was of particular importance in connection with the need to master the tower electric drives, already adopted for future squadron battleships.

However, the hopes of some admirals to use Apraksin to train gunners turned out to be futile due to the events of the autumn of 1899. At first, the 1899 campaign of the year was going quite well for the battleship. On August 4, having completed the tests and having on board about 320 tons of coal and supplies for the summer campaign, General-Admiral Apraksin left Kronstadt. At noon the next day, the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank V.V. Lipdestrem, safely brought him to Revel as part of the Training Artillery Detachment. During his service in the Apraksin detachment, he went out shooting five times with officer-class students and student gunners, having used up 628 cartridges for training 37-mm barrels, as well as 9 254-mm and 40 120-mm shells. The shooting turned out to be quite troublesome for the senior artillery officer, Lieutenant F.V. Rimsky-Korsakov: on the fifth day in the aft tower, a sleeve and a device for installing a training barrel were torn, and on the sixth, the horizontal guidance of the bow tower failed. This malfunction was eliminated within a day at the Wiegandt private plant, which restored the broken teeth of the coupling for transferring from manual to electric control.

August 14, 1899 "General-Admiral Apraksin" went to sea to go to Copenhagen. A fresh north wind foreshadowed a stormy voyage. The new ship, according to V.V. Lindeström, showed "excellent seaworthiness": in the case of oncoming waves, only splashes flew onto the tank, and in passing, the pitching range did not exceed 10 ° on board. The machine worked properly, providing an average speed of 11.12 knots with two boilers put into operation. On the morning of May 16, the low-lying green shores of Denmark appeared on the horizon, and at 14 o’clock the Apraksin was already on a barrel in the harbor of Copenhagen, finding the Tsarevna yacht, the Grozychy gunboat and two Danish ships there.

On August 22, Nicholas II and his family arrived in the Danish capital on the Shtandart yacht. The Apraksin parking lot in the capital of a friendly state was marked by numerous receptions and visits. Non-commissioned officers and sailors were regularly dismissed ashore. According to tradition, the King of Denmark “granted” the Apraksin officers as holders of the Order of the Dannebrog.

On September 14, leaving the imperial yachts to cruise through European ports, the battleship left the hospitable kingdom and arrived in Kronstadt two days later. On September 21, he finished the campaign, but did not disarm, so that after completion of the outfitting work he would go to Libau. The squadron battleships "Poltava" and "Sevastopol" were also going there, completing tests in a separate detachment of Rear Admiral F.I. Amosov.

Tuesday, November 12, 1899, scheduled for the Apraksin to go to sea, began with fog and a gradual increase in the northeast wind. The fog that dissipated at about 15 o'clock allowed the navigator of the Apraksin, Lieutenant P.P. Durnovo to determine the deviation along the alignment of the Kronstadt lights, and the commander V.V. Lindeström decided to go ahead with the plan. Watching the fall of the barometer. Vladimir Vladimirovich hoped to take refuge in Reval, but he still had to get there.

By 20:00, the wind increased to six points, and soon reached the strength of a storm, aggravated by negative air temperature and a snowstorm. The battleship, covered with a layer of ice, walked blindly - out of sight of the islands and lighthouses. Due to the freezing of water and the danger of sending people to the poop, mechanical and manual logs were not used, the speed was determined by the speed of the cars.

At 2045 hours, the commander reduced the course from 9 to 5.5 knots, intending to clarify the place by measuring the depth of the sea. Having not received certain results in this way, V.V. Lindestrome and P.P. Durnovo considered that the battleship had been blown to the south and were going to decide on the lighthouse of Gogland, the largest island in the center of the Gulf of Finland. In fact, the Apraksin turned out to be much to the north, and at 3:30 on November 13, at a speed of about 3 knots, it ran onto a shallow near the high snowy southeastern shore of Gogland.

The blow seemed soft to the commander, and the situation was not hopeless. However, an attempt to get off the shallows in full astern failed, and an hour later water appeared in the bow stoker, which quickly arrived. The ship listed up to 10 ° yellow side and, in the waves, strongly beat the bottom against the ground. V.V. Lindeström, thinking about saving people, decided to take the team ashore. The message with the latter, on which the locals gathered, was installed with the help of two lifelines, filed from the fore mars. By 3 p.m., the crossing of people was successfully completed, having stopped the steam raised after the accident in two feed and auxiliary boilers.

They learned about the accident of the new coastal defense battleship in St. Petersburg from a telegram from the commander of the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, who, on the way from Kronstadt to Revel, noticed the distress signals given by the Apraksin. Vice-Admiral P.P. Tyrtov, head of the Naval Ministry, immediately ordered the squadron battleship Poltava to be sent to Gogland from Kronstadt, and the battleship Admiral Ushakov from Libava, providing them with plasters and materials for rescue operations, the head of which was appointed Rear Admiral F .I.Amosov, holding the flag on the Poltava. In addition to warships, the Ermak icebreaker, the Moguchiy steamer, two rescue steamers of the private Revel Rescue Society and divers of the Kronstadt school of the maritime department were involved in the rescue of the Apraksin. "Admiral Ushakov" did not reach Gogland - he returned to Libava due to a breakdown in the steering gear.

On the morning of November 15, F.I. arrived at Apraksin. Amosov, who, not sharing the initial optimism of V.V. Lindeström ("with immediate assistance, the battleship will be removed"), found the situation "extremely dangerous" and dependent on the weather. Fortunately, Yermak could provide ice control, but the telegraph to maintain communication with St. Petersburg was available only in Kotka, which made it difficult to manage the work.

It was possible to organize communication with the help of an outstanding invention of the late 19th century - radio. December 10, 1899 Vice Admiral I.M. Dikov and Acting Chief Mine Inspector Rear Admiral K.S. Ostoletsky proposed to connect Gogland with the mainland using a “telegraph without wires” invented by A.S. Popov. On the same day, the head of the ministry imposed a resolution on the report: "You can try, I agree ...". A.S. Popov himself, his assistant P.N. Rybkin, captain 2nd rank G.I. soon went to the place of work with sets of radio stations. Zalevsky and Lieutenant A.A. Remmert. On Gogland and on the island of Kutsalo near Kotka, the construction of masts for installing antennas began.

By this time, it turned out that "Apraksin", according to the apt expression of F.I. Amosov, literally "climbed into a pile of stones." The top of a huge stone and an 8-ton granite boulder got stuck in the armadillo's hull, forming a hole with an area of ​​about 27 m2 to the left of the vertical keel in the region of 12-23 frames. Through it, the bow cartridge cellar of the Baranovsky guns, the mine cellar, the turret compartment, the hook chamber and the bomb cellar of the 254-mm turret, the entire bow compartment to the armored deck, were filled with water. Three other stones produced smaller damage to the bottom. In total, the ship received more than 700 tons of water, which could not be pumped out without sealing the holes. Stones stuck in the bottom prevented the Apraksin from moving.

Among the many proposals for saving the battleship were very curious. For example, put a “steel board” under the hull and, simultaneously with towing, raise it above the stone with explosions under the board of explosive charges (signed “Not a sailor, but just a Moscow tradesman”), “One of the well-wishing battleship Apraksin proposed to raise the hull above the stone with using a huge lever made of rails.

Subsequently, commander V.V. Lindeström considered it quite realistic to use the “ice dock” designed by Major General Zharintsev to repair the ship at the accident site. The latter proposed to freeze the water around the armadillo to the very bottom with the help of liquid carbon dioxide, and then cut a trench to the bow to deepen the place and “free the surface of the seabed from stones.” However, the rescuers went the other way.

All rescue work was carried out under the general guidance and control of the head of the ministry, Admiral P.P. Tyrtov, who involved famous admirals I.M. Dikova, V.P. Verkhovsky and S.O. Makarov, chief inspectors of the MTC N.E. Kuteynikova, A.S. Krotkova, N.G. Nozikov. Directly involved in the rescue work under the leadership of F.I. Amosov was the commander of the battleship V.V. Lindestrem, junior assistants to the shipbuilder P.P. Belyankin and E.S. Politovsky, a representative of the Revel Rescue Society von Franken and a pointer to the New Admiralty Olympiev, who knew the ship well. Divers who worked in ice water were led by Lieutenants M.F. Schultz and A.K. Nebolsin. It was decided to remove the upper part of a large stone with the help of explosions, unload the battleship, which had a displacement of 4515 tons at the time of the accident, repair the hole if possible, pump out water and, using pontoons, pull the battleship aground.

Attempts to pull the Apraksin afloat were made twice: on November 28 (the icebreaker Ermak with the Apraksin in full reverse gear) and on December 9 (the steamships Meteor and Helios came to the aid of the Yermak). After a thorough examination of the hull and a large stone by divers, it became clear that these attempts were doomed to failure in advance.

The struggle with stones, which dragged on until the freeze-up, with the failure of attempts to move the Apraksin from its place by tugboats, led P.P. Tyrtov to the decision to postpone its removal from the shallows until the spring of next year. F.I. Amosov with "Poltava" and the majority of the crew of the emergency ship was recalled to Kronstadt. To ensure the work, 36 sailors were left with the boatswain Ivan Safonov. The danger of the destruction of Apraksin by a heap of ice was avoided with the help of Yermak and the strengthening of the ice fields around the battleship.

On January 25, 1900, the chairman of the ITC, Vice Admiral I.M. Dikov read an urgent telegram from Kotka: "Gogland's telegram received without wires by telephone, front stone removed." Having reported it to P.P. Tyrtov, Ivan Mikhailovich was instructed to report the content to the editors of Novoye Vremya and the Government Bulletin: this was the first radiogram transmitted over a distance of more than 40 miles.

At the end of January 1900, the commander of the Training Artillery Detachment, Rear Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, was appointed the head of the rescue operations on Gogland. Zinovy ​​Petrovich involved in the rescue of the battleship the Bureau for Soil Research, which belonged to the mining engineer Vojislav. The bureau sent technicians to Apraksin with two machines equipped with diamond drills for drilling holes in granite stones. The explosion of dynamite in the pits turned out to be harmless to the ship. At the end of the work, Vojislav even refused the reward. The Naval Ministry, expressing its gratitude to him for his disinterestedness, paid 1,197 rubles. in the form of compensation for equipment breakdowns and the maintenance of technicians.

By the beginning of April 1900, in the conditions of a relatively harsh winter, they managed to deal with the stones, temporarily close up some of the holes and unload the battleship by about 500 tons. On April 8, Yermak made an unsuccessful attempt to drag the ship 2 fathoms - the length of the lane created in solid ice. Three days later, the attempt was repeated, flooding the aft compartments of the Apraksin and helping the Yermak with steam and coastal manual capstans. The battleship finally set off and by evening, with its own machines put into operation, moved 12 meters back from the stone ridge.

On April 13, along the channel laid by the Yermak, he moved to the harbor near Gogland, and on April 22 he safely moored in Aspe near Kotka. Up to 300 tons of water remained in the armadillo's hull, which was continuously pumped out by pumps. In the presence of only 120 tons of coal and the absence of artillery (except for turret guns), ammunition, provisions and most of the supplies, the draft fore and aft was 5.9 m.

On May 6, General-Admiral Apraksin, accompanied by the cruiser Asia and two rescue ships of the Revel Society, arrived in Kronstadt, where it was soon put in for repairs at the Konstantinovsky Dock, and on May 15 ended the protracted campaign. P.P. Tyrtov congratulated V.V. Lindestrem with the end of the difficult epic and thanked all the participants in the work, especially Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

Repair of damage to the battleship by means of the Kronstadt port, completed in 1901, cost the treasury more than 175 thousand rubles, not counting the cost of rescue work.

The Apraksin accident showed the weakness of the rescue equipment of the maritime department, which was forced to resort to improvisation and the involvement of other public and private organizations. Assessing their contribution to the salvation of the ship, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky pointed out that without the Yermak, the battleship would have been in distress 1 without the help of the Revel Rescue Society would have sunk back in November 1899. In difficult winter conditions, a lot was decided by the dedication in work and the entrepreneurial spirit that Russians have in extreme situations.

The commission to investigate the circumstances of the accident did not find corpus delicti in the actions of the commander and navigator of the battleship. Former navigator of Apraksin P.P. Durnovo brilliantly rehabilitated himself in the Battle of Tsushima by leading the wrecked destroyer Bravy to Vladivostok. The experience of the winter of 1899/1900 prompted Captain 1st Rank V.V. Lindeström to speak in the "Sea Collection" with criticism of ensuring the unsinkability of his ship. In his article “Accident of the battleship General-Admiral Apraksin”, he pointed out the weakness of the bottom and bulkheads, the permeability of bulkhead doors, noted the complexity and inconvenience of installing drainage facilities, the spread of water through the ventilation system and sealing pipes and cables in bulkheads.

The article was reviewed by the shipbuilding department of the MTK, which, under the leadership of N.E. Kuteynikova very thoroughly substantiated the impossibility of its publication. In a review signed by I.M. Dikov, the prevailing idea was to protect the "honor of the uniform" of the committee itself and the maritime department as a whole. Calling "Apraksin" "a type, structurally obsolete to a certain extent," the MTC shipbuilders considered that V.V. Lindeström outlined its shortcomings in a generalized way, and this could create "false ideas about modern shipbuilding" in society. It was alleged that almost all the shortcomings over the past two years had been eliminated by the committee's resolutions, and the specific issue of Apraksin would be discussed in the MTC on the basis of the corresponding official report by S.O. Makarov, who attached a duplicate of the article to it.

On the basis of the opinion of the MTK, P.P. Tyrtov banned the publication: the official press organ of the ministry could not give rise to attacks "on the orders existing in the fleet." Unfortunately, these orders became the object of press attacks very late, when the fleet had already paid off for them in the Tsushima Strait.

Campaigns of 1902-1904 "General-Admiral Apraksin" held in the Training Artillery Detachment. During this period, its crew consisted of up to 185 people of the personnel team and up to 200 students of gunners, that is, a variable composition of trainees. In 1902, the battleship participated in the well-known demonstration maneuvers of the detachment in the presence of two emperors on the Reval roadstead, and at the beginning of the winter of the same year, unsuccessfully tried to force the ice of the Gulf of Finland and received damage to the hull. In general, according to the last commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank N.G. Lishin. appointed on April 6, 1903, the Apraksin hull, due to the accident in 1899 and ice navigation in 1902, was severely “shaken” and even leaky in the bow and throughout the upper deck.

In November 1904, "General-Admiral Apraksin", together with "Admiral Ushakov" and "Admiral Senyavin", was appointed to the Separate detachment of ships of the future 3rd Pacific squadron for immediate passage to the Far East - to reinforce the 2nd squadron.

The battleship began the campaign on December 22, 1904. During preparations for the voyage, a wireless telegraphy station of the Slyabi-Arko system, two Barra and Strouda rangefinders (on the fore-mars and on the aft bridge), Perepelkin optical sights for 254-mm and 120-mm guns, two of the latter were replaced by new ones due to the large "execution". For 254-mm guns, 60 armor-piercing, 149 high-explosive and 22 segmental shells were released on the ship, but only 200 of them could be placed in the cellars, and the rest had to be loaded onto transports. The latter also carried an additional 100 high-explosive 254-mm shells for all three battleships of the same type. Ammunition for 120-mm guns amounted to 840 rounds (200 with armor-piercing, 480 with high-explosive and 160 with segmental shells), 47-mm guns - 8180 rounds, 37-mm guns - 1620 rounds, and for 64-mm landing guns they took 720 shrapnel and 720 grenades. The transports were loaded with additional cartridges with 180 armor-piercing and 564 high-explosive shells of 120 mm caliber and 8830 cartridges for 47-mm guns. At the request of the commander N.G. Lishin about replacing the upper deck, the commander of the Libau port of Emperor Alexander III, Rear Admiral A.I. Iretskoy responded with the phrase “You should defend everything,” followed by obscene expressions.

On February 2, 1905, "General-Admiral Apraksin" as part of a separate detachment of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov left Libau for the Far East. In the daytime battle on May 14, 1905 - the first phase of the Tsushima battle - "General-Admiral Apraksin" valiantly fought the Japanese. Its crew consisted of 16 officers and mechanical engineers, 1 doctor, 1 priest, 8 conductors and 378 lower ranks (1 sailor died at the crossing in the Red Sea). In the combat formation of the 3rd armored detachment "Apraksin" was the second matelot - in the wake of the flagship battleship of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov "Emperor Nikolai I".

At the beginning of the battle, the senior artillery officer of the battleship, Lieutenant Baron G.N. Taube concentrated fire on the Japanese flagship battleship Mikasa, but after 30 minutes transferred it to the closer armored cruiser Nisshin. The Apraksin bow turret was commanded by Lieutenant P.O. Shishko, stern - Lieutenant S.L. Trukhachev.

40 minutes after the start of the battle, General-Admiral Apraksin, which had so far remained unharmed, passed four cables from the dying battleship Oslyabya. The death of the "Oslyabi" and the failure of the flagship of the squadron "Prince Suvorov", on which fires raged, made a heavy impression on the Apraksin team, which entered the battle in a "cheerful mood". Shortly after the Oslyabi was sunk by the Japanese, the senior ship mechanic, staff captain P.N.Mileshkin, could not stand it and "took alcohol", for which he was removed by the commander N.G. Lishin. Until midnight from May 14 to 15, when the commander reinstated the senior ship engineer in his rights, his duties were performed by Lieutenant N.N. Rozanov.

However, the Apraksin crew bravely fought the Japanese until the evening. The battleship fired up to 132 254-mm shells (together with those fired on the night of May 14-15 on destroyers - up to 153 shells) and up to 460 120-mm shells. The role of Apraksin and other battleships of the 3rd detachment was clearly manifested around 17:00, when they inflicted damage on Japanese armored cruisers and forced the latter to retreat, stopping the shelling of crowded transports, cruisers and destroyers of the Russian squadron. At the same time, Apraksin itself was damaged. A 203-mm projectile from the cruisers of the squadron of Vice Admiral H. Kamimura hit the aft turret at the embrasure of the 254-mm gun, the rupture of the projectile raised the roof and made it difficult to rotate the turret, although it did not penetrate the armor. The fragments of the projectile knocked out gunner Sonsky, wounded several gunners, and the tower commander, Lieutenant S.L. Trukhachev was shell-shocked, but remained at his post. A 120-mm shell hit the wardroom and mortally wounded the miner Zhuk, who died soon after. Another projectile of unknown caliber demolished the gaff, fragments of others disabled the network (antenna) of the wireless telegraph.

Having relatively little damage and losses in people (two dead, ten wounded), "General-Admiral Apraksin", not including combat lighting, on the night of May 15 vigorously repulsed mine attacks and did not lag behind the "Emperor Nicholas I", the flagship of the detachment , en route to Vladivostok with a course of at least 12-13 knots.

However, on the morning of May 15, the detachment of N.I. Nebogatov was surrounded by superior enemy forces. "Well. We broke in ... we will die, ”N.G. Lishin said on the Apraksin bridge. The officers and crew of the battleship, indeed, were ready to fight to the last and die. Commander Petelkin, "tempted by a successful tip", even fired a sighting shot from a 120-mm cannon, but there was no new battle - Admiral Nebogatoye, as you know, surrendered to the enemy. His example (on a signal) was followed by the commander of the "Apraksin" N.G. Lishin (it is known that, on the orders of Lieutenant Taube, gunners threw locks of small guns and sights overboard).

So the ship, bearing the name of an associate of Peter the Great and the first admiral general of the Russian fleet, fell into the hands of the enemy. The Japanese called it "Okinoshima" and even used it in the operation to capture the island of Sakhalin. In 1906-1915, Okinoshima was a training ship, in 1915-1926 - a blockship, and in 1926 she was sent for scrapping.

For the surrender of the battleship to the enemy N.G. Lishin, even before returning from captivity, was deprived of the rank of captain of the 1st rank, and then convicted. The verdict of the court - the death penalty - was changed by Nicholas II to 10 years in a fortress. The court also sentenced senior officer Lieutenant N.M. to two months in the fortress. Fridovsky, who could not prevent the "criminal intentions" of his commander.

Sources and literature

1.B. L. The device of the ice dock according to the project of Major General Zharshov for sealing holes // Marine collection. 1905. No. 3. Neof. otd. pp.67-77.
2. Gribovsky V.Yu., Chernikov I.I. Battleship "Admiral Ushakov", St. Petersburg: Shipbuilding, 1996.
3. Molodtsov S.V. Coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Senyavin type // Shipbuilding. 1985. No. 12. S.36-39.
4. Report on the occupations of the MTK for 1893 in artillery. SPb., 1900.
5. Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905 Fleet actions. The documents. Dep. IV. Book. 3. Issue. 1. St. Petersburg, 1912.
6. Tokarevsky A. Crippled battleships according to official estimates // Russian Shipping. 1898. March-April (No. 192-183). pp.63-97.
7.RGAVMF.F.417, 421.921.

Coastal defense battleships of the type "Admiral Ushakov"

Coastal defense battleship(BBO) - due to its specificity, it had a relatively low freeboard and was inferior to squadron battleships in terms of seaworthiness. BBO - a warship with a shallow draft, good armor and armed with large-caliber guns. Designed for combat in shallow water and coast protection. Was in service with most maritime states. Coastal defense ironclads became the logical development of monitors and gunboats.

Appearance

floating batteries

The first head of state, who ordered the creation of armored ships, was Emperor Napoleon 3. The chief shipbuilder of the French fleet, Dupuy-de-Lom, having tested iron plates by shooting, created floating batteries Lave ,tonnante and Devastation. These ships were sheathed with 120 mm iron sheets and carried 18 guns of 240 mm caliber.

Class evolution

The sinking of USS Monitor

It was because of the low seaworthiness of the monitors that Vice-Admiral Popov proposed his ship project, later called "popovki". They were so named because of their round shape, but despite this, they had good seaworthiness. In 1873, the barbette battleship Novgorod was launched. In 1875, the barbette battleship "Vice-Admiral Popov" was launched (when laying "Kyiv" in 1874).

The death of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

The situation in the Baltic Sea required the construction of a new type of coastal defense battleships. They turned out to be ships of the Admiral Ushakov type. Armed with four 254 mm guns, the battleships of this series, which were not inferior to the German and Swedish battleships, were supposed to dominate the Baltic, but their fate was different. All three ships of this series were lost in the Battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

Germany

Gerania, later than all European countries, began building battleships. Fearing an attack by the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Empire, in 1888, 8 coastal defense battleships of the type Siegfried.Armament consisted of three 240 mm guns in barbette mounts. As a result of the Sino-Japanese and Spanish-American wars, the wooden parts of the ships, where possible, were replaced with metal. After the construction of ships of the type Siegfried, Germany switched to the construction of squadron battleships.

For operations in the Adriatic, Austria-Hungary in 1893. three ships of the type were laid down Monarch, entered service in 1898. The ships of this type were similar to the German battleships of the Kaiser class, they carried four 240 mm main battery guns and were distinguished by a high rate of fire. Compared to other coastal defense battleships, they were the best in their class.

Sweden

Coastal defense battleship Sverige

The Swedish Naval Office attached particular importance to coastal defense battleships, as they had limited resources, and the theater of operations corresponded to the purpose of these ships. In 1865-1867. three type monitors come into operation John Ericsson. These are single-turret monitors with two 240-mm guns. In 1881, a monitor of the type Loke armed with two 381 mm guns. Although all four monitors were slow-moving (7 knots), the Swedish command considered that it corresponded to the solution of coastal defense tasks.

In 1886, the first of three battleships of the type Svea. These were ships with a shallow draft and carried two 254 mm main guns located in the bow turret and four 152 mm auxiliary guns in the casemate. In 1897, an battleship of the type Oden. There were also three of these ships. The concept of building these battleships took into account the fight against light enemy forces (destroyers, light cruisers), in accordance with it, the main caliber was reduced to six 120 mm guns. Also, searchlights were installed on them, as well as on ships of the Svea type. In continuation of this concept, an armadillo of the type Dristigheten(1901). Two guns of the main caliber of 210 mm and six auxiliary calibers of 152 mm made up the main firepower of the ship. This combination of guns remained on Swedish ships for a long time. Dristigheten served as a prototype for the next series of ships of the type Aran from four ships. The difference was that these battleships were weaker armored, respectively, and faster, as well as that the 152-mm guns were installed in the towers. The battleship completed this stage of construction Oscar II.The only ship in its class with three tubes, the artillery was located in the towers and consisted of two 210-mm guns and eight 152-mm guns. In 1915, the strongest coastal defense battleship of the type Sverige. It is considered the pinnacle of development of this type of ships. Its armament consisted of four guns of the main caliber 283 mm, and eight auxiliary caliber 152 mm. In 1939, the Swedish naval command questioned the concept of coastal defense ironclads and began building light cruisers instead.

Norway

The Norwegian Navy developed along the same lines as the Swedish Navy. This was due not only to a similar theater of operations, but also to the fact that these two countries were bound by an agreement and coordinated their military programs. In 1866-1872. four type monitors come into operation Scorpionen armed with one 270 mm gun. They formed the basis of coastal defense until 1897, when the British built two coastal defense ironclads for the Norwegian Navy. Harald Haarfagre.The main caliber of this type of ships consisted of two 210-mm guns and six auxiliary 120-mm guns. The Norwegians were satisfied with the ships of this type and therefore ordered two more ships of the type Norway. Battleships of this type are the development of the project Harald Haarfagre. Due to some lightening of the reservation and an increase in displacement, the artillery armament was strengthened. The 120 mm secondary caliber guns were replaced with 152 mm guns. Rather modest in terms of combat characteristics, these ships by the beginning of the First World War were the largest and most powerful in the Norwegian fleet.

Denmark

Until the middle of the 19th century, Denmark had a fairly powerful fleet, which included dozens of sailing battleships, frigates, corvettes, sloops, and gunboats. However, in the era of steam armored ships, coastal defense battleships formed the basis of its fleet.

Battleship Rolf Krake

The Danes went the other way, abandoning the monitors, and ordered an battleship from Cowper Kolz in England to protect the coast Rolf Krake. It was a ship equipped with a 700 hp engine and schooner sailing equipment and armed with four 203-mm caliber guns mounted in two Kolz turrets. Kolz managed to design a tower, the design of which turned out to be more successful than that of Erickson. Erickson's tower rested on the upper deck. To turn, it was necessary to raise it on the central support column, turn it along with the column and lower it again. The Kolza tower lay on the rollers located along the perimeter of the tower, and on the central pin located under the upper deck; as a result, the rotation of the tower did not require any preliminary operations. In 1868, improving Rolf Krake, the Danes developed an armadillo of their own construction Lindormen armed with two 229 mm guns. A further development in this direction was Gorm. In this battleship, the main caliber was increased to 254 mm. The armadillo completes the development of this direction Odin whose armament increased to four 254-mm guns.

Coastal defense battleship Niels Juel

The consistent development of previous projects led Danish designers to create a completely seaworthy coastal defense battleship. Helgoland with a freeboard height of 3 meters. 260-mm guns were in a casemate located in the middle part of the ship (two guns on each side). The tower with one 305-mm gun was located on the forecastle. Rapid-fire 120-mm guns were placed one by one on the forecastle and stern. Two masts could carry, if necessary, the sailing armament of the schooner. For many years it remained the largest and most powerful Danish warship. next battleship Tordenskjold came out unsuccessful, as the Danes wanted to combine a high-speed ram and a stable firing platform in one ship. Reservations were limited to 114 mm armored decks, and armament consisted of one 305 mm main caliber gun and four 120 mm caliber guns. In 1886, the coastal defense battleship was launched. Iver Hvitfeldt. The armament consisted of two 260-mm main-caliber guns placed in single-gun barbettes and four 120-mm secondary caliber guns. After 10 years, the Danes launch Skjold. In an attempt to create a ship with a draft of 4 meters, the Danes reduce armor and artillery, and as a result they get a coastal ship, which is close in design to monitors. During the First World War, it was listed as an armored floating battery. Armed with one 240 mm gun and three 120 mm guns. In 1897, a series of coastal defense battleships of the type Herluf Trolle. Armed with two 240 mm and four 152 mm guns. The last Danish coastal defense ironclad Niels Juel was laid down in 1914 and commissioned in 1923. According to the results of the First World War, the initial armament of two 305-mm and ten 120-mm guns was abandoned and ten 152-mm guns were installed.

Finland

Latest European coastal defense ironclads Vainamoinen were built in Finland. They were intended to protect the flank of the Finnish army overlooking the Gulf of Finland. It was supposed to use them as heavy batteries in the offensive or defense. Armed with four 254-mm guns and eight 105-mm guns. Prototype to create Vainamoinen German ships of the Deutschland type served. In 1947 Vainamoinen sold to the USSR and joined the Baltic Fleet under the name "Vyborg".

sunset class

Coastal defense battleship Henri IV

The very idea of ​​​​the appearance of coastal defense battleships was that in order to attack the coast, a large seaworthy enemy battleship would be forced to enter coastal waters, where a smaller coastal defense battleship would be able to fight with it on an equal footing. But the increase in firing range led to the fact that the coastal defense battleship had to go out more seaward, where it lost its advantages. In addition, due to the increase in the range of naval artillery, the trajectories of the shells became more and more sheer and the frequency of hits not on board , and the deck has increased significantly. Thus, low-sided ships lost their main advantage - a small silhouette and a large area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe side protected by armor - and were no longer so profitable. Their shortcomings have become too relevant in the new conditions of the war at sea. Last attempt to revive the French ironclad class Henri IV was not entirely successful and was never repeated.

In this regard, by the beginning of the 20th century, coastal defense battleships were built almost exclusively for the fleets of the Scandinavian powers, whose coasts abounded in small bays, bays and skerries, and visibility conditions in northern waters often left much to be desired. Scandinavian engineers believed that under such conditions large enemy ships would not be able to realize their advantage in long-range artillery, and would be forced to enter shallow coastal waters and fight in narrow straits at a very short distance. In such a situation, small, well-protected coastal defense ironclads with not too powerful, but fast-firing heavy artillery (caliber from 203 to 280 millimeters) could still be effective.

However, if this rule still worked against squadron battleships and early dreadnoughts, then the rapid naval arms race at the beginning of the 20th century finally put an end to coastal defense battleships. The advent of superdreadnoughts with 320-406 mm artillery meant that any reasonably sized coastal defense battleships were in a losing position; the development of aviation, torpedo boats and destroyers meant that the enemy, most likely, simply would not send his heavy battleships and cruisers into shallow coastal waters. This was confirmed with the latest coastal defense battleships of the type Sri Ayuthia built for the Thai Navy.

Combat use

October 17, 1855 floating batteries Lave ,tonnante and Devastation approached the Russian fortification of Kinburn at the mouth of the Dnieper. After a three-hour shelling on the Russian forts, 29 out of 62 cannons were destroyed, parapets and casemates were damaged. The fort had to be surrendered. Each of the batteries received more than 60 hits, but the armor was not penetrated.

During the American Civil War on March 9, 1862, a battle took place on the Hampton roadstead between the ancestor of this class USS Monitor and casemate battleship CSS Virginia. Formally, the fight ended in a draw, although each side declared this fight a victory. The "southerners" argued that they sank two enemy ships and the USS Monitor left the battlefield, the "northerners" replied that the blockade had not been lifted, so the goal had not been achieved. But experts argued that armor won.

February 18, 1864 Rolf Krake in a duel with Prussian field batteries, he successfully withstood over 100 hits from 152 mm rifled guns!

On May 15, 1905, the coastal defense battleship Admiral Ushakov was discovered by Japanese armored cruisers. Iwate and Yakumo.After the previous battle, it was damaged and developed a speed of no more than ten knots. The battleship answered the offer to surrender with fire. After several hits, the Japanese cruisers left the range of the Russian guns and shot the ship from a long distance. According to Japanese data, the last battle of the battleship Admiral Ushakov took place 60 miles west of Oki Island. The ship disappeared under water at about 10:50. May 15, 1905. Death coordinates: 37°02’23″ s. latitude, 133°16" E

At the end of 1917, two battleships of the type Monarch Vienna and Budapest they moved to Trieste, from where they went out to shell the Italian troops on the Piava River. But on the night of December 10, two Italian torpedo boats quietly overcame the booms and attacked the Austrian battleships right at the anchorage. One torpedo hit Vienna and he quickly sank.

On April 9, 1940, a detachment of destroyers under the command of Captain 1st Rank Bonte headed for the capture of Narvik. Two ironclads of the Norwegian Navy type Norway expected an attack. Therefore, the battleship Norway took a position in the fiord, allowing him to keep the entrance to the port at gunpoint with his guns. Meanwhile, the same Eidsvold stood on the road in combat readiness. The Germans failed to take the Norwegians by surprise and so they sent a truce on a boat. After refusing to surrender, the German officer, having retreated to a safe distance, gave a sign, and the destroyer fired a volley of torpedo tubes. Two torpedoes hit the target and Eidsvold exploded. Immediately followed by an attack on Norway. Two of the six torpedoes hit the target, after which the battleship sank very quickly.

Types of battleships of coastal defense of different countries

All performance characteristics in this table are presented by the lead ships of the series.

Type name	Quantity, pcs	Years in service	Full displacement, t	Speed, knots	Artillery, number, caliber	Armor
HMS Glatton	1	1871 - 1903	4990	12	2x305	245-304 / / 355 / 305-355
HMS Cyclops	4	1874 - 1903	3560	11	4x254	152-203 / 38 / 203-228 / 228-254

Type name	Quantity, pcs	Years in service	Full displacement, t	Speed, knots	Artillery, number, caliber	Armor (belt / deck / barbettes / forehead of the GK tower), mm
Cerberus	4	1868 - 1900	3344	10	4x254	152-203/ / 178-203 / 203-254
Tonnerre	2	1879 - 1905	5765	14	2x270	254-330 / 51 / 330 / 305-330
tonnant	1	1884 - 1903	5010	11,6	2х340	343-477 / 51 / 368 / 368
Henri IV	1	1888 - 1908	8949	17	2x274, 7x140	75-280 / 30-75 / 240 / 305

Type name	Quantity, pcs	Years in service	Full displacement, t	Speed, knots	Artillery, number, caliber	Armor (belt / deck / barbettes / forehead of the GK tower), mm
"Hurricane "	10	1865 - 1900	1655	7,7	2x229	127/25-37 / / 279
"Tornado"	1	1865 - 1959	1402	9	4х196	102-114/25-37 / / 114
"Mermaid"	2	1868 - 1911	1880	9	2x381, 2x229	83-114/25-37 / / 114
"Novgorod"	2	1872 - 1892	2491	6,5	2x280, 1x87	229/53-76 / 356 /
"Admiral Ushakov"	3	1897 - 1905	4700	16	4x254, 4x120	203-254/38-63 / /152-254

List of BBO types of Austria-Hungary