10 Stalinist strikes table strike the name of the operation. Ten Stalinist strikes against capitalism and US imperialism! program text and video

The current year 2014 is significant for many dates. One of them is the 70th anniversary of the largest strategic offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War of 1944, which were included in the title " Ten Stalinist blows". These operations made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II.

Initially, this series of operations was not united under a common name. Operations were planned and carried out based on the logic of events and the overall strategic objectives for this year. For the first time, ten strokes were listed by I.V. Stalin in the first part of the report " 27th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution” dated November 6, 1944 at a solemn meeting of the Moscow Council of Working People's Deputies. After that they got their name. Later, the term "Stalin's Ten Strikes", glorifying Stalin, ceased to be used in Soviet literature and journalism. This was due to the wave of debunking the cult of his personality, then the name " ten strokes».

By 1944 the situation had changed even more in favor of the Soviet Union. The final period of the war in Europe began. But the path to its end was difficult. The Nazi army was still strong. Due to the lack of a second front, Germany continued to keep the main troops on the Soviet-German front. 236 of its divisions and 18 brigades operated here, which included more than 5 million people, 54 thousand guns, 5400 tanks, 3 thousand aircraft. Germany still commanded the resources of almost all of Europe.

The Soviet Armed Forces outnumbered the enemy in terms of the number of personnel by 1.3 times, in artillery - by 1.7 times, in aircraft - by 3.3 times. This quantitative superiority was reinforced by the high quality of weapons, morale and the increased operational and tactical skill of command.

As a result of a deep analysis of the situation, the Headquarters decided in 1944 to launch an offensive on the front from Leningrad to the Crimea, inclusive. Offensive operations in 1944, popularly called " Ten Stalin blows”, began immediately after the completion of the offensive in 1943, not allowing the enemy to come to his senses after the defeat in battles near Kursk and on the Dnieper. The task was to work out such a sequence of attacks on the enemy that would be unexpected for him, would be continuous and would deprive him of the opportunity to maneuver forces to repulse the main attack.

But no matter how these strikes are called, and how they were or were not connected with the name of the then leader of our country, the feat of the Soviet soldier did not become less. And behind this term lies not just a name, but the blood and hard combat work of our fathers and grandfathers who took part in the battles of 1944. The soldiers and officers of the fronts that crushed the aggressors won back our “spans and crumbs”, freed their compatriots from fascist captivity. They perished without asking the question what these strikes would be called in the future. It so happened that the offensive operations of this period of the great war were summarized by a general term, and we will leave it the same.

Strategic offensive operations included in Ten Stalinist blows:

1. - Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation(January 14 - March 1, 1944)
2. - Dnieper-Carpathian strategic offensive operation(December 24, 1943 – April 17, 1944)
3. - Odessa operation offensive operation (March - April 1944); Crimean operation offensive operation(April 8 - May 12, 1944)
4. Fourth strike - Vyborg-Petrozavodsk offensive operation (June 10 - August 9, 1944)
5. Fifth strike - Belarusian strategic offensive operation (June 23 - August 29, 1944)
6. Sixth strike - Lviv-Sandomierz strategic offensive operation (July 13 - August 29, 1944)
7. - Iasi-Chisinau strategic offensive operation(20 - 29 August 1944); Bucharest-Arad offensive operation (August 30 - October 3, 1944)
8. Eighth strike - Baltic strategic offensive operation (September 14 - November 24, 1944)
9. Ninth strike - East Carpathian operation (1944) - strategic offensive operation (September 8 - October 28, 1944); Belgrade strategic offensive operation (September 28 - late October 1944)
10. Tenth strike - Petsamo-Kirkenes offensive operation (October 7 - November 1, 1944)

Thus, 1944 ended with the complete and steady advantage of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht.

Eventually ten strokes Soviet troops were defeated and put out of action 136 enemy divisions, of which about 70 divisions were surrounded and destroyed. Under the blows of the Red Army, the block of countries - allies of fascist Germany finally collapsed. Germany's allies left the war - Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, the first two of which declared war on her, their troops began to act on the side of the Red Army.

In 1944, almost the entire territory of the USSR was liberated from the invaders, and hostilities were transferred to the territory of Germany and its allies. The successes of the Soviet troops in 1944 predetermined the final defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

For the first time, "10 strikes of the Soviet Army" - as a series of major strategic operations of 1944, which were carried out from January 14 to October 29 and became decisive in the impending surrender of Germany - were listed by I. Stalin in the first part of the report on the 27th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution November 6 at the solemn meeting of the Moscow Council of Working People's Deputies. (By the way, it was in this report that Stalin first announced the need to hoist the Banner of Victory over the Reichstag.) And then - since all operations were carried out according to a single plan of the Headquarters under the general leadership of the Supreme Commander I. Stalin, who, among other things, was personally involved in fundamentally new forms of strategic actions - operations of groups of fronts - these "10 strikes" first acquired their name as "Ten Stalin strikes of the Soviet army", and entered the popular consciousness with a shorter name - as "Ten Stalin strikes".
IMPACT FIRST. Leningrad-Novgorod operation. January 14-February 29

Offensive operations were carried out by the troops of the Leningrad (General of the Army L. Govorov), Volkhov (General of the Army K. Meretskov) and the 2nd Baltic (General of the Army M. Popov) fronts in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet (Admiral V. Tributs). Involved 1.25 million Soviet troops. The result of the operation was the lifting of the blockade of Leningrad and the liberation of the Leningrad region, including Novgorod. Favorable conditions were created for the liberation of the Baltic states and the defeat of the enemy in Karelia.
IMPACT SECOND. Korsun-Shevchenko operation. January 24 - February 17

Offensive actions were carried out by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian (General of the Army N. Vatutin) and the 2nd Ukrainian (General of the Army I. Konev) fronts. Involved 255 thousand Soviet troops. The entire Right-Bank Ukraine was liberated and conditions were created for a subsequent strike in Belarus and the defeat of German troops in the Crimea and near Odessa.
IMPACT THIRD. Odessa operation. March 26-April 16

Offensive operations were carried out by the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front (General of the Army R. Malinovsky) in cooperation with the 2nd Ukrainian Front (General of the Army I. Konev), as well as with the Black Sea Flotilla (Admiral F. Oktyabrsky). Involved up to 200 thousand Soviet troops. At the final stage of the Odessa operation, the Crimean operation began. April 8 - May 12. Offensive operations were carried out by the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (General of the Army F. Tolbukhin) and the Separate Primorsky Army (General of the Army A Eremenko), supported by the Azov Flotilla (Rear Admiral S. Gorshkov). 470 thousand Soviet troops were involved. During both operations, Odessa, Nikolaev, Crimea, Sevastopol were liberated.
IMPACT FOUR. Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation. June 10-August 9

It was carried out taking into account the release on June 6 of the Anglo-American landing across the English Channel and the opening of the Second Front - so that the Germans could not transfer their units to the West to repel it. Offensive operations were carried out by the troops of the Leningrad Front (Marshal L. Govorov) - on the Karelian Isthmus and the Karelian Front (Marshal K. Meretskov) - in the Svir-Petrozavodsk direction, with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet (Admiral V. Tributs), Ladoga (Rear Admiral V. Cherokov) and Onega (captain of the 1st rank N. Antonov) military flotillas. Involved 450 thousand Soviet troops. The "Mannerheim Line" was broken through, the cities of Vyborg, Petrozavodsk and most of the Karelian-Finnish SSR were liberated. The defeat forced the Finnish government to withdraw from the war.
IMPACT FIFTH. Belarusian operation ("Bagration"). June 23-August 29.

Offensive operations were carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic (Army General I. Bagramyan), 1st Belorussian (Marshal K. Rokossovsky), 2nd Belorussian (Army General G. Zakharov) and 3rd Belorussian (Army General I. Chernyakhovsky) fronts supported by the Dnieper military flotilla (Rear Admiral V. Grigoriev). 2.4 million Soviet troops involved. Destroyed 30 enemy divisions east of Minsk. The Byelorussian SSR, most of the Lithuanian SSR and a significant part of Poland were liberated. Soviet troops crossed the Neman, reached the Vistula and directly to the borders of Germany - East Prussia.
IMPACT SIX. Lviv-Sandomierz operation. July 13-August 29

Offensive operations were carried out by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front (Marshal I. Konev) in cooperation (since July 30) with the 4th Ukrainian Front (Colonel General I. Petrov). Involved 1.1 million Soviet troops. Western Ukraine was liberated, the Vistula was forced and a powerful bridgehead was created west of the city of Sandomierz.
IMPACT SEVENTH. Iasi-Chisinau operation. August 20-29

Offensive operations were carried out by troops of the 2nd Ukrainian (General of the Army R. Malinovsky) and 3rd Ukrainian (General of the Army F. Tolbukhin) fronts in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet (Admiral F. Oktyabrsky) and the Danube military flotilla (Rear Admiral S. Gorshkov ). 1.25 million Soviet troops involved. The Moldavian SSR was liberated. Then, already within the framework of the Romanian operation, support was provided for the anti-fascist uprising in Romania on August 23. 34 Soviet divisions remained to destroy the encircled Chisinau enemy grouping, and 50 divisions - mainly of the 3rd Ukrainian Front - crossed the Romanian border, occupied the port of Constanta, Ploiesti and a number of other cities and liberated significant Romanian territories. The incident disabled Germany's allies - Romania and Bulgaria and opened the way for the Soviet troops to Hungary and the Balkans.
IMPACT EIGHT. Baltic operation. September 14-November 24

Offensive operations were carried out by the troops of the Leningrad (Marshal L. Govorov), 1st Baltic (General of the Army I. Bagramyan), 2nd Baltic (General of the Army A. Eremenko) and 3rd Baltic (General of the Army I. Maslennikov) fronts, with support of the 3rd Belorussian Front (General of the Army I. Chernyakhovsky) and the Baltic Fleet (Admiral V. Tributs). Involved 900 thousand Soviet troops. Tallinn, Memel, Riga, Moonsund and a number of other operations were carried out. More than 30 enemy divisions were defeated. The result of the operation was the liberation of the Estonian SSR, the Lithuanian SSR, and most of the Latvian SSR. Finland was forced to break with Germany and declare war on her. The Germans who took refuge were isolated in East Prussia and the Courland pocket (Latvia).
IMPACT NINE. East Carpathian operation. September 8-28

Offensive actions were carried out by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian (Marshal I. Konev) and 4th Ukrainian (General of the Army I. Petrov) fronts. Involved 246 thousand Soviet troops. Immediately after the completion of the operation in the Carpathians, the Belgrade operation began. September 28 - October 20, carried out by the 3rd Ukrainian Front (Marshal F. Tolbukhin). More than 660 thousand Soviet and Yugoslav troops were involved. As a result of the operations, Transcarpathian Ukraine was liberated, assistance was provided to the Slovak national uprising on August 20 and part of Eastern Slovakia was liberated, most of Hungary was cleared, assistance was provided in the liberation of Czechoslovakia, Serbia was liberated and Belgrade was taken on October 20. Our troops entered the territory of Czechoslovakia and conditions were created for its subsequent liberation, strikes in the Budapest direction, in Austria and South Germany.
IMPACT TENTH. Petsamo-Kirkenes operation. October 7-29

Offensive operations were carried out by the troops of the Karelian Front (Marshal K. Meretskov) and the ships of the Northern Fleet (Admiral A. Golovko). Involved 107 thousand Soviet troops. The Soviet Arctic was liberated, the threat to the port of Murmansk was eliminated, the enemy troops in Northern Finland were defeated, the Pechenga region was liberated, and the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) was taken. Soviet troops entered Northern Norway.

As a result of these "Ten Stalin's blows", almost the entire territory of the USSR was liberated from the invaders. 136 enemy divisions were defeated and liquidated, of which 70 were surrounded and destroyed. Romania, Finland and Bulgaria went over to the side of the anti-Hitler coalition. The successes of 1944 predetermined the final defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

And now you are reading these mean lines of the list of operations - and it simply takes your breath away. What a strength! What power! What invincibility! And what names are legends! And what are the rates of movement of troops, the timing and scale of the battles won! And the blows were really powerful, truly steel, Stalinist. In which millions of people, hundreds of thousands of pieces of military equipment were involved, and - most importantly! - overcame hundreds of kilometers to the West. To Berlin! To Hitler's lair.
And all this was! And all this is WE! And what was the geography of our great country: from the Arctic and Murmansk to Odessa and the Crimea, from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea.

And most importantly: then WE were all TOGETHER! In one country - and without any idiotic borders between people.

"The area was so badly pitted with shells that it helped the small and bombarded defending German troops to stop the American advance."

First, as usual, a few words on the topic of possible alternatives.

I decided not to write anything about the Battle of Kursk (yet?). The fact is that they even tried to pervert it somehow in Hollywood. Like, if the Germans had advanced another kilometer, if the Allies hadn’t diverted the Adolf Hitler division, which had lost tanks by that time, with their heroic offensive in Sicily, if Private Ryan hadn’t defused the bomb two seconds before the explosion ... in generally clear. It's from impotence. In short, in fact, the Battle of Kursk looked like an attempt by a very trained person to break through a stone wall with his forehead, behind which they were still waiting for him with an ax.

In general, it was clear to both sides on the Eastern Front that 1944 would be a year of great flogging. It was also clear who would flog, whom and for what. Again, playing as Germany, I would just ask for peace, as long as there is something to trade. I would have asked Stalin, since the Western allies, by and large, didn’t need Germany anymore, but the Union could come in handy. By the way, initially the demand for Germany's unconditional surrender did not belong to Stalin, but to the Western allies.

Hitler, of course, did not survive in this situation, and it is precisely this circumstance that makes me suspicious of modern nationalist doctrines - if the leader demands so much from the people under the motto "we are of the same blood", he owes him no less. And if Stalin demanded to carry Hitler in a cage across Red Square, it was necessary to obey. For this very people. Hitler, on the other hand, chose the strategy of dragging out the war, relying on political factors - say, on a split in the coalition opposing him. If he still had the opportunity to provoke this split, the strategy would look reasonable. There were also problems with the "miracle weapon", and the problems were precisely in the orientation of thinking, so to speak. For example, the Germans had systems projects that could make life extremely difficult for Allied bombers - up to and including anti-aircraft missiles. But Hitler spent money on "V". Bang louder, yes.

"Ten blows" in this text (I repeat - only in THIS text) I determine according to the AUTHOR's enumeration, and not according to history textbooks. Why? Because we are talking about the 1944 campaign of the year. For the first time, "ten blows" were listed personally by I.V. Stalin in the report "Twenty-seventh Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" of 6.XI.1944.

Here, I found a very good drawing, convenient for analysis in the first approximation. The strikes are numbered according to the time of application, two bold lines are the states of the front "before" and "after".

Doesn't it seem strange to you that all kinds of revisionists of the Great Patriotic War at such a level (see figure) do not reason at all? Well, there, the suffering of a penalty box, which, under the fire of a detachment, runs into the attack. Loss ratio. The Germans smelled of cologne. Traitors betrayed because Stalin was bad. Etc.

But the full-length figure depicts the reinforced concrete adequacy of the Soviet grand strategy, which is simply pointless to dispute. It is precisely here that the confidence of both our General Staff and all committees of the Chiefs of Staff is rooted in the fact that the Soviets could conquer the whole world.

See for yourself.

1. January 1944. The German defense near Leningrad was hacked, the Germans were driven back. Everything? Yep, right now. The northern flank of the Germans - Finland - they needed only when the Germans had the initiative, and they needed it for two specific tasks - to take Leningrad and interrupt the railway. to Murmansk, after which this flank collapsed along the line from the White Sea to the Baltic, and the released troops were pushed into the depths of Russian territory. Neither one nor the other came of it, and with the transition of the initiative to the Soviet troops, the Germans got all the delights of an extended flank, vulnerable communications and an unreliable ally in one bottle. With the first blow, the Soviets actually won the northern flank, driving the Germans into the Baltic. After that, with the active assistance of Roosevelt, who threatened to break off diplomatic relations with the Finns, a negotiation process specifically about peace was launched - already in mid-February, Paasikivi and Kollontai met in Stockholm. Then the USSR made a frankly ingenious political move, removing all the preconditions for negotiations and thus selecting excuses from the Finnish government, which would be happy to *depict* the negotiation process, trying to sit on two chairs. Against the backdrop of Hitler's "ally", who openly threatened the occupation of Finland, the Soviets looked much more preferable. Unfortunately, the Finnish government still needed to be convinced by the task, but more on that later.

2. Korsun-Shevchenko operation. End of January-March. Southern flank. Yeah, yeah, first in the north, then in the south, let the Germans roll the reserves back and forth. Hitler still held the Crimea, and it was right, although, I repeat, in the general case, the strategy of tough defense had already outlived itself by that time. The Germans could theoretically take their chances in a mobile war by surrendering large territories, but alas, their decision space was already more than in the same 42, influenced by purely economic and technical factors.

By the preparatory blow of Vatutin - a specialist in Manstein, by the way ... - the railway line was cut. Odessa-Vilnius, read - communications between GA "Center" and GA "South". Then ours arranged for the Germans the actual Korsun-Shevchenkovsky cauldron, which they cleaned up by February 17th. The operation to liquidate the Nikopol ledge also belongs to the same Stalinist strike. Well, then Hitler himself asked for it, clinging to the manganese deposit. But what choice did he have? When the German defenses collapsed, the Germans just *ran* - it's hard to explain the loss of all heavy weapons by several divisions in another way.

Any special signs of this offensive? There are no special ones. All the same. The Germans adhered to the idea of hard defense. What did it mean? This meant that ours, having a maximum one and a half times superiority in people, calmly massed forces to attack where they wanted, which the extended front line only contributed to.

3. Crimea. April May. In terms of meaning, it was already garbage collection with all its charms. The Germans were torn apart mainly by artillery fire and aviation work, the order of the Supreme Commander expressly forbade * spending * people, as a result, German irretrievable losses exceeded ours by an order of magnitude. "No one invited them here." (with)

4. Karelia. Liberation of Vyborg and Petrozavodsk. Hot Finnish guys should have been hurried to think, although I repeat - already after the first Stalinist blow, Finland found itself in the position of "elusive Joe." A rather peculiar theater, a rather peculiar layout of weapons - our superiority in technology was overwhelming, but in the summer in that region, ground equipment does not really help. The Finns fought well, and so well that some of their historians still believe that the stubborn defense of the Finns was somehow useful. Nevertheless, in mid-July, ours simply stopped, because, firstly, people were needed on other fronts, secondly, there were still enough forces to finish off the Finns, and, thirdly, the negotiation process was already underway, and was extremely pragmatic. Don't want the word "surrender" on your resume? For God's sake. Can't you drive out the Germans yourself? Let's help. Oh, you can already... What, what are the limits? What-what 39th year? So, out the door, don't forget to leave, it's time for us to have dinner... What? 40th? Well, it would have been like that for a long time.

Thus, the flanks of the Eastern Front certainly won the first four blows (see the figure), and on the southern flank the troops of our European guests were simply eaten up in encirclement.

5. Belarus. Operation "Bagration", which in the West is called somewhat more dryly "the destruction (destruction) of the army group" Center "". In general, I must say that our propagandists missed a marvelous opportunity to export such names. Normal such bilingualism is for us an operation by name and patronymic, for a foreign consumer it is some kind of "extermination", "devastation", "extermination" and "eradication". Mochilovo, after all. If they don't want to be respected, let them be afraid.

The acquaintance of the first citizen he meets with the Bagration operation, at best, comes down to the fact that he recalls the famous apocrypha, where the Supreme Commander invites Rokossovsky to think, then think again, and then says something like "ah ... with him, let's do In your". What exactly Rokossovsky was asked to think about, the first comer no longer knows.

So. The main idea of defeating the enemy was still to break the defense in a specific sector of the front and introduce mobile formations into the breakthrough with the subsequent exploitation of their achievements - encirclement, etc. In this connection, naturally, the principle of massing forces in the breakthrough sector was applied. In Belarus, at first they were going to attack in the same way. Rokossovsky proposed the following, referring to the conditions of the theater of operations: dividing forces, attack at once all enemy groupings that held defenses at tactical depth. The idea was to deprive these groups of mobility and the ability to help each other in repelling the textbook "main strike", gouge them with separate operations on the spot and enter the operational and even strategic space, where no one would get in the way. The famous "rail war", launched on June 20, also had the goal of depriving the Germans of mobility. So that, therefore, they sit quietly while ours operate on them.

At the level of grand strategy, the Germans disgraced themselves in the most shameful way. I don’t know what is the proportion of our intelligence success and their failure, I don’t know who exactly is responsible for the wrong assumption (generals, as usual, blame everything on the Fuhrer in memoirs), but the basic hypothesis was that the Russians would strike south of Pripyat - there it turned out to be a rather beautiful exit to the Vistula and to the Baltic from south to north ... Thank you, of course, that they thought so well of us, but it also turned out well in Belarus.

What I like about Bagration purely aesthetically is that the Germans were paid for the blitzkrieg with the same currency. "Debt by payment is terrible" (c). I'm talking, of course, not only about the coincidence of the dates of occurrence - I'm talking about methods. Let's say, three out of every five aircraft that the Germans had in this direction, ours carried out by bombing airfields. The figures for the daily advance of our troops generally exceed those for these places, achieved by the Germans in 1941. A cauldron near Minsk for a hundred thousand people - it is necessary, it is necessary ... The officers and generals caught there were then led through the streets of Moscow.

I found excerpts from the diary of a German infantry officer.

“27.6. Everything is going backwards. The last forces are still fighting hard fighting in order to cover the bridge. Everyone retreats. Cars are filled with people. Wild escape.

29.6. We continue to leave. The Russians are always trying to overtake us with a parallel pursuit. The partisans destroyed all the bridges.

30.6. Unbearable heat. The horror journey has begun. Everything is up. Bridge over the river Berezina under heavy shelling. We are going through this chaos.

1.7. Everyone was completely out of breath. We move further along the highway to Minsk. Wild traffic jams and congestion. Often shelling right and left. Everything is running. Panic retreat. Much remains on the road.

2.7. The Russians have occupied the highway, and no one else will pass ... Such a retreat has never happened before! You can go crazy."

Yes, please, go: it's a pity, or something ... I repeat: "No one called them here" (c). By the way, at that time, Field Marshal Bush (don't get excited, this is a namesake) was replaced by Field Marshal Model, the commander of the Army Group Center, who had previously been waiting for the Russian offensive as commander of the Northern Ukraine Army Group. Did not help.

In general, the German defense ceased to exist for quite a long time. Approximately until the end of summer (the 6th strike is also important here, but more on that later). Reducing the front line worked first on our own, allowing us to release additional forces for the pursuit. The front line moved more than five hundred kilometers to the west.

The offensive ended as it should - communications are being stretched, the rear is lagging behind (already from July 9, in some directions, our troops were supplied with fuel by air), the density of enemy troops is increasing ... The following points are most interesting.

Firstly, the Germans hardly repelled our throw to the Gulf of Riga in order to cut the communications of Army Group North. This throw itself was, in a sense, more impudent than the Allied landing at Arnheim, sung in the movie about the bridge too far.

Secondly, the liberation of Lublin (July 23), openly * ordered * by Stalin by a specific date (July 26), which was rare. It is understandable, it was necessary to upgrade the government of Poland somewhere, the main advantage of which over London was sanity. It is to this event that the well-known apocrypha relates with Stalin sending his portrait to Churchill and fortune-telling of the latter, how Stalin washed him this time.

Thirdly, the trouble with, God forgive me, the "uprising" in Warsaw. About him later.

So, it was only half of the 10 Stalinist blows. Look again at the drawing. Imagine that it only has the results of hits from 1 to 5, and that's it. Beautiful, isn't it? The Germans started out with a shitty northern flank. And they continue to have it, but already in the Baltics. One ally was withdrawn from the war - Finland - but Russian troops are reaching the border with Romania, so the political (over-military) headache of keeping their coalition with the Germans remains and even intensifies, because it was easier to defend Finland purely under the terms of the theater of operations. The reduction of the front line is devalued by the fact that a significant part of the troops that were attacked were eaten up in encirclement. In short, the Germans, having suffered irreparable losses, did not solve any of their problems with these victims. If this is not an ideal offensive strategy, then what is an ideal one?

Returning to the topic.

6. Lviv-Sandomierz operation. July August. I am forced to note that this, in general, was a direct action in its purest form, the very one that Sun Tzu branded with the expression "the worst thing is to besiege fortresses." That is, the goals have been set, the tasks have been defined, the enemy has guessed everything and is waiting (although it is difficult to add the word "impatiently" here). And yet, considering this strike on the scale of the entire campaign, it is clear that it solves not only local problems. Firstly, this is the classic pressure on the center, which is necessary to ensure a deep flank breakthrough (7th and 9th strikes, about them below). Secondly, it was necessary to deal with the mobile German reserves that were turning over precisely in those places (GA "Northern Ukraine") before they left anywhere (the Germans were already starting to retreat). Our armies managed to cut through the "Northern Ukraine" GA, but they failed to break through the Carpathians on the move due to supply problems. However, the same problems began with the Germans, as well. our breakthrough to the Carpathians forced them to supply the South Ukraine GA bypassing through the Balkans and Hungary.

Look at the map again. A strike in Belarus, and the Germans are pulling troops there from northern Ukraine. A blow to northern Ukraine - troops are going there from the south. A strike in southern Ukraine (Iasi-Chisinau operation) - and oh my god ... IMHO, Hitler's mistake was that he put the retention of the conquered territories higher than the retention of the allies, which is unreasonable (the same Sun Tzu put "break the enemy's alliances" higher than capturing territory).

For direct action, the operation was extremely successful, especially the breakthrough of our armies across the Vistula (Sandomierz bridgehead, early August). The Germans tried to drive our people out of there in full - there, if I'm not mistaken, the "royal tigers" went into battle for the first time. Although the “Royal Tigers” are so, the cream on the cake, on all those reserves that the Germans pulled up there, weakening, I repeat, the Southern Ukraine Civil Aviation, which allowed ours to carry out the Iasi-Kishinev operation. However, ours concentrated as many as THREE tank armies there (either the 1st or the 3rd one, I don’t remember, then the 5th GTA, then the 4th one came up), and it came out according to the proverb "no matter how much you feed the wolf, but the bear still has more."

7. Iasi-Chisinau operation. August. While the Germans were trying to drive us out of the Vistula, ours began to deal with the German allies. In general, one must understand that it is precisely the threat of a strike from the southeast that can be considered decisive for winning the foreign stage of the war between the USSR and Germany. Of course, breaking down the shortest straight line through Poland is an obvious idea. However, together with a blow through Romania and Hungary, this breakthrough created a situation that is called in chess the "Tarrasch principle" and is formulated, it seems, as follows: "a position is considered lost if it contains two weaknesses that do not compensate for each other." A direct attack through Poland posed a threat to the German lands proper and sharply limited the possibilities of maneuver for those defending against a superior enemy (it was necessary to think before). An attack through Romania and Hungary put the Allies out of action, flirted with the factor of an open flank, and, most importantly, deprived the Germans of oil.

The adoption of this strategy unequivocally confirms that our people relied only on themselves and considered themselves perfectly capable of defeating Hitler without a second front, without threats from the south (from Italy) or from the west.

The humor, so to speak, of this operation lies in the fact that ours set up a cauldron of the same 6th German army, which had already raked near Stalingrad (with different personnel, of course). Moreover, the flanks that ours pierced, surrounding the Germans, were covered by the same Romanian armies, the 3rd and 4th. This time the matter ended somewhat faster - the offensive began on the 20th, the pocket was formed on the 23rd and was liquidated on the 27th of August. On August 23, the King of Romania, Mihai, summoned the dictator Antonescu to him and arrested him, and then honestly kept his politicians in check, not allowing them to lie under the Western allies, which many of the mentioned politicians wanted with every fiber of their soul.

In early September, ours entered Bucharest, and on September 12, the Romanians signed up for the anti-Hitler coalition. To be honest, if it were not for the important strategic position of Romania, it would be possible to leave the king to his country. Deserved. But alas. At least everything was done without incident. And even the order "Victory" was given.

The war with Bulgaria is generally easy to describe. On September 3, Tolbukhin published an edict stating that the Red Army did not want to fight the brotherly Bulgarian people. On September 5, the USSR government declared war on Bulgaria. On September 8, ours entered the territory of Bulgaria, and the Bulgarians did not shoot at ours, but we had an order not to take away weapons from them. War, however. On the afternoon of September 9, the government changed in Bulgaria, and in the evening Stalin gave the order to stop hostilities against Bulgaria. In general, it would always be so.

Lyrical digression. An interesting correlation is observed: the more a certain people owes us, the more serious troubles they have passed because of Russian valor or condescension, the more painfully this people strives to kick the Russians in moments of our weakness. And vice versa. It seems that the Hungarians less than all the peoples of Eastern Europe bloom and smell about the "Soviet occupation."

But the Magyars fought for Hitler, as long as they could fight at all, and they bled our noses seriously, incomparably with all other allies of the Germans. And then in 1956, when they thought that they sensed weakness, they rebelled not like a child, without the "orange" Czechoslovak antics and jumps. Our people explained to them that it was not good to cut "epaulettes" on the shoulders of captured Soviet officers, and it was absolutely not necessary to seize the maternity hospital with officer wives. The technology of explanation, although far from NLP, deserves close study (maybe I'll write it as a thread).

8. Baltics. September October. In general, here the Germans prepared very well, created powerful defensive lines "Valga", "Cesis" and "Sigulda", covering Riga. If you look at the map, you can see that it was the capture of Riga that won this battle - the further cut off GA "North" could only think of capitulation. The Germans, however, foresaw this too, concentrating in Courland (north-west Latvia) all their remaining tank divisions in the amount of five pieces in order to equalize the Russian rates.

At first, ours conscientiously beat their foreheads against the German defenses, incurring unacceptable losses. It would seem that it is high time to hear a shout from the Kremlin: "Attack until you overwhelm them with corpses, otherwise liberal historians will be very offended in the future!" But alas. There was no shout, although the attacks continued so that the Germans would not relax and generally look in the right direction. In the meantime, ours prepared a strike on Memel (the local nickname is Klaipeda), that is, they simply decided to increase the size of future ticks, and the transfer was carried out in such a way that the Germans slammed it - to be precise, they simply did not believe that it was possible to transfer it already during the operation direction of the main attack. When the attack on Memel began, the Germans themselves left Riga, planting in Courland in the amount of 33 divisions.

9. Yugoslavia (October) and Hungary (very long, although it started around the same time). Well, I'm not a big supporter of all these "Slavic brotherhoods" and "Orthodox peoples", but we to the Yugoslavs - more precisely, to the Serbs and Montenegrins - simply *must* and will be for a long time to come. For what? During the month that, in 1941, German tank divisions traveled around the Balkans, fucking Yugoslavia, where a coup took place, as a result of which Hitler was sent to hell, and a desire was expressed to negotiate with the Union. All the troubles of these peoples, very large even by the standards of that time, arose precisely from this event. And for this month, the Barbarossa plan has been postponed. So it goes.

In Yugoslavia there was porridge in the manner of Latin American troubles. The Germans, Ustashe, Chetniks, Tito - and both the Chetniks and Tito throughout the war played with both the USSR and Great Britain, despite the exile government of Yugoslavia, also sponsored by the British. The Russian security corps of White Guard origin was also sitting there, which slaughtered the communists and was on the payroll of the Germans, but did not particularly bully the Chetniks, and sometimes helped them. Plus, ours showed up there, accompanied by the Bulgarians, with whom the Serbs once fought in earnest ... But everything was done very quickly and cleanly, and in general, the Germans rather solved the problem of how to get their legs out of the Balkans, and not how to save them behind us, so that the pace of our advance was determined more by difficulties in supplying the stretched communications than by enemy resistance.

Hungary was basically a different matter. I don’t know whether they remembered how Nicholas I explained to them in 1848 why a revolution is not good, or whether they had a general national upsurge and an adrenaline rush ... It was great like Poland in 1920, when r-r-revolutionary The Red Army was unable to defeat the Poles, because the theories about the uprising of the oppressed classes could not withstand the collision with reality, no matter what Tukhachevsky wrote.

The Hungarian land admiral Horthy, like any politician, writhed for a long time, bargaining with all parties, and writhing to the point that he was thrown out of office in early October, or whatever it is called in Hungarian. Until their defeat, the Hungarians remained loyal and reliable allies of the Reich. I must say that the Germans did not have the psychological problems that arise when fighting on their native land - from the point of view of a cynic, a defensive battle on the territory of an ally is generally close to ideal in terms of the psychological state of the fighter produced by it.

Hungary was Hitler's last foreign headquarters, and he spared no reserves. Ours, however, failed to create an adequate advantage in the operation of forces (infantry and tanks) and paid for it. In addition, the supply went only by road, due to the difference in the gauge of the railways. And the quality of the marching replenishment, recruited already on the territory of Ukraine and Moldova, left much to be desired. Plus, the whole assortment, such as the perfectly organized German counter-offensives in January 1945, attempts to unblock the surrounded Budapest, the most powerful fortified areas (the Margarita line), the actual urban war with the desperate resistance of the garrison, and so on. “They didn’t fight with the Papuans” (c), although, on the other hand, no one has yet canceled superiority in firepower, and the fifth column did not help much for those who fell under Russian art and air strikes. Our overseas friends very correctly remarked: "power is a firepower".

Of the special moments that I have not yet mentioned, first of all we must recall the Slovak uprising. It was not an idiotic cancan a la Warsaw, but a seriously prepared performance aimed at capturing and holding a vast territory (at the peak of about 20 thousand square kilometers), precisely with an eye on the USSR, and ours helped with what they could and could not, however, they simply didn’t have time to * gnaw through the Carpathians on time (the Slovaks requested help on August 31, and only on October 6 ours broke through the Dukla Pass), and the uprising was defeated. Actually, the materials on this speech with the words "this is how it is done" should be recommended to our Polish friends, when they begin to wonder why the Muscovites did not help, when the proud Poles with as many as three thousand pieces of light small arms began to break windows in a single city.

It was 1944, after all, so a happy ending was inevitable. The Hungarians were crushed, and with them the GA "South", although the decisive success was achieved only by mid-March 1945 and continued with the Vienna operation.

10. Far North. End of October-November. Ours entered the territory of Norway, depriving Germany of ice-free northern ports and sources of raw materials. And, of course, the threat to the Arctic convoys has sharply decreased. Nevertheless, IMHO, this is still a local strike, listed in the list only because another potentially sovereign country, Norway, was played in it.

Again, looking at the map, one can be convinced that the strikes from the 6th to the 10th were also connected by a common strategic plan, namely, a threat was organized in two directions, Germany's allies were put out of action, the northern flank was finally eaten up and used extremely low density of troops on the southern flank. Nevertheless, the law of stretching communications and increasing the density of troops on a shrinking front line objectively acted against us, which explained the considerable losses in the Baltic states and especially Hungary.

In conclusion, again, a great quote from Liddell Hart, for authority. The quote refers to the 1943 campaign and, IMHO, the author in this case speaks more of an operational level than a strategic one.

"The nature and pace of Russian operations more and more resembled those of the Allies during their counter-offensive in the West in 1918, namely: delivering alternating strikes in various sectors of the front; temporary cessation of the offensive in a certain direction, when its pace slowed down in the face of increased enemy resistance, and the transition to an offensive in another direction; coordination of the purpose of each strike to facilitate the delivery of the next one; carrying out all strikes in close cooperation with each other, linking them in time and space. The actions of the Russians forced the German command, as in 1918, to hastily transfer their limited reserves to where they struck, and at the same time narrowed the ability to timely transfer reserves to threatened sectors of the front.As a result, the Germans lost their freedom of action, and the number of reserves was catastrophically reduced.This strategy of the Russians led to a general paralysis of the German military machine.

Russian methods of action are natural for any army with a general superiority in strength. The allied armies acted in the west in 1918 in exactly the same way as the Red Army in 1943. This method is especially suitable in a theater where line communications are not sufficiently developed and cannot provide the attacker with the ability to quickly transfer reserves from one sector of the front to another in order to develop success in a certain direction. Since this method provides for breaking through the front each time in a new direction, the losses of troops will be higher than when breaking through the front and developing success in depth in only one direction. In addition, the success achieved by this method in each individual direction will be less decisive. However, the cumulative effect of strikes on all sectors of the front will be quite significant, provided that the party using this method has sufficient strength to withstand the stress for a long time.

As can be seen, in the campaign of 1944 the same principle was applied at a higher level, and in combination with political factors (the transition from strategy proper to "grand strategy" according to the same Liddell Hart) guaranteed the defeat of Germany.

Russian superiority in strength was realized not so much in frontal pressure (live waves on machine guns, with which the liberals like to scare us), but in depriving the Germans of freedom of action, i.e. freedom to operate reserves. The Germans were simply not given time to figure out what kind of filth against us these reserves could be spent on (I recommend looking at the history of the Grossdeutchland division, which worked as a "fire brigade"). It is curious that the classic strategy - a breakthrough in a single sector and the development of success - for the Russian theater of operations would indeed be, let's say, less guaranteed, since the troops that broke through would have to deal with a counterattack by German maneuverable reserves over still vast spaces, and the Germans would fight have not forgotten how, and the outcome of such a highly maneuverable cut cannot be confidently predicted 1 . In addition, the very depth of such a single breakthrough in 1944, even under the most optimistic assumptions, did not give hope for deciding the outcome of the entire war.

It is interesting to mention L.-G. about "the close interaction [of Soviet strikes] with each other, linking them in time and space." I don’t recall sources apologetic or accusatory of Hitler that would even mention that he, with his desire to get into all cases, considered decisions on the scale of the entire front, without immediately slipping into a discussion of a single operation. This speaks of a much more effective organization of strategic planning on the Soviet side.

And finally, about losses. Indeed, the strategy of alternating strikes is more costly from this point of view, but, as mentioned above (and below), it *guaranteed* success for the conditions of our theater of operations and the balance of forces. A good illustration of the overall picture of the Soviet-European war is the gambler, adventurer Hitler and the cold, prudent manager Stalin. A lesson to remember, IMHO, although everyone draws their own conclusions here.

In general, in maneuvering clashes, a lot depends on "how the chip will fall," and the influence of random and fundamentally unaccounted for factors is the higher, the higher the connectivity of the territory on which the maneuvering war is waged, and the more diverse the opportunities provided by technology. An extreme example: the battle of Midway - the sea, aircraft carriers and an unthinkable chain of chances in favor of the Americans. In the conditions of the Russian theater of operations, however, the choice of such a direction of the only breakthrough that would guarantee a small variety of German opportunities to repel it automatically meant the same small variety of Russian opportunities to develop success, and the situation degenerated into a battle of attrition with German reserves, despite the fact that the superiority of the technical capabilities of the defense over the technical capabilities of the attack remained, and the protracted communications continued to work against the Russians who had broken through. That is, the canonical strategy of a single breakthrough of the front line either unacceptably increased the degree of unpredictability of the result, or led to a battle of attrition with huge losses.

Author: Juggernaut. Text from the page

Ten Stalinist strikes - the common name for a number of major offensive strategic operations in the Great Patriotic War, carried out in 1944 by the armed forces of the USSR.
Along with other offensive operations, they made a decisive contribution to the victory of the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition over Nazi Germany and its allies in World War II.

Initially, this series of operations was not united under a common name, the operations were planned and carried out based on the logic of events and general strategic tasks for this year. For the first time, ten blows were listed by I. V. Stalin in the first part of the report “27th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution” dated November 6, 1944, at a solemn meeting of the Moscow Council of Working People's Deputies.
Stalin's first blow. complete elimination of the blockade of Leningrad

The first blow in January 1944 was the strategic offensive operation of the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet in order to defeat the German group near Leningrad and Novgorod. Having cracked the powerful long-term defense of the enemy on the 300-km front, the Soviet troops defeated the 18th and partly the 16th German armies of the Army Group North and by February 29 advanced 270 km, completely eliminating the blockade of Leningrad and liberating the Leningrad region. As a result of the successful implementation of the first strike, favorable conditions were created for the liberation of the Baltic states and the defeat of the enemy in Karelia.
In the words of Stalin himself: “The first blow was dealt by our troops in January of this year near Leningrad and Novgorod, when the Red Army broke into the long-term defense of the Germans and threw them back into the Baltic. The result of this blow was the liberation of the Leningrad region.
Stalin's second blow. Liberation of Right-bank Ukraine

The second blow was delivered by the troops of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts in February-March 1944, defeating the German army groups "South" and "A" on the Southern Bug River and throwing their remnants across the Dniester River . As a result of the strategic surprise of the strike of the Soviet troops, the entire Right-Bank Ukraine was liberated and the Soviet troops reached the line of Kovel, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Balti. This created the conditions for a subsequent strike in Belarus and the defeat of the German-Romanian troops in the Crimea and near Odessa in April-May 1944.

The third Stalinist blow. Liberation of Odessa

As a result of the third strike by the Soviet troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts and the Separate Primorsky Army, in cooperation with the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the Black Sea Fleet, the Odessa and Crimean groups of the 17th German Army were defeated, and Crimea was liberated. The third blow began with the Odessa operation (March 26 - April 14) and the liberation of the cities of Nikolaev and Odessa by the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. From April 8 to May 12, the Crimean operation was carried out, Simferopol was liberated on April 13, and Sevastopol was liberated on May 9.

Stalin's fourth blow. defeat of the Finnish army

The fourth blow was carried out by the troops of the Leningrad Front on the Karelian Isthmus and the troops of the Karelian Front in the Svir-Petrozavodsk direction with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet, the Ladoga and Onega military flotillas in June-July 1944. On June 6, the Allied troops launched an amphibious operation in Normandy. This meant the opening of the long-awaited second front. In order to prevent the Germans from moving troops to the west, on June 10, the Red Army launched a summer offensive on the Karelian Isthmus. Having broken through the "Mannerheim Line" and occupied Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, Soviet troops forced the Finnish government to withdraw from the war and start peace negotiations. As a result of the fourth blow, the Soviet troops inflicted a major defeat on the Finnish troops, liberated the cities of Vyborg, Petrozavodsk and most of the Karelian-Finnish SSR.

Fifth Stalinist blow. operation "Bagration"

In June-July 1944, offensive operations were carried out in Belarus by the troops of the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts. Soviet troops defeated the German Army Group Center and destroyed 30 enemy divisions east of Minsk. As a result of the fifth blow, the Byelorussian SSR, most of the Lithuanian SSR and a significant part of Poland were liberated. Soviet troops crossed the Neman River, reached the Vistula River and directly to the borders of Germany - East Prussia. German troops were utterly defeated in the region of Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha. The German Army Group North in the Baltic was cut in two.

Sixth Stalinist blow. Lvov-Sandomierz operation

The sixth blow was the offensive operations of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in July-August 1944 in Western Ukraine. Soviet troops defeated the German group near Lvov and threw back its remnants across the San and Vistula rivers. As a result of the sixth strike, Western Ukraine was liberated; Soviet troops crossed the Vistula and formed a powerful bridgehead west of the city of Sandomierz.
Stalin's seventh blow. Iasi-Chisinau Cannes

Romanian operation
The offensive operations of the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube military flotilla in August-September 1944 in the Chisinau-Iasi region became the seventh blow. The basis of the strike was the Iasi-Kishinev offensive operation of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, as a result of which a large grouping of German-Romanian troops was defeated, the Moldavian SSR was liberated and Germany's allies, Romania, and then Bulgaria, were put out of action, the way was opened for Soviet troops in Hungary and the Balkans.
Stalin's eighth blow. battle for the Baltic

In September-October 1944, the troops of the Leningrad, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts and the Baltic Fleet carried out the Tallinn, Memel, Riga, Moonsund and other offensive operations in the Baltic states. As a result of these operations, Soviet troops were cut off from East Prussia, isolated in the Baltic (Kurland cauldron) and defeated more than 30 German divisions, pressing them to the coast between Tukums and Libava (Liepaja). They liberated the Estonian SSR, the Lithuanian SSR, most of the Latvian SSR. Finland was forced to break the alliance with Germany and subsequently declare war on her.

Ninth Stalinist blow. East Carpathian operation

Belgrade operation
The ninth strike was carried out in October-December 1944. It included offensive operations of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts, carried out in the northern part of the Carpathians, between the Tisza and Danube rivers, and in the eastern part of Yugoslavia. As a result of these operations, the German army groups "South" and "F" were defeated, most of the territory of Hungary was cleared, Transcarpathian Ukraine was liberated, assistance was provided in the liberation of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and conditions were created for a subsequent attack on Austria and South Germany.
Tenth Stalinist blow. Battle in the Far North

The tenth blow in October 1944 was the operation of the troops of the Karelian Front and the ships of the Northern Fleet to defeat the 20th mountain German army in Northern Finland, as a result of which the Pechenga region was liberated and the threat to the port of Murmansk and the northern sea routes of the USSR was eliminated. On October 15, Soviet troops occupied Pechenga, on October 23 they crossed the Kirkenes-Rovaniemi highway, cleared the entire region of nickel mines, and on October 25 entered the allied Norway to liberate it from German troops.
Impact results.
As a result of ten strikes by the Soviet troops, 136 enemy divisions were defeated and put out of action, of which about 70 divisions were surrounded and destroyed. Under the blows of the Red Army, the bloc of the Axis countries finally collapsed; Germany's allies - Romania, Bulgaria, Finland - were put out of action. In 1944, almost the entire territory of the USSR was liberated from the invaders, and hostilities were transferred to the territory of Germany and its allies. The successes of the Soviet troops in 1944 predetermined the final defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

"Ten Stalin's blows"

1.Leningrad-Novgorod operation of the Red Army

In an effort to finally eliminate the threat to Leningrad and begin the liberation of the northwestern regions of the USSR, the Headquarters developed a plan for the defeat of Army Group North by the forces of the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts. On January 14, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts launched an offensive south of Leningrad and near Novgorod. Having inflicted a defeat on the German 18th Army and pushed it back to Luga, they liberated Krasnoe Selo and Ropsha on January 19, Novgorod on January 20, Mgu on January 21, Lyuban on January 28, and Chudovo on January 29. In early February, units of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts reached the approaches to Narva, Gdov and Luga; On February 4 they took Gdov, on February 12 Luga. The threat of encirclement forced the 18th Army to hastily retreat to the southwest. On February 17, the 2nd Baltic Front carried out a series of attacks against the 16th German army on the Lovat River; On February 18, his troops occupied Staraya Russa, on February 21, Kholm, on February 24, Dno, and on February 29, Novorzhev. In early March, the Red Army reached the defensive line "Panther" (Narva - Lake Peipsi - Pskov - Ostrov); most of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions were liberated.

2. The defeat of the German army groups "South" and "A" (March 1944)

The second blow was delivered by the troops of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts in February-March 1944, defeating the German army groups "South" and "A" on the Southern Bug River and throwing their remnants across the Dniester River . As a result of the strategic surprise of the strike of the Soviet troops, the entire Right-Bank Ukraine was liberated and the Soviet troops reached the line of Kovel, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Balti. This created the conditions for a subsequent strike in Belarus and the defeat of the German-Romanian troops in the Crimea and near Odessa in April-May 1944.

3. Odessa and Crimean operations (March 28 - May 12, 1944)

As a result of the third strike by the Soviet troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts and the Separate Primorsky Army, in cooperation with the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the Black Sea Fleet, the Odessa and Crimean groups of the 17th German Army were defeated and Crimea was liberated. The third blow began with the Odessa operation (March 28 - April 16) and the liberation of the cities of Nikolaev and Odessa by the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. From April 8 to May 12, the Crimean operation was carried out, Simferopol was liberated on April 13, and Sevastopol was liberated on May 9.

4. Vyborg offensive operation (June 10 - June 20, 1944)

The fourth blow was carried out by the troops of the Leningrad Front on the Karelian Isthmus and the troops of the Karelian Front in the Svir-Petrozavodsk direction with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet, the Ladoga and Onega military flotillas in June-July 1944. As a result of the fourth blow, the Soviet troops defeated the Finnish army, liberated the cities of Vyborg, Petrozavodsk and most of the Karelian-Finnish SSR.

In June-July 1944, offensive operations were carried out in Belarus by the troops of the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts. Soviet troops defeated the German Army Group Center and destroyed 30 enemy divisions east of Minsk. As a result of the fifth blow, the Byelorussian SSR, most of the Lithuanian SSR and a significant part of Poland were liberated. Soviet troops crossed the Neman River and reached the Vistula River and directly to the borders of Germany.

6. Liberation of Western Ukraine and consolidation on the bridgehead west of the city of Sandomierz (July - August 1944)

The sixth blow was the offensive operations of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in July-August 1944 in Western Ukraine. Soviet troops defeated the German group near Lvov and threw back its remnants across the San and Vistula rivers. As a result of the sixth strike, Western Ukraine was liberated; Soviet troops crossed the Vistula and formed a powerful bridgehead west of the city of Sandomierz.

7. Yassko-Chisinau offensive operation (August-September 1944)

The offensive operations of the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube military flotilla in August-September 1944 in the Chisinau-Iasi region became the seventh blow. The basis of the strike was the Iasi-Kishinev offensive operation of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, as a result of which a large grouping of German-Romanian troops was defeated, the Moldavian SSR was liberated and Germany's allies, Romania, and then Bulgaria, were put out of action, the way was opened for Soviet troops in Hungary and the Balkans.

8. Tallinn, Memel and Riga offensive operations (September-October 1944)

In September-October 1944, in the Baltics, the troops of the Leningrad, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts of the Soviet Army and the Baltic Fleet carried out the Tallinn, Memel and Riga offensive operations. As a result of these operations, Soviet troops were cut off from East Prussia, isolated in the Baltic states and defeated more than 30 German divisions, pressing them to the coast between Tukums and Libava (Liepaja), liberated the Estonian SSR, most of the Latvian SSR; Germany's ally, Finland, was put out of action, and then declared war on Germany.

9. Offensive operations of the 4th, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts of the Soviet Army (October-December 1944)

The ninth strike was carried out in October-December 1944. It included offensive operations of the 4th, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts of the Soviet Army, carried out in the northern part of the Carpathians, between the Tisza and Danube rivers, and in the eastern part of Yugoslavia. As a result of these operations, the German army groups "South" and "F" were defeated, most of the territory of Hungary was cleared, Transcarpathian Ukraine was liberated, assistance was provided in the liberation of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and conditions were created for a subsequent attack on Austria and South Germany. Hungary, a former ally of Germany, declared war on it.

10. Operation in Northern Finland (October 1944)

Impact results

136 enemy divisions were defeated and put out of action, of which about 70 divisions were surrounded and destroyed

The fascist bloc finally collapsed;

Germany's allies - Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary - were put out of action.

The entire territory of the USSR was cleared of Nazi invaders and military operations were transferred to the territory of Germany and its allies.

The successes of the Soviet Army in 1944 predetermined the final defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

Stage

Dating

Events

First

Retreat of the Red Army. The strategic initiative belonged to the German command. The economy was rebuilt on a war footing. The evacuation of enterprises to the east began. A guerrilla war began in the occupied territories.

Second

December

1942

period of equilibrium. The first major defeat of Germany near Moscow, the disruption of the "blitzkrieg". The defense of Stalingrad and the battle for the Caucasus

The third

1943

The period of a radical change, the transition of the strategic initiative to the Soviet command. The defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad. The Battle of Kursk, the Battle of the Dnieper. As a result - the collapse of the offensive and defensive tactics of Germany. Strengthening the war economy

Fourth

The final period of the Great Patriotic War. The final liberation of the territory of the USSR. Liberation campaign of the Red Army in Europe. Surrender of Germany

Fifth

The fighting of the USSR against Japan. Defeat of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Japanese surrender. End of World War II

Campaign

Main battles

Significance of campaigns (position on the fronts and in the rear)

Summer-autumn

Border battle

Defense of the Brest Fortress.

The main task of the USSR is to organize strategic defense. Leningrad defensive operation (10.07-30.09) - against Army Group North. The enemy was stopped on the outskirts of the city, the front was stabilized.

The beginning of the battle for Leningrad. Battle of Smolensk (10.07 - 10.09) - against Army Group Center. During the battle, a counteroffensive was carried out and the enemy was defeated near Yelnya. The Katyushas were used for the first time. The planned attack on Moscow was delayed for two months. Kyiv defensive operation (7.07 - 26.09) - against the army group "South. Long defense of Kyiv. Moscow defensive operation (first stage of the battle for Moscow) (30.09-5.11) - fierce battles surrounded by Vyazma and Bryansk, a large role of the militia, the heroism of the Red Army (Western, Bryansk, Reserve fronts). Disruption of the Typhoon plan, failure of the Nazi offensive.

Germany's failures in the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, despite a significant advance of troops (in the North-West - up to 850 km, in the West - up to 1000 km, in the South-West - up to 1250 km). Losses of the USSR - about 3 million people. The difficult situation of the Soviet front and rear. The beginning of the restructuring of the rear.

The main task is to organize the counter-offensive and offensive of the Red Army. The possibilities of the Red Army for the planned general offensive were overestimated. Counter-offensive near Moscow (Kalinin, Western, South-Western fronts) and a general offensive in the Western direction. The Moscow and Tula regions, the regions of the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Orel, Tula, Kharkov, Donetsk regions and the Kerch peninsula have been completely liberated.

The blitzkrieg plan is finally thwarted. Significant losses of the Nazis. Our losses are more than 1 million 200 thousand people. Formation of the anti-Hitler coalition. The development of the partisan movement. Suspended the fall of industrial production (March).

The strategic plan of Germany is an offensive in the southern direction, depriving the USSR of the most important economic centers. The main target is the Caucasus, the auxiliary strike is on Stalingrad. The strategic plan of the Headquarters: to combine strategic defense (central direction) and offensive operations (in the Crimea, in the Kharkov direction, near Leningrad) is a gross miscalculation in assessing the capabilities of the enemy and reassessing one's own forces. The result - the defeat of the Red Army in the Crimea (4.07 Sevastopol was captured), the defeat near Kharkov. Advancement of the Army Group "South" (the main direction is Stalingrad). July 17 - November 18 - Stalingrad defensive operation (the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad) (Stalingrad, South-Eastern, Don Fronts, Volga Flotilla).

Germany is building up forces on the Eastern Front - 70% of the armed forces, although it suffers heavy losses. The maximum length of the front line (6200 km) has been reached. The USSR lost the most economically developed territories, where 40% of the population lived. The losses of the Red Army - more than 2 million people. Partisan actions. The growth of the military industry.

Winter 1942-1943

Stalingrad offensive operation. The second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (11/19/42 - 02/2/43), South-Western, Don, Stalingrad, Voronezh fronts. Volga Flotilla. The defeat of two German, two Romanian and Italian armies, the loss of the enemy - 1.5 million people. The beginning of a radical turning point in the war. General offensive of the Red Army. The Stavropol Territory, the North Caucasus, the regions of the Rostov Region and the Krasnodar Territory were liberated; in January 1943 the blockade of Leningrad was broken.

Major successes of the Red Army. The entire territory captured in the summer of 1942 was liberated (the enemy was pushed back 600-700 km from the Volga and Terek). German losses - 1.7 million troops. 24 thousand guns, 3.5 thousand tanks, 4.3 thousand aircraft. Our losses; about 1 million people, 4.5 thousand tanks, 10.2 thousand guns, 1.4 thousand aircraft.

The Battle of Kursk (5.06 - 23.08) - the disruption of the offensive plan "Citadel", the defeat of 50 of the best German divisions. The superiority of the USSR in the number of troops, military equipment, weapons. The actions of powerful tank groups (Prokhorovna). The collapse of the offensive strategy of the enemy. German losses: 0.5 million troops, 3 thousand guns, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.7 thousand aircraft. Battle behind Dnieper (autumn 1943) - the collapse of the enemy's defensive strategy.

Victorious battles along the entire length of the front. Successful actions of the partisans. The superiority of the Soviet military industry. The campaign surpassed the previous one in terms of duration and saturation of hostilities. The stubborn resistance of the enemy led to the highest average daily losses of our troops. In total, about 1.4 million people died.

Offensive on the Right-Bank Ukraine - the defeat of the southern wing of the Eastern Front of Germany. 03.28. - the exit of Soviet troops to the state border with Romania. Liberation of the Crimea. Leningrad-Novgorod operation (14.01 - 27.01) - the final lifting of the blockade of Leningrad.

Almost three-quarters of the occupied territory has been liberated. German losses - more than 1 million troops, 20 thousand guns, 4.2 thousand tanks, 5 thousand aircraft. Our losses; more than BOO thousand people, about 10 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10 thousand guns, more than 1 thousand aircraft.

Vybgo-Petrozavodsk operation (10.06-9.0V) - liberation of Karelia, northern regions of the Leningrad region. The end of the battle for Leningrad. Finland leaves the fascist bloc, the Belarusian offensive operation "Bagration" (23.06 - 29.08) - the liberation of Belarus, parts of Lithuania and Latvia, entry into the territory of Wormwood. L ow with co-Sandomierz operation (13.07-29.08) - liberation of Western Ukraine. Iasi-Chisinau operation (20.08-29.08) - Moldova was liberated. Romania leaves the fascist bloc. Liberation of the Baltics. Petsamo-Kirkenes operation - liberation of Northern Norway. Military operations on the territory of Yugoslavia, Military operations in Bulgaria. Bulgaria's withdrawal from the fascist bloc. Military operations on the territory of Hungary.

Great successes of the USSR. Liberation of the territory of the USSR. The beginning of the liberation of the peoples of Europe. Despite the opening of a second front (June 1944), the Soviet-German front remained decisive.

Vistula-Oder operation (12.01-3.02) - the liberation of Poland, entry into Germany. Battle for Berlin (16.04 - 8.05). 1st, 2nd Belorussian, 1st Ukrainian fronts - the defeat of the Berlin grouping, April 30 - the hoisting of the Banner of Victory over the Reichstag, on the night of May 8-9 - the unconditional surrender of Germany.

The defeat of Nazi Germany, the end of the war in Europe. Our losses are 800 thousand people. The USSR participated in the liberation of 11 European countries, military operations on the Soviet-German front were decisive in the victory over fascism.

Major battles of WWII

Sinyavin operations of 1941 (September-October 1941)

Kerch-Feodosia Landing Operation 1941–42 (December 25, 1941-January 2, 1942)

Arctic Defense 1941–44 (1941-1944)

Defense of Karelia 1941–44 (1941-1944)

Table of stages of the battle:

Yelninskaya

List of military operations of the Soviet troops that took place during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War:

Moscow battle

Rzhev-Vyazmenskaya

Lyubanskaya

Battle of Stalingrad

The list of military operations of the Soviet troops that took place during the period of a radical change in the Great Patriotic War:

Battle of Kursk

battle for the Dnieper

"Bagration"

Correct list of military operations related only to
the final stage of the Great Patriotic War:

Belgrade

Vistula - Oder operation

Koenigsberg

Yassko-Chisinau

Lviv-Sandomierz

Prague

Berlin

Warlords and their battles:

Soviet military leaders

Battle

I.V. Panfilov, L.M. Dovator

Battle for Moscow

A.I. Eremenko, V.I; Chuikov

Battle of Stalingrad

K.K. Rokossovsky, N.F. Vatutin

Battle of Kursk

I.D. Chernyakhovsky I.O. Konev

Battle of Kursk

K.K. Rokossovsky, I.O. Konev

battle for berlin

A.I. Eremenko

G.K. Zhukov

S.K. Timoshenko

Smolensk battle

G.K. Zhukov

AND ABOUT. Konev

Vistula - Oder operation