Exactly seventy years ago, the Soviet Union launched a seven-year program of "large naval shipbuilding" - one of the most expensive and ambitious projects in the history of domestic, and not only domestic, military equipment.

The main leaders of the program were considered heavy artillery ships - battleships and cruisers, which were to become the largest and most powerful in the world. Although it was not possible to complete the super battleships, interest in them is still great, especially in light of the recent fashion for an alternative history. So what were the projects of the "Stalinist giants" and what preceded their appearance?

Lords of the Seas

The fact that battleships are the main force of the fleet was considered an axiom for almost three centuries. From the time of the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century until the Battle of Jutland in 1916, the outcome of the war at sea was decided by an artillery duel of two fleets lined up in wake lines (hence the origin of the term “ship of the line”, abbreviated as battleship). Faith in the omnipotence of the battleship was not undermined by either the emerging aircraft or submarines. And after the First World War, most admirals and naval theorists still measured the strength of the fleets by the number of heavy guns, the total weight of the broadside and the thickness of the armor. But it was this exceptional role of battleships, considered the undisputed rulers of the seas, that played a cruel joke with them ...

The evolution of battleships in the first decades of the twentieth century was truly rapid. If by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 the largest representatives of this class, then called squadron battleships, had a displacement of about 15 thousand tons, then the famous Dreadnought built in England two years later (this name became a household name for his many followers) had a full the displacement was already 20,730 tons. "Dreadnought" seemed to contemporaries a giant and the height of perfection. However, by 1912, against the backdrop of the latest superdreadnoughts, it looked like a completely ordinary ship of the second line ... And four years later, the British laid the famous "Hood" with a displacement of 45 thousand tons! Incredibly, powerful and expensive ships in the conditions of an unbridled arms race became obsolete in just three to four years, and their serial construction became extremely burdensome even for the richest countries.

Why did it happen so? The fact is that any warship is a compromise of many factors, the main of which are three: weapons, protection and speed. Each of these components "ate" a significant part of the ship's displacement, since artillery, armor, and bulky power plants with numerous boilers, fuel, steam engines or turbines were very heavy. And the designers, as a rule, had to sacrifice one of the fighting qualities in favor of the other. So, the Italian shipbuilding school was characterized by high-speed and heavily armed, but poorly protected battleships. The Germans, on the contrary, prioritized survivability and built ships with very powerful armor, but moderate speed and light artillery. The desire to ensure a harmonious combination of all characteristics, taking into account the trend of a constant increase in the main caliber, led to a monstrous increase in the size of the ship.

Paradoxically, the appearance of the long-awaited "ideal" battleships - fast, heavily armed and protected by powerful armor - brought the very idea of ​​\u200b\u200bsuch ships to complete absurdity. Still: floating monsters, because of their high cost, undermined the economy of their own countries more significantly than the invasion of enemy armies! At the same time, they almost never went to sea: the admirals did not want to risk such valuable combat units, since the loss of even one of them was equated almost to a national disaster. Battleships from a means of waging war at sea have become an instrument of big politics. And the continuation of their construction was no longer determined by tactical expediency, but by completely different motives. To have such ships for the prestige of the country in the first half of the 20th century meant about the same as now to have nuclear weapons.

The need to stop the untwisted flywheel of the naval arms race was recognized by the governments of all countries, and in 1922, at an international conference convened in Washington, radical measures were taken. The delegations of the most influential states agreed to significantly reduce their naval forces and fix the total tonnage of their own fleets in a certain proportion over the next 15 years. For the same period, the construction of new battleships was almost everywhere stopped. The only exception was made for Great Britain - the country forced to scrap the largest number of brand new dreadnoughts. But those two battleships that the British could build would hardly have had an ideal combination of fighting qualities, since their displacement was to be measured in the amount of 35 thousand tons.

The Washington Conference was the first real step in history to limit offensive arms on a global scale. It has given the global economy some breathing room. But no more. Since the apotheosis of the "battleship race" was yet to come...

The dream of a "large fleet"

By 1914, the Russian Imperial Fleet ranked first in the world in terms of growth. On the stocks of the shipyards in St. Petersburg and Nikolaev, powerful dreadnoughts were laid down one after another. Russia quickly recovered from the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and again claimed the role of a leading maritime power.

However, the revolution, the Civil War and general devastation did not leave a trace of the former sea power of the empire. The Red Navy inherited from the "tsarist regime" only three battleships - "Petropavlovsk", "Gangut" and "Sevastopol", renamed respectively "Marata", "October Revolution" and "Paris Commune". By the standards of the 1920s, these ships already looked hopelessly outdated. It is not surprising that Soviet Russia was not invited to the Washington Conference: its fleet was not taken seriously at that time.

At first, the Red Fleet did not really have any special prospects. The Bolshevik government had far more urgent tasks than restoring its former sea power. In addition, the first persons of the state, Lenin and Trotsky, looked at the navy as an expensive toy and an instrument of world imperialism. Therefore, during the first one and a half decades of the existence of the Soviet Union, the ship structure of the RKKF was replenished slowly and mainly only by boats and submarines. But in the mid-1930s, the naval doctrine of the USSR changed dramatically. By that time, the "Washington battleship vacation" was over and all the world powers began to feverishly catch up. Two international treaties signed in London tried to somehow restrain the size of future battleships, but everything turned out to be futile: practically none of the countries participating in the agreements from the very beginning was going to honestly fulfill the signed conditions. France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, the USA and Japan have begun to create a new generation of leviathan ships. Stalin, inspired by the successes of industrialization, also did not want to stand aside. And the Soviet Union became another participant in a new round of the naval arms race.

In July 1936, the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR, with the blessing of the Secretary General, approved the seven-year program of "large naval shipbuilding" for 1937-1943 (due to the dissonance of the official name in the literature, it is usually called the "Big Fleet" program). In accordance with it, it was supposed to build 533 ships, including 24 battleships! For the then Soviet economy, the figures are absolutely unrealistic. Everyone understood this, but no one dared to object to Stalin.

In fact, Soviet designers began to develop a project for a new battleship back in 1934. Things progressed with difficulty: they had no experience in creating large ships. I had to attract foreign specialists - first Italian, then American. In August 1936, after analyzing various options, the terms of reference for the design of battleships of type "A" (project 23) and "B" (project 25) were approved. The latter was soon abandoned in favor of the Project 69 heavy cruiser, but Type A gradually turned into an armored monster, leaving all its foreign counterparts far behind. Stalin, who had a weakness for giant ships, could be pleased.

First of all, we decided not to limit the displacement. The USSR was not bound by any international agreements, and therefore, already at the stage of the technical project, the standard displacement of the battleship reached 58,500 tons. The thickness of the armor belt was 375 millimeters, and in the area of ​​​​the bow towers - 420! There were three armored decks: 25 mm upper, 155 mm main and 50 mm lower anti-fragmentation. The hull was equipped with solid anti-torpedo protection: in the central part of the Italian type, and in the extremities - of the American type.

The artillery armament of the Project 23 battleship included nine 406-mm B-37 guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers, developed by the Stalingrad plant "Barrikada". The Soviet gun could fire 1,105 kg projectiles at a range of 45.6 kilometers. In terms of its characteristics, it surpassed all foreign guns of this class - with the exception of the 18-inch Japanese super battleship Yamato. However, the latter, having larger shells, were inferior to the B-37 in terms of firing range and rate of fire. In addition, the Japanese kept their ships so secret that until 1945 no one knew anything about them at all. In particular, the Europeans and Americans were sure that the caliber of the Yamato artillery did not exceed 16 inches, that is, 406 millimeters.

Japanese battleship "Yamato" - the largest warship of World War II. Laid down in 1937, commissioned in 1941. Total displacement - 72,810 tons. Length - 263 m, width - 36.9 m, draft - 10.4 m. Armament: 9 - 460 mm and 12 - 155 -mm guns, 12 - 127mm anti-aircraft guns, 24 - 25mm machine guns, 7 seaplanes

The main power plant of the Soviet battleship is three turbo-gear units with a capacity of 67 thousand liters each. With. For the lead ship, the mechanisms were bought from the Swiss branch of the English company Brown Boveri, for the rest the power plant was to be manufactured under license by the Kharkov Turbine Plant. It was assumed that the speed of the battleship would be 28 knots and the cruising range of a 14-knot course - over 5,500 miles.

In the meantime, the "large offshore shipbuilding" program was revised. In the new "Large Shipbuilding Program", approved by Stalin in February 1938, "small" type "B" battleships were no longer listed, but the number of "large" project 23 increased from 8 to 15 units. True, none of the experts doubted that this number, as well as the previous plan, belonged to the realm of pure fantasy. After all, even the “mistress of the seas” Great Britain and the ambitious Nazi Germany expected to build only 6 to 9 new battleships. Having realistically assessed the possibilities of industry, the top leadership of our country had to limit itself to four ships. Yes, and it turned out to be beyond the power: the construction of one of the ships was stopped almost immediately after the laying.

The lead battleship ("Soviet Union") was laid down at the Leningrad Baltic Shipyard on July 15, 1938. It was followed by "Soviet Ukraine" (Nikolaev), "Soviet Russia" and "Soviet Belarus" (Molotovsk, now Severodvinsk). Despite the mobilization of all forces, construction lagged behind schedule. By June 22, 1941, the first two ships had the highest degree of readiness, respectively 21% and 17.5%. At the new plant in Molotovsk, things were going much worse. Although in 1940, instead of two battleships, they decided to build one there, anyway, by the beginning of World War II, its readiness reached only 5%.

The timing of the manufacture of artillery and armor was not kept. Although tests of an experimental 406-mm gun were successfully completed in October 1940, and before the start of the war, the Barrikady plant managed to hand over 12 barrels of naval superguns, not a single turret was assembled. Even more problems were with the release of the armor. Due to the loss of experience in the manufacture of thick armor plates, up to 40% of them went to waste. And negotiations on ordering armor from Krupp ended in nothing.

The attack of Nazi Germany crossed out the plans for the creation of the "Big Fleet". By a government decree of July 10, 1941, the construction of battleships was stopped. Later, the armor plates of the "Soviet Union" were used in the construction of pillboxes near Leningrad, and the B-37 experimental gun also fired at the enemy there. "Soviet Ukraine" was captured by the Germans, but they did not find any use for the giant corps. After the war, the issue of completing the construction of battleships according to one of the improved projects was discussed, but in the end they were dismantled for metal, and the section of the hull of the lead "Soviet Union" was even launched in 1949 - it was planned to be used for full-scale tests of the anti-torpedo protection system. The turbines received from Switzerland were at first wanted to be installed on one of the new light cruisers of Project 68 bis, then they abandoned this: too many alterations were required.

Good cruisers or bad battleships?

Project 69 heavy cruisers appeared in the “Large Shipbuilding Program”, which, like the “A” type battleships, were planned to be built 15 units. But these were not just heavy cruisers. Since the Soviet Union was not bound by any international treaties, the restrictions of the Washington and London conferences for ships of this class (standard displacement up to 10 thousand tons, artillery caliber no more than 203 millimeters) were immediately discarded by Soviet designers. Project 69 was conceived as a fighter for any foreign cruisers, including the formidable German "pocket battleships" (with a displacement of 12,100 tons). Therefore, at first its main armament was to include nine 254-mm guns, but then the caliber was increased to 305 mm. At the same time, it was necessary to strengthen armor protection, increase the power of the power plant ... As a result, the total displacement of the ship exceeded 41 thousand tons, and the heavy cruiser turned into a typical battleship, even larger than the planned project 25. Of course, the number of such ships had to be reduced. In reality, in 1939, only two “super cruisers” were laid down in Leningrad and Nikolaev - Kronstadt and Sevastopol.

The heavy cruiser Kronstadt was laid down in 1939 but not completed. The total displacement is 41,540 tons. The maximum length is 250.5 m, the width is 31.6 m, the draft is 9.5 m. The power of the turbines is 201,000 l. s., speed - 33 knots (61 km / h). The thickness of the side armor - up to 230 mm, towers - up to 330 mm. Armament: 9 305 mm and 8 - 152 mm guns, 8 - 100 mm anti-aircraft guns, 28 - 37 mm machine guns, 2 seaplanes

There were many interesting innovations in the design of the Project 69 ships, but in general, according to the cost-effectiveness criterion, they did not stand up to criticism. Conceived as good cruisers, Kronstadt and Sevastopol, in the process of "improving" the project, turned into bad battleships, too expensive and too difficult to build. In addition, the industry clearly did not have time to manufacture the main artillery for them. Out of desperation, the idea arose to arm the ships instead of nine 305-mm guns with six German 380-mm guns, similar to those installed on the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz. This gave an increase in displacement by more than a thousand tons. However, the Germans were in no hurry to fulfill the order, of course, and by the beginning of the war, not a single gun had arrived from Germany in the USSR.

The fate of "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol" developed similarly to their counterparts of the "Soviet Union" type. By June 22, 1941, their technical readiness was estimated at 12-13%. In September of the same year, the construction of Kronstadt was stopped, and Sevastopol, located in Nikolaev, was captured by the Germans even earlier. After the war, the hulls of both "super cruisers" were dismantled for metal.

Battleship "Bismarck" - the strongest ship of the Nazi fleet. Laid down in 1936, commissioned in 1940. Total displacement - 50,900 tons. Length - 250.5 m, width - 36 m, draft - 10.6 m. Side armor thickness - up to 320 mm, towers - up to 360 mm. Armament: 8 - 380 mm and 12 - 150 mm guns, 16 - 105 mm anti-aircraft guns, 16 - 37 mm and 12 - 20 mm machine guns, 4 seaplanes

Last attempts

In total, 27 battleships of the latest generation were built in the world in 1936-1945: 10 in the USA, 5 in Great Britain, 4 in Germany, 3 each in France and Italy, 2 in Japan. And in none of the fleets did they justify the hopes placed on them. The experience of the Second World War clearly showed that the time of battleships is gone. Aircraft carriers became the new masters of the oceans: carrier-based aircraft, of course, surpassed naval artillery both in range and in the ability to hit targets in the most vulnerable places. So it is safe to say that the Stalinist battleships, even if they were built by June 1941, would not have played any significant role in the war.

But here's the paradox: the Soviet Union, which, compared to other states, spent somewhat less money on unnecessary ships, decided to make up for lost time and became the only country in the world that continued to design battleships after the Second World War! Contrary to common sense, designers have been working tirelessly for several years on the drawings of the floating fortresses of yesterday. The successor of the "Soviet Union" was the battleship of project 24 with a total displacement of 81,150 tons (!), The successor of "Kronstadt" was the 42,000-ton heavy cruiser of project 82. mm artillery of the main caliber. Note that the latter, although it was called medium, but in terms of displacement (30,750 tons) left all foreign heavy cruisers far behind and approached battleships.

Battleship "Soviet Union", project 23 (USSR, laid down in 1938). Standard displacement - 59,150 tons, full - 65,150 tons. Maximum length - 269.4 m, width - 38.9 m, draft - 10.4 m. Turbine power - 201,000 l. s., speed - 28 knots (when boosting, respectively, 231,000 hp and 29 knots). Armament: 9 - 406 mm and 12 - 152 mm guns, 12 - 100 mm anti-aircraft guns, 40 - 37 mm machine guns, 4 seaplanes

The reasons for the fact that domestic shipbuilding in the post-war years went clearly against the tide are mostly subjective. And in the first place here are the personal preferences of the "leader of the peoples." Stalin was very impressed with large artillery ships, especially fast ones, and at the same time he clearly underestimated aircraft carriers. During a discussion of the Project 82 heavy cruiser in March 1950, the Secretary General demanded that the designers increase the speed of the ship to 35 knots, “so that he would panic the enemy’s light cruisers, disperse them and smash them. This cruiser should fly like a swallow, be a pirate, a real bandit.” Alas, on the threshold of the nuclear missile era, the views of the Soviet leader on issues of naval tactics lagged behind their time by one and a half to two decades.

If projects 24 and 66 remained on paper, then under project 82 in 1951-1952, three “bandit cruisers” were laid down - “Stalingrad”, “Moscow” and the third, which remained unnamed. But they did not have to enter service: on April 18, 1953, a month after Stalin's death, the construction of ships was stopped due to their high cost and the complete ambiguity of tactical use. A section of the hull of the lead "Stalingrad" was launched and for several years was used to test various types of naval weapons, including torpedoes and cruise missiles. It is very symbolic: the world's last heavy artillery ship turned out to be in demand only as a target for new weapons ...

Heavy cruiser Stalingrad. Laid down in 1951, but not completed. Full displacement - 42,300 tons. Maximum length - 273.6 m, width - 32 m, draft - 9.2 m. Turbine power - 280,000 l. s., speed - 35.2 knots (65 km / h). The thickness of the side armor - up to 180 mm, towers - up to 240 mm. Armament: 9 - 305 mm and 12 - 130 mm guns, 24 - 45 mm and 40 - 25 mm machine guns

The obsession of the "supership"

In conclusion, it should be noted that the desire to create a "supership", stronger than any potential enemy of its class, at different times puzzled the designers and shipbuilders of different countries. And here there is a pattern: the weaker the economy and industry of the state, the more active this desire; for developed countries, on the contrary, it is less typical. So, in the interwar period, the British Admiralty preferred to build ships that were very modest in terms of combat capabilities, but in large numbers, which ultimately made it possible to have a well-balanced fleet. Japan, on the contrary, sought to create ships stronger than the British and American ones - in this way she expected to compensate for the difference in economic development with her future rivals.

In this regard, the shipbuilding policy of the then USSR occupies a special place. Here, after the decision of the party and the government to build the "Big Fleet", the obsession with "superships" was actually brought to the point of absurdity. On the one hand, Stalin, inspired by the successes in the aviation industry and tank building, considered too hastily that all problems in the shipbuilding industries could be solved just as quickly. On the other hand, the atmosphere in society was such that the project of any ship proposed by industry and not superior in its capabilities to foreign counterparts could easily be considered "wrecking" with all the ensuing consequences. The designers and shipbuilders simply had no choice: they were forced to design the “most powerful” and “fastest” ships armed with the “world’s longest-range” artillery ... In practice, this resulted in the following: ships with the size and armament of battleships began to be called heavy cruisers (but the most powerful in the world!), heavy cruisers - light, and the latter - "destroyer leaders". Such a substitution of some classes for others would still make sense if domestic factories could build battleships in the quantities in which other countries built heavy cruisers. But since this was, to put it mildly, not at all the case, the reports about the outstanding successes of the designers that went up often looked like banal eyewash.

It is characteristic that almost all the "superships" ever embodied in metal did not justify themselves. Suffice it to cite the Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi as an example. They died under the bombs of American aircraft, without firing a single salvo with their main caliber at their American "classmates". But even if they happened to meet with the US fleet in a linear battle, they could hardly count on success. After all, Japan was able to build only two battleships of the latest generation, and the United States - ten. With such a balance of power, the individual superiority of the Yamato over the individual "American" no longer plays any role.

World experience shows that several well-balanced ships are much better than one giant with hypertrophied combat characteristics. And yet, in the USSR, the idea of ​​a "supership" did not die. A quarter of a century later, Stalin's leviathans had distant relatives - nuclear missile cruisers of the Kirov type, followers of Kronstadt and Stalingrad. However, that's a completely different story...

In a time long past...on the high seas, he [the battleship] feared nothing. There was not a shadow of a sense of defenselessness from possible attacks by destroyers, submarines or aircraft, nor quivering thoughts about enemy mines or air torpedoes, there was essentially nothing, except perhaps a severe storm, drift to the lee shore or a concentrated attack of several equivalent opponents, which could shake the proud confidence of a sailing battleship in its own invincibility, which it took upon itself with every right to do so. - Oscar Parks. Battleships of the British Empire.

background

Many interconnected technological advances and circumstances led to the emergence of battleships as the main force of the navies.

The technology of building wooden ships, which is considered today as a classic - first the frame, then the skin - was formed in the Mediterranean basin during the 1st millennium AD. e. and began to dominate at the beginning of the next. Thanks to its advantages, it eventually supplanted the construction methods that existed before that, starting with sheathing: the Roman used in the Mediterranean, with a sheathing consisting of boards, the edges of which were connected with spikes, and the clinker used from Russia to the Basque Country in Spain, with sheathing overlaid and inserted into finished case with transverse reinforcement ribs. In the south of Europe, this transition finally took place before the middle of the 14th century, in England - around 1500, and in Northern Europe merchant ships with clinker sheathing (holki) were built as early as the 16th century, possibly later. In most European languages, this method was denoted by derivatives of the word carvel (à carvel, carvel-built, Kraweelbauweise)- probably from caravel, "caravel", that is, initially - a ship built starting from the frame and with sheathing smooth.

The new technology gave shipbuilders a number of advantages. The presence of a ship frame made it possible to determine in advance its dimensions and the nature of the contours, which, with the previous technology, became fully evident only during the construction process. Since then, ships have been built according to pre-approved plans. In addition, the new technology made it possible to significantly increase the dimensions of the ships, both due to the greater strength of the hull, and due to the reduction in the requirements for the width of the boards used for plating, which made it possible to use less quality timber for the construction of ships. Also, the requirements for the qualifications of the labor force involved in the construction were reduced, which made it possible to build ships faster and in much larger quantities than before.

In the 14th-15th centuries, gunpowder artillery began to be used on ships, but initially, due to the inertia of thinking, it was placed on superstructures intended for archers: forcastel and aftercastle, which limited the permissible mass of guns for reasons of stability. Later, artillery began to be installed along the side in the middle of the ship, which largely removed the restrictions on the mass and, consequently, the caliber of the guns, however, aiming them at the target was very difficult, since the fire was fired through round holes made to the size of the gun barrel in the sides, in the marching plugged from the inside. Real cannon ports with covers appeared only towards the end of the 15th century, which opened the way for the creation of heavily armed artillery ships. True, loading guns was still a big problem - even in the days of Mary Rose, the most advanced muzzle-loading guns at that time had to be loaded outside the hull, since the cramped interior space of the gun deck of ships of that era did not allow them to be pulled inside (it is because of this that on ships for a long time they used breech-loading bombards, which were very unreliable and, in terms of characteristics, were inferior to their modern muzzle-loading guns). Because of this, the reloading of guns in battle was practically excluded - heavy artillery was saved for a single salvo during the entire battle immediately in front of the boarding dump. However, this volley often decided the outcome of the entire battle.

Only by the second quarter of the 16th century, ships began to appear, the design of which allowed for convenient reloading of heavy artillery during the battle, which made it possible to fire with repeated volleys from a long distance, without risking losing the opportunity to use it if they approached the boarding distance. Thus, the Spaniard Alonso de Chavez, in his work Espejo de Navegantes (Navigator's Mirror), published in 1530, recommended dividing the fleet into two parts: the first approached the enemy and waged a classic boarding battle, while the second, acting on the flanks of the main forces , exhausted him with artillery fire from a long distance. These recommendations were developed by British sailors and applied during the Anglo-Spanish War.

So, over the course of the 16th century, a complete change in the nature of naval battles takes place: rowing galleys, which had been the main warships for thousands of years, give way to sailboats armed with artillery, and boarding battle - to artillery.

Mass production of heavy artillery pieces was very difficult for a long time. Therefore, until the 19th century, the largest of those installed on ships remained 32 ... But working with them during loading and aiming was very complicated due to the lack of mechanization and servo drives - such guns weighed several tons each, which necessitated a huge gun crew. Therefore, for centuries, ships tried to arm as many relatively small guns as possible, located along the side. At the same time, for reasons of strength, the length of a warship with a wooden hull is limited to about 70 ... 80 meters, which also limited the length of the onboard battery: several dozen heavy guns could only be placed in several rows one above the other. This is how warships arose with several closed gun decks - decks - carrying from several dozen to hundreds or more guns of various calibers.

In the 16th century, cast iron cannons began to be used in England, which were a great technological innovation due to their lower cost relative to bronze and less laborious manufacturing compared to iron, and at the same time had better characteristics. Superiority in naval artillery manifested itself during the battles of the English fleet with the Invincible Armada (1588) and since then began to determine the strength of the fleet of any state, making history of massive boarding battles. After that, boarding is used solely for the purpose of capturing an enemy vessel already disabled by fire. By this time, artillery had reached a certain degree of perfection, the characteristics of the guns had more or less stabilized, which made it possible to accurately determine the strength of a warship by the number of guns and build systems for their classification.

In the middle of the 17th century, the first scientific systems for designing ships and methods of mathematical calculation appeared. Introduced into practice around the 1660s by the English shipbuilder Anthony Dean, the method of determining the displacement and waterline level of a ship based on its total mass and the shape of the contours made it possible to calculate in advance at what height from the sea surface the ports of the lower gun deck would be located, and to arrange the decks accordingly and the guns are still on the slipway - earlier for this it was required to lower the ship's hull into the water. This made it possible, even at the design stage, to determine the firepower of the future ship, as well as to avoid incidents similar to what happened with the Swedish "Vase" due to too low-lying gun ports. In addition, on ships with powerful artillery, part of the gun ports necessarily fell on the frames. Only the frames that were not cut by ports were power, so the exact alignment of their relative position was important.

History of appearance

The immediate predecessors of the battleships were heavily armed galleons, carracks and the so-called "big ships" (Great Ships). The English Mary Rose (1510) is sometimes considered the first purpose-built artillery ship - although in fact it retained many features that indicate a focus primarily on boarding combat (very high superstructures-towers in the bow and stern, anti-boarding nets stretched over deck in the middle part of the hull during the battle, a large boarding team, the number of soldiers in which was almost equal to the number of ship sailors) and, in fact, was more of a transitional type to a well-armed artillery ship. The Portuguese attribute the honor of their invention to their king João II (1455-1495), who ordered several caravels to be armed with heavy guns.

Until the end of the 16th-17th centuries, there was no strictly established order in the battle, after the rapprochement of the opposing sides, the sea battle turned into a disorderly dump of individual ships. Firefighters were a terrible weapon in such conditions - old ships that were stuffed with combustible and explosive substances, set on fire and launched at the enemy.

The formation of wake columns began to be used in battle towards the end of the 16th century, but it took at least 100 years (1590-1690) for its widespread adoption, since the use of linear tactics required specific changes in the design of ships, as well as the introduction of a certain degree of standardization. During this period, the wartime British Royal Navy consisted of a "core" of specially built warships and numerous requisitioned "merchants". However, it soon became clear that with a linear construction, such a heterogeneity of ships in terms of seaworthiness and combat qualities is extremely inconvenient - weaker ships turned out to be the “weak link” of the chain when placed in a battle line due to worse driving performance and less resistance to enemy fire. It was then that the final division of sailing ships into combat and merchant ships took place, and the former were divided by the number of guns into several categories - ranks. The belonging of the ships to the same rank guaranteed their ability to operate in the same formation with each other.

The first real battleships appeared in the fleets of European countries at the beginning of the 17th century, and the 55-gun HMS Prince Royal  (1610) is considered the first three-deck (three-deck) battleship. It was followed by the even larger and well-armed three-deck 100-gun HMS Sovereign of the Seas (1637), which was one of the largest (and most expensive) ships of its time.

The French responded by laying down the two-decker, 72-gun battleship La Couronne (1636), which set the standard for a more moderate and cheap but still powerful battleship. This marked the beginning of a long-term "arms race" between the main European naval powers, the main instrument of which was precisely the battleships.

Ships of the line were lighter and shorter than the “tower ships” that existed at that time - galleons, which made it possible to quickly line up sideways to the enemy when the bow of the next ship looked at the stern of the previous one.

Also, ships of the line differ from galleons by straight sails on the mizzen mast (the galleons had from three to five masts, of which usually one or two were “dry”, with oblique sailing weapons), the absence of a long horizontal latrine at the bow and a rectangular tower at the stern , and the maximum use of the surface area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe sides for guns. The lower hull increased stability, which made it possible to increase windage by installing higher masts. The ship of the line is more maneuverable and stronger than the galleon in artillery combat, while the galleon is better suited for boarding combat. Unlike galleons, which were also used to transport merchant cargo, battleships were built exclusively for naval combat, and only as an exception sometimes took on board a certain number of troops.

The resulting multi-deck sailing ships of the line were the main means of warfare at sea for more than 250 years and allowed countries such as Holland, Great Britain and Spain to create huge trading empires.

By the middle of the 17th century, there was a clear division of battleships into classes depending on the purpose, and the number of guns became the basis for the classification. So, the old two-deck (with two closed gun decks) ships, which had about 50 guns, were not strong enough for linear combat as part of a squadron, and were used mainly for escorting convoys. Double-deck battleships carrying 64 to 90 guns made up the bulk of the war fleets, while three- or even four-deck ships (98-144 guns) served as flagships. A fleet of 10-25 such ships made it possible to control sea trade lines and, in case of war, block them for the enemy.

Ships of the line should be distinguished from frigates. The frigates had either only one closed battery, or one closed and one open on the upper deck. The sailing equipment of battleships and frigates was fundamentally the same - three masts, each of which had direct sails. Initially, frigates were inferior to battleships in terms of driving performance, having superiority only in cruising range and autonomy. However, later the improvement of the contours of the underwater part of the hull allowed the frigates to develop a higher speed with the same sail area, making them the fastest among large warships (the armed clippers that appeared in the 19th century as part of some fleets were faster than frigates, but they were a very specific type of ships , generally unsuitable for military operations). The battleships, in turn, surpassed the frigates in terms of artillery firepower (often several times) and the height of the sides (which was important during boarding and, partly, from the point of view of seaworthiness), but lost to them in speed and cruising range, as well as could not operate in shallow water.

battleship tactics

With the increase in the strength of the warship and with the improvement of its seaworthiness and fighting qualities, an equal success in the art of using them appeared ... As the evolutions of the sea become more skillful, their importance grows day by day. These evolutions needed a base, a point from which they could start and to which they could return. The fleet of warships must always be ready to meet the enemy, therefore it is logical that such a base for naval evolutions should be a battle formation. Further, with the abolition of the galleys, almost all the artillery moved to the sides of the ship, which is why it became necessary to keep the ship always in such a position that the enemy was abeam. On the other hand, it is necessary that not a single ship of its own fleet could interfere with firing at enemy ships. Only one system allows you to fully satisfy these requirements, this is the wake system. The latter, therefore, was chosen as the only battle formation, and consequently also as the basis for all fleet tactics. At the same time, they realized that in order for the battle formation, this long thin line of guns, not to be damaged or broken at its weakest point, it is necessary to bring into it only ships, if not of equal strength, then at least with equally strong sides. It follows logically that at the same time as the wake column becomes the final battle formation, a distinction is established between battleships, which alone are intended for it, and smaller ships for other purposes. - Alfred T. Mahan

The term "battleship" itself arose due to the fact that in battle, multi-deck ships began to line up one after another - so that during their volley they were turned sideways to the enemy, because the volley from all onboard guns caused the greatest damage to the target. This tactic was called linear. Building in a line during a naval battle was first used by the fleets of England, Spain and Holland at the beginning of the 17th century and was considered the main one until the middle of the 19th. Linear tactics also protected the leading squadron well from attacks by firewalls.

It is worth noting that in a number of cases, fleets consisting of ships of the line could vary tactics, often deviating from the canons of the classic skirmish between two wake columns going in parallel courses. So, at Camperdown, the British could not line up in the correct wake column and attacked the Dutch battle line in formation close to the front line followed by a disorderly dump, and at Trafalgar they attacked the French line with two intersecting columns, competently using the advantages of longitudinal fire, inflicting undivided transverse bulkheads to wooden ships suffered terrible damage (at Trafalgar, Admiral Nelson used the tactics developed by Admiral Ushakov). Although these were out of the ordinary cases, nevertheless, even within the framework of the general paradigm of linear tactics, the squadron commander often had enough room for bold maneuver, and the skippers for showing their own initiative.

Design features and fighting qualities

Although in comparison with all-metal ships of subsequent eras, wooden battleships were relatively small, nevertheless they were structures of an impressive scale for their time. So, the total height of the main mast of Nelson's flagship - "Victory" - was approximately 67 m (above a 20-story building), and the longest yard reached a length of 30 m, or almost 60 m with extended fox spirits. Of course, all work with spars and rigging was carried out exclusively by hand, which required a huge crew - up to 1000 people.

The wood for the construction of battleships (usually oak, less often teak or mahogany) was selected most carefully, soaked (stained) and dried for a number of years, after which it was carefully laid in several layers. The side plating was double - inside and outside of the frames. The thickness of the outer skin alone on some battleships reached 60 cm at the gondek (in the Spanish Santisima Trinidad), and the total thickness of the inner and outer skin was up to 37 inches (that is, about 95 cm). The British built ships with relatively thin plating, but often located frames, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich the total thickness of the side at the gondek reached 70-90 cm of solid wood. Between the frames, the total thickness of the side, formed by only two layers of skin, was less and reached 2 feet (60 cm). For greater speed, French battleships were built with sparser frames, but with thicker skin - up to 70 cm in total between the frames.

To protect the underwater part from rot and fouling, it was covered with outer skin made of thin planks of soft wood, which was regularly changed during the timbering process in dry dock. Subsequently, at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries, sheathing with copper began to be used for the same purposes.

Even in the absence of real iron armor, the battleships were still to some extent and at a certain distance protected from enemy fire, in addition:

... wooden sailing [linear] ships and frigates, according to the then offensive means, had a high degree of survivability. They were not invulnerable, most of the cores pierced their sides, nevertheless, what they lacked invulnerability was made up for by survivability. Damage to two or three yards and sails did not deprive the ship of the ability to steer. Damage to two or three dozen guns did not prevent the rest from continuing their artillery fire. Finally, the entire ship was controlled by people without the help of steam engines, and there were no such devices, knocking out or damaging which makes the ship unsuitable for combat ... - S. O. Makarov. Reflections on naval tactics.

In battle, they were usually put out of action by shooting at the spars, by the defeat of the crew or by fire, in some cases they were captured by the boarding team after the possibilities of resistance were exhausted, and as a result, they changed hands for decades until they fell victim to fire, dry rot or wood-boring beetle. The sinking of a battleship in battle was a rare matter, since flooding with water through relatively small holes from the cannonballs, usually located above the waterline, was small, and the pumps on the ship coped with it quite well, and the holes themselves were sealed up from the inside during the battle - with wooden plugs, or from the outside - cloth plaster.

It was this factor that became decisive in establishing English naval dominance in the Atlantic during the Seven Years' War, when the French fleet, equipped with technically more advanced ships, lost battles to more experienced English sailors, which led to the loss of French colonies in the West Indies and Canada. After that, England rightfully bore the title of mistress of the seas, supporting his so-called. "double standard", that is, maintaining such a size of the fleet, which made it possible to counteract the two next most powerful fleets in the world.

Russo-Turkish wars

Napoleonic Wars

This time Russia and England are allies. Accordingly, Napoleonic France was opposed at once by two of the strongest maritime powers at that time. And if the Russian-Austrian army was defeated at Austerlitz, then at sea the British and Russian fleets, on the contrary, won one victory after another. In particular, the English, under the command of Admiral Nelson, utterly defeated the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar, and the Russian fleet, under the command of Admiral Ushakov, for the first time in the history of military fleets, captured the fortress of Corfu by storm from the sea with the direct participation of the warships of the fleet. (Prior to this, almost always the naval fortress was stormed only by the assault landing force landed by the fleet, while the ships of the fleet did not participate in the attack on the fortress, but only blocked the fortress from the sea.)

Sunset sailing ships of the line

Between the end of the 18th and the middle of the 19th century, the development of battleships went almost exclusively along an extensive path: the ships became larger and carried more heavier guns, but their design and combat qualities changed very little, in fact, they had already reached the perfection possible with the existing level of technology. The main innovations during this period were the increase in the level of standardization and the improvement of individual elements of the hull design, as well as the increasing introduction of iron as a structural material.

• List of men-of-war 1650-1700. Part II. French ships 1648-1700.
• Histoire de la Marine Francaise. French naval history.
• Les Vaisseaux du roi Soleil. Contain for instance list of ships 1661 to 1715 (1-3 rates). Author: J.C. Lemineur: 1996 ISBN 2-906381-22-5

unique photo of four Iowa-class battleships together in one campaign, June 1954

Battleships type " Iowa” are considered the most advanced ships in the history of shipbuilding. It was during their creation that designers and engineers managed to achieve the maximum combination of all the main combat characteristics: weapons, speed and protection. Battleships of the Iowa type put an end to the development of the evolution of battleships. They can be considered an ideal project.

Here are the names of the legendary battleships: Iowa"(BB-61)," New Jersey"(BB-62)," Missouri" (BB-63) and " Wisconsin» (BB-64). Two more battleships , « Illinois" (BB-65) and " Kentucky» (BB-66) were not completed. Since by September 1939 the Americans had a clear advantage over the Japanese fleet in terms of the number of warships built, it was decided to experiment and build a high-speed battleship. But in the meantime, US intelligence suggested that construction of the third and fourth Yamato-class battleships had begun in Japan. According to them, the displacement of these warships is 46,000 tons, and the caliber of artillery is 406 mm (in fact, the data was different: 62,315 tons and 460 mm, respectively). The coming strengthening of the fleet of a potential enemy caused concern. Therefore, the General Council instructed the design department, in parallel with the development of a high-speed battleship, to consider its low-speed version.

battleship Iowa, August 1962

In April, three draft designs of a low-speed battleship were submitted to Admiral Hart for consideration. As a result, one of them is approved. Immediately after that, the production of working documentation - drawings - began. The decision to build the first two battleships of the new type was approved by Congress on May 17, 1939. Europe was already at war. Immediately after the surrender of France, the US Congress adopted a shipbuilding program that provided for the creation of a powerful fleet. She even had a name Two Ocean Navy Act", which means "Fleet of two oceans." Far from the last place in the program was occupied. Therefore, on September 9 of the same year, an order for two more ships of the type " Iowa': under the names ' Illinois" and " Kentucky". Production of battleships of the class " Iowa” was a rather difficult task, but the American industry coped with it quite easily. The laying of the lead ship took place on June 27, 1940, and on February 22, 1943, it already became part of the US Navy. The last pair of battleships, unfortunately, were not lucky, due to a change in priorities in the military-industrial complex, the construction of battleships was stopped.

see a good selection of historical photos and videos of the legendary battleship Iowa

On the ship " Iowa"At the end of 1943, US President Roosevelt went to Casablanca to escort the US Pacific Fleet's aircraft carrier formation.

After the war " Iowa"was placed in reserve, August 24, 1951 re-commissioned and was transferred to the US Atlantic Fleet.

In the spring of 1980, the US Congress decided to reopen battleships type " Iowa» (4 units). By that time, the "cold war" between the USSR and the "conditional enemy" had reached its climax. The United States took a course on a sharp increase in its fleet. "Rebirth", so you can call the return to life of the famous battleships. They retained sets of heavy artillery and armored belts with decks, in addition, they were equipped with strategic weapons - cruise missiles of the " Tomahawk» as well as anti-ship missiles and automated anti-aircraft artillery systems.

battleship "Iowa" photo

battleship Iowa fired a salvo

salvo of the battleship "Iowa"

battleship Iowa, 1988

battleship "Iowa" stern

On April 28, 1984, after a thorough modernization in New Orleans, the Iowa battleship re-enters service. However, in mid-April 1989, after the explosion of the powder compartment, which caused enormous damage to the central gun of the ship, it was put into reserve.

Battleship "Wisconsin” became on January 12, 1995 for permanent mooring in the port of Newport.

Battleships of this type participated in the Vietnam War, took part in Operation Desert Storm, as well as in the localization of the conflict in the Falkland Islands. They were repaired, modernized and put back into operation.

Battleship"Missouri" on May 4, 1998 was transferred to the US Navy Museum, which is located at the Pearl Harbor military base. Despite the age of 40, the battleships are quite well preserved, because they were operated for only about 13 years, and the rest of the time they were in reserve.

battleship Wisconsin, 1952

05/24/2016 at 20:10 · pavlofox · 22 250

The largest battleships in the world

For the first time ships of the line appeared in the 17th century. For a while, they lost the palm to slow-moving armadillos. But at the beginning of the 20th century, battleships became the main force of the fleet. The speed and range of artillery pieces became the main advantages in naval battles. Countries concerned about increasing the power of the navy, since the 1930s of the 20th century, began to actively build heavy-duty battleships designed to enhance superiority at sea. Not everyone could afford the construction of incredibly expensive ships. The largest battleships in the world - in this article we will talk about super-powerful giant ships.

10. Richelieu | Length 247.9 m

The French giant "" opens the rating of the largest battleships in the world with a length of 247.9 meters and a displacement of 47 thousand tons. The ship is named after the famous statesman of France, Cardinal Richelieu. A battleship was built to counter the Italian navy. The battleship Richelieu did not conduct active hostilities, except for participation in the Senegal operation in 1940. In 1968, the supership was scrapped. One of his guns was erected as a monument in the port of Brest.

9. Bismarck | Length 251 m

The legendary German ship "" takes 9th place among the largest battleships in the world. The length of the vessel is 251 meters, the displacement is 51 thousand tons. The Bismarck left the shipyard in 1939. The Fuhrer of Germany, Adolf Hitler, was present at its launch. One of the most famous ships of the Second World War was sunk in May 1941 after prolonged fighting by British ships and torpedo bombers in retaliation for the destruction of the British flagship, the cruiser Hood, by a German battleship.

8. Tirpitz | Ship 253.6 m

On the 8th place in the list of the largest battleships is the German "". The length of the vessel was 253.6 meters, displacement - 53 thousand tons. After the death of the "big brother", "Bismarck", the second of the most powerful German battleships practically failed to take part in naval battles. Launched in 1939, the Tirpitz was destroyed in 1944 by torpedo bombers.

7. Yamato | Length 263 m

"- one of the largest battleships in the world and the largest warship in history ever sunk in a sea battle.

"Yamato" (in translation, the name of the ship means the ancient name of the Land of the Rising Sun) was the pride of the Japanese navy, although due to the fact that the huge ship was protected, the attitude of ordinary sailors towards it was ambiguous.

The Yamato entered service in 1941. The length of the battleship was 263 meters, displacement - 72 thousand tons. Crew - 2500 people. Until October 1944, the largest ship in Japan practically did not participate in the battles. In Leyte Gulf, the Yamato opened fire on American ships for the first time. As it turned out later, none of the main calibers hit the target.

Japan's last pride hike

On April 6, 1945, the Yamato went on its last campaign. American troops landed on Okinawa, and the remnants of the Japanese fleet were tasked with destroying enemy forces and supply ships. The Yamato and the rest of the ships of the formation were attacked by 227 American deck ships for a two-hour period. Japan's largest battleship went out of action, having received about 23 hits from aerial bombs and torpedoes. As a result of the explosion of the bow compartment, the ship sank. Of the crew, 269 people survived, 3 thousand sailors died.

6. Musashi | Length 263 m

The largest battleships in the world include "" with a hull length of 263 meters and a displacement of 72 thousand tons. This is the second giant battleship built by Japan during World War II. The ship entered service in 1942. The fate of "Musashi" was tragic. The first campaign ended with a hole in the bow, resulting from a torpedo attack by an American submarine. In October 1944, Japan's two largest battleships finally came into serious combat. In the Sibuyan Sea, they were attacked by American aircraft. Coincidentally, the enemy's main attack was on the Musashi. The ship sank after being hit by about 30 torpedoes and bombs. Together with the ship, its captain and more than a thousand crew members died.

On March 4, 2015, 70 years after the sinking, the Musashi was discovered by American millionaire Paul Allen. It is located in the Sibuyan Sea at a depth of one and a half kilometers. "Musashi" takes 6th place in the list of the largest battleships in the world.

Incredibly, not a single super battleship was built by the Soviet Union. In 1938, the battleship "" was laid down. The length of the ship was to be 269 meters, and the displacement - 65 thousand tons. By the beginning of World War II, the battleship was built at 19%. It was not possible to complete the ship, which could become one of the largest battleships in the world.

4. Wisconsin | Length 270 m

The American battleship "" is ranked 4th in the ranking of the largest battleships in the world. It was 270 meters long and had a displacement of 55,000 tons. He entered service in 1944. During World War II, he accompanied aircraft carrier groups and supported amphibious operations. Served during the Gulf War. The Wisconsin is one of the last battleships in the US Navy Reserve. Was decommissioned in 2006. Now the ship is in the parking lot in the city of Norfolk.

3. Iowa | Length 270 m

With a length of 270 meters and a displacement of 58,000 tons, it ranks third in the ranking of the largest battleships in the world. The ship entered service in 1943. During the Second World War, "Iowa" actively participated in combat operations. In 2012, the battleship was withdrawn from the fleet. Now the ship is in the port of Los Angeles as a museum.

2. New Jersey | Length 270.53 m

The second place in the ranking of the largest battleships in the world is occupied by the American ship "", or "Black Dragon". Its length is 270.53 meters. Refers to the Iowa-class battleships. Left the shipyard in 1942. The New Jersey is a true veteran of naval battles and the only ship that took part in the Vietnam War. Here he played the role of supporting the army. After 21 years of service, it was withdrawn from the fleet in 1991 and received the status of a museum. Now the ship is parked in the city of Camden.

1. Missouri | Length 271 m

The American battleship "" tops the list of the largest battleships in the world. It is interesting not only for its impressive size (the length of the ship is 271 meters), but also for the fact that it is the last American battleship. In addition, the Missouri went down in history due to the fact that the surrender of Japan was signed on board in September 1945.

The supership was launched in 1944. Its main task was to escort Pacific aircraft carrier formations. Participated in the war in the Persian Gulf, where he opened fire for the last time. In 1992, he was withdrawn from the US Navy. Since 1998, the Missouri has had the status of a museum ship. The parking lot of the legendary ship is located in Pearl Harbor. Being one of the most famous warships in the world, it has been featured in documentaries and feature films more than once.

High hopes were placed on heavy-duty ships. Characteristically, they never justified themselves. Here is a good example of the largest battleships ever built by man - the Japanese battleships "Musashi" and "Yamato". Both of them were defeated by the attack of American bombers, without having time to fire at the enemy ships from their main calibers. However, if they met in battle, the advantage would still be on the side of the American fleet, equipped by that time with ten battleships against two Japanese giants.

What else to see:

type "Soviet Union"

The combat charter of the Naval Forces of the Red Army - 1930 (BU-30) recognized battleships as the main striking force of the fleet, and the course towards industrialization opened up real prospects for their creation. However, the matter was held back not only by limited opportunities, but also by dogmatism, extremes in the development of naval theory. Leading theorists B.B. Zhreve and M.A. Petrov, who advocated a proportional ratio of different classes of ships in the combat composition of the fleet, at the turn of the 20-30s. labeled apologists for the "bourgeois old school"; while M.A. Petrov, who brilliantly defended the fleet from its radical reduction in a sharp polemic with M.N. Tukhachevsky at a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, ended up in prison, where he later died.

Under the influence of a tempting idea to solve the problems of the naval defense of the USSR through the mass construction of relatively cheap submarines, torpedo boats and seaplanes, not always competent specialists of the so-called young school won the theoretical dispute; some of its representatives, out of opportunistic considerations of undermining the authority of the "old specialists", distorted the picture of the struggle at sea during the First World War, idealizing the combat capabilities of "new means", for example, submarines. Sometimes such one-sided concepts were shared by the leaders of the Naval Forces of the Red Army; so, in October 1933, the head of the USSR Navy (Namorsi) V.M. Orlov, at the suggestion of the most aggressive "theoretician" A.P. Aleksandrova demanded "exposing in the press" and "withdrawal from circulation" of the book "Anglo-American Maritime Rivalry", published by the Institute of World Economy and Politics; one of its authors - P.I. Smirnov, who held the position of Deputy Inspector of the Navy of the Red Army, dared to objectively show the place of battleships in the fleet that A.P. Aleksandrov regarded it as "a shameless attack on the party line in naval construction, undermining the confidence of personnel in their weapons."

It is noteworthy that even during the period of enthusiasm for mosquito forces (October 1931), a group of engineers from the design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad seemed to foresee the imminent need for these ships; they submitted a memorandum to the industry leadership, which contained proposals to start preparatory work, select types, draw up projects, strengthen the material base, design and workforce. Many of the signatories of this document participated in the design of Soviet battleships. The importance of building large ships in the mid-30s. became obvious to Namorsi V.M. Orlov, his deputy I.M. Ludri and the head of the Glavmorprom of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry R.A. Muklevich.

The greatest success in 1935 was achieved by the Central Design Bureau of Special Shipbuilding of the Glavmorprom (TsKBS-1), headed by V.L. Brzezinski. Among a number of promising projects, six variants of battleships with a standard displacement from 43,000 to 75,000 tons were worked out. According to the results of the work, the chief engineer of TsKBS-1 V.P. Rimsky-Kor-sakov (in the recent past - deputy head of the Naval Training and Construction Department) compiled a generalized code of TTE, which V.L. On December 24, 1935, Brzezinski reported to the leadership of the Naval Forces and Glavmorprom. The first order for the preliminary design of the “project No. 23 of the battleship for the Pacific Fleet” was issued by Glavmorprom to the Baltic Shipyard on February 21, 1936, but the assignment for this project was not approved and was subjected to adjustments according to the TsKBS-1 options. V.M. Orlov recognized projects of battleships with a standard displacement of 55,000-57,000 and 35,000 tons (instead of the option of 43,000 tons) as “interesting and relevant” for the Navy; On May 13, 1936, he gave instructions to I.M. Loudry on the issuance of "clear tasks" to the Naval Research Institute of Military Shipbuilding (NIVK) and industry for the "final sketch design of large ships" in the development of selected options. Preliminary tactical and technical specifications for sketches developed under the guidance of the head of the Shipbuilding Department of the UVMS flagship engineer 2nd rank B.E. Alyakritsky, approved on May 15, 1936 by I.M. Ludry.

The concept of building two types of battleships (larger and smaller displacement) was based on the differences in the theaters of military operations - the open Pacific, limited Baltic and Black Sea. The compilers of the TTZ proceeded from the optimal characteristics of the ships, determined by the level of technology and experience of the past war, combat training. However, at the initial stage, the design was strongly influenced by foreign experience and contractual displacement limits provided for by the Washington (1922) and London (1930 and 1936) agreements, in which the USSR did not officially participate. V.M. Orlov was inclined to reduce the displacement and caliber of weapons of the first battleship of the Pacific Fleet, and for the second he chose the option of a relatively small but fast ship, embodied in the projects of the French Dunkirk and the German Scharnhorst. When discussing the sketches, the proposed placement of all three turrets of the main caliber of the “large” battleship in the bow of the hull (following the example of the English battleship Nelson) did not pass the proposed design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard. The TsKBS-1 sketch was taken as the basis, in which two three-gun turrets were placed in the bow, and one in the stern. August 3, 1936 V.M. Orlov approved the TTZ for the preliminary design of battleships of types "A" (project 23) and "B" (project 25), proposed on a competitive basis by TsKBS-1 and the design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard.

In accordance with the special regulation approved by V.M. Orlov and R.A. Muklevich on August 21, 1936, work on projects was carried out in close cooperation with the heads of the Design Bureau and TsKBS-1 S.F. Stepanova and V.L. Brzezinski with representatives of the Navy, who observed the design. The examination was entrusted to the heads of naval institutes under the general supervision of the head of the NIVK, flag officer of the 2nd rank E.P. Liebel.

In November 1936, the materials of the draft designs of the battleships "A" and "B", together with the reviews of the observers and the NIVK, were considered in the Shipbuilding Department of the UVMS (head - engineer-flag officer 2nd rank B.E. Alyakrinsky). To draw up the general technical design of the first of the battleships, the most thoughtful version of the design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard (standard displacement 45,900 tons) was chosen with changes approved by V.M. Namorsi. Orlov November 26, 1936; displacement, for example, was allowed in the range of 46-47 thousand tons with an increase in draft in full load up to 10 m, it was envisaged to strengthen the booking of decks and the bow end. The development of the general technical design of the battleship type "B" was entrusted to TsKBS in the development of the sketch presented by him with a standard displacement of 30,900 tons (total 37,800).

Fulfilling the government decree of July 16, 1936, the Shipbuilding Department of the UVMS issued on December 3 an order to Glavmorprom for the construction of eight battleships with delivery to the fleet in 1941. In Leningrad, it was planned to build two battleships of project 23 (Baltic Plant) and the same number of project 25, in Nikolaev - four projects 25 . This decision actually meant another correction of the shipbuilding program of the second five-year plan (1933-1937), supplementing it with previously unforeseen battleships. However, the implementation of new plans to strengthen the fleet encountered serious difficulties, some of which were determined by the huge amount of experimental work that could ensure the success of design and construction; this meant the manufacture of steam boilers, mine protection compartments, armor plates, life-size models of turbine and boiler rooms, testing the effects of bombs and shells on deck armor, irrigation systems, remote control, air conditioning, etc. The problems of creating artillery installations and turbine mechanisms of high power turned out to be especially difficult.

All these difficulties were overcome in an atmosphere of disorganization in the management of the fleet and industry caused by the repressions of 1937-1938, when almost everyone who led the choice of types and the creation of future battleships became victims. The already dire situation worsened with the availability of qualified command and engineering personnel, as a result of which the laying of ships in 1937 did not take place, and the design tasks themselves underwent serious changes. Project 25 was abandoned, later it was transformed into a heavy cruiser (Project 69, Kronstadt). In August-September of the same year, the new leadership of the Navy of the Red Army (Namorsi - the flagship of the fleet of the 2nd rank L.M. Galler) reworked the previously drawn up ten-year plan for building ships. This option provided for the prospective construction of 6 battleships of type “A” and 14 of type “B” instead of 8 and 16. However, such a truncated plan, submitted to the Defense Committee by Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov in September 1937, was never officially approved.

Despite the problematic implementation of the ten-year program, the government, by a decision of August 13/15, 1937, determined the revision of the technical project 23 with an increase in the standard displacement to 55-57 thousand tons while optimizing the armor and constructive underwater protection and abandoning two stern 100-mm towers. The increase in displacement, reflecting the objective need to combine powerful weapons, reliable protection and high speed, proved the validity of the initial tasks of 1936. At the same time, TsKB-17 received the flagship of the 2nd rank S.P. developed by the commission. Stavitsky tactical and technical

a request for the design of a battleship type "B" (project 64) with 356-mm artillery of the main caliber. For projects 23 and 64, the unification of the main turbo-gear units with a capacity of 67,000 hp was assumed. each (technical assistance from the Swiss company Brown-Boveri), 152-, 100-mm turrets and quad 37-mm machine guns of domestic design.

The materials of technical project 23 (head of the design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard Grauerman, chief engineer B.G. Chilikin) were considered in the Shipbuilding Department (UK) of the Red Army Navy in November 1937. In December, the head of TsKB-17 N.P. Dubinin and chief engineer V.A. Nikitin submitted to the Criminal Code draft design 64, but both of them were recognized as unsatisfactory. In project 23 (standard displacement 57,825, total displacement 63,900 tons), there were many unresolved issues related to the development of the main power plant, anti-mine and anti-aircraft artillery towers, bottom protection and a reservation system that did not correspond to the results of experimental bombing. The shortcomings of Project 64 were largely explained by the task itself, which involved the creation of a deliberately weak ship, designed to solve problems "in cooperation with other means of connection." Armament (nine 356-, twelve 152-, eight 100-, thirty-two 37-mm guns) and its characteristics (for 356-mm it was planned 750-kg shells with an initial speed of 860-910 m / s) at a speed of 29 knots could not provide a battleship of type "B" tactical advantages in single combat with the same foreigners. The desire of the designers to meet the stringent requirements of the TTZ for the protection of the ship led to an increase in the standard displacement to almost 50,000 tons. The wishes of the Naval Shipbuilding Administration to reduce the displacement to 45,000 tons did not come true at the beginning of 1938, the battleship "B" was abandoned.