In the second half of 1944, Germany found itself in a critical situation. Soviet troops in the east and Allied troops in the west successfully developed offensive operations. The German command decided to carry out a counteroffensive on the western front in order to try to get out of this difficult situation.

The military-political leadership of Germany set itself the task of achieving far-reaching military and political goals: to defeat the Anglo-American troops, change the situation in Western Europe in favor of Germany, and create prerequisites for negotiations with the United States and Britain on a separate peace. The German command hoped that this would allow them to throw all their forces on the Soviet-German front to continue the war against the USSR.

The German leadership saw its last chance to avoid defeat in the split of the anti-Hitler coalition. And this could be achieved only through serious success in the West, but not in the East.

“The Russians,” General A. Jodl, Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht High Command, wrote after the war, “were so powerful in their reserves that even if our offensive was successful, they would destroy 30 Russian divisions, and this would not change anything. Such a loss would not have been of great importance to the Soviet troops, but represented one third of the Anglo-American expeditionary forces.

When planning a counteroffensive, the German command chose for it the most vulnerable places in the Allied defense - the weakly covered Ardennes sector of the front. These were the densely forested hills in the Ardennes where Luxembourg, Germany and Belgium meet, the historic invasion route that the German army marched in triumph in 1870, 1914 and 1940. (From Munich to Tokyo Bay. View from the West. M., 1992. S. 364-365.) A strike from these sectors of the front in a northwestern direction to Antwerp was supposed to cut off the entire British army group, as well as American troops in the Aachen areas from Allied forces operating in France. “The purpose of the operation,” stated Hitler’s directive of November 10, 1944, “is to, by destroying enemy forces north of the Antwerp-Brussels-Luxembourg line, achieve a decisive turn in the course of the war in the West and thereby, possibly, the war as a whole” . (History of the Second World War, 1939-1945. T.9. M., 197? S. 272.) The operation was called "Watch on the Rhine."

The offensive was to be carried out by a new army group "B", the very existence of which the Anglo-American command was aware of. The command of the group was entrusted to Field Marshal V. Model. The army group included: the 6th SS Panzer Army under the command of SS Oberstgruppenführer I. Dietrich (9 divisions, including the selected tank divisions Leibstandarte, Reich, Hitler Youth and Hohenstauffen), 5th Panzer - General X. Manteuffel (7 divisions) and 7th - General E. Brandenberg (4 divisions). One division was in reserve. By December 16, 1944, the shock group had 250 thousand soldiers and officers, 900 tanks and 2,600 guns and mortars. For aviation support and air cover for this grouping, 800 aircraft were allocated ("Operation Watch on the Rhine". M., 1986. S. 67.)

The German command pinned great hopes on the planned special sabotage operation behind enemy lines. For its implementation, a special military unit (150th tank brigade) was formed under the command of O. Skorzeny. Its personnel, dressed in American and British uniforms, moving in tanks and vehicles captured from the Allies, were supposed to go among the advancing troops to the Meuse River and capture one or more bridges. The groups of this unit were to cause as much chaos as possible behind the American lines, passing false orders, disrupting communications, spreading false rumors. It was also planned to drop an airborne assault in the area north of Malmedy in order to prevent the transfer of Anglo-American troops from the north to the breakthrough site.

The command of the Wehrmacht sought to increase the striking power of the troops intended for the offensive. The 5th Panzer Army was given 400 new Panthers to arm the new tank brigades. However, these forces were clearly not enough to achieve the goals of the operation. The decisive nature of the struggle on the Soviet-German front forced the German command to limit itself to 21 divisions instead of the planned 25 divisions. Tanks had fuel for only half of the operation. General F. Halder wrote later that "... it was unacceptable to set the task of breaking through the Ardennes to Antwerp with several divisions that did not have sufficient fuel supplies, had a limited amount of ammunition and did not receive air support." (Ibid., p. 67.) The German command hoped to compensate for the lack of forces and means by achieving complete surprise. However, in the final analysis, it could not have a decisive influence on the course of the operation, given the great superiority of the Anglo-American troops. Although at the time of the German offensive on the 115-kilometer front, they were opposed by the troops of the 4th divisions of the 1st Army of the 12th Army Group (commander O. Bradley), numbering 83 thousand people, 424 tanks and self-propelled artillery guns, more than 300 guns. (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary. M., 1983. S. 42.)

The German war machine, straining its last efforts, could still deliver strong blows. But the Anglo-American command clearly underestimated the enemy, believing that "the German army is in a state of complete decline." (Sekistov V. A. War and Politics. M., 1970. P. 455.) The headquarters and troops of the allies did not even suspect that the counteroffensive was being prepared by the Germans. The subsequent course of events fully confirmed this.

In the early morning of December 16, 1944, German troops went on the offensive in the Ardennes. The offensive caught the divisions of the enemy's 8th Army Corps by surprise. For several hours in the highest headquarters they could not come to their senses from surprise and determine the force of the blow. American troops were unable to put up serious resistance in the early days. The front was broken. German tanks had already penetrated more than 30 kilometers into the depths, and in one of the sections they reached Stavelot. The commander of the 1st Army, K. Hodges, realized the seriousness of the threat only on the morning of December 17, when it became clear that the Germans had passed through Stavelot and approached his headquarters in Spa.

On the evening of December 16, D. Eisenhower ordered two armored divisions (the 7th from the 9th Army and the 10th from the 3rd Army) to be sent to the breakthrough site. On December 17, he was forced to transfer two airborne divisions (82nd and 101st) from his reserve to the Ardennes.

However, despite the surprise achieved and initial successes, the plans of the German offensive began to be violated already in the first days of the operation. The strike of the 6th Panzer Army on the right flank was repulsed by the stubbornly defending Americans at Montjoie. On the left flank, the Germans broke through the defenses and, bypassing Malmedy, crossed the river on December 18. Amblev, passing almost 50 km from the starting line. In this narrow defile, they were stopped by American units. New attempts by the Germans to move forward were not successful. The offensive of the 6th Panzer Army was stopped.

In the center, the 52nd Panzer Army successfully launched an offensive. Having broken through the American defenses and having passed about 50 km, she went close to the Bastogne stronghold, but an attempt to seize an important road junction by storm was repulsed. On the morning of December 19, the 101st Airborne Division from Eisenhower's strategic reserve managed to approach Bastogne. German tank columns bypassed Bastogne on both sides. The siege of the city was continued by the 26th Infantry Division and the Panzer Group. The 7th Army, which was supposed to cover the left flank of the advancing group, advancing through Nesh to Mezieres, could not break through the defenses of the Americans. The German airborne landing north of Malmedy, carried out on the night of December 17, ended in complete failure. Hopes for the effective actions of sabotage detachments did not materialize. It was not possible to capture the crossing over the Meuse. (History of the Second World War, 1939-1945, Vol. 9. S. 275.)

The breakthrough by the Germans of the defense on a broad front caused great alarm among the Anglo-American command. On December 19, the allied commanders met at Verdun. At the meeting, it was decided to promptly prepare and conduct a counterattack on the flanks of the advancing German group. On December 20, in order to improve leadership and control of the troops, Eisenhower subordinated to Montgomery all the troops located north of the breakthrough site, including both American armies - the 1st and 9th. Montgomery deployed the 30th Corps (consisting of four divisions) to the enemy breakthrough site to defend bridges across the river. Maas.

On December 18, the German command made significant changes to the operation plan. It canceled the previously planned strike from the area north of Aachen to the west. The troops of the shock group sought to continue the offensive. The 6th Panzer Army was ordered to support the offensive of the 5th Panzer Army and strike in a southwestern direction. However, despite the introduction of tank divisions into battle, he was not successful. Most of the forces of the 5th Panzer Army were pinned down by the battles for Bastogne. Only its advanced units approached the Meuse in the Dinan area. In an effort to ensure the exit of the advancing troops of the river. Maas, Hitler allocated the 9th Panzer and 15th Motorized Divisions from the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to help Manteifle to clear the Marche Seli area on the outskirts of Dinand from the Anglo-American troops. However, the advanced units of the 5th Panzer Army could not advance further: the forces that advanced forward were insignificant, and the tanks did not have fuel. Reserves were needed for the development of success, but they were absent. The situation on the Soviet-German front did not allow the German command to reinforce the troops in the west.

General D. Patton's 3rd American Army received the task of launching a counterattack on the southern face of the front ledge. She handed over almost her entire line of defense to the 7th Army and was transferred to the north between 19 and 24 December.

On December 21, the army went on the offensive. At the beginning, due to weak air support, it developed slowly. Finally, on December 23, flying weather arrived. As of December 24, the US 9th Tactical Air Force had flown 1,150 fighter-bomber sorties, and the US 8th Strategic Air Force had launched 2,050 four-engine bombers and 900 fighters against the enemy. Meanwhile, between December 23 and 27, German aviation made an average of only 447 sorties per day (in the presence of 600 fighters). This was the maximum activity of the Germans in the air after Normandy. (Sekistov V. A. War and politics. S. 460.)

As a result of urgent measures taken by the allied command, the German troops were deprived of the opportunity to develop an offensive against Antwerp. They suffered heavy losses. In some divisions, the number of soldiers was reduced to 20-30 in each company; the supply of fuel and food, medical care were paralyzed. As the participants in the battle recalled, it seemed to them that American fighter-bombers were able to find and destroy a convoy that was trying to deliver something. (From Munich to Tokyo Bay. S. 389.) On December 28, 1944, at a meeting at headquarters when discussing the course of the Ardennes operation, Hitler stated that the offensive had failed. Therefore, he decided to temporarily abandon the continuation of the operation on this sector of the front and carry out new strikes south of the Ardennes in order to destroy the American troops stationed there. (History of the Second World War, 1939-194 ^ 1 T.9. S. 276.) On the night of January 1, 1945, German troops (1st 19th Army) struck in Northern Alsace, in the wooded Vosges. On January 5, they advanced southward up to 30 km and crossed the Rhine to the north of Strasbourg. Fierce fighting continued in the Ardennes.

According to Eisenhower's chief of staff, the Allied losses in the Ardennes were 76,890, including 8,607 killed, 47,139 wounded, and 21,144 missing. The Germans during the Ardennes operation lost 81,834 people, 12,625 killed, 38,600 wounded and 30,582 captured and missing. Allied losses in weapons and equipment were also great: 783 tanks and tank destroyers, thousands of machine guns, mortars, artillery pieces up to the largest caliber. During six weeks of fighting in Alsace and the Ardennes, more than a million and a quarter of artillery shells were used up, thousands of vehicles of all types were lost. American and British losses in tanks, guns and other military equipment amounted to 15 to 35 percent of what they had in Europe by December 16. (From Munich to Tokyo Bay. S. 397.)

German losses in weapons and materiel were also very heavy - 324 tanks and assault guns, more than a thousand vehicles and other military equipment. They were more serious than the losses of the allies, since they could not be replenished.

A German strike in the Ardennes thwarted Allied plans for major offensives in late 1944. However, the main goal of the counteroffensive was not achieved.

However, the position of the Allies in Western Europe remained difficult. W. Churchill, fearing new attacks by the German troops, turned to I. Stalin with a request that the Red Army launch major offensives and thereby provide assistance to the allies. On January 12, 1945, the Soviet offensive began on the front from the Baltic to the Carpathians, which thwarted all the plans of the Germans in the West. The German command recognized the offensive on the western front as unpromising. On January 28, the last German units, pursued by the Allied forces, rolled back to their previously occupied positions and went on the defensive. In the military diary of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command, it is written that "in view of the threatening situation on the Eastern Front, the Fuhrer ordered to go on the defensive in the West." “Only now,” General B. Zimmerman pointed out, “the high command finally gave the order to gradually withdraw its troops from the Ardennes to the positions of the Western Wall and to simultaneously transfer almost a third of all forces to the East.” (The World War of 1939-1945. M., 1957. S. 85.) The 6th SS Panzer Army - the main striking force of the German group of troops in the Ardennes - and a number of formations were sent to the eastern front.

Ardennes operation
(Operation Watch on the Rhine)
Battle for the Bulge

German offensive in the Ardennes - (Ardennnenoffensive) - the operation of the German Army Group "B" in the Ardennes mountain range in southwestern Belgium in order to defeat the Anglo-American troops in Belgium and southern Holland, to change the situation on the Western Front in their favor and the freed forces and send funds to the Eastern Front. The German offensive in the Ardennes began on December 16, 1944 and lasted 9 days, after which, within a month, American and British troops restored their initial position (until January 28, 1945).

The code name for the German operation in the Ardennes is "Watch (guard) on the Rhine"(Wacht am Rhein) . In the UK, this operation is called (Battle of the Ardennes), in the USA - "Battle for the Ledge"(Battle of the Bulge).

By the end of 1944, the Allied forces approached the German border, which was covered by " Siegfried line”, or “Western rampart”. However, the fortifications of the Siegfried Line, built in the 30s, did not meet modern requirements. Casemates were designed for 37 mm guns and could not accommodate 75 mm and 88 mm guns that could successfully fight enemy tanks. In addition, there were not enough troops to occupy the Siegfried Line.

Allied bomber aircraft regularly made massive raids on industrial centers and cities in Germany. Soviet troops stood on the Vistula near East Prussia.

The situation on the Western Front on December 15, 1944 on the eve of the Ardennes operation.

US Army Center for Military History

The deployment of the forces of the parties to the beginning of the Ardennes operation

Allied troops:

21st British Army Group(B. Montgomery) - 2nd British and 1st Canadian armies.

12th US Army Group(O. Bradley) - 1st, 3rd and 9th American armies.

At the beginning of the German offensive, the 1st and 9th American armies were transferred to the 21st British Army Group. 1st Army - temporarily.

In the Ardennes located: the 1st American Army (C. Hodges), the 30th British Corps (B. Horrocks) from the 2nd British Army and the 8th Corps of the 3rd American Army (J. Patton).

The 1st American Army took up defensive positions in the northern part of the Ardennes between the cities of Saint-Vith and Liège. Part of its formations and the formations of the 9th Army fought in the Hurtgen forest. Here they broke through the Siegfried Line into German territory and created a bridgehead 50 km along the front and 40 km in depth. The 30th British Corps defended the bridges across the river Meuse. The bridges were mined in case German tanks approached them.

North of the Ardennes were the 1st Canadian Army, the 2nd British Army and the 9th American Army.

South of the Ardennes the main forces of the 3rd American Army were located, which partially wedged into the Siegfried line and created a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Saar River, where troops were concentrated to continue the offensive into the Saar region. Even further south, in Alsace and Lorraine, the 6th Army Group (J. Davers) was located - the 7th American Army (A. Patch) and the 1st French Army (J. de Lattre de Tassigny).

The command of the allied forces had significant reserves for a timely response to a German breakthrough anywhere on the front, including in the Ardennes.

In France, the 15th American Army was formed from divisions arriving from the United States. Having completed the formation, at the beginning of 1945 she was sent to the front.

The total number of American troops in the area of ​​the Ardennes operation reached 840 thousand people with 1300 tanks, 182 self-propelled anti-tank guns and 394 artillery pieces.

German troops:

For German offensive in the Ardennes(Operation Watch on the Rhine - Wacht am Rhein) the 6th SS Panzer Army was formed, consisting of the 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 67th Army Corps.

To carry out the Ardennes operation, the German command created two strike groups: Northern ( 6th SS Panzer Army, Commander SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer Sepp Dietrich) and South ( 5th Panzer Army General Manteuffel, 47th and 58th Tank Corps, 66th Army Corps). In the 6th SS Panzer Army and the 5th Panzer Army, a large number of Panther medium tanks and Tiger and King Tiger heavy tanks, as well as Jagdpanther and Jagdtigr self-propelled guns were concentrated.

Also involved in the operation 7th Army(E. Brandenberger, 80th and 85th corps), advancing on the left flank.

Erie three armies were part of Army Group "B"(Heeresgruppe B, commander of Field Marshal V. Model), located opposite the Ardennes. The German group consisted of 24 divisions, including 10 tank divisions, as well as individual units.

Army Group "X"(Heeresgruppe H, J. Blaskowitz) was located north of the Ardennes. It included the 15th and 25th armies and the 1st parachute army.

Army Group "G"(Heeresgruppe G, P. Hausser) was located south of the Ardennes. It consisted of the 1st and 19th armies.

According to various estimates, 240 thousand - 500 thousand people, 1800 tanks, 1900 artillery pieces and Nebelwerfer rocket launchers and 800 aircraft participated in the Ardennes operation from the German side.

Planning for the German offensive in the Ardennes

It was planned to strike through the Ardennes (Operation Watch on the Rhine - Wacht am Rhein), because the Allies considered this area impassable for troops in winter. Then the German strike groups, passing through Bastogne and Malmedy, were supposed to cross the Meuse and capture Brussels and Antwerp. It was planned to cut off the northern flank of the allied front, press it to the sea and arrange a second Dunkirk. The planning of the offensive in the Ardennes was carried out in deep secrecy. Many formation commanders learned about him only on the eve of the start of the offensive.

According to the plan, the 6th SS Panzer Army was to advance on Antwerp, through the port of which the 21st British Army Group was supplied, and the 5th Panzer Army on Brussels.

The first task of the German troops, there were bridges across the river Meuse in the cities of Liege and Namur. In the same cities, advanced German detachments were supposed to capture fuel depots in order to make up for the lack of fuel for armored vehicles and vehicles of the advancing German groups.

At the beginning of the offensive in the Ardennes, German troops had a significant superiority in tanks and an almost 5-fold superiority in artillery. The German command also counted on non-flying weather, which excluded the use of Allied aviation, which had overwhelming air superiority.

Ardennes operation December 16, 1944 - January 28, 1945

Soviet military encyclopedia, vol. 1.

German offensive in the Ardennes 16-25 December 1944

On the morning of December 16, Army Group B under the command of Field Marshal V. Model, consisting of three armies (6th Panzer SS, 5th Panzer and 7th Field), launched an offensive through the Ardennes mountain forest massif. After a short artillery preparation, the strike groups of German troops, supported by 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, launched an offensive.

Bad weather brought to naught the absolute superiority of Allied air power.

Promotion of the German 6th SS Panzer Army in the northern sector of the Ardennes Offensive from 16 to 19 December 1944


Source: Scanned from map insert in US Army in World War II - The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge.

Promotion of the 5th German Panzer Army in the central sector of the Ardennes offensive from 16 to 19 December 1944

Advancement of the German 7th Army in the southern sector of the Ardennes offensive
from 16 to 19 December 1944


Source: Scanned from map insert in US Army in World War II - The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge.
License: US Government document. Assumed public domain.

One of the main factors that did not allow Nazi Germany to produce the maximum concentration of forces on the Western Front was the actions of Soviet troops on the Soviet-German front. The famous English historian Liddell Hart wrote: "The commanders who were instructed to lead the offensive soon learned to their dismay that they would not receive part of the promised forces as a result of the menacing Russian strikes in the East."

The offensive of German troops in the Ardennes: December 16 - 25, 1944

Source: US ARMY in World War II - The Ardennes. License: Assumed public domain.

On December 17, 1944, near the Belgian town of Malmedy, a detachment under the command of SS Standartenführer Joachim Peiper destroyed more than a hundred (according to other sources from 20 to 35) American prisoners of war from the 285th field artillery reconnaissance battalion.

The direction of the attacks of German troops in the Ardennes on December 16–24, 1944

On December 17, the 18th American Airborne Corps (General Ridgway), which was in reserve, was transferred from near Reims to the Ardennes as part of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, which had previously participated in heavy battles in Holland.

The 101st Airborne Division was sent to defend the city of Bastogne. The German Panzer Training Division, which was part of the 5th Panzer Army, approached Bastogne, where they met the staunch defense of the American troops. In the following days, units of the 5th German Panzer Army repeatedly attacked Bastogne, but were never able to take the city. Although Bastogne was surrounded, the American troops defending Bastogne seriously hampered the further advance of the German troops, because seven main roads in the Ardennes intersected in Bastogne, which were necessary to advance and supply the 5th German Panzer Army.

In the northern sector of the German offensive in the Ardennes, the American 7th Panzer Division held the small Belgian town of Saint-Vith, which also crossed important roads in the Ardennes, for 5 days. According to the German plan, Saint-Vit was supposed to be taken on the evening of December 17, but this did not happen until December 21. Under the threat of encirclement, American troops left the city, but the defense of the city of Saint-Vith also greatly slowed down the German offensive. The selfless defense of the cities of Bastogne and Saint-Vith slowed down the pace of the German offensive and gained time for the allies to transfer their reserves to the Ardennes.

On December 19, 1944, at a meeting of the allies in Verdun, along with defensive measures, a plan was discussed for the counteroffensive of the 3rd American Army to release the 101st Airborne Division, which was defending the city of Bastogne. It was also decided to speed up the formation of French and Belgian formations, with which the US and British governments were in no hurry.

By December 20, units of the German Army Group "B" broke through the front in a section of 100 kilometers and advanced 30-50 kilometers deep. A difficult situation developed for the American and British troops.

The commander-in-chief of the allied forces in Europe, General D. Eisenhower, asked for troops from Italy, and also insisted on sending 100,000 marines from the United States and the Panama Canal zone to France.

German grenadiers fighting in a forest in Luxembourg, December 22, 1944

Bundesarchiv Bild 183-1985-0104-501, Ardennenoffensive. Photo: Lange.

German machine gunner, Belgium, December 1944.

U.S. NARA file no. 111-SC-197561.

At dawn on December 22, the 3rd Army launched a counteroffensive from the south and began to advance towards Bastogne.

On December 23, the weather improved, and Allied aircraft continued to deliver ammunition and food to the troops defending Bastogne. Allied aircraft began to strike at the advancing German groups and their supply lines. By this time, German troops were experiencing an acute shortage of fuel and lubricants, as they could not capture the fuel depots in Liege and Namur. They could not even complete the first task - to capture the bridges over the Meuse River, because they did not reach it.

On the morning of December 25, 1944, the German offensive in the Ardennes came to a halt at the Belgian town of Celles, only 6 km from the river Meuse and the bridge at Dinant. This was the maximum advance to the west of the shock German group. By December 25, the 5th Panzer Army had advanced almost 100 km deep into the defense of the allied forces. Near the city of Sel, the German 2nd Panzer Division, advancing in the vanguard of the 5th Panzer Army, was surrounded.

The 1st American Army, together with the 30th British Corps, completely stopped the advance of the 6th SS Panzer Army on Liege.

Followed by Hitler's orders to continue the offensive, but the German offensive in the Ardennes stopped. The last attempt of the German "blitzkrieg" was completed. By that time, the German troops had used up almost the entire supply of fuels and lubricants.

The Allies were able to regroup their troops.

German soldiers in an armored personnel carrier Sd.Kfz 251 at the front
during the offensive in the Ardennes, late December 1944


Bundesarchiv Bild 183-J28519, Ardennenoffensive. Photo: Göttert.

Allied counteroffensive and elimination of the Ardennes salient
December 26, 1944 - January 28, 1945

On December 26, the 37th Armored Regiment of the 3rd US Army broke through the blockade of Bastogne. Other parts of the 3rd American Army launched a counterattack on the left flank of the German troops.

After liberating Bastogne, the American 3rd Army cut the supply lines of the German left flank south of Bastogne. The threat of encirclement loomed over the 5th German Panzer Army. She had only a “corridor” 40 kilometers wide north of Bastogne left for retreat, which was shot through from both sides by the fire of American 155-mm howitzers (with a firing range of up to 24 km).

From the north, the Ardennes ledge was attacked by the mobile grouping of the 1st American Army, putting the Germans at risk of encirclement.

Good, clear weather allowed American aircraft to regularly carry out massive raids on stalled German troops and their supply lines.

Before the New Year, German troops began a general retreat from the Ardennes salient, leaving the territory captured during the Ardennes offensive.

Allied counteroffensive and elimination of the Ardennes salient
December 26, 1944 - January 25, 1945.

Source: US ARMY. License: US Government document. Assumed public domain.

On January 1, 1945, the German troops of Army Group G went on the offensive in Alsace in the region of Strasbourg. It was a diversionary strike, in which insignificant forces participated. However, the German command lost the strategic initiative irretrievably. German troops in the Ardennes retreated in all sectors.

On January 1, 1945, Germany had 313 divisions and 32 brigades. On the Western Front and in Italy there were 108 divisions and 7 brigades. On the Eastern Front, Germany concentrated 185 divisions and 21 brigades, of which 15 divisions and 1 brigade were Hungarian.

By the end of the German offensive in the Ardennes, the Allied forces were in a critical position. As early as December 21, the commander of the allied forces, General D. Eisenhower, persistently asked the governments of the United States and Britain to turn to the Soviet Union for military assistance. On January 6, 1945, Prime Minister W. Churchill wrote to I.V. Stalin and asked him to launch an offensive on the Soviet-German front, to which he received a quick response with a promise to accelerate the preparation of a large offensive by Soviet troops.

Soviet troops launched a general offensive on January 12, 1945, 8 days ahead of schedule. The 6th SS Panzer Army was urgently sent to Hungary near Budapest and Lake Balaton to stop the Soviet offensive.

in the Ardennes, January 1945


Bundesarchiv Bild 183-J28475, Ardennnenoffensive. Photo: Pospesch.

American tank M4 "Sherman" and infantrymen of company G of the 740th tank battalion of the 504th regiment
82nd Airborne Division of the 1st US Army near Herresbach (Herresbach)
during the battle for the ledge.


Source: US-Army history images.

The chief of staff of the Western Front during the operation “Watch (guard) on the Rhine” (Wacht am Rhein), General Westphal wrote: “On January 12-13, the Russians launched their big offensive from the Baranuv bridgehead. His influence immediately affected the Western Front. We have long been anxiously awaiting the transfer of our troops to the East, and now it was carried out with the utmost speed. The 6th SS Panzer Army was transferred there with separate units of army subordination, two corps headquarters and four SS Panzer divisions, the Führerbegleit brigade and the grenadier brigade, as well as all their artillery and crossing facilities.

By January 15, 1945, the formations of the 1st and 3rd American armies advancing from the north and south connected north of Bastogne in the area of ​​​​the cities of Houffalize and Noville. Half of the Ardennes ledge was recaptured. The 101st Airborne Division was transferred near Colmar to the 6th Army Group. On the night of January 18, the 12th Corps of the 3rd American Army, unexpectedly for the enemy, crossed the Sur River.

On January 22, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee stated: “The new Russian offensive has dramatically changed the situation. According to the most likely assumptions, the end of the war can be expected in mid-April.

On January 23, troops of the 1st American Army liberated the city of Saint-Vith. The 12th Army Group began preparations to storm the Siegfried Line.

The offensive of the Soviet troops, which began on January 12, inflicted a crushing defeat on the main forces of the Wehrmacht. Almost all German mobile formations were transferred to the Eastern Front. Only a few battered infantry divisions remained on the Western Front. During the 21 days of the Soviet offensive during the Vistula-Oder operation, Soviet troops passed from the Vistula to the Oder and captured several bridgeheads on its left bank. In early February, there were only 60 kilometers from the bridgeheads on the Oder to Berlin. At the same time, Soviet troops were advancing in East Prussia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. German troops lost up to half a million people, while German losses in the Ardennes operation amounted to less than 100 thousand people.

By January 28, the Allied forces completely eliminated the Ardennes ledge, formed by the German offensive in the Ardennes. On January 29, the Allied forces launched an invasion of Germany and moved towards the Rhine.

Operation Watch (Guard) on the Rhine (Wacht am Rhein) ended in a crushing defeat and became the last major German offensive in World War II. The Ardennes operation delayed the Allied invasion of Germany for several weeks, but the German troops wasted military resources, especially armored vehicles, aircraft (including jets) and fuel, which could have been used to effectively defend the Siegfried Line. Thanks to the German offensive in the Ardennes, the American-British troops suffered fewer losses: the main German forces were defeated outside the defensive fortifications of the Siegfried Line, where a victory over the enemy would have cost the Allied forces much greater losses.

After the defeat in the Ardennes Offensive, the German armed forces were no longer able to organize any offensive operation, limited to small counterattacks that could no longer affect the situation in Central Europe (counterattacks in Alsace in January 1945 and on Lake Balaton in March 1945 G.). The strategic initiative finally passed to the allies.

Losses

The losses of German troops in the Ardennes operation, according to various sources, ranged from 67,200 to 120,000 people and about 600 tanks and assault guns.

According to German data, their losses in the operation “Watch (guard) on the Rhine” (Wacht am Rhein) reached 67,675 people, of which 17,236 were killed, 34,439 were wounded and 16,000 were captured and missing.

American troops in the battle for the Bulge lost 89.5 thousand people (more than 19 thousand people killed, 47.5 thousand wounded and 23 thousand captured or missing), as well as about 800 tanks.

The British troops lost 1,408 men, of which 200 were killed.

Literature:

Hermann Jung: Die Ardennen-Offensive 1944/45. Ein Beispiel für die Kriegführung Hitlers, Göttingen 1992.

Klaus-Jürgen Bremm: Im Schatten des Desasters. Zwölf Entscheidungsschlachten in der Geschichte Europas. BoD, Norderstedt 2003.

Alexander Kuffner: Zeitreiseführer Eifel 1933-45. Helios, Aachen 2007.

Chapter 29

THE BATTLE OF THE ARDENNE (July 21, 1944 - January 17, 1945)

On September 16, Hitler issued an order demanding "fanatical determination" from all troops in the West. The Americans approached the German border, and south of Aachen even crossed it. “From our side, any large-scale operations cannot be carried out. The only thing left for us is to hold our positions or die.” It seemed that the Fuhrer was calling only for the defense of the fatherland, but this was a ploy to mislead the enemy, who, as Hitler feared, had a spy in his headquarters. After the meeting, the Fuhrer invited Keitel, Jodl and the Luftwaffe representative, General Kreipe, to his office. While they were wondering what surprise the Fuhrer was preparing for them, the owner of the office entered - stooped, pale, visibly passed after the third mini-heart attack. His eyes were watery and cloudy, his jaw dropped.

Jodl briefly reported on the situation: Germany has no reliable allies - some have defected, others are going to do it. Although there are over 9 million men under arms in the Wehrmacht, over the past three months losses have amounted to 1.2 million, almost half of them on the Western Front. There was a relative calm in the East. The Soviet offensive appears to have fizzled out. “But in the West we are going through a serious test in the Ardennes,” Jodl concluded. It was a hilly region in Belgium and Luxembourg, the path taken by German troops to victory in World War I.

At the word "Ardennes" Hitler started up, raised his hand and shouted: "Stop!" There was silence. Finally he spoke, “I have made an important decision. I'm going on the offensive. Here in the Ardennes!” The Fuhrer struck the map with his fist. "Across the river Meuse and further - to Antwerp!" Everyone stared at him in amazement. Hitler's shoulders straightened, his eyes sparkled, signs of anxiety and illness disappeared. It was the dynamic Hitler of 1940. In the next few days, he was a model of the former energy, insisted on preparing a plan for a decisive counteroffensive. He issued orders for the creation of a new tank army and outlined ways to deliver 250,000 troops and a thousand tanks to the Ardennes in absolute secrecy.

Only then did he keep his promise to do an X-ray of his head. By the evening of September 19, he was taken to the field hospital in Rastenburg and taken to the X-ray room, which had previously been carefully examined for explosives. Then the Fuhrer visited his wounded officers and shed tears at the sight of the dying General Schmundt. At the exit, she was greeted with shouts of “Sieg heil!” an enthusiastic crowd of townspeople and convalescing soldiers. This delight at the sight of the Fuhrer was understandable, but Giesing was struck by the fact that sincere enthusiasm was even in the eyes of the crippled and seriously wounded.

In the morning Giesing studied the three photographs. Then every day I went to the bunker to examine the patient. The doctor noticed that under artificial lighting, Hitler's face takes on a strange reddish hue. Subsequently, the Fuhrer's stomach pains intensified, and he demanded six "little black pills" prescribed by Morel. Surprised by such a dose, Giesing began to cautiously wonder what kind of pills they were. Linge showed him the vial. The label said: anti-gas pills. This was followed by their composition, having studied which, Giesing was horrified: it included strychnine and atropine, although in small quantities. But given the fact that Hitler took these pills for a long time and in large quantities, it could be assumed that he was poisoning himself. Perhaps that was the explanation for the seizures, the growing weakness, irritability, aversion to light, the hoarse voice and that strange reddish skin tone. Cardiograms inspired fears.

On September 25, Giesing accidentally saw the patient in natural light - on the street. This time his skin had a yellowish tint, and there was yellowness in his eyes. It was obvious jaundice. Hitler did not get up in the morning. Secretaries, adjutants and attendants were in alarm. No one could remember the Fuhrer staying in bed, no matter how sick he was.

He did not want to see anyone, did not want to eat, was indifferent to everything. He was not even interested in the critical situation on the Eastern Front. Morel advised the patient to stay in bed. Concerned Giesing, after another examination, furtively took a vial of Morel's black pills and showed it to Hasselbach. He, too, was amazed, but advised Giesing to remain silent until they spoke with Brandt.

Meanwhile, Morel ordered that no other doctors be allowed to see the Fuhrer. Both Giesing and van Eyken were turned down. Morel believed that the Fuhrer had no jaundice. Nevertheless, in a few days, Hitler lost almost one and a half kilograms in weight and lay writhing in pain.

Physical pain was not the only cause of Hitler's depression. Another bundle of documents was found in the safe of the army headquarters in Zossen, testifying to the involvement of a significant part of the army leadership in the conspiracy. The Fuhrer was in shock, and many believed that this was what undermined his spirit.

September 29 Brandt managed to get to Hitler. He tried to prove to the Fuhrer that Morel was a charlatan. At first, he took Brandt's words seriously, but Morel managed to convince Hitler that he was absolutely innocent. If the Führer suffers side effects from the use of drugs, it is because he himself increases the doses. Frustrated, Brandt waved his hand at everything. Then Hasselbach went to Bormann. But he didn’t take into account that Bormann had long wanted to get rid of Brandt, because he was Speer’s man, whose “dangerous” influence on the Fuhrer Bormann wanted to reduce at any cost. The “grey eminence” listened to Hasselbach’s story with mock indignation, and then went to Hitler and warned him that Brandt, Hasselbach and Giesing had conspired to defame Morel for their own selfish purposes. From now on, no doctor, except Morel, was allowed to see Hitler. It seemed that Bormann had won.

But on October 1, Giesing called Linge and said that the Fuhrer had a severe headache, and he asked the doctor to come to him immediately. The Fuhrer was lying on his Spartan bed in his nightgown. He lifted his head slightly to greet the doctor, and immediately dropped it on the pillow. The Fuhrer's eyes were empty, indifferent to everything. When Giesing sat down on his bed, Hitler suddenly asked:

– Doctor, how did you find out about antigas pills? Giesing said. Hitler frowned.

Why didn't you come to me right away? Didn't you know that I trust you completely?

Giesing's skin was chilled. He explained that he was not allowed to see the Fuhrer. Hitler shrugged.

“You have greatly frightened Morel. He even turned pale and nervous. But I calmed him down. I myself have always thought that these are simple tablets for absorbing gases in the stomach, and they helped me.

Giesing countered that the sense of relief was illusory.

“What you are saying probably has some basis,” Hitler interrupted him, “but this thing has never harmed me. I often experienced stomach cramps due to constant nervous tension, especially in the last month.

Giesing suggested that Hitler had jaundice, but he expressed doubts about this. Nevertheless, the Fuhrer asked him to examine. For the first time, Giesing subjected his patient to a complete physical examination. He checked his neuralgic reflexes and at the same time made sure that the rumors about the underdevelopment of the Fuhrer's genitals were not true.

As Linge and Giesing helped him put on his dressing gown, Hitler said:

– You see, doctor, I have a generally healthy body and, I hope, I will be healthy soon.

He thanked Giesing for everything and asked for another dose of "that cocaine drug." But suddenly a deathly pallor spread over the Fuhrer's face. Giesing checked his pulse: it was fast and weak. Hitler lost consciousness.

The doctor looked around - he was alone. The orderly left when someone knocked on the door. The Fuhrer was completely in the hands of Giesing. The doctor saw a tyrant in front of him. Some inner voice prompted him to stick a tampon stick into a bottle of cocaine - the second dose could be fatal, and he quickly began to treat Hitler's left nostril with the medicine. He was almost finished when Linge's voice was heard:

– How much more time do you need? Giesing replied as calmly as possible that not much. Hitler still did not regain consciousness.

“The Führer has spasms again,” the orderly remarked. - Let him rest.

With difficulty restraining his excitement, Giesing said goodbye to Linge and rode his bicycle to his hospital. One thought haunted him: Will Hitler still live? Frightened, he called Hasselbach, telling him what had happened, and took a day off under the pretext that he had to go to Berlin, since his house had been bombed.

The next day, Giesing called from the capital and learned that the Fuhrer was alive. No one suspected that he had received a double dose of cocaine.

When Hitler felt better, he was given materials about the involvement in the conspiracy of Field Marshal Rommel. The Fuhrer decided: Rommel must commit suicide. On October 14, on behalf of the Fuhrer, two generals visited the castle in the vicinity of Ulm, where Rommel was recovering from his wound. An hour later they left the castle, and an agitated Rommel told his wife that he was accused of being involved in a conspiracy, and Hitler gave him a choice - either poison, or "people's court." Saying goodbye to his wife and son, the field marshal took the adjutant aside and said to him: "Aldinger, this is the end." He was supposed to go with two generals to Ulm and take poison along the way, and half an hour later they would report the death of the field marshal as a result of an accident. He will be buried with all honors, his family will not be persecuted. The adjutant advised Rommel not to surrender, but he replied that this was impossible: the area was surrounded by SS men, and the line of communication with the troops was cut off.

At 13.05, in the leather jacket of the commander of the "Afrika Korps" and with a field marshal's baton in hand, Rommel left with his companions for the hospital in Ulm and swallowed poison along the way. According to the official medical report, death was the result of blockage of blood vessels caused by damage to the skull during the wound. The face of the deceased, according to relatives, expressed "cold contempt."

Otto Skorzeny, an active participant in the Ardennes operation

By the end of September, Hitler had lost three allies - Finland, Romania and Bulgaria. In October, another defector appeared: Horthy, a Hungarian admiral without a fleet, ruler of a kingdom without a king, sent his representatives to Moscow to conclude a truce. Soviet troops were 150 kilometers from the Hungarian capital. Since any secrets in Budapest were usually discussed loudly in cafes, Hitler was aware of the negotiations. While the Hungarian delegation was negotiating favorable terms in Moscow, the Fuhrer sent his favorite Otto Skorzeny to Hungary with the task of returning its leaders to the right path. He did this with minimal bloodshed as a result of an operation called "Mickey Mouse". Skorzeny kidnapped Horthy's son, wrapped him in a carpet and took him to the airport. Then he captured the fortress where the Hungarian dictator lived and ruled, while managing with one airborne battalion. The operation was carried out in half an hour, the losses amounted to seven people.

A week later, the Fuhrer enthusiastically welcomed his favorite in the Wolf's Lair. He was amused by the story of the kidnapping of young Horthy. When Skorzeny got up to leave, Hitler stopped him: "Now I want to give you the most important task." He announced the upcoming offensive in the Ardennes. Skorzeny, he said, will have to play a leading role: to train saboteurs in American uniforms. They will seize bridges across strategically important water barriers, sow panic, give false orders.

By this time, Jodl had presented Hitler with a plan of attack, code-named Watch on the Rhine. It provided for the introduction of three armies, consisting of 12 tank and 18 infantry divisions. "Watch on the Rhine" was based on two prerequisites: complete surprise and inclement weather, excluding the use of allied aircraft. The purpose of the operation was to defeat more than thirty American and British divisions. It was assumed that as a result of such a stunning defeat, the West would ask for a separate peace. After its conclusion, all German troops will be able to unite their actions against the Red Army.

Strict measures were taken to ensure secrecy: the name of the operation changed every two weeks, it was forbidden to talk about it on the phone, all documents were sent by couriers, from whom they took a non-disclosure subscription.

The leadership of the operation was entrusted to Field Marshal Model. Rundstedt proposed his plan, which boiled down to a massive attack with twenty divisions on a front of 65 kilometers. Hitler responded by giving a whole lecture about Frederick the Great, who smashed the enemy, twice the size of his troops. "Why don't you study history?" - the Fuhrer addressed his generals in a mocking tone. His eyes shone, it was the Hitler of the old days, full of self-confidence. As a result of this offensive, he assured, "an unpredictable historical event will occur: the alliance of the enemies of the Reich will fall apart"!

On November 10, Hitler signed an order to prepare for an offensive in the Ardennes. He made it clear that this operation was the last stake in the big game in which the fate of Germany was decided. The tone of his directive provoked objections from some military leaders. Upon learning of this, the Fuhrer decided to go to the front. But suddenly all his illnesses became aggravated. His voice was hoarse, and on examination by Professor van Eyken, a polyp was found on his right vocal cord. Hitler became grumpy and depressed, received visitors in bed, looked pale and haggard. Morel was forced to give him numerous injections.

Hitler was advised to take a short vacation before making the tiring and dangerous trip to the Western Front. But the Fuhrer was obsessed with the idea of ​​inspiring people who were about to go through a difficult test. On November 20, he left the headquarters with a large group of escorts. Hitler apparently realized that he would never return to the Wolf's Lair, but he instructed to continue construction work. The train left at dawn to arrive in Berlin at nightfall. Hitler sat for a long time in his compartment with curtained windows. It was time for dinner, and he went into the dining car. Traudl Junge had never seen the Fuhrer so distracted. He spoke in a whisper, looked only at the plate, or stared at the stain on the tablecloth with exaggerated attention. He said that Professor van Eiken insisted on an operation to remove the throat polyp.

For several days after the operation, Hitler did not appear in public. Then he showed up for breakfast, clearly in need of company. Everyone put out their cigarettes and opened the windows. He spoke in a whisper, explaining that this was the doctor's prescription. Others involuntarily also switched to a whisper. “My ears are good, and there is no need to spare them,” the Fuhrer said softly, and everyone laughed.

Hitler enthusiastically got to work. On December 7, he approved the final plan for the Ardennes offensive, which almost coincided with his original version. False rumors were spread in beer halls and restaurants to misinform enemy agents.

Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny, who had more power than some colonel generals, prepared his "Americans". Volunteers took a course in army slang, learned to operate behind enemy lines.

On December 11, preparations for the operation ended. The railway services of the Reich performed a miracle - they secretly transported troops and equipment to the area of ​​​​concentration. On this day, Hitler moved his headquarters to the vicinity of the medieval Ziegenberg castle. It was the "Eagle's Nest", where the command post for command and control was located during the invasion of the West in 1940. The Fuhrer and his associates settled down in deep underground bunkers. On the same day, Hitler held a meeting to which the commanders of military formations were invited. Upon arrival, the generals handed over their personal weapons and briefcases to the Gestapo.

The Fuhrer, Keitel, Jodl, Model, Rundstedt and Lieutenant General von Manteuffel sat at a narrow table. The latter was the German pentathlon champion, he was to command the most powerful of the three armies. Hitler lectured sixty generals on Frederick the Great, German history and National Socialism for more than an hour, and then announced the political motives for the decision to launch a general offensive. "Autumn Fog"—that was its final codename—was scheduled to begin on December 15 at 5:30. The divisional commanders listened to Hitler in reverent silence, amazed by the grandiosity of the idea and the energy of the Fuhrer. However, Manteuffel, who was sitting almost next to him, could not help but pay attention to the unhealthy complexion and trembling hands of the Fuhrer. In conclusion, Hitler declared: “The battle will have to be fought with all cruelty, the resistance of the enemy must be broken. In this most serious hour for the fatherland, I demand courage from each of my soldiers and once again courage. The enemy must be defeated - now or never! Germany will live!

The next day, December 12, he repeated the same calls to another group of combat commanders. The offensive was postponed for another day - December 16th. This, Hitler said, was the final date, provided that the weather did not allow enemy aircraft to take off.

In the Ardennes, the night of December 15-16 was cold and calm. The front, 150 kilometers long, was held by six American divisions, three of which were fresh and three were badly battered in previous battles. It was the so-called “ghost front”, where nothing happened for more than two months. That night, no one expected a German attack. In the evening, British Field Marshal Montgomery categorically stated that the Germans “cannot organize a major offensive operation,” and even asked the commander of the Allied forces, the American General Eisenhower, if he had any objections if he went to England next week.

Three German armies - 250 thousand people and thousands of vehicles - were secretly advanced to their starting lines. The clang of caterpillars was muffled by low-flying planes. By midnight everything was ready for the start of the offensive. The soldiers were shivering from the cold, but listened with enthusiasm to the message of Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the meaning of which boiled down to one thing: "Forward to victory!"

At 5.30, fire and smoke began to erupt throughout the “ghost front”. Mines exploded, rockets hissed, Junkers-88s roared, hundreds of tanks rumbled, and heavy guns mounted on railway platforms unleashed a flurry of artillery fire on the American positions.

An hour later there was an ominous silence. Then, like ghosts, figures dressed in white, almost invisible in the snow, appeared in front of the Americans ... Airplanes appeared from the east, flying at incredible speed. These were the first German jet-powered fighters - the same “wonder weapon” that Hitler had already mentioned more than once.

A powerful attack caught the allies by surprise. The Germans achieved particular success in the north, breaking through the American front. Troops moved through the gap, supported by tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored cars. However, the commander of the American army, General Omar Bradley, assured Eisenhower that this was just a "local attack." Eisenhower, however, disagreed, believing that "it is unlikely that the Germans would launch a local attack on our weakest point," and ordered Bradley to send two panzer divisions to the aid of the surprise troops.

Hitler was delighted with this development. Late in the evening, he telephoned General Balck, commander of Army Group B, south of the Ardennes, and informed him of the brilliant success. “From now on, not a step back, today we only go forward!” The weather was as if to order: fog, haze, frost. The Germans built on the success achieved as a result of a sudden blow. On December 18, at the Eagle's Nest, Hitler learned that Manteuffel's troops had opened the road to Bastogne. He felt so good that he took a short walk in the fresh air and became so invigorated that he decided to do it every day.

Over the course of two days, the Allies suffered a series of catastrophic setbacks. On the snow-covered heights, at least 8,000 Americans got into the "bag". After the Philippines, this was the largest surrender of Americans in history.

Only seven "jeeps" with Skorzeny's sabotage groups managed to break through to the rear of the allies, but they did a great job. The commander of one group sent an entire American regiment along the wrong route, his people changed signs and cut telephone wires. Another team feigned a terrible panic and infected the column of Americans with it, who turned into a disorderly flight. A third team cut the line of communication between Bradley's headquarters and his second-in-command, General Hodges.

But the greatest damage to the allied forces was caused by saboteurs captured. When they told an American intelligence officer about their mission, a message was broadcast over the radio that thousands of German saboteurs dressed in American uniforms were operating in the rear. On December 20, half a million Americans throughout the Ardennes interrogated each other on lonely roads, in pine forests and in abandoned villages. Neither passwords nor soldiers' books were taken into account. An American was considered only one who could without hesitation name the capital of the state of Pennsylvania and how many goals the “king” of baseball Babe Ruth scored.

In Paris, the panic reached its peak. Rumor has it that German paratroopers have landed, disguised as priests and nuns. According to the "confession" of the captured saboteur, they were given the task of kidnapping Eisenhower. The American security service believed this fake. The building of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Forces was surrounded by barbed wire and the security was quadrupled. Tanks stood at the gates, passes were carefully checked and rechecked... Skorzeny's twenty-eight saboteurs, who caused such a commotion behind enemy lines, became the heroes of the operation.

By the morning of December 21, the mobile front line took the shape of a gigantic ledge. In its middle, near the Belgian city of Bastogne, American troops under the command of Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe were completely surrounded. To the proposal of the German envoy to capitulate, he casually replied: "Nuts." (American slang word for "Are you nuts?") This brief reply helped lift the weakening Allied morale. The run is over. The “Hitler weather” is also over. The next morning the sun shone brightly in the Ardennes, and by noon large transport planes were already dropping supplies to the encircled allied forces in Bastogne.

The tide could be replaced by low tide, but Hitler did not think about it. Manteuffel's tanks passed the encircled Bastogne and were on their way to the river Meuse. But Manteuffel himself was alarmed: the infantry was far behind. On December 24, he called the Fuhrer's headquarters and informed Jodl that his left flank was exposed. He could not go to the Meuse and take Bastogne at the same time, and therefore he proposed to turn north along the Meuse and set up a trap for the Americans on the east bank of the river. But Hitler rejected this plan, insisting on forcing the Meuse and advancing towards Antwerp.

The Fuhrer was sure of victory and on Christmas surprised his loved ones by drinking a glass of wine. At the end of the day, he rejected another request from Manteuffel to stop the attacks on Bastogne, although the tank division that had pulled ahead was cut off by the Americans and suffered heavy losses. There were arguments in the Eagle's Nest. Jodl urged Hitler to face reality: “We cannot cross the Meuse, the 2nd Panzer Division is in danger of complete annihilation. Patton's army opened a corridor to Bastogne from the south for the Americans. The attack has been stopped." Hitler issued a new order: Manteuffel turn to the northeast and outflank the Americans in the upper half of the salient. “I need to transfer three fresh divisions and at least 25,000 reinforcements to the Ardennes,” the Fuhrer announced. Since the enemy could not be wiped out with one powerful blow, as planned, Autumn Mist can still be turned into a successful battle of attrition. And this will bring Germany an important political victory.”

These orders were intercepted by the Allied radio intelligence service and relayed to Eisenhower. He realized that Hitler's offensive had run out of steam. But counterintelligence did not know that a violent quarrel had taken place between the Fuhrer and his appointed successor. Goering declared that the war was lost and a truce must be sought. To this end, he offered to make contact with the nephew of the Swedish king, Count Bernadotte, who might agree to act as an intermediary. Hitler's reaction was violent. He accused Goering of cowardice and betrayal and declared that he forbade him to take any steps in this direction. “If you violate my order, I will shoot you,” the enraged Fuhrer threatened. The dejected Reichsmarschall told his wife about this. “This is the final break,” Goering observed gloomily. “It makes no sense for me to go to the daily meetings anymore. He doesn't trust me anymore."

The Germans called this battle the Ardennes Offensive, for the Americans it was the "battle for the ledge." On December 28, its third and final phase began. At a conference with the military leaders that day, Hitler admitted that the situation was desperate, but he did not recognize the word "surrender" and would steadily move towards his goal. The Führer declared that he would fight "until the scales tilted in our favor", and therefore, on January 1, he launched a new offensive, code-named "North Wind".

The concentration of German troops south of the Ardennes was carried out so covertly that the enemy did not even send reconnaissance aircraft to this area. Hitler sarcastically remarked about this: “Perhaps some people object to themselves, they doubt whether the offensive will succeed. Gentlemen, I heard the same objections in 1939. I was told in writing and orally that it was impossible. Even in the winter of 1940, I was warned that we should not do this, it would be better to stay behind the Western Wall. What would happen if we did so? Now we are in a similar situation."

Field Marshal Rundstedt had the imprudence to advise Hitler to cancel Operation Autumn Mist and retreat before the enemy launched a counteroffensive. The Fuhrer flared up. As soon as the "North Wind" begins, the offensive in the Ardennes will resume, he said. The Fuhrer's impassioned speech made an impression on the listeners, although everyone noticed his trembling left hand and a sickly look. "In the meantime, Model will consolidate his position and regroup his forces for a new attempt," continued Hitler. “He will also make another powerful attack on Bastogne. First of all, we must take Bastogne." By midnight, several tank and infantry divisions pulled up to the city.

“Military qualities are not exercises on a box of sand,” Hitler said the next day to the inspector general of the armored forces, General Thomale. - Ultimately, they manifest themselves in the ability to hold on, in perseverance and determination. This is the decisive factor in any victory. Genius is an abstract concept unless it is based on perseverance and fanatical determination. This is the most important thing in a person." World history, he continued, can only be made by a man possessed. “No one lives forever. The question is who will last longer. The one who puts everything on the line must last longer. If America gives in, nothing will happen to it. New York will remain New York. But if we say today: that's enough, we've had enough, Germany will cease to exist. Therefore, so stubbornly Hitler continued the war, which in essence was already lost. For this gambler, it was necessary to keep fighting, even if the chance of success was one in a thousand. What to another person would have seemed pure madness, for the Fuhrer, with his obsession, was completely logical.

His chief propagandist was not so optimistic, at least in his own circle. At the New Year's party, where the famous pilot Hans Ulrich Rudel was also present, Joseph Goebbels mockingly remarked that his post - the Reich's commissioner to mobilize efforts for total war - was completely unnecessary. “Now there is nothing to mobilize,” said the Reich Minister of Propaganda, “everything, including flower shops, is closed by British bombers.” Goebbels turned to Heinz Ruck, who had warned in the first year of Hitler's rule that many storm troopers were dissatisfied with the Fuhrer's compromise with the chauvinists and such a compromise would lead to the death of National Socialism. At the time, Goebbels indignantly denied this. This time he melancholy said to Rook: "Then, in 1933, I should have taken your words more seriously." Almost everyone agreed that the end was near. Only Rudel claimed that Hitler's new secret weapon would bring victory to Germany.

At midnight, Operation North Wind began. Eight German divisions attacked the positions of the 7th American Army, which stood near the borders of Northern Alsace. In the north, in the Ardennes, the defensive lines of the allies covered the fiery shaft.

Photo from the German Federal Archives

Five minutes after the start of a new German offensive, Hitler's speech was broadcast over the radio throughout Germany. Germany, he declared, would rise like a Phoenix and win. The Fuhrer had to celebrate the last New Year in his life in the bunker, where his inner circle also gathered. Champagne created a relaxed atmosphere, but there was a lot of animation. The Fuhrer was the most excited. He predicted great German successes in 1945. Gradually everyone was infected by his enthusiasm...

At 0435 Hitler left the company to find out the first results of the new winter offensive. It began successfully, but the British radio interception service urgently transmitted the information received to the headquarters of the allied forces. Eisenhower retaliated, and the Germans managed to advance only 25 kilometers.

In the Ardennes, the Allies launched a counteroffensive on January 3, 1945, hoping to dismember the huge ledge formed by the enemy wedged into their defenses with massive attacks from the north and south. The Germans fought desperately and the Americans advanced slowly. Thick fog precluded the use of aviation and limited the effectiveness of artillery. On ice-covered roads, tanks and self-propelled guns skidded and often collided with each other.

Churchill flew in from England to oversee the course of the counteroffensive. On January 6, he met with Eisenhower. Both were concerned about the slow progress of the operation. Wouldn't it be possible, Eisenhower asked, to ask the Russians for help to distract the Germans? Churchill wrote to Stalin the same day. The answer from Moscow came quickly. A large-scale offensive, Stalin wrote, would begin no later than the second half of January.

At the same time, Allied attacks from the north and south were gaining momentum, and on 8 January, with a heavy heart, Hitler agreed to a withdrawal from the western half of the salient. This was the end of the Führer's great dream. It was now only about how to avoid another Stalingrad.

On January 9, Guderian visited the Eagle's Nest and once again warned Hitler that the Red Army was preparing a massive offensive. The chief of staff of the Wehrmacht brought with him maps and documents prepared by Gehlen's intelligence service with a recommendation to immediately withdraw troops from East Prussia, otherwise Berlin would be in danger. After reviewing the materials, Hitler called them "absolutely stupid" and ordered Goodsrian to send their author to an insane asylum. Guderian did not hold back. “Their author is General Gehlen, one of the best on my staff,” he said. “If you want to send General Gehlen to a lunatic asylum, do the same to me!” Hitler calmed down and assured Guderian that there were sufficient reserves on the Eastern Front. But Guderian was of a different opinion. “The Eastern Front is a house of cards,” he said. “If the front is broken in one place, everything else will collapse, because twelve and a half divisions is too small a reserve for such a long front.” But Hitler was adamant. He refused to transfer reserves from the Ardennes, where, in his opinion, there was still hope for success. “The Eastern Front,” said the Fuhrer in conclusion, “must make do with available forces.” Guderian left in a gloomy mood. He knew that in the event of a major Soviet offensive, the weakened front would be broken through.

Three days later, Stalin kept his word. Nearly 3 million Soviet troops attacked 750,000 poorly armed Germans on a 650-kilometer front from the Baltic to the middle of Poland. Supported by a large amount of artillery and a seemingly inexhaustible stream of Stalin and T-34 tanks, hordes of Red infantrymen began to storm Guderian's weak defense system. Although the weather did not allow the attackers to use aircraft, by the end of the day the Russians had advanced 20 kilometers. Germany was squeezed from the east and west. On the same day, an important victory was achieved in the Ardennes: American troops joined up, advancing from the north and south.

In mid-January, Hitler left the Eagle's Nest for his new headquarters in Berlin. Outwardly, he did not seem depressed, he even laughed along with others when someone joked that Berlin is now the most convenient place to bet, since you can take the metro to both the Western and Eastern fronts.

In the Ardennes ledge, by January 16, a 20,000-strong German group was surrounded. True, the Allied victory was overshadowed by a quarrel between the Americans and the British, caused by the statement of Field Marshal Montgomery that the Americans were saved by British troops. The Americans, of course, were outraged, especially since it was their troops who bore the brunt of the Battle of the Bulge. Upon learning of this, Hitler was delighted: his dream was coming true to drive a wedge between the allies...

On January 17, a general withdrawal of Manteuffel's army began. The retreating columns suffered heavy losses from air strikes and artillery fire. The Battle of the Bulge ended, leaving behind two devastated countries, destroyed homes and farms, and more than 75,000 corpses. Few of the survivors now believed in the possibility of a German victory.

Among the numerous myths of the Second World War, the battle in the Ardennes at the end of the war is one of the most famous and at the same time mythophized.

In Soviet popular historiography, it is generally accepted that the Red Army launched an offensive that, by order of Stalin, began ahead of schedule at the request of the allies, saved from the defeat of the allies in the Ardennes.

Let's try to figure it out by analyzing the facts. First of all, we will try to find out whether there was a rout, and whether there was a request for help, respectively.

So the Ardennes operation (1944-1945) Battle of the Bulge English version of the name of this battle
The offensive in the Ardennes (codename German Wacht am Rhein - “Watch on the Rhine”) is an operation by German troops on the Western Front during World War II. It was carried out on December 16, 1944 - January 29, 1945 in the Ardennes (southwest of Belgium) with the aim of changing the situation on the Western Front, defeating the Anglo-American armed forces in Belgium and the Netherlands, and, if possible, persuade the United States and England to separate negotiations on peace and cessation of hostilities actions in the West, thereby freeing up forces for the Eastern Front.

At the initial stage of the battle, according to the English version of Wikipedia, the allies had 83 thousand soldiers and officers, 242 medium tanks, 182 self-propelled guns, 394 guns, 4 infantry and one mechanized division. Subsequently, they were reinforced by 20 infantry and 9 tank and mechanized divisions.

On December 23-24, 1944, the Allied forces included approximately 610,000 Americans, 55,000 British, 4,155 guns, 1,616 tanks and 6,000 aircraft.

The Germans at the beginning of the battle had 13 divisions, including 8 infantry and 5 tank and mechanized, 200,000 soldiers and officers, 340 tanks, 280 self-propelled guns, 1600 guns, and 955 multi-barreled mortars. Later they were reinforced by twelve infantry and 3 mechanized divisions, which included 100,000 soldiers and officers, 440 tanks and about the same number of self-propelled guns. From the air they were covered by 1600 aircraft.

Allied casualties: 89,500 Americans, 19,000 of them killed, 47,500 wounded and 23,000 missing or captured. Between 700 and 800 tanks and self-propelled guns and 647 aircraft were lost.

The British have 1408 of them 200 killed, 969 wounded and 239 missing or taken prisoner.

According to various sources, the Germans have from 67459 to 125000 losses, including those killed, wounded and missing or captured. Destroyed or damaged from 600 to 800 tanks and self-propelled guns and hundreds of aircraft.

The defense of the allies in the Ardennes was held by American divisions (about 83 thousand people), two of which had no combat experience, and two had previously suffered heavy losses and were withdrawn to a "calm area" to recuperate. On December 16, 1944, at the beginning of the operation, German troops managed to break through the front of the Anglo-American troops in a sector of 80 km and capture thousands of Allied soldiers and officers.

The offensive of the German troops (6th SS Panzer Army, 5th Panzer Army and 7th Field Army, united in Army Group "B" under the command of Field Marshal V. Model began in the morning of December 16, 1944, and by December 25 the Germans advanced 90 km deep into the defense.The first goal of the Germans, of course, were the bridges over the Meuse River, which separated the Ardennes from the rest of Belgium and without the capture of which a further offensive was impossible due to geographical features of the terrain.Then they planned to attack Antwerp, through the port which was supplied to the 21st Army Group and to the capital of Belgium - Brussels. The German command most of all relied on its heavy armored vehicles (Tiger and Royal Tiger tanks) and non-flying weather - due to constant snowfalls and heavy cloud cover, the Allied aviation had several could not act for days and this temporarily nullified the superiority of the Allies in the air.The Germans expected to make up for the lack of fuel by capturing from the allies in warehouses in the cities of Liege and Namur. The bridges over the Meuse were defended by parts of the 30th British Corps and were mined by sappers and ready to be blown up in case there was a threat of their capture by the Germans.

By the end of December, the weather improved and the Allies immediately took advantage of this. Allied aircraft began to strike at the advancing German troops and bombed the supply lines of the German troops, who were experiencing an acute shortage of fuel, as they could not capture the fuel depots in Liège and Namur. They could not even reach the first goal of the operation - the capture of bridges across the Meuse River, since they did not reach the river. Meanwhile, American troops, reinforced by redeployment from other sectors of the front, launched a counterattack by the 3rd American Army from the south in the direction of the city of Bastogne, and the 1st American Army, together with the 30th British Corps, completely stopped the enemy advance. The 101st Airborne Division in Bastogne held back the onslaught of the enemy and was released by units of the 3rd American Army.

The offensive of the Wehrmacht bogged down near the Belgian city of Celles on the morning of December 25, 1944, just 6 km from the Meuse River and the bridge in the city of Dinan. Ironically, this was the last settlement on the way to the Meuse. Here was the "point" of the Ardennes ledge, that is, the westernmost point of the German offensive in the Ardennes. Here the German 2nd Panzer Division, advancing in the vanguard of the 5th Panzer Army, was surrounded near the town of Sell. The 2nd German Panzer Division was surrounded by the 2nd American and 11th British Panzer Divisions.

By December 25, 1944, as a strategic operation, the German offensive in the Ardennes ended in complete failure. They did not even fulfill tactical tasks - they could not capture the bridges over the Meuse River, and did not even reach the river itself. This was mainly due to the problems of supplying German troops with fuel and ammunition. Despite Hitler's orders to continue the offensive, the German troops began to withdraw.

On January 3, 1945, the Anglo-American troops moved from small counterattacks to a full-scale offensive against German positions.

On December 24, 1944 (the day when the encirclement around Budapest had already closed), Guderian, then chief of the general staff, arrived at Hitler's Headquarters "Eagle's Nest", located in Zigenberg (Hesse). He intended to categorically demand the cancellation of the operation planned on the Western Front. He considered it an unnecessary waste of time and effort, which he so badly needed on the Eastern Front. He talked about the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Soviet troops, about a 15-fold superiority in ground weapons and almost 20-fold in the air. And these words were not some kind of exaggeration. Guderian himself knew that the Soviet command planned to launch a general offensive around January 12th. But these words did not touch Hitler. He replied indifferently: “This is the biggest deception of Genghis Khan. Who told you such nonsense?

Here is what Guderian recalled: So, on December 16, the offensive began, the 5th Panzer Army deeply wedged into the enemy’s defenses. The advanced tank formations of the ground forces - the 116th and 2nd tank divisions - went directly to the river. Maas. Separate units of the 2nd Panzer Division even reached the river. Rhine. The 6th Panzer Army was not so successful. Troop concentrations on narrow, icy mountain roads, delays in bringing the second echelon into battle in the sector of the 5th Panzer Army, insufficiently quick use of initial success - all this led to the fact that the army lost the momentum of the offensive - the most necessary condition for conducting any major operation. In addition, the 7th Army ran into difficulties, as a result of which it was necessary to turn the armored units of Manteuffel to the south in order to forestall the threat from the flank. After that, there could be no question of a major breakthrough. Already on December 22, it was necessary to recognize the need to limit the purpose of the operation. On this day, a large-minded command should have remembered the expected offensive on the Eastern Front, the situation of which depended on the timely completion of the already largely failed offensive on the Western Front. However, not only Hitler, but also the high command of the armed forces, and especially the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces, in these fateful days thought only of the Western Front. The tragedy of our military command became even more obvious after the failure of the offensive in the Ardennes before the end of the war.

On December 24, it was clear to every sane soldier that the offensive had finally failed. It was necessary to switch all our efforts to the east immediately, if it was not already too late.

In the early days of 1945, Hitler had a new solution. He planned to withdraw the 6th SS Panzer Army from the Ardennes, replenish it, and then transfer it to the Eastern Front. The German army command was not yet ready to admit the failure of the Ardennes offensive, but due to huge human and material losses, discontent began to spread among the generals.

General Tippelskirch wrote about this:
“During the retreat, we lost more tanks and assault guns than during the entire offensive. It was a very strong blow to the psychological mood in the units. The sight of SS units pulled up from the West was especially depressing. Even if they had to be replenished in order to be further used on another sector of the front, it still made an unfavorable impression on the army units, since now the main burden of the battle had to fall on their shoulders. This was a huge psychological miscalculation, which, however, never affected the front-line relations between SS officials and army employees.
It is significant that it was the Ardennes operation, unsuccessfully planned by Hitler, that became the starting point of his deep disappointment in his own Waffen-SS formations. The English historian Lidzel Hart noted in this regard: "This failure ruined the entire reputation of the Waffen-SS."

During the operational meeting, which was attended by the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and the commander of Army Group West, Field Marshal Rundstedt, Hitler announced his intention to withdraw the 6th Panzer Army from the Western Front in order to create a powerful reserve on its basis. At that moment, not a word was uttered about her transfer to the Eastern Front, as Colonel-General Guderian demanded.

For a long time it was not possible to begin the withdrawal of this "reserve of the High Command of the Wehrmacht", since the Anglo-American troops attacked the 6th Panzer Army from almost all sides. In addition, her disappearance from the Western Front would have been immediately noted by Western reconnaissance aircraft. The transfer was also associated with another risk - the British and American aircraft, which dominated the air in this region, could inflict enormous damage on the retreating tank army. In those days, Western stormtroopers literally hunted every vehicle like hunting dogs after a hare. As on the Eastern Front, any movement was possible only at night, but even in these conditions they were associated with heavy losses. While the withdrawal of the 6th Panzer Army from the West was very slow, Hitler decided to transfer it after replenishment to the Eastern Front. The sector of the front where this armada was supposed to be was not yet determined.

But the events that were rapidly developing both on the Eastern and Western fronts very quickly influenced the choice of Hitler. On January 12, 1945, exactly as Guderian had indicated, the general offensive of the Red Army began. A day later, the Western allies began active operations. Hitler was in a state of shock.

On the night of January 19-20, 1945, Rundstedt received an order to prepare to withdraw the 6th as soon as possible. tank army. At 7 p.m. on January 20, the withdrawal of the 1st SS Panzer Corps began, which was heading "to the East near Berlin."

In various sources, the figures for the number of troops participating in the Battle of the Arden are different, but at the same time they all say that in terms of the balance of forces and the sequence of events, there was no defeat in the Ardennes, although for the allies this German strike was unexpected and for the entire period of offensive actions in this battle, they suffered the greatest losses. Within 9 days, after the start of the German offensive, it was stopped. The forces of the allies many times exceeded the forces of the Wehrmacht, and every day this difference only increased, as the allies constantly increased their forces in Europe, and the Germans no longer had any reserves.

In total, by mid-December 1944, on a front of 640 km, the Allies had 63 divisions (of which 15 were armored), including 40 American, about 10 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, almost 8 thousand aircraft (excluding transport aviation). In addition, four airborne divisions (two in the Reims area and two in England) were in the reserve of the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary forces.

Now back to the second question. Was there a request?

The canonical version of this request sounds like this on January 6, 1945, Winston Churchill addressed the Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin:
“I would be grateful if you could let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January...

Now let's turn to the primary sources. Below are the translations and original texts of Stalin's correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill during this period.

In 1958, in Moscow, Gospolitizdat published a 2-volume edition of "Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" with a circulation of 150,000 copies, in which the correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I V. Stalin with US President F. Roosevelt, US President G. Truman, with British Prime Minister W. Churchill and British Prime Minister C. Attlee during the so-called "Great Patriotic War"

I have just returned from visiting General Eisenhower's headquarters and Field Marshal Montgomery's headquarters separately. The battle in Belgium is very difficult, but they believe that we are masters of the situation. The diversionary offensive that the Germans are undertaking in Alsace also causes difficulties in relations with the French and tends to pin down American forces. I still remain of the opinion that the strength and equipment of the allied armies, including the air force, will make von Rundstedt regret his bold and well-organized attempt to split our front and, if possible, capture the port of Antwerp, which is now of vital importance.

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL TO MARSHAL STALIN
There is very heavy fighting going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourselves know from your own experience how troubling the situation is when one has to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative. It is highly desirable and necessary for General Eisenhower to know in general terms what you intend to do, since this, of course, will affect all of his and our most important decisions. According to the message received, our emissary Air Chief Marshal Tedder was in Cairo last night, weather bound. His trip was greatly delayed through no fault of yours. If he has not yet arrived to you, I shall be grateful if you can let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front or somewhere else during January and at any other points that you may you wish to mention. I will not pass on this highly classified information to anyone, with the exception of Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only on condition that it is kept in the strictest confidence. I consider the matter urgent.
January 6, 1945.

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL TO MARSHAL STALIN
The battle in the West is very heavy and, at any time, large decisions may be called for from the Supreme Command. You know yourself from your own experience how very anxious the position is when a very broad front has to be defended after temporary loss of the initiative. It is General Eisenhower "s great desire and need to know in outline what you plan to do, as this obviously affects all his and our major decisions. Our Envoy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was last night reported weather-bound in Cairo. His journey has been much delayed through no fault of yours. any other points you may care to mention.
I shall not pass this most secret information to anyone except Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only under conditions of the utmost secrecy. I regard the matter as urgent.
January 6th, 1945
________________________________________

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL
Your message of January 6 reached me in the evening of January 7.
I am sorry to say that Air Marshal Tedder has not yet arrived in Moscow.
It is extremely important to take advantage of our superiority over the Germans in guns and aircraft. What we need for the purpose is clear flying weather and the absence of low mists that prevent aimed artillery fire. We are mounting an offensive, but at the moment the weather is unfavorable. Still, in view of our Allies" position on the Western Front, GHQ of the Supreme Command have decided to complete preparations at a rapid rate and, regardless of weather, to launch large-scale offensive operations along the entire Central Front not later than the second half of January Rest assured we shall do all in our power to support the valiant forces of our Allies.
January 7, 1945

So, the supporters of the legend about the request, for some reason, are bashfully silent that on January 5, in a letter to Stalin, Churchill writes that the Western allies have no doubts about the outcome of the battle in the Ardennes. In a letter dated January 6, he only asks about the plans of the Soviet command, which of course they wanted to know in order to plan their own operations.

As you know, the Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation - the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops on the right flank of the Soviet-German front began on January 12, ended on February 3. That is, the operation began two weeks after the German offensive in the Ardennes ended and the German troops began to retreat under the blows of the allies.

The withdrawal to the East of the most combat-ready German 6th Panzer Army, which had lost almost all of its tanks in the Ardennes, began only on January 20th.

The most interesting thing is that, presumably, the date of January 12, as the beginning of the Soviet offensive, was brought to the attention of Hitler by the head of intelligence of the Eastern Front of Germany, Reinhard Gehlen, through Guderian, long before the start of the Arden operation. That is why Guderian was against the Arden operation and the transfer of troops from the Eastern Front to the Western. On December 24, Guderian reported to Hitler's headquarters about the impending offensive of the Soviet troops and demanded that the Arden operation be stopped in order to transfer troops to the East.

Hitler rejected this proposal, considering the information of German intelligence about the forces of the Red Army a bluff. On December 31, Guderian, knowing full well that the Arden operation had failed, again demanded the transfer of troops to the east, but was again refused.

Those hundreds of thousands of German soldiers and officers, thousands of tanks, guns and aircraft could have ended up on the Eastern Front, if not for the Ardennes operation and our multimillion-dollar losses, and so huge, they would have been even greater.

As you know, the German troops on the Western Front for the period from June 1 to December 31, 1944 lost 634 thousand people - 57 thousand killed, 188 thousand wounded and 389 thousand captured and missing.

During the period of the Cold War, mutual insults and accusations, the myth of saving the allies in the Arden operation was born.

By the end of 1944, Nazi Germany was on the brink of disaster. The last attempt to turn the tide of the war was the Ardennes operation, which ended in failure.

"Anything is possible"?

Once upon a time in the Middle Ages, the castles of feudal lords stood in the Ardennes forest and bands of robber knights hid. And no one, not even Walter Scott, could subsequently foresee that the scene of his novel "Quentin Dorward" would become the site of one of the bloody battles of the Second World War ...

And it happened that by the winter of 1944, fascist Germany, squeezed in the grip of the Allied offensive from the west and the Red Army from the east, was on the verge of disaster. One country cannot be at war with the whole world, it was clear. And everyone knew that the end was near. But Hitler entertained the illusion of a possible split among Germany's opponents. Therefore, in his opinion, it was necessary to hit the Anglo-Americans in the west. And there "everything is possible."

To this end, it was decided to conduct an offensive operation in the Ardennes, which was code-named "Watch on the Rhine", and try to defeat the allies on the outskirts of Germany in Belgium and the Netherlands, and free up forces for the Eastern Front, where Soviet troops were already standing at the gates of the Reich.

It is well known that the enemy is defeated, first of all, by those who are well aware of his plans. That is why one should not spare money either for spies or for the technical support of espionage at all levels. So American intelligence knew in advance about the plans of the German command as early as November 1944, since it could read the German ciphers of the Ultra system, and also knew about all the movements of German troops and their concentration east of the Ardennes thanks to air reconnaissance data.

Training

Thus, the American command had the opportunity to prepare in advance to repel the enemy offensive by deploying large groupings of troops to the north and south of the Ardennes. In the Ardennes themselves, the defenses were deliberately weakened so that when the Germans broke through 100 km to the west, they would be surrounded by blows from the flanks. That is, the German command made a serious mistake by not calculating such consequences from the offensive in the Ardennes. However, in that situation, in any case, it would have been an “offensive of the desperate”, and the place ... the place did not even play a special role!

However, despite all the difficulties, the Germans prepared for the offensive quite well. They gathered everyone who knew English and dressed them in American uniforms, creating assault detachments from them under the leadership of Otto Skorzeny, who were supposed to sow panic among the Americans in the rear and destroy headquarters and commanders.

Part of the Panther tanks were disguised as American ones: they hung other bulwarks, covered the towers with metal sheets, removed the muzzle brakes from the guns, and painted large white stars on the armor.

The time for the offensive was chosen according to weather conditions so that the Anglo-American aircraft could not fly. A large number of "King Tiger" tanks were involved, as well as jets. And I must say that when the offensive was launched, all this bore fruit!

The operation was commanded by Field Marshal V. Model, who ordered it to begin on the morning of December 16, 1944, and by December 25 the Germans had advanced 90 km deep into the enemy defenses. The main target, of course, were the bridges across the river Meuse, although the Germans could not but understand that they were mined and would be blown up at the slightest threat! However, then they planned to attack Antwerp and the capital of Belgium - Brussels. The Germans expected to make up for the lack of fuel by capturing fuel depots in Liege and Namur.

As soon as the offensive began, the German commandos Otto Skorzeny and the "false panthers" rushed to the rear of the American troops, but as always happens in such cases, it was the case that decided everything. One of the Germans asked for refueling and instead of "gas", he asked to fill him with "petroleum". And from a literary point of view, it was right, but the Americans themselves do not say that!

In a word, the saboteurs were uncovered, their cars were burned with bazookas, but the matter was not limited to this. An order was given to all suspicious Americans to ask about what only “100% Americans” could know, which in turn led to a lot of curious cases, up to the detention of senior officers, who naturally did not know much of what their subordinates knew.

However, the operation in the Ardennes went "wrong" from the very beginning, not only because of this. So, for example, the 101st US Airborne Division held the defense in the city of Bastogne and the German 5th Panzer Army could not take it. The American 7th Panzer Division held the town of Saint-Vith near the Belgian-German border for five days. According to the plan, the Germans were supposed to take it at 18:00 on December 17, but they did it only on the 21st. The defense of both cities seriously slowed down the pace of the German offensive, which allowed the Allies to transfer additional forces to the Ardennes.

Counter attack

On December 19, 1944, General Eisenhower decided that it was time to strike back, which was scheduled for December 22. And then the weather came to the aid of the allies! Now their aircraft could provide effective support to the defending and advancing troops, and bomb the supply lines of the German troops, who were experiencing an acute shortage of fuel, as they could not capture the depots in Liege and Namur. They also failed to capture the bridges across the river Meuse, although they were only 6 km from the bridge in the city of Dinant - the last settlement on the way to the Meuse! So, by December 25, 1944, the German offensive in the Ardennes ended in complete failure.

Despite Hitler's orders to keep attacking, the German troops began to retreat. The "Last Blitzkrieg" is over.

On January 1, 1945, as a result of German air strikes, including Me.262 jet fighters, at least 260 Allied aircraft were destroyed there. However, the Luftwaffe also lost more than 300 aircraft, which drastically reduced their combat power. On the same day, the Germans again went on the offensive in Alsace in the Strasbourg region in order to pull the Allied forces away from the Ardennes, but this strike did not give any results.

Fight to the death

The bloodless and embittered German troops fought with extreme bitterness. Executions of American prisoners of war became more frequent. In particular, the shooting during the “Massacre at Malmedy” is known, after which orders were issued in the American army prohibiting the capture of paratroopers and SS soldiers.

On January 1, 1945, in the village of Chenon, American troops also shot about 60 German prisoners of war in retaliation for the massacre at Malmedy. So there were enough violations of the rules of warfare during the fighting in the Ardennes on both sides!

By January 29, the Allies completely eliminated the Ardennes "ledge" (which is why in American historiography this operation is called the "Battle of the Bulge" - "Battle for the Bulge"), and began the invasion of Germany. The Wehrmacht lost more than a third of its armored vehicles in battles and almost all the aircraft (including jets) participating in the operation used up fuel and ammunition, which it already lacked.

True, the Ardennes operation delayed the Allied offensive on the Rhine for six weeks: since it had to be postponed to January 29, 1945. But on the other hand, the Allies suffered fewer losses, since the German troops were defeated on the ground, where it was easier for the Allied mobile troops to operate, then as if the Germans had remained on the fortifications of the Siegfried Line, then a victory over them would have cost significantly more losses. So here, too, the benefit was entirely on the side of the Allies, and not the German command!

gossip

It is interesting that the theme of the battle in the Ardennes did not escape the close interest of conspiracy theorists, who are convinced of the widespread existence of conspiracies of "dark forces". However, the idea of ​​a "conspiracy" in this case was thrown to them by the Soviet film "Secret Mission", filmed in 1950.

There, the initial retreat of the Allies in the Ardennes is presented as a wholesale flight, and their subsequent successful counter-offensive as the result of a secret collusion between the American and German ruling circles: they say that the Germans should not resist in the West, but throw all their forces on the Eastern Front, that is, all of them were "bad". However, the fact that some behind-the-scenes negotiations were held somewhere and by someone about this can neither be confirmed nor denied today, since a lot of documents on the war were classified until 2045!