The 71st anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War is approaching. The question posed in the title of this article has been debated for decades, but to this day there is no honest, accurate and complete answer to it. However, for many people it is obvious: of course, Joseph Vissarionovich and Lavrenty Pavlovich bear the main responsibility for the tragic beginning of the Great Patriotic War. However, below are the facts, without taking into account which, in my deep conviction, an objective analysis of the then situation is impossible.

I'll start with the famous "Sorge telegram":

First of all, its text differs sharply from real ciphers.
Secondly, no responsible manager will take any action based on such a report, even if it comes from a reliable informant.
Thirdly However, Sorge did not report anything of the kind.

On June 16, 2001, the Krasnaya Zvezda organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation published materials from a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the start of the war, with the confession of SVR Colonel Karpov:

“Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in the Khrushchev era. Such "fools" are launched simply.

Alas, the same "fool" - and supposedly Beria's resolution:

“Many workers… are spreading panic. The secret collaborators of "Hawk", "Carmen", "Almaz", "Verny" ... erase into camp dust as accomplices of international provocateurs who want to quarrel us with Germany ... June 21.

These lines have been walking around the printed pages for a long time, but their falsity has long been established by a number of independent experts. In addition, from February 3, 1941, Beria did not have foreign intelligence under his control, because the NKVD was divided that day into the NKVD of Beria and the NKGB of Merkulov. But how many people know about it?

In order to understand how this telegram / fake Ramsay / Sorge differs from the authentic reports of Sorge / Ramsay, I will give his other ciphers on this issue:

March 10, 1941: "The new German BAT believes that after the end of the present war, Germany's fierce struggle against the Soviet Union should begin."

May 2: "I talked with the German ambassador Ott and the naval attache about the relationship between Germany and the USSR ... The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler, either in May or after the war with England."

May 19:“The new German representatives who have arrived here from Berlin declare that the war between Germany and the USSR may begin at the end of May, since they have received orders to return to Berlin by this time. But they also said that this year the danger may be over.”

May 30:“Berlin informed Ott that the German offensive against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure the war will start."

June 1st: “The expectation of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left on May 6 for Bangkok. In Bangkok, he will take the post of military attache.

June 15: “The German courier told the military attache that he was convinced that the war against the USSR was delayed, probably until the end of June. The military attache does not know whether there will be a war or not.

June 20"German Ambassador in Tokyo Ott told me that war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable".

Similar reports in the spring of 1941 came from other sources. So, according to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, on June 1, 1941

“The general distribution of the German Armed Forces is as follows:

122-126 divisions against England (in all directions);

120-122 divisions against the USSR;

44-48 reserve divisions.

Now let me remind you of three important orders of the NPO of the USSR, which must not be forgotten.

December 27, 1940 new people's commissar of defense Tymoshenko issued an order № 0367 with reference to another Voroshilov order No. 0145 dated 09.09.39 on mandatory camouflage of the entire airfield network of the Air Force in the 500-km zone from the border with the completion of work by July 1, 1941.

Neither the Main Directorate of the Air Force, nor the district did not comply with this order. The direct fault is the Air Force Inspector General, Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for Aviation Smushkevich and Chief of the Air Force Main Directorate, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Rychagov. Both were shot after the start of the war.

Another NPO order was issued on June 19, 1941 for № 0042 . In it, Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov stated that “nothing significant has been done so far to mask airfields and the most important military facilities”, that aircraft "the complete absence of their disguise" are crowded at airfields, etc.

Many land generals in terms of criminal neglect of the affairs of service did not go far from aviation generals. From the same command No. 0042 dated 06/19/41:

Artillery and mechanized units show a similar carelessness to camouflage: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks is not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for hitting from the air. Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with colors that give a bright reflection and are clearly visible not only from the air, but also from the ground. Nothing has been done to camouflage warehouses and other important military facilities ... "

Next, consider the memoirs of the former commander of the Long-Range Aviation Chief Air Marshal A. E. Golovanova(the title, by the way, directly repeats the title of one of the sections of the book). He writes that in June 1941, commanding a separate 212th long-range bomber regiment subordinate directly to Moscow, he arrived from Smolensk to Minsk to be presented to the commander of the Air Force of the Western Special Military District I. I. Kopts and then to the commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlov.

During the conversation with Golovanov, Pavlov contacted Stalin via HF. And he began to ask the general questions, to which the commander of the district answered the following:

“No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my scouts are working well. I will check again, but I consider it just a provocation ... "

At the end of the conversation, Pavlov threw Golovanov:

“Not in the spirit of the owner. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border.

Alarm messages

Today there is no way to establish exactly who this "bastard" was, but there is every reason to believe that the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria was meant.

And that's why... On February 3, 1941, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a separate People's Commissariat of State Security headed by Vsevolod Merkulov was allocated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. On the same day, Beria was appointed deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, leaving him in the post of head of the NKVD. But now he was not in charge of foreign intelligence, since the NKGB was in charge of it. At the same time, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs was still subordinate to the Border Troops, which had their own intelligence. Her agents did not include the "cream of society", but she was helped by simple train drivers, oilers, switchmen, modest settlers and residents of cordon towns ...

They collected information like ants, and it, concentrated together, gave the most objective picture of what was happening. The result of the work of this "ant intelligence" was reflected in Beria's notes to Stalin, three of which are given below in extracts from the 1995 collection "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table", published jointly by the FSB of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation and the Moscow City Association of Archives.

So ... The first note is addressed immediately to Stalin, Molotov and People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko:

Top secret

From April 1 to April 19, 1941, the border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border obtained the following data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the governor general.

In the border zone of Klaipeda region:

Two infantry divisions arrived, an infantry regiment, a cavalry squadron, an artillery battalion, a tank battalion and a company of scooters.

To Suwalki Lykk area:

Arrived up to two mechanized divisions, four infantry and two cavalry regiments, tank and sapper battalions.

To Myshinets-Ostrolenka area:

Up to four infantry and one artillery regiments, a tank battalion and a motorcycle battalion arrived.

To the Ostrov Mazowiecki - Malkinia Gorna area:

One infantry and one cavalry regiment arrived, up to two artillery battalions and a company of tanks.

To the area of ​​Biala Podlaska:

One infantry regiment, two engineer battalions, a cavalry squadron, a company of scooters and an artillery battery arrived.

To the Vlodaa-Otchovok area:

Up to three infantry, one cavalry and two artillery regiments arrived.

To the Holm area:

Arrived up to three infantry, four artillery and one motorized regiments, a cavalry regiment and a sapper battalion. Over five hundred cars are also concentrated there.

To the Hrubieszow area:

Up to four infantry, one artillery and one motorized regiments and a cavalry squadron arrived.

To the Tomasov area:

The headquarters of the formation arrived, up to three infantry divisions and up to three hundred tanks.

To the Pshevorsk-Yaroslav area:

They arrived up to an infantry division, over an artillery regiment and up to two cavalry regiments ...

The concentration of German troops near the border took place in small units, up to a battalion, squadron, battery, and often at night.

In the same areas where the troops arrived, a large amount of ammunition, fuel and artificial anti-tank obstacles were delivered ...

During the period from April 1 to April 19, German planes violated the state border 43 times, making reconnaissance flights over our territory to a depth of 200 km.

“... Two army groups concentrated in the regions of Tomashov and Lezhaysk. In these areas, the headquarters of two armies were identified: the headquarters of the 16th army in the town of Ulyanuv ... and the headquarters of the army in the Usmierzh manor ... the commander of which is General Reichenau (requires clarification).

On May 25 from Warsaw ... the transfer of troops of all branches was noted. The movement of troops takes place mainly at night.

On May 17, a group of pilots arrived in Terespol, and a hundred aircraft were delivered to the airfield in Voskshenitsa (near Terespol) ...

Generals of the German army carry out reconnaissance near the border: May 11, General Reichenau - in the area of ​​​​the town of Ulguvek ... May 18 - a general with a group - in the Belzhets region ... May 23, a general with a group ... in the Radymno region.

Pontoons, canvas and inflatable boats are concentrated in many points near the border. The largest number of them was noted in the directions to Brest and Lvov…”

Three days later, on June 5, Beria sent another note to Stalin (No. 1868/B) on the same subject:

“Border detachments of the NKVD of the Ukrainian and Moldavian SSR additionally (our No. 1798 / B of June 2 of this year) obtained the following data:

Along the Soviet-German border

May 20 p. in Byala Podlaska ... the location of the headquarters of the infantry division, the 313th and 314th infantry regiments, the personal regiment of Marshal Goering and the headquarters of the tank formation are marked.

In the Yanov-Podlyasky area, 33 km northwest of Brest, pontoons and parts for twenty wooden bridges are concentrated ...

Along the Soviet-Hungarian border

In the city of Brustura ... there were two Hungarian infantry regiments and in the Khust area - German tank and motorized units.

Along the Soviet-Romanian border ...

During May 21-24, they proceeded from Bucharest to the Soviet-Romanian border: through st. Pashkans - 12 echelons of German infantry with tanks; through st. Craiova - two echelons with tanks; at st. Three echelons of infantry arrived at Dormenashti and at st. Borshchov two echelons with heavy tanks and vehicles.

At the airfield in the Buzeu area ... up to 250 German aircraft were noted ...

The General Staff of the Red Army has been informed."

Beria, even in the half-month remaining before the start of the war, sent Stalin the accumulating data as they were obtained by the agents of the border troops of the NKVD. By June 18-19, 1941, it was clear to them: peacetime counts if not for hours, then for days!

But maybe I'm wrong? After all, Stalin's genuine visa is known on the special message of the People's Commissar of State Security V. N. Merkulov No. 2279 / M dated June 17, 1941, containing information received from the "Foreman" (Schulze-Boysen) and "Corsican" (Arvid Harnak)

."Tov. Merkulov. Maybe send your "source" from the German headquarters. aviation to the fucking mother. This is not a "source", but a misinformer. I. St.

This visa is now often cited as an argument against Stalin, losing sight of the fact that he shares the informants and expresses distrust of only one of them - from the Luftwaffe headquarters - the "Sergeant" (Schulze-Boysen), but not the "Corsican" (Harnack). Whether Stalin had grounds for this, let the reader judge for himself.

Although Harro Schulze-Boysen was an honest agent, his report of June 17 looks frivolous only because it confuses the date of the TASS report (not June 14, but June 6), and the second-rate Svirskaya HPP, Moscow factories, "producing separate parts for aircraft, as well as car repair (?) workshops." Of course, Stalin had every reason to doubt the honesty of such "information".

However, having imposed a visa, Stalin then (information from the collection of documents “Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table”) summoned V. N. Merkulov and the head of foreign intelligence P. M. Fitin. The conversation was conducted mainly with the second. Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the sources. After Fitin explained why intelligence trusts Corsican and Sergeant, Stalin said:

“Go, clarify everything, double-check this information and report to me.”

An important point to which attention should be paid: in a number of previous reports of the "Sergeant" and "Corsican" there is an idea that the German attack will be preceded by the presentation of an ultimatum, and he, in turn, will be a "war of nerves."

14th of April:"The start of hostilities should be preceded by an ultimatum to the Soviet Union with a proposal to join the Pact of the Three."

5 May: “Germany will demand from the USSR to act against England on the side of the Axis powers. As a guarantee that the USSR will fight on the side of the “Axis” to the decisive end, Germany will demand from the USSR the occupation by the German army of Ukraine and, possibly, also of the Baltic states.

May 9:“First, Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding greater exports to Germany and the rejection of communist propaganda ... The presentation of the ultimatum will be preceded by a “war of nerves” in order to demoralize the Soviet Union.”

the 9th of June:"Germany will present the USSR with a demand to provide the Germans with economic leadership in Ukraine and to use the Soviet Navy against England".

Flight June 18

Here are two facts, without knowing which, it is simply impossible to form a correct view of the events of that time.

There is a book "I am a fighter" Major General of Aviation Hero of the Soviet Union Georgy Nefedovich Zakharov.

Before the war, he commanded the 43rd Fighter Air Division of the Western Special Military District with the rank of colonel. He had experience of fighting in Spain (6 aircraft personally shot down and 4 in a group) and in China (3 personally shot down).

Here is what he writes (the quote is extensive, but every phrase is important here):

“... Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week - it was either the seventeenth or the eighteenth of June of the forty-first year - I received an order from the aviation commander of the Western Special Military District to fly over the western border. The length of the route was four hundred kilometers, and it was necessary to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.

I flew out on a U-2 together with the navigator of the 43rd Fighter Air Division, Major Rumyantsev. The border areas west of the state border were packed with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves, there were poorly camouflaged, or even not at all camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, and guns. Motorcycles darted along the roads, cars - apparently, headquarters - cars. Somewhere in the depths of a vast territory, a movement was born, which here, at our very border, slowed down, resting on it ... and ready to overflow over it.

The number of troops recorded by our eye, at a glance, did not leave me any other options for reflection, except for the only one: war was approaching.

Everything that I saw during the flight was superimposed on my previous military experience, and the conclusion that I made for myself can be formulated in four words: "From day to day".

We flew then a little over three hours. I often landed a plane at any suitable site, which might seem random, if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently saluted (that is, he knew in advance that our plane with urgent information would land soon! - S. B.) and waited for several minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received a report, the border guard disappeared, and we again took to the air and, after passing 30-50 kilometers, they sat down again. And I again wrote a report, and another border guard silently waited and then, saluting, silently disappeared. By evening, in this way, we flew to Bialystok and landed at the location of Sergei Chernykh's division ... "

By the way ... Zakharov reports that the commander of the Air Force of the district, General Kopets, took him after the report to the commander of the district. Here is another direct quote:

"D. G. Pavlov looked at me as if he had seen me for the first time. I had a feeling of dissatisfaction when, at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The intonation of the commander frankly replaced the word "exaggerate" on the "panic"- he obviously did not fully accept everything that I said ... With that, we left.

As you can see, the information of Marshal Golovanov is reliably confirmed by the information of General Zakharov. And we are all told that Stalin "did not believe Pavlov's warnings."

Zakharov, as I understand it, sincerely does not remember when he flew on the instructions of General Kopts - on June 17 or 18? But most likely he flew on June 18th. In any case, not later ... And he flew on Stalin's instructions, although, of course, he himself did not know about this, just as Kopets did not know this either.

Let's think about it: why, if the task was given to Zakharov by the aviation commander of the ZapOVO, that is, a person from the department of People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko, the reports from Zakharov were everywhere accepted by border guards from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of People's Commissar Beria? And they accepted silently, without asking questions: who, they say, are you and what do you need?

Why were there no questions? How it is?! In a tense border atmosphere, an incomprehensible plane is landing near the border, and the border patrol is not interested: what, in fact, does the pilot need here?

This could happen in one case: when at the border under each, figuratively speaking, this plane was waiting for this plane.

Why were they waiting for him? Who needed, and even in real time, Zakharov's information? Who could give an order that united the efforts of Tymoshenko's and Beria's subordinates? Only Stalin. But why did Stalin need this? The correct answer - taking into account the second fact that I cite a little later - is one. This was one of the elements of the strategic sounding of Hitler's intentions, carried out personally by Stalin no later than June 18, 1941.

Imagine again the situation of that summer ...

Stalin receives information about the impending war from illegal immigrants and legal out-of-cord residencies of Merkulov from the NKGB, from illegal immigrants of General Golikov from the GRU of the General Staff, from military attachés and through diplomatic channels. But all this may be a strategic provocation of the West, which sees its own salvation in the clash between the USSR and Germany.

However, there is intelligence of the border troops created by Beria, and now it is not only possible, but necessary, to believe her information. This is integral information from such an extensive peripheral intelligence network that it can only be reliable. And this information proves the proximity of the war. But how to check everything finally?

The ideal option is to ask Hitler himself about his true intentions. Not the Fuhrer's entourage, but his own, because the Fuhrer more than once, unexpectedly even for the environment, changed the deadlines for the implementation of his own orders!

Here we come to the second (chronologically, perhaps the first) key fact of the last pre-war week. On June 18, Stalin appeals to Hitler about the urgent dispatch of Molotov to Berlin for mutual consultations.

Information about this proposal of Stalin to Hitler is found in the diary of Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Reich Ground Forces. On page 579 of the second volume, among other entries on June 20, 1941, there is the following phrase:

"Molotov wanted to speak with the Fuhrer on 18.6."

One phrase... But it reliably captures the fact of Stalin's proposal to Hitler about Molotov's urgent visit to Berlin and completely turns the whole picture of the last pre-war days. Fully!

Hitler refuses to meet with Molotov. Even if he began to delay with an answer, this would be proof for Stalin that the war was near. But Hitler refused at once.

After Hitler's refusal, one did not have to be Stalin to draw the same conclusion that Colonel Zakharov did: "From day to day".

And Stalin instructed the People's Commissariat of Defense to ensure urgent and effective aerial reconnaissance of the border zone. And he emphasizes that reconnaissance should be carried out by an experienced high-level aviation commander. Perhaps he gave such a task to the commander of the Air Force of the Red Army Zhigarev, who visited Stalin's office from 0.45 to 1.50 on June 17 (in fact, already on 18) June 1941, and he called Kopts in Minsk.

On the other hand, Stalin instructs Beria to ensure the immediate and unhindered transmission of the information collected by this experienced aviator to Moscow ...

INCOMPLETE ORDERS

Realizing that Hitler did decide to go to war, Stalin, no later than the evening of June 18, began to give appropriate orders to the leadership of the NPO. The new activity was also noticed by a stranger, which is confirmed in a note to Stalin, Molotov and Beria, sent by the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov on June 21, 1941, with the text of a conversation between two foreign diplomats on June 20. There were the words:

“- Here everyone is worried - war, war. - Yes Yes. The Russians have found out.

Yes, the Russians did!

And they learned in advance because the efforts of many large and small intelligence officers, undertaken in recent months, were crowned by a successful strategic sounding of Moscow! It was an intelligence class in the full sense of the word at the highest level - the Führer himself turned out to be the Kremlin's informant.

Now it was necessary to give instructions on the urgent bringing - without much noise - of the troops of the Special Districts to combat readiness. And here, alas, not all generals were at their best. Later, in memoirs, some referred to the “demagnetizing” effect of the TASS statement of June 14th. But any political statements cannot be a guide to action for the military. For a military man, only an order is such!

From the beginning of May 1941, every senior commander and general in the western military districts had to be like a tight string. This was also the responsibility of the “teams” of Timoshenko and Zhukov in Moscow, Pavlov in Minsk and Kirponos in Kyiv. But the army was “preparing” for the war in such a way that, with an insignificant mobilization stock of firearms in KOVO in January 1941, the General Staff and GAU preferred to unsubscribe and “reassured” Kyiv that, they say, during 1941 everything would be shipped.

The country gave the army strong armor of the latest fast T-34 tanks, but in the pre-storm time, ordinary tankers did not have the opportunity to master this technique in the shortest possible time. On the other hand, new mechanized and tank corps were formed almost on the border. Yes, in general, the Red Army was strong, but, as it turns out now, it had a number of weak links. But the chain breaks on them! And Stalin is responsible for this only to the extent that the supreme leader is responsible for everything, even without being directly guilty. The guilt of the generals was much more specific.

We have much, much obscurity in our coverage of the pre-war half of 1941, and especially of the last pre-war week. For example, the famous "merit" of the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov in bringing the fleets to readiness No. 1 ... Was it really so great in practice?

There are “Notes of a Participant in the Defense of Sevastopol” by Captain 1st Rank Evseev, which are stored in the Central Naval Archive. And from them it follows that combat readiness at the Black Sea Fleet was declared after the first German bombs exploded on the Primorsky Boulevard of Sevastopol, filled with walkers on the occasion of the completion of large maneuvers. Komflot Oktyabrsky gave a banquet that night.

The maneuvers were led by Admiral Isakov. It was he who classified Evseev's notes in 1943 "with the right to use by everyone working in Sevastopol." Note: he did not give the order to punish Evseev for slander, but "only" classified the inconvenient truth about the admiral's banquet under German bombs.
But on the night of June 22, the head of the Main Directorate of the NKVD border troops, General Sokolov, was at the site of the 87th border detachment of the Belarusian border district. The main border guard of the country could not be there without the order of Beria and the sanction of Stalin, and it is clear that Sokolov was needed in Belarus in order to organize the combat work of border guards in war conditions with the outbreak of hostilities. On June 21, outposts, border commandant's offices and detachments left the barracks and occupied defensive structures. Border guards have always been able to fight, and one experienced border soldier (and there were about 100 thousand of them in the western districts) in a complex dynamic battle was perhaps worth a dozen ordinary Red Army soldiers. And so it happened: the border troops in the outbreak of war immediately played a strategic role without exaggeration. They kept for days in an environment in which many army units rolled back after hours. However, the strategic feat of the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR in June 1941 has not yet been assessed by its significance!

On the last pre-war evening, General Pavlov enjoyed an operetta at the Minsk theater, although at that moment he was supposed to be not in the box of the theater, but at the front command post.

Namely, the front-line, and not the district, because today it is known for sure that on June 19, 1941, the departments of the Western and Kyiv special districts were transformed into front-line ones. This is documented and confirmed in memoirs. So, Marshal of Artillery N. D. Yakovlev,
just before the war, from the post of artillery commander of the Kyiv OVO, he was appointed head of the GAU, recalled that by June 19

“I have already completed the handover of affairs to my successor and almost on the go said goodbye to my now former colleagues. On the move, because the headquarters of the district and its departments these days just received an order to relocate to Ternopil and hastily curtailed work in Kyiv.

And the general unpreparedness of the border military districts of the NPO by June 22 looks more than strange against the background of the readiness of the border districts of the NKVD. Why? After all, apparently, Stalin gave a general “good” three days before the war! Not a version, but a fact that no later than the afternoon of June 19, an order was received from Moscow to Kyiv for the field department of the district headquarters to immediately relocate to the city of Ternopil, where the front command post was located in the building of the former headquarters of the 44th Infantry Division.

Near Baranovichi, in the area of ​​the Obuz-Lesnaya station, the front-line command post ZapOVO was deployed. Only Pavlov did not appear there before the start of the war!

But in the OdVO, General Zakharov arrived at his field command post in the Tiraspol region on June 21 on time and took command.

And Zakharov arrived there because on June 14 (!) he received an order from Moscow to separate the army command of the 9th Army and on June 21 to withdraw it to Tiraspol.
The former deputy chief of staff of the Odessa Naval Base, Rear Admiral Derevyanko, directly writes about the directives of Timoshenko and Zhukov of June 14 and 18 and reports that the commanders of other western districts received them on June 18! However, in "Memoirs and Reflections" of Marshal Zhukov, these directives are not mentioned - only directives of April 14 and May 13 are mentioned. Not a word about directives on June 14 and 18!

Yes, they cover their tracks and cover them. For example, it is reported that on June 13, Timoshenko asked Stalin for permission to put on alert and deploy the first echelons according to cover plans, but Stalin did not allow it. Well, on June 13, so, presumably, it was. Stalin, realizing that the country was not yet ready for a serious war, did not want to give Hitler a pretext for it. It is known that Hitler was very unhappy that Stalin could not be provoked. Therefore, on June 13, Stalin could still hesitate - is it time to take all possible measures to deploy troops. Therefore, urgent soundings began, starting with the TASS statement of June 14, which Stalin most likely compiled after a conversation with Timoshenko. Then followed the "moment of truth" with the flight of Colonel Zakharov and the refusal of Berlin to accept Molotov. In his memoirs, Zhukov wrote:

“After the death of I.V. Stalin, versions appeared that on the night of June 22, some commanders and their headquarters, without suspecting anything, were sleeping peacefully or having carefree fun. This is not true. The last peaceful night was completely different ... "

Alas, with all due respect to Georgy Konstantinovich, I cannot but say that here one can see the desire and honor to observe, and to acquire capital ... Firstly, General Pavlov and Admiral Oktyabrsky were just having fun without a care. Secondly, if on the last peaceful night the commanders and their headquarters were in place and on alert, then why were the troops sleeping? Moreover, some were sleeping, while others were already moving towards the border ... How is this to be understood?

More than seventy years have passed since those days. And all these years, many of the "darkness of low truths" turned out to be dearer than their "elevating" deceit. It remains to be understood - what do we need today: a continuation of lies or bitter, like a saving medicine, the truth about the beginning of the Great Patriotic War?

Sergey Brezkun, Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences

No. 605. DIRECTIVE TO THE AGAIN COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE 3rd, 4th AND 10TH ARMIES June 22, 1941
I convey the order of the People's Commissariat of Defense for immediate execution:

1. During June 22 - 23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZapOVO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. The attack may start with provocative actions.

2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.

At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kyiv and Odessa military districts should be in full combat readiness, to meet a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies.

I ORDER:

a) during the night of June 22, 1941, secretly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border;

b) before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse all aviation, including military aviation, over field airfields, carefully disguise it;

c) put all units on combat readiness. Troops keep dispersed and camouflaged;

d) put the air defense on alert without additional lifting of the assigned staff. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;

e) no other activities are to be carried out without special instructions.

Timoshenko Zhukov
Pavlov Fominykh
Klimovsky

CA MO RF. F.208. Op.2513. D.71. L.69. Typescript. There are marks: “Received on June 22, 1941 at 01-45″, “Sent on June 22, 1941 at 02-25 - 02-35″. Original, autograph.

Image copyright RIA Novosti Image caption Semyon Timoshenko and Georgy Zhukov knew everything, but took the secrets to the grave

Until the very beginning of the war and in the first hours after it, Joseph Stalin did not believe in the possibility of a German attack.

He learned about the fact that the Germans were crossing the border and bombing Soviet cities at about 4 am on June 22 from the Chief of the General Staff, Georgy Zhukov.

According to Zhukovsky's "Memoirs and Reflections", the leader did not react to what he heard, but only breathed heavily into the phone, and after a long pause, he limited himself to telling Zhukov and People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko to go to a meeting in the Kremlin.

In a prepared but undelivered speech at a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in May 1956, Zhukov claimed that Stalin forbade opening fire on the enemy.

At the same time, in May-June, Stalin secretly transferred 939 echelons with troops and equipment to the western border, called up 801,000 reservists from the reserve under the guise of training camps, and on June 19, by secret order, reorganized the border military districts into fronts, which was always done and only a few days before. start of hostilities.

"The transfer of troops was planned with the expectation that the concentration would be completed from June 1 to July 10, 1941. The offensive nature of the planned actions influenced the disposition of the troops," the collective monograph "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" published by the Russian Ministry of Defense in 1992 says.

A legitimate question arises: what is the reason for the tragedy of June 22? Usually referred to as "mistakes" and "miscalculations" of the Soviet leadership. But on closer examination, some of them turn out not to be naive delusions, but the result of well-thought-out measures in order to prepare a preemptive strike and subsequent offensive actions Vladimir Danilov, historian

"There was surprise, but only tactical. Hitler was ahead of us!" - said Vyacheslav Molotov to the writer Ivan Stadnyuk in the 1970s.

"The trouble was not in our lack of plans - we had plans! - but in the fact that the suddenly changed situation did not allow them to be carried out," Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky reported in an article written for the 20th anniversary of the Victory, but which was published only at the beginning of 90 -X.

Not the "traitor Rezun", but the president of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army Mahmud Gareev, pointed out: "If there were plans for defensive operations, then the groupings of forces and means would be located in a completely different way, management and echeloning of material reserves would be built differently. But this was not done in the border military districts".

"Stalin's main miscalculation and his fault was not that the country did not prepare for defense (it did not prepare for it), but that it was not possible to accurately determine the moment. A preemptive strike would have saved our Fatherland millions of lives and, possibly, would have led much earlier to the same political results that the country, ruined, hungry, having lost the color of the nation, came in 1945,” said Academician Andrei Sakharov, director of the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Clearly aware of the inevitability of a collision with Germany, the leadership of the USSR until June 22, 1941 did not see itself as a victim, did not guess with a beating heart "they will attack - they will not attack", but worked hard to start a war at a favorable moment and conduct it "small blood on foreign soil." Most researchers agree with this. The difference is in details, dates and, mainly, in moral assessments.

Image copyright RIA Novosti Image caption The war broke out unexpectedly, although foreboding was in the air

On this tragic day, on the eve and immediately after it, amazing things happened that did not fit into either the logic of preparing for defense or the logic of preparing for an offensive.

There is no explanation based on documents and testimonies of the participants in the events, and it is unlikely that it will appear. There are only more or less plausible guesses and versions.

Stalin's dream

Around midnight on June 22, having agreed and allowed Timoshenko and Zhukov to send a controversial document known as "Directive No. 1" to the border districts for their signatures, the leader left the Kremlin for the Middle Dacha.

When Zhukov called with a message about the attack, the guard said that Stalin was sleeping and did not order to wake himself, so the chief of the general staff had to shout at him.

The widespread opinion that the USSR waited for an attack by the enemy, and only then planned an offensive, does not take into account that in this case the strategic initiative would be given into the hands of the enemy, and the Soviet troops were placed in deliberately unfavorable conditions Mikhail Meltyukhov, historian

Saturday, June 21, passed in incredible tension. From the border there were reports that the approaching roar of engines was coming from the German side.

After the Führer's order was read to the German soldiers before the formation at 13:00, two or three communist defectors swam across the Bug to warn the "kamaraden": it would begin tonight. By the way, another mystery is that we do not know anything about these people who should have become heroes in the USSR and the GDR.

Stalin spent the day in the Kremlin in the company of Timoshenko, Zhukov, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov and Mekhlis, analyzing the incoming information and discussing what to do.

Suppose he doubted the data he received and did not take concrete steps. But how could one go to bed without waiting for the denouement when the clock was counting? Moreover, a person who had the habit of working until dawn and sleeping until lunch even in a casual, calm atmosphere?

Plan and directive

In the headquarters of the Soviet troops in the western direction, up to and including divisions, there were detailed and clear cover plans, which were stored in "red packets" and were subject to execution upon receipt of the corresponding order of the People's Commissar of Defense.

Cover plans are different from strategic military plans. This is a set of measures to ensure the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces in the event of a threat of a preemptive attack by the enemy (occupation of fortifications by personnel, the advancement of artillery to tank-prone areas, the rise of aviation and air defense units, and the activation of reconnaissance).

The introduction of a cover plan is not yet a war, but a combat alert.

During the one and a half hour meeting that began at 20:50 on June 21, Stalin did not allow Timoshenko and Zhukov to take this necessary and obvious step.

The directive completely confused the troops on the border Konstantin Pleshakov, historian

In return, the famous "Directive No. 1" was sent to the border districts, which, in particular, stated: "During June 22-23, a surprise attack by the Germans is possible. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions […] at the same time be in in full combat readiness to meet a possible strike […] other measures should not be carried out without a special order.

How can you "meet the blow" without carrying out the activities provided for by the cover plan? How to distinguish a provocation from an attack?

Belated mobilization

Unbelievable, but true: general mobilization in the USSR was not announced on the day the war began, but only on June 23, despite the fact that every hour of delay gave the enemy additional advantages.

The corresponding telegram from the people's commissar of defense was received by the Central Telegraph Office at 16:40 on June 22, although since early morning the leadership of the state, perhaps, had no more pressing task.

At the same time, a short text of only three sentences, written in dry clerical language, did not contain a word about a treacherous attack, defense of the homeland and sacred duty, as if it were a routine call.

Theatrical and concert evening

The command of the Western Special Military District (by that time, in fact, the Western Front), headed by General of the Army Dmitry Pavlov, spent Saturday evening at the Minsk House of Officers at the performance of the operetta "Wedding in Malinovka."

Memoir literature confirms that the phenomenon was massive and ubiquitous. It is hard to imagine that the big commanders in that atmosphere would unanimously go to have fun without instructions from above.

There are numerous testimonies about the cancellation on June 20-21 of earlier orders to increase combat readiness, the unexpected announcement of days off, and the sending of anti-aircraft artillery to training camps.

The anti-aircraft divisions of the 4th Army and the 6th Mechanized Corps of the Western OVO met the war at a training ground 120 km east of Minsk.

Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky was completely bewildered by orders to the troops to send artillery to the firing ranges and other instructions that were ridiculous in that situation.

“On Sunday, the regiment was declared a day off. Everyone was happy: they didn’t rest for three months. On Saturday evening, the command, pilots and technicians left for their families,” recalled former pilot of the 13th bomber regiment Pavel Tsupko.

On June 20, the commander of one of the three ZapOVO air divisions, Nikolai Belov, received an order from the district air force commander to put the division on alert, cancel vacations and dismissals, disperse equipment, and at 16:00 on June 21, it was canceled.

“Stalin sought by the very state and behavior of the troops of the border districts to make it clear that calm reigns here, if not carelessness. As a result, instead of misleading the aggressor with skillful disinformation actions about the combat readiness of our troops, we actually reduced it to extremely low degrees," the former head of the operational department of the headquarters of the 13th Army, Sergei Ivanov, was perplexed.

The ill-fated regiment

But the most incredible story happened in the 122nd Fighter Aviation Regiment, which covered Grodno.

On Friday, June 20, high ranks from Moscow and Minsk arrived at the unit, and at 6 pm on Saturday, an order was announced to the personnel: to remove weapons and ammunition from I-16 fighters and send weapons and ammunition to the warehouse.

Image copyright RIA Novosti Image caption It took several hours to reinstall the removed machine guns on the I-16

The order was so wild and inexplicable that the pilots started talking about treason, but they were silenced.

Needless to say, the next morning the 122nd Air Regiment was completely destroyed.

The grouping of the Soviet Air Force in the western direction consisted of 111 air regiments, including 52 fighter regiments. Why did this one get so much attention?

What happened?

"Stalin, contrary to the obvious facts, believed that this was not yet a war, but a provocation by individual undisciplined units of the German army," Nikita Khrushchev said in a report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

The obsessive thought of some kind of provocation, apparently, was indeed present in Stalin's mind. He developed it both in "Directive No. 1" and at the first meeting in the Kremlin after the start of the invasion, which opened at 05:45 on June 22. Until 06:30, he did not give permission to return fire, until Molotov announced that Germany had officially declared war on the USSR.

The late St. Petersburg historian Igor Bunich claimed that a few days before the start of the war, Hitler sent Stalin a secret personal message warning that some Anglophilizing generals might try to provoke a conflict between the USSR and Germany.

Stalin allegedly remarked to Beria with satisfaction that, they say, this is impossible with us, we have put things in order in our army.

True, it was not possible to find a document in the German or Soviet archives.

Israeli researcher Gabriel Gorodetsky explains Stalin's actions with panic fear and a desire not to give Hitler a reason for aggression at any cost.

Stalin really drove every thought from himself, but not about the war (he didn’t think about anything else), but about the fact that Hitler at the very last moment would be able to get ahead of him Mark Solonin, historian

"Stalin drove away any thought of war, he lost the initiative and was practically paralyzed," writes Gorodetsky.

Opponents object that Stalin was not afraid in November 1940, through the mouth of Molotov, to firmly demand Finland, Southern Bukovina and the base in the Dardanelles from Berlin, and in early April 1941 to conclude an agreement with Yugoslavia that enraged Hitler and at the same time had no practical meaning.

A demonstration of defensive preparations, however, cannot provoke a potential enemy, but can make one think again.

“When dealing with a dangerous enemy, you should probably show him, first of all, your readiness to fight back. If we had demonstrated our true power to Hitler, he might have refrained from war with the USSR at that moment,” the highly experienced staff officer believed Sergei Ivanov, who later rose to the rank of Army General.

According to Alexander Osokin, Stalin, on the contrary, deliberately encouraged Germany to attack in order to appear in the eyes of the world as a victim of aggression and receive American help.

Critics point out that the game in this case turned out to be painfully dangerous, Lend-Lease did not have a self-contained value in Stalin's eyes, and Roosevelt was guided not by the kindergarten principle "who started it?", but by the interests of US national security.

Shoot first

Another hypothesis was put forward by historians Keistut Zakoretsky and Mark Solonin.

During the first three weeks of June, Timoshenko and Zhukov met with Stalin seven times.

According to Zhukov, they called for immediately bringing the troops into some kind of incomprehensible "state of full readiness for war" (preparation was already carried out continuously and at the limit of strength), and, according to a number of modern researchers, to deliver a preemptive strike without waiting for the completion of the strategic deployment .

Truth is stranger than fiction, because fiction has to stay within the bounds of the probable, but truth doesn't Mark Twain

Zakoretsky and Solonin believe that in the face of the obvious aggressive intentions of Berlin, Stalin did listen to the military.

Presumably, at a meeting on June 18 with the participation of Timoshenko, Zhukov, Molotov and Malenkov, it was decided to start a preventive war not sometime, but June 22, the longest day of the year. Only not at dawn, but later.

The war with Finland was preceded by. According to researchers, the war with Germany should also have started with a provocation - a raid by several Junkers and Dorniers bought from the Germans on Grodno. At the hour when residents have breakfast and take to the streets and parks to relax after a week of work.

The propaganda effect would have been deafening, and Stalin could well have sacrificed several dozen civilians in the higher interests.

The version quite logically explains almost everything.

And Stalin's refusal to believe that the Germans would strike almost simultaneously (such coincidences simply do not happen, and what Hitler intends to do in the following days is no longer important).

And the beginning of mobilization on Monday (the decree was prepared in advance, but they did not bother to redo it in the confusion of the first morning of the war).

There are two wills in the field Russian proverb

And the disarmament of the fighters based near Grodno (so that one of the "vultures" is not inadvertently shot down over Soviet territory).

Deliberate complacency made the fascist cunning even more flagrant. The bombs were supposed to fall on a peaceful Soviet city in the midst of complete prosperity. Contrary to popular belief, the demonstration was not addressed to the Germans, but to their own citizens.

It also becomes clear that Stalin did not want to blur the effect by putting the cover plan into action ahead of time.

Unfortunately for the USSR, the aggression turned out to be real.

However, this is only a hypothesis, which the authors themselves emphasize.

The first 4 hours of the Great Patriotic War.

For the first time, the events of the first day of the war are told directly at the sites of the main hostilities. There is a lot of new, unknown to the viewer information in the film. For example, about the fact that the first Soviet city was recaptured from the Germans on June 23, 1941! About the fierce battles in the Vladimir-Volynsky region, about the feat of the garrisons of the Soviet fortified areas, about the fact that the Soviet Air Force was not destroyed, as the almost official myth says, as well as about other little-known pages of the war.

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War

Get up, great country,
Stand up for the death fight
With dark fascist power,
With the damned horde!

On the fifth day of the war, the whole country sang this song to the verses of Lebedev-Kumach and the music of Aleksandrov.

And the war began at dawn on June 22, 1941. Fascist Germany treacherously, without declaring war, attacked the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its aircraft delivered massive strikes against airfields, railway junctions, naval bases, quarterings for military units and many cities to a depth of 250-300 km from the border.

Here it is necessary to remember that the Soviet Union in 1941 was going to celebrate the 24th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

During these 24 years, our country has achieved a lot. Automobile plants were built in Moscow, Gorky, Yaroslavl. Tractor factories appeared in Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kharkov, Chelyabinsk. All of them could make tanks. Our aviation set world records for flight range. The Soviet state could resist any other state, but it was difficult for us to fight all of Europe.

Nazi Germany and its satellites concentrated large contingents of troops against the Soviet Union - 190 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) and a large amount of military equipment: about 4300 tanks and assault guns, 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, 4980 combat aircraft and over 190 warships. And all this power was thrown at our country. From the ice of the Arctic to the Black Sea, the war scorched the fire of conflagrations, destroyed cities and burned villages, and civilians died.

According to the Barbarossa plan, Germany wanted to defeat the Soviet Union in six weeks. At the same time, the main forces of the Red Army were supposed to be destroyed, preventing them from retreating into the depths of the country. But the plans of the fascist command from the very beginning of the war were thwarted by the courage and heroism of our army and the whole people.

First hit

The frontier troops and divisions located near the border were the first to receive the enemy's blow. We had more than 500 frontier outposts along the western border. The Nazi command allotted no more than 30 minutes for the destruction of the outpost. But the outposts fought for days and weeks, and the Brest Fortress, located on the border at the confluence of the Mukhavets River with the Bug River, fought with enemies for more than a month. All this time, the defenders of the Brest Fortress fettered an entire Nazi division. Most of the defenders of the fortress fell in battle, some made their way to the partisans, some of the seriously wounded, exhausted, were captured. The defense of the Brest Fortress is a vivid example of patriotism and mass heroism of Soviet soldiers. Representatives of 30 nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union fought among the defenders of the Brest Fortress.

But, despite the heroic resistance, the covering troops could not detain the enemy in the border zone. In order to save forces, the Soviet troops were forced to retreat to new lines.

The Nazi troops in a short time advanced 400-450 km northwest, 450-600 km in the west, 300-350 km southwest, captured the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, part of Estonia, a significant part of Ukraine, almost all of Belarus, Moldova, invaded the western regions of the Russian Federation, reached the distant approaches to Leningrad, threatened Smolensk and Kyiv. Mortal danger hung over the Soviet Union.

Based on the prevailing situation, the Soviet command at the end of June decided to switch to strategic defense on the entire Soviet-German front. The troops of the first strategic echelon were given the task of preparing a system of echeloned defensive lines and lines in the directions of the main attacks of the enemy, relying on which, by stubborn and active opposition, to undermine the offensive power of the enemy, stop him and buy time to prepare a counteroffensive.

The feat of the army and the people

The perfidious attack of Nazi Germany aroused the anger and indignation of the Soviet people. In a single impulse, he rose to the defense of his homeland. At rallies that swept across the country, the Soviet people stigmatized the fascist barbarians and swore to severely punish the invaders who broke in. Military registration and enlistment offices were stormed by thousands of young men and women, men and women - communists, Komsomol members and non-party people. They demanded immediate dispatch to the front, filed an application with a request to be sent behind enemy lines, to partisan detachments.

The misfortune that befell the Fatherland rallied the whole people as never before. The whole people, the whole vast country rose up to fight to the death for a holy and just cause. Every day that passed both at the front and in the rear was measured by the answer to the question: What did you do for the front, for victory? The efforts of the whole people - soldiers, workers, collective farmers, intellectuals - were subordinated to one goal - to defend the Motherland from the fascist barbarians. And for this he spared neither his strength nor his life.

The word patriotism acquired a special meaning and meaning. It did not require any translations or explanations. Love for the Motherland beat in the heart of every Soviet person: whether he stood for the fifth day in the workshop at the machine tool or went to ram an enemy aircraft, whether he gave his personal savings to the defense fund or blood for wounded soldiers.

Already in the first days and weeks of the war, thousands of feats and boundless self-sacrifice of the bravest Soviet soldiers were inscribed in its annals. At that time, the names of most of these courageous people who fought to the last bullet, to the last drop of blood, were not yet known.

The results of these days and weeks, the most difficult for the Soviet people and their soldiers, already testified to the first failures in the implementation of Hitler's plans for a "blitzkrieg".

The enemy failed to destroy the main forces of the Soviet Army in the border battles, as he expected. The resistance of our troops grew every day. And in the deep rear, reserves for the front were being prepared at an accelerated pace. It was incredibly difficult to form, arm and train new regiments, divisions of the Soviet Army, but every day an increasingly powerful stream of fresh reserves went to the front. He significantly exceeded the reserves of the enemy, coming to the front to make up for the losses he had suffered.

Hundreds of industrial enterprises were at that time on wheels - they were relocated from threatened areas to the deep rear of the country. It took time to install the equipment and put it into operation in new places. The most active part of the working class and specialists of operating enterprises left for the ranks of the Soviet Army. Only a small part of skilled workers and specialists remained at the enterprises, without which it was impossible to start mass production of military products. Those leaving for the front were replaced by hundreds of thousands of women and teenagers.

But even these difficulties were overcome in the shortest possible time. The release of weapons, military equipment, ammunition and various equipment for the defenders of the Motherland increased every day.

Mass labor heroism was also shown by the workers of socialist agriculture. Collective farms and state farms transferred a huge number of tractors and motor vehicles to equip the reserves of troops. There are even fewer men left in this sector of the economy than in industry and transport. And in the countryside, women and teenagers became the decisive force. It was they who had to harvest the vast sown areas. Remove mostly by hand. In front-line areas, harvesting was often carried out under enemy fire. And, nevertheless, with the help of hundreds of thousands of citizens, students and schoolchildren, agricultural workers also coped with the most important task for the front and the whole country - they laid in the state bins such an amount of food without which the war would have been successful.

In its entire course, the war showed that the courage and heroism of the Soviet people turned out to be an invincible force that managed to prevent the gravest crime against humanity.

On June 22, 1941, at 4 o'clock in the morning, fascist Germany treacherously invaded the USSR without declaring war. This attack ended the chain of aggressive actions of Hitlerite Germany, which, thanks to the connivance and instigation of the Western powers, grossly violated the elementary norms of international law, resorted to predatory seizures and monstrous atrocities in the occupied countries.

In accordance with the Barbarossa plan, the fascist offensive began on a broad front by several groupings in various directions. The army was stationed in the north "Norway" advancing on Murmansk and Kandalaksha; an army group was advancing from East Prussia to the Baltic states and Leningrad "North"; most powerful army group "Centre" had the goal of defeating units of the Red Army in Belorussia, capturing Vitebsk-Smolensk and taking Moscow on the move; army group "South" was concentrated from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube and led the attack on Kyiv - Donbass. The plans of the Nazis boiled down to delivering a surprise strike in these areas, destroying border and military units, breaking through to the rear, capturing Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and the most important industrial centers of the southern regions of the country.

The command of the German army expected to end the war in 6-8 weeks.

190 enemy divisions, about 5.5 million soldiers, up to 50 thousand guns and mortars, 4300 tanks, almost 5 thousand aircraft and about 200 warships were thrown into the offensive against the Soviet Union.

The war began in exceptionally favorable conditions for Germany. Before the attack on the USSR, Germany captured almost all of Western Europe, whose economy worked for the Nazis. Therefore, Germany had a powerful material and technical base.

Germany's military products were supplied by 6,500 largest enterprises in Western Europe. More than 3 million foreign workers were involved in the military industry. In Western European countries, the Nazis looted a lot of weapons, military equipment, trucks, wagons and steam locomotives. The military and economic resources of Germany and its allies greatly exceeded those of the USSR. Germany fully mobilized its army, as well as the armies of its allies. Most of the German army was concentrated near the borders of the Soviet Union. In addition, imperialist Japan threatened an attack from the East, which diverted a significant part of the Soviet Armed Forces to defend the country's eastern borders. In the theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU "50 years of the Great October Socialist Revolution" an analysis of the reasons for the temporary failures of the Red Army in the initial period of the war is given. They are connected with the fact that the Nazis used temporary advantages:

• the militarization of the economy and the whole life of Germany;
• lengthy preparations for a war of conquest and more than two years of experience in conducting military operations in the West;
• superiority in armament and the number of troops concentrated in advance in the border zones.

They had at their disposal the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe. The miscalculations made in determining the possible timing of an attack by Nazi Germany on our country and the related omissions in preparing to repulse the first blows played their role. There were reliable data on the concentration of German troops near the borders of the USSR and the preparation of Germany for an attack on our country. However, the troops of the western military districts were not brought to a state of full combat readiness.

All these reasons put the Soviet country in a difficult position. However, the enormous difficulties of the initial period of the war did not break the fighting spirit of the Red Army, did not shake the stamina of the Soviet people. From the first days of the attack, it became clear that the blitzkrieg plan had collapsed. Accustomed to easy victories over the Western countries, whose governments betrayed their people to be torn to pieces by the occupiers, the fascists met stubborn resistance from the Soviet Armed Forces, border guards and the entire Soviet people. The war lasted 1418 days. Groups of border guards bravely fought on the border. The garrison of the Brest Fortress covered itself with unfading glory. The defense of the fortress was led by Captain I. N. Zubachev, regimental commissar E. M. Fomin, Major P. M. Gavrilov and others. (In total, about 200 rams were made during the war years). On June 26, the crew of Captain N.F. Gastello (A.A. Burdenyuk, G.N. Skorobogaty, A.A. Kalinin) crashed into a column of enemy troops on a burning plane. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers from the first days of the war showed examples of courage and heroism.

Lasted two months Smolensk battle. Born here near Smolensk soviet guard. The battle in the Smolensk region delayed the enemy advance until mid-September 1941.
During the Battle of Smolensk, the Red Army thwarted the plans of the enemy. The delay of the enemy offensive in the central direction was the first strategic success of the Soviet troops.

The Communist Party became the leading and guiding force for the defense of the country and the preparation for the destruction of the Nazi troops. From the first days of the war, the Party took urgent measures to organize a rebuff to the aggressor, carried out a huge amount of work to restructure all work on a war footing, to turn the country into a single military camp.

“For a real war,” wrote V. I. Lenin, “a strong organized rear is necessary. The best army, the most devoted to the cause of the revolution, people will be immediately exterminated by the enemy if they are not sufficiently armed, supplied with food, and trained ”(V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., vol. 35, p. 408).

These Leninist instructions formed the basis for organizing the struggle against the enemy. On June 22, 1941, on behalf of the Soviet government, V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, spoke on the radio about the "robber" attack of fascist Germany and a call to fight the enemy. On the same day, a Decree was adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the introduction of martial law on the European territory of the USSR, as well as a Decree on the mobilization of a number of ages in 14 military districts. On June 23, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the tasks of party and Soviet organizations in war conditions. On June 24, the Evacuation Council was formed, and on June 27, by a decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On the procedure for the export and placement of human contingents and valuable property”, the procedure for the evacuation of productive forces and the population to the eastern regions was determined. In the directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 29, 1941, the most important tasks for mobilizing all forces and means to defeat the enemy were set out to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions.

“... In the war with fascist Germany imposed on us,” this document said, “the question of life and death of the Soviet state is being decided, of whether the peoples of the Soviet Union should be free or fall into enslavement.” The Central Committee and the Soviet government urged to realize the full depth of the danger, to reorganize all work on a war footing, to organize all-round assistance to the front, to increase the production of weapons, ammunition, tanks, aircraft in every possible way, to export all valuable property in the event of the forced withdrawal of the Red Army, and to destroy what cannot be taken out , in the areas occupied by the enemy to organize partisan detachments. On July 3, the main provisions of the directive were outlined in a radio speech by IV Stalin. The directive determined the nature of the war, the degree of threat and danger, set the tasks of turning the country into a single military camp, strengthening the Armed Forces in every possible way, restructuring the work of the rear on a military basis, and mobilizing all forces to repulse the enemy. On June 30, 1941, an emergency body was created to quickly mobilize all the forces and means of the country to repel and defeat the enemy - State Defense Committee (GKO) headed by I. V. Stalin. All power in the country, state, military and economic leadership was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee. It united the activities of all state and military institutions, party, trade union and Komsomol organizations.

Under war conditions, the restructuring of the entire economy on a war footing was of paramount importance. approved at the end of June "Mobilization national economic plan for the III quarter of 1941", and on August 16 "The military economic plan for the IV quarter of 1941 and for 1942 for the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia". In just five months of 1941, more than 1360 large military enterprises were relocated and about 10 million people were evacuated. Even according to bourgeois experts industry evacuation in the second half of 1941 and early 1942 and its deployment in the East should be considered among the most amazing feats of the peoples of the Soviet Union during the war. The evacuated Kramatorsk plant was launched 12 days after arriving at the site, Zaporozhye - after 20. By the end of 1941, the Urals produced 62% of iron and 50% of steel. In scope and significance, this was equal to the largest battles of wartime. The restructuring of the national economy on a war footing was completed by the middle of 1942.

The Party did a great deal of organizational work in the army. In accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, on July 16, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree "On the reorganization of political propaganda bodies and the introduction of the institution of military commissars". From July 16 in the Army, and from July 20 in the Navy, the institution of military commissars was introduced. During the second half of 1941, up to 1.5 million communists and more than 2 million Komsomol members were mobilized into the army (the party sent up to 40% of the entire membership to the active army). Prominent party leaders L. I. Brezhnev, A. A. Zhdanov, A. S. Shcherbakov, M. A. Suslov and others were sent to party work in the army.

On August 8, 1941, I. V. Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander of all the Armed Forces of the USSR. In order to concentrate all the functions of managing military operations, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was formed. Hundreds of thousands of communists and Komsomol members went to the front. About 300 thousand of the best representatives of the working class and intelligentsia of Moscow and Leningrad joined the ranks of the people's militia.

Meanwhile, the enemy stubbornly rushed to Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, Odessa, Sevastopol and other major industrial centers of the country. An important place in the plans of fascist Germany was occupied by the calculation of the international isolation of the USSR. However, from the very first days of the war, an anti-Hitler coalition began to take shape. Already on June 22, 1941, the British government announced its support for the USSR in the fight against fascism, and on July 12 signed an agreement on joint actions against Nazi Germany. On August 2, 1941, US President F. Roosevelt announced economic support for the Soviet Union. September 29, 1941 gathered in Moscow tri-power conference(USSR, USA and England), which developed a plan for Anglo-American assistance in the fight against the enemy. Hitler's calculation for the international isolation of the USSR failed. On January 1, 1942, a declaration of 26 states was signed in Washington anti-Hitler coalition about the use of all the resources of these countries for the struggle against the German bloc. However, the allies were in no hurry to provide effective assistance aimed at defeating fascism, trying to weaken the belligerents.

By October, the Nazi invaders, despite the heroic resistance of our troops, managed to approach Moscow from three sides, simultaneously launching an offensive on the Don, in the Crimea, near Leningrad. Heroically defended Odessa and Sevastopol. September 30, 1941 the German command begins the first, and in November - the second general offensive against Moscow. The Nazis managed to occupy Klin, Yakhroma, Naro-Fominsk, Istra and other cities of the Moscow region. Soviet troops fought a heroic defense of the capital, showing examples of courage and heroism. The 316th rifle division of General Panfilov fought to the death in fierce battles. A partisan movement unfolded behind enemy lines. About 10 thousand partisans fought near Moscow alone. On December 5-6, 1941, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Moscow. At the same time, offensive operations were launched on the Western, Kalinin and Southwestern fronts. The powerful offensive of the Soviet troops in the winter of 1941/42 drove the fascists back in a number of places at a distance of up to 400 km from the capital and was their first major defeat in World War II.

Main result Moscow battle consisted in the fact that the strategic initiative was wrested from the hands of the enemy and the blitzkrieg plan failed. The defeat of the Germans near Moscow was a decisive turn in the military operations of the Red Army and had a great influence on the entire subsequent course of the war.

By the spring of 1942, the production of military products was established in the eastern regions of the country. By the middle of the year, most of the evacuated enterprises were deployed in new places. The transfer of the country's economy to a military footing was largely completed. In the rear - in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals - there were more than 10 thousand industrial construction projects.

Instead of men who went to the front, women and youth came to the machines. Despite very difficult living conditions, Soviet people worked selflessly to ensure victory at the front. They worked one and a half to two shifts to restore industry and supply the front with everything necessary. All-Union socialist competition developed widely, the winners of which were awarded Red Banner GKO. In 1942 agricultural workers organized overplanned crops for the defense fund. The collective farm peasantry supplied the front and rear with food and industrial raw materials.

The situation in the temporarily occupied regions of the country was exceptionally difficult. The Nazis plundered cities and villages, mocked the civilian population. At the enterprises, German officials were appointed to oversee the work. The best lands were selected for farming for German soldiers. In all occupied settlements, German garrisons were kept at the expense of the population. However, the economic and social policy of the Nazis, which they tried to pursue in the occupied territories, immediately failed. The Soviet people, brought up on the ideas of the Communist Party, believed in the victory of the Soviet country, did not succumb to Hitler's provocations and demagogy.

Winter offensive of the Red Army in 1941/42 dealt a powerful blow to fascist Germany, to its military machine, but the Nazi army was still strong. Soviet troops fought stubborn defensive battles.

In this situation, the nationwide struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines played an important role, especially partisan movement.

Thousands of Soviet people went to partisan detachments. A partisan war developed widely in the Ukraine, in Belorussia and in the Smolensk region, in the Crimea and in a number of other places. In cities and villages temporarily occupied by the enemy, underground party and Komsomol organizations operated. In accordance with the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 18, 1941 No. "On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops" 3,500 partisan detachments and groups, 32 underground regional committees, 805 city and district party committees, 5,429 primary party organizations, 10 regional, 210 inter-district city and 45 thousand primary Komsomol organizations were created. To coordinate the actions of partisan detachments and underground groups with units of the Red Army, by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on May 30, 1942, at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the central headquarters of the partisan movement. Headquarters for the leadership of the partisan movement were formed in Belarus, Ukraine and other republics and regions occupied by the enemy.

After the defeat near Moscow and the winter offensive of our troops, the Nazi command was preparing a new major offensive with the aim of capturing all the southern regions of the country (Crimea, the North Caucasus, the Don) up to the Volga, capturing Stalingrad and tearing Transcaucasia from the center of the country. This posed an exceptionally serious threat to our country.

By the summer of 1942, the international situation had changed, characterized by the strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition. In May - June 1942, agreements were signed between the USSR, Britain and the USA on an alliance in the war against Germany and on post-war cooperation. In particular, an agreement was reached on the opening in 1942 in Europe second front against Germany, which would have greatly accelerated the defeat of fascism. But the allies in every possible way delayed its opening. Taking advantage of this, the fascist command transferred divisions from the Western Front to the Eastern. By the spring of 1942, the Nazi army had 237 divisions, massive aviation, tanks, artillery and other types of equipment for a new offensive.

intensified Leningrad blockade, almost daily subjected to artillery fire. In May, the Kerch Strait was captured. On July 3, the High Command ordered the heroic defenders of Sevastopol to leave the city after a 250-day defense, since it was not possible to keep the Crimea. As a result of the defeat of the Soviet troops in the area of ​​Kharkov and the Don, the enemy reached the Volga. The Stalingrad Front, created in July, took upon itself the powerful blows of the enemy. Retreating with heavy fighting, our troops inflicted huge damage on the enemy. In parallel, the fascist offensive was going on in the North Caucasus, where Stavropol, Krasnodar, Maykop were occupied. In the Mozdok area, the Nazi offensive was suspended.

The main battles unfolded on the Volga. The enemy sought to capture Stalingrad at any cost. The heroic defense of the city was one of the brightest pages of the Patriotic War. The working class, women, old people, teenagers - the entire population rose to the defense of Stalingrad. Despite the mortal danger, the workers of the tractor factory daily sent tanks to the front lines. In September, fighting broke out in the city for every street, for every house.

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“On June 21 at 21.00, a soldier who had fled from the German army, Liskov Alfred, was detained at the site of the Sokal commandant's office. Since there was no interpreter at the commandant's office, I ordered the commandant of the section, Captain Bershadsky, to deliver the soldier in the city of Vladimir to the detachment headquarters by truck.

At 0.30 on June 22, 1941, the soldier arrived in the city of Vladimir-Volynsk. Through an interpreter, at about 1 a.m., soldier Liskov testified that on June 22, at dawn, the Germans should cross the border. I immediately reported this to the responsible officer on duty at the headquarters of the troops, Brigadier Commissar Maslovsky. At the same time, I personally informed the commander of the 5th Army, Major General Potapov, by telephone, who was suspicious of my message, not taking it into account.

I personally was also not firmly convinced of the veracity of the message of soldier Liskov, but nevertheless called the commandants of the districts and ordered to strengthen the protection of the state border, to put up special listeners to the river. Bug and in the event of the Germans crossing the river, destroy them with fire. At the same time, he ordered that if anything suspicious was noticed (any movement on the adjacent side), immediately report to me personally. I was at headquarters all the time.

The commandants of the districts at 1.00 on June 22 reported to me that nothing suspicious was seen on the adjacent side, everything is calm ... "("Mechanisms of War" with reference to the RGVA, f. 32880, on. 5, d. 279, l. 2. Copy).

Despite doubts about the reliability of the information transmitted by the German soldier, and the skeptical attitude towards it on the part of the commander of the 5th Army, it was promptly transferred "upstairs".

From the telephone message of the UNKGB in the Lvov region to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR.

" On June 22, 1941, at 3:10 a.m., the UNKGB in the Lvov region transmitted the following message by telephone to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR: “A German corporal who crossed the border in the Sokal region testified as follows: his surname is Liskov Alfred Germanovich, 30 years old, worker, carpenter of a furniture factory in Kolberg (Bavaria), where he left his wife, child, mother and father.

The corporal served in the 221st sapper regiment of the 15th division. The regiment is located in the village of Tselenzha, which is 5 km north of Sokal. He was drafted into the army from the reserve in 1939.

He considers himself a communist, is a member of the Union of Red Soldiers, says that life in Germany is very hard for soldiers and workers.

Before evening, his company commander, Lieutenant Schultz, gave the order and announced that tonight, after artillery preparation, their unit would begin crossing the Bug on rafts, boats and pontoons. As a supporter of the Soviet government, having learned about this, he decided to run to us and tell us.("History in documents" with reference to "1941. Documents". Soviet archives. "News of the Central Committee of the CPSU", 1990, No. 4. ").

G.K. Zhukov recalls: “At about 24 o’clock on June 21, the commander of the Kyiv district, M.P. Kirponos, who was at his command post in Ternopil, reported via HF [...] another German soldier appeared in our units - 222- 1st Infantry Regiment of the 74th Infantry Division. He swam across the river, appeared to the border guards and said that the German troops would go on the offensive at 4 o'clock. MP Kirponos was ordered to quickly transfer the directive to the troops to put them on alert ... ".

However, there was no time left. The above-mentioned head of the 90th border detachment, M.S. Bychkovsky, continues his testimony as follows:

"... In view of the fact that the translators in the detachment are weak, I called a German teacher from the city, who was fluent in German, and Liskov repeated the same thing again, that is, that the Germans were preparing to attack the USSR at dawn on June 22, 1941. Named himself a communist and declared that he had come specially to warn him on his own initiative.

Without finishing the interrogation of the soldier, he heard strong artillery fire in the direction of Ustilug (the first commandant's office). I realized that it was the Germans who opened fire on our territory, which was immediately confirmed by the interrogated soldier. I immediately began to call the commandant by phone, but the connection was broken ... "(cit. source) The Great Patriotic War began.

03:00 - 13:00, General Staff - Kremlin. First hours of the war

Was the German attack on the USSR completely unexpected? What did the generals, the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense do in the first hours of the war? There is a version that the beginning of the war was banally overslept - both in the border units and in Moscow. With the news of the bombardment of Soviet cities and the transition of the fascist troops to the offensive, confusion and panic arose in the capital.

Here is how G.K. Zhukov recalls the events of that night: “On the night of June 22, 1941, all employees of the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense were ordered to remain in their places. It was necessary to transfer to the districts as soon as possible a directive on bringing the border troops on combat readiness. At this time, the People's Commissar of Defense and I were in continuous negotiations with the commanders of the districts and the chiefs of staff, who reported to us about the increasing noise on the other side of the border.They received this information from the border guards and advanced cover units.Everything indicated that the German troops were moving closer to the border."

The first message about the beginning of the war was received by the General Staff at 03:07 on June 22, 1941.

Zhukov writes: “At 03:07, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, F.S. Oktyabrsky, called me on HF and said: “The VNOS [airborne surveillance, warning and communications] system of the fleet reports on the approach from the sea of ​​a large number of unknown aircraft; the fleet is in full combat readiness, I ask for instructions" [...]

“At 4 o’clock I again spoke with F.S. Oktyabrsky. He reported in a calm tone: “The enemy raid has been repulsed. An attempt to hit the ships was thwarted. But there is destruction in the city.”

As can be seen from these lines, the beginning of the war did not take the Black Sea Fleet by surprise. The air raid was repulsed.

03.30: Chief of Staff of the Western District, General Klimovskikh, reported on an enemy air raid on the cities of Belarus.

03:33 The chief of staff of the Kyiv district, General Purkaev, reported on an air raid on the cities of Ukraine.

03:40: Commander of the Baltic District General Kuznetsov and reported on the raid on Kaunas and other cities.

03:40: People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko ordered the Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov to call Stalin at the "Near Dacha" and report on the start of hostilities. After listening to Zhukov, Stalin ordered:

Come with Tymoshenko to the Kremlin. Tell Poskrebyshev to call all the members of the Politburo.

04.10: The Western and Baltic special districts reported the start of hostilities by German troops in the land sectors.

At 4:30 am, members of the Politburo, People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko, and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov gathered in the Kremlin. Stalin asked to urgently contact the German embassy.

The embassy said that Ambassador Count von Schulenburg asked to receive him for an urgent message. Molotov went to meet Schulenberg. Returning to the office, he said:

The German government has declared war on us.

At 07:15, JV Stalin signed a directive to the Armed Forces of the USSR on the repulse of Hitler's aggression.

At 9:30 a.m., I. V. Stalin, in the presence of S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov, edited and signed a decree on mobilization and the imposition of martial law in the European part of the country, as well as on the formation of the Headquarters of the High Command and a number of other documents .

On the morning of June 22, it was decided that at 12 o'clock V. M. Molotov would address the peoples of the Soviet Union with the Statement of the Soviet Government by radio.

“JV Stalin,” recalls Zhukov, “being seriously ill, of course, could not make an appeal to the Soviet people. He, together with Molotov, drafted a statement.”

“At about 1 pm I.V. Stalin called me,” writes Zhukov in his memoirs, “and said:

Our front commanders do not have sufficient experience in directing the combat operations of troops and, apparently, are somewhat confused. The Politburo has decided to send you to the Southwestern Front as a representative of the Headquarters of the High Command. We will send Shaposhnikov and Kulik to the Western Front. I called them to my place and gave the appropriate instructions. You need to fly immediately to Kyiv and from there, together with Khrushchev, go to the front headquarters in Ternopil.

I asked:

And who will lead the General Staff in such a difficult situation?
JV Stalin replied:

Leave Vatutin behind.

Don't waste your time, we'll get around here somehow.

I called home so that they would not wait for me, and after 40 minutes I was already in the air. I just remembered that I hadn't eaten anything since yesterday. The pilots helped me out by treating me with strong tea and sandwiches. (the chronology is based on the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov).

05:30. Hitler announces the start of war with the USSR

On June 22, 1941, at 5:30 am, Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels, in a special broadcast on the Great German Radio, read out Adolf Hitler's appeal to the German people in connection with the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union.

“...Today, 160 Russian divisions are stationed on our border,” the appeal said, in particular. “In recent weeks, there have been continuous violations of this border, not only ours, but also in the far north and in Romania. Russian pilots amuse themselves by that they carelessly fly over this border, as if they want to show us that they already feel like masters of this territory.On the night of June 17-18, Russian patrols again invaded the territory of the Reich and were driven out only after a long skirmish.But now the hour has come when it is necessary to oppose this conspiracy of Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and also Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik center in Moscow.

German people! At the moment, the greatest in terms of its extent and volume of military action, which the world has ever seen, is being carried out. In alliance with the Finnish comrades are the fighters of the winner at Narvik near the Arctic Ocean. The German divisions under the command of the conqueror of Norway, together with the Finnish heroes of the struggle for freedom, under the command of their marshal, defend the Finnish land. Formations of the German eastern front were deployed from East Prussia to the Carpathians. On the banks of the Prut and in the lower reaches of the Danube to the Black Sea coast, Romanian and German soldiers unite under the command of the head of state, Antonescu.

The task of this front is no longer to protect individual countries, but to ensure the security of Europe and thereby the salvation of all.

That is why I have decided today to once again place the fate and future of the German Reich and our people in the hands of our soldiers. May the Lord help us in this struggle!

Battles across the front

Fascist troops went on the offensive along the entire front. Not everywhere the attack developed according to the scenario conceived by the German General Staff. The Black Sea Fleet repelled an air raid. In the south, in the north, the Wehrmacht failed to gain an overwhelming advantage. Heavy positional battles ensued here.

Army Group "North" ran into fierce resistance from Soviet tankers near the city of Alytus. The capture of the crossing over the Neman was critical for the advancing German forces. Here, units of the 3rd Panzer Group of the Nazis stumbled upon the organized resistance of the 5th Panzer Division.

Only dive bombers managed to break the resistance of the Soviet tankers. The 5th Panzer Division did not have air cover, under the threat of destruction of manpower and materiel, it began to retreat.

The bombers swooped down on the Soviet tanks until noon on 23 June. The division lost almost all armored vehicles and, in fact, ceased to exist. However, on the first day of the war, the tankers did not leave the line and stopped the advance of the Nazi troops inland.

The main blow of the German troops fell on Belarus. Here the Brest Fortress stood in the way of the Nazis. In the first seconds of the war, a hail of bombs fell on the city, followed by heavy artillery fire. After that, units of the 45th Infantry Division went on the attack.

The hurricane fire of the Nazis caught the defenders of the fortress by surprise. However, the garrison, numbering 7-8 thousand people, put up fierce resistance to the advancing German units.

By the middle of the day on June 22, the Brest Fortress was completely surrounded. Part of the garrison managed to break out of the "cauldron", part was blocked and continued to resist.

By the evening of the first day of the war, the Nazis managed to capture the southwestern part of the fortress city, the northeast was under the control of Soviet troops. Pockets of resistance also remained in the territories controlled by the Nazis.

Despite the complete encirclement and overwhelming superiority in people and equipment, the Nazis failed to break the resistance of the defenders of the Brest Fortress. Skirmishes continued here until November 1941.

Battle for air supremacy

From the first minutes of the war, the USSR Air Force entered into a fierce battle with enemy aircraft. The attack was sudden, some of the aircraft did not have time to rise from the airfields and were destroyed on the ground. The Belarusian military district took the greatest blow. The 74th assault aviation regiment, which was based in Pruzhany, was attacked at about 4 am by Messerschmites. The regiment did not have air defense systems, the planes were not dispersed, as a result of which enemy aircraft smashed equipment as if on a training ground.

A completely different situation developed in the 33rd Fighter Aviation Regiment. Here the pilots entered the battle as early as 3.30 in the morning, when over Brest the link of Lieutenant Mochalov shot down a German plane. This is how the Aviation Encyclopedia website "Corner of the Sky" describes the battle of the 33rd IAP (article by A. Gulyas):

"Soon, about 20 He-111s flew into the airfield of the regiment under the cover of a small group of Bf-109s. At that time, there was only one squadron there, which took off and entered the battle. Soon the other three squadrons, returning from patrolling the Brest-Kobrin area, joined it. "In the battle the enemy lost 5 aircraft. Two Non-111s were destroyed by Lieutenant Gudimov. He won his last victory at 5.20 in the morning, ramming a German bomber. Twice more, the regiment successfully intercepted large groups of Heinkels on the distant approaches to the airfield. After another interception, the returning already on the last liters of fuel, the regiment's I-16s were attacked by Messerschmitts. No one could take off to help. The airfield was subjected to continuous attack for almost an hour. By 10 o'clock in the morning, not a single aircraft capable of taking off was left in the regiment ... ".

The 123rd Fighter Aviation Regiment, whose airfield was located near the town of Imenin, just like the 74th Attack Aviation Regiment, did not have anti-aircraft cover. However, its pilots were in the air from the first minutes of the war:

“By 5.00 am, B.N. Surin already had a personal victory - he shot down a Bf-109. On the fourth sortie, being seriously wounded, he brought his“ seagull ”to the airfield, but could no longer land. Obviously, he died in the cockpit while leveling ... Boris Nikolaevich Surin fought 4 battles, personally shot down 3 German aircraft. But this did not become a record. The young pilot Ivan Kalabushkin turned out to be the best sniper of the day: at dawn he destroyed two Ju-88s, closer to noon - He-111, and sunset, two Bf-109s were sent as victims of his nimble "gulls"! .. "- reports the Aviation Encyclopedia.

“At about eight in the morning, four fighters piloted by Mr. M.P. Mozhaev, L. G.N. Zhidov, P.S. Ryabtsev and Nazarov flew out against the eight Messerschmitt-109. Taking Zhidov’s car into the “pincers” ", the Germans knocked her out. Rescuing a comrade, Mozhaev shot down one fascist. Zhidov set fire to the second. Having used up ammunition, Ryabtsev rammed a third enemy. Thus, in this battle, the enemy lost 3 cars, and we lost one. For 10 hours, the pilots of the 123rd IAP were heavy fighting, making 10-14 and even 17 sorties. Technicians, working under enemy fire, ensured the readiness of aircraft. During the day, the regiment shot down about 30 (according to other sources, more than 20) enemy aircraft, losing 9 of its own in the air."

Unfortunately, in the absence of communication and the prevailing confusion, timely delivery of ammunition and fuel was not organized. Fighting vehicles fought to the last drop of gasoline and the last bullet. After that, they froze dead on the airfield and became easy prey for the Nazis.

The total losses of Soviet aircraft on the first day of the war amounted to 1160 aircraft.

12:00. Radio speech by V.M. Molotov

At noon on June 22, 1941, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov read out an appeal to the citizens of the Soviet Union:

"CITIZENS AND CITIZENS OF THE SOVIET UNION!

The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, have instructed me to make the following statement:

Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities - Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Sevastopol, Kaunas from their aircraft. and some others, more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy aircraft raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territory.

This unheard-of attack on our country is treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized peoples. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and Germany and the Soviet government fulfilled all the conditions of this pact in all good faith. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that during the entire period of the validity of this treaty the German government could never make a single claim against the Soviet Union regarding the fulfillment of the treaty. The entire responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union falls entirely on the German fascist rulers.

Already after the attack, the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, at 5:30 in the morning, made a statement to me, as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of his government that the German government had decided to go to war against the Soviet Union in connection with the concentration of Red Army units near eastern German border.

In response to this, on behalf of the Soviet government, I stated that until the last minute the German government did not make any claims against the Soviet government, that Germany attacked the Soviet Union, despite the peace-loving position of the Soviet Union, and that thereby fascist Germany was the attacking side .

On instructions from the government of the Soviet Union, I must also state that at no point did our troops and our aviation allow the border to be violated, and therefore the statement made by the Romanian radio this morning that allegedly Soviet aircraft fired at Romanian airfields is a complete lie and provocation. Hitler's entire declaration today is just as much a lie and a provocation, trying to concoct, retroactively, accusatory material about non-compliance by the Soviet Union with the Soviet-German pact.

Now that the attack on the Soviet Union has already taken place, the Soviet government has given an order to our troops to beat off the piratical attack and drive the German troops out of our homeland.

This war was imposed on us not by the German people, not by the German workers, peasants and intelligentsia, whose sufferings we understand very well, but by a clique of bloodthirsty fascist rulers of Germany who enslaved the French, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other peoples .

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its unshakable confidence that our valiant army and navy and the brave falcons of Soviet aviation will honorably fulfill their duty to their homeland, to the Soviet people, and deal a crushing blow to the aggressor.
This is not the first time our people have had to deal with an attacking arrogant enemy. At one time, our people responded to Napoleon's campaign in Russia with a Patriotic War, and Napoleon was defeated and came to his collapse. The same will happen to the arrogant Hitler, who has announced a new campaign against our country, the Red Army and all our people will once again wage a victorious patriotic war for the motherland, for honor, for freedom.

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its firm conviction that the entire population of our country, all workers, peasants and intelligentsia, men and women, will treat their duties and their work with due conscience. All our people must now be united and united as never before. Each of us must demand from ourselves and from others discipline, organization, selflessness, worthy of a true Soviet patriot, in order to provide for all the needs of the Red Army, fleet and aviation, in order to ensure victory over the enemy.

The government calls on you, citizens and women of the Soviet Union, to rally your ranks even more closely around our glorious Bolshevik Party, around our Soviet government, around our great leader Comrade Stalin.

Our cause is right. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

The first atrocities of the Nazis

The first case of atrocities by the German army on the territory of the Soviet Union falls on the first day of the war. On June 22, 1941, the Nazis, advancing, broke into the village of Albinga, Klaipeda region of Lithuania.

The soldiers robbed and burned all the houses. Residents - 42 people - were herded into a barn and locked up. During the day of June 22, the Nazis killed several people - they beat them to death or shot them.

The next morning, the systematic destruction of people began. Groups of peasants were taken out of the barn and shot in cold blood. First all the men, then the turn came to women and children. Those who tried to escape into the forest were shot in the back.

In 1972, a memorial ensemble for the victims of fascism was created near Ablinga.

The first summary of the Great Patriotic War

SUMMARY OF THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE RED ARMY
for 22.VI. - 1941

At dawn on June 22, 1941, the regular troops of the German army attacked our border units on the front from the BALTIC to the BLACK Sea and were held back by them during the first half of the day. In the afternoon, the German troops met with the advanced units of the field troops of the Red Army. After fierce fighting, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Only in the GRODNO and KRYSTYNOPOLS directions did the enemy manage to achieve minor tactical successes and occupy the towns of KALVARIYA, STOJANOW and TSEKHANOVEC (the first two at 15 km and the last at 10 km from the border).

Enemy aviation attacked a number of our airfields and settlements, but everywhere they met with a decisive rebuff from our fighters and anti-aircraft artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. We shot down 65 enemy planes. from RIA Novosti funds

23:00 (GMT). Winston Churchill's speech on BBC radio

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on June 22 at 23:00 GMT made a statement in connection with the aggression of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union.

"... The Nazi regime has the worst features of communism," in particular, he said on the air of the BBC radio station. no one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than I have been in the last 25 years. I will not take back a single word I have said about it. But all this pales before the spectacle now unfolding. The past with its crimes, follies and tragedies disappears.

I see Russian soldiers standing on the threshold of their native land, guarding the fields that their fathers have cultivated since time immemorial.

I see them guarding their homes, where their mothers and wives pray - yes, for there are times when everyone prays - for the safety of their loved ones, for the return of their breadwinner, their protector and support.

I see tens of thousands of Russian villages where the means of subsistence are torn from the ground with such difficulty, but where there are primordial human joys, where girls laugh and children play.

I see how the vile Nazi war machine is approaching all this, with its dapper, rattling Prussian officers, with its skillful agents, who have just pacified and tied hand and foot a dozen countries.

I also see a gray, well-drilled, obedient mass of ferocious Hun soldiers advancing like clouds of crawling locusts.

I see German bombers and fighters in the sky, still scarred from the wounds inflicted by the British, rejoicing that they have found what they think is easier and surer prey.

Behind all this noise and thunder, I see a bunch of villains who are planning, organizing and bringing this avalanche of disasters to humanity ... I must announce the decision of His Majesty's Government, and I am sure that the great dominions will agree with this decision in due time, for we should speak out immediately, without a single day of delay. I have to make a statement, but can you doubt what our policy will be?

We have only one single unchanging goal. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime. Nothing can turn us away from it, nothing. We will never negotiate, we will never enter into negotiations with Hitler or with any of his gang. We will fight him on land, we will fight him at sea, we will fight him in the air until, with God's help, we have rid the earth of his very shadow and free the peoples from his yoke. Any person or state that fights against Nazism will receive our help. Any person or state that goes with Hitler is our enemy...

This is our policy, this is our statement. It follows from this that we will give Russia and the Russian people all the help that we can ... "