Armored ship Cerberus. Ships under the southern cross Cerberus ship

Operation Cerberus is a daring breakthrough by three large surface ships of the Kriegsmarine from Brest to Germany across the English Channel. Also known as "Channel Dash"

background

When Northern France was captured by Germany, the strategic advantage of the French harbors was assessed by the command of the German Navy and the naval bases of La Rochelle, Saint-Nazaire, Lorient, Brest were quickly occupied by the ships of the Kriegsmarine. Brest, on the other hand, was the most important naval base in the Atlantic Wall system due to its location, as well as its material and technical location. At the beginning of 1942, there were 3 German heavy ships in Brest: the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which, after a successful raid in the Atlantic in 1941, were in the harbor to repair damage, as well as the heavy cruiser Prince Eugen, which managed to successfully escape from the British fleet during their pursuit of the Bismarck. But England was nearby, so the ships did not stand still, the daily bombings caused more damage, as a result of which the ships did not leave the repair docks. For these reasons, and also because the center of hostilities was moving to the East, at Hitler's headquarters, the highest military officials of the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine began to develop a plan to withdraw ships from Brest and transfer them to the Wilhelmshaven base. It was decided to pass the ships through the Strait of Dover, because. in this case, the transition distance was ~850 miles, and the squadron would have been in the air cover zone throughout the entire route. This was not the first time that the Germans had escorted surface warships across the English Channel, but they were auxiliary cruisers, which outwardly did not differ from merchant ships, in this case a large group of heavy warships had to be escorted.

Preparing for the operation

On January 12, 1942, a meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters on the upcoming operation. From the Kriegsmarine, Erich Raeder, Otto Ziliaks and Rear Admiral Rüge were present. The Luftwaffe was represented by Goering, Jeschonnek and Galland. The sailors offered to leave at night in order to pass through the English Channel under air cover during the day, but they were doubtful that the aircraft could reliably cover them, Jeshonnec was also not sure of the success of the operation. But then Adolf Galland took the floor, after listening to other people's opinions, he mentally weighed everything, so his answer was clear. He said that if the first part of the voyage was carried out in secret, then during the day the fighters would be able to reliably cover the ships from British aircraft. He noted that the strengths of the plan were surprise, as well as the fact that the British command, accustomed to planning everything in detail, would be confused in this situation. These arguments led Hitler to the idea of a daytime breakthrough across the English Channel, the operation was approved, the sea part was called Cerberus and the air part was called Thunderbolt.

Otto Ciliax

Adolf Galland

Galland was appointed personally responsible for the air operation, he had 252 fighters at his disposal, as well as 30 Bf.110 night fighters. Above the ships there should always be 16 fighters, two links on each side, the planes had to write out elongated "eights" in the air "And patrol the squadron throughout its entire length. The change took place every 30 minutes. The replacement group kept low to avoid detection by the British radar. The battleship Scharnhorst housed a specially formed fighter command headquarters, headed by Oberst Max Ibel.
General Wolfgang Martin led the electronic warfare: reconnaissance was carried out on the carrier frequencies of coastal radars, their geographical location, jamming transmitters were developed (to blind indicators of enemy radars), their base points were selected and the schedule for their inclusion was verified (the enemy should not guess about the operation). The transmitters were switched on for a short time, so the British believed that the interference was due to atmospheric phenomena. A number of measures were thought out to disinform the enemy. The ships were loaded with boxes of pith helmets and barrels of oil, with inscriptions on the container: "For use in the tropics." Until the very last moment (the departure of the ships), the postal and laundry services for the crews continued.
The command of the naval part of the operation was entrusted to Vice-Admiral Otto Ciliaks (held the flag on the battleship Scharnhorst). Chief of Staff - Captain 1st Rank Reinicke. To escort the battleships and the heavy cruiser, 6 destroyers (Z-29, Richard Beitzen, Paul Jacobi, Hermann Schönmann, Friedrich Inn, Z-25), 14 destroyers, 28 torpedo boats were involved . The task of determining the course of the squadron from Brest to the North Sea fell on the shoulders of Captain 1st Rank Gissler, the flagship navigator of Admiral Tsiliaks. Rear Admiral Friedrich Ruthe, commander of the minesweeping forces of the German fleet, provided a safe path for the squadron. The squadron's departure was scheduled for 19:30 on February 11, 1942.
Despite the secrecy of the operation, its preparation did not go unnoticed by British intelligence officers. As early as 1941, the Admiralty developed Plan Fuller to prevent this breakthrough. British aviation was ordered to drop bottom, magnetic mines in enemy fairways, coastal batteries, destroyer divisions, torpedo bombers were put on alert. In the areas of Brest, between Le Havre and Boulogne, constant aerial reconnaissance was carried out, British submarines were on combat duty, on February 11, in the waters surrounding Brest, the Sealion submarine occupied the position.

Operation progress

February 11th in 19 hours, a raid was made by English aircraft with a force of 18 Wellingtons, the bombs did not hit the targets, the pilots did not find anything unusual. However, because of this, the German squadron went to sea an hour late at 20 h 45 min. The night was moonless, a haze hung over the water, but the Sealion commander did not notice the enemy, because. he found it possible to get out of position and charge the batteries during the bombardment. The British patrol plane was forced to return to base due to a breakdown in the locator, another plane replaced it two hours later and, of course, the German ships in the harbor were not caught by this time. 12th of February in 5 h 30 min the squadron passed the island of Alderney. AT 8 h 50 min cover fighters appeared - Bf.110. Two aircraft, equipped with jamming devices, began emitting radiation to hide a group of cover fighters from the British radars, at the same time German coastal jamming stations began to operate. The British staff officers did not attach much importance to interference, believing that they were dealing with some kind of atmospheric phenomenon. AT 10 h one of the British radar stations went on such a high frequency that the Germans could not interfere with it, and with it a message was received about unknown aircraft flying to the strait at low altitude. AT 10 h 30 min two British Spitfire reconnaissance fighters spotted the ships, but mistook them for their convoy. AT 10 h 42 min two other Spitfires, chasing a German fighter, emerged from the clouds directly above the German squadron, but due to radio silence, the British pilots reported what they saw only upon returning to their base in 11 h 09 min.

German ships cross the English Channel

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau

AT 12 h 18 mi English coastal guns began to fire, but a half-hour bombardment yielded no results. AT 12 h 23 min 5 torpedo boats that left Dover discovered the squadron, but the commander did not dare to attack without air cover, torpedoes were dropped from 4 cable boats, not a single one hit the target.

AT 12 h 6 torpedo bombers took off from the Menston airfield. The commander was Captain Eugene Esmond, a participant in a successful hunt for the Bismarck. Due to poor visibility, too few Spitfires joined the escort of the slow Swordfish. AT 12 h 50 min Esmond saw the German squadron, the torpedo bombers divided into 2 groups and personally led the attack on the battleship Scharnghorst, but the enemy Messerschmitt sat on his tail and knocked him out. With the last effort, the captain dropped the torpedo, after which the plane crashed into the water. Other pilots were also unlucky, all 6 torpedo bombers were shot down and the torpedoes again did not hit the targets! An hour and a half later, the surviving pilots were picked up by a British torpedo boat. In total, 13 pilots were killed during the desperate raid.

British torpedo bomber "Swordfish"

AT 13 h the German squadron entered the mined waters, Tsiliaks ordered to slow down in order to pass through the narrow fairways. Although the ships were an extremely vulnerable target at the moment, no one attacked them. AT 14 The ships picked up speed again, but the Scharnhorst almost immediately hit a mine, but the damage was not so serious and did not prevent it from moving at a speed of 25 knots. Tsiliaks switched to the destroyer "z-29", the damaged battleship remained to accompany 4 destroyers, the rest of the squadron went on. Scharnhost and the escort tried to attack Beaufort bombers, Hurricanes cannons and torpedo bombers, but they did not succeed, the Germans shot down 4 aircraft.

The Brest squadron was soon to enter the North Sea, only a division of destroyers under the command of Commander Paizi could prevent them. The interception plan had been drawn up in advance by Vice-Admiral Bertrand Ramsey, who foresaw that the Germans would carry out a breakthrough at night. The division consisted of two leaders (“Campbell” and “Mackay”) and four destroyers (“Viveishies”, “Worple”, “Worchested” and “Whitshed”) built during the First World War, so even in speed they were inferior to the German squadron. Realizing that they were late with the attack, the commander decided to break through the minefields. The risk justified itself, only the destroyer "Worple" turned to the base due to a breakdown of the machine, while the rest did not receive any damage.
AT 15 h 37 min from the flagship leader Campbell, signalmen saw German battleships 9.5 miles away. Using poor visibility, the British approached the enemy and from a distance of 7 miles, "Viveishies" and "Campbell" fired torpedoes. The Wortchester came even closer, but the Scharnhorst covered it with the first salvo and the destroyer received several direct hits. Mackay and Whitshed were the last to fire torpedoes, and again not a single torpedo hit their targets. Unable to move and fight (17 killed 45 wounded out of 130 crew members), . "Worchester" was in a disastrous position at the moment when the Germans passed by, ignoring the burning, sinking ship (the Germans believed that he was doomed). The British destroyers, returning to the battlefield, guarded him and escorted him back to base, subjected to repeated attacks by their own and German bombers.

"Z-29" also fired on the British destroyers in the last minutes of the battle. One of his own shells exploded before it could leave the barrel. Due to damage, the destroyer lost speed for 20 minutes. Ciliax had to switch to Hermann Schemann. Now the squadron, moving at full speed along the Dutch coast, could only be attacked by bomber aircraft. 242 bombers went on the attack, but only 39 machines found the squadron, which went out to the target at random. Not a single bomb hit the ships, German anti-aircraft gunners shot down 15 aircraft.
AT 19 h 55 min on the beam of the island Terchelling was blown up by a Gneisenau mine. Due to a strong explosion, the stern was damaged, the battleship lost its course for a while, but after 7 hours of the next day, he was the first from the squadron to anchor at the mouth of the Elbe. Next came the Prinz Eugen. Scharnhorst in 21 h 35 min hit a mine again, the gyrocompass and lighting failed, the turbines had to be restarted. In Wilhelmshaven they came in tow.

"Scharnhorst" - a hole from a mine explosion

Operation results

Operation Cerberus is rightfully considered one of the most daring operations not only of the Second World War, but, perhaps, in the entire history of the world. Despite the damage received, the squadron, without losing a single ship, reached its destination. The operation was a complete success for both the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe. It should be noted that this was one of the few operations where the German Navy worked closely with the German Air Force.

Blue: Bf 109F-4, Bf 110G, FW190A-4 (replacing FW190A-3)

I am for such a card, but please consider.

1. Weight FW190A-3 - 3977kg and FW190A-4 - 3989kg

2. FW190A-3 engine power - 1770 hp FW190A-4 - 1580 hp !!!

To the question of replacing the FW190A-3, historically, the FW190A-5 is more suitable. But I personally agree and the Reds did not resent the FW190A-4. .

Who cares "I will give the following episode. After during the battle with the Spitfires over southwestern England, Luftwaffe Lieutenant Arnim Faber lost his bearings and landed by mistake at the Pembry airfield in South Wales, a completely serviceable FW190A-3 fell into the hands of the British. immediately transferred to Dunsforth, where the center of combat use of the Royal Air Force Fighter Command was located.Here, during the tests, the Focke-Wulf was compared with the Spitfire Mk.Vb, Spitfire Mk.IX, Typhoon Mk.1, Mustang Mk.1A and "Lightning" R-38F. The latter, up to 6700 m, was inferior to the German fighter in speed, higher - superiority in this passed to the American car, which was due to the presence of turbochargers. However, the acceleration characteristics, rate of climb and dive speed of the FW190A-3 were much better. True, at low flight speeds, the P-38F had a shorter time and radius of a steady turn, but this had little effect in a real air battle, where the decisive pas The parameter in battles on the horizontals was the angular roll rate, in which the FW190 surpassed not only all American and British fighters, but also Soviet ones (with the exception of the I-16). Since the maximum speed of another German fighter, the Bf109G-2, was superior to the FW190A-3 in almost the entire range of altitudes, the unfavorable ratio of performance characteristics for the Lightning in this case looked even more distinct. Add in the noticeable superiority of the Messers and Fokkers in terms of firepower, and it becomes clear why the pilots of the American P-38s did not achieve any significant success in the battles with the Luftwaffe in the European theater of operations.

Now about "Aircobra". It is very difficult, if not impossible, to talk about the superiority of even the most advanced modification of this American P-39Q fighter over the Bf109G or FW190A (or at least approximate equality with them). However, judge for yourself. With a takeoff weight of 3656 kg, the aircraft had an Alison V-1710-85 engine, the maximum power of which was 1200 hp. A simple calculation shows that for one "American" horsepower there are 3.05 kg of the mass of the fighter structure. The FW190A-3 weighed 3977 kg, but its BMW801D engine developed 1770 hp, which gave the German car a power load of 2.25 kg per 1 hp. In the Bf109G-2, this ratio was even more favorable: its takeoff weight was only 3100 kg, and the DB605A engine developed 1475 hp, which made it possible to obtain an energy-to-weight ratio of 2.11 kg / hp. Of course, with an increase in flight altitude, these indicators worsened, but they were still better than those of all modifications of the R-39 without exception. In addition, this American fighter had poor spin characteristics. As for its merits, there were essentially four of them in a combat situation: excellent visibility, fairly powerful weapons, a good radio station and a high level of pilot protection due to the rear engine.

In terms of its own flight characteristics, the P-39 did not represent anything outstanding, and the successes achieved by the Soviet aces on these fighters are explained by the exceptionally competent tactics of their use. We must not forget that American aircraft entered service with air regiments that had already gained significant combat experience. The idea circulated in various publications that the R-39 was able to demonstrate its qualities to the maximum extent on the Soviet-German front for the reason that air battles were fought on it at altitudes up to 5000 m does not hold water. Both in Europe and over the islands of the Pacific, pilots fought in the entire range of altitudes from a few meters to the practical ceiling of "flying fortresses". Moreover, no one in the West forced the Airacobra pilots to cover the B-17 and B-24 in their strategic raids. This task was first assigned to the R-38, then to the R-47, and in the end, the R-51 Mustang fighters were recognized as the best for escorting bombers. "Aerocobras" over the English Channel, Tunisia, Guadalcanal and New Guinea acted in the same way as on the Soviet-German front. However, the low level of training of American pilots who piloted the R-39 did not allow them to achieve success comparable to the achievements of their Soviet counterparts.

And now from myself Personally, my opinion is that in our game the overload and smoothness of flights are not modeled. In no newsreel do planes move in maneuvers with such speed as it happens in the game IL2. You can see from the ganks that even a vigorously maneuvering aircraft goes under attack for 6-10 seconds before either leaving the range or being shot down. In our case, with especially active moments, everything happens in 1-2 seconds. You go to the tomato at 6 and, having crap, gives a stick to the eggs and to the right, as much as a stall on the wings. Once and he has already left the zone of fire. In real life, from several such turns, he would have shit out of his ears.

On February 11, 1942, German ships, a whole squadron, passed through the Channel (as the British call the central part of the English Channel) from Brest to the North Sea! And this is within the range of British aviation, at the sight of coastal batteries, through minefields! Yes, how could this even happen?

Millions of British people were asking the same question in February 1942. Yes, Britain had a chance to endure tragedies - take at least the death of the battlecruiser Hood, sunk in May 1941 with the entire crew of the German battleship Bismarck. But Hood died in battle, and the honor of the fleet was not damaged. And now? However, in order to understand the situation, let us turn to the events of the end of 1941.

Then the Nazi fleet had impressive forces. The newest battleship Tirpitz, heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper and Admiral Scheer, 4 light cruisers and destroyers were stationed in the Baltic. The battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were stationed at Brest. Destroyers and submarines were based in the ports of Nazi-occupied Norway.

The British home fleet then consisted of the battleships King George and Rodney, the aircraft carrier Victorius, 4 heavy and 6 light cruisers, and destroyers. The latter were not enough even to protect the allied convoys traveling through the central Atlantic.

Fears of a possible attack on these convoys by large surface ships of the enemy, including the Brest squadron, persuaded the British Admiralty to undertake a grandiose raid on this port. In January 1942, 612 bombers dropped 908 bombs on her, which, however, did not cause any serious damage to the battleships.

As it turned out, the ranks of the Admiralty worried in vain. Hitler's attention was focused on the Eastern Front, where the Wehrmacht suffered its first serious defeats. Therefore, Hitler decided to stop the operations of surface ships in the mid-Atlantic and concentrate them in northern Norway, from where they could strike at the Arctic convoys en route to the ports of the Soviet Union. On December 12, 1941, he ordered Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen stationed in Brest to be transferred to Norwegian waters, which were to break through the English Channel. A detailed plan for this operation "Cerberus" was developed in detail by the commander of the Brest squadron, Vice Admiral Zilliaks.

The departure of the squadron from Brest was scheduled for 19:30 on February 11, 1942. As expected, the preparation of the operation did not go unnoticed by the British intelligence officers, which they reported to London in a timely manner. Back in 1941, the Fuller counter-operation plan was developed, which provided for a number of measures aimed at preventing this breakthrough. In particular, British aviation was ordered to drop magnetic, bottom mines on enemy fairways in the strait, minelayers "Menksman" and "Welshman" put up an additional barrier between Wessan and Boulogne. Coastal batteries, units of torpedo bombers and bombers, and a destroyer division were put on alert. The torpedo boats stationed at Dover were reinforced with another flotilla. In the areas of Brest, the island of Ouessant, between the ports of Le Havre and Boulogne, constant air patrols were organized. On February 11, the Sealion submarine was sent into the waters surrounding Brest, the commander of which was ordered to continuously monitor enemy ships. Everything seemed to be taken into account. However...

The Brest squadron put to sea at 20:45, an hour late due to an air raid on the port. The night was moonless, and a mist hung over the water. But the commander of the Sealion did not notice the enemy for this reason. During the bombing, he found it possible to leave the position in order to recharge the batteries.

I did not see the squadron and the patrol aircraft, which returned to base due to a breakdown of the onboard locator. Another car, sent to the same square two hours later, of course, did not find the enemy.

In the meantime, the squadron was moving through the strait at a 7-knot course and at 05:30 on February 12 passed the island of Alderney. At dawn, Messerschmitts of air cover hung over the ships.

At 10:30 a.m., the ships sailed abeam the mouth of the Somme, and the British Admiralty was still unaware of their departure from Brest. By the way, an hour earlier, interference had appeared on the screens of British coastal radars. However, this has happened before, so the staff officers did not attach any importance to them.

Two British spitfire fighters, flying out for reconnaissance, saw some ships in the strait, but mistook them for one of their convoys. Only upon returning to the airfield did the pilot notice that some ship looked like a battleship.

At 1042 hours, two other Spitfires, pursuing an enemy aircraft, emerged from the clouds just above the squadron. The leader of the pair, Colonel Beamish, immediately realized that ships from Brest were under him, but, mindful of the order to maintain radio silence, he reported on what had happened only after landing, at 1109 hours.

And so it began... Phones rang in the British headquarters, orders poured in, sometimes ill-conceived and contradictory. Instead of a clear plan "Fuller", a completely disordered war machine came into action. For example, it never occurred to anyone that Swordfish torpedo bombers were twice as slow as the fighters sent to cover them, that high-altitude bombers did not have time to reach the battlefield, that out of a dozen torpedo boats allocated for Operation Fuller, they were combat-ready only eight.

Finally, the barrels of the guns of the British coastal batteries began to stir, although the gunners were sure that firing at ships covered in fog and rain was pointless without a pickup on the radars (which, as we know, were "blinded"). Nevertheless, at 12:18 the guns started talking, making 33 volleys in 27 minutes. Alas, not a single 229-mm shell fell closer than a mile from the squadron.

The sound of gunfire was still echoing over the channel when only five Dover torpedo boats were out to sea. In addition, one soon fell behind due to engine failure. At 12:23 the boats discovered the squadron, but the detachment commander did not dare to approach the enemy without air cover. Rather, in order to free themselves from the cargo, and not to hit the enemy, four boats fired torpedoes in a fan from a distance of 4 cables and retreated. The crew of the fifth boat, having fixed the engine, broke through the fire of the escort, fired torpedoes at the Prince Eugen - also to no avail!

Now it's aviation's turn. At about 12 o'clock, six torpedo bombers, one after another, broke away from the runway of the Menston airfield. The squadron was led by Captain Esmond, a participant in a successful hunt for the battleship Bismarck in May 1941. But then Esmond's "swordfish" were dealing with a strong but single enemy, and now they had to attack a squadron guarded by guards and fighters. Soon, Spitfire fighters appeared over the slow torpedo bombers.

Weak cover ... - grumbled the captain. He never learned that poor visibility prevented the rest of the Spitfires from finding the Swordfish wards.

German fighters met the British near Ramsgate and, having tied up the Spitfires, attacked the torpedo bombers, whose crews saw the enemy squadron at 12:50. Splitting the squadron, Esmond led the vehicles of Lieutenants Rose and King's Mill to attack. On the other side Lieutenants Thompson, Wood and Bligh were advancing on the enemy. The commander's "swordfish" slipped through the escort barrage zone and rushed at low level to the dark gray bulk of Scharnhorst. And on the planes and body of the torpedo bomber, the shells of the Messerschmitts tightly clinging to it were already hitting. With the last effort, the wounded Esmond dropped a torpedo, and immediately his blazing car fell into the water. Lieutenant Rose's Swordfish, freed from a torpedo, swept over the deck of a ship, flared up and splashed awkwardly. Climbing into an inflatable boat, the pilots clearly saw how the burning Kingsmill plane crashed into the waves ... An hour and a half later, the stiffened pilots were picked up by a British torpedo boat. A desperate attack by "swordfish" cost England six cars, which killed 13 pilots. And not a single torpedo hit enemy ships!

Meanwhile, the squadron entered the mined waters, and Admiral Zilliax reluctantly ordered to slow down. Now the British will definitely resume attacks on ships crawling along narrow fairways, deprived of the ability to maneuver! But the passage of the squadron through the minefields, oddly enough, no one interfered.

By 14 o'clock the ships again picked up speed, but Scharnhorst immediately shuddered from a powerful explosion. However, the damage caused by the mine was not too serious, and soon he was again moving at a speed of 25 knots. The Brest squadron entered the North Sea, and the only one who could interfere with it was a division of destroyers from Harwich.

The commander of this division - Commander Paizi - received orders to attack the Nazis when his ships were on training at sea. The division consisted of two leaders and four destroyers built at the end of the First World War. They were even inferior to the German battleships in speed. Realizing that the division was hopelessly late in attacking, Pizi took a chance and led his ships through the minefields. True, the destroyer Walpole was forced to turn back to the base due to a breakdown of the machine, the rest confirmed the truth of the saying "who does not risk does not win."

At 15:17, the flagship leader Campbell's signalmen saw the battleships of Zilliaks 9.5 miles through the rain and fog. Using poor visibility, Pizi approached the enemy for another 2 miles, after which the Campbell and Viviciouses fired torpedoes at once. The Worcester, which came even closer to Scharnhorst, was immediately covered by a salvo of battleships and received several direct hits. McKay and Whitshed were the last to fire their torpedoes. And none of them reached their goal!

Now only 242 British bombers could overtake the squadron, which was moving at full speed along the Dutch coast. But they were not lucky either - the squadron was discovered by the crews of only 39 vehicles, which went out to the target at random, without cover. The result - anti-aircraft guns of Nazi ships and fighters shot down 15 bombers, and all British bombs exploded in the sea ...

At 1955 hours, on the beam of the island, Terschelling ran into a mine and Gneisenau. A strong explosion damaged the bottom of the battleship in the stern, he temporarily lost speed, but at 7 o'clock the next day he was the first from the squadron to anchor at the mouth of the Elbe. It was followed by Prinz Eugen, Zilliax's only capital ship not to be damaged in the breach. As for Scharnhorst, it was blown up again at 21:35, took in more than 1,000 tons of outboard water, and with great difficulty, with the help of tugboats, crawled to the base in Wilhelmshafen. Nevertheless, the Kriegsmarine command had reason to consider Operation Cerberus a success.

Millions of British people were asking the same question in February 1942. Yes, Britain had a chance to survive tragedies - take at least the death of the battlecruiser Hood, sunk in May 1941 with the entire crew of the German battleship Bismarck. But Hood died in battle, and the honor of the fleet was not damaged. And now? However, in order to understand the situation, let us turn to the events of the end of 1941.

Then the Nazi fleet had impressive forces. The newest battleship Tirpitz, heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper and Admiral Scheer, 4 light cruisers and destroyers were stationed in the Baltic. The battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were stationed in Brest. Destroyers and submarines were based in the ports of Nazi-occupied Norway.

The British home fleet then consisted of the battleships King George and Rodney, the aircraft carrier Victorias, 4 heavy and 6 light cruisers, and destroyers. The latter were not enough even to protect the allied convoys traveling through the central Atlantic.

As it turned out, the ranks of the Admiralty worried in vain. Hitler's attention was focused on the Eastern Front, where the Wehrmacht suffered its first serious defeats. Therefore, Hitler decided to stop the operations of surface ships in the mid-Atlantic and concentrate them in northern Norway, from where they could strike at the Arctic convoys en route to the ports of the Soviet Union. On December 12, 1941, he ordered Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen stationed in Brest to be transferred to Norwegian waters, who were to break through the English Channel. A detailed plan for this operation "Cerberus" was developed in detail by the commander of the Brest squadron, Vice Admiral Zilliaks.

LC Scharnhorst. There were 2 of them and Gneisenau. They were attributed to various classes of heavy ships, either battleships or battlecruisers. For battleships, their AGK-280mm is rather weak. Yes, and VDM is not enough for the battleships of WWII. There were plans to re-equip them with 3x2x380mm, but this remained the plan.

By the combination of parameters, ships of the Scharnhorst type are often (and quite rightly) called battlecruisers. However, the Scharnhorst project is more of a pedigree from "pocket battleships". The only thing that the designers borrowed from the Kaiser battlecruisers was the armor scheme. Otherwise, the Scharnhorst type is simply a Deutschland grown to normal size with a third 283-mm turret and a steam turbine plant.

In the meantime, the squadron was moving through the strait at a 7-knot course and at 05:30 on February 12 passed the island of Alderney. At dawn, Messerschmitts of air cover hung over the ships.

“Weak cover…” the captain grumbled. He never learned that poor visibility prevented the rest of the Spitfires from finding the Swordfish wards.

German fighters met the British near Ramsgate and, having tied up the Spitfires, attacked the torpedo bombers, whose crews saw the enemy squadron at 12:50. Splitting the squadron, Esmond led the vehicles of Lieutenants Rose and King's Mill to attack. On the other side Lieutenants Thompson, Wood and Bligh were advancing on the enemy. The commander's "swordfish" slipped through the escort barrage zone and rushed at low level towards the dark gray bulk of Scharnhorst. And on the planes and body of the torpedo bomber, the shells of the Messerschmitts tightly clinging to it were already hitting. With the last effort, the wounded Esmond dropped a torpedo, and immediately his blazing car fell into the water. Lieutenant Rose's Swordfish, freed from a torpedo, swept over the deck of a ship, flared up and splashed awkwardly. Climbing into an inflatable boat, the pilots clearly saw how the burning Kingsmill plane crashed into the waves ... An hour and a half later, the stiffened pilots were picked up by a British torpedo boat. A desperate attack by "swordfish" cost England six cars, which killed 13 pilots. And not a single torpedo hit enemy ships!

The commander of this division, Commander Paizi, was ordered to attack the Nazis when his ships were on training at sea. The division consisted of two leaders and four destroyers built at the end of the First World War. They were even inferior to the German battleships in speed. Realizing that the division was hopelessly late in attacking, Pizi took a chance and led his ships through the minefields. True, the destroyer Walpole was forced to turn back to the base due to a breakdown of the machine, the rest confirmed the truth of the saying "who does not risk does not win."

At 15:17, the flagship leader Campbell's signalmen saw the battleships of Zilliaks 9.5 miles through the rain and fog. Using poor visibility, Pizi approached the enemy for another 2 miles, after which the Campbell and Viviciouses fired torpedoes at once. The Worcester, which came even closer to Scharnhorst, was immediately covered by a volley of battleships and received several direct hits. McKay and Whitshed were the last to fire their torpedoes. And none of them reached their goal!

Now only 242 British bombers could overtake the squadron, which was moving at full speed along the Dutch coast. But they were not lucky either - the squadron was discovered by the crews of only 39 vehicles, which, discordantly, without cover, went to the target. The result - the anti-aircraft guns of the Nazi ships and fighters shot down 15 bombers, and all the British bombs exploded in the sea ...

At 1955, on the beam of the island, Terschelling ran into a mine and Gneisenau. A strong explosion damaged the bottom of the battleship in the stern, he temporarily lost speed, but at 7 o'clock the next day he was the first from the squadron to anchor at the mouth of the Elbe. It was followed by Prinz Eugen, Zilliax's only capital ship not damaged by the breach. As for Scharnhorst, it was blown up again at 21:35, took in more than 1,000 tons of outboard water, and with great difficulty, with the help of tugboats, crawled to the base in Wilhelmshaven. Nevertheless, the Kriegsmarine command had reason to consider Operation Cerberus a success.

KRT Prince Eugen.

py.sy. There is a story that Winnie asked only-Why? And the admirals could not find anything to answer.

From the point of view of the aftermath, on February 24, 42, Gneisenau received a direct hit by an English 454 kg bomb in the area of \u200b\u200bthe first tower. The explosion caused great destruction. The battleship got up for repairs, which never ended. In January 43, repairs were stopped.

Operation Cerberus

After Germany and Italy declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941, there was little chance for surface ships to succeed in the Atlantic. In addition, "Gneisenau", "Scharnhorst" and "Prince Eugen" who joined them after the death of "Bismarck" had big changes in personnel, and it took time for exercises and training to go on a long trip across the Atlantic. To cross the Denmark Strait to Norway, or between the Faroes and Iceland, all three ships needed to be refueled at sea, and almost all German supply ships in the Atlantic had already been sunk. Just before the death of the Bismarck from a sunken boatU-100 the British got some German secret codes, the knowledge of which made it possible to sink the bulk of the German "suppliers" in May - June 1941. In addition, Hitler no longer wanted to risk large ships in the Atlantic, considering the defense of Norway more important. Bearing in mind the increased effectiveness of radar and reconnaissance aircraft, the command of the fleet suggested that Hitler return all three heavy ships through the English Channel - the most daring and risky option for a breakthrough. The German naval command foresaw that the northern waters would become the most important theater of operations, especially with the entry of the United States into the war and with the increase in the number of convoys to the USSR. The repair of the Gneisenau had been completed by that time, and it was dangerous to stay in Brest, the British raids on which were becoming more and more fierce and accurate. On December 18, the ship received fragmentation damage from several bomb hits in the dry dock, on December 23 she became along the pier to check the electronic systems, and within a week she was brought to full combat readiness.

On December 30, the Scharnhorst was almost locked in the dock when a floating crane was overturned by a heavy bomb at its gates. A few days later, camouflage nets stretched over the ship caught fire, but major troubles were avoided.

By the end of 1941, they completed the development of preliminary plans for the return of the Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen to Germany for service in Norway, which Hitler called the “zone of fate”. The damage received by the Gneisenau during the raids on Brest showed that the Luftwaffe was unable to provide reliable air cover for these ships in the base. On January 6, 1942, during the next raid, a bomb exploded between the side of the Gneisenau and the wall of the dry dock. The fragments pierced the outer skin in the waterline area in some places, which led to the flooding of several side compartments. The repair took 10 days.

At a meeting of the senior commanders of the fleet and air forces at Hitler's headquarters on January 12, the final decision was made to break through the "Brest squadron". When planning the operation, called "Cerberus", all precautions and disinformation about the possible movements of these ships were observed. At the end of the month, Vice Admiral Otto Ziliaks, who was appointed commander of the operation (by the way, the first commander of the Scharnhorst), received a detailed breakthrough plan.

On the evening of January 26, the Gneisenau went to sea to test the mechanisms and artillery exercises, and a few days later she was completely ready to cross the English Channel. The Scharnhorst left the dock on January 15, loaded the ammunition and was at sea for 10 hours on February 3 for testing and artillery practice. The rest of the preparation for the breakthrough had to be carried out in the harbor.

In the first days of February, at night, trawling of the passage in the English Channel began, which the British never found. But they spotted the passage of the destroyer flotilla to Brest, which gave reason to assume that the German squadron was about to enter the Atlantic.

Around 11 pm on February 11, 1942, the Germans launched one of the most daring operations of the Second World War. The departure of the Scharnhorst (Ciliax's flag), the Gneisenau, and the Prinz Eugen delayed the air raid on Brest for two hours, so that the ships entered the Channel just after midnight. At 27 knots they sailed along the French coast, and at 0630 they were joined by a destroyer flotilla near Cherbourg. Luftwaffe planes circled over the very masts of their ships to disorientate the British radars. The close interaction of the fleet and aviation was ensured by General Adolf Galland, who assigned a Luftwaffe officer to each large ship for communication. German aircraft then interfered with British radar by dropping foil reflectors. At 1300, the squadron passed the cliffs of Dover without resistance, but 34 minutes later it was attacked by six Swordfish torpedo bombers escorted by Spitfire fighters. Powerful air cover tied the Spitfires into battle, and the slow-moving torpedo bombers were attacked by other aircraft and fierce anti-aircraft fire from ships. All six planes were shot down without any hits. The flagship opened fire on one of the Swordfish from a distance of about 1 km. The plane fell into the water about a hundred meters from the port side of the ship, but managed to fire a torpedo, which they managed to dodge with a sharp lapel.

But at 14.31, 30 m from the port side of the Scharnhorst, opposite the Bruno tower, one of the magnetic mines set by British aircraft at a depth of 38 m a few days earlier exploded. On the ship, due to fuse damage, the electrical systems failed, leaving all rooms without lighting for 20 minutes. The emergency switches left without power on the boilers and turbines did not allow the turbines to be stopped immediately.

While the Scharnhorst stood motionless, Vice Admiral Otto Ziliaks transferred the flag to the destroyerZ-29. At the same time, on the destroyer, which came close to the side of the battleship in heavy seas, the wing of the bridge was torn off, which caught on the Scharnhorst superstructures. The explosion of a mine formed a large hole in the area of the Bruno tower, in 30 waterproof compartments of the five main compartments over a length of 40 m, about 1220 tons of water accumulated, the ship received a roll to the port side of 1 degree and a trim on the bow of 1 m. were also serious. Tower "Bruno" temporarily jammed with serious damage to the main electric motor. The forward 150 mm turret and a single 150 mm port mount were also jammed, and 105 mm mount No. 2 was damaged. Several transformers and some fire control equipment were destroyed. Weak foundations not designed for such shock loads failed the bearings of the feed pumps and turbine generators, forcing the ship to stop. Because of the bearings, all turbogenerators failed, with the exception of those located in compartment No. 4. For a short time, the aft gyrocompass, director and echo sounder failed.

Perhaps due to the poor quality of welding, cracks and shells formed in the keel and bottom plating in front of the bow turret. The same, but due to the poor quality of the casting, happened to the starboard hawse pipe.

18 minutes after the explosion, the first turbine was launched, after 6 minutes - the second, and at 15.01 - the third, which made it possible to move at 27 knots. Shortly thereafter, a twin-engine bomber dropped several bombs 90 meters from the port side, which did not cause damage. A little later, Scharnhorst was attacked by 12 Beauforts for 10 minutes, but they were driven off by anti-aircraft fire and Luftwaffe fighters. Then they managed to evade a torpedo dropped by an aircraft from the aft corner. There were several more air attacks, but intense anti-aircraft fire and skillful maneuvering nullified all British efforts. The barrels of anti-aircraft guns were red-hot, one even tore apart, and several others jammed horizontal guidance drives.

The Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen and five destroyers that had gone forward were also subjected to air attacks. At 1445, five Whirlwind twin-engine fighter-bombers attempted to attack but were driven off by German fighters. Over the next two hours, fighters and anti-aircraft fire repulsed several more air raids. In total, 242 British aircraft participated in the attacks on the formation, of which only 39 were able to reach the target. Although there were no hits on large ships, two escort ships received shrapnel damage and were forced to seek shelter in the bases.

At 16:17, five British destroyers launched an unsuccessful attack on the Gneisenau formation from a distance of 3700 m. The battlecruiser opened fire with 283-mm guns in full salvos, then Prinz Eugen's 203-mm guns joined her. One of the destroyers - "Worchester" - approached at a distance of 200 m, but hit by 283-mm and 203-mm shells stopped, being under concentrated fire from German ships for 10 minutes. On the Gneisenau, due to the strong wind that drove its own smoke towards the target, it was difficult to distinguish bursts from its shells, which may have saved the Worcester from death. However, he received heavy damage to the superstructures, lost both masts. Several 283-mm shells pierced through its hull, leaving huge holes in the sides. Heavy shelling and bad weather prevented the British destroyers from making a decisive attack.

This group of destroyers was assembled in great haste, and included two ships from the 16th Flotilla from Harwich and four from the 21st Flotilla from Sheerness. One destroyer was left behind due to problems with propeller shaft bearings. It should also be noted that the Home Fleet sailed from Scapa Flow to Hvalfjord, Iceland, in order to be in the best position to intercept the Germans if they tried to break through the North Atlantic. The core of these forces were the battleships King GeorgeV"and" Rodney ", as well as the aircraft carrier" Victories ".

Meanwhile, the Scharnhorst, which had set in motion, lagged behind the main forces by 23 km. At 16.08 an attack took place, in which about 100 Hudson and Beaufort bombers took part. Again, there were no hits on the ships, and at least five aircraft were shot down by the Germans.

At 18.06 one of the British torpedo bombers broke through dense anti-aircraft fire, but the torpedo fired by him went close to the surface and the ship easily evaded it. With the onset of darkness, the formation was attacked by Wellington bombers for 30 minutes, which they managed to drive away, knocking down several cars. The raids somewhat delayed the advance of the German formation, so that British aircraft managed to lay mines at the mouth of the Elbe and on the approach to the Kiel Canal.

On one of the mines dropped a few days earlier, near Terschelling (Holland) at 19.55, the Gneisenau, which was going at 27 knots, was blown up. The explosion occurred in front of the aft turret, as a result, several dents formed in the hull, some welds and sheathing sheets cracked. There was a loss of power from the middle turbine, and the commander ordered the ship to be stopped. The corridor of the right propeller shaft turned out to be flooded, the shaft alignment was disturbed, because of which some packing glands were broken. Outboard water began to filter into the hull, but the roll and trim turned out to be insignificant. The gaps in the glands were quickly sealed with non-porous material, and the incoming water was pumped out. Part of the navigation equipment was damaged by the impact, but the guns and mechanisms were not damaged. After 30 minutes, the ship set sail and continued to move at low speed. At 3.50, together with two destroyers, the Gneisenau anchored in Helgoland Bay.

By 18.00 Scharnhorst approached the coast of Holland. At 19.16, several bombs dropped from a great height fell behind her stern. And at 21.34, another magnetic mine exploded from the starboard side at a depth of 24 m. Gyrocompasses and lighting failed for two minutes. Again, all the turbines had to be stopped: the left and middle ones jammed, and the right one was almost undamaged.

A large hole formed near the aft installation of 105-mm anti-aircraft guns. Ten rooms in four main watertight compartments received about 300 tons of water. The steam line fittings in the starboard engine room failed to withstand the impact and due to steam leaks, the associated boilers had to be shut down. The foundation bolts of the outer bearings of the propeller shaft have collapsed. I had to go only under the middle turbine at a speed of 10 knots until they gave part of the load to the right shaft, after which the speed was increased to 14 knots. The list to port, formed after the first explosion, leveled off, but the draft increased even more. The right turbine was launched at 22.11, but the left one required repair at the shipyard. Additional damage was caused to electrical systems, due to the failure of automatic equipment, the switches did not work for 30 minutes, generator compartment No. 5 failed, and compartment No. 2 had difficulty maintaining a steady supply of current. The mechanisms and rotating parts of the main battery turrets received minor damage due to a strong impact, and several 105-mm mounts were slightly more seriously damaged.

At 08:00 on February 13, the Scharnhorst met some ice that delayed its progress at the mouth of the Yade River. Vice Admiral Ciliax again transferred the flag to him; in the afternoon the ship arrived at Wilhelmshaven, where it was docked for inspection of the hull. It turned out that the damage was not so serious as to keep the ship for a long time at the shipyard in Wilhelmshaven, which was too close to the British air bases and was subjected to frequent raids. Therefore, the ship moved to Kiel to repair the damage.

The success of the breakthrough was largely facilitated by the interaction with the Luftwaffe, which allocated 252 fighters for air cover. This was one of the few cases when the German fleet and aviation worked together so well that the British also felt that they lost more than 40 aircraft in raids on the Brest squadron that was breaking through.