3rd Ukrainian Front General of the Army Tolbukhin. Tolbukhin Fedor Ivanovich

Ballistic missiles were divided [ ] for intercontinental (over 5000 kilometers), medium (from 500 to 5000 kilometers) and shorter (from 150 to 500 kilometers) ranges. In the USSR until the mid-1980s [ ] operational-tactical missiles (from 1 to 500 kilometers) also stood out. In the United States, tactical (operational-tactical) missiles had [ ] flight range from 1 to 150 kilometers. In 1987, a new classification was finally established. Therefore, in relation to the period up to the mid-1980s, it is legitimate to use both classifications in historical works.

In accordance with the agreement, the parties were to destroy all launchers and ground-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 kilometers within three years, including missiles both on the European and Asian territory of the USSR. This was the first case in history of an agreement on a real reduction in existing weapons. The treaty also provided for verification procedures by inspectors who were to monitor the destruction of the missiles of the opposite side.

According to Art. 3 of the Treaty, were subject to destruction:

• intermediate range missiles
  • USSR - RSD-10 "Pioneer", "R-12", "R-14" (according to NATO classification, "SS-20", "SS-4" and "SS-5", respectively) and ground-based cruise missiles of the Republic of Kazakhstan -55 (according to NATO classification - SSC-X-4 "Slingshot");
  • USA - Pershing-2 and BGM-109G (ground-based Tomahawk cruise missile);
• short range missiles
  • USSR - "OTR-22 "Temp-S"" and OTR-23 "Oka" ("SS-12" and "SS-23");
  • USA - Pershing-1A.

These actions caused alarm in the USSR. In 1976, D. F. Ustinov became Minister of Defense of the USSR, who was inclined to a tough response to US actions. The basis of the modified nuclear strategy of the USSR was the build-up of the fleet of heavy ICBMs with MIRVs and, at the same time, the cover of the "Euro-strategic" direction. In 1977, the USSR, under the pretext of modifying the obsolete RSD-4 and RSD-5 (SS-4 and SS-5) systems, began deploying medium-range RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20) missiles on the western borders. In total, about 300 missiles of this class were deployed, each of which was equipped with three warheads for individual targeting. This allowed the USSR to destroy NATO's military infrastructure in Western Europe in a matter of minutes - control centers, command posts and, especially, ports (the latter, in the event of a war, made it impossible for American troops to land in Western Europe). Against the backdrop of the total superiority of the USSR in conventional weapons, this gave the Warsaw Pact complete military superiority in the European theater of operations.

On December 8, 1987, the Washington Treaty was signed, under which the parties agreed to destroy the INF as a class of missiles under the control of inspectors.

Entry into force of the treaty

Gallery

The possible withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty) has caused a flurry of criticism. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini said that "the world does not need a new arms race," while Nils Annen, Minister of State at the German Foreign Ministry, called the decision "catastrophic." Beijing saw blackmail in what was happening and invited Washington to "think twice." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that any action will "meet opposition" and reminded the United States of its "share of responsibility" for global stability.

Trump's statement is also criticized at home: Senator Rand Paul called it "destructive", "destroying decades of work." However, the American president did not say anything new, but rather stated a fait accompli: the treaty signed 30 years ago became invalid due to a number of circumstances, turning into a relic of the Cold War. He does not provide security by fending off threats that have not existed for a long time, but he ties hands - more of the United States, but also of Russia.

Times change

The Treaty on the Elimination of Missiles was discussed throughout the 80s and was signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan only after a series of serious concessions from the USSR. For example, a hundred Oka missile systems had to be destroyed, although they did not fall under the definition of the INF Treaty. As a result, the USSR "cut" 1846 installations - 1000 more than the United States.

In this regard, the treaty is often criticized for its "softness", but it is truly parity: the Soviet Union lost the opportunity to wage a limited nuclear war in Europe, corresponding to the "Ustinov Doctrine"; The US could no longer implement the concept of an "instant decapitation strike" on the USSR with missiles stationed in Europe, proposed by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the INF Treaty - before it, in a nuclear war, there could theoretically be a winner, which increased the risk of a conflict to extreme. After the fulfillment of the treaty, the superpowers could only exchange "mutually destroying", and therefore senseless, intercontinental strikes.

In 2000, newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the country might withdraw from the INF Treaty in response to the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the second key document that ensured parity between the USSR and the United States. It prohibited the creation, testing and deployment of systems aimed at combating strategic ballistic missiles. Despite the threat, the United States nevertheless denounced the agreement; the construction of missile defense systems in Central and Eastern Europe began.

The threat looming over the domestic forces of strategic deterrence was again: not destruction on the ground, as in the 1980s, but the interception of launched missiles. In the future, however distant, such a weakening of Russia's nuclear potential will negate the postulate of mutually assured destruction, the cornerstone of the existing nuclear parity.

Since 2001, the issue of missile defense has become one of the most acute in relations with the West. Vladimir Putin returns to it again and again, the last time in the sensational "weapon" message to the Federal Assembly in 2018. “For a long time we persuaded the Americans not to destroy the ABM treaty. Everything is in vain,” the president lamented, presenting the new developments of the military-industrial complex to the senators.

Recrimination

Russia has hinted more than once that the EuroPRO components will become priority targets in the period of danger: “People who make the relevant decisions should know that they have lived so far calmly, comfortably and safely. Now, after deploying these missile defense elements, we will have to think about how to stop the threats,” Putin said in 2016.

"Kupirovanie" requires appropriate weapons, so national security dictated the need to restart the production of short and medium-range missiles. Probably, Russia is already producing them: the Novator 9M729, a cruise missile for the Iskander complex, is under the suspicion of Western experts. It is assumed that this is a land analogue of the Kalibr sea-based missile. Its range is estimated at 5500 km, which is quite enough to hit targets in the entire European theater of operations. The Novator stationed in Siberia will be able to target the West Coast of the United States.

The US has been making claims about this missile since 2013; it is stated that at least two Iskander batteries are already armed with 9M729. The Russian side denies the accusations, arguing that the range of the Novator does not exceed the "conventional" 500 km. The statements are not believed: NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said that if Russia does not justify itself, "the allies will assume that the most plausible assessment is that Russia is violating the INF Treaty."

Russia, for its part, also accuses the United States of violating the treaty: claims against universal missile defense launchers in Romania and Poland, which can easily be converted to launch sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles. In addition, Russia insists that the American strike "drones" are the same cruise missiles, and there are no reservations in the treaty as to whether SMD missiles must be disposable. Finally, the creation of medium-range target missiles for missile defense testing is also a violation of the letter of the INF Treaty.

Defending the legality of its developments, the United States indulges in such cunning casuistry, explaining, for example, that the document refers to the launch (Launch) of missiles, and unmanned vehicles take off (Take-off), which becomes obvious: within the framework of the current agreement, the parties cannot agree . The INF Treaty needs modernization, but for Russia the key aspect of the new treaty is the settlement of the missile defense problem, and the United States defiantly does not make any concessions on this issue.

The third side

The conflict with Russia over missile defense is not the only reason for the US to denounce the INF Treaty. And perhaps not even the main one, since the United States hardly expects, after withdrawing from the treaty, to again deploy missiles in Europe aimed at Russia. Although Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands still have American Cold War thermonuclear bombs in storage, the Europeans are unlikely to be happy about the new installations in their territories. The existing arsenal burdens countries: the requirement to remove bombs is contained in the programs of four of the six parties of the Bundestag, and the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Ruud Lubbers said that the storage of nuclear weapons is a “meaningless tradition” and “stupidity”.

Not bound by any treaties, China is actively developing a class of weapons prohibited for the United States and Russia. According to US Admiral Harry Harris, this allowed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to acquire "the most impressive and most flexible missile force in the world" - over 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles. 95% of them would violate the INF Treaty if China participated in the treaty, the admiral stressed.

Trump's demand that Beijing "join the new deal" on the INF - that is, destroy 95% of the missiles - is clearly rhetorical. Against the background of the growing confrontation between China and the United States, the old treaty with the defunct USSR on the limitation of effective weapons certainly seems like an American military relic of the past. Despite assurances to the contrary by domestic officials, Russia can hardly help but feel threatened by Chinese medium- and short-range missiles, just as the United States is aware of the futility of self-restraint under the circumstances.

Is Russia Violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty? According to the information that has emerged, the Obama administration believes it is in violation, and senior Republican lawmakers are demanding drastic action. “We believe it is imperative not to allow Russian leaders to believe that they will benefit from a violation of this or any other treaty,” wrote House Armed Services Committee Chairman, California Republican Buck McKeon, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. House Foreign Affairs Ed Royce, also a California Republican, and Michigan Republican Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.

Such statements create an extremely difficult situation. They are likely to further aggravate U.S.-Russian relations, which have already sunk to a very low point, dampen prospects for further nuclear arms cuts, and could thwart President Obama's efforts to win congressional support for his Iranian policies and achieve key arms control gains.

Allegations of violations are twofold. The first concerns the new Yars (RS-26) intercontinental ballistic missile upper limit under the INF Treaty (this treaty bans all American and Soviet/Russian missiles with a launch range of 500 to 5500 km). Although these tests may cause concern, they are not a violation. The RS-26 is, without a doubt, a strategic missile (its range exceeds 5,500 km), and there are no provisions in the existing treaties prohibiting testing at a range less than the maximum. Flight tests of the missile are apparently being conducted to evaluate its ability to penetrate enemy defenses, which is why the Russians use the Sary-Shagan test site, which specializes in missile defense, for launches. The second allegation, which has only recently come to light, concerns an unidentified land-based cruise missile.

The American government, according to available information, repeatedly raised the question of conducting these tests with the Russians, but they replied that this was not a problem and refused to answer further. On January 17, 2014, the United States informed NATO allies of its concerns. However, the official representative of the State Department explained that this issue is still being analyzed, and no one puts the actions of the Russians in the category of violations.

The topic of compliance with the INF treaty covers three distinct but closely related aspects. One of them is technical: the nature of the allegations of violations, the characteristics of the missiles involved, and the issue of verification. The second relates to arms control and strategic issues - how the provisions of the INF treaty fit (or do not fit) into Russia's national security strategy. The third deals with politics, raising questions about why allegations of wrongdoing continue to surface in public debate, with potential implications for American foreign policy.

Technical Aspects: Nature of Concern

Technical matters are a complex maze of engineering, military, and legal details. As noted above, Russian testing of RS-26 ICBMs is not a violation of the treaty: there is no ban on short-range tests in the current arms control treaties. The lack of a lower limit on flight testing of strategic weapons is a legacy of Cold War approaches. At that time, the parties were mainly concerned about the maximum capabilities of weapons systems, whether it was the range or the number of warheads mounted on a launch vehicle. There is also a technical reason: it is impossible to prevent unsuccessful launches, which can be attributed to violations, if a minimum flight test distance is set.

The allegations of testing new medium-range ground-launched cruise missiles (the INF Treaty bans ground-launched missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km) are more difficult to analyze because no specific details have been released. Ballistic missiles, which often use the same propulsion systems as space rockets, fly in steep trajectories, rising with fuel and descending with gravity. Cruise missiles are guided, and they consume fuel throughout the flight, like aircraft torpedoes. One of the candidates for the role of a suspicious cruise missile may be the R-500 missile, created for the Iskander complex, which was originally designed for a ballistic missile.

Iskander was supposed to replace the Oka operational-tactical missile system (SS-23 according to NATO classification), which was eliminated under the INF Treaty. The decision to eliminate the Oka outraged Soviet military leaders, who claimed that its range was less than 500 km (450-470 km) and that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev made such a major concession to the United States without their support. The Iskander has the same range as the Oka, that is, less than 500 km, and it does not violate the INF Treaty. However, there are serious suspicions that this range can be increased if necessary. According to a report by the National Defense University of Finland, on the optimal range trajectory, the ballistic version of the Iskander can have a range of 600 and even 700 km. It is believed that the R-500 cruise missile, which was tested at 360 km, can have a flight radius "several times greater." If, as many believe, the R-500 is a modified version of the Granat (SS-N-21 NATO classification) ship-based surface-to-surface cruise missile, it could theoretically have a longer range.

In the case of the R-500, allegations of possible violations may indicate several options:

The United States may have detected one or more tests carried out at ranges greater than 500 km;

The United States may have made a measurement error. Such measurements must be carried out by national technical means, and therefore they may not be accurate enough;

The American measurements could be based on optimal range trajectory calculations, while the Russian data could be taken from a real flight trajectory that includes XY maneuvers to avoid detection and interception by missile defense systems (in this case, the practical range may be less than 500 km, and the optimal range trajectory is greater than ).

In any of these cases, the excess in range (over 500 km) is small, and it actually does not create any strategic difference. If this is true, then the R-500 dispute will end just like the dozens of unresolved problems with the implementation of treaties that are inevitable in the process of arms control and their reductions end. In fact, Russia also has claims against the United States regarding the implementation of the agreements.

But there are also less likely possibilities. For example, it could be tests of the Granat rocket. Available information suggests that these sea-launched cruise missiles have been removed from submarines and are now stored ashore. At the same time, the Russian military routinely tests old Soviet weapons systems to verify they are up to par. For various reasons, it is sometimes more convenient to launch rockets from the ground than from an offshore platform. There is also a joint Russian-Indian project to create the BrahMos II cruise missile, which is designed to be launched from different platforms, including from the ground. But this project is still at an early stage of implementation.

Or Russia could test a new ground-launched cruise missile with a range well beyond the 500 km limit. Without at least basic information, it will be difficult to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the implications of such a system for arms control strategy and regime. However, the fact that the State Department did not call this case a violation, but instead said that it was a matter of concern and required additional assessments and consultations, indicates that the Russians are unlikely to have a new long-range (over 500 km) land-based cruise missile. Meanwhile, an analysis of Russia's behavior in the area of ​​arms control and strategy indicates that it is unlikely to cheat under the treaty in order to increase the range of a missile by a mere hundred kilometers.

Aspects of Arms Control: Attitudes towards the INF Treaty in Russia

It is well known that many influential figures in Russia's ruling elite oppose the INF treaty. In 2005, Vladimir Putin's close associate, then Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, raised the possibility of Russia withdrawing from the INF Treaty during a conversation with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

The subsequent debate in Moscow led to a decision not to withdraw from the treaty, but the issue does surface from time to time. The main rationale is that medium-range missiles are being built by countries south of Russia - China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel and others. It can be said that the fate of the INF Treaty in Russia hangs in a very thin thread.

Some say that Russia's cool attitude towards the INF Treaty can be explained by an attempt to circumvent or even violate it. But the opposite is likely true: if Moscow decides that the INF treaty interferes with its critical R&D programs, then it will not hesitate to withdraw from it.

At the heart of Russia's security strategy is the creation of obstacles to the possible use of precision non-nuclear weapons (such as Tomahawk missiles from the Navy) by the United States and NATO, as they did during the wars in Kosovo and Iraq, and in other countries over the past 15 years . The Russian military doctrine of 2000 provides for the limited use of nuclear weapons against air bases and command centers in order to counter a perceived threat. However, the reliance on the use of nuclear weapons from the very beginning was considered a temporary measure, valid until the country acquires modern means of non-nuclear deterrence and deterrence. The Iskanders have filled one of these non-nuclear capability niches (there is currently no evidence that Russia is testing these missiles for use with nuclear warheads, although it is theoretically possible), and in this sense they play an important role, targeting a range of potential targets without the threat of a nuclear strike.

If the Iskanders are located in the Kaliningrad region, located as an enclave between Poland and Lithuania, these missiles with a range of 500 km will be able to hit targets almost throughout Poland and in the Baltic countries, which is a possible springboard for NATO strikes. If the range of these missiles is increased by 100 or even 200 kilometers, the situation will not change radically.

Therefore, it seems quite logical that if Russia decided to deploy land-based medium-range missiles, it would aim for some kind of quantum leap, say, systems with a range of 1000-1500 km. Such missiles would allow Russia to endanger not only a large part of the European theater of operations, but also other countries to the south of Russia.

Withdrawal from the INF treaty is unlikely to be a major problem if the agreement interferes with the development of weapons that the Russian leadership considers important for the further development of non-nuclear deterrence capabilities. Withdrawal from the treaty is likely to be supported by most of the elite. If Putin introduces such a bill to parliament, it will be passed without debate and without serious opposition.

The US withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2003 would be a necessary pretext. Like the George W. Bush administration, Moscow can claim that the INF is a remnant of the Cold War, that maintaining it is detrimental to the country's security (while citing the missile programs of Russia's southern neighbors), and that it has no intention of developing medium-range nuclear weapons. Moreover, the state of Russian-American relations today is such that, in the opinion of the Russian leadership, the annulment of some old treaty is unlikely to worsen it even more.

Thus, the case that Russia is seriously violating the INF treaty seems weak. As noted above, the RS-26 tests are not a violation. At worst, it is exploiting a legal loophole for your own advantage. The story of the cruise missile test is vague, but the fact that the US government was unwilling to call it a violation speaks volumes about its uncertainty. In the history of Soviet-American and Russian-American arms control, there have been dozens of similar cases when the parties expressed concern about the actions of each other. In most cases, these concerns were not resolved until they were no longer relevant.

As a rule, these were technical issues discussed by technical experts behind closed doors. Why, then, did these allegations of a possible violation of the INF treaty appear at all? Most likely, the reasons should be sought not in the essence of the arms control process, but in alliances and peculiarities of domestic politics.

Political Aspects: Russian-American Relations and US Domestic Policy

The most consistent and persistent questions about the deployment of Iskanders are asked by the Baltic states, in particular, Lithuania. Referring to these missiles, she speaks of the need to keep American free-fall nuclear bombs in Europe, although many of the old members of the North Atlantic Alliance are in favor of their withdrawal. News of the suspicious tests emerged after the NATO meeting in January.

And inside the U.S., a group of Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee wrote a letter that suggests the GOP saw the information as a convenient opportunity to stall administration initiatives in a number of areas, such as further cuts in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. and the Iranian nuclear program.

The news comes shortly after the interim nuclear deal with Iran went into effect and President Obama threatened to veto all attempts by Congress to impose new sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. Armed Services Committee Republicans argue that the new deal will allow Iran to deceive the US without suffering severe punitive sanctions, and say the administration's handling of Russia proves them right.

Similarly, Republicans have been extremely skeptical of Obama's 2013 proposal to reduce by another third US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons under the 2010 START-3 treaty, from 1,550 to 1,000. Their main concern is that Obama might try to implement these cuts bypassing the Senate, whose approval of the treaties is mandatory.

Paradoxical as it may seem, here they have found common ground with Russian opponents of compromise. Moscow is showing a clear reluctance to engage in cuts in addition to those provided for by START-3. Any action that weakens the prospects for such cuts will find support from the Russian government (of course, it will publicly declare otherwise). Moreover, if the initiative comes from the United States, it will be beneficial for Moscow, since it will be able to lay the blame for the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament on the opposite side.

In addition, these leaks come just as the Senate is considering Rose Gottemoeller. Gottemoeller, who served as the chief US diplomat in the START negotiations, has been acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international policy for several years. She is expected to be appointed to this position on a permanent basis. But the price of its approval may be the resolution of the INF dispute on terms favorable to opponents of new cuts. Specifically, this means forcing Russia to admit that it has violated the treaty, and in such a way that the administration's plans for arms control are further violated.

Nikolai Sokov is a senior research fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation. Miles Pomper is Senior Fellow at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and former editor of Arms Control Today.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

Officer of the Russian Empire, Marshal of the Soviet Union, participant in the First World, Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. He liberated Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria from the enemy. He was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Royal officer

Fedor Ivanovich Tobukhin was born on June 16, 1894 in a peasant family with many children in a village located in the Danilovsky district of the Yaroslavl province. At first, Fedor studied at a parochial school, in 1907 he graduated from a zemstvo school in the village of Davydkovo (now this village bears the name). After Fedor's father died, the elder brother took him to his house to make life easier for the family. In St. Petersburg, the boy continued to study. In 1910 he graduated from a trading school. Then he studied at the St. Petersburg Commercial School, which he graduated as an external student in 1912. At the same time, Fedor began working as an accountant in the Mariinsky partnership "Kolchakov and K". But commerce did not particularly appeal to him.

The First World War began, and in December 1914 Tolbukhin was drafted into the army. As having a fairly high education, he was sent to the ranks of a new - technical kind of troops: Private Tolbukhin became a motorcyclist. After the first months of military life, spent in the autorot as part of the North-Western Front, a capable soldier received a promotion. After training at the city's officer school, Fedor Ivanovich was awarded the rank of ensign. Later Tolbukhin participated in the fighting on the Southwestern Front. During the war, he commanded a company, later - a battalion. He was wounded twice and shell-shocked the same number of times. Received the rank of staff captain. For participation in hostilities, Tolbukhin received two officer orders - Anna and Stanislav.

In 1917, after the February Revolution, Captain Tolbukhin, who was highly respected by the soldiers, headed the regimental committee. After the end of hostilities, he led the demobilization of his unit, demobilized himself. But the peaceful period in his life did not last long.

Soviet commander

In 1918, the Civil War broke out in the country. Military specialist Tolbukhin opens a military commissariat in his native places in August of this year and leads the process of recruiting people into the emerging Red Army. The following year, he graduated from the headquarters school and fought on the Northern, and then the Western Fronts of the Civil War. The peak of his career during this period was the position of deputy chief of staff for operational work in a rifle division. For the fighting near Warsaw, Fedor Ivanovich received his first Soviet order - the Order of the Red Banner. In 1921, Fedor Tolbukhin participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion. Later, he fought with the Finns for. In September 1921, Tolbukhin was sent to the 56th Rifle Division to act as chief of staff.

Twice, in 1927 and 1930, Tolbukhin took refresher courses for senior military personnel. In November 1930, Fedor Ivanovich was appointed to the post of chief of staff in the 1st Rifle Corps. In 1934 he graduated from the Military Academy named after . Since October 1937, Tolbukhin has been commander of the 72nd Rifle Division. But in July 1938 he received a new appointment - now he is the chief of staff of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District. Two years later, in June 1940, after the return of general ranks to the Red Army, Fedor Ivanovich received the rank of major general.

When the top leaders of the Soviet Union decided on the appointment of Tolbukhin to the post of chief of staff of the ZakVO, he received him personally and asked about his military career in Soviet and tsarist times. Married to a countess, the former tsarist officer Tolbukhin had every reason to fear the worst. However, shortly after this conversation, Fedor Ivanovich received another award - the Order of the Red Star.

The Great Patriotic War began. Tolbukhin continued to remain in his former position for a long time - the chief of staff of the Transcaucasian Military District. During this period, as during the beginning of the civil war, he led the mobilization into the Red Army, but now on a much larger scale. In August 1941, the district forces were transformed into the Transcaucasian Front, which took part in the occupation of Iran by Soviet and British troops. The troops of the front coped with the task quickly, with a minimum of incidents. And this was a considerable merit of Tolbukhin - the chief of staff of the formations of the Caucasian Front.

In the period from December 1941 to February 1942, being the chief of staff, Tolbukhin was developing the Kerch-Feodosiya operation, which had as its goal the landing of Soviet troops in the Crimea. Launched on January 2, 1942, the operation was quite successful. After the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula, a new Crimean Front was formed, and Tolbukhin, according to the already established tradition, took the post of chief of staff of the new front. However, attempts to further develop the operation were unsuccessful. To deal with the situation, a representative of the Headquarters, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, was sent to the Crimea. Arriving, he almost immediately demanded to remove Tolbukhin from his post. In historiography, it is customary to criticize him for this act, although the well-known historian A.V. Isaev believes that General P.P. Vechny, who was appointed to replace Tolbukhin, surpassed him as a staff officer. In any case, Fyodor Ivanovich will still have many opportunities to distinguish himself, this time not as a staff officer, but independently commanding troops.

After being removed from his post as chief of staff of the Crimean Front, Tolbukhin helped the commander of the formations of the Stalingrad district for some time. And in July 1942, when the front was already approaching, Tolbukhin was appointed to command the 57th Army. Three months of fierce defensive battles south of the city, and then participation in the encirclement and destruction of a large grouping (6th infantry and 4th tank armies) of German troops. Not surprisingly, in January 1943, Tolbukhin was awarded the newly created Order of Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov, 1st degree, simultaneously with the assignment of the rank of lieutenant general to him. This was the start of his meteoric rise in ranks (3 promotions this year and one more next year).

In February-March 1943, Tolbukhin fought in the sectors of the North-Western Front. For some time he was the commander of the 68th Army and took part in the final stage of the most successful Velikoluki operation up to this point for this front. As a result of this operation, a grouping of German troops in was surrounded and destroyed.
In March 1943, Tolbukhin became commander of the Southern Front, and in April he became a colonel general. The most glorious and victorious stage of Tolbukhin's career in the Great Patriotic War begins - the command of the fronts on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.

Hero of the southern flank

The first strategic offensive operation carried out by Tolbukhin as a front commander turned out to be the least successful. As a result of the offensive launched on July 17, 1943 on the Mius River, it was not possible to break through the German front. However, the operation cannot be called completely unsuccessful, since as a result of it a significant number of formations of the Nazi troops were shackled, which helped the Soviet army under.

As a result of the next - the Donbass operation, the formations of the Southern Front, acting jointly with the forces of the South-Western Front, advanced 300 kilometers. They liberated the Donbass, defeated the opposing troops, and by September 21 reached the Molochnaya River - part of the German "Eastern Wall". At the same time, Tolbukhin was awarded the rank of army general.

The new Melitopol operation followed almost without interruption, already on September 26th. In a little more than a month, Soviet troops again defeated the enemy, captured Melitopol, cut off the Crimea and created bridgeheads for its subsequent assault. However, before the storming of the Crimea, the troops of the Southern and Southwestern fronts destroyed the enemy's Nikopol bridgehead and liberated Nikopol. In April-May 1944, Tolbukhin and his front (now bearing the name of the 4th Ukrainian), together with the troops of the Primorsky Army, liberated the Crimea. Sevastopol was taken by storm in three days, a few days later the remnants of German troops in the Crimea capitulated at Chersonese. In May, Tolbukhin was transferred to a new duty station for the last time during the war. Now Fedor Ivanovich was appointed to command the forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

The pinnacle of Tolbukhin's military talent is considered by many researchers to be the Iasi-Kishinev operation that began on August 20, 1944. He managed to mislead the enemy. The enemy was expecting an offensive near Chisinau, and Tolbukhin attacked from the extremely inconvenient Kitskansky bridgehead on the Dniester. Together with the Danube Flotilla, the Black Sea Fleet and the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Tolbukhin defeated the opposing troops. This had far-reaching political consequences: it served as an impetus for the arrest of the Romanian dictator Antonescu and the transition of Romania to the side of the anti-Hitler coalition. After that, Tolbukhin drove the German troops out of southern Romania. The speed with which Fedor Ivanovich managed to establish interaction with his recent adversary, the Romanian army, is indicative. Already on September 8, the troops of the front, led by Tolbukhin, entered Bulgaria. It was a unique operation during the Great Patriotic War, during which no blood was shed. The Bulgarians met the enemy not with shots, but with flowers. Already on September 12, Tolbukhin was awarded the next rank - Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Liberation of Europe

Further brilliant successes continued. Tolbukhin in the period from September 28 to October 20, the Belgrade operation was carried out, in which he commanded not only the Soviet, but also the Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops. This operation (carried out in cooperation with formations of not one, but two allied formations) also had no analogues in the entire history of the Great Patriotic War. Having successfully liberated most of Yugoslavia, Tolbukhin quickly invaded Hungary, defeated the formations of the 2nd Hungarian army and created the prerequisites for an attack on Budapest. During the storming of Budapest, as later in the subsequent storming of Vienna, the use of heavy artillery was forbidden in order to reduce damage to the city. This further complicated the operation, which, nevertheless, was carried out successfully.

During this period of the war, Tolbukhin distinguished himself in three outstanding operations - the Budapest offensive, the Balaton defensive and the Vienna offensive, each of which belongs to the masterpieces of military art. During the Budapest offensive operation, Tolbukhin with tremendous efforts held the bridgehead across the Danube (he even had to move the headquarters almost to the front line), preventing the counterattacking German troops from releasing Budapest. Hitler considered it very important to keep Hungary by sending troops there from Poland and transferring German units from the Western Front. During the Balaton operation, which was defensive in nature, Tolbukhin led the troops of his front with such skill that units of the elite 6th SS Panzer Army faltered and retreated. At the same time, he retained enough strength to carry out the Vienna offensive operation. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, according to Tolbukhin's plans, attacked with simultaneous strikes from three different directions - the so-called compressive maneuver. They liberated Hungary, Vienna and most of Austria, still occupied by the Germans. Tolbukhin and his front hold the record for the number of capitals liberated during the Great Patriotic War. As a result of the Vienna offensive operation on April 26, 1945, Tolbukhin received another award - the Order of Victory. Fedor Ivanovich rightfully participated in the post-war Victory Parade with the consolidated continent of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

The fate of Tolbukhin turned out to be connected with the fate of two prominent Europeans. The first - Theodor Kellner, a retired Austrian general, appointed by him as temporary burgomaster of Vienna, soon became the first president of liberated Austria. The second was the Romanian King Mihai, to whom it was he who presented the Order of Victory. But Mihai was soon expected to lose the throne and be expelled from the country.

After the war, in 1945-1947, Tolbukhin was the commander of the Southern Group of Forces, and in 1947-1949 - the Transcaucasian Military District.