Fighting on the Black Sea coast. Geopolitical and economic consequences of the conflict

After the occupation of part of Georgia by Russian troops and the ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages around South Ossetia, a ceasefire was reached with the participation of international mediators. According to the agreements reached, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory was to be completed before October 1, 2008.

1. Background of the conflict

Ethnolinguistic map of the Caucasus.

Map of Georgia, 1993

2. Military action

2.1. The beginning of the conflict

Protests in front of the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi.

The aggravation of the situation on the border between the autonomy and Georgia began in late July and early August. Each side blamed the other for starting hostilities. Significant deterioration took place on August 1, when six Georgian policemen were wounded as a result of a terrorist attack. In response to this, shelling of Tskhinvali from the Georgian side began, which caused an escalation of the conflict and shelling of enemy positions from both sides. On August 3, South Ossetia began the evacuation of the civilian population from Tskhinvali - about 2.5 thousand people were evacuated.

2.2. Russian intervention

Georgia unilaterally stopped the offensive to allow the civilian population to leave the war zone. In turn, the government of South Ossetia announced the death of 1,400 people, mostly the civilian population of the region. Meanwhile, regular troops of the Russian Federation with a total strength of about 150 tanks and other equipment were brought into South Ossetia. By the end of August 8, Russian troops and Ossetian detachments controlled large parts of Tskhinvali, and Russian aircraft continued to bombard military bases near Tbilisi and destroy Georgian aircraft. There were also direct clashes between Russian and Georgian troops in the area of ​​military operations around Tskhinvali.

2.3. Escalation of the conflict

On the night of August 8-9 and in the morning, fighting continued between Georgian and Russian troops around the capital Tskhinvali. At the same time, information was received about the bombing by Russian aircraft of the Georgian port of Poti on the Black Sea coast of the country. Military bases in different cities of Georgia were also bombed, in particular, residential buildings were bombed in the city of Gori, where about 60 civilians were killed. Also, airborne units and special forces units began to arrive to reinforce Russian troops in South Ossetia, in particular, the formation of the 76th and 98th airborne divisions. Already at about 8 am, the Russian side announced the capture of Tskhinvali - this information was denied by the Georgian side, which insisted that Georgian troops still controlled parts of the autonomy's capital. Georgia also reported 10 downed Russian planes, but Russia acknowledged the loss of only two. After the fact, Russia admitted the loss of six aircraft, three of which were hit by Russian air defense forces: three Su-25 attack aircraft, a Tu-22M3 bomber and two Su-24M front-line bombers.

The main battle in the early days unfolded in the air of Georgia. The Georgian air defense system offered fierce resistance to Russian aircraft - and it also served as the main target of air strikes. After the Russian aviation managed to destroy the main radars and anti-aircraft defense systems of the Georgians, and it completely took control of the sky over Georgia, the organized armed resistance to the invasion actually ceased. Russian military units advanced without resistance to the lines defined for themselves. The Georgian command withdrew its units and began to prepare for the defense of Tbilisi.

The escalation of the conflict spread to another separatist region, Abkhazia, where detachments of the unrecognized republic and Russian mercenaries (in the Russian press - "volunteers") launched attacks on Georgian positions in the Kodori Gorge. On the same day, on the proposal of President Saakashvili, the Georgian Parliament adopted a resolution on the "state of war" in Georgia for a period of 15 days. The President of Georgia also proposed a ceasefire between the parties and the withdrawal of troops, but this proposal was rejected by Russia, which insisted on the withdrawal of Georgian troops from South Ossetia as a precondition for a ceasefire. The UN Security Council also failed to make a decision regarding the solution of this conflict, and Russia said that it was conducting "an operation to force Georgia to peace."

The situation worsened significantly on August 11, when Russia extended its range of attacks not only to targets in the immediate vicinity of the theater of operations, but also launched an offensive against the city of Gora on the way to Tbilisi and captured the Georgian cities of Zugdidi and Senaki in the west of the country. Also, Russian troops seized the central highway that connects eastern and western Georgia. As the front approached Tbilisi, panic began in the city and residents began to flee from the area of ​​hostilities. Mikheil Saakashvili tried to reassure the population and assured that the Georgian troops were ready to defend the capital. Meanwhile, Russia has announced that it does not intend to attack Tbilisi.

2.4. Participation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet

A group of ships of the Russian fleet, led by the flagship missile cruiser Moskva, took a direct part in the conflict, the detachment included large landing ships Yamal and Saratov and others. The marines of the Black Sea Fleet occupied the main port of Georgia, Poti, and destroyed all Georgian boats and ships in the roadstead that had military markings, including border ones, by planting explosives in them.

As early as August 10, Ukraine warned the Russian side against the participation of ships of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the conflict over South Ossetia. The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine noted "In order to prevent the occurrence of circumstances in which Ukraine may be drawn into an armed conflict and hostilities due to the participation in them of military units of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, which is temporarily based on the territory of Ukraine, the Ukrainian side reserves the right, in accordance with the norms of international law and legislation of Ukraine, prohibit the return to the territory of Ukraine until the conflict is resolved of ships and vessels that may take part in the above actions ". However, the Ukrainian side subsequently admitted that the interstate agreements regulating the presence of the Russian fleet in Ukraine do not contain restrictions on the military use of the fleet.

3. Sarkozy plan

Press conference of Medvedev and Sarkozy after the talks on the six-point truce plan

On August 10, Georgian troops announced the withdrawal of troops from Tskhinvali and a unilateral ceasefire. Mikheil Saakashvili signed the truce plan proposed by the European Union, the EU presidency France took the initiative. The agreement was negotiated in Tbilisi by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who later visited Moscow and had talks with Russian President Medvedev.

On August 12, French President Nicolas Sarkozy also joined the peace process and proposed a six-point peace plan. He also secured the support of the President of Georgia and Russia for this plan, according to which each of the parties committed to:

In the previous plan there was a clause on the international discussion of the future status of the unrecognized republics, however, at the request of Georgia, it was slightly changed. This deal was called the "Sarkozy plan", in Russia it was called the "Medvedev-Sarkozy plan". Moscow did not enter into a direct negotiation process with Tbilisi, they chose the path of ignoring Mikhail Saakashvili. All negotiations were actually carried out through the mediation of the French side.

3.1. Occupation of Georgian territories

On August 11, President Medvedev announced "A significant part of the operation to force Georgia to peace has been completed." In Russian propaganda terminology, the invasion of Georgia was called "peace enforcement." The next day, Prime Minister Putin corrected the president's statement, noting that "Russia will bring its peacekeeping mission to its logical conclusion."

Despite the agreement signed on August 12, Russian troops began to actively move deep into Georgian territory. In particular, the cities of Gori, Senaki, Poti were occupied, the road connecting western and eastern Georgia was cut. Roadblocks were set up on the roads. Russia used serious strategic weapons in the conflict, in particular, the Tu-22 bomber carried out military tasks, the Tochka-U missile system was delivered through the Roki tunnel. On the 100-kilometer section of the road between Tbilisi and Gori, on August 16-17, a column of heavy equipment was observed moving towards the Georgian capital: Urals with infantry and Grad installations, self-propelled guns, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, General Nogovitsyn, said at a press conference on September 17 that the Russians are watching how Georgian troops are concentrating around Tbilisi.

In turn, Georgia also accused Russia of targeted attacks on civilian targets, bombing residential buildings in Gori and Poti and Tbilisi International Airport. With the threat of an offensive by Russian troops on the capital, refugees appeared who tried to leave Tbilisi. Ossetian units, according to the Georgian side, shelled Georgian villages around Tskhinvali, which led to the appearance of refugees from these regions. In connection with the offensive of the Russian troops, the city of Gori was almost deserted - most of the inhabitants became refugees. Eyewitnesses accused the South Ossetian rebels of a campaign of terror against the inhabitants of Gori. There were also accusations of ethnic cleansing on both sides. The President of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, spoke frankly about ethnic cleansing and boasted of the destruction of Georgian villages in the autonomy; the fact of ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia was confirmed by international human rights organizations.

6. Information war

From the first day of the confrontation, the mass information dissemination channels, the TV channels of Russia and Georgia, were mobilized for informational support of military operations. So in Russia, where the main TV channels are controlled by the state, a continuous telethon was actually organized, the main slogans of which were repeated by voice hundreds of times a day and were displayed all the time in large letters on the screens. These slogans were "Genocide in South Ossetia" and "Forcing Georgia to peace." Russian society, in agreement with the country's authorities, supported the introduction of troops into South Ossetia and military operations on Georgian territory; more than 70% of Russians approved such decisive actions.

In Georgia, which presented itself as a victim of the aggression of its northern neighbor, support for President Mikheil Saakashvili has grown.

6.1. cyberwar

During the war, objective information coming from the scene played an important role. Russian, Georgian and foreign media covered the information that came from the scene in different ways. A real information war unfolded on the Internet, long before the start of hostilities. On the territory of Georgia, Russian channels were turned off, which Georgia accused of conducting an information war. The Internet connection of sites with the "ru" domain was also blocked. As with the standoff over the Bronze Soldier in Estonia, Georgia and its institutions have also been hacked. In particular, the website of the Georgian Foreign Ministry was attacked, where photos of Hitler were posted. Other sites of the government of the republic also did not work because of hacker attacks. Attacks from Russia on the websites of the parliament, government and the Ministry of Defense turned out to be very organized and massive, even the websites of Georgian news agencies were blocked. Russian hackers spread the call: "Hackers and bloggers of all countries unite", "Websites will be completely blocked! No one will be able to read the nonsense that Russia attacked Georgia." At the same time, Estonia, which suffered similar attacks, sent a team of experts to help Georgia.

The government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia also reported attacks on the websites of its state institutions and news agencies of the republic. Reporters Without Borders condemned the actions.

6.2. Mass media

Attitudes towards the conflict became polarized both in Ukraine and abroad. Georgia unequivocally condemned the aggression, its position was supported by a number of Ukrainian politicians and international organizations, who called Russia's actions aggression against sovereign Georgia. Numerous Western politicians, in particular US Vice President Dick Cheney and Lithuanian President Adamkus and others, called Russia's actions military aggression. At the same time, some international and Ukrainian politicians came out in support of Russia's actions. In particular, the chairman of the Communist Party of Ukraine Simonenko called these events Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia. The Supreme Council of the Crimean Autonomy spread the same attitude towards the conflict in its appeal and called on Kyiv to recognize Abkhazia and Pv. Ossetia. Miguel Brockman, President of the UN General Assembly, also condemned Georgia's actions in the conflict.

In turn, Russia accused Western news agencies of biased coverage of events in Georgia. It was pointed out that the news releases of the Western media almost completely ignored the events in Tskhinvali and the destruction of the city, and instead paid much attention to the comments of the Georgian side, in particular Mikheil Saakashvili.

The Russian media have also been criticized for censoring coverage of events in Georgia. In particular, British journalist William Dunbar resigned in protest from the English-language channel Russia Today, where, according to him, there is censorship. According to the journalist, he was not allowed to go on the air after reporting on the bombing of Russian aircraft in Georgia.

7. Diplomatic relations

8. Statements of the parties to the conflict

9. Reaction of the world community

9.1. PACE Commission

The Commission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) believes that Moscow and Tbilisi bear equal responsibility for the August hostilities. This conclusion is contained in the report of the head of the PACE special commission, Luc van der Brande, published on September 29. Between September 21 and 26, Luc van der Brande visited South Ossetia, the buffer zones in Georgia, Tbilisi and Moscow in order to clarify the causes and consequences of the August armed conflict. According to the report, the delegation is "extremely concerned" that two members of the Council of Europe have violated their obligations within this organization to peacefully resolve all differences, including old conflicts. Such behavior is unacceptable, and both countries "are responsible for the escalation of this conflict into a full-scale war," the statement said.

The report also notes that the completely opposite points of view and versions of the parties, as well as the short duration of the commission's visit to the conflict zone, make it very difficult to determine the sequence of events on August 7 and 8 and the circumstances that led to them.

However, "it is quite clear that both sides did not make sufficient efforts to prevent war", and since then numerous human rights violations have been committed in the region - and still are being committed. PACE called for the investigation of all such cases and the punishment of those responsible in court, while emphasizing that the Russian Federation is responsible for the crimes that are committed in the territory now under its control.

The report also notes that the Council of Europe is surprised that Russia and the United States do not have satellite images that could clarify the situation about the beginning of the conflict in Georgia. The parliamentarians noted that Moscow and Tbilisi adhere to diametrically opposed versions of the start of full-scale hostilities. Thus, the Russian side insists that it brought in tanks and armored vehicles after Georgian troops invaded the Tskhinvali region and began to conduct military operations there. The Georgian side, in turn, claims that its intelligence reported a concentration of Russian troops and armored vehicles entering South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel, and a military operation was launched to repel an attack by the Russian army that had invaded Georgian territory.

9.2. international Court

According to international affairs lawyer Akhmat Glashev, "the court made a purely political decision, which, first of all, is beneficial to Russia. The court actually refused to satisfy the complaint of the Georgian side, and at the same time stepped aside from making any clear decision. The court decision does not say, Russia violated the international convention on the elimination of racial discrimination.

9.3. European Parliament

The war in Georgia had significant economic consequences: with the outbreak of hostilities, the shares of Russian companies fell sharply and were reflected not only in Russia, but also in the world market. There was also some correction of the ruble exchange rate against the US dollar, when foreign investors began to sell rubles on the domestic market. Trading on the main Russian stock exchanges MICEX and RTS was stopped several times during August due to falling indices to prevent panic among traders: the total drop in the PCT and MICEX indices for a month and a half after the war amounted to more than 40%. The continuous growth of Russia's foreign exchange reserves against the background of the oil boom turned into a fall: over 30 business days, the volume of gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Russia decreased by $38 billion, or 6.8%.

Notes

1. Comparison of the combat potential of the ARMED FORCES of Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia in the conflict zone - lenta.ru/articles/2008/08/08/forces/
2. General Staff: Russian Armed Forces lost 64 servicemen in South Ossetia - gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2008/08/20/n_1260079.shtml
3. UPC specified Russian losses during the war in South Ossetia - lenta.ru/news/2009/08/07/losses/
4. Russian General Staff: Russian troops lost 74 dead - ua.korrespondent.net/world/552715
5. Georgia confirms the withdrawal of Russian troops - www.polit.ru/news/2008/09/13/151.html
6. South Ossetia chose independence and Kokoity (Rus.)- Newsru.com/world/13nov2006/osetia1.html
7. S. Ik: There are double standards in Russia regarding the conflict in the Caucasus. - www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/indepth/story/2008/08/080808_eke_ie_om.shtml
8. Kulik about the Caucasus: Ukraine needs to draw conclusions. - www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/indepth/story/2008/08/080809_kulyk_is_is.shtml
9. Terrorist attack in South Ossetia: six Georgian policemen were wounded. - novynar.com.ua/world/33571
10. More than 2.5 thousand people left the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict - novynar.com.ua/world/33715
11. Georgia announced the beginning of the war with South Ossetia - novynar.com.ua/world/34135
12. Saakashvili did not give a reason to start hostilities - maidan.org.ua/static/news/2007/1218543889.html
13. Russia left Georgia no choice - maidan.org.ua/static/news/2007/1219242475.html
14. Vladimir Gorbach. Provocation - Prostration - Occupation - pravda.com.ua/news/2008/8/20/80141.htm
15. Kokoity: The assault on Tskhinvali has begun - ua.korrespondent.net/world/547055
16. BBC Ukrainian: Georgia offers truce to rebels - www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/news/story/2008/08/080807_georgia_ob.shtml
17. Saakashvili ordered the full mobilization of reservists - novynar.com.ua/world/34153
18. ... We've been there since August 7th. Well, our entire 58th Army... - www.permnews.ru/story.asp?kt=2912&n=453
19. Russian tanks entered Tskhinvali: Georgia threatens Russia with war - ua.korrespondent.net/world/547700
20. Russian aircraft attacked a military base near Tbilisi - ua.korrespondent.net/world/547722

War in South Ossetia 2008, Five Day War
	South Ossetia, Georgia, Republic of Abkhazia
	According to the official position of South Ossetia, Russia and Abkhazia: A response to Georgia's aggression against civilians in South Ossetia and Russian peacekeepers. "Forcing Georgia to Peace". According to the official position of Georgia: Carrying out a military operation in the Tskhinvali region in response to the provocations of the South Ossetian armed groups; Russia's aggression against Georgia, which began from the territory of Ukraine 6 days before the hostilities in South Ossetia.
	The defeat of the Georgian troops, the complete loss of control over the territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Georgia. 15,613 Georgian refugees and 34,000 Ossetian refugees from South Ossetia. Recognition by Russia of the independence of the republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Opponents
	Armed Forces of South Ossetia
	According to Azerbaijani media, a small number of their citizens-volunteers from ethnic Georgians
According to the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, at least 200 volunteers from UNA-UNSO	Volunteers from North Ossetia
MPRI, HALO Trust and other foreign mercenaries.
	76th "Pskov" airborne division
	Armed Forces of Abkhazia
Commanders
Mikhail Saakashvili	Eduard Kokoity
	Dmitry Medvedev
	Sergey Bagapsh
David Kezerashvili	Vasily Lunev
Zaza Gogava	Anatoly Barankevich
Mamuka Kurashvili	Marat Kulakhmetov
	Anatoly Khrulev
	Vladimir Shamanov
	Igor Miroshnichenko
	Valery Evtukhovich
	Sulim Yamadayev
	Alexander Kletskov
	Sergey Menyailo
	Merab Kishmaria
	Anatoly Zaitsev
Side forces
17 thousand people in South Ossetia The number of armed forces - 29 thousand people (of which 2000 were in Iraq at the beginning of the war), and an unknown number of internal troops.	3 thousand personnel, not less than 20 tanks and 25 self-propelled guns 300 - 2 thousand volunteers from North Ossetia. 19 thousand personnel: 10 thousand in South Ossetia 9 thousand in Abkhazia Abkhazia: 5 thousand personnel
Military casualties
According to Georgia: 412 dead (including 170 servicemen and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 228 civilians), 1,747 wounded and 24 missing. According to Russia, the scale of losses is about 3,000 people among the army and security forces.	According to various estimates, from 162 to 1692 dead (see the section on the losses of South Ossetia). According to official figures - 67 dead and 283 wounded. According to other sources, from 71 killed and 340 wounded soldiers to 400 killed according to Georgia. Abkhazia: 1 dead and two injured

Armed conflict in South Ossetia (2008)- military confrontation in August 2008 between Georgia on the one hand and Russia, along with the unrecognized republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the other.

Main events

Georgian and South Ossetian troops have been skirmishing and fire attacks of varying degrees of intensity since late July 2008. On the evening of August 7, the parties agreed on a ceasefire, which, however, was not really done.

On the night of August 7-8, 2008 (at 0:06), Georgian troops began a massive artillery shelling of the capital of South Ossetia, the city of Tskhinvali (and) and adjacent areas. A few hours later, the city was stormed by the forces of Georgian armored vehicles and infantry. The official reason for the attack on Tskhinval, according to the Georgian side, was the violation of the ceasefire by South Ossetia, which, in turn, claims that Georgia was the first to open fire.

On August 8, 2008 (at 14:59), Russia officially joined the conflict on the side of South Ossetia as part of an operation to force the Georgian side to peace, on August 9, 2008 - Abkhazia as part of an agreement on military assistance between members of the Commonwealth of Unrecognized States. On August 12, 2008, Russia officially announced the successful completion of the operation to force the Georgian authorities to peace, on August 13, 2008, Abkhazia officially announced the completion of the operation to oust Georgian troops from the Kodori Gorge, after which active hostilities ended.

From August 14 to August 16, 2008, the leaders of the states involved in hostilities signed a plan for the peaceful settlement of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict ("Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan").

Background to the conflict

The origins of the modern Georgian-Ossetian conflict lie in the events of the late 1980s, when the activation of the Georgian national movement for independence from the union center (while denying the right to autonomy to the small peoples of Georgia) and the radical actions of its leaders (primarily Zviad Gamsakhurdia) on against the backdrop of the weakness of the central leadership of the USSR led to a sharp aggravation of relations between Georgians and ethnic minorities (primarily Abkhazians and Ossetians, who had their own autonomous entities and even then put forward demands for an increase in their status - and, ultimately, independence).

1989-1992

In 1989, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region proclaims an autonomous republic, and a year later it declares its sovereignty. In response, on December 10, 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia abolished the Ossetian autonomy in general, dividing its territory into six administrative regions of Georgia.

In 1990, the USSR law "On the procedure for resolving issues related to the secession of a union republic from the USSR" granted the right to autonomous entities "to independently decide the issue of secession from the USSR as part of the seceding republic or of staying within the USSR." The Executive Committee of People's Deputies of South Ossetia took advantage of the granted right, and when Georgia withdrew from the USSR on April 9, 1991, South Ossetia remained in its composition.

The political struggle quickly escalated into armed clashes, and throughout 1991 South Ossetia was the scene of active hostilities during which the irretrievable losses (killed and missing) on ​​the Ossetian side amounted to 1 thousand people, more than 2.5 thousand people were injured.

On January 19, 1992, a referendum was held in South Ossetia on the issue of "state independence and (or) reunification with North Ossetia." The majority of those participating in the referendum supported this proposal.

In the spring of 1992, after some lull caused by a coup d'état and civil war in Georgia, hostilities in South Ossetia resumed. Under pressure from Russia, Georgia began negotiations that ended on June 24, 1992 with the signing of the Dagomys Agreement on the principles for resolving the conflict. The Dagomys agreements provided for the creation of a special body to resolve the conflict - the Mixed Control Commission (JCC) from representatives of the four parties - Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia and North Ossetia.

On July 14, 1992, the fire was ceased, and the Mixed Peacekeeping Forces (SPKF) consisting of three battalions - Russian, Georgian and Ossetian - were introduced into the conflict zone to separate the warring parties.

The Mission of observers from the OSCE was placed in Tskhinvali.

1992-2007

After 1992, South Ossetia was a de facto independent state, had its own constitution (adopted in 1993) and state symbols. The Georgian authorities still considered it as an administrative unit of the Tskhinvali region, but no active steps were taken to establish control over it.

In the 1990s, the process of accepting Russian citizenship by the population of South Ossetia was actively going on. On July 1, 2002, a new citizenship law was introduced in Russia. This law closed the possibility for former citizens of the USSR to obtain Russian citizenship in an extremely simplified manner. In this regard, in June 2002, the Congress of Russian Communities of Abkhazia initiated an action for the mass receipt of Russian passports by the inhabitants of the country. For this purpose, according to Vremya Novostey, employees of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were specially sent to Sochi and a special headquarters was opened that dealt with the registration of Russian citizenship for residents of Abkhazia. This led to the fact that in June up to 8,000 Abkhazians received Russian citizenship per day. At the end of the action, about 220 out of 320 thousand residents of Abkhazia had Russian citizenship. By the end of July 2002, the number of Russian citizens in South Ossetia exceeded 60% of the population, by 2006 - 80% of the population. In 2006, Deputy Foreign Minister of Georgia Merab Antadze stated that Russia intended to contribute to the intensification of confrontation in South Ossetia. Granting Russian citizenship to the population of South Ossetia, the Deputy Minister called "the annexation of Georgian territories." The representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry said that the adoption of Russian citizenship by the population of South Ossetia takes place within the framework of international law, and any claims on this issue from Georgia are inappropriate.

On December 5, 2000, at the initiative of the Russian side, a visa regime was introduced between Russia and Georgia, which created difficulties for Georgian citizens, 500,000 of whom were working in Russia at that time. At the same time, a visa-free regime was left for residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which caused protests in Georgia. On March 1, 2001, benefits were canceled that provided for visa-free travel for Georgian diplomatic representatives and residents of the border strip.

The next increase in tension in the conflict zone coincides with the coming to power of Mikheil Saakashvili, who announced a course to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia. In August 2004, things came to bloody clashes, during which Georgian troops unsuccessfully tried to establish control over the strategic heights around Tskhinvali, but, having lost several dozen people, were withdrawn.

In February 2006, the Georgian authorities announced the need for Russian peacekeepers in the zones of interethnic conflicts to have visas, these statements were accompanied by frequent detentions of the peacekeepers due to the lack of visas. The Russian side did not recognize the legitimacy of the Georgian demands. On February 15, 2006, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution in which the activities of the peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia were recognized as unsatisfactory and a desire was expressed to switch to a "new format of a peacekeeping mission." In May of the same year, the Georgian authorities declared Russian peacekeepers, who arrived in South Ossetia as part of the rotation, “criminal criminals” due to violations of the visa and border regime, which took place from the point of view of the Georgian authorities. The South Ossetian authorities, in response to Georgia's claims, threatened to introduce visas for Georgian citizens, including peacekeepers. The situation escalated on July 18, when the Georgian Parliament demanded the withdrawal or "legalization" of the peacekeepers.

On July 20, 2006, the Russian Defense Minister promised to help Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the event of Georgian aggression.

On November 12, 2006, two parliamentary elections and a referendum on independence were held simultaneously in South Ossetia. One election and a referendum were held in the territory controlled by the authorities of South Ossetia (Eduard Kokoity won here, and the majority of the referendum participants voted for independence). Other elections were held in territory controlled by the Georgian authorities and among refugees from Ossetia in Georgia proper (here Dmitry Sanakoev won). Both sides recognized the elections they held as democratic and reflecting the will of the people, while others recognized them as fraudulent. Both winners took an oath to the people of South Ossetia, claimed power over the entire territory of South Ossetia and accused each other of collaborationism (with Russia and Georgia, respectively).

In the same year, Georgia sent its troops into the Kodori Gorge, despite the protests of Abkhazia, after which the contingent of Russian peacekeepers in the lower part of the gorge was reinforced.

Tiger Throw Plan

According to some Russian sources, back in 2006 there was a plan in Georgia, code-named "Tiger Throw", which assumed until May 1, 2006, with the support of the United States and the OSCE, to force Russia to withdraw its peacekeepers from South Ossetia. Following this, in order to destabilize the situation in the region, several resonant provocations were to be organized within a week against the population of Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia. At the same time, under the pretext of localizing the conflict area and ensuring the security of the Georgian population living in its immediate vicinity, it was planned to create groupings of Georgian troops on the border with South Ossetia. On May 6, formations, military units and subdivisions of law enforcement agencies of Georgia from different directions were to seize all large settlements of South Ossetia while simultaneously completely blocking the border with the Russian Federation. Further, according to the plan, the de facto leadership of South Ossetia was arrested and brought to trial. Then martial law was to be introduced in the republic, a provisional government was appointed and a curfew was established. In total, the Georgian military had 7 days for this operation. In reality, these events did not occur.

The existence of such a plan was confirmed in an interview with Reuters by former Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili. According to him, " Abkhazia was our strategic priority, but in 2005 we developed military plans to take over both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The plan initially provided for a double operation of the invasion of South Ossetia, taking control of the Roki tunnel and Dzhava". He stated that the United States had already warned that they would not provide assistance in the event of an invasion: “ When we met with George W. Bush in May 2005, we were told bluntly: don't try to enter into a military confrontation. We will not be able to provide military assistance to you».

Withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia

In 2007, President Saakashvili demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia. The largest base was Akhalkalaki. The troops were withdrawn ahead of schedule - November 15, 2007, although the withdrawal was planned during 2008. Only Russian peacekeepers remained, acting under a CIS mandate in Abkhazia and under the Dagomys agreements in South Ossetia.

Financial, political and military support for South Ossetia

After the military events of 1991-1992, the Russian Federation began to play an active political role on the territory of South Ossetia.

According to the Georgian side, Russia also supplied weapons to South Ossetia. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated in January 2006:

Russia, in turn, refuted the accusations of the Georgian side. In January 2006, Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador-at-Large Valery Kenyaikin stated:

According to him, it was about four T-55 tanks, several howitzers and armored vehicles.

According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta (February 2007), the South Ossetian armed forces numbered 3,000; 15 thousand people were in the reserve. According to some sources, South Ossetia was armed with 15, according to other sources - 87 T-72 and T-55 tanks (according to Novaya Gazeta, 80 of them "remained after the [Russian] exercises" Kavkaz-2008 "") , 95 guns and mortars, including 72 howitzers, 23 BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems, 180 armored vehicles, including 80 infantry fighting vehicles, and three Mi-8 helicopters.

The magazine "Vlast" dated August 25, 2008 cited information, citing an unnamed minister of North Ossetia, that the budget of North Ossetia annually received 2.5 billion rubles from the Russian federal treasury for "international activities", which were immediately transferred to the government of South Ossetia ; no transparent reporting on the expenditure of the transferred funds was provided. This information was confirmed by former South Ossetian Prime Minister Oleg Teziev.

The bulk of the government of the unrecognized republic of South Ossetia before the start of the armed conflict in 2008 consisted of former Russian officials, including military and intelligence officers.

Political and military support for Georgia. Military budget of Georgia

During Saakashvili's presidency, Georgia set a world record for the growth of the military budget, increasing it from 2003 to 2008 by more than 33 times. The leadership of Georgia sharply increased the military budget, trying to bring its armed forces to NATO standards. The budget of Georgia for 2008 planned expenditures of the Ministry of Defense equivalent to 0.99 billion US dollars, which is more than 4.5% of GDP (purchasing power parity estimate) or about 9% of GDP (exchange rate estimate) and more than 25 % of all budget revenues of Georgia for 2008.

According to the BBC, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, Georgia's arms suppliers included the United States, England, France, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Serbia and others. In particular, Kalashnikov assault rifles were delivered from Serbia, which were used in the attack on South Ossetia and Russian troops. Russian diplomats pointed out to Serbia that Russian helicopters were shot down by bullets produced in Serbia (however, it should be noted that only one helicopter is known to have been lost by the Russian armed forces in South Ossetia, and this machine crashed for a non-combat reason after the end of the war; for more details see below). article Losses of aviation during the war in South Ossetia (2008)). The Serbian manufacturing plant denies direct deliveries and suggests that the machines came to Georgia through Croatia and Bosnia.

Ukraine confirms arms supplies to Georgia:

On August 12, from the report of Ukraine published by the UN on the export of military equipment, it became known what kind of weapons Ukraine supplied to Georgia. Some Ukrainian experts point out that some of these weapons are obsolete, while at the same time, some equipment was removed from combat duty and delivered to Georgia, bypassing standard procedures, with the knowledge and on behalf of Yushchenko. According to the report, Ukraine supplied the following types of weapons to Georgia: Osa and Buk air defense systems, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, L-39 training aircraft, self-propelled guns (including heavy 2S7 Pion) and tanks , infantry fighting vehicles and small arms. MLRS "Grad" is not on the list.

Later, the head of the Interim Investigative Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which deals with the degree of legality of the foreign arms trade, Valeriy Konovalyuk, said that the Commission found violations of Ukrainian legislation in the supply of weapons to Georgia, which caused Ukraine enormous economic and political damage, and also weakened the country's defense capability.

On this occasion, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said: “Official Kyiv did not even express regret over the deaths of civilians and Russian peacekeepers. At the same time, it is known that the Ukrainian leadership, by supplying heavy offensive weapons to the Georgian army, bears its share of responsibility for the tragedy that occurred in this region. Hundreds of people died, most of them civilians.”

In addition, according to the Internet publication Vesti.ru, citing the British publication Financial Times, the Georgian armed forces and special forces were intensively trained by American instructors on the orders of the Pentagon: “Georgian units were trained by the United States under a program that was tested in 1995 in Croatia as part of an operation by the Croatian armed forces to seize the Krajna region, the majority of whose population was ethnic Serbs.

Immediately after the entry of Russian troops into South Ossetia, on August 8, about a hundred American military specialists were evacuated from Tbilisi by the US Air Force. On August 28, a representative of the Russian General Staff, Colonel-General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, told reporters that the Russian military had found "a lot of interesting things" in the filling of the captured American military Hummer jeeps in the city of Poti. There are reports that this is related to satellite intelligence. Nogovitsyn confirmed that jeeps with 20 servicemen were seized near the city of Gori with full weapons. According to the US, the jeeps were in the port in sealed warehouses and were waiting to be sent to the American base in Germany after the completion of the Georgian-American exercises.

In August 2010, the Prime Minister of Russia, V.V. Putin, said that if there had not been a rearmament of Georgia, there would have been no aggression in 2008 and the blood that was shed then. According to Putin, the Russian leadership spoke about this to its partners in other countries, including European ones, but they remained silent.

Foreign policy context

On February 17, 2008, the autonomous province of Serbia Kosovo and Metohija declared its independence as the Republic of Kosovo; the next day it was recognized by a number of countries, including the United States. The recognition of Kosovo's independence evoked an extremely negative reaction from the Russian leadership: on February 22 of the same year, President V. Putin said at the summit of the CIS countries: “The Kosovo precedent is a terrible precedent. Those who do this, they do not calculate the results of what they do. Ultimately, this is a double-edged sword, and the second stick will crack them in the head someday.”

The British magazine The Economist of 21 August 2008 wrote: Russia's failed attempts to determine the outcome of Ukraine's 2004 presidential election, followed by the Orange Revolution there (after Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution), stung Mr. Putin. Discontent that smoldered over continued NATO expansion, US plans to deploy elements of its missile defense in the Czech Republic and Poland, ignited after the announcement at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April that both Georgia and Ukraine could eventually join the Union, although only then , when they'll be ready. Both Russia and Georgia wanted a fight.»

On August 12, 2008, the influential American newspaper The New York Times, citing assistants to the US Secretary of State, wrote that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during a private dinner with Georgian President M. Saakashvili on July 9, 2008 in Tbilisi, warned the latter against entering into a military conflict with Russia, in which he has no chance of winning.

Erosi Kitsmarishvili, who was Georgia's ambassador to Russia during the war, on November 25, 2008, citing his sources in the Georgian government, said that US President George W. Bush gave the go-ahead to start a war in South Ossetia. US Vice President Dick Cheney considered sending NATO and US troops to fight against Russia.

Rising Tensions (early 2008)

At the beginning of 2008, there was an increase in tension in the conflict zone, as well as in relations between Russia and Georgia.

On March 6, 2008, it was announced that Russia had withdrawn from the ban on trade, economic and financial ties with Abkhazia; Moscow's decision was regarded by the Georgian Foreign Ministry as "encouraging separatism in the Abkhaz region and an open attempt to encroach on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia."

On April 16, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin had given instructions to the government on the basis of which Moscow would build special relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

On April 17, 2008, Kokoity announced that Georgian military units were moving up to the borders of his republic and called for "refraining from rash steps that could lead to tragic consequences."

On April 21, the Georgian side confirmed that an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, manufactured by the Israeli company Elbit Systems, was shot down the day before. According to the Georgian authorities, he was shot down on Georgian territory by a Russian MiG-29 fighter. The incident was discussed in the UN Security Council.

On April 29, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry officially announced "Measures to Strengthen the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict"; According to Novaya Gazeta on May 5, “a thousandth (at least) contingent with armored vehicles crossed the border from the Sochi region along the Psou River.”

On May 6, 2008, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov, head of the Main Directorate for Combat Training and Service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, commenting on the situation in Abkhazia, said that the situation in the conflict zone was in the field of view of the leadership of the Russian Defense Ministry and "all the necessary measures are already being taken." On the same day, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili, who was on a visit to Brussels, said: “Of course, we are trying to avoid war. But we are very close to it. We know the Russians very well, we know the signals. We see that Russian troops are occupying territories based on false information, and this worries us.”

In the second half of July, simultaneously with the joint Georgia-US exercise “Immediate Response” (in which, according to military observer Zaur Alborov, an attack on South Ossetia was practiced), Russia conducted a large-scale exercise “Kavkaz-2008”, which involved units of various power structures. At the same time, the Russian railway troops repaired the tracks in Abkhazia.

Escalation of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict

In late July - early August, the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict escalated. Skirmishes and fire raids of varying degrees of intensity took place regularly. Civilians of South Ossetia began to leave the conflict zone en masse.

Starting from August 1, at the initiative of the Prime Minister of South Ossetia, Yuri Morozov, the residents of Tskhinvali were evacuated.

According to the correspondent of Nezavisimaya Gazeta (issue dated August 8, 2008), on August 6, Russian troops and armored vehicles were already moving towards South Ossetia: “Meanwhile, Russia is gathering serious military forces to the borders of Georgia. Military columns and individual vehicles with personnel, armored vehicles are moving along the Transkam from Alagir towards the border point Nizhniy Zaramag. This observer "NG" observed with his own eyes on the way from Vladikavkaz to Tskhinvali. The military says the exercises are ongoing, but there is no doubt that Russia is demonstrating its resolve to protect its citizens in South Ossetia. Up to and including an operation to enforce peace - if no other way is left.”

On August 7, the Georgian army tried to occupy the Prissky heights around Tskhinvali, this attack was repulsed. On the same day, the American ambassador to Georgia, John Teft, informed Washington that Georgian troops, including units with Grad-type launchers, were moving in the direction of South Ossetia.

On the afternoon of August 7, 2008, the Secretary of the Security Council of South Ossetia, Anatoly Barankevich, stated: Along the entire border with South Ossetia, the activity of Georgian troops is observed. All this suggests that Georgia is launching a large-scale aggression against our republic.". Barankevich also suggested that the Georgian military has plans to storm Tskhinval in the near future.

In an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, an officer of the 135th motorized rifle regiment of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District said: “On August 7, a command came to advance to Tskhinval. They raised us on alarm - and on the march. They arrived, settled down, and already on August 8 it flared up there.” Later, the newspaper clarified that it was about the date of 8 August. Some Russian media also claimed that on August 7, a number of units of the 58th Army began to be sent to South Ossetia, a month later the Georgian side began to declare this, publishing its intelligence information in September 2008. The Georgian side published the recordings of the conversation, which, according to it, belong to the South Ossetian border guards. At the same time, as The New York Times notes, from the phrases (the question “Listen, did the armored vehicles come or how?” and the answer “Armored vehicles and people”), one cannot draw conclusions about the number of armored vehicles or indicate that Russian forces participated at that time in combat operations.

However, Shota Utiashvili, spokesman for the Georgian Interior Ministry, said that under the peacekeeping mission agreements that both sides signed in 2004, the rotation of the Russian peacekeeping battalion could only take place during the daytime and with at least a month's advance notice, but in this case, no notice did not have.

The materials submitted by the Georgian side include the telephone numbers of a Georgian mobile operator, however, according to Kommersant, according to South Ossetia, “recently, all officials and military personnel used exclusively the services of the Russian operator MegaFon.”

Yuri Snegiryov, a correspondent for the Izvestia newspaper, said that military exercises of the 58th Army were held in North Ossetia in June-July, and after they ended, the equipment did not go into the boxes, but remained in front of the entrance to the Roki Tunnel (in Russia). Yuri Snegiryov said: “There was no equipment after the tunnel. This I saw myself. This can be confirmed by my other colleagues who, after the shelling of Tskhinvali on August 2, began to visit South Ossetia every day.

The Kozaev brothers (one of whom is an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Ossetia, the other is a hero of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) during and after the conflict claimed that the President of South Ossetia E. Kokoity knew in advance about the upcoming military events and left Tskhinvali in advance for Java. However, according to Anatoly Barankevich, the President of South Ossetia left for Java only on August 8 at about 2 am.

Different interpretations of the reason for the war

Georgia version

In the early hours of the war, the Georgian government motivated its actions by the fact that "the separatists carried out an attack on the villages adjacent to Tskhinvali", doing this in response to a unilateral ceasefire by Georgia. Massive bombardments of the civilian population and peacekeepers were announced, which took place in the last hours of August 7, 2008, while it was also indicated that “hundreds of armed persons and military equipment crossed the Russian-Georgian border through the Roki tunnel.” In a related statement, published on August 8 at 2 am by the Civil.ge website, there are calls for the Ossetian armed groups to stop hostilities, but there are no calls for Russia.

At 2 am, the Georgian government issued a statement: "During the last hours, the separatists carried out a military attack on the civilian population of the villages of the region and against the peacekeeping forces, which caused an extreme escalation of the situation. In response to the unilateral ceasefire and the proposal of the President of Georgia to hold peace talks, the separatists carried out an attack on the villages adjacent to Tskhinvali. First it was attacked the village of Prisi at 22.30, and then at 23.00 - the village of Tamarasheni. A massive bombardment was carried out, both on the positions of the peacekeeping forces and on the civilian population. As a result of the attack, there were wounded and hundreds of armed persons and military equipment crossed the Georgian border.In order to ensure the safety of the civilian population and prevent armed attacks, the Georgian authorities were forced to take adequate measures.Despite the aggravated situation, the Georgian government reaffirms its readiness for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and calls on the separatists to stop start hostilities and sit down at the negotiating table."

On August 8, Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili called on Russia to intervene in the conflict as a "real peacemaker."

On August 8, Georgian peacekeeper commander Mamuka Kurashvili called Georgia's actions in South Ossetia "an operation to restore constitutional order in the Tskhinvali region." Later, in October 2008, during the investigation into the August events in the Georgian parliament, Kurashvili will say that his statement was impulsive and was not sanctioned by the top political leadership of Georgia. Secretary of the National Security Service of Georgia Lomaia said at the same time that the essence of the statement "was not correct", and Kurashvili himself received a reprimand.

Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili explained that “the goal of the Georgian leadership is not to capture the cities. In Tbilisi, they only want to put an end to the criminal regime so that no one threatens our cities, citizens and infrastructure.” The Georgian side stated that the actions of the Georgian army in South Ossetia were a response to the violation of the ceasefire.

On August 9, the Georgian parliament unanimously approved the decree of President Mikheil Saakashvili declaring martial law and full mobilization for a period of 15 days. In the text of the decree, the introduction of martial law was justified by the need to "prevent destabilization in the region, armed attacks on civilians and facts of violence, in order to protect human rights and freedoms."

On August 22, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili said in an interview with the Ukrainian UNIAN news agency: “…the decision to attack Tskhinvali was taken only when a convoy of Russian military equipment began to enter South Ossetia. The stories that we attacked Tskhinvali from the Grad installations are lies. Russians bombed Tskhinvali after we took it for four and a half hours. We bombed the surrounding heights, using aircraft and Grad as well. I emphasize, not settlements.

On September 5, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze, in an interview with Interfax diplomatic correspondent Ksenia Baigarova, stated that “from August 1 to 7, heavy artillery of the so-called South Ossetian forces led by the Russian military leveled all Georgian villages adjacent to the conflict zone to the ground.” A more complete Georgian version is presented in the application for consideration of the conflict in the Hague Court.

According to the official statements of the Georgian side, the Russian peacekeeping forces that remained on the territory of Georgia after the signing of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan "actually represented the occupying troops, whose main goal was not to resolve the conflict, but to appropriate Georgian territories."

On November 5, 2008, at an official press conference held under the auspices of NATO in Riga, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili presented his own version of the start of the war, according to which this war was Russia's aggression against Georgia, which began from the territory of Ukraine. According to this version, the exit of the ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet "with full armament" from Sevastopol to the coast of Georgia, which occurred at least 6 days before the first shots on the administrative border with South Ossetia, should be considered the beginning of the conflict. According to Saakashvili, Ukrainian President Yushchenko tried to stop the Black Sea Fleet by decree, but Russia ignored him. This version is disputed by Ukrainian and Russian media, pointing out that Yushchenko's decree appeared only on August 13, that is, 5 days after the start of the war, and after Russian President Medvedev officially announced the cessation of the military operation.

Also in November 2008, Saakashvili stated that Russia did not go for the conquest of all of Georgia because it understood the readiness of the Georgian Armed Forces to resist it. “For the first time since World War II, the Georgian army forced Russian generals to flee from the battlefield,” the Georgian president noted. At the same time, he is convinced that 95% of the combat-ready part of the Russian Armed Forces fought against Georgia, “17-19 (Russian) aircraft were shot down. The 58th Russian army was actually burned by the 4th (Georgian) brigade.” In general, Saakashvili is very pleased with the actions of the Georgian Armed Forces. "Georgian army put up exemplary resistance to the monster - the army of a large country," the Georgian president noted. However, according to him, “when the 58th Army was defeated, Russia involved ground and air forces. They fired more than half of their Iskander stock." The Georgian president believes that the decision to launch military operations in South Ossetia was inevitable:

This decision was inevitable due to two main circumstances: 1. we became aware that hundreds of tanks of the Russian army, heavy equipment, artillery installations, and thousands of military personnel were brought to the Georgian-Russian border, near the Roki tunnel, and we began to receive irrefutable, confirmed intelligence data, and you saw them, that they started moving and crossed the state border of Georgia. This fact was later confirmed by the world media, telephone intercepts were published, a lot of material obtained from the Internet, from open sources, and from intelligence sources was studied, although it must be said that information from open sources is as convincing as information from intelligence information, sometimes it can be more convincing. And at that time, the Russian Federation itself could not and did not refute the fact of the invasion of Georgia by military force.

On May 26, 2009, Saakashvili stated that Russian troops were planning to take control not only of Georgia, but of the entire Black Sea-Caspian region, but due to the valor of the Georgian military, this did not happen.

Criticism

The European Union Commission of Inquiry into the Circumstances of the War, in a report published on September 30, 2009, concludes that Georgia started the war, while Russia's actions preceding this were limited to many months of defiant actions.

State Minister of Georgia for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili on August 22 is not confirmed by reports from world news agencies. The first reports of the intervention of the Russian military appeared only around noon on 8 August. It is also worth noting that no one from the Georgian leadership stated on August 8 that the start of the war was a consequence of the entry of Russian troops. On the contrary, statements were made about "restoring constitutional order" and the desire to "put an end to the criminal regime."

According to the German magazine Spiegel, by the morning of August 7, the Georgian side had concentrated about 12 thousand people and seventy-five tanks near Gori on the border with South Ossetia. The magazine wrote that according to Western intelligence services, “the Russian army started firing no earlier than 7:30 am on August 8,” “Russian troops began their march from North Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel no earlier than 11 am. This sequence of events suggests that Moscow did not carry out aggression, but simply acted in response. According to Colonel Wolfgang Richter of the German General Staff, who was in Tbilisi at the time, "Georgians to a certain extent 'lied' about troop movements." Richter said he could not find evidence of Saakashvili's claims that "the Russians advanced into the Roki Tunnel even before Tbilisi gave the order to advance."

On October 12, the French Le Monde, commenting on the claims of the Georgian side that the shelling and attack on Tskhinvali took place after “hundreds of Russian tanks had already passed through the Roki tunnel linking South Ossetia with Russia to start the invasion”, noted: “This point view is problematic because it contradicts all the statements that the Georgian side made during the events.” The newspaper wrote that until August 8, no one spoke publicly about Russian tanks and cited the words of the French ambassador to Georgia, Eric Fournier: “The Georgians did not call their European allies with the words: the Russians are attacking us.”

Member of the European Parliament Julietto Chiesa said that Saakashvili does not make independent decisions, and Georgia, in fact, is a protectorate of the United States. According to him, over the past 3-4 years, an information war has been waged against Russia. J. Chiesa stressed that in the conflict in South Ossetia, Russia is not the attacking side, it was only forced to come to the rescue and repel the blow. He also considers it quite legitimate to recognize the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, since "recognition of the independence of these republics occurred only after the attack by the Georgian side." “All this time, Moscow’s policy has been distinguished by caution and restraint. For a long time Russia did not recognize the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And she did not plan to blow up the situation,” J. Chiesa added. In his opinion, the United States played a significant role in this situation. “Little Georgia is essentially a US protectorate… It's no secret that Georgian officials receive official salaries from the US State Department. It is quite obvious that no one will give money just like that. All this is payment for the services rendered by President Saakashvili and his administration... American advisers in the Georgian army are by no means an improvisation. Taking into account the diverse political issues, we can say with confidence that systematic, purposeful work is being carried out. Both civilian and military. Saakashvili does not make independent decisions. Georgia alone would not have lasted even 10 minutes - without the support of US dollars. The states are making huge investments in the country's economy,” J. Chiesa explained.

The South Ossetian side calls all the allegations of the Georgian side "cynical lies" and accuses high-ranking Georgian officials, including the president, of organizing war crimes. South Ossetian officials hope to see the Georgian leadership in the dock.

On November 10, 2008, the President of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, said: “Today, from the point of view of the information that comes to the Western media, and through them is already brought to the international community, it says that a turning point is already coming in this information confrontation, because that the lies, the dirt that they tried at the very beginning to pour on the Ossetian side, on the Russian side. Today, the West is more and more coming to an understanding of who and how unleashed this aggression, who imposed Nazism... Therefore, if you and I again consolidate all our efforts in order to break through and finally dispel all these Georgian myths about supposedly danger and aggression from South Ossetia and from Russia, the more the people, the international community know the truth, the less mistakes they will make. There will be no such hot spots as South Ossetia…”

So far, no independent source has confirmed Saakashvili's statement that on August 7, Russian troops first crossed the border, and only then Georgia launched an offensive. It is especially strange that during the conflict the Georgian authorities did not mention this at all, and called the goal of their actions "restoration of constitutional order" in South Ossetia. In addition, Georgia claimed to have gone on the offensive in response to the shelling of four Georgian villages the previous evening. However, another independent source - this time The New York Times - cites evidence from independent Western observers who also refute the official Georgian version. Observers from the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe say they have not found any evidence to confirm that these villages actually survived the attack. On the contrary, they accused Georgia of a "completely indiscriminate and disproportionate attack" consisting of heavy shelling of civilian targets with artillery shells and unguided rockets.

The American newspaper The Boston Globe in November 2008 wrote about the reports made by observers under the auspices of the OSCE: “ These observers, who were on the territory of self-proclaimed South Ossetia on the night of August 7-8, report that they saw Georgian artillery and rocket launchers converging on the border of South Ossetia at 3 p.m. on August 7, long before the first Russian convoy entered the enclave. They also testified to the unprovoked shelling of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali that evening. Shells fell on residents hiding in their homes. And the observers did not hear anything that would confirm Saakashvili's statement that the Georgian shelling of Tskhinvali was a response to the shelling of Georgian villages. There is no reason to doubt the competence or integrity of the OSCE monitors. The inevitable conclusion is that Saakashvili started this war and lied about it.».

On December 20, 2008, the British television company BBC cited the opinion of the former Minister of Defense of Georgia Giorgi Karkarashvili: “According to the ex-minister, the assertions of the Georgian military that the Georgian army was conducting only defensive operations in the territory of South Ossetia clearly contradicts, although short-term, but the consolidation of the central group of troops in Tskhinvali. And this at a time when, logically, it should have been focused on the direction of the Roki tunnel, from where, as the Georgian side claimed, the manpower and equipment of the Russian army continued to advance..

The position of the government of South Ossetia

In the South Ossetian interpretation, the war was caused by Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia, which took place on the eve of the Olympic Games. South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity said:

The code name of the blitzkrieg - "Clear Field" - reveals the essence of Georgia's plans - to carry out ethnic cleansing, to turn the whole of South Ossetia into a "clear field". The very first day of the full-scale military aggression undertaken by Georgia against South Ossetia brought enormous losses to our people. Only the peace enforcement operation put an end to the senseless and brutal war that had brought so much suffering to our people. The decision of the President of Russia to conduct an operation to force the aggressor into peace was timely, courageous and the only true one... South Ossetia will never forget or forgive the crimes of Georgian fascism. The Georgian authorities, with their senseless cruelty, dug a bottomless bloody abyss between Georgia and South Ossetia.

On August 8, President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity reported numerous casualties among civilians in South Ossetia and accused Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili of genocide against the Ossetian people. In an interview with Kommersant newspaper, Kokoity acknowledged cases of looting in Georgian villages. He also acknowledged the destruction of the Georgian enclaves, using the expression "We almost leveled everything there," and noted the impossibility of returning Georgians there: "We do not intend to let anyone else go there." Later, however, Kokoity declared that all Georgian refugees from South Ossetia would be able to return to the territory of South Ossetia. However, those who do not have South Ossetian citizenship will have to obtain it and renounce their Georgian citizenship. We are talking about those who did not take any part in the hostilities against South Ossetia, did not participate in the genocide of the Ossetian people. With regard to the residents of some Georgian-populated villages in South Ossetia, which were destroyed during the conflict, the South Ossetian authorities intend to conduct a particularly thorough personal check before allowing them to return, as the South Ossetian prosecutor's office believes that the residents of these villages participated in armed groups and took participation in the genocide of the Ossetian people.

Russia version

The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, President Medvedev, spoke about the beginning of an armed clash with the Georgian army in his interview, timed to coincide with the third anniversary of the start of the conflict:

On the night of the 7th to the 8th, the Minister of Defense called me (I was just moving along the Volga, I was on vacation, and in general the whole planet was in anticipation of the Olympics, which was in China) and said that our Georgian neighbor had begun active fighting. To be honest, I am absolutely, extremely frankly, at first I was very doubtful and I say: “You know, we need to check whether he is completely crazy, crazy, or what? Maybe it's just some kind of provocation, he tests the strength of the Ossetians and tries to show us something? An hour passes, he says: “No, they have already hit from all the guns, they use the Grad. I say: "OK, I'm waiting for new information." Some time passes, he says: “You know, I want to report to you, they just destroyed the tent with our peacekeepers, put everyone to death. What should I do?" I said, "Return fire to kill." There were no figures at this time.

On August 9, Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces I. Konashenkov stated that the units and subunits of the 58th Army, having arrived on the outskirts of Tskhinvali, “began preparing an operation to enforce peace in the zone of responsibility of the peacekeepers.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the reasons for the entry of Russian troops into the conflict zone were Georgia's aggression against the territories of South Ossetia not controlled by it and the consequences of this aggression: a humanitarian catastrophe, the exodus of 30 thousand refugees from the region, the death of Russian peacekeepers and many residents of South Ossetia. Lavrov qualified the actions of the Georgian army against civilians as genocide. He noted that the majority of the population of South Ossetia are citizens of Russia, and that "no country in the world would remain indifferent to the murder of its citizens and the expulsion of them from their homes." Lavrov said that Russia "did not prepare this conflict" and came up with a proposal to adopt a UN Security Council resolution calling on Georgia and South Ossetia to renounce the use of force. According to Lavrov, "Russia's military response to Georgia's attack on Russian citizens and soldiers of the peacekeeping contingent was fully proportionate." The need to bombard military infrastructure outside the conflict zone, Lavrov explained by the fact that it was used to support the Georgian offensive. Lavrov called accusations that Russia, hiding behind the South Ossetian conflict, tried to overthrow the government of Georgia and establish control over the country, "utter nonsense." He noted that as soon as security in the region was restored, the President of Russia announced the end of the military operation.

On August 11, Deputy Director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry Boris Malakhov denied the version that Russia's goal is to overthrow the regime of M. Saakashvili.

On August 15, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that "Mr. Saakashvili was tired of all this diplomacy, and he simply decided to cut out the Ossetians who were interfering with him."

According to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation A. A. Nogovitsyn, the Georgian operation "Clear Field" against South Ossetia was developed by Georgia together with the United States.

Criticism

According to The Wall Street Journal, the prevailing view in the West is that the Russian reaction to the actions of Saakashvili, who initiated the war, is disproportionate. The Commission of Independent Military Experts, established under the leadership of the European Union for the international study of the causes of the conflict, in its report explains that the initial Russian response to the attack of Georgian troops on Tskhinval was justified by the goals of protection, however, in the opinion of the commission, the subsequent actions of the Russian troops were excessive.

There is a version about the unofficial entry of Russian troops into South Ossetia on the eve of the war, which, according to Tbilisi, provoked retaliatory actions by Georgian troops.

In the first days of the conflict, as an argument about a "humanitarian catastrophe" and "genocide of the Ossetian people", the versions about the number of dead residents of South Ossetia, more than a thousand people, voiced by the South Ossetian side, were called.

Some are of the opinion that Russia's point of view on Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia also contradicts the UN Charter, since the independence of South Ossetia as of August 8, 2008 was not recognized by any UN member state in the world (unlike the independence and territorial integrity of Georgia).

Abkhaz version

On August 22, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Abkhazia, Anatoly Zaitsev, stated that the Georgian army, after the complete capture of South Ossetia, planned to launch an offensive military operation against Abkhazia in 3 hours. According to him, Georgia’s plans were as follows: “a powerful air strike was delivered, the first echelon of troops was landed from the sea in the amount of 800 people on high-speed boats, then another 800 people were to land in the city of Sukhumi, and 6 thousand people were to strike with artillery and rocket systems, with a firing range of 45 km, against our mountain rifle battalions in the Kodori Gorge and checkpoints of the Russian peacekeeping forces. (...) The Georgians assumed that our units and checkpoints of the "blue helmets" would be demolished by heavy fire in this narrow gorge, and after that the Georgian group began to advance in the direction of the city of Sukhumi.

The course of hostilities

8 August

On the night of August 8 (about 00.15 Moscow time), Georgian troops bombarded Tskhinvali from Grad rocket launchers, and at about 03.30 Moscow time they began to storm the city using tanks.

A few minutes before the start of the operation of the Georgian forces, the commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), General Murat Kulakhmetov, was informed by telephone from Tbilisi about the cancellation of the truce. At an urgently convened briefing in Tskhinval, Kulakhmetov told reporters that " the Georgian side actually declared war on South Ossetia».

The places of deployment of Russian peacekeepers were also attacked. More than ten Russian servicemen were killed, several dozen were wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Timerman, who led the defense of the Russian peacekeeping battalion, was subsequently awarded the title of Hero of Russia.

At 00.30 Moscow time on August 8, the commander of operations of the armed forces of Georgia, General Mamuka Kurashvili, announced on the Rustavi-2 TV channel that, due to the refusal of the Ossetian side to dialogue to stabilize the situation in the conflict zone, the Georgian side " decided to restore constitutional order in the conflict zone". Mamuka Kurashvili urged the Russian peacekeepers stationed in the conflict zone not to interfere in the situation.

By morning, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia disseminated information that “ the villages of Mugut, Didmukha and Dmenisi, as well as the outskirts of the city of Tskhinvali, were taken under the control of government forces».

On the morning of August 8, Russian aviation began bombing targets in Georgia. According to the Russian military, " the planes covered only military facilities: the military base in Gori, the airfields of Vaziani and Marneuli, where Su-25 and L-39 aircraft are based, as well as a radar station 40 kilometers from Tbilisi».

August 9

The transfer of troops from Russian territory to South Ossetia and the creation of a strike force continued. In the morning, I. Konashenkov, Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, said that units and subunits of the 58th Army, having arrived on the outskirts of Tskhinvali, “ began preparations for an operation to enforce peace in the zone of responsibility of the peacekeepers».

It was reported about the transfer of a unit of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division to Tskhinvali with standard military equipment and weapons; units of the 98th Ivanovo Airborne Division and a special forces regiment of the Airborne Forces from Moscow were also expected.

In the afternoon there was an unsuccessful attempt to release the Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali by the forces of the battalion group of the 135th motorized rifle regiment. The group entered the city and met with the Georgian troops, who launched a new assault on Tskhinvali. After the battle, having suffered losses in people and equipment, the group withdrew from the city. In this battle, several correspondents of the Russian media and the commander of the 58th Army, Lieutenant General Khrulev, were wounded. Having received no reinforcements, the Russian peacekeepers were forced to retreat from the Southern Camp.

During the day, the exchange of artillery fire and Russian air strikes on the territory of Georgia continued.

Russian ships entered the territorial waters of Georgia and began combat patrols. At that time, in Abkhazia, an amphibious landing began in the Ochamchira region and the transfer of airborne units to the Sukhumi airfield.

August 10

There was a Russian-Georgian naval clash;

11th August

According to an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of South Ossetia, a Georgian Su-25 was shot down, attacking the positions of the 58th army. Earlier in the day, a Russian military spokesman said that the Russian Air Force had firmly gained dominance in the skies and Georgian military aircraft were not flying. Russian peacekeepers occupied the Georgian village of Khurcha in the Zugdidi region. Russian troops approached the city of Senaki and retreated after they eliminated the possibility of shelling from a military base.

truce

A number of media disseminated information that the purpose of the Russian military operation was the capture of Tbilisi and the overthrow of the Georgian leadership; political pressure from the United States and its allies, as well as the unpreparedness of the military for such an operation, thwarted such a scenario. For example, according to information published on November 13, 2008 by the French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur, Putin allegedly threatened during a meeting on August 12 with French President N. Sarkozy "to hang Saakashvili by the balls"; Moreover, Sarkozy allegedly had data intercepted by the French special services, indicating that a significant part of the Russian army intends to go all the way and overthrow Saakashvili (at the same time, Medvedev announced the termination of the military operation before meeting with Sarkozy).

However, all this information is refuted by official representatives of Russia. Putin's press service called the article in Le Nouvel Observateur "an insinuation of a provocative nature." Answering the question “why, after all, the Russian military did not reach Tbilisi,” Russia’s permanent representative to NATO D.O. Rogozin stated on August 22, 2008 that the Russian leadership had no goal of reaching Tbilisi, since Russia’s only goal was “ save the Ossetians from physical destruction.” The French side did not refute the article in Le Nouvel Observateur.

12th of August

On August 12, at a working meeting in the Kremlin with Minister of Defense A.E. Serdyukov and Chief of the General Staff N.E. Makarov, President of Russia D.A. Medvedev said that “on the basis of the report, he decided to complete the operation to force Georgia to peace”: “ The security of our peacekeeping forces and the civilian population has been restored. The aggressor was punished and suffered significant losses. His military forces are disorganized. In the event of pockets of resistance and other aggressive offensives, make decisions on destruction.

After that, during the visit to Moscow of the EU President, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, during a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, six principles for a peaceful settlement were agreed (Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan):

1. Refusal to use force.
2. The final cessation of all hostilities.
3. Free access to humanitarian aid.
4. The return of the Georgian Armed Forces to their places of permanent deployment.
5. The withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the line preceding the start of hostilities.
6. The beginning of an international discussion on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure their lasting security.

After that, President N. Sarkozy visited Tbilisi, where he met with Georgian President M. Saakashvili.

On August 12, Chechen President R. A. Kadyrov announced his readiness to send 10,000 people to support Russian peacekeepers. Kadyrov called the actions of the Georgian authorities a crime, noting that the Georgian side committed murders of civilians.

August 13

Georgia stated that Russian troops in armored vehicles entered the city of Gori.

According to an France-Presse correspondent, a convoy of Russian military equipment left the Georgian city of Gori and headed towards Tbilisi. A dozen and a half tanks, which CNN showed the day before, claiming that they were going to Tbilisi, were discovered by the Russian military near Gori and taken out of the region in order to ensure the safety of the civilian population, as Russian Foreign Minister S. V. Lavrov said.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. A. Nogovitsyn: "There are no Russian tanks in Gori, and could not be." The General Staff of the Russian Federation: “There were not tanks near Gori, but armored personnel carriers.”

Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov confirmed the presence of the Russian army near the Georgian cities of Gori and Senaki, but denied the information about their presence in Poti.

The representative of the peacekeeping forces categorically denied the allegations of the Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, Alexander Lomai, about the Russian military bombardment of the Georgian city of Gori and the introduction of Cossacks there.

Radio Ekho Moskvy claimed that the Vostok battalion of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the Russian Defense Ministry was present in the area of ​​the Georgian city of Gori.

On August 13, Georgia adopted a plan to resolve the conflict, but with reservations. Thus, at the request of the Georgian President, the clause on the beginning of discussions on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was removed. French President N. Sarkozy confirmed M. Saakashvili's statement, adding that the item on the beginning of the discussion of the future status of the two unrecognized republics was removed with the consent of Russian President D. A. Medvedev. This paragraph was reformulated, as it allowed for ambiguous interpretation. After the changes were made, Saakashvili announced that he was signing the settlement plan and accepting the terms of the ceasefire in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

According to N. Sarkozy, “a six-point text cannot answer all questions. It doesn't completely solve the problem."

August 14

There was an attack by unknown persons on UN employees in Gori, Ekho Moskvy reported with reference to France Presse.

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, at 2 p.m. Russian troops completely occupied the territory of the city of Gori. The Russian side denied this. The head of the Information and Analytical Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia said that Russian troops were mining Gori and Poti.

Russian troops handed over control of Gori to Georgian police. Major-General Alexander Borisov officially confirmed that Georgian policemen can safely enter Gori for joint patrols. Together with the Georgian policemen, several groups of journalists entered Gori. Cars were taken away from some of them (journalists blamed the Ossetian militias for this). Georgian special forces were spotted in the vicinity of Gori. The situation in the city and its environs escalated again. Shelling and constant looting continued.

The Russian military must leave the city in two or three days, which will be needed to repair armored vehicles.

August 15

"The peacekeeping group in South Ossetia will be increased, it will be given armored vehicles," Lieutenant General Nikolai Uvarov, spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry, told RIA Novosti on August 15.

“We will certainly learn from the events in South Ossetia. The grouping of peacekeepers, which will remain here on a permanent basis, will be increased. The peacekeepers will be armed not only with small arms, but also with heavy military equipment, including tanks,” said a spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry.

The Georgian police, to whom General Vyacheslav Borisov handed over control of the city of Gori the day before, were again withdrawn from there by his order and located a kilometer away.

August 16

On August 16, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the plan for a peaceful settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Prior to this, the document was signed by the leaders of the unrecognized states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as Georgian President M. Saakashvili. The signing of this document by the parties to the conflict finally marked the end of hostilities.

Terrorist attacks, shelling and assassination attempts after the signing of a truce

• On October 3, 2008, a Georgian car brought for inspection was blown up near the headquarters of the peacekeeping forces in Tskhinvali. Seven Russian servicemen were killed, including the head of the Joint Staff of Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia, Ivan Petrik. The power of the explosive device is estimated at 20 kg of TNT.
• On October 3, an attempt was made on the head of the administration Anatoly Margiyev in the Leningorsky district.
• On October 5, in Tskhinvali, an employee of a Russian construction company, which is restoring South Ossetia, was killed as a result of shelling from the Georgian side. The shelling was carried out by people in the form of Georgian special forces.
• On October 6, an explosive device was detonated in front of the lead vehicle of the convoy of Russian peacekeepers being withdrawn from the territory of Georgia to the north-east of Zugdidi.
• In November 2008, the situation in the conflict zone remained tense. There were reports of explosions and shelling with casualties in the area of ​​the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Similar information came from the Georgian-Abkhazian border.

Losses of the parties and casualties of the war

Military losses and civilian casualties

South Ossetia: Official data

Official data

By the evening of August 8, preliminary data on the victims appeared: as the president of the unrecognized republic, Eduard Kokoity, stated in an interview with the Interfax news agency, more than 1,400 people became victims of the attack by Georgian troops on South Ossetia. On the morning of August 9, the official representative of the South Ossetian government, Irina Gagloeva, reported 1,600 dead. On the evening of August 9, Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko stated that at least 2,000 residents of Tskhinvali (about 3% of the population of South Ossetia) had died.

On August 11, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Boris Malakhov said that, according to updated data, approximately 1,600 civilians were killed in the conflict zone.

Data on a limited number of wounded were confirmed by the Ministry of Emergency Situations. On August 12, the information department of the Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that 178 people who had suffered from the military actions of Georgia in South Ossetia, including 13 children, were in medical institutions in North Ossetia. According to the head of the Federal Medical and Biological Agency Vladimir Uiba, among children " no seriously injured", there are " tangential wounds, as well as shrapnel wounds, but somatic diseases and psychological trauma predominate».

On August 16, South Ossetian Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev said that the final death toll is still unclear, but it is already clear that more than 2,100 people have died.

The final official data was reported on 20 August; according to Irina Gagloeva, in total, during the conflict, South Ossetia lost 1,492 people dead.

At the same time, the Prosecutor's Office of South Ossetia reported on August 20 that “as a result of the armed aggression of the Georgian army”, the death of 69 residents of South Ossetia, including three children, was “established and documented”. According to prosecutors, this list will grow, as it does not include those who died in rural areas.

On August 20, Boris Salmaksov, deputy head of the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation (SKP), said that it was not yet possible to accurately determine the number of deaths in Tskhinvali as a result of Georgia's aggression. According to B. Salmaksov, it will be possible to determine the number of dead "only when all the refugees who, except for Vladikavkaz, are in various regions of the Southern Federal District, have been interrogated and have left the country and gone abroad." B. Salmaksov said that the UPC has data on 133 dead. He stressed that many graves left in South Ossetia after the Georgian attack had not been opened.

On August 22, Vice-Speaker of the Parliament of South Ossetia Torzan Kokoiti stated that the number of people killed in South Ossetia as a result of Georgia's aggression, according to preliminary data from the South Ossetian Ministry of Internal Affairs, amounted to 2,100 people.

On August 28, Prosecutor General of South Ossetia Teimuraz Khugaev stated: “ As of August 28, we have data on 1692 people - dead and 1500 wounded as a result of Georgian aggression».

On September 5, the head of the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation (SKP), Alexander Bastrykin, said that the committee's investigators had documented the deaths of 134 civilians.

On September 17, Taimuraz Khugaev, Prosecutor General of South Ossetia, spoke in an interview about 1,694 who died in the war, including 32 servicemen and employees of the Republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs.

On July 3, 2009, the head of the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation (SKP), AI Bastrykin, stated that 162 civilians became victims of the genocide and 255 were injured. However, according to him, this is not the final data.

Other data

Representatives of the international human rights organization Human Rights Watch in Vladikavkaz questioned the statements of the Ossetian authorities about the death toll. According to Tatyana Lokshina, a representative of the organization, the data on the huge number of those killed are not confirmed by the recorded number of wounded. Lokshina notes that " From the morning of August 9 to the evening of August 10 [the hospital] received a total of 52 wounded. At the same time, 90% of these wounded are military personnel, 10% are civilians. We are not trying to claim that these statistics are representative, but the hospital management reports that the wounded pass through them.". According to her, the official data on the number of those killed are not confirmed by the testimony of refugees from Tskhinvali who arrived in North Ossetia after the end of the fighting in this city. As an employee of the organization told Ekho Moskvy radio station, as of August 14, less than 50 dead and 273 wounded were registered in the central hospital of Tskhinvali (most of the wounded were military). Human Rights Watch emphasized that these figures do not include the number of deaths in various villages near Tskhinvali. However, a representative of the organization on August 14 in an interview with REGNUM said: “But we also talked with residents who buried the dead in yards, gardens ... Taking this into account, the numbers given to us by doctors - 273 wounded and 44 killed - are not exhaustive". Also, in this regard, it should be noted that the only hospital in Tskhinvali was destroyed on August 8 by Georgian troops. The heavy fire of the Georgian troops on the hospital severely limited the ability to bring the wounded there.

According to Human Rights Watch, a significant part of the South Ossetian dead were armed militias, who cannot be counted as civilian casualties.

However, according to Alexander Brod, a human rights activist and director of the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch significantly underestimates the death toll. According to him, some foreign organizations are silent about the victims and destruction in South Ossetia: “ Either this is silence, or as Human Rice Watch clearly underestimates the number of deaths (they say that 44 people died). In Tskhinvali, we were shown a whole street where the rubble had not yet been dismantled, under which the bodies of civilians who were sleeping, having calmed down with Saakashvili's promises not to start hostilities».

A journalist from the Ukrainian news agency "Internet newspaper of Donbass" expressed the opinion that allegedly some of the photographs presented at the photo exhibition "South Ossetia: a chronicle of the genocide" were taken in the Georgian city of Gori.

On August 29, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammarberg also suggested that Human Rights Watch's figures were understated: “I don’t want to politicize the discussion around the victims of the conflict, but in any case, the death toll seems to be higher than the number of well-established victims, which was cited by some organizations, such as Human Rights Watch”. Hammarberg noted: "many reports say that people were burying the dead in their homes, in their cities due to problems with decomposing bodies".

On September 4, the “Public Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes in South Ossetia and Assistance to the Affected Civilian Population” published a list of 310 dead, indicating their full names, age, cause of death and place of burial. As of September 26, the death toll had risen to 364. This list is not final and is updated as accurate information is established about persons whose fate is not established reliably, or there is hope that people are alive. On October 28, this list was 365 people.

At the same time, the “Public Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes in South Ossetia and Assistance to the Affected Civilian Population” turned out to be inaccessible to HRW and Memorial employees who tried to get in touch with them to clarify the details.

The Regnum Agency also published a list of those who died during the hostilities by name. Referring to the information of its own verification, the agency questioned 8 items on this list. 5 people from the list, according to the agency, died before the August events. For 3 more people, the agency was embarrassed by the absence of their names in the list of the dead for this locality (Khetagurovo). As of September 4, 2008, the list of the Regnum agency contained 311 names of the dead.

However, the list of deaths by name remains the only way to calculate the true number of deaths, based on verifiable data. On this occasion, A. Cherkasov, a member of the HRC Memorial, said: “It is possible to draw up lists of names, and only lists of names can give us this figure.”

On November 10, the American magazine Business Week reported that Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimated that between 300 and 400 South Ossetian civilians had died as a result of the Georgian attack. Business Week also reported that HRW “denied claims, widely circulated in the Western media and the Internet during the conflict, that she initially counted only 44 dead in South Ossetia”.

Official Russian data

According to preliminary information from A. A. Nogovitsyn, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, as of August 13, the losses of Russian servicemen totaled 74 dead, 19 missing, and 171 wounded.

On August 12, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that conscripts do not participate in hostilities in South Ossetia, only contract soldiers perform combat missions. A representative of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces said that a small number of conscripts took part in the hostilities.

New data were made public on September 3 by the chief military prosecutor of the Russian Federation, S. N. Fridinsky; according to them, the loss of Russian servicemen amounted to 71 dead and 340 wounded. In the list of dead Russian military of the Russian agency Regnum, there is one more surname than in official figures.

As of mid-2009, official information about the losses of the Russian armed forces during the conflict remains contradictory. In February, Deputy Defense Minister General of the Army Nikolai Pankov said that 64 servicemen were killed (according to the list of surnames), 3 were missing and 283 were injured. However, in August, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin reported 48 dead and 162 wounded. The reasons for this discrepancy in numbers are unknown.

Other data

According to Georgia, Russia significantly underestimated its losses. So on August 12, Georgian President Saakashvili said that the Georgian Armed Forces had killed 400 Russian soldiers.

The Georgian news agency Medianews disseminated information about losses among Russian military personnel and equipment, many times higher than the loss data announced by both the Russian side and Georgian officials: “As a result of the fighting in the Tskhinvali region, the Russian 58th Army lost 1,789 soldiers, 105 tanks, 81 combat vehicles, 45 armored personnel carriers, 10 Grad devices and 5 Smerch devices”. On August 12, the Georgian website Nasha Abkhazia, citing unnamed Russian sources, pointed to a large number of people killed in Tskhinvali, from which some unnamed commentators of the newspaper concluded that this indicates “about the huge losses of the Russian army, etc. "volunteers". The edition for this article used a catchy title: “There are so many corpses of Russian soldiers in Georgia that they are not being taken to Russia”.

Georgia official data

On August 10, a source in the Georgian government reported that at this point, 130 citizens of the country had died since the beginning of the conflict, and another 1,165 were injured. This number includes both the military and civilians who died on the territory of Georgia as a result of Russian air raids.

On August 13, after the end of hostilities, Georgian Health Minister Sandro Kvitashvili said that 175 citizens of the country had died during the conflict, these data are not final.

• Ministry of Defense - 133 dead, 70 missing, 1,199 wounded
• Ministry of the Interior - 13 dead, 209 injured
• Civilian population - 69 dead, 61 injured

In total, 215 people were killed, 70 were missing and 1,469 citizens of the country were injured.

On September 15, the casualty figures were updated: 154 Defense Ministry servicemen, 14 Interior Ministry personnel, and 188 civilians were reported dead; in addition, the bodies of 14 dead servicemen were not found. Taking into account the new data, Georgia's losses amount to 356 people who died.

• List of killed civilians in Georgian. Russian-language blogs contain amateur translations from Georgian into Russian, the list contains the first name, last name, and locality. In total, there are 228 people on the list, opposite 62 names there is a sign “information is being verified”.
• List of military and police dead: official list of names published on September 25 in English.

The list will be updated as new information becomes available. There are 169 people on this list in total.

• Thus, the total number of those killed according to the official lists of the dead is 397, while 62 deaths are not officially confirmed. Data on some of those killed cannot be verified due to the lack of opportunity for Georgian officials to work in the territory controlled by the de facto authorities of South Ossetia and the Russian military.

Other data

Journalists from the Russian newspaper Kommersant, who were in Tbilisi on August 11, quoted an unnamed Georgian army officer as saying that his unit had delivered almost 200 killed Georgian soldiers and officers from South Ossetia to the hospital in Gori alone.

Some Russian sources accused Georgia of significantly underestimating the losses suffered. Some of the Russian information portals published expert opinions about the huge losses among the Georgian military. According to the assumptions of Russian military experts, expressed in the news program "Vesti" on the TV channel "Russia" on August 15, the losses of the Georgian army could amount to 1.5-2 thousand people killed and up to 4 thousand wounded. On September 15, an unnamed Russian intelligence source said that Georgia had lost about 3,000 security personnel during the war. The media also reported that the Georgian armed forces are not taking any action to remove the corpses of the dead Georgian soldiers from the Tskhinvali region, and that some of the dead Georgian soldiers were buried without identification in mass graves. This circumstance also prompted speculation in some media that the Georgian side is somewhat underestimating its military losses. It should be noted that unconfirmed by data from independent sources, these reports remain only assumptions.

Victims among journalists

• Alexander Klimchuk (collaborated with ITAR-TASS, Russian Newsweek) and Grigol Chikhladze were killed by Ossetian militia fire.
• Teimuraz Kiguradze and Winston Featherly (a US citizen) were injured in the same incident.
• Special correspondent of "Komsomolskaya Pravda" Alexander Kots was wounded by Georgian troops.

• Pyotr Gassiev, producer of the NTV television company, was wounded.
• War correspondent of the Vesti TV channel Alexander Sladkov, cameraman Leonid Losev and video engineer Igor Uklein were wounded.

• Two Turkish journalists were wounded.

• In the morning on the main square of Gori, in front of the city administration building, a Dutch journalist - documentary cameraman, 39-year-old Stan Storimans (TV channel RTL-2) was killed and his colleague Jeroen Akkermans was wounded. According to the human rights organization Human Rights Watch and the Dutch Foreign Ministry, this happened as a result of Russian aerial bombardment with RBC-250 cluster bombs.
• At the same time, Zadok Yehezkeli, a correspondent for the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot, was seriously wounded.

• Georgian television correspondent Tamara Urushadze was slightly injured on live television. Presumably, she was wounded by a sniper.

Refugees

On August 15, the official representative of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Ron Redmond, said that more than 118 thousand people became refugees as a result of the conflict, including about 30 thousand South Ossetian refugees are in Russia, about 15 thousand more people (ethnic Georgians ) moved from South Ossetia to Georgia and another 73,000 people fled their homes in Georgia, including most of the residents of Gori.

The Guardian of 1 September 2008 reported what they claimed was eyewitness accounts of the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population on 12 August 2008 in the village of Karaleti and neighboring villages north of Gori.

Russian media and officials (including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin) have repeatedly claimed ethnic cleansing of the Ossetian population. The phrase "genocide" is predominantly used.

Russian citizens held by Georgia

According to information agencies (RIA Novosti, Interfax, Vesti.ru), according to eyewitnesses, tourists - Russian citizens who were vacationing in Georgia, were detained by the Georgian authorities, who do not allow them to leave the country. The Georgian police detain them at checkpoints at the exit from settlements. Many Russian citizens are in Georgia with young children. The exit of Russian citizens to Armenia, Turkey and Tbilisi is also blocked. The Russian Foreign Ministry said on August 10 that Georgia's detention of Russian citizens "will become a subject of discussion in international organizations."

On August 11, the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a note to Georgia that as of August 10, at least 356 Russian citizens (out of those who applied to the embassy in Tbilisi) cannot leave the territory of Georgia. “We demand that the Georgian authorities stop violating international norms. All responsibility for the consequences of such a situation lies with the Georgian side.”

According to Novye Izvestia, the Russian Embassy in Georgia did not organize the evacuation. The press service of the EMERCOM of Russia reported that they had not received instructions from the Foreign Ministry to organize a centralized evacuation. Information about the detention of Russian citizens was refuted by Deputy Foreign Minister of Georgia Grigol Vashadze and head of the press center of the Georgian border police Lela Mchedlidze. They argued that “Russians who left Georgia and flew in from Yerevan had no obstacles when leaving Georgia.”

Russian citizens held by South Ossetia

According to the Kommersant newspaper on September 1, 2008, two residents of North Ossetia, Vadim and Vladislav Kozaev, who left for Tskhinvali on August 9, 2008 to take their mother to Russia, on their way to Tskhinvali, in Dzhava, unexpectedly ran into South Ossetian President E. Kokoity, whom they personally knew. The brothers accused Kokoity of having "knowing in advance about the upcoming military events, left Tskhinval without taking care of the evacuation of civilians, the elderly, women, children." Kokoity's guards beat and detained the brothers; they were charged with "splitting Ossetian society." At a press conference, Kokoity said that Russian citizens were not going to be released. On September 10, 2008, the Kozaev brothers, having been imprisoned for exactly a month, crossed the Roki Tunnel and ended up on Russian territory.

Destruction and loss in technology

According to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, 10 South Ossetian border settlements "are completely wiped off the face of the earth."

The Human Rights Center "Memorial" reported that the Georgian villages of South Ossetia Kekhvi, Kurta, Achabeti, Tamarasheni, Eredvi, Vanati, Avnevi were almost completely burned. The destruction of Georgian villages was confirmed in an interview with Kommersant newspaper by Eduard Kokoity.

On August 17, Deputy Minister of Regional Development of the Russian Federation Vladimir Blank said that out of more than 7,000 buildings in Tskhinval, every tenth building was beyond repair, and 20% were damaged to varying degrees. This damage estimate is much lower than those given earlier. In the early days of the conflict, information appeared in the media that by August 9, the city of Tskhinvali had been almost completely destroyed; according to Irina Gagloeva, the official representative of the government of South Ossetia, about 70% of residential buildings in the city were destroyed. Subsequently, Minister of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu specified that more than 2,500 residential buildings had been destroyed, of which 1,100 could not be restored.

According to Alexander Brod, "the Jewish quarter of Tskhinval, destroyed during the Georgian aggression, made a depressing impression on international representatives." However, Andrei Illarionov, who, according to him, visited the ruins of the Jewish quarter in October 2008, said that this part of the city impressed him as a long abandoned place. According to Illarionov's observations, bushes and trees up to several meters high grow right in the middle of the ruins. The quarter was indeed destroyed back in 1991-1992 by rocket and artillery strikes of the Georgian troops and military operations and was abandoned by the residents.

On August 22, Vice Speaker of the South Ossetian Parliament Tarzan Kokoity stated that the entire territory of South Ossetia, with the exception of the Leningor region, which Georgia considered its own, was shelled from heavy guns and multiple launch rocket systems. “In Tskhinvali itself, the Electrovibromashina, Emalprovod, mechanical, and underwear knitwear factories were destroyed. Today it makes no sense to talk about the fact that the republic has its own industry,” T. Kokoity said.

During the hostilities, the buildings and barracks of the Russian peacekeeping forces in the so-called Southern (Upper) Gorodok, located on the southern outskirts of Tskhinval, were partially destroyed and damaged.

Numerous cases of arson and looting were noted in the villages of Georgia bordering on South Ossetia by South Ossetian formations.

The Georgian authorities accused the Russian armed forces of vandalism, including damage to unique historical monuments, and ecocide, namely, setting fire to forests in the Borjomi National Park during a military operation in the country.

It was reported about the destruction of the railway bridge in the Cape region of Georgia.

Losses in Georgian technology

Georgian aviation losses

In total, information was received from the South Ossetian and Russian sides at different times about four downed Georgian aircraft and one helicopter. The Georgian side stated that it had no losses in the air, but admitted the destruction of three An-2s at the Marneuli airfield as a result of Russian air strikes on August 8. In addition, three helicopters (one Mi-14 and two Mi-24) were destroyed by Russian troops at the occupied Senaki airfield.

The Georgian magazine Arsenal reported that one Georgian helicopter (most likely a Mi-24) crashed during the fighting. Perhaps we are talking about a helicopter shot down on August 9 from a ZU-23-2 installation.

Losses in armored vehicles of Georgia

On the first day of the war, South Ossetian representatives reported that by a certain point, 3 Georgian tanks had been knocked out in Tskhinval, and one T-72 was personally knocked out by the former Minister of Defense of the unrecognized republic, Anatoly Barankevich.

By the end of the first day of hostilities, a source in the Russian power structures reported that Russian troops had destroyed a large number of Georgian armored vehicles. During the evening assault on Tskhinval on August 9, according to the South Ossetian side, 12 Georgian tanks were knocked out.

On the Internet there are photographs of 9 Georgian tanks destroyed in Tskhinval and its environs (all T-72s), as well as photographs of about 20 tanks abandoned by Georgian servicemen and blown up by advancing soldiers of the 42nd motorized rifle division.

Losses of the Georgian fleet

Russian ships sunk two Georgian boats that tried to attack them. As stated, these are boats of projects 205 and 1400M "Vulture".

According to Kommersant-Vlast magazine, the Georgian fleet was destroyed "almost completely": two boats were lost in naval battles, several more (up to 10) were destroyed from the air and flooded by Russian paratroopers at the piers in Poti.

Trophy equipment

On August 19, Anatoly Nogovitsyn, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, announced that part of the weapons and military equipment left by the Georgian army in the fighting in South Ossetia would be transferred to the Russian army, while the other part would be destroyed. According to Rosbalt, Russian peacekeepers and units captured more than 100 armored vehicles in the conflict zone, including 65 tanks. On August 19, US White House Press Secretary Gordon Johndroe urged Russia to return US military equipment seized during the conflict, if any. On August 22, Anatoly Nogovitsyn, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, stated that the request of the US authorities to return the American equipment confiscated from the Georgian military was incorrect.

Losses in Russian technology

Russian aviation losses

Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia Alexander Lomaia and Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili announced on August 8 that 4 Russian aircraft had been shot down in the conflict zone; searches are underway for the wreckage and the ejected pilot, however, this information was called "nonsense" by the Russian Foreign Ministry. In the future, the number of declared downed aircraft was constantly growing; by the end of the conflict, the Georgian side reported 21 downed aircraft and 3 helicopters.

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation officially recognized the loss of four of its aircraft - three Su-25 attack aircraft and one Tu-22M3 bomber (or reconnaissance aircraft). In addition, it is known that after the end of hostilities, on the night of August 16-17, as a result of an accident during landing, a Mi-8 helicopter of the border service of the FSB of the Russian Federation burned down.

Some experts expressed the opinion that the real losses of the Russian Air Force are somewhat higher than those recognized. So, the head of the Center for Military Forecasting, Anatoly Tsyganok, immediately after the end of hostilities, estimated the losses of Russian aviation at seven aircraft (six Su-25s and one Tu-22M). According to another expert, Said Aminov, the loss of Russian aviation amounted to seven aircraft (four Su-25s, two Su-24s and one Tu-22M) and possibly one helicopter (Mi-24). In July 2009, an article was published in the Moscow Defense Brief magazine, which refers to the downing of six Russian Air Force aircraft and gives the circumstances of the loss of each of them; the author of the article, Anton Lavrov, also claims that three of the six downed aircraft could have been hit by “friendly fire”. On August 4, 2010, a report by independent experts was published - which says about 6 downed aircraft: three Su-25s, two Su-24s and one Tu-22M3.

Losses in Russian armored vehicles

Alexander Lomaya said on August 9 that 10 units of Russian armored vehicles had been knocked out by Georgian forces in South Ossetia. At the end of the day, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Eka Zguladze, announced the destruction of 40 Russian tanks on the outskirts of Tskhinvali.

Detailed information is available about the loss of only 3 Russian tanks - T-72B (M) (141st separate tank battalion of 19th motorized rifle division), T-62M ((presumably No. 232u) of the 70th motorized rifle regiment of 42nd motorized rifle division) and T-72 (No. 321 of the 1st company of the tank battalion of the 693rd motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division). For the rest of the allegedly knocked out Russian tanks, the only evidence is the verbal assurances of the Georgian military and politicians about generalized losses.

According to Gazeta.ru correspondent Ilya Azar, who visited Tskhinval, Russian peacekeeping troops lost a large number of infantry fighting vehicles at the beginning of hostilities. However, neither the total number of lost infantry fighting vehicles nor their type is specified. On August 4, 2010, a report by independent experts was published - which refers to the following losses: three tanks - T-72B (M), T-72B and T-62M, nine BMP-1s, three BMP-2s, two BTR-80s, one BMD -2, three BRDM-2 and one MT-LB destroyed by enemy fire. Of the destroyed vehicles, these are: 20 units on the territory of the Russian peacekeeping battalion, ten more GAZ-66 trucks, which were part of the mortar batteries of the 135th and 693rd motorized rifle regiments, and two cargo Urals.

There were no statements on the total number of lost armored vehicles by Russian officials.

Legal assessments of the actions of the parties

In statements by Russian officials, the invasion of Georgian troops into South Ossetia has been repeatedly called aggression. From the point of view of international law, aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, while by the time the war began, the independence of South Ossetia was not recognized by any state in the world. At the same time, Russia's entry into the war may formally fall under the definition of aggression, since such an invasion "cannot be justified by any considerations of any nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise." However, according to the report of the European Commission of Inquiry into the Circumstances of the War, Russia's protection of its peacekeepers served as a sufficient basis for intervention in the conflict, but not enough for the introduction of troops into proper Georgia.

At the same time, it follows from the conclusions of the report that Georgia (the first) violated international law by using armed force against Russian military personnel (peacekeepers) without justification, and the use of armed force against South Ossetia was unjustified and disproportionate, since, according to the drafters of the report, many hours the shelling of Tskhinvali using heavy artillery and MLRS cannot be interpreted as self-defense.

War crimes in the conflict zone

Russia and South Ossetia on the one hand, and Georgia on the other, accuse each other of crimes and ethnic cleansing. War crimes during the conflict are also reported by journalists, human rights activists and others.

The Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation expressed its intention to bring charges against the Georgian side under the articles "planning, preparing, unleashing or waging an aggressive war", "use of prohibited means and types of weapons", "mercenarism", "attack on persons or institutions that enjoy international protection" , "genocide", "the murder of two or more persons, committed in a generally dangerous way, based on racial and national hatred."

On August 11-12, 2008, the Georgian government filed lawsuits against Russia with the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. Both claims have been accepted. A lawsuit against Russia in 49 cases involving 340 civilians who were injured was filed with the European Court of Human Rights by the Georgian Young Lawyers Association in connection with the violation of such rights as “the right to life, the right to property, the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment.”

In November 2008, the human rights organization Amnesty International published a report according to which:

• During the storming of Tskhinval, the Georgian army carried out indiscriminate attacks that killed dozens of South Ossetian civilians and injured many, and significantly damaged infrastructure (public buildings, hospitals, schools);
• The main destruction of Tskhinval was caused by the Grad multiple launch rocket systems used by the Georgian army, the missiles of which have low accuracy.
• During the conflict, Russian aviation carried out more than 75 air raids, most of which targeted the positions of the Georgian army. The airstrikes hit villages and towns, the damage from them "is limited to a few streets and individual houses in some villages."
• There is evidence that some Russian attacks on Georgian settlements and roads resulted in the injury and death of civilians, and "perhaps no distinction was made between legitimate military targets and civilians." As the report writes, "if this is true, then such attacks are qualified as attacks of an indiscriminate nature and constitute a violation of international humanitarian law."
• According to the report, “according to eyewitnesses, the disciplined behavior of the Russian military was sharply different from the actions of the Ossetian fighters and militia units, who were seen in looting and robbery.” Georgians interviewed by Amnesty International noted that Russian servicemen “have generally treated Georgian civilians with dignity and proper discipline.”
• South Ossetian subdivisions and paramilitary formations have committed serious crimes against Georgians in South Ossetia and its adjacent territories. Eyewitnesses reported unlawful killings, beatings, threats, arson and robberies carried out by armed groups from the South Ossetian side.

January 23, 2009 the international human rights organization human rights watch published a report “Up in Flames” that had been in preparation for several months (more than 460 eyewitnesses of the hostilities were interviewed), which concluded that the Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian armed forces had committed numerous violations of humanitarian law that resulted in the death of civilians; The authors of the report call on Moscow and Tbilisi to investigate the crimes and punish those responsible. In a 147-page report, the Georgian side was accused of indiscriminate use of weapons in the shelling of Tskhinvali, neighboring villages and during the ensuing offensive, as well as beating detainees and robberies. The South Ossetian side was accused of torture, murder, rape, robbery and ethnic cleansing. The Russian side was accused of robberies. HRW also stated that numerous allegations by the Russian side of the Georgian army of genocide and massacres are not confirmed during the verification, and HRW did not receive answers to a request to the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office. According to HRW, individual facts of the brutality of the Georgian army, published in the Russian media, can be qualified as independent serious crimes, but not as an attempt at genocide.

Other legal aspects

Bill Bowring, an expert on international law at Berkbeck College of the University of London, believes that Russia had reason to send additional troops to the territory of South Ossetia. Otto Luchterhandt, head of the department at the University of Hamburg, considers it lawful to bring Russian troops into South Ossetia and nearby territories, but not into western Georgia.

According to Article 102 of the Russian Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Federation Council includes "decision on the possibility of using the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of the Russian Federation." However, the Federation Council did not make such a decision regarding the dispatch of troops to the territory of Georgia before the start of the operation of the Russian troops. Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov said on August 11 that the upper house of parliament would not meet for an emergency meeting to agree to the entry of Russian troops into Georgia. “It is not a military contingent operating in South Ossetia. We are increasing the peacekeeping contingent, and this does not require the approval of the Federation Council.”

On August 18, 2008, the Vlast magazine expressed the opinion that, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the consent of the Federation Council to the entry of Russian troops into Georgia was required. The journalist recalled that earlier, in accordance with the law of the Russian Federation “On the procedure for providing the Russian Federation with military and civilian personnel to participate in activities to maintain or restore international peace and security”, the consent of the Federation Council was asked to increase the number of peacekeeping contingents abroad. The publication also stated: “The same law says that “the decision to send individual servicemen outside the territory of the Russian Federation to participate in peacekeeping activities” is made by the president himself. If we recognize the many thousands of troops brought into South Ossetia and Abkhazia as “separate military personnel”, then in this case the Federation Council really could not have met”.

On August 25, 2008, Sergei Mironov announced that the Federation Council would have to consider the use of "an additional contingent of peacekeeping forces represented by the Russian Armed Forces in the region of the Georgian-South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts from August 8", saying that this issue was put before the Federation Council by the President RF in accordance with the law and the regulations of the chamber. On the same day, at a closed meeting, the Federation Council adopted resolutions “On the use of additional peacekeeping forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to maintain peace and security in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict” and “On the use of additional peacekeeping forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to maintain peace and security in zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict"

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved on July 12, 2008 by Russian President D. Medvedev, reads (paragraph III, 2): “Russia proceeds from the fact that only the UN Security Council is authorized to authorize the use of force to enforce peace.”

Information coverage of the conflict

Information coverage of the armed conflict in South Ossetia played a significant role, as it influenced public opinion regarding the actions of one side or another. From Russian, Georgian, Western and other media, conflicting information about the events of the conflict was sometimes received. Interpretations have also been discussed on the Internet, ranging from harsh comments on blogs and forums to attacks on official government websites.

Geopolitical and economic consequences of the conflict

After the end of hostilities, the confrontation of the parties acquired a predominantly political and diplomatic character, to a large extent moving into the sphere of international politics.

Economic consequences

The conflict had significant economic consequences.

In October 2008, Western countries announced the allocation of $4.55 billion in financial assistance to Georgia during 2008-2010 to overcome the results of the military conflict, of which $2.5 billion is a long-term low-interest loan, and $2 billion is a grant. According to a number of experts, this assistance played a major role in preventing the collapse of the Georgian economy.

At the turn of the 80-90s of the 20th century, an ethno-political conflict arose between Georgia and Abkhazia. Georgia wanted to secede from the Soviet Union, while Abkhazia, on the contrary, sought to remain part of the USSR, separating, in turn, from Georgia. Tensions between Georgians and Abkhazians led to the creation of Georgian nationalist groups demanding the elimination of Abkhazian autonomy.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia entered the stage of open confrontation. On April 9, 1991, President Z. Gamsakhurdia proclaimed the independence of Georgia. In January of the following year, he was overthrown, and Eduard Shevardnadze took over as president. On February 21, 1992, the Supreme Council of Georgia abolished the Soviet Constitution and restored the Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic adopted in 1921.

In March 1992, E. Shevardnadze headed the State Council, which controlled the entire territory of Georgia, except for South Ossetia, Adzharia and Abkhazia. If it was possible to agree with South Ossetia and Adzharia, then with Abkhazia things were different. Abkhazia was part of Georgia as an autonomous region. The abolition of the Soviet Constitution of Georgia and the restoration of the Constitution of 1921 deprived Abkhazia of autonomy. On July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia restored the Constitution of the Abkhazian Soviet Republic, adopted in 1925. Georgian deputies boycotted the session. Since that time, the Council has been divided into Georgian and Abkhaz parts.

In Abkhazia, mass dismissals of Georgians from law enforcement agencies and the creation of a national army began. In response, Georgia sent troops into autonomy under the pretext that it was necessary to protect the railway, which was the only transport route between Russia and Armenia, which at that time was at war with Azerbaijan. On August 14, 1992, detachments of the Georgian National Guard entered Abkhazia and in a few days occupied almost the entire territory of the autonomy, including Sukhumi and Gagra.

The Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia moved to the Gudauta region. The Abkhazian and Russian-speaking population began to leave the autonomy. The Abkhaz detachments received support from the Chechens, Kabardians, Ingush, Circassians, and Adyghes, who declared that they were ready to help their ethnically related people. The conflict has ceased to be only Georgian-Abkhazian, and has grown into a pan-Caucasian one. Everywhere the formation of militia detachments began, which went to Abkhazia. The parties were preparing for war, Russia has not interfered yet, offering, however, to act as a mediator and settle the conflict peacefully.

In October 1992, Abkhazians and militia detachments recaptured the city of Gagra from the Georgians, established control over a strategically important territory near the Russian border, and began to prepare for an attack on Sukhumi. According to unconfirmed reports, Russian tanks also participated in the capture of Gagra. Georgia accused Russia of providing weapons to Abkhazia, but the Abkhaz leadership claimed that they used only captured weapons and equipment. In particular, after the capture of Gagra, about ten infantry vehicles and armored personnel carriers passed into the hands of the Abkhazians.

Several units of the Russian Armed Forces found themselves in the conflict zone. They maintained neutrality, guarded the property of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, ensured the safety of the evacuation of civilians and vacationers, and the delivery of products to the blockaded city of Tkvarcheli. Despite the neutral position occupied by the Russian side, the Georgian detachments repeatedly fired at the Russians, they were forced to respond in kind. Such skirmishes led to casualties among the civilian population.

In the summer of 1993, the Abkhaz launched an offensive against Sukhumi. After lengthy battles, the city was completely blocked by the Abkhazians, and both sides entered into negotiations. On June 27, 1993, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Sochi. Russia acted as a guarantor in these negotiations. In August, the Georgian side removed almost all heavy weapons from Sukhumi and withdrew most of the troops. According to one version, this was not at all connected with the Sochi agreement, but with the fact that an internal conflict was brewing in Georgia itself at that moment.

The Abkhazians took advantage of the situation, violated the agreement, and on September 16, 1993, began to seize Sukhumi. The Georgians tried to transfer troops to the city on civilian planes, but the Abkhazians shot down planes landing at Sukhumi airport from anti-aircraft installations. According to unconfirmed reports, this was made possible thanks to assistance from Russia.

On September 27, Sukhumi was captured, and by September 30, the entire territory of the autonomy was already under the control of the Abkhaz detachments and North Caucasian formations. Ethnic Georgians, fearing the perceived threat from the victors, began to leave their homes in a hurry. Some went to Georgia on their own through mountain passes, others were taken by sea. During this period, about 300 thousand people left Abkhazia. Only a few of them, and only after a few years, were able to return home. According to unconfirmed reports, about 10 thousand civilians died during the resettlement from the autonomy.

Internal problems forced E. Shevardnadze to join the Union of Independent States (CIS) and ask for help from Russia. Then Russia advised Abkhazia to stop the offensive. The Georgian faction of the Abkhazian parliament moved to Tbilisi, but continued to work.

On June 23, 1994, the CIS peacekeeping forces entered Abkhazia. Russian units, which were here before, acted as peacekeepers. A so-called "security zone" was established along the Inguri River. Only the Kodori Gorge remained under Georgian control. As a result of the Abkhaz war, about 17 thousand people died, about 300 thousand inhabitants (more than half of the population) were forced to move to Georgia.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia entered into a confrontation with Georgia - the Georgian side decided to put an end to their autonomy. In the spring of 1991, the chairman of the Supreme Council of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, announced the independence of this republic. The Georgians took the corresponding resolution adopted in 1918 as a basis. Less than a year later, Gamsakhurdia was overthrown in an armed coup. E. A. Shevardnadze, a former member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU of the USSR, came to power.

In Georgia, they said goodbye to the Constitution of the Georgian SSR and proclaimed the supremacy of the main law that was in force in the republic in 1921. Shevardnadze, who headed the State Council of Georgia, faced the problem of the lack of state control over South Ossetia, Adzharia and Abkhazia - these territories refused to obey the center. In addition, there were constant skirmishes in Mingrelia, where the Zviadists rebelled, supporting Gamsakhurdia, deprived of power.

In Abkhazia, in turn, they also remembered the past and instead of the former Soviet republican Constitution, they adopted the law of 1925 as a basis. Georgia stated that this document is legally untenable, and the Georgian State Council decided to cancel it.

The Zviadists kidnapped several major Georgian officials, among whom was Shevardnadze's assistant. Eduard Amvrosievich in August 1992 decides to send troops to Abkhazia. The formal reason is to take decisive action to free the people taken hostage and to regain control over the railway, which was the only transport thread connecting Russia and Armenia. However, in essence, such a decision meant the declaration of hostilities.

The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is one of the most acute ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. Tension in relations between the Georgian government and the Abkhazian autonomy was periodically manifested even in the Soviet period. The fact is that when the USSR was created in 1922, Abkhazia had the status of a so-called treaty republic - it signed the treaty on the creation of the USSR. In 1931, the "contractual" Abkhaz SSR was transformed into an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR. After that, the "Georgianization" of the republic began: in 1935, car numbers of the same series were introduced as in Georgia, a year later the geographical names were modified to the Georgian way, and the Abkhazian alphabet was made on the basis of the Georgian graphics.

The Abkhazian language until 1950 was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by the obligatory study of the Georgian language. In addition, Abkhazians were forbidden to study in Russian schools, Russian sectors were closed in Sukhumi institutes. Signboards in the Abkhazian language were banned, radio broadcasting in the native language of the inhabitants of the region was stopped. All office work was translated into Georgian.

The migration policy, which began under the auspices of Lavrenty Beria, reduced the proportion of Abkhazians in the total population of the republic (by the beginning of the 1990s, it was only 17%). The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) was formed by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians, liberated after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949.

Mass demonstrations and unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967, and the largest in May and September 1978.

The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhazian princes), a 30,000th gathering of the Abkhazian people took place, which put forward a proposal for the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia and its restoration to the status of a union republic.

The Lykhny declaration provoked sharp protests from the Georgian population. On March 20, mass rallies began, which took place both in the regions of Georgia and in the cities and villages of Abkhazia. The culmination was a multi-day unauthorized rally in front of the Government House in Tbilisi - it began on April 4, and on April 9 it was dispersed with the use of troops, while in the ensuing stampede about 20 people died, more than 250 were injured and injured, and 189 military personnel were also injured.

On July 15-16, 1989, bloody clashes took place in Sukhumi between Georgians and Abkhazians. During the riots, 16 people were reportedly killed and about 140 injured. Troops were used to stop the unrest. The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences. Later, the situation was stabilized by significant concessions to the demands of the Abkhaz leadership, made during Zviad Gamsakhurdia's tenure in Tbilisi.

On February 21, 1992, the ruling Military Council of Georgia announced the abolition of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR of 1978 and the restoration of the constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1921.

The Abkhaz leadership perceived the abolition of the Soviet constitution of Georgia as the actual abolition of the autonomous status of Abkhazia, and on July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic (with a boycott of the session by Georgian deputies) restored the Constitution of the Abkhaz Soviet Republic of 1925, according to which Abkhazia is a sovereign state (this decision The Supreme Council of Abkhazia was not recognized at the international level).

On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which developed into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The military phase of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict began with the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of releasing the Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia, Alexander Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held on the territory of Abkhazia, guarding communications, incl. railroad, and other important facilities. This move provoked fierce resistance from the Abkhaz, as well as from other ethnic communities in Abkhazia.

The goal of the Georgian government was to establish control over Abkhazia, which it regarded as an integral part of Georgian territory. The goal of the Abkhaz authorities is to expand the rights of autonomy and, ultimately, gain independence.

On the part of the central government, the National Guard, volunteer formations and individual volunteers acted, on the part of the Abkhaz leadership - armed formations of the non-Georgian population of the autonomy and volunteers (who arrived from the North Caucasus, as well as Russian Cossacks).

On September 3, 1992, in Moscow, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze signed a document providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.

By the end of 1992, the war had acquired a positional character, where neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993, hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, occupied by Georgian troops.

On July 27, 1993, after lengthy fighting, an agreement on a temporary ceasefire was signed in Sochi, in which Russia acted as a guarantor.

At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of the Abkhaz troops. Georgian troops were forced to completely leave Abkhazia.

The armed conflict of 1992-1993, according to the published data of the parties, claimed the lives of 4,000 Georgians (another 1,000 went missing) and 4,000 Abkhazians. The loss of the economy of the autonomy amounted to 10.7 billion dollars. About 250 thousand Georgians (almost half of the population) were forced to flee from Abkhazia.

On May 14, 1994, in Moscow, between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, with the mediation of Russia, an agreement was signed on a ceasefire and separation of forces. On the basis of this document and the subsequent decision of the Council of CIS Heads of State, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces have been deployed in the conflict zone since June 1994, whose task was to maintain the non-resumption of fire regime. These forces were fully staffed by Russian servicemen.

On April 2, 2002, a Georgian-Abkhazian protocol was signed, according to which the patrolling of the upper part of the Kodori Gorge (the territory of Abkhazia, controlled at that time by Georgia) was entrusted to Russian peacekeepers and UN military observers.

On July 25, 2006, units of the Georgian armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (up to 1.5 thousand people) were introduced into the Kodori Gorge to conduct a special operation against local armed Svan formations (“militia”, or “Monadire” battalion) Emzar Kvitsiani, who refused to obey the demand of the Minister of Defense Georgian Irakli Okruashvili lay down his arms. Kvitsiani is accused of "treason."

Official negotiations between Sukhumi and Tbilisi were then interrupted. As the authorities of Abkhazia emphasized, negotiations between the parties can be resumed only if Georgia begins to implement the UN Security Council Resolution, which provides for the withdrawal of troops from Kodori.

In the summer-autumn of 2006, Georgia regained control over the Kodori Gorge. On September 27, 2006, on the Day of Memory and Sorrow, by the decree of the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, Kodori was renamed Upper Abkhazia. In the village of Chkhalta, on the territory of the gorge, the so-called "legitimate government of Abkhazia" in exile was located.

On October 18, 2006, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia turned to the Russian leadership with a request to recognize the independence of the republic and establish associated relations between the two states. For its part, the Russian leadership has repeatedly declared its unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia, of which Abkhazia is an integral part.

On August 9, 2008, after Georgian troops attacked South Ossetia, Abkhazia launched a military operation to oust Georgian troops from the territory of the Kodori Gorge. On August 12, the Abkhazian army entered the upper part of the Kodori Gorge and surrounded the Georgian troops. Georgian formations were completely ousted from the Abkhazian territory.

On August 26, 2008, after Georgia's military operation in South Ossetia, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia.

STORIES OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE OPERATION IN THE KODOR GORGE

The participants in the operation remember the officers of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Abkhazia, Major Nodar Avidzba and Senior Lieutenant Daut Nanba:

“Landing in Mi-8 airborne transport helicopters was made at 10:20 am on August 12, 2008. There were 15 people in our fire group. In total, 87 servicemen from various brigade tactical groups of our armed forces participated in the landing. Each group was assigned a landing point and an object of attack. Our group included two sappers, two snipers, two machine gunners with RPK and PK, one grenade launcher with RPG-7. In addition, each soldier in the group had a disposable RPG-26 Mukha grenade launcher.

Flight time to the target was three minutes. Already during the landing approach at the Svan settlement of Chkhal-ta, it was clear that the Georgians had panic and confusion. They dropped everything and ran towards the border with Georgia. Having united after landing with the assault group, together, consisting of 25 people, we examined the entire village and the surrounding area for three hours. During the inspection, a stone road bridge across one of the mountain rivers was cleared. A Georgian observation post discovered near the village was opened fire from small arms and a grenade launcher, completely smashing it to smithereens.

After that, they began to advance to the settlement of Azhara, located seven kilometers east of Chkhalta. They advanced to Azhara on foot, simultaneously conducting reconnaissance and inspecting the area adjacent to the highway. At every step there were thrown weapons. In particular, US-made 5.56 mm Bushmaster assault rifles (apparently, we are talking about the XM15E2 automatic carbine developed on the basis of the M4), shots for an RPG-7 grenade launcher, abandoned brand new hunter cars, three-bridge KamAZ trucks, graders, French Renault ambulances, American-made ATV snowmobiles. NATO uniforms and ammunition were scattered everywhere. The names of Georgian servicemen on the tags are in English. There were many documents thrown in a hurry, NATO instructions for conducting classes.

By 4 pm we reached Azhara. It was quiet. At the entrance to the mountain village, we were met by the priest of the local church. During the conversation with him, it turned out that a hundred meters from the church building there is a house in which the Georgians left an ammunition depot. During the retreat, they wanted to blow it up, but did not have time. Upon careful inspection of the house, the sappers found many 82mm mortar rounds, as well as US-made 60mm mortar rounds. In each room there was a box of TNT bombs with detonators. From the house towards the forest there was a field wire 30 meters long. All of this was defused. Also in Azhar, during the inspection, they found a depot of ammunition for artillery and small arms destroyed by an air strike. In this settlement, the Georgians left a large warehouse of fuel and lubricants. Here we captured a fully deployed stationary military hospital with a significant supply of medicines. In terms of time, it took exactly an hour to inspect Azhara.

Further, by order of the commander of the Kodori direction, Major General Law Nanba (he is the first deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Abkhazia - commander of the ground forces), we began advancing from Azhara to Gentsvish. For the whole day, of course, we got a bit tired, because from the very landing from the helicopter we went on foot. Therefore, we decided to go on trophy cars. We got from Azhara to Genzwisz in 30 minutes. Georgians were nowhere to be found. Already in Azhar, and then in Gentsvish, paratroopers, special forces and intelligence officers from other groups and assault units joined our group.

Somewhere at half past six in the evening we reached the village of Saken. Local residents were not visible throughout the movement from Chkhalta to the very border with Georgia, located 10 kilometers from Saken. They, as it turned out later, were hiding. These are mostly women, old people and children. The Svan men left with the Georgians across the cordon. Already at about half past eight in the evening we reached the foot of the Khida pass, where the border with Georgia passed. With this, we have completed our task. There were no fights, as the Georgians simply ran away.”

The chief of staff of the intelligence department of the general staff of the armed forces of the Republic of Abkhazia, Colonel Sergey Arshba, a 1983 graduate of the Lviv Higher Military-Political School, says:

“Yes, the Georgians were preparing for the offensive operation codenamed “Rock” thoroughly. We managed to capture as trophies tens of thousands of artillery shells, mortar mines, dozens of guns, mortars, communications equipment compatible with NATO systems, GPS space navigation receivers, thermal imagers, the latest Western-made night vision devices, military equipment.

The Pentagon and NATO structures were thoroughly preparing an operation to seize Abkhazia, as well as South Ossetia. We managed to find out all this both through secret agents and from captured documents. The Georgians were only puppets in their hands. If Russia had yielded to them here as well, then these dashing guys from Washington and Brussels would not have stopped there. They would have climbed further, to the North Caucasus, primarily to Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan. There and so the situation is explosive. There are also difficulties in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. Abkhazia directly borders on these two subjects of the Russian Federation. If the Americans and their henchmen managed to carry out their plans, then no one would have thought a little. They have one goal - to seize natural resources, which, by the way, are rich in both Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus. First of all, it is oil, gas and other strategic raw materials.

That is why they armed and trained the Georgians according to their patterns. They just didn’t take into account the mentality and morale of those trained and armed.

The result is known - by the end of the day on August 12, 2008, units and subunits of the armed forces of the Republic of Abkhazia along the entire length from the junction of the borders of Russia and Abkhazia with Georgia from the Main Caucasian Range in the areas of the Southern Shelter, the passes of Khida, Kalamri-Suki in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge reached the line at which the operation to capture the Upper Kodors was completely completed.

There were no contact battles with Georgian troops, except for reconnaissance in force on August 10, 2008, during the entire operation. Artillery and aviation did a good job, inflicting accurate strikes on identified targets. Here we should also note the good work of scouts, spotters of artillery fire and aircraft gunners.

Of course, it was difficult in the conditions of mountainous wooded areas and high mountains to conduct mounted fire to hit point targets with heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems. The artillerymen several times asked the scouts and the artillery spotters who were with them for the specified coordinates of the targets being hit. But thanks to the filigree work of artillerymen and pilots, not a single building in the district, except for those objects that were hit, was not damaged.

According to radio interception, at 9 pm on August 11, 2008, the radio network of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia in Upper Kodery ceased to exist. From 3:50 am on August 12, 2008, the grouping of law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Georgia in Upper Kodery also ceased to exist.”

According to Colonel Sergei Arshba, who oversees special operations with the participation of special forces, the enemy, having entered the upper part of the Kodori Gorge at the end of July 2006, also captured the Marukhsky, Klukhorsky, Nakharsky and a number of other passes along the Main Caucasian Range along the state border with Russia on its Abkhazian section with a total length of 50-60 kilometers. And he "planted" special forces and intelligence units on them. The Abkhazians held the Adange pass and all the others towards Krasnaya Polyana, Adler and Sochi. On the northern slopes from the side of the Russian Federation, the state border with Georgia was guarded by Russian border guards. For reinforcement, they were given airborne assault maneuver groups of the Directorates of the Border Service of the FSB of Russia in Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, the Directorate of the Border Guard Service of the FSB of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District, as well as army special forces from the North Caucasus military district.

According to the military intelligence of the Abkhazians, on the above passes and in the Southern Shelter, where the base camp of the special forces of the Georgian Armed Forces was, there was a regular rotation of special forces and intelligence units. Moreover, the permanent "guests" there were American, Israeli, French, Turkish "specialists" and specialists in sabotage and intelligence from other NATO states and their friendly countries. What they were doing there, I think, is easy to guess.

Sergey Arshba recalls such a case: “We are sitting in ambush on a slope near one of the passes. I look, Georgian special forces are walking along the path in NATO camouflage. And in front of the "students" they stomp ... who would you think? That's right - Americans, blacks. Confidently they go in the direction of the Main Caucasian Range, where the border with Russia passes. And not one or two, but a whole group of "comrades" from across the ocean. Well, I think we'll hit them now. I contacted the higher command. To my great regret, I received an order to let us through, although they were 5-6 meters away from us. We would put them all in a row...

And all this special forces "brotherhood" from different foreign countries constantly "hung out" in this area, as if it was smeared with honey there. Moreover, helipads and special forces bases were openly equipped. It can be seen that they were preparing not only for actions against Abkhazia, but also, it is possible, against Russia. Abkhazian fighters on the territory recaptured from the Georgians. On the building - the flag of Abkhazia.

And in August 2008, they draped from the passes as best they could. Some were photographed from a height of 2500 meters by helicopters, and some went down the paths and glaciers towards Georgia under their own power. But these bastards gave us "gifts" in the form of minefields, and very sophisticated ones, pretty much. I've already lost six experienced commandos there. Therefore, the passes where the Georgians and their friends from the West crowded together are impassable, there are mines everywhere.”

According to Sergei Arshba, the depth of the operation from the starting line in the Kuabchar region to the border with Georgia was 50 kilometers, and from the Adange pass area to the Khida and Kalamri-Suki passes - about 70 kilometers.

Everything that the Georgians abandoned during their flight from the Upper Kodors, the Abkhaz military took out for a long time. There were not enough trucks for such a volume of trophies, and the capacity of the broken roads in the Kodori Gorge is not enough. As Colonel S. Arshba noted, the reserves created by the Georgian side show that they expected to fight long and hard.

The Georgians even managed, probably not without the help of their friends from abroad, to drag heavy guns and mortars, as well as multiple launch rocket systems, to the mountain peaks and pass points. "We still cannot understand, - said Sergey Arshba, - how they managed to do it in the conditions of high mountains." From there, they, as in a shooting range, could freely shoot through the entire defense of the Abkhazian army and its supply routes for tens of kilometers.

Moreover, it must be said that during the two years of ownership of the Upper Kodors, with the help of funds allocated by foreign sponsors, the Georgian military built an excellent road there, part of which was asphalted, and part had a gravel surface. Through the communications of Tsebelda - Azhara - Upper Kodori, the enemy could freely transfer various forces and means to the battlefield. Road bridges across the mountain rivers Kodor, Chkhalta, Gvandra, Klych and others were capital, that is, stone. Heavy equipment, tanks, armored combat vehicles, etc. could move along them. The Georgians at any time could build up their grouping with manpower, weapons and military equipment.

During their rapid flight, the Georgians did not have time to blow up the bridges over the mountain rivers behind them, although explosives were placed under their foundation. Abkhazian sappers, moving forward, neutralized dangerous finds in time and preserved bridge crossings over the rivers.

And one more point, which drew the attention of Colonel S. Arshba. The Georgians, with the help of the Americans, were able to quickly form brigades of reservists during the preparation and during the hostilities in South Ossetia and transfer them to the areas where the fighting was going on. Another thing is that they had low combat capability and low morale. But the very fact of their quick knocking together and putting into battle says a lot. Here, the experience of the US National Guard units, the strategic reserve of the US armed forces, was used with might and main. In a good situation for the Georgians, if with the help of their overseas friends they managed to create a combat-ready reserve, both in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the defenders of these republics, and the Russian military, would have had a hard time. Moreover, the mobilization reserve in Georgia is significant. Fighting on both sides could then take on a fierce and protracted character. And it is not known which side would prevail. We need to draw certain conclusions from what happened. Moreover, the Georgians have not calmed down and will not calm down. The events of recent months show that they, too, have drawn certain conclusions from the short war. And now more thoroughly, using foreign military and economic assistance, they will prepare for revenge.

In many respects, the positive results of the operation in the Upper Kodori were influenced by the fact that units and subunits of the Russian Armed Forces prevented the intensification of Saakashvili's actions to strike at Abkhazia.

V. Anzin, "Soldier of Fortune", 2009