Brusilovsky breakthrough in Galicia. Brusilovsky breakthrough: briefly about the offensive

Military action is always a tragedy. First of all, for ordinary soldiers and their families, who may not wait for loved ones from the front. Our country survived two catastrophes - the First World War and the Great Patriotic War, where it played one of the key roles. The Second World War is a separate topic, books are written about it, films and programs are made. The events of the First World War and the role of the Russian Empire in it are not particularly popular with us. Although our soldiers and commanders-in-chief did a lot for the victory of the allied bloc of the Entente. One of the most important events that changed the course of the war was the Brusilovsky breakthrough.

A little about General Brusilov

Without exaggeration, the Brusilovsky breakthrough is the only military operation named after the commander in chief. Therefore, it is impossible not to mention this person.

Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov came from a family of hereditary nobles, that is, the origin was the most noble. The future legend of the First World War was born in Tiflis (Georgia) in 1853 in the family of a Russian military leader and a Pole. From childhood, Alyosha dreamed of becoming a military man, and as he grew up, he fulfilled his dream - he entered the Corps of Pages, then was attached to a dragoon regiment. He was a participant in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, where he fought bravely. For exploits on the fronts, the emperor awarded him orders.

Subsequently, Alexei Brusilov becomes the commander of the squadron and switches to teaching. He was known in Russia and abroad as an outstanding rider, an expert in cavalry riding. And it is not surprising that it was such a person who became the turning point that decided the outcome of the war.

The beginning of the war

Until 1916, the Russian army was not very lucky on the battlefields - the Russian Empire was losing hundreds of thousands of soldiers' lives. General Brusilov participated in the war from the very beginning, taking command of the 8th Army. His operations were quite successful, but it was a drop in the bucket compared to other failures. In general, fierce battles took place in the territories of Western Europe, in which the Russians were defeated - participation in the battle of Tannenberg and near the Masurian Lakes in 1914-1915 reduced the size of the Russian army. The generals commanding the fronts - Northern, Northwestern and Southwestern (before Brusilov) were not eager to attack the Germans, from whom they had suffered defeats before. It needed a win. Which had to wait another year.

Note that the Russian army did not have the latest innovations in technology (this was one of the reasons for the defeat in battles). And only by 1916 the situation began to change. Factories began to produce more rifles, soldiers began to receive improved training and combat techniques. The winter of 1915-1916 was relatively calm for Russian soldiers, so the command decided to improve the situation with training and advanced training.

Attempts were crowned with success - in 1916 the army entered much better prepared than at the beginning of the war. The only drawback was in the officers who were able to lead - they were killed or taken prisoner. Therefore, at the very "tops" it was decided to carry out - Alexei Alekseevich should take command of the southwestern front.

The first operation was not long in coming - the Russian military in the battle of Verdun tried to push the Germans to the east. It was a success, and an unexpected one - the German army was surprised at how experienced and armed the Russian army had become. However, the success did not last long - soon all weapons and artillery were removed by order of the leadership, and the soldiers were left unprotected against the enemy, who did not fail to take advantage of this. The poison gas attack reduced the Russian army even further. The Western Front retreated. And then the top leadership made a decision that should have been taken at the beginning of hostilities.

Appointment of Brusilov as commander-in-chief

In March, Alexei Brusilov takes over from General Ivanov (who has been criticized for his mismanagement of the army and the failure of military operations).

Alexei Alekseevich advocates an offensive on all three fronts, two of his "colleagues" - Generals Evert and Kuropatkin - prefer to take a waiting and defensive position.

However, Brusilov argued that only a massive attack on the Germans could change the course of the war - they simply could not physically respond in all three directions at once. And then success is guaranteed.

It was not possible to reach full agreement, but it was decided that the Southwestern Front would launch an offensive, while the other two would continue. Brusilov instructed his subordinate officers to develop an accurate plan of attack so that not a single detail was overlooked.

The soldiers knew that they were going to attack a well-defended defensive line. Laid mines, electric fences, barbed wire and much more - that's what met the Russian army as a gift from Austria-Hungary.

For complete success, you need to study the area, and Brusilov spent a lot of time compiling maps to then distribute them to the soldiers. He understood that he had no reserves, neither human nor technical. That is, either all or nothing. There won't be another chance.

Breakthrough

The operation began on 4 June. The main idea was to deceive the enemy, who expects an attack all along the front and does not know exactly where the blow will be delivered. Thus, Brusilov hoped to confuse the Germans and prevent them from repelling the attack. Machine guns were placed along the entire perimeter of the front, trenches were dug, roads were laid. Only the highest military officials who directly supervised the operation knew about the real place of the strike. Artillery bombardments threw the Austrian army into confusion, and after four days it was forced to retreat.

The main target for Brusilov was the capture of the cities of Lutsk and Kovel (which were subsequently captured by Russian troops). Unfortunately, the actions of other generals, Evert and Kuropatkin, did not go well with Brusilov. Therefore, their absence and the maneuvers of General Ludendorff caused great problems for Alexei Alekseevich.

In the end, Evert abandoned the attack and transferred his men to the Brusilov sector. This maneuver was negatively received by the general himself, since he knew that the Germans were monitoring the reshuffling of forces on the fronts and would transfer their soldiers. In the territories subject to Germany and Austria-Hungary, an established railway network was built, along which German soldiers arrived at the place earlier than Evert's army.

In addition, the number of German troops significantly exceeded the Russian army. By August, as a result of bloody battles, the latter lost about 500 thousand people, while the losses of the Germans and Austrians amounted to 375 thousand.

Results

Brusilovsky breakthrough is considered one of the bloodiest battles. Within a few months of the operation, losses on both sides ran into the millions. The power of the Austro-Hungarian army was undermined. It is difficult to say exactly what the losses were on all sides - German and Russian sources give different data. But one thing is invariable - it was with the Brusilov breakthrough that the bloc's success streak and the Russian army in particular began.

Romania, seeing a near defeat in the war of the Central Powers, went over to the side of the Entente. Unfortunately, the war continued for another long year and a half and ended only in 1918. There were many more noteworthy battles in it, but only the Brusilovsky breakthrough became a turning point, which is talked about even a century later, both in Russia and in the West.

The Brusilovsky breakthrough went down in military history as one of the few successful front-line operations of the Russian troops during the First World War.

Initially, it was called the Lutsk breakthrough or the 4th Galician battle. This was in keeping with the tradition that the battle was named after the place where it took place.

How the offensive was prepared

It was planned by the members of the Entente at the beginning of 1916. On the river The Somme was to be attacked by the British and French in early July. The strike of the Russian armies was supposed two weeks earlier. To this end, intensive training of troops was organized on the Russian Southwestern Front.

This association of four armies was commanded by General Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov. The personnel were actively trained in offensive actions. Well-equipped engineering bridgeheads were moved up to the Austrian positions. A detailed reconnaissance of the enemy's positions and his defensive potential was constantly carried out.

brusilovsky breakthrough photo

On the eve of the breakthrough, the armies of the front had a serious advantage over the enemy. They numbered more than half a million infantrymen and 60 thousand cavalrymen. Their actions in the offensive were to be supported by 168 heavy and 1770 light guns. In order to increase the superiority, during the month before the start of the offensive operation, a serious replenishment of combat subunits and units was carried out.

On the state of the enemy troops

Four Russian armies were opposed by one German and four armies of Austria-Hungary. The total number of their infantry units was 448 thousand bayonets, cavalry - 38 thousand. The number of heavy guns was almost three times that of the Russians. The enemy had 1301 light guns.

Against the armies of General A.A. Brusilov, a deeply echeloned, powerful defense was created. It consisted of three defensive lines with several lines of trenches.

Fortification of the Austro-German troops was provided by:

support nodes, which were the basis of a line of well-equipped trenches;
continuous trenches fired from the flanks between these nodes;
located at heights, long-term firing points with special cut-off positions in which the attackers fell into the "bag"; special slingshots, wolf pits and notches installed in front of the trenches;
powerful dugouts, multi-row wire barriers, minefields, etc.

The enemy command believed that the Russian armies could not break through these barriers.

Breakthrough, result

The armies of the front, with their decisive offensive actions, caught the Austro-German troops by surprise. The offensive began on May 22, 1916. and the battle lasted until 09/07/1916. In this case, a previously unknown form of breaking into enemy positions on a wide front was used. It consisted in the fact that all the armies of the front entrusted to General Brusilov were advancing at the same time.

brusilovsky breakthrough photo

The main blow was delivered in the direction of Lutsk, which was occupied by the Russian army on May 25. The result of the breakthrough was the decisive defeat of the Austro-Hungarian troops. At 80-120 km, enemy territory was captured, the territories of Volhynia and Bukovina, and partially Galicia, were almost completely occupied.

According to Russian sources, the losses of the enemy in manpower and various weapons were enormous. To stop the Russian offensive, the states that opposed the Entente troops were forced to urgently transfer more than 400 thousand troops to the places of fierce battles. The Brusilovsky breakthrough provided the Entente states with a complete strategic initiative in military operations.

A four-meter-high bronze monument to A. A. Brusilov was erected in St. Petersburg.
In Vinnitsa, where Aleksey Brusilov lived for some time with his family, his bas-relief is installed on one of the houses
In honor of the glorious general, streets in Moscow and Voronezh bear his name.
In 1923, Brusilov was appointed Chief Inspector of the Red Army Cavalry.
The ancient Ukrainian town of Brusilov has nothing to do with the outstanding general.

In Soviet military history, it is emphasized that the Brusilovsky breakthrough became a harbinger of the outstanding offensives of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War.

The fighting in the Eastern European theater of the First World War in the campaign of 1916 was marked by such an important event as the offensive operation of the Russian Southwestern Front under the command of General A.A. Brusilov. During its implementation, for the first time in the entire positional period of hostilities, an operational breakthrough of the enemy front was carried out, which neither the Germans, nor the Austro-Hungarians, nor the British and French had ever been able to do before.

General A.A. Brusilov

The success of the operation was achieved thanks to the new offensive method chosen by Brusilov, the essence of which was to break through enemy positions not in one sector, but in several places along the entire front. The breakthrough in the main direction was combined with auxiliary strikes in other directions, because of which the entire positional front of the enemy was shaken and he could not concentrate all his reserves to repel the main attack.

“In the early warm morning of June 4, 1916, May 22, according to the old style, the Austrian troops, buried in front of the Russian Southwestern Front, did not see the sunrise,” the historian writes. -Instead of sunlight from the east, dazzling and blinding death - thousands of shells turned habitable, heavily fortified positions into hell ... This morning, something unheard of and unseen in the annals of a dull, bloody, positional war happened. Almost the entire length of the South-Western Front, the attack was a success. (Yakovlev N.N. The Last War of Old Russia. M., 1994. P. 169.)

This first, overwhelming success was achieved thanks to the close interaction of infantry and artillery. Russian gunners once again demonstrated their superiority to the whole world. Artillery preparation in various sectors of the front lasted from 6 to 45 hours. The Austrians experienced all types of Russian artillery fire and even received their portion of chemical shells. “The earth was moving. With a howl and whistle, three-inch shells flew, with a dull groan, heavy explosions merged into one terrible symphony. (Semanov S.N. Makarov. Brusilov. M., 1989. P. 515.)

Under cover of the fire of their artillery, the Russian infantry went on the attack. She moved in waves (3-4 chains in each), following one after another every 150-200 steps. The first wave, not stopping on the first line, immediately attacked the second. The third line was attacked by the third and fourth (regimental reserves) waves, which rolled over the first two (this method was called the "roll attack" and was subsequently used by the Allies in the Western European theater of war).

The most successful breakthrough was carried out on the right flank, in the offensive zone of the 8th Army of General Kaledin, which operated in the Lutsk direction. Lutsk was taken already on the third day of the offensive, and on the tenth day the army troops went deep into the enemy’s location for 60 km and reached the river. Stokhod. Much less successful was the attack of the 11th army of General Sakharov, who faced fierce resistance from the Austro-Hungarians. But on the left flank of the front, the 9th Army of General Lechitsky advanced 120 km, crossed the Prut River and took Chernivtsi on June 18.

Success had to be developed. The situation required a shift in the direction of the main attack from the Western Front to the Southwestern Front, but this was not done in a timely manner. The headquarters tried to put pressure on General A.E. Evert, commander of the Western Front, in order to force him to go on the offensive, but he, showing indecision, hesitated. Convinced of Evert's unwillingness to take decisive action, Brusilov himself turned over his head to the commander of the left-flank 3rd Army of the Western Front, L.P. Lesha with a request to immediately go on the offensive and support his 8th army. However, Evert did not allow his subordinate to do so.

Finally, on June 16, the Headquarters became convinced of the need to use the success of the Southwestern Front. Brusilov began to receive reserves (the 5th Siberian Corps from the Northern Front, General A.N. Kuropatkin and others), and Evert, although very late, was forced under pressure from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General M.V. Alekseev to go on the offensive in the Baranovichi direction. However, it ended unsuccessfully.

Meanwhile, in Berlin and Vienna, they realized the extent of the catastrophe that befell the Austro-Hungarian army. From near Verdun, from Germany, from the Italian and even Thessaloniki front, troops began to hastily be transferred to the aid of the defeated armies. Fearing to lose Kovel, the most important communications center, the Austro-Germans regrouped their forces and launched powerful counterattacks against the 8th Russian Army. By the end of June, there was some calm at the front. Brusilov, having received reinforcements from the 3rd, and then the Special Army (the latter was formed from the guards corps, it was the 13th in a row and, out of superstition, it was called the Special), launched a new offensive with the aim of reaching the line of Kovel, Brody, Stanislav. During this phase of the operation, Kovel was never taken by the Russians. The Austro-Germans managed to stabilize the front.

Due to the miscalculations of the Headquarters, the lack of will and inactivity of the commanders of the Western and Northern Fronts, the brilliant operation of the Southwestern Front did not receive the completion that could be expected. But she played a big role during the 1916 campaign. The Austro-Hungarian army suffered a crushing defeat. Its losses amounted to about 1.5 million killed and wounded and were already irreparable. 9 thousand officers and 450 thousand soldiers were taken prisoner. The Russians lost 500,000 men in this operation.

The Russian army, having won 25 thousand square meters. km, returned part of Galicia and all of Bukovina. From her victory, the Entente received invaluable benefits. To stop the Russian offensive, from June 30 to early September 1916, the Germans transferred at least 16 divisions from the Western Front, the Austro-Hungarians curtailed their offensive against the Italians and sent 7 divisions to Galicia, the Turks - 2 divisions. The success of the operation of the Southwestern Front predetermined the entry of Romania into the war on August 28, 1916 on the side of the Entente.

Despite its incompleteness, this operation is an outstanding achievement of military art, which is not denied by foreign authors either. They pay tribute to the talent of the Russian general. "Brusilovsky breakthrough" is the only battle of the First World War, in the title of which the name of the commander appears.

Operation name question

Contemporaries knew the battle as the "Lutsk breakthrough", which corresponded to the historical military tradition: the battles were named according to the place where they took place. We know the Battle of Borodino, not the "Kutuzovskaya"; The Neva battle, and not the "battle of the name of the Grand Duke Alexander Nevsky", etc. However, it was Brusilov who was given an honor never before seen anywhere: military operations in the spring of 1916 on the South-Western Front received the name "Brusilov Offensive".

The Russian liberal public often showed surprising activity when it was necessary to glorify a person whose exaltation was associated with the humiliation of the autocracy. When the success of the Lutsk breakthrough became obvious, according to the military historian A.A. Kersnovsky, “a victory that we have not yet won in a world war”, which had every chance of becoming a decisive victory and the final war, then in the ranks of the Russian opposition there was a fear that the victory would be attributed to the Tsar as the Supreme Commander, which would strengthen the monarchy, personified by Nicholas II build. In order to avoid this, it was necessary to try to lay all the glory on the commander-in-chief of the front: Brusilov began to be praised in the press, no matter how N.I. Ivanov for the victory in the Battle of Galicia, nor A.N. Selivanova for Przemysl, nor P.A. Plehve for Tomashev, nor N.N. Yudenich for Sarykamysh, Erzurum or Trabzon.

In Soviet times, the name associated with the name of the general who went to the service of the Bolsheviks fell to the court and Soviet historiographers, the Soviet lieutenant general M. Galaktionov wrote in his preface to Brusilov’s memoirs: “The Brusilov breakthrough is the forerunner of the remarkable breakthroughs made by the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War".

Brusilovsky breakthrough as an object of mythology

Nelipovich S.G.

The Brusilovsky breakthrough of 1916 occupies an important place in the history of the First World War. Its scope and drama shocked the world no less than Verdun, which became a symbol of the strategy of attrition. However, today in Russia much less is known about this major operation of the Russian army than 60 years ago.

At present, the myth of the Brusilov breakthrough has revived and is not going to die, generated by official propaganda and military censorship back in the war years, subjected to serious criticism in the 1920s, despite the opposition of A.A. Brusilov, refuted in the 30s and recreated later in the conditions of the Great Patriotic War. In the postwar years, serious researchers of the First World War (A.A. Strokov, I.I. Rostunov) could not overcome the "mythological" trend, their assessments of the Brusilov offensive are contradictory, because the facts refute ideological constructions. Why is there a reason to talk about the mythologization of the Brusilov breakthrough, what is the myth and what are the objections to its provisions?

Sam A.A. Brusilov in his memoirs, followed by Soviet military historians of the 40-70s, created the following main dogmas of the history of the offensive of the Southwestern Front:

the idea of the offensive belonged personally to Brusilov, and he personally insisted on carrying it out;

the offensive was a huge success - the enemy lost 2 million people, transferred 2.2 million soldiers and officers from other theaters of military operations, thanks to which operations near Verdun (France) and Trento (Italy) were stopped;

the breakthrough was successful only thanks to the method personally invented by Brusilov - an offensive by all armies at once, with tactical tasks for each, so that the enemy did not guess where the main blow was being struck (modified into the "theory of crushing blows" after 1941);

the offensive stopped due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, Brusilov's lack of reserves, M.V. Alekseev and commander of the 8th Army A.M. Kaledin, "treason" A.E. Evert.

An appeal to the historical works of the 20-30s (both Soviet and foreign authors), and to the documents of the Russian State Military Historical Archive allows us to refute the above. Here are the main arguments.

The idea of a distracting strike on Lutsk was expressed on April 1, 1916 at a meeting in Headquarters by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander M.V. Alekseev and only finalized by Brusilov in tactical and operational terms (1).

The breakthrough at Lutsk and on the Dniester really shook the Austro-Hungarian army. However, by July 1916, she had recovered from the defeat and, with the help of German troops, was able not only to repel further attacks, but also to defeat Romania. According to published archival data, the enemy lost, including the sick, on the Russian front by the end of the year a little more than 1 million people. 35 divisions were deployed against Brusilov's troops (including 8 badly battered from the west and 6 from Italy; 4 of them were taken back), i.e. less than it took to transfer against the Romanians (41).

It was because of the speech of Romania that the German offensive near Verdun was stopped; the operation against Italy stalled even before the start of the Brusilov breakthrough.

The "wide offensive" method is not Brusilov's invention. It was used by all parties in the 1914 campaign, and in 1915 by the Russian troops of N.I. Ivanov in the Carpathians and our opponents in Galicia, Volhynia, Poland, the Baltic states and Serbia. With a fortified front, success could only be achieved by a huge numerical superiority or in conditions of demoralization of the enemy. Otherwise, a frontal assault led to unjustified huge losses. Already in June, the enemy figured out the direction of the main attack and then repulsed it with the help of mobile reserves in the key sectors of the front.

Brusilov blamed others for his miscalculations in vain. Kaledin was his nominee and acted successfully until Brusilov himself began to interfere in every little thing in the management of the army, which lost over 300 thousand people as a result of the operation (2).

Accusations of A.E.'s inaction are also unfair. Evert: his Western Front launched an offensive, which the enemy repulsed. Alekseev, after the failure of the Western Front, takes the main blow to the Brusilov zone. Up to half a million soldiers from other fronts and more than 600,000 march reinforcements are sent to the Southwestern Front. At the same time, only according to rough estimates according to the statements of the Headquarters, Brusilov's Southwestern Front lost from May 22 (June 4) to October 14 (27), 1916 1.65 million people (3).

It was this circumstance that decided the fate of the offensive: thanks to the "Brusilov method", the Russian troops choked on their own blood. Brusilov did not complete a single task: the enemy was not defeated, his losses were less than those of the Russians, success for the attacks of the Western Front was also not prepared by this grand diversion operation. Kovel, which attracted all the attention of Brusilov, like Selena the lunatic, was never taken, despite the monstrous losses of three armies that stormed it in vain. It is no coincidence that many authors associated the disintegration of the Russian army with the collapse of hopes for the development of success as a result of Brusilov's offensive.

It should be noted that a myth can exist only if the sources are neglected. Now the task is again to expand the source base of research on the First World War and, of course, on the Brusilov breakthrough. We are talking primarily about archival sources, firmly forgotten since the 40s. The development of new documents will allow a better and deeper understanding of the great drama of 1914-1918.

Notes:

(1) Strategic outline of the war 1914-1918. M., 1920, part 5. S.27, 28; Vetoshnikov L.V. Brusilovsky breakthrough. M., 1940. P.24.
(2) Russian State Military Historical Archive. F.2003. Op.1. D.1304. L.227; F.2134. Op.2. D.308. L.43-280.
(3) Calculated from: Ibid. F.2003. Op.1. D.613. L.7-308; D.614. L.1-277; D.615. L.3-209; Op.2. D.426. L.218-280.

Nelipovich S.G. Brusilovsky breakthrough as an object of mythology // First World War: Prologue of the 20th century. M., 1998. S.632-634.

More than 100 years ago, in early August, one of the most famous ground operations of the First World War, authored by Russian General Alexei Brusilov, ended. The general's troops broke through the Austro-German front thanks to an original tactical novelty: the commander, for the first time in the history of wars, concentrated his forces and delivered powerful blows to the enemy in several directions at once. However, the offensive, which gave a chance to quickly end the war, was not brought to its logical end.

In May 1916, hostilities in Europe became protracted. In military affairs, this is called the fine term "positional warfare", but in fact it is an endless sitting in the trenches with unsuccessful attempts to go on a decisive offensive, with each attempt turning into huge victims. Such, for example, are the well-known battles on the Marne River in the autumn of 1914 and on the Somme in the winter-spring of 1916, which did not give tangible results (if you do not take hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded from all sides as a "result") neither to Russia's allies in the Entente bloc - England and France, nor opponents - Germany and Austria-Hungary.

General A. A. Brusilov (years of life: 1853-1926).

The Russian commander, Adjutant General Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov, studied the experience of these battles and came to curious conclusions. The main mistake of both the Germans and the Allies was that they acted according to outdated tactics, known since the time of the Napoleonic Wars. It was assumed that the enemy's front needed to be broken through with one powerful blow in a narrow area (as an example from the biography of Napoleon Bonaparte, we recall Borodino and the stubborn attempts of the French to crush the left flank of Kutuzov - the Bagration flushes). Brusilov, on the other hand, believed that at the beginning of the 20th century, with the development of the fortification system, the advent of mechanized equipment and aviation, holding the attacked area and quickly delivering reinforcements to it was no longer an insoluble task. The general developed a new offensive concept: several strikes in different directions.

Initially, the offensive of the Russian troops in 1916 was scheduled for mid-summer, and the Southwestern Front, commanded by Brusilov (he was opposed mainly by the troops of Austria-Hungary), was assigned a secondary role. The main goal was to contain Germany, so that practically all the reserves were at their disposal on the Northern and Western fronts. But Brusilov managed to defend his ideas before the Headquarters, headed by Emperor Nicholas II. This was partly facilitated by a change in the operational situation: in early-mid-May, the troops of Italy - another ally of England, France and Russia - suffered a major defeat from the Austrians near Trentino. In order to prevent the transfer of additional Austrian and German divisions to the west and the final defeat of the Italians, the Allies asked Russia to launch an offensive ahead of schedule. Now the South-Western Front of Brusilov was supposed to participate in it.

"Brusilovskaya" infantry on the Southwestern Front in 1916.

At the disposal of the general were four Russian armies - the 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th. The troops of the front at the time of the start of the operation numbered more than 630 thousand people (of which 60 thousand cavalry), 1770 light guns and 168 heavy ones. In manpower and light artillery, the Russians were slightly - about 1.3 times - superior to the Austrian and German armies that opposed them. But in heavy artillery, the enemy had an overwhelming, more than threefold advantage. This alignment of forces gave the Austro-German bloc an excellent opportunity for defensive battles. Brusilov, however, even managed to take advantage of this fact: he correctly calculated that it would be extremely difficult for the "heavy" enemy troops in the event of a successful Russian breakthrough to organize quick counterattacks.

Russian gun crew during the First World War.

The simultaneous offensive of four Russian armies, known in history as the "Brusilovsky breakthrough", began on May 22 (June 4, modern style) along a front with a total length of about 500 km. Brusilov - and this was also a tactical innovation - paid great attention to artillery preparation: for almost a day, Russian artillery continuously hit Austro-Hungarian and German positions. The ninth, the southernmost of the Russian armies, went on the offensive first, inflicting a crushing blow on the Austrians in the direction of the city of Chernivtsi. The army commander, General A. Krylov, also applied an original initiative: his artillery batteries constantly misled the enemy, transferring fire from one sector to another. The ensuing infantry attack was crowned with complete success: the Austrians did not understand until the very end which side to expect it from.

A day later, the 8th Russian army went on the offensive, hitting Lutsk. The deliberate delay was explained simply: Brusilov understood that the Germans and Austrians, in accordance with the prevailing concepts of tactics and strategy, would decide that Krylov's 9th Army would deal the main blow, and would transfer reserves there, weakening the front in other sectors. The general's calculation was brilliantly justified. If the pace of advance of the 9th Army slowed down slightly due to counterattacks, then the 8th Army (with the support of the 7th, which delivered an auxiliary blow from the left flank) literally swept away the weakened enemy defenses. Already on May 25, Brusilov's troops took Lutsk, and in general, in the first days, they advanced to a depth of 35 km. The 11th Army also went on the offensive in the region of Ternopil and Kremenets, but here the successes of the Russian troops were somewhat more modest.

Brusilovsky breakthrough. The dates in the title and legend of the map are given in the new style.

General Brusilov designated the city of Kovel, northwest of Lutsk, as the main goal of his breakthrough. The calculation was that a week later the troops of the Western Front of the Russians would begin to attack, and the German divisions in this sector would be in huge pincers. Alas, the plan never came to fruition. The commander of the Western Front, General A. Evert, postponed the offensive, citing rainy weather and the fact that his troops did not have time to finish their concentration. He was supported by the chief of staff of the Headquarters M. Alekseev, a long-time ill-wisher of Brusilov. In the meantime, the Germans, as expected, transferred additional reserves to the Lutsk region, and Brusilov was forced to temporarily stop the attacks. By June 12 (25), Russian troops went over to the defense of the occupied territories. Subsequently, in his memoirs, Alexei Alekseevich bitterly wrote about the inaction of the Western and Northern fronts, and, perhaps, these accusations have grounds - after all, both fronts, unlike Brusilov, received reserves for a decisive attack!

As a result, the main actions in the summer of 1916 took place exclusively on the Southwestern Front. In late June-early July, Brusilov's troops again tried to advance: this time, hostilities unfolded in the northern sector of the front, in the area of the Stokhid River, a tributary of the Pripyat. Apparently, the general had not yet lost hope for active support from the Western Front - the strike through Stokhod almost repeated the idea of the failed "Kovel ticks". Brusilov's troops again broke through the enemy's defenses, but they could not force the water barrier from the move. The general made his last attempt in late July-early August 1916, but the Western Front did not help the Russians, and the Germans and Austrians, throwing fresh units into battle, offered fierce resistance. "Brusilovsky breakthrough" ran out of steam.

Documentary photography of the aftermath of the breakthrough. In the photo - apparently, the defeated Austro-Hungarian positions.

The results of the offensive can be assessed in different ways. From a tactical point of view, it was undoubtedly successful: the Austro-German troops lost up to one and a half million people killed, wounded and captured (against 500 thousand for the Russians), the Russian Empire occupied a territory with a total area of 25 thousand square kilometers. A side effect was that shortly after Brusilov's success, Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente, significantly complicating the position of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

On the other hand, Russia did not seize the opportunity to quickly end the hostilities in its favor. In addition, Russian troops received an additional 400 km of front lines that needed to be controlled and protected. After the Brusilov breakthrough, Russia again got involved in a war of attrition, which was rapidly losing popularity among the people: mass protests intensified, the morale of the army was undermined. Already in the next year, 1917, this led to devastating consequences within the country.

It is interesting! German strategists learned the "lesson of Brusilov" very well. This is confirmed by the military operations of Germany a little over 20 years later, at the beginning of World War II. Both the “Manstein plan” to defeat France and the infamous “Barbarossa” plan to attack the USSR are actually built on the ideas of the Russian general: the concentration of forces and the breakthrough of the front in several directions at the same time.

The plan of Hitler's general (future field marshal) Erich von Manstein to defeat France. Compare with the map of the Brusilov breakthrough: doesn't it look like it?

The Brusilovsky breakthrough, in short, was one of the largest operations carried out on the Eastern Front of the First World War. Unlike other battles and battles, it was named not by the geographical location where it took place, but by the name of the general under whose command it was carried out.

Preparing for the offensive

The offensive in the summer of 1916 was an integral part of the general plan of the allies. Initially, it was scheduled for mid-June, while the Anglo-French troops were supposed to launch an offensive on the Somme two weeks later.
However, events unfolded a little differently than planned.
On April 1, during the military council, it was determined that everything was ready for the offensive operation. In addition, at that time the Russian army had a numerical superiority over the enemy in all three areas of warfare.
An important role in the decision to postpone the offensive was played by the plight in which Russia's allies found themselves. At that time, the “Verdun meat grinder” continued on the Western Front - the battle for Verdun, in which the Franco-British troops suffered heavy losses, and on the Italian front, the Austro-Hungarians pressed the Italians. In order to give the Allies at least a small respite, it was necessary to draw the attention of the German-Austrian armies to the east.
Also, the commanders and the commander-in-chief feared that if they did not prevent the actions of the enemy and did not help the allies, then defeating them, the German army in full force would move to the borders of Russia.
At this time, the Central Powers did not even think about preparing for an offensive, but instead they created an almost impenetrable defensive line. The defense was especially strong in that sector of the front, where General A. Bursilov was supposed to carry out an offensive operation.

Defense Breakthrough

The offensive of the Russian army came as a complete surprise to its opponents. The operation began late at night on May 22 with many hours of artillery preparation, as a result of which the enemy's first line of defense was practically destroyed and his artillery was partially neutralized.
The breakthrough that followed was carried out at once in several small areas, which subsequently expanded and deepened.
By the middle of the day on May 24, Russian troops managed to capture almost a thousand Austrian officers and more than 40 thousand ordinary soldiers and capture more than 300 units of various guns.
The ongoing offensive forced the Central Powers to hastily transfer additional forces here.
Literally every step was given to the Russian army with difficulty. Bloody battles and numerous losses accompanied the capture of every settlement, every strategically important object. However, only by August the offensive began to weaken due to increased enemy resistance and the fatigue of the soldiers.

Results

The result of the Brusilov breakthrough of the First World War, in short, was the advance of the front line deep into the territory of the enemy by an average of 100 km. Troops under the command of A. Brusilov occupied most of Volyn, Bukovina and Galicia. At the same time, the Russian troops inflicted huge losses on the Austro-Hungarian army, from which it was no longer able to recover.
Also, the actions of the Russian army, which led to the transfer of several German military units from the Western and Italian fronts, allowed the Entente countries to achieve some success in those areas as well.
In addition, it was this operation that became the impetus for the decision to enter the Romanian war on the side of the Entente.