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Biography

From 1929 he lived in Moscow.

Graduated from the Faculty of Geography of Moscow State University (1947), postgraduate studies at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1951).

Worked for magazines

• "Questions of Philosophy" (1953-1958)
• "Problems of peace and socialism" (1958-1965)
• "World Economy and International Relations" (1972-1986)
• "Communist" - "Free Thought" (1986-1994)

He headed the department of sociology at the Institute of the International Labor Movement (1967-1971), from 1965 to 1986 he was an associate professor, then a professor at the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU (now the Russian Academy of Public Administration under the President of Russia), since 1993 - a leading researcher at the Institute of Human RAN.

In 1971 he was invited to teach at the Sorbonne, but the trip did not take place. Fluent in English, French, German, Italian, Czech...

He was a member of the editorial board of the collection "NF".

Compositions

Published works of E.A. Arab-Ogly related to demography

• Introductory article to the book by J. de Castro "The Geography of the Famine", Foreign Literature, 1953.
• 1000000000 hungry. "New time", No. 39, 1957.
• Some problems of population. "Questions of Philosophy", 1957, No. 6.
• Again about Malthusianism. "World Economy and International Relations", 1957, No. 3.
• Is overpopulation a threat to humanity? "Problems of Peace and Socialism", 1961, No. 8.
• On the demographic consequences of the war. "Problems of Peace and Socialism", 1962, No. 8.
• Review of the book by B. Urlanis "Wars and population of Europe". "World Economy and International Relations", 1962, No. 7
• What is the future of humanity? Co-author of the preface, compiler, author of a number of materials. Prague, 1964
• Articles for the dictionary "Man" - "Malthusianism", "Nation", "Population", "Optimum population", "Zero population growth", etc. 1966
• World population in 2000. "World Economy and International Relations", 1968, No. 6
• On demographic forecasting - problems of the population of the Earth. Knowledge, 1969
• Wars and population. "Marxist-Leninist theory of population". Section V, ch.8, Thought, 1970. Translated into English, French and Spanish
• Outcasts. "Population aging or social decrepitude?" "Literaturnaya Gazeta", March 11, 1970
• Sociological problems of demography. "Problems of Demography: Issues of Theory and Practice". Statistics, 1971
• In the labyrinth of prophecies Social forecasting and ideological struggle. M., 1973. Translated into Czech, German, Bulgarian, English and Italian
• Prospects for world population growth. "Population of the countries of the world" (Handbook), ch. III, Statistics, 1974
• Prospects for world population growth. Ch.II, Statistics, 1974
• Demographic mirage and demographic iceberg. "World Economy and International Relations", 1975, No. 9
• Prospects for world population growth. "World Economy and International Relations", 1976, No. 11.
• Demographic and ecological forecasts. M., 1978. Translated into Italian under the name "Identikit-2000"
• Preface to the book by V.S. Steshenko "Demography in the modern world". Statistics, 1978
• Demographic and ecological forecasts - Criticism of modern. bourgeois. concepts, 319 p. ill. 21 cm, M. Statistics 1978
• Demographic problems of mankind. "Global problems of our time", ch. IV, Thought, 1981
• Demographic processes and social problems of the XX century. "World Economy and International Relations", No. 11, 1981
• demographic forecasting. Working book on forecasting, ch.8,12, Thought, 1982.
• Book review by A.G. Vishnevsky "Reproduction of the population and society". "Sociological Research", 1984, No. 2
• Global Demographic and Environmental Projections: Critical. analysis. Per. from Russian / E. Arab-Ogly, 314 p. 20 cm, M. Progress 1985
• On white mice and individual freedom / Edvard Arab-ogly, 78 p. 16 cm, M. Publishing house of the Novosti press agency, 1985
• Raymond Aron in the mirror of his memoirs: [Bourgeois. philosopher of the second half of the 20th century] / Edvard Arab-Ogly, 84, p. 16 cm, M. Publishing house of the Novosti press agency, 1986
• Foreseeable future: Social. consequences of scientific and technological revolution: year 2000 / E. A. Arab-Ogly, 204, p. 20 cm, M. Thought 1986
• Raymond Aron in the mirror of his "Memoirs": [Fr. sociologist of the second half of the 20th century. : Per. from Russian] / Edward Arab-Olgy, 78 p. 17 cm, M. Publishing house of the Novosti Press Agency, 1988
• Demographic encyclopedic dictionary. 1989. Author of 8 articles
• Encyclopedic Dictionary "Population". 1994. Articles: "Geopolitics", "Global Problems of Modernity", "Malthusianism", "Zero Population Growth", "Limits to Growth Theory", "Social and Economic Forecast", "Club of Rome", "Humanity". 8 articles

Achievements

• Doctor of philosophical science

Images

Miscellaneous

• Father is Armenian, mother is Russian.

Bibliography

• Francis Karsak's Space Odyssey // Karsak F. Flight of the Earth / Per. from fr. F. Mendelssohn. - M.: MG, 1972. S. 328-334
• Science fiction and global problems of our era (Instead of a preface) // Collection of science fiction. V. 27. - M.: Knowledge, 1983. S. 3-9.
• Robinsons in the city dump // IL, 1980. No. 4. S. 197-200. [TO. Faldbakken. Sunset Country]
• Old scenarios for the new world // World economy and international relations, 1973. No. 8. P. 112-120.
• Ambartsumov E. Not quite distinguishable future // Novy Mir, 1974. No. 10. P. 276-281
• Vl.G. Arab-ogly, Edward Arturovich // Encyclopedia of Science Fiction / Ed. Vl. Gakov. - M.: LLC "International Center for Fiction", 1997. CD-ROM (HTML)
• E.Kh. The Science of the Fantasy in Russia: A Bio-Bibliographic Reference. Version 2.0 - Revised and updated: August 3, 2001

On June 14, 2001, Edward Arturovich ARAB-OGLY died after a long illness.
A versatile, highly educated person with a wide range of interests, a philosopher, sociologist, futurist, journalist, he left a noticeable mark on the history of Russian demography.

E.A. Arab-Ogly was born on October 13, 1925 in Tbilisi, and since 1929 he lived in Moscow. His father was Armenian, his mother was Russian. Graduated from the Faculty of Geography of Moscow State University (1947) and postgraduate studies at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1951).

An extremely talented person, an erudite, a polyglot (he knew English, French, German, Italian, Czech), for many years he held prestigious positions in various publications and scientific institutions - positions that for many quickly turned into a sinecure, a source of career prosperity, and he was only encouraged to be creative.

The track record of E. Arab-Ogly includes responsible work in the journals "Problems of Philosophy" (1953-1958), "Problems of Peace and Socialism" (1958-1965), "World Economy and International Relations" (1972-1986), "Communist "- "Free Thought" (1986-1994). He headed the department of sociology at the Institute of the International Labor Movement (1967-1971), from 1965 to 1986 he was an associate professor, then a professor at the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU (now the Russian Academy of Public Administration under the President of Russia), since 1993 - a leading researcher at the Institute human RAS. In 1971, he was invited to France for a year - as a professor at the Sorbonne, but this event did not leave a mark on the real track record - the trip to Paris then did not take place - as they say, for reasons beyond the control of the invitee.

Since the mid-1950s, the scientific and social activities of E.A. Arab-Ogly was aimed at the revival of sociology and demography in our country, associated with the use of cybernetics, statistics and other exact sciences and methods in the study of social forecasting, demography and global studies. In the 60s - early 90s he took an active part in non-governmental pacifist organizations and the international ecumenical movement, international philosophical and sociological congresses.

E.A. Arab-Ogly is the author of a number of monographic studies translated into many foreign languages, including: "In the Labyrinth of Prophecies" (1973), "Demographic and Ecological Forecasts" (1978); "Foreseeable Future: Social Consequences of Scientific and Technical Revolution - Year 2000" (1986); "Raymond Aron through the lens of his memoirs" (1988), co-author of the two-volume textbook "Introduction to Philosophy" (1989). He was a member of the editorial board and the author of many articles in the "Demographic Encyclopedic Dictionary" (1986), "Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary" (1989), editor and author of prefaces to the books "Geography of Famine" by J. de Castro (1954); M.F. Malinovsky "Selected Socio-Political Works" (1958); "What future awaits humanity?" (Prague, 1964); "Cybernetics in Social Sciences" (in Czech, Prague, 1965); "The Future is in the Present" (1984); P. Kuusi "This human world" (Moscow, 1986). His active journalistic activity in a number of central periodicals is widely known.

Recently, E.A. Arab-Ogly worked fruitfully in the field of human ecology and global forecasting. He published a number of scientific articles on these topics, in particular, for the new edition of the "Philosophical Dictionary" (20 articles were written), the "Man" dictionary (12 articles), the new edition of the textbook "Introduction to Philosophy" and the collective fundamental research "Introduction to Human Science ", a number of articles about the "post-industrial society".

It is impossible not to mention the teaching work of E.A. Arab-Ogly (especially at the Academy of Social Sciences, Moscow State University and other scientific institutions), where several dozen highly qualified specialists from Russia and the USSR, as well as from Europe, Asia and Latin America, were trained under his leadership.

Demography was not the main specialty of Edward Arturovich, but she always interested him, and since he was characterized not only by the breadth of interests, but also by the depth of thinking, he very seriously delved into the demographic problems that he had to deal with. His books and articles on demographic issues are among the most interesting publications of recent decades. And its role in the post-war revival of Russian demography can hardly be overestimated. For the main obstacle that hindered the development of this science was ideological blockages, and in clearing them the position of the "fighters of the ideological front" was very important, to which E. Arab-Ogly, a journalist for leading party publications, a teacher of the party academy, always belonged. To Edward Arturovich's credit, it must be said that he was not a typical representative of his professional ideological guild, was not in the least a stupid dogmatist, which was so common among his colleagues.

In all the ideological disputes that, unfortunately, accompanied every step of the Soviet demographic science of the 60s - 80s, gradually restoring its strength, emerging from international isolation, he always occupied an anti-dogmatic position, and even the most notorious retrogrades. The list of publications by E. Arab-Ogly, in which demographic issues are treated, has about three dozen titles, but in addition to these published works, there were countless speeches at all kinds of scientific meetings, internal reviews, etc., in which Edward Arturovich, who knew perfectly well " the rules of the game" of his time, skillfully and firmly supported everything new, everything that was "science" against what was nothing more than scientific mythology.

Exactly 50 years passed between the end of Edvard Arturovich's postgraduate studies in 1951 and his death in 2001. Looking back at these five decades, you clearly see: for this man they were not in vain, and therefore, they were not in vain for us, who lived and worked next to him, and for those who will come after us and get to know Edward Arturovich through his scientific heritage. .

Scientist-philosopher and sociologist, critic, publicist, one of the leading domestic specialists in social forecasting. He graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University, worked at the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU, in the editorial office of the magazine "Communist". Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor. Lives in Moscow.

Author of books on social forecasting and futurology: "In the labyrinth of prophecies" (1973), "Demographic and ecological forecasts. Criticism of modern bourgeois concepts" (1978), "Foreseeable future. Social consequences of scientific and technological revolution: year 2000" (1986) and others, in which A. actively uses the works of authors of anti-utopias, utopias and science fiction in the analysis of modern futurological concepts. He also owns articles on the NF itself, in which A. considers this literature from the standpoint of sociology and futurology; author of articles on the work of A. Azimov, P. Buhl, F. Karsak, R. Merle and others. Edited by A. published a collection of articles on futurology - "The Future in the Present" (1984).

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In the Labyrinth of Prophecy: Social Forecasting and Ideological Struggle.- M.: Mol. guard, 1973. - 304 p.

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Dystopia // Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M., 1989. - S. 31-32.

In the utopian anti-world // Lit. gas. - 1972. - No. 9.

Dialogues with the future: [On the work of Stanislav Lem] // Lem S. Favorites. - M.: Progress, 1975. - S. 5-18.

"The End of Eternity" - a novel-warning // Azimov A. The End of Eternity. - M.: Mol. guard, 1966. - S. 245-254.

A Space Odyssey by Francis Karsak // Karsak F. Flight of the Earth; Lions of El Dorado. - M.: Mol. guard, 1972. - S. 328-334.

Between Scylla and Charybdis: [On Scandinavian fantasy. countries] // Anthology of Scandinavian fiction. - M.: Mol. Guard, 1971. - S. 361-368. - (B-ka modern. fiction; T. 20).

Science fiction and global problems of our era // NF: Sat. scientific fiction. Issue. 27. - M.: Knowledge, 1983. - S. 3-9.

Monkeys among us: [About the novel by Pierre Boulle "Planet of the Apes"] // Boulle P. Planet of the Apes; Stories. - M.: Mol. guard, 1967. - S. 5-24.

Orwell // Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M., 1983.

Foreword // Merle R. Malville. - M.: Progress, 1977. - S. 5-22. - In co-authorship with E. Ambartsumov.

Doomsday in space: Notes of a sociologist on modern. fantastic. lit. in the West // Vopr. philosophy - 1962. - No. 3. - S. 109-119.

Stanislav Lem about the "fake world" of the 21st century // Inostr. lit. - 1987. - No. 7. - S. 84-86.

Utopia // Philosophical Encyclopedia. - M., 1970. - T. 5; The same // Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. - M., 1989. - S. 679-680.

Questions of Philosophy 1990 No. 8

The problem of civilization is one of the central ones in the philosophy of the history of modern times. It acquired especially relevant importance in the 20th century in connection with the rapid socio-economic, political and cultural development of mankind in the modern era. For this problem is associated with the comprehension of the meaning of history in its unity and diversity.
Until our century, in European social thought, the very concept of "civilization" was usually used in the singular, denoting a high level of social development, and was usually opposed to a lower level of development, if not of all, then most of the countries and peoples outside our continent, which many Europeans denied "civilization". Thus, emphasizing the uniqueness of European civilization was accompanied by the idea of ​​a special civilizing mission of Western Europe in relation to the rest of mankind. In its various geopolitical variants, such an ideology has long served as a moral justification for the political dominance of European powers on our planet, their economic expansion and various forms of colonialism.
In the 20th century, as a result of two world wars, the economic and political predominance of Western Europe in international relations was undermined. The collapse of colonial empires in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the acquisition by their peoples of political independence and their desire to revive their cultural heritage - all this prompted such prominent philosophers of history as O. Spengler and A. Toynbee, as well as many of their followers, to rethink the very concept of “civilization”. ” and reflect on the fate of “civilization” now in the plural.
In their concepts of world history, which became widespread in the second half of our decade both in Europe and beyond its borders, the European (Western, Christian) civilization appeared as one of a number of local civilizations that existed throughout the history of mankind, replacing each other in separate regions of the planet and at the same time coexisting at the present time. At the same time, the fundamental difference that was attributed to these civilizations was seen in the fact that they rested on non-coinciding, and often incompatible with each other, systems of social values. Directed against Eurocentrism in the interpretation of world history, these concepts sought to substantiate social and cultural pluralism in the development of mankind, to give a philosophical justification for the decline of Europe in the system of international relations. It must be said that the popularity of these concepts was far from limited to academic circles; they also had a certain influence on many political figures (suffice it to mention, for example, G. Kissinger and R. Nixon).
However, now, at the end of our century, it seems to me, the historical limitations of the concepts of local civilizations, dividing world history in time and space into isolated and opposed to each other human cultural communities, are becoming more and more obvious. Through the prism of new thinking, which embodies the objective desire of mankind for planetary interaction, for interdependence and cultural unity, the very problem of civilizations urgently requires its philosophical rethinking. With all the differences between local civilizations, both existing in the past and coexisting in our time, we have the right to talk about the embodiment in each of them of universal social and moral values. And the difference between them no longer appears as their cultural incompatibility, but as a measure of the implementation of enduring cultural values, which are the common heritage of mankind, bound by a common destiny. In turn, this allows us to see the meaning of world history in the formation and assertion of universal human values ​​and in their perception by all the peoples of our planet.
Through the prism of these universal values, European civilization itself appears in a different light: not as unique in its exclusivity and not as one of many in its relativity, but as a unique and still the most vivid embodiment of universal human values.
What are these social and moral values ​​that underlie European civilization and at the same time, as I believe, are universal, and therefore not alien to other peoples, even if they have not yet acquired them?
First of all, it seems to me, this is the position of the individual in society. European civilization since antiquity has been based on a certain social contract between the rulers and the ruled. We already find this social contract in the reforms of Solon and the laws of Lycurgus, in the laws of the XII tables in Ancient Rome, in the principle of the separation of powers and in ancient democracy, and in modern times both in the theory of the social contract and in the political practice of Western democracy. Of course, we can find elements of such a social contract in other civilizations, but only in Europe did they acquire a stable and enduring place, while in others they were episodic.
Speaking about the separation of powers, it would be wrong to limit it only to the now generally accepted division of political power into legislative, executive and judicial, that is, a tradition dating back to J. Locke, S. Montesquieu, T. Jefferson and other thinkers of the 17th-19th centuries. The problem of the separation of powers, based on the social contract between the rulers and the ruled, undoubtedly has a deeper socio-philosophical meaning and practical significance in the activities of society.
It should be emphasized that power in society is far from being exhausted by political power, the bearer of which is the state. Along with political power in any society there is also economic power and spiritual, moral power, as well as other forms of power. It is the presence of a wide range of power in its various forms that makes it possible to distinguish between the state and civil society. The more polycentric is the distribution of power in society, the more democratic it is, the greater is the independence of citizens from the state. And in this respect, European civilization, again, since antiquity (especially in the Middle Ages, and even more so in modern times) embodied such polycentrism, the dispersal of power in society, including both the relative independence of various forms of power, and its restriction to various levels, subject to a certain autonomy of local authorities.
In this regard, the division of power into political and spiritual, moral, which took place in Western Europe throughout its history, which was carried, on the one hand, by the state, and on the other, by the church, deserves special attention. The struggle between political and spiritual power (in the history of the Middle Ages it is traditionally called the struggle between emperors and popes, although it, of course, is not limited to this either chronologically or in terms of its social content) both began and ended with the fact that, along with the “kingdom of the Caesars ” in the life of society, the “kingdom of God”, the kingdom of the spirit, defended itself. In other words, the spiritual power, the sphere of human morality, managed to defend itself against the encroachments of political power. Thanks to this, European civilization, despite temporary defeats, managed to avoid the threat of both totalitarianism and theocracy. Ultimately, the freedom of the individual as a universal human value, as well as other human rights, largely have their source in this division of political and spiritual power in society, thanks to which the individual not only acquired a moral ideal that promotes his independence and the pursuit of happiness, but also became in many ways relations independent, sovereign in matters of choice between good and evil. On the moral ideal, on the recognition of the sovereignty of the individual, in turn, is based both secular and religious humanism, whose history goes back not only to the Renaissance, but also to primitive Christianity, as well as Stoicism.
The spiritual freedom of the individual in society has a wide range of manifestations, because it also includes the intellectual freedom of the individual in search of not only goodness, but also truth and beauty. It is on this intellectual freedom that modern science rests as a search for objective knowledge about nature, society and man, as well as achievements in the field of literature and art.
Of exceptional importance in society is the separation of political and economic power, which is especially characteristic of European civilization in modern times, although it was far from rudimentary in the Middle Ages, and even in antiquity. It is the granting of economic power to civil society and the recognition of the individual's right to economic freedom with his initiative, enterprise and ingenuity that has, over the past two or three centuries, become a powerful stimulus for economic development and prosperity in Western Europe, North America, and now in other regions. Freedom of enterprise, at all costs, in the light of new thinking is by no means a “capitalist value”, as it was perceived in the West and East until recently, but a universal human value, which, with its reasonable regulation, is the only one capable of bringing material security and prosperity to mankind. . Of course, this problem deserves a deeper study and discussion, because the freedom of entrepreneurship must fit into the current environmental situation and not trample on social justice as an independent universal value.
Above we have given only a limited list of universal values. Along with them, one can also name such things as political sovereignty, which belongs to each people, the right of nations to self-determination and freedom of social choice, and a number of others that have received a more complete embodiment in European civilization.

M. Markovich Marx on alienation

From the editor. One of the key themes in the philosophical heritage of K. Marx, which is relevant in our time, is the problem of alienation. The published article by the famous Yugoslav philosopher, member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences M. Markovich gives the Soviet reader the opportunity to get acquainted with the interpretation of Marx's concept of alienation, unusual for our philosophical literature. In the future, the editors of the journal intend to return to the discussion of this issue.
Most followers of Marx and his critics are convinced that a critical study of alienation is an unnecessary and redundant part of his theory.
This was largely facilitated by the activities of a group of respectable scholars called "Structuralist Marxists", who put forward the idea of ​​an "epistemological gap" between the young, Hegelian-minded, humanistic Marx and the mature, non-Hegelian, scientifically oriented Marx in the period after the "German Ideology" of 1846 This approach seemed plausible enough and was fairly widely adopted, partly due to the fact that 1846 was indeed a turning point in the development of Marxism, marking the transition from a brilliant, abstract theory to a concrete scientific study of social life. From that moment on, the style and terminology of Marx changed significantly, who did not miss the opportunity to emphasize that he was engaged in scientific, and not philosophical research, "scientific", and not "utopian" socialism. And yet, upon closer examination, it is clear that the differences in style and emphasis cannot serve as a basis for artificially contrasting the young Marx as a Hegelian and humanist with the mature Marx, who allegedly left both Hegelianism and humanism for the soil of “pure science”. The very idea of ​​the "epistemological break" (coupure epistemologique) is completely alien to Marx's method of thinking and borrowed from Gaston Bachelard. According to Marx, even in the most radical historical change, the network is both discontinuous (the removal of internal limitations) and continuity (as the preservation of the “rational grain”, what is necessary for further development). It is not difficult to show that after 1846 Marx overcame the abstract, purely speculative form of humanism. But the main humanistic ideas, including the critique of alienation, permeate all of his work from "German Ideology" to "Capital". For example, in The German Ideology, he writes: “As long as... the division of activity is not done voluntarily, but spontaneously, a person’s own activity becomes an alien, opposing force for him, which oppresses him instead of him dominating it .. This social force ... appears to these individuals not as their own united force, but as some kind of alien power standing outside them, about the origin and development trends of which they know nothing; they, therefore, can no longer dominate this force... This "alienation", speaking in a language understandable to the philosopher, can, of course, be abolished only if there are two practical prerequisites, one of which is that the enormous masses of people are deprived of property, and the second - in "universal communication", as a result of which "locally-limited individuals are replaced by individuals world-historical, empirically universal". Both of these presuppositions presuppose a "universal development of the productive force."
The political-economic concepts of productive forces and property are intertwined in this analysis with the "Hegelian" philosophical concepts of alienation, universality, and world-historical individuals. Anyone who believes that this is characteristic only of the works of the transitional period, and in no way of Capital, let him reread, for example, the following: “... under the capitalist system, all methods of increasing the social productive power of labor are carried out at the expense of the individual worker; all means for the development of production turn into means of subordinating and exploiting the producer, they deform the worker, making him an incomplete person (einen Teilmenschen), reduce him to the role of an appendage of the machine, turning his labor into torment, deprive this labor of content, alienate spiritual forces from the worker the labor process to the extent that science enters the labor process as an independent force; make the conditions under which the worker works disgusting, subject him during the labor process to the most petty, disgusting despotism, turn his whole life into working time, throw his wife and children under the juggernaut chariot of capital.
This criticism in Capital differs from the criticism in the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts only in that it is more concrete, based on vast factual material about the living conditions of workers in mid-century England. The basic humanistic ideas remain the same. In defending the view that Marx abandoned them after The German Ideology, Althusser had to resort to a special "symptomatic" method of reasoning. The most important rule of this method seems to be this: ignore and disregard all texts that are incompatible with your interpretation.
2
The decisive question is not whether Marx used the concept of alienation in his mature writings (explicitly or implicitly - without using the term), because he certainly did. The question is whether he really needed it. Could Marx have expressed all that he said in descriptions of facts, analysis and criticism of capitalism without using such an abstract concept as alienation at all? Did he needlessly embellish his scientific writings with incomprehensible philosophical words from some irrelevant, personal extra-scientific considerations? Did he not say, for example, in the Afterword to the second German edition of Capital: “But just at the time when I was working on the first volume of Capital, noisy, pretentious and very mediocre epigones, setting the tone in modern educated Germany , learned the manner of bullying Hegel, as once in Lessing's time, the brave Moses Mendelssohn bullied Spinoza like a "dead dog". Therefore, I openly declared myself a student of this great thinker, and in the chapter on the theory of value, in places I even flirted with Hegel's characteristic manner of expression.
But maybe. Was Marx really just “flirting” with the term “alienation”? Any careful study of Marx's intellectual development, the nature of his theory and his method, leads to an unambiguously negative answer to this question.
1) From his very first articles in the Rheinische Zeitung until his death, Marx engaged in a critical study not of particular aspects and institutions of social life, but of human conditions as a whole.
2) It can hardly be disputed that Marx's theory was scientific. His idea of ​​science in many respects coincides with the ideas of his predecessors (Smith, Ricardo) and his contemporaries (Comte, Mill): objective facts must be accurately described, the laws of phenomena are open - and all this is modeled on natural science and in a strong positivist and deterministic accent. However, Marx brought something completely new to these ideas: the idea of ​​a critical social science. From now on, it is also the task of social science to reveal the limitations of the given in direct experience and to show that they must be overcome (aufgehoben). Since this criticism is not always immanent, it requires a fundamental philosophical criterion of evaluation. Marx did not need to look for him; this criterion was worked out in his early writings.
3) As Marx repeatedly said, including in Capital, his method is dialectical. Dialectics is a method of holistic, critical, historical thinking. All its main categories are loaded with values: development, progress, denial, transcendence, self-determination. According to Hegel, the meaning of the entire world-historical process is given by the increasing concretization and self-realization of the original abstract rationality; according to Marx, the meaning of history lies in the practical realization of the potential humanity hidden in each individual and wasted under adverse historical conditions.
Marx misled many of his followers, especially those inclined towards dualistic thinking, by making scathing remarks about philosophy, about utopian consciousness, about his own early writings, and about the scientific nature of his later writings.
To some extent, Marx was misunderstood. For dualistic thinking, since Descartes and Hume, denial is tantamount to rejection. For Marx, negation is the establishment of a certain limitation (Grenze) that must be overcome. Such a limitation of the philosophy of his time is its "pure", "abstract", idealistic character, its separation from the empirical sciences, its detachment from empirical life and practical activity. There is no doubt that philosophy is present in all his works, but as an element of an interdisciplinary, concrete, practice-oriented theory. In addition, the essential limitation of the utopian consciousness contemporary to Marx lies in its isolation from practice, in the assumption of the absolute idea of ​​reason and its concrete embodiment - justice, in the naive and arbitrary construction of detailed schemes of an ideal social life, together with the dogmatism and rigidity inherent in these schemes, in which, apparently, it was supposed to squeeze future human communities in some supernatural way. On the other hand, if the utopian tradition acts as the guardian of moral values ​​aimed at the need to replace existing forms of life, then, probably, an element of utopian consciousness is always present in Marx's theory: in his view of the proletariat as a class “in itself”, in his idea social revolution as universal human liberation and in his vision of a communist society.
Marx did not depart from any of these ideas that appeared in his early writings. He knew very well that the empirically existing proletariat, living in poverty and ignorance, can at best develop only a trade union consciousness, that the revolution, as the reality of history shows, very often comes down to only its “first episode” - the seizure of political power, that communism can be a primitive egalitarian society or political despotism, and not "the positive abolition of private property", "the overthrow of all those relations in which man is a degraded, enslaved, helpless, contemptible being" or "the complete emancipation of all human feelings and qualities". These ideas themselves were not rejected by Marx, they were discarded in their speculative abstract form. When we encounter them again in the mature writings of Marx, they are mediated by a wealth of historical and economic data. The proletariat is not only a class chained in “radical chains”, which “has a universal character, due to ... universal sufferings” and which cannot liberate itself without liberating all other social spheres. Marx shows how the degree of exploitation of this class rises under capitalism, how capital must squeeze more and more surplus value out of labor in order to resist the downward trend in the average rate of profit. The consciousness of the proletariat is growing: firstly, because the bourgeoisie itself must “appeal to the proletariat, call upon it for help, and thus draw it into the political movement. Consequently, it itself transfers to the proletariat the elements of its own education...”; secondly, because entire sections of the propertied classes are proletarianized and, consequently, “bring to the proletariat a large number of elements of education”; thirdly, because a part of the bourgeois ideologists go over to the side of the proletariat, insofar as they "raised themselves to a theoretical understanding of the entire course of the historical movement"; fourthly, because the proletarians organize themselves into a political party and develop a cultural vanguard, communists, who "clearly understand" the conditions and "general results of the proletarian movement."
The purpose of this copious quotation was not only to illustrate the nature of Marx's rejection of his early abstract ideas, but also to draw attention to the most important problem, Marx's understanding of himself.
When all these conditions for the transition of the class “in itself” and the class “for itself” are taken into account, the following question arises: do they really determine this transition? If we understand determination in the way that Marx understood it in many of his writings, then the answer would be in the negative. As a nineteenth-century scientist, Marx was strongly tempted to give determination a strict and mechanistic interpretation as inevitability and independence from human consciousness, will and practical activity.
Thus the dualistic, dichotomous and narrowly analytical way of thinking of Marx's interpreters was but the only reason for the misunderstanding of the nature of his theory and his relation to philosophy, utopias and his early work. Another reason was Marx's ambiguous and contradictory understanding of his contribution to the social theory of his time. In part, these ambiguities and inconsistencies are objectively due to the very involvement in practical action and the struggle at different times with different opponents. Marx criticizes the Hegelianism of the German professors of philosophy, and then, a quarter of a century later, "flirts" with the Hegelian language, speaking out against mediocre epigones who treated the "powerful thinker" like a "dead dog." He criticizes the utopian socialism of his time (including the communist utopias of Cabet, Dozami, and Weitling), but he himself must be recognized as a utopian thinker when compared with the petty-bourgeois positivist scientists of the second half of the 19th century. He is a critical thinker in all respects, but desires to be perceived as a scientist (and scientific socialist) so much that he approves of an entirely positivist interpretation of his method. A Russian observer (in Vestnik Evropy, St. Petersburg, 1872) extols Marx for interpreting social history as a “natural-historical process,” for “perfectly stating” facts, for striving to discover the laws of the development of phenomena, the laws “not only not depending on the will, consciousness and intentions of a person, but also themselves still determining his field, consciousness and intentions. “The author ... thereby described nothing but the dialectical method,” remarks Marx.
If Marx really did just that, then his place in history would be behind Ricardo, Mill, Comte, Durkheim and other positivist social scientists of the 19th century, and today there would hardly be a need to study Capital. But in fact, Marx is a thinker who belongs both to the 19th and 20th centuries, and this is the true reason for the contradictions both in his theory and in his own understanding of this theory. His positivism and determinism, his predictions about the growth of the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat and the disappearance of the middle classes are now outdated. His views on social laws as trends, on freedom as the liberation of man in the given objective conditions that limit him, on social science as a critical social theory, on practice as the most important thing in the creation of human history, his critical study of alienated labor and alienated politics even more relevant today than during his lifetime.
3
It is now easier to answer the crucial question: could Marx have developed a scientific theory of capitalism and its transition to communism without any humanist philosophical foundation? With a little effort of the imagination, we could imagine what this theory might be. The description and analysis of capitalism within the framework of such a theory would be strictly objective, data of any kind, no matter how they contradict each other, would be studied solely from the point of view of their reliability and validity. The language used would be neutral, excluding all value-laden concepts. Criticism of political economy would be reduced to a criticism of the theories of political economy and would refrain from any criticism of political economy as a reality of capitalist society. The established laws of development would either have to determine the transition from capitalism to socialism in an amazing way, independent of human consciousness and activity, or else reveal a range of different alternative possibilities, of which only one would be communism.
There is hardly any doubt that Marx's theory is not like that.
Already in a letter to Ruge in 1843, Marx explains in detail his theoretical concept as a merciless criticism of everything that exists. “We do not seek to dogmatically anticipate the future, but we wish only through criticism of the old world to find a new world.” At the end of the same year, Marx formulates his “categorical imperative”, “the doctrine that man is the highest being for man” and asserts the need to move from criticism of religion to criticism of law, from criticism of theology and criticism of politics. He proclaims "a revolution that abolishes private property and overthrows the whole order of things." The next step is a critical study of alienated labor and alienated politics in the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. In 1845, in the Theses on Feuerbach. Marx insists on a connection between critical theory and revolutionary practice. In The German Ideology, Marx defines communist consciousness as the consciousness of the need for a radical revolution. But for the success of the cause it is necessary to change human beings and to produce communist consciousness on a mass scale - which can only take place in a practical movement. A year later, he writes the program of the Communist Party and embarks on a long-term critical study of capitalist society in order to provide the proletarian revolutionary movement with a scientific foundation.
It is absurd to think that this kind of intellectual history and cultural background could lead to a neutral, value-laden description of capitalism. This does not mean that Marx's research is arbitrary, guided by some narrow, selfish interest (which happens in ideological research). Marx believes that the proletariat is interested in the truth, since its interests fully coincide with the general interests of the liberation of mankind. The selection and interpretation of data (which takes place in all social research) should not hide or distort anything in a capitalist society. Its limitations are obvious and have so many confirmations that attempts at ideological apologetics are easily exposed and its true nature is revealed: truth coincides with critical consciousness and becomes the basis for conclusions about the need for liberation. That is why objectivity does not contradict criticality. Thus, when Marx uses critical concepts (exploitation, alienation, oppression, capital), their negativity reflects the negativity of reality itself, and by exposing this reality, he opens the way to liberation from it.
However, no theoretical criticism alone is sufficient to change reality. If Marx were only a scientist, if his theory were purely scientific, he would have limited himself to simply asserting the transition from capitalism to some new mode of production. In his works, he never considered the possibility that it would not be communism, but something else. We have no reason to believe that Marx allowed any other alternative for a society after capitalism. Therefore, those who deny the humanistic background of Marx's theory consider this theory to be rigidly deterministic or simply false.
When this theory is placed in its proper context, in the totality of Marx's reflections and practical deeds, it must be understood as an orientation towards history-making activity. After all, it is human beings who make history and can make it intelligently and humanly with the help of the appropriate theory. A theoretical statement is not just a statement about reality, but also a speech act that can generate forces to change it - when there are objective conditions for this. Marx can only be understood in the context of this activity, especially since he did not limit himself to speeches alone, but created the first International Communist Organization and led it.
From a purely scientific, deterministic, contemplative point of view, such activity is futile and devoid of any meaning. The revolution, determined regardless of human consciousness and will, will happen one way or another. Then why waste energy and time? On the other hand, activism presupposes a moral stance. The basis of this morality does not change to be religion - "the opium of the people", which "transforms the human essence into a fantastic reality, because the human essence does not have true reality." Revolutionary morality rests on the fundamental premise that there is a potential humanity which, under existing conditions, is prevented from developing and held back, and which can be brought back to life if these conditions are changed. And this is the whole point of alienation and its overcoming (dealienation).
Critical thought includes, per definitionern, the idea of ​​the negative, the idea of ​​limitation. Even the most detached, least biased thinking is critical in this sense. For analytic philosophy, the negative is inconsistency, ambiguity, confusion. For conformist social theory, negativity is disorder, inefficiency. Revolutionary theories are critical of the structural characteristics of the system: the unfair distribution of wealth, unequal access to the means of labor, political domination, economic exploitation. It is obvious that a theory can be critical, even revolutionary, revealing only partially those structural features of the system that cause human suffering. It is possible, for example, to destroy private property without affecting the dominance of the bureaucracy and the dehumanizing organization of labor. Thus, critical theory is truly radical when it reveals the negative in the totality of the circumstances of human life. The great advantage of the concept of alienation is that it makes it possible to capture all the negative aspects of the human condition.
4
This immediately raises many questions. First, is alienation really such a comprehensive critical concept? Second: if so, isn't it too vague? Given its long history, doesn't it mean much more than what Marx wanted to say? Third, is there really any use for such a “comprehensive” concept? Can't we decipher it, express it in terms of other concepts, or even do without it altogether? Fourth: Isn't one of the reasons for Marx's rare mention of "alienation" in his mature writings the fact that alienation is an abstract universal that presupposes the immutability and normativity of human nature? This last question requires special attention, but first I will briefly touch on the first three.
1) It can indeed be shown that the concept of alienation encompasses all the special limitations of class societies that Marx speaks of. The basic meaning of the term is that, due to some unfavorable historical conditions, human beings are not really what they could potentially be. This loss of basic human identity, this conflict between actual existence and potential being, appears in several forms, which Marx analyzed in the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts. Thus, one of the aspects of alienation is the loss of control over the products of human activity. Another aspect of it is the pathological nature of social relations: envy, competition, distrust, hatred and hostility instead of possible cooperation, reciprocity, meaningful communication and concern for meeting the needs of other people. The third aspect is a waste of the potential of creative activity. The fourth is the loss of self-identity of the individual, its internal disintegration into parts that are strangers to each other. We can add a fifth aspect: the alienation of man from nature.
Further, everything that, according to Marx, characterizes the relations of production really refers to one of these aspects. Economic and political domination is a special case of alienated human relations. The transformation of produced goods into commodities, driven by market forces, the flow of surplus value from the producer to the capitalist, the accumulation of capital and the concentration of property in the hands of a few individuals are all specific forms of loss of control over human products. (This is also true of such political institutions as the state, a political party.) Labor, which has turned into a hated webbing, into a monotonous donkey, where there is no need for the worker's ability to think, solve problems and be creative, is an extreme form of senseless waste of human resources. abilities that could be applied to free, creative activity (praxis). Both workers and capitalists lose their human identity: the former because they are forced to sell their body, their labor power, and their true life only begins when the working hours are over; the second because all their human feelings are reduced to one feeling of possession, which in the end gives life various artificial characteristics, forces people to enter into roles and images that do not correspond to the real possibilities of the individual. Politics and culture in bourgeois society are replete with special forms of self-alienation. Professional politicians and apologetic intellectuals are selling their minds and exercising pragmatic rationality in accordance with the various goals imposed on them. Philosophers separate and isolate reason, experience, morality, will and practice from each other. Artists adapt to market demands and follow fashions that have nothing to do with their creative inclinations.
The concept of alienation is so broad and general that it encompasses all of these critical humanistic views.
2) But then another question arises: Is not alienation such a broad concept that it hardly serves any useful cognitive purpose? It is impossible not to admit that concepts that cover so much do not allow to see what they exclude, and lose their informativeness. Information implicitly contains negation - omnis determinatio negatio est. To be meaningful, a concept must make some important distinction. The concept of alienation, in the sense of Marx, introduces a distinction between all those cases where some normatively defined characteristics of human beings are actualized, and those where actual existence and activity correspond to the descriptive requirements of humanity, but do not meet normative requirements.
Later we will return to the question of how the normative notion of human nature can be justified. It is important to note at this point that alienation is by no means an “all-encompassing” term. It cannot be said that every situation can be regarded as an example of alienation, that every individual is always and in all alienated. sense of alienation.
It is true that the term “alienation” has had many different meanings throughout history. In Aristotle, the corresponding Greek terms mean "excluded from the community" or "transfer of property." In Christian theology, man is "alienated from God." An obvious example of alienus "a is Satan. This also includes fallen angels and sinners. Starting with Origen, this concept is also used in the sense of a gap between a sinful body and an independent free spirit. Augustine has both meanings. Alienation (in a negative sense) is the situation of all human individuals who, due to original sin, have an innate urge to sensual passions and run the risk of being alienated from God.
However - and this is the positive meaning of alienation - a person can be saved if he resists passions and alienates himself from the frailty of bodily existence. In mystical theology, alienation is liberation from earthly fetters through spiritual ecstasy; therefore it is a presupposition of pure knowledge of supernatural truth. Meister Eckhart retained this meaning: in alienation, the soul returns to itself from its natural slavery. Aquinas distinguishes three meanings of alienation: 1) a sick state of mind, 2) liberation from feelings, and 3) a state of ecstasy, going beyond the work of one's own "I".
Another example illustrating the extreme vagueness of this concept is, of course, the meaning that Hegel attaches to the word Entfremdung. Any objectification of the spiritual in the natural, in the world of objects, in space and time, is alienation.
Marx is highly critical of the Hegelian interpretation, especially when it became fashionable for a time among German philosophy professors after Hegel's death. It was considered radically critical to overcome alienation. However, from Hegel's point of view, the removal of alienation is simply a return to the spirit, which becomes aware of its objectification in nature and human history. A “radical” neo-Hegelian critique would consist only in the discovery of a rational structure of reality, and therefore everything that existed, of course, had to appear rational. Marx distinguished alienation from objectification, which is implicitly present in all practical activity. Only that practice produces an alienated reality that is inhuman and squanders human potential. Therefore, in order to abolish alienation, it is not enough to establish how reason is, or could be, incarnated in reality; almost inhuman structures, institutions and social relations must be destroyed.
Thus we see that alienation is one of those very general concepts which have been used in many different senses throughout the history of human thought. But this does not matter if we clearly define its use in our reasoning and consistently adhere to this use.
3) And yet the question remains: could we not sort out the meaning of the term, distinguish several types of alienation, introduce new terms for each of them, and in this way replace an abstract concept with several more concrete ones? Of course it could be done. But why? We could, in principle, eliminate any concept from our language. Each concept can act as a substitute for a whole set of concepts. Each is a kind of abbreviation. For example, Zeeman analyzed alienation in terms of helplessness, nonsense, abnormality, loneliness, self-detachment. Each of these concepts, in turn, can be replaced by its definiens "OM. As a result, the language would become more and more bizarre and awkward. Brevity requires metaphor in literature and high abstractions in philosophy. But style is far from the only consideration in favor of abstractions. Much the more important argument is the preservation of Gestalt "a, the structure of the whole. Today, none of the natural scientists would take seriously the rejection of the concept of energy and its replacement by the concepts of the ability to perform mechanical work, the concepts of heat, light, electricity, magnetism, radioactivity, etc. They all have something in common, and this common characteristic is the final notation of the term "energy". It is believed that a very important breakthrough took place in the history of modern physics, when all these seemingly heterogeneous types of phenomena were integrated and attributed to such an extremely abstract concept. Whatever the differences between the natural and social sciences, the trend towards integration and systematization is legitimate in both. Helplessness in relation to one's own products, detachment between people, senseless waste of creativity, loss of self-identity, internal discord, etc. seem to be different types of phenomena. If we can show that these are all different dimensions of the same human situation, characterized by a conflict between actual human existence and human abilities, then this must be recognized as a significant theoretical achievement. If there is no such conflict, then the concept of alienation is irrelevant. If it exists, then this concept is indispensable, and it is necessary not only in order to better understand the totality of the human situation, but also to conceptualize the possibility of its radical, and not accidental, partial change.
5
The most serious difficulty with regard to the concept of alienation is that that it clearly presupposes the immutability and normativity of human nature. As if something associated with it must first be, in order to then be alienated. This is how the matter was portrayed in all interpretations of alienation before Marx. The citizen first belongs to the community, and then is alienated from it. Some property first belongs to the owner, and then alienated from him. Adam and Eve first lived close to God, and then were rejected and alienated from Him. The soul first lives its sinful life in a passionate, sensual body, and then alienates itself from it. According to Hegel, alienation is preceded by the full logical development of the Absolute Spirit, but this precedence is logical, not temporary. To put it in Kant's language, the logical structure of the Absolute Spirit is the condition for the possibility of its alienation into nature and history. Many followers of Marx are convinced that this idea of ​​alienation presupposes forms of life (in primitive communism) in which the human essence was fully realized even before alienation took place (g. class society). This idealization of the primitive collective community is too naive to be taken seriously. B. Olmen, in his monograph on alienation, went to the other extreme. Alienation is the absence of non-alienation (!), and non-alienation is the life of a person in the future under communism. This is a very crude and misleading formulation of common sense: what we are alienated from is a human possibility, which is wasted in the present, but which can be realized in the future.
Further, if this possibility were a set of individual dispositions that are unique to each person, then the meaning of alienation would be different in each individual case. "Alienation" would never be a universally valid social concept, but would be only a word of a purely personal language (if something like that is even possible). And if alienation were related to the particular dispositions of a certain group, then its meaning would change from group to group and would be devoid of any constancy. Therefore, when using the term "alienation" refers to a set of universal human dispositions. The assumption here is that every human individual has certain characteristic abilities and can exercise them in life if the right conditions are present. Such abilities include communication with the help of symbols (in particular, knowledge of the language), conceptual thinking according to some logical rules, choice not determined mechanically, activity carried out in new ways, production of new objects, life in stable, harmonious communities, governed by consciously accepted rules; they include a sense of self-identity and awareness of one's past, negative in reality and in oneself, plans for the future. One can hardly argue with the fact that human beings are endowed with all these abilities, regardless of racial, national, civilizational, class, tribal, age boundaries - they are truly universal. It should not be a problem to explain the ontological status of these abilities. They are dispositional properties comparable in principle to the solubility of sugar or the electrical conductivity of copper wire. This means that the physical structure in this case, or in the case of human beings, the biochemical, genetic structure determines certain properties that exist in latent food until well-defined appropriate conditions arise when they could really come to light.
With respect to universal human potential (from which we may be alienated), there are really difficult problems: 1) does not such an abstract universal bind us to the concept of the immutability of human nature? 2) does not this notion of a universal human being encompass all factually given general dispositions of human behavior in various groups and at various stages of history, or, in other words, is it purely descriptive? If it is normative, how can one justify its choice?
1) The abstract universal concept does oblige us to accept the concept of an unchanging human nature. For Platonism and Hegelianism this would be acceptable. This is incompatible, however, with Marx's dialectical method and his philosophy of history, according to which every object is an open process. This view is essentially different not only from the eternal ideas of Plato, but also from Hegelian historicism, which is enclosed in the schematism of a priori logical structure. All conceivable change in Hegel is directed from the logically abstract to the logically concrete and then from the spiritual potential to the material actualization. Marx is obliged to recognize the change in human nature. All history is nothing but the self-creation of man. It does not end with communism either. A society without classes and a state is only the beginning of true history, it is a horizon beyond which we can hardly look. Nevertheless, this view of human nature as something open and dynamic can be conceptualized using the Hegelian category of concrete universality in its sublated form. The absolute character of this universality will be destroyed: Marx does not require a fully developed logical order prior to reality. Rationality must continue to build itself in the course of history. However, along with discontinuity (discovery of more and more limitations, incompleteness in overcoming them, creative leaps), there is also continuity in history and human nature. Some human traits turn out to be trans-epochal and each time they are found in new specific forms. Symbols remain human creations that express structures of thought and feeling and designate objective patterns independent of individual consciousness - but new, richer and more complex symbolic forms appear in language, myth, rituals, arts and sciences. Rationality is also invariant, but rules, problems to be solved, and methodological tools are largely updated and generated at an increasing rate. Although creativity is always an innovation, the richness of its forms and content grows exponentially.
Human nature, understood as a historical (not absolute) concrete universality, means 1) that human characteristics are not just logically possible, but are real dispositions, manifesting themselves under appropriate conditions and in a variety of ways depending on the specific conditions; 2) that these general characteristics should not be thought in isolation from the special and individual forms in which they are realized - thus, the identity of a human being does not exclude the difference between eras, kind. class, nation, race or age; 3) that the development of human nature consists in its (continuous) preservation and at the same time in the (discontinuous) transition from one particular form and style to another; 4) that there is no limit to this development, which admits not only the possibility of the emergence of ever new forms of the human. but also the possibility of a radical transformation of the human into something essentially new, transhuman.
Thus we see that the assumption of a universal human nature does not obligate us to a rigid, static, ahistorical point of view. Concrete universality is a totality that unites possibility and actualization; general, special and individual; invariance and development, openness to overcoming limitations.
2) The concept of a potential human being, assumed by Marx's idea of ​​alienation, is not descriptive, but normative. When Marx characterizes, in contrast to animals, the human generic essence, he lists such properties as freedom, universal production “according to standards of any kind” and “free from physical necessity”, “creation of things according to the laws of beauty”, relations with other personalities - as social being, “joint work”, “confirmation of one's essential forces” in handling objects, etc. Obviously, this is not the whole list. It lacks a number of very general properties that other writers say are important parts of human nature and that do appear throughout human history. Among them are the will to dominate, greed, aggressiveness, zealous defense of one's status, power, property, territory, readiness for destruction, self-centeredness, rationalization of selfishness. A descriptive concept of human nature would also have to accommodate such less desirable invariant dispositions of human behavior. This concept, of course, must be contradictory, full of conflicting and internally opposed motives. Then alienation must also be contradictory - and in part even very desirable, like, for example, alienation from aggressiveness, selfishness, greed and destructiveness.
Whatever the price of such an uncritical interpretation of alienation, it has nothing to do with Marx's triad: generic essence - alienation - universal human liberation. All three concepts are critical, value-laden, and normative. The first speaks of the chosen and desirable possibility of human existence, the second - of the denial and distortion of this possibility, the third - of the process of removing the denial and the practical realization of this possibility.
The most difficult question for Marx's theory and for philosophical humanism in general is this: what are the criteria that determine what is truly human, which decide which of the conflicting dispositions of actual behavior are included in the undoubtedly normative concepts of generic essence, human potential or human nature?
Marx does not discuss this problem. Op uses essentialist language and either postulates “good” human characteristics, such as human essence (man is a free, creative, social being), or turns human essence into a descriptive concept when, in the Theses on Feuerbach, he says that human essence is in its reality is "the totality of all social relations."
In fact, two criteria seem to be implicit in his writings.
One of them is directed at the choice of the specifically human. Since we are part of the animal world and, generally speaking, nature, we share many characteristics with other living organisms and natural objects. Like any other natural force, we can disrupt or set in motion various physical and chemical processes. Like any other animal, we can zealously fight for our territory, for dominance and self-preservation. This is also human, but not specifically human.
Another selection criterion is more complex. The specific feature of human history, as opposed to the history of plants or galaxies, is an extraordinary and ever more rapid development, which can hardly be compared with biological evolution. In parallel, there is a steady process of liberation of more and more significant masses of people from various external coercions - to an ever greater variety of life manifestations. The transcendental question must be asked: what are the conditions for the possibility of all this development and continued liberation? Some specifically human dispositions do not meet this criterion. Other things being equal, aggressiveness and individual and group egoism impede development and liberation rather than facilitate them. The normative concept of human nature includes universal human dispositions that satisfy both criteria: symbolic communication, cultural education of feelings, rational thinking, creative production, harmony in the community and solidarity, etc. They constitute a potential that, in a situation of alienation, is denied, restrained and is wasted.
These two criteria can no longer be justified purely theoretically. They are presupposed by the very process of making history, just as certain criteria of rationality are presupposed by the very process of using language. And just as we must stop communication if we begin to deny these demands of rationality, we must stop making history if we begin to deny these principles of humanity. If someone is ready to blow up the planet, return to the caves, or turn the vast majority of humanity into slaves, then there is no point in trying to theoretically justify the criteria of humanity to such a person. The sole purpose of the dialogue may be to draw out all the practical consequences of his intentions in order to find out whether he fully understands the meaning of these intentions and whether it is possible to stop their practical implementation by appealing to the moral feelings that have survived this person.
6
A critical examination of alienation seems highly abstract, but in the appropriate context its implications for the goals of human emancipation are extremely radical.
After more than two centuries of various emancipatory social movements, there is ample experience indicating that limited emancipation is the result of narrow or superficial social criticism.
Criticism of power for arbitrariness, denial of political freedoms and violation of civil rights can lead to political liberation. Only political liberation does not affect economic domination and exploitation. The accumulation of economic power provides political influence that cannot be swept away by any purely legal equality.
Economic criticism centered on low wages and unfavorable working conditions can greatly improve the material side of a worker's life. This does not necessarily solve the problem of social security. When criticism raises the issue of socio-economic rights, they can largely be realized in a meaningless and unworthy way in a society of bourgeois prosperity, where the consumer of goods can remain unemployed and excluded from public life all the time.
The criticism of capitalism, which sees the main evil in private property, results in a very limited emancipation of the proletariat. The nationalization of state property leads to a monopoly of power for the state bureaucracy. Without becoming a ruling class, the workers come to the point that they are deprived of some elementary civil rights, not to mention the right to participate in decision-making. In some socialist communities where a fairly high level of participation and self-government has been achieved, such as in Yugoslav factories or in Israeli industrial kibbutz settlements, another aspect of alienated labor is completely ignored: work remains as mechanical and inhuman as in any capitalist factory.
Anarchist criticism focuses on the state. Of course, no large-scale liberation is possible unless professional politics and the growing gigantic repressive machinery of the modern state are overcome. However, it is possible to weaken the influence of the state and find yourself at the mercy of all the injustice and inequality generated by free enterprise (laisser faire) in a market economy. Further, one can imagine, though not very plausible, that modern states will disintegrate into small local communities that will enable future ecologists to free themselves from state bureaucracy, large corporations and from the industrial paradigm of modern life. However, the cost of a lack of large-scale coordination and an industrial way of life can be more mechanical work, lower levels of satisfaction, and a limited spiritual realm. And if one does not recognize the problem of alienated politics and does not know how to prevent the transformation of public self-government into political bodies, then it may happen that the always existing local rulers may turn out to be even more unpleasant than the remote national ones.
Criticism of discrimination and oppression of social groups can lead to significant, but usually limited, liberation. It is one thing for an oppressed nation, race, class, religion, or gender to fight to destroy all dominant alienated power and achieve true equality, and quite another when they themselves seek to seize power for the purpose of suppression. In the latter case, the just goal of liberation turns into nationalistic, racist, class, sexist or religious bigotry, which only replaces one form of alienation with another. The liberating effect of such a movement is also reduced if the final liberation from external masters is accompanied by internal differentiation and the emergence of master-slave relations within the movement, which at first seemed homogeneous.
A critique of alienation in all its dimensions suggests a very radical, multi-dimensional, deep understanding of liberation that puts all of the above examples of limited liberation in the right perspective.
The idea of ​​freedom, in our sense, embraces both negative freedom (from the alienation of the products of human activity, from external relations of domination, exploitation and oppression) and positive freedom (for autonomy, restoration of self-identity, realization of one's creative potential). It includes freedom of action (the ability to do what you want) and free will (autonomous choice among alternative possibilities).
Universal, radical human liberation turns out to be such a grandiose project in the context of Marx's thinking that it obviously cannot be fully implemented immediately or in a short historical period. It gives a long-term perspective and allows you to understand the place of each individual dimension and phase in the integrity of the whole process. Thus, the sequence of phases of economic emancipation is as follows: breaking the trend of increasing poverty of workers - reducing the degree of exploitation - gradual socialization of the means of production - complete destruction of the relations of labor and capital - reduction of working time and gradual humanization of work - overcoming commodity production and its market regulation. True, the final stage of this process, production aimed at satisfying human needs, not mediated by the market, is very distant. Nevertheless, it gives the whole process of liberation a long-term perspective. Likewise, political emancipation begins with civil liberties and ends, on the horizon of our era, with the establishment of self-governing councils and assemblies that completely replace the state in all its necessary functions (governance, coordination and harmonization of private interests) and abolish its main negative characteristics (professional politics and coercion apparatus). This political project of emancipation, consistent to the end, no matter how remote its full realization may be, gives meaning to every single step in its direction.
How far can one go in the fight against alienation? Is alienation a historical phenomenon or an unchanging human situation that has always existed in one form or another?
To answer these questions, some distinctions must first be made.
First, there are forms of alienation that can in principle be overcome if future generations of human beings act accordingly. Since history does not guarantee anything, these opportunities may be missed. Humanity can fall into the labyrinth of all sorts of "mixed societies." True production, aimed at satisfying human needs, and a fully developed democracy may not be realized. Some forms of alienation may remain with us indefinitely, because there is no natural or historical logos according to which human beings would “inevitably” act out the best possibilities.
Secondly, some unknown and unforeseen pathological characteristics of the human situation may appear, which will be called "alienation" and which may turn out to be stable features of human life on earth. But we can ignore this: it is a thing-in-itself. Our present notion of alienation must refer to things-for-us, phenomena that we experience and can theoretically project on the basis of objective historical experience.
Finally, there are subjective psychological aspects of human relations, which can be characterized as alienation and the complete disappearance of which is very difficult to imagine. Two people who are in friendship or who love each other can become estranged. Any object in which we put our thoughts and feelings can become alien to us. Even in a fully self-governing society, an elected delegate may temporarily become alienated from the community that elected him. However, these forms of alienation cannot be established, institutionalized and turned into institutionalized public structures that define our lives. This is what Marx had in mind when he characterized our epoch as an epoch of transition from alienated to liberated humanity.