The fate of the battleship Slava was rich in events. The last of the five battleships of the Borodino series, the ship was late with the completion of work by the time it left for the Far East as part of the 2nd Pacific Squadron and entered service in 1905. Its first major service, stretching for three years (1906-1909), began long-distance voyages with graduates of the Naval Corps and the Naval Engineering School - ship midshipmen, candidate officers.

By August 1914, the battleship had been in the fleet for nine years, and, having begun service on the eve of the dreadnought era, approached the beginning of the First World War completely outdated morally. Since 1911, he, together with the veteran of Port Arthur "Tsesarevich" and the pre-dreadnoughts "Andrew the First-Called" and "Emperor Paul I", made up a brigade of battleships of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. At that time, it was the only force that could stand in the way of the enemy in the event of his operation to break through the sea to the Russian capital. After the entry into service at the beginning of 1915 of the four dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol type, which from now on became the "shield of Petrograd", the combat value of the Glory was finally determined as secondary.

However, it was precisely this status that allowed her to exhaustively prove herself at the forefront of the naval war in the Baltic and eventually become the most famous ship of the Russian fleet. In July 1915, after the German army occupied Courland and reached the southern coast of the Gulf of Riga, as well as due to the increased activity of the enemy at sea, a plan arose to strengthen the naval grouping of naval forces in the bay with a heavy ship. According to the plan, such a ship, being the backbone of heterogeneous light forces - destroyers, gunboats, minesweepers - was designed to effectively ensure their actions against the enemy coastal flank, having overwhelming superiority in artillery. It was also entrusted with the main task of countering with its long-range heavy artillery the enemy's attempts to penetrate, under the guidance of minesweepers, through the minefields of the Irben Strait into the Gulf of Riga.

It was this role that went to Glory, which was to plunge into the routine of a peripheral naval war off the shallow coast of Courland and Livonia. Transferred to the bay on July 18, 1915, the battleship coped with this task admirably. Successfully using his powerful artillery, showing a sound initiative (rolling to increase the firing range), he successfully mastered the role of an integral element of defense in a mine-artillery position, becoming a real stumbling block for the German forces to break into the bay from July 26 to August 4, 1915.

During the entire period of the Slava's stay in the Naval Forces of the Slava Bay, it was the backbone of the Russian light forces. It is her actions that explain the 10-day "trampling at Irben" of the many times superior enemy forces in the summer of 1915, it was "Slava" who led the pressure on the coastal flank of the enemy land front from the sea, west of Riga, the remainder of 1915 and in 1916. Having undergone intensive repairs in the winter of 1916/1917, the renewed Slava again moved to the Gulf of Riga in the summer. Here she was destined to die on October 4, 1917 during the defense of Moonsund in a battle with a many times strongest enemy.

The theme of "Glory" in the battles of 1915-1917 many works have been devoted to the national historiography of the fleet. Chronologically, they are divided into several waves, reflecting periods of a surge of interest in the history of the ship. The first major publication was D. P. Malinin’s work “The battleship Slava as part of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga in the war of 1914–1917” placed in the “Naval Collection” in 1923; according to personal documents, memoirs and materials of the Naval Historical Commission” (Nos. 5, 7). In 1928, the major work of the Naval Academy “Fighting the Fleet against the Coast in the World War” was published, volume IV of which was written by A. M. Kosinsky and was dedicated to the Moonsund operation of 1917. In 1940, a monograph by K. P. Puzyrevsky was published "Damage to ships from artillery and damage control", which systematized the experience of the impact of gunfire on ships based on the materials of the First World War.

A feature of these works of the "first wave" was that they were written by former naval officers - contemporaries of the fighting in the Baltic in 1914-1917, and D.P. Malinin directly participated on the battleship in the battles of 1917 in Moonsund as a senior navigator officer. Sufficiently complete, informative and written in good language by an educated man of the "old times", Malinin's work was mainly devoted to a general presentation of the circumstances of the defense of the Gulf of Riga in the campaigns of 1915-1917. and gave the actions of "Glory" a significant place. The detailed work of A. M. Kosinsky was devoted to both actions in the defense of the Moonsund archipelago of naval forces and ground units. Due to the inevitable need for a brevity of the narrative for such a detailed work, Kosinsky's material in the part of "Glory" as a whole is presented similarly to D.P. Malinin. Like his predecessor, A. M. Kosinsky used the documents of the Naval Historical Commission, (including reports on the battle on October 4, 1917 of the officers of "Glory" and the report of Vice Admiral M. K. Bakhirev on the operation that existed then in the manuscript ). As for the work of K. P. Puzyrevsky on the impact of artillery on ships based on the experience of the First World War, it provided an informative, albeit concise description of the damage to the Glory. Despite some inconsistencies in the description of the battle on October 4, in general, the picture of damage and damage control is presented in great detail. This indicates the use by the author of the battleship officers' reports, so the description can be considered the most complete study in terms of the state of the material part. The works of all three of the aforementioned authors who directly used documents (reports, reports, acts of damage) and were contemporaries of the events can therefore be considered as fairly reliable and complete studies on the actions of Glory in the battles of 1915–1917.

A look at the actions of "Glory" "from the other side" was reflected in the works of German official history published in the USSR in the 30s: A.D. Chivits. Capture of the Baltic Islands by Germany in 1917 (- M: Gosvoenizdat, 1931), G. Rollman. War on the Baltic Sea. 1915 (- M: Gosvoenizdat, 1935). Rollman's work analyzes in detail the actions of the German fleet during the breakthrough into the Gulf of Riga in August 1915, the battles on the coastal flank in the autumn of 1915 and the role of Glory in them. In a detailed work by Chishwitz on Operation Albion (the author was the chief of staff of the invasion group and received the highest Prussian order “Pour le Merit” for the operation), the breakthrough of the dreadnoughts of Vice Admiral P. Behnke to Moonsund and the battle that became the last for “ Glory." It is known that Chishwitz also used the work of D. P. Malinin.

In the post-war period, the mood of domestic publications was simplified and politicized - in the collection “Russian Naval Art” published in the Military Publishing House in 1951, the material of Captain 3rd Rank V. I. Achkasov “The Revolutionary Baltic Fleet in the Battle for the Moonsund Archipelago” was placed 445-455), where a place was also given to the battle of "Glory" near Kuyvast on October 4, 1917. The era disposed to exaggerations, so the narrative was interspersed with quotes from Lenin and Stalin, and the actions of "Glory" on October 4 were opened by sinking ("the very first volley" ) the lead German destroyer, whose death, as well as "the withdrawal of the rest of the German destroyers, forced the enemy battleships to also turn south" (i.e., retreat). Such statements, which appeared to please the political situation prevailing in those years, of course, cannot be considered serious. In the spirit of the leading and guiding role of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, another Soviet historian tells in his monograph about the Moonsund operation (A. S. Pukhov. Moonsund battle. - L: Lenizdat, 1957).

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The topic is devoted, let's say, to the maximum possible modernization squadron battleship "Andrew the First-Called". Although technically in this modernization there is nothing impossible. But, its author, colleague Ansar, diplomatically pointed out that this is a naked game of fantasy or a dream of reason, and he does not see any historical conditions for his modernization options. Whether Ansar's colleague is right or not is no longer known today.

However, a similar version of the modernization, however, not of Andrew the First-Called, but of the battleship Slava existed in reality. And almost got done.

These works are associated with the name of the later famous shipbuilder - V.P. Kostenko. On October 14, 1908, a month and a half after returning to Russia from England, where he was one of those overseeing the construction of the Rurik armored cruiser at the Vickers shipyard in Barrow, Kostenko was assigned to serve in the MTC. There is every reason to believe that the main reason for this appointment was the need to strengthen the rigid drums of 10 "and 8" towers, which was revealed during the acceptance firing of the Rurik in the summer and autumn of 1908, first in England and then in Russia. The tests confirmed that the reinforcements of the installations were unreliable, and the chief inspector of shipbuilding, Major General (since September 8, 1908), A.N. Krylov said that they are subject to alteration by the counterparty at his own expense in accordance with the recalculations and the technical decision of the Russian side. The Vickers had to agree, and all the work of finding an acceptable reinforcement design for rigid drums on an already finished ship fell on the shoulders of the 27-year-old staff captain Kostenko. He very successfully coped with the task by carrying out a non-trivial engineering solution - he connected the rigid drums of the installations with vertical racks with barbet armor, which made it possible to include thick barbette armor in the work on the perception of recoil from volleys from turret guns. To unload the latter, a system of vertical racks was also introduced under the lower deck. This engineering idea was fully confirmed in practice - repeated tests of the Rurik towers did not reveal residual deformations and the cruiser was accepted into the treasury *****.

The work of V.P. Kostenko was awarded the "highest award" to him on March 29, 1909, on the proposal of Major General Krylov, the Order of St. Stanislav, 2nd degree. For the issue under study, it is interesting in that the engineer has proven his ability to find original technical solutions when modifying existing critical ship structures, taking into account new, complex tasks. This largely explains the decision of A.N. Krylov, who entrusted the general study of the problem of modernization of "Glory" and "Tsesarevich" to Kostenko.

The work was not hasty and was carried out by V.P. Kostenko, in parallel with his supervision of work on the Rurik in Kronstadt, which lasted until July 1909. The six-month period in which the design resulted could be explained by the overall workload of the shipbuilding department of the MTK. The department did not have comprehensive design and engineering capabilities, since in addition to A.N. Krylov, only 10 people *. It should be taken into account that in the period from September 1908 to March 1909, the MTK, in addition to participating in the redesign of reinforcements for the Rurik towers and supervising work on the cruiser in Kronstadt, held a responsible competition for the design of the first Russian dreadnought battleship, and was also forced to participate in the mass of current routine affairs.

March 14, 1909 A.N. Krylov (by that time, in addition to the chief inspector of shipbuilding, already the acting chairman of the MTK) presented to the Moscow State School of Buildings the completed development of the shipbuilding drawing committee: a draft "motto" project for the rearmament of the Glory and two options for the rearmament of the Tsesarevich. It included an explanatory note, two drawings, a calculation of the weights of removed and added cargo, comparative diagrams of static stability before rearmament and after it with a broken and whole side, as well as an approximate estimated cost of rearmament of Glory. It was noted that "all these sketch calculations performed by staff captain Kostenko" result in:

When redesigning, it was originally supposed to include in the project conning towers of the "new system" weighing 280 - 350 tons each; however, for a not entirely clear reason, they were not included in the project, but “old ones of about 70 - 80 tons” ** were preserved.

This MTK project was again submitted for review to the Moscow State School of Staff, which, on the basis of this development, was to determine the range of its requirements for the modernization of ships. Head of the MGSH Vice Admiral A.A. Ebergard ordered to consider the new development of the ITC in the tactical commission on March 21, for which he asked to come to the meeting of the project developer V.P. Kostenko. Genmore's view on the problem of re-equipping Slava and Tsesarevich remained the same - they "in terms of tactical elements should be adjusted to the elements of Andrei and Pavel so that they can be put in one line" ***.

1) replace 6 "artillery with 8-inch artillery, taking into account the condition of the possibility of firing from all guns of one side at a heading angle of at least 45 °;

2) replace all anti-mine artillery currently installed on them with 102 mm guns, leaving only 4 47-mm guns for salutes from small-caliber ones;

3) increase, as far as possible, combat stability and reduce the existing overload.

One of the main conditions for the rearmament of the MGSH recognized its implementation "in the shortest possible time", which meant an exhaustive set of measures for preliminary preparation. Genmor, guided by the need to comply with the minimum period of absence of two single strategic combat units in the Baltic Naval Forces, requested the ITC to calculate the possible rearmament time, including the development of detailed drawings, the manufacture of additional guns, installations and armor, as well as the estimated time for the actual installation *** *.

The question was again entrusted to the shipbuilding drafting department of the MTC. It took three months to complete. The topic was left to V.P. Kostenko, who in the remaining days of June, before departing again for England, completed the project of re-equipping Slava and Tsesarevich in two main versions, depending on the arrangement of 8 "guns *****. The first was to install 8 8 "guns in single casemates on the upper deck, the second - in the room of the same number of 8" guns in 4 two-gun turrets on the Slava and in two twin towers and four single casemates on the Tsesarevich. The advantages of the first option were reduced, as noted in an explanatory note by V.P. Kostenko, "exclusively to the method of performing work and their cost, due to the combat offensive qualities of the ships. " The second option involved the use of tower installations - only 6 for both ships and, "requiring more capital work, at the same time allows you to bring the combat offensive qualities of the battleships "Glory" and "Tsesarevich" to the strength of the ships "Andrey [Pervozvanny]" and "[Emperor] Pavel

The author of the project noted that both projects satisfy the requirements of the MGSH, but when installing 8 "guns in casemates, "it will be necessary to change the type of the machine and the shield of the 8" gun to provide the [required] firing angle of 135 °." Anti-mine artillery was adopted from 120-mm guns, and it was noted that the reduction in weight would allow the installation of either 12 102-mm guns or 10 120-mm guns. The third requirement (an increase in combat stability with a parallel decrease in the existing overload) was satisfied only by the second option. V.P. Kostenko believed that "a noticeable unloading of battleships can only be obtained if 6 8" guns are installed instead of the 12 6" currently available. At the same time, he undertook to place the guns so that they could all act on one side. This undoubtedly meant placing these 6 8-inch guns in three turrets, all in a center plane - two on top of the 12-inch gun turrets and one on a spardeck between the chimneys. This option has not been worked out in detail*.

However, the direct need to unload the ships of V.P. Kostenko did not see. He estimated their real draft “under normal load, close to 27 feet (like the Andrey and Pavel)” and noted that the speed of the ships would practically not change from 500 tons lighter. He also did not consider (no matter how unusual it may seem) unloading as an indispensable condition for increasing stability in this case, "as can be seen from the calculations." The engineer made the conclusion that all three conditions of the MGSH were satisfied by the sketch, "assuming the placement of 8" guns in the towers.

As for the terms in which both battleships could be reworked according to a modified project, the author of the development made it dependent primarily on the time of manufacture of a significant amount of Krupp cemented armor (about 1200 tons for both ships - he pointed out) and the manufacture of 8 "artillery, as well as anti-mine caliber. Option No. 2 also required the manufacture of six two-gun 8 "mounts. Actually, he, as an engineer, estimated the term of dismantling and installation work at six months or a year, depending on the degree of readiness of all components **.

It can be stated that during this period, the issue of the alleged rearmament of "Glory" and "Tsesarevich" still had a perspective. On September 30, 1909, the report of the chairman of the ITC A.N. Krylov in the highest instance for this decision - Comrade of the Minister of Marine (since February 1909) Vice Admiral I.K. Grigorovich. He was in charge of all issues of development, improvement and renewal of the materiel of the fleet***.

Notifying the authorities about the development of three options for re-equipping battleships, Major General Krylov, taking into account the opinion of the Moscow State Staff on the approach of the tactical properties of the ships to be modernized to those completed by the construction of "Andrew the First-Called" and "Emperor Paul I", concluded that the task of option N ° was most satisfied 2.

A kind of analogue of the Slava modernization projects turned out to be the Japanese battleship Iwami - the former Eagle, one of the Borodino series, which went on a campaign with the 2nd squadron and fell on May 15, 1905, the morning after the Tsushima battle, into Japanese captivity . Despite the severe destruction of the surface part and damage to artillery, the new owners included their prize in the fleet on May 24 and began to repair it, as well as to radically modernize the artillery unit.

Simultaneously with the clearing of the captured battleship from the wreckage, the Japanese cut off the forecastle on it over 2/3 of the length, making the ship more squat and more stable. The 12-inch artillery was left the same, and the left gun of the bow turret, torn in battle on May 14, was replaced with a similar one from one of the captured Russian battleships. The place of two-gun 6-inch turrets was taken by single mounts of 8-inch guns in 45 calibers, of which 4 were of English production ("Armstrong"), and two of Japanese. In the approach to protecting these guns, the Japanese showed a fair amount of extravagance - four guns installed closer to the ends received full armor, while two guns in the middle of the hull were not covered by armor. For the end guns, individual armored casemates were equipped, similar in shape and design to similar rooms for 6-inch guns on Japanese battleships and armored cruisers of English construction. These casemates were armored with vertical plates of 6 and 3 dm (152 and 76 mm - external and internal, respectively). Medium 8-inch guns were deprived of any protection, not counting the 76-mm annular armor shields of the installations themselves. 8-inch guns were equipped with devices for feeding barrels into the casemate along the rail.

All 75-mm guns were removed, instead of them, 16 76-mm Armstrong rapid-fire guns were installed openly on superstructures (of which 2 each under the upper deck in the bow and stern). The bow and stern torpedo tubes were dismantled. In addition to the existing bow, a small (diameter 2.44 m) conning tower also appeared in the stern.

The main and auxiliary mechanisms of the "Eagle" / "Iwami" remained unchanged. The chimneys were shortened by 6 feet. By reducing the displacement of the unloaded ship to 13280 tons, it exceeded the 18-knot mark on the test.

The amount that the conversion of the former Orel into a combat unit of acceptable value cost the Japanese fleet is estimated, according to various sources, from 2.5 to 3 million yen (the yen at the then exchange rate was practically equal to the ruble). This is less than the estimated cost of converting Slava to 8-dm artillery, but we should not forget that the conversions on the Russian battleship were planned to be more extensive, and most importantly, its second main caliber was to be located in the towers.

Its main essence was as follows. The forecastle in the bow was eliminated, the 12 "turret was lowered a deck below; the freeboard in the bow after this metamorphosis was estimated at 18 feet (i.e. 5.5 m - "like the battleship" Andrew the First-Called ""). All 6" towers were dismantled , on top of 12 "installations in the diametrical plane, one 8" two-gun turret was added. Another 4 8" guns were placed in casemates "at the midsection" behind 127 mm armor and rear bulkheads of 25 mm. All small-caliber artillery from 20 75 mm and 20 47 mm guns was removed (only 4 47 mm guns for salutes remained) and was replaced by 10 100-mm or 120-mm guns on the upper deck in casemates armored with 76-mm plates.The board above the armored (lower) deck was armored with 76-mm Krupp plates over 2/3 of the hull length. "Longitudinal cabin bulkheads" with a thickness of 19 mm "with an unarmored side". When re-equipped according to this option, for Glory, the displacement was 13,800 tons, draft 8.0 m, metacentric height 1.37 m, for Tsesarevich - 13,230 tons, 7.97 m and 1.37 m, respectively. The estimated cost of re-equipping each ship was estimated at 4 million rubles, of which the cost of artillery and ammunition was about 1.7 million rubles.

The main condition for success was the ability of the Izhora and Obukhov plants to produce about 1200 tons of armor (for both ships), as well as 8 "and 120-mm guns and installations for them (especially 8" tower installations). The full period of modernization in the absence of any delays was estimated at 10 - 12 months. In the event that a fundamental decision was made regarding the rearmament of both battleships, A.N. Krylov, the question should have been submitted for evaluation in the departments of the Committee - artillery, mines and mechanical. Then, after determining all the details, the development of a detailed working draft was entrusted to the proposed contractor - the Baltic Shipyard, which was supposed to determine the final cost and timing of the work. After that, the leadership of the Naval Ministry left the decision on the time to disable both battleships for work. In parallel, the GUKiS had to find the necessary funds *.

With this message from Major General Krylov, the correspondence about the projects for the modernization of Glory and Tsesarevich in 1909 is interrupted. On the original of A.N. Krylov "at the discretion" of the comrade of the naval minister, the resolution of I.K. Grigorovich is missing. Since there was no further development of the issue, we can conclude that the latter lost its primary interest in re-equipping both structurally obsolete ships. The primary technical sounding of the topic rested on the need to spend at least 8 million rubles on the modernization of two ships of the dotsushima project. Moreover, having invested in this once, the leadership of the Naval Ministry was obliged to do this in the future - for example, for the costly maintenance of their machine-boiler plant in order to maintain the design parameters of the speed, without which the saturation of obsolete ships with additional artillery would lose sense.

This could be the deciding factor. Convinces in this assumption is an appeal to the memoirs of I.K. Grigorovich. It was in September 1909, shortly before the report of A.N. Krylov to the Deputy Minister about the projects of re-equipment of "Glory" and "Tsesarevich", on the stocks of the Admiralty and Baltic plants, they began assembling the hull of four dreadnoughts, which marked the beginning of broad plans for the revival of the fleet, which the purposeful and consistent admiral cherished. Simultaneously with carrying out such a responsible undertaking, the Comrade Minister was faced with the need to establish serious order in his administration. On inspection of military ports in the Black and Baltic Seas, shipyards, gun and armor factories in the spring and summer of 1909, he left the following lines: “Everything that had to be examined makes a heavy impression” **. Against the backdrop of such problems, the need for a major rework of the only two strategic ships of the Baltic Fleet at that time, coupled with extreme tightness in funds, was clearly not visible. This decision is best illustrated by the saying: "Two hens do not make an eagle."

PS.Well, in conclusion, I suggest colleagues to discuss the following alternative. Suppose all the battleships of the Borodino type, to which the battleship Slava belonged, were originally made according to the Kostenko project. How this could happen is not particularly important. For example, with the help of the intervention of the fallen, there are a lot of works about the fallen in the Russo-Japanese War. Recall at least a masterpiece cycle Doinikov dedicated Varangian, or less strong Admiral General cycle Zlotnikova(for possible AI, I think this cycle is more suitable).

So, as we know, 4 battleships of the Borodino type took part in the Tsushima battle at once (three of which died). Despite the fact that these were the most modern battleships of the Russian fleet at that time, this did not help turn the tide in battle.

And how would things go if, so to speak, alternative ships participated in the battle? The firepower of the Russian squadron would immediately increase by 32,203 mm guns. Interestingly, this might not be the deciding factor. I remember that the Japanese armadillos also miraculously survived.

"Glory"- squadron battleship-dreadnought of the Russian Imperial Navy type "Borodino". The only ship of its type that did not take part in the Russo-Japanese War.

During the First World War, he was part of the Baltic Fleet, operating mainly in the Gulf of Riga. Sunk during the Battle of Moonsund. In the 1930s, Slava was dismantled by the Estonians for metal.

Description

Power point

The propulsion system of the ship consisted of 20 Belleville water-tube boilers, which produced steam under pressure up to 19 atmospheres, and two vertical triple-expansion steam engines, driving two 4-bladed propellers.

The ship had two dynamos driven by the main engine of 150 kW each, as well as two independent auxiliary generators of 64 kW.

The design power of the power plant was 15,800 hp, but during tests it developed 16,378 hp, which allowed the battleship to have a speed of 17.64 knots (32.67 km / h).

With a full load of coal - 1,372 tons - the ship had a cruising range of 2,590 nautical miles at 10 knots.

Armament

Four 12-inch (305 mm) guns of the main caliber were located in two-gun turrets placed in the center plane of the ship. The rate of fire of the guns was about 1 shot per minute, and after the modernization of the ammunition supply system around 1914, it increased to 1 shot per 40 seconds. 305 mm guns had a 40-caliber (12200 mm) integral barrel with an annular fastening and a manually operated piston breech. Muzzle energy 106.1 MJ. The gun mounts had powerful anti-projectile armor, electric drives for horizontal and vertical guidance in the sector of 270 ° horizontally and from -5 ° to + 15 ° vertically. The gun mounts had a loading mechanism which consisted of two punches, a main and a backup, and an ammunition supply system. The opening and closing of the shutters was carried out at a zero elevation angle, and loading at a fixed elevation angle of +5 °. For firing, relatively light armor-piercing, high-explosive, buckshot and segment shells mod. 1907 weighing 331.7 kg. The shells had ballistic tips. The total ammunition load of the ship is 248 shells. The guns gave them an initial speed of 792.5 m / s and a range of 21.5 km (116 cables). The gun mounts had three control posts and two optical sights (one per gun). Armor-piercing shells had good ballistics and a long direct range, but at the same time they were inferior to much heavier shells of a similar caliber from Western countries in armor penetration at long distances and poorly penetrated deck armor.

• Medium-caliber artillery was represented by twelve 6-inch (152 mm) guns, which were also placed in towers located on the upper deck and had an electric drive. Their practical rate of fire was about 3 rounds per minute, the ammunition load was 180 rounds per gun.

The 152-mm guns of the Kane system, by analogy with the main caliber, had a composite barrel with an annular fastening 45 calibers long (6840mm) and a piston valve. The gun mounts had anti-projectile armor and electric drives for horizontal and vertical guidance. At the same time, for the 1,2,5,6th gun mounts, a horizontal guidance angle of about 160 ° was provided, and for the 3.4th - 180 °. The vertical guidance angle ranged from −5° to +20° for all 152 mm gun mounts. The gun mounts had only an ammunition feed mechanism, and loading was done manually by loaders. The maximum rate of fire is 4-5 volleys / 60 seconds. For firing, 152 mm cartridge-type projectiles, model 1907, weighing 41.5 kg, of the same types as 305 mm, were used. In addition, as a means of anti-aircraft defense, the ship had special diving shells operating on the principle of depth charges. The total ammunition load is 1564 rounds. The guns provided 41.5-kg projectiles with an initial velocity of 792.5 m / s and a maximum range of 14.45 km (78 cables). Optical sights and control posts are similar to AU GK.

To protect against destroyers, the battleship had 12 75 mm Kane guns with 300 rounds of ammunition each, 6 per side, located in the central casemate battery. 75 mm guns had a barrel length of 50 calibers (3750 mm), manual guidance drives and a mechanized supply of ammunition. Shells weighing 4.92 kg had a maximum range of 6.5 km (35 cables). Rate of fire 6-8 shots / min. Four of them were located in the forward casemate, directly below the forward gun turret of the main caliber, two on board, and were sufficiently raised above the waterline in order to fire in any wave. The rest were located in the casemates of the stern of the ship along the side, which made it problematic to fire from them in heavy seas.

All but four of the 47 mm Hotchkiss quick-firing guns envisaged by the project were removed during the construction of the ship, and the rest were used as salutes.

In addition to artillery armament, the ship had four 15-inch (381 mm) torpedo tubes - one surface in the stem and stern and two underwater along the sides. Ammunition 8 Wyhead torpedoes. The 381-mm torpedo had a mass of 430 kg, a warhead of 64 kg and a range of 0.9 km at 25 knots or 0.6 km at 30 knots.

Subsequently, already during the First World War, two 47-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed on the ship. According to other sources, at the beginning of 1917, the ship had four 76-mm anti-aircraft guns. By this time, her ship's anti-mine artillery had been reduced to 12 3-inch guns. In addition, in 1916, changes were made to the design of the main battery turrets, thanks to which the maximum elevation angle of the 12-inch barrels reached 25 °, and their range increased to 21 km.

fire control system

Modernized SUAO mod.1899. A set of instruments was first presented at an exhibition in Paris in 1899 and was installed on many RIF battleships. It was the prototype of modern central aiming systems. The basis of the system was two sighting posts (VP) - one on board. Pancratic, optical, monocular devices of these posts - central aiming sights (VCN) had a variable magnification - 3x-4x. The search for a target and aiming a weapon at it was carried out by the operator of the VP. When aiming at the target, the VCN was used to determine the elevation angle of the target relative to the diametrical plane of the ship, and the tracking system associated with it automatically set this angle with an arrow in the receiving instruments of the main 8-turret guns and batteries of 75 mm guns of the ship. After that, the gunners-operators (commanders) carried out horizontal aiming of their installations until the angle of rotation of the AU was combined with the elevation angle of the target (the so-called principle of “combining the arrows”) and the target fell into the field of view of the gun optical sights. Optical, pancratic, monocular sights of the Perepelkin system had a variable magnification - 3x-4x and a field of view angle of 6 - 8 degrees changing in accordance with it. To illuminate the target at night, six combat searchlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm were used. The next step was to determine the distance to the target. To do this, in the conning tower there were two rangefinder stations - one on board. They were equipped with Barr and Studd horizontal base rangefinders with a base of 1200 mm. Another rangefinder post with the same rangefinder was located between the pipes. The rangefinder measured the distance and, using the rangefinder key, the data was automatically entered into the receiving devices of the conning tower, central post, 8 main turret guns and batteries of 75 mm guns. To control the correctness of data transmission, there was a feedback system with a control rangefinder dial, the readings of which were compared with those entered into the receiving devices. A set of instruments and a magnetic compass in the conning tower showed the senior artillery officer his own course and speed, direction and strength of the wind. He determined the course and speed of the target approximately “by eye”. Having data on his own speed and course, direction and strength of the wind, deviation, type of target, elevation angle of the target and distance to it, estimating the approximate speed and course of the target, the senior artillery officer, using firing tables, manually (on paper) made the necessary calculations and calculated the necessary amendments to the lead on VN and GN. I also chose the type of AU and the type of projectiles necessary to hit this target. After that, the senior artillery officer transmitted data for guidance to the AU, from which he intended to hit the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower and the central post there was a set of master pointers, which, through 47 cable cores, transmitted data to the receiving devices in the AC and 75 mm batteries. The whole system worked at voltage Ur=23V through a 105/23V transformer. In the case of centralized fire control, they transmitted data on the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance, the type of projectiles used. After receiving the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected AU installed the guns at the given angles (corrected the initial installation according to the VCN) and loaded them with the selected type of ammunition. After performing this operation, the senior artillery officer, who was in the conning tower, at the moment when the inclinometer showed "0", set the handle of the firing indicator device to the sector corresponding to the selected fire mode "Fraction", "Attack" or "Short alarm", in accordance with which AU opened fire. This mode of centralized fire control was the most effective. In the event of a failure of a senior artillery officer or the impossibility for any other reason to carry out centralized fire control, all 305 mm, 152 mm guns and a battery of 75 mm guns switched to group (plutong) or single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data about their course, their speed, direction and strength of the wind, the elevation angle of the target, the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the AU or battery. This mode of fire was less effective. In the event of a complete defeat of fire control devices, personnel of the conning tower and data transmission circuits, all AUs switched to independent fire. In this case, the choice of target, and aiming at it, was carried out by calculating a specific AU using only a gun optical sight, which sharply limited its effectiveness and range. Guidance of torpedo tubes was carried out using ring sights with the same tracking system as that of the VP for onboard 381mm TA or by turning the entire hull of the vessel for the new and aft 381mm TA.

Booking

• the thickness of the lower armor belt (from bow to stern) - 145-147-165-194-165-147-145 mm. Total in the center 40 mm (bevel) + 194 mm (GBP) = 234 mm.
• thickness of the upper armor belt (from bow to stern) - 102-125-152-125-102 mm
• decks - 72-91-99 mm in total in different parts of the ship and up to 129-142 mm from the side sections. Consisted of a lower armored deck 40 mm thick throughout. She formed a bevel 2 m from the side and adjoined the lower edge of the main armor belt. The average (battery) had a thickness of 32-51 mm in different areas from bow to stern. In addition, the upper deck of the side cuts had armor 51 mm thick. The roof of the middle casemate of the PMK, not covered by the armor of sections and the aft casemate of the PMK, had an armor thickness of 27 mm. The armor box of the forward casemate of the PMK had a roof and a floor made of armor 27 mm thick.
• turrets of the main caliber - 254 mm
• medium caliber towers - 152 mm
• casemates and part of the board - 76 mm
• conning tower and pipes in the CPU - 203 mm
• roofs of main gun mounts and conning tower - 51 mm, roofs of SK gun mounts - 38 mm
• roof and floor (fore only) casemates - 27 mm
• rotating tables of gun mounts GK - 76 mm, SK - 38 mm
• anti-torpedo bulkhead - 40 mm
• Chimney base protection - 51 mm

Service

"Glory" was built at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. The battleship was laid down on November 1, 1902, launched on August 19, 1903, construction was completed in October 1905. By this time, after Tsushima, the ship was already considered obsolete.

After that "Glory" was assigned to a separate training squadron.

Together with the armadillo "Tsesarevich" and cruiser "Bogatyr", "Glory" went on her first training voyage, during which she visited Bizerte, Tunis, Toulon and other ports of the Mediterranean. In December 1908, when "Glory" was in the Sicilian city of Messina, there was a strong earthquake. The ship's crew took part in rescue work in the city, the wounded were evacuated on an armadillo to Naples.

In 1910, the ship had a serious accident in the boiler room, after which it was towed "Tsesarevich" to Gibraltar, and then sent to Toulon, where in 1910-1911 the battleship was overhauled at the company's factory "Forge e Chantier"(fr. Forges et Chantiers de la Mediterranee), which took about a year. After returning to Kronstadt, the ship was withdrawn from the training squadron and enlisted in the Baltic Fleet.

At the beginning of the First World War, in the Baltic, Russia had only four obsolete pre-dreadnoughts, from which a brigade of battleships was formed; four dreadnought-type "Gangut" were under construction. After they entered service and could begin to guard the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, "Glory" passed the Irben Strait and joined the forces operating in the Gulf of Riga.

Battle for the Gulf of Riga

On August 8, 1915, the German squadron began sweeping minefields in the Irben Strait. "Glory" and gunboats "Threatening" and "Brave" approached the place of work; the gunboats opened fire on the minesweepers. They were answered from a great distance by German pre-dreadnoughts "Alsace" and Braunschweig, but "Glory", despite the damage received from close explosions of shells, did not leave the position. According to one source, "Glory" did not respond to their fire due to the insufficient range of the guns, and the Germans retreated, as there were much more Russian mines than they expected to meet. According to other information "Glory" entered into an artillery duel with German battleships, and, having lost two minesweepers, T-52 and T-58, on mines, the Germans temporarily abandoned their breakthrough attempt.

The second attempt was made by the Germans on August 16, this time under the cover of dreadnoughts. "Nassau" and "Posen". Crew "Glory" flooded part of the compartments of one side, creating an artificial roll of 3 ° - this made it possible to bring the firing range of the main caliber to about 16,500 m. However, this time it did not come to a direct collision with battleships, "Glory" only fired at minesweepers, and also fired at other German forces, in particular, an armored cruiser "Prince Adalbert", as they approached other Russian ships.

The next day, the Germans returned to trawling again, this time "Glory" received three direct hits by 283-mm shells. The first pierced the armor belt and exploded in a coal pit; the second pierced the deck, hitting the feed tube of the rear port 6-inch gun turret, and started a fire in her ammunition cellar, which had to be flooded. The third shell demolished several boats of the ship and exploded in the water near the side. However, these hits did not cause significant damage to the ship, and "Glory" remained in place until the order to retreat.

The next day, German forces entered the Gulf of Riga, but after August 19, a British submarine E-1 torpedoed a German cruiser "Moltke", they were forced to leave, especially since the Russian coastal artillery still controlled the Irben Strait, making the presence of the Germans in the bay very risky.

The retreat of the German forces allowed "Glory" switch to the task of fire support for ground forces. During the bombardment of German positions near Tukums, the commander and five other people were killed by a hit in the conning tower of an anchored ship. According to McLaughlin, it was a hit by a German field artillery shell, but Nekrasov's book states that a 10-kilogram bomb from one of the German naval aircraft hit the wheelhouse. Anyway, "Glory" remained in position and continued the bombardment. The battleship continued to support the ground forces with fire until the time when the waters of the Gulf of Riga began to cover with ice, after which he left for the winter on the island of Muhu.

On April 12, 1916, three light bombs dropped from German naval aircraft hit the ship; they did little to no damage to the ship, but killed several sailors. On July 2, the battleship continued to bombard the advancing German troops, repeatedly repeating the bombardment throughout July and August, despite the hit of an 8-inch (203 mm) shell in the armor in the waterline area, however, which did not cause any damage.

September 12 German cruisers were lured out "Glory" to the open sea; the Germans tried to sink the battleship, which had greatly annoyed them, with the help of a coordinated attack by the UB-31 submarine and low-flying torpedo bombers, but all torpedoes missed the target. This was the first attack by torpedo bombers on a moving ironclad.

Modernization

In 1916, the battleship underwent repairs and modernization.

One tier of the aft superstructure was removed, the firing sectors of the 152-mm towers were increased. The elevation angle of the barrels of the main battery guns was increased to 25 degrees (instead of 15 degrees), which increased the range of fire to 115 cables. 76.2 mm anti-aircraft guns were installed on the roofs of the main caliber towers.

Moonsund battle

In the initial stages of the German operation "Albion" in October 1917, "Glory" was in position near the island of Ezel, guarding the entrance to the Gulf of Riga and Kassarsky reach, separating the islands of Ezel and Dago. On October 15 and 16, she opened fire on German destroyers attacking Russian light forces in the Kassar reach, but without success.

On the morning of October 17, the Germans began sweeping Russian mines at the southern entrance to the Moonsund Canal. "Glory", predreadnought "Citizen"(former "Tsesarevich") and an armored cruiser "Accordion" on the orders of Vice Admiral Mikhail Bakhirev, they set off to meet the German forces and opened fire on the minesweepers at 8:05 CET, and at 8:12 Slava fired at the German battleships from a distance close to the limit Konig and Kronprinz that covered the minesweepers. "Citizen", whose towers have not been upgraded, and "Accordion" continued at this time the shelling of minesweepers. The German battleships responded, but their shots did not reach the position. "Glory". "Glory" also never hit, although some of her shells fell only 50 m from "König". As a result, the Germans, seeing the inconvenience of their position in the narrowness that made maneuvering difficult, retreated.

Meanwhile, the German minesweepers achieved great success, despite the constant bombardment from the Russian ships and the coastal battery. In addition, at this time, the bow tower "Glory" failed after 11 shots due to deformation of the bronze ring gear and jamming of the horizontal aiming mechanism. The squadron was ordered to withdraw to the north for the breakfast of the crews. By 10:04, the Russian ships returned to their position, "Slava" opened fire with a stern tower from a distance of about 11 km. Meanwhile, while the Russians were having breakfast, minesweepers made a passage in the northern part of the minefield, after which the German dreadnoughts were able to come closer and join the battle. "Koenig" shelled "Glory" at 10:14, and from the third salvo covered the Russian battleship with three hits. The first shell hit the bow, penetrating the armor below the waterline and exploding in the bow dynamo room, causing it, as well as the ammunition magazine for the bow 12-inch guns and other compartments in the bow, to be flooded. The ship received 1,130 tons of water, got a trim on the bow and listed by 8 °, later the roll was reduced to 4 ° due to the action of the pumps. The third shell hit the armor belt of the left side opposite the engine room, but did not penetrate it. At 10:24, two more shells hit the ship, hitting the area of ​​​​the forward chimney, they damaged the cellar of six-inch shells and the forward boiler room; The fire started and was extinguished within 15 minutes. The cellar of the forward 6-inch port side turret had to be flooded. At 10:39 a.m., two more shells hit two people in the boiler room and flooded the coal bunker. Around the same time "Glory" and the second battleship was ordered to retreat to the north, their retreat was covered by the Bayan.

Leak in holds "Glory" intensified so much that the ship could not leave with the rest of the fleet through the Moonsund Strait between the islands of Dago and Vormsi; the crew was ordered after the passage of the fleet to flood the battleship at the entrance to the strait. However, the Committee created on the ship after the February Revolution ordered the crew to leave the engine room due to the threat of flooding; soon the ship lay down on pitfalls to the southeast of the entrance to the strait. The destroyers removed the crew from the ship, after which, at 11:58, the shell magazine of the aft 12-inch turret was blown up. The explosion was considered not strong enough, so three destroyers were ordered to finish off the ship with torpedoes. After hitting one of the six issued by "Glory" torpedoes, the ship lay down on the ground with a hole in the port side near the chimney.

In the mid-1930s, independent Estonia dismantled the remains of the ship for scrap.

"Glory"
Service:	Russia
Vessel class and type	Squadron battleship
Organization	Baltic Fleet
Manufacturer	Baltic plant
Construction started	November 1, 1902
Launched into the water	August 29, 1903
Commissioned	June 12, 1905
Withdrawn from the Navy	May 29, 1918
Status	Scuttled and blown up after the Battle of Moonsund, broken up for scrap in the 1930s
Main characteristics
Displacement	14,646 tons; complete
Length	121.1 m
Width	23.2 m
Draft	8,9
Booking	Krupp armor; belt deck tower barbets felling
Engines	2 vertical triple expansion steam engines from the Baltic Plant, 20 Belleville water tube boilers
Power	15 800 l. with.
mover	2 screws
travel speed	18 knots
cruising range	2590 nautical miles at 10 knots
Crew	867 officers and sailors
Armament
Artillery	2×2 6×2 20 x 3" (76.2mm); 4×47 (rapid-firing Hotchkiss guns)
Mine and torpedo armament	4 × 381 mm torpedo tubes

Battleship "Glory". The undefeated hero of Moonzund Vinogradov Sergey Evgenievich

Fight "Glory" October 4, 1917

The last battle of Slava with two German dreadnoughts remained in the history of the ship as the highest point of its fate, a glorious result of two years of military service in the Gulf of Riga. Despite the fact that this episode was covered more than once in works on the history of the fleet, many of its details required clarification. How many shells were fired by the battleship, how many hits did it receive, what losses did it suffer in personnel, what actually happened in the conning tower, at the ship’s combat posts during the dramatic moments of its being under the covers of German dreadnoughts? Where was it eventually flooded - is it believed to be at the entrance to the Moonsund Canal or not reaching the alleged site of flooding and explosion? What was the consumption of ammunition by the German battleships and the effectiveness of their fire resulting from this, were they still hit from Glory, as stated in a number of sources, or did the enemy fight “dry”?

The main sources during the battle of "Glory" with the German forces are the reports of the commander and officers of the battleship, as well as the report of the commander of the MSRP, Vice Admiral Bakhirev. The view from the German side, traditionally previously drawn from the work of A. D. Chishwitz, was significantly supplemented by a report on the battle on October 4/17 of the German flagship Vice Admiral P. Behnke, as well as information from the Combat Journals of both of his dreadnoughts.

Tserell Battery No. 43

Despite the successful advance of the German ground units deep into the Ezel after the landing in Tagalakht Bay on September 29, 1917, the crossing of the Irben Strait at sea and the subsequent breakthrough into the Gulf of Riga continued to be of considerable difficulty. Minefields in the strait of extremely considerable length and density were covered from the Svorbe Peninsula by a powerful battery of 4 12? / 52 guns, with a range of 156 kb and capable of frustrating any attack on the Irbeny from the sea. For successful trawling of the strait, first of all, the neutralization of this battery was required.

To do this, the enemy undertook a combined strike - on October 1, the positions of the ground cover on the isthmus of Svorbe were attacked by German infantry, while from the sea for an hour the battery was fired upon by the task force of two dreadnoughts of the IV line squadron of Vice Admiral V. Souchon ("Friedrich der Grosse" ( commander's flag) and "Koenig Albert"), firing from distances of 65-110 kb. Despite the fact that the demoralized calculations of the two 12? the guns fled, the third acted sporadically with half of the personnel, and only the fourth energetically responded to the enemy, the German official history notes that "the zerel battery fired very quickly and accurately, so the ships had to go dispersed and constantly change courses." However, this bombardment, apparently, finally broke the morale of the vast majority of the defenders, because the next day on the battery in the morning they began to destroy the materiel and undermine the magazines of ammunition.

The way to Irbeni was open. On October 2, the commander of the III linear squadron, Vice Admiral P. Behnke, returned with the battleships König and Kronprinz from bunkering from Putzig and anchored at the Mikhailovsky lighthouse. By this time, the German minesweepers, for the fourth day "gnawed through" the mine defenses of the strait, had done only about half of the work. The time of the end of the trawling remained unclear, since the Germans did not have exact information about the actual size of the barriers. After the explosion of the Tserel battery, the situation in the strait was greatly simplified. The German historian notes that "it was difficult to understand from the behavior of the enemy that he would do anything else to defend the barriers." A favorable moment for the breakthrough of the German fleet into the Gulf of Riga has arrived.

After the work of minesweepers that did not stop for a minute, the detachment of Vice Admiral P. Behnke on October 3 at 7.15 weighed anchor and moved along the swept southern fairway deep into the Gulf of Riga. 26 minesweepers and 18 minesweepers were ahead, followed by the light cruiser Kolberg with a distance of 6 kb, then the König (flag of P. Behnke), the Kronprinz, the light cruisers Strasbourg and Augsburg. A group of supply vessels kept behind at a distance of 50 kb. At about 11 o'clock, stopping more than once due to the breaking of a mine alarm upon discovering previously missed mines, the German detachment went into the bay to the 58th parallel and stopped in sight of Ahrensburg, abandoned by the Russians the day before.

With this breakthrough, the German fleet occupied a dominant position in the Gulf of Riga and secured Arensburg from the sea, where the Germans moved the headquarters of the land group and which, they believed, could become the object of an attack by Russian amphibious assault forces if Russian naval forces maintained dominance in the Gulf. The order to “attack with all forces the Russian naval forces in the Moonsund and the Gulf of Riga” was received by Vice Admiral P. Benke, commander of the ship group in the Gulf, on October 3 at 13.30. Three hours later, his unit headed for 0N0, having 16 minesweepers in its head, followed by König and Kronprinz, guarding 10 destroyers of the 16th and 20th semi-flotillas and, after them, the cruisers Kolberg and Strasbourg". The group was closed by 9 minesweepers and their base ship.

However, on this day, the Germans failed to get closer to the entrance to Moonsund, where all the available Russian naval forces of the bay were located: they had to move behind the trawls, slowly and carefully, constantly taking into account the danger from under the water - both from mines and from submarines . Around 19:00, the Indianola minesweeper base received a torpedo from the British submarine C-27 and was towed to Ahrensburg. At 22.30 P. Benke's detachment settled down for the night, anchoring about 35 miles southwest of the entrance to Moonsund. In the morning, it was decided to attack the Russian forces in Moonsund and destroy them, or force them to withdraw north through the canal.

In preparation for the battle for Moonzund, both commanders were faced with a number of serious problems. For Vice-Admiral Bakhirev, this was the weakness of his linear forces, the extreme tightness of the maneuverable space between Moon and Werder, where, when defending a mine position, Glory and Grazhdanin had to hold on and, most importantly, the unreliability of the teams, at any moment ready to show open disobedience and disrupt the operational plan, destroy ships and crews.

The Russian flagship made a decision to fight at the entrance to Moonsund, which he explains as follows: “Despite the great disparity in forces, in order to maintain the spirit of the Moonsund garrison, counting on a minefield to S from Kuivast, [I] decided to accept the battle and delay the capture of the enemy as much as possible southern part of Moonsund. If I succeeded and his appearance at Moonsund was unsuccessful, his position in the Gulf of Riga, if he decided to stay there for a while, without a base for large ships, with the existence of submarines in the sea and mines laid at night, would be risky. Moreover, the attacks of our destroyers were made very possible. With the departure of the German fleet from the Gulf of Riga and the slowdown in mastering the southern Moonsund, even for a short time, it was still possible to bring fresh infantry and cavalry units and artillery to Moon and through it to Ezel and, therefore, there was still hope for an improvement in the situation. In addition, I believed that the withdrawal of naval forces without a fight would entail a rapid retreat of our unstable land units not only from Werder, but also from points to N and O from it, and even from Dago Island.

The German flagship, which made the decision to break through, also faced a difficult task. The success of the breakthrough was decided by the numerous heavy artillery of his powerful dreadnoughts, which still had to be brought to a place where they could tie up the weaker and slower Russian battleships in a decisive battle and sink them. Only such a solution to the problem - the destruction of "Glory" and "Citizen", the main Russian foothold in Moonsund - led to the complete displacement of the remaining forces of the MSRP to the north, the complete occupation of the islands and the final implementation of the Albion plan. The possibility of sending dreadnoughts to Moonsund followed from the presence at the disposal of Vice-Admiral P. Behnke and his headquarters of the coordinates of the Russian minefields at the entrance to the strait, which were to be cleared. The entire burden of this work, under the concentrated fire of Russian battleships and coastal batteries, fell on the fleets of German minesweepers. The danger from submarines was not ruled out, as an example was the unsuccessful attack of the Koenig with two torpedoes that took place the day before at 18.30, as well as the Indianola that was blown up shortly after that - if one of the dreadnoughts were in its place, the German commander would most likely be forced to turn your plan.

Vice-Admiral Bakhirev could not know where the enemy would move from. The German forces could break through to the north, bypassing either the vestibule or the skeleton end of the southern barrier, set up in 1917. The bypass from the east, due to the presence of shallow banks of Larin and Afanasyev in this area, was especially difficult for the dreadnoughts, which had a large draft. The detour from the west was complicated by mine banks, which had previously been set up by the German underwater minelayer. Through these barriers there was a passage that had been cleared by the Russians, unknown to the Germans. As a result, German mines now caused more harm to themselves.

Around 0.15 on October 4, Vice-Admiral P. Behnke decided to move by the western passage, the width of which his headquarters estimated at 1.4 miles. Upon reaching the free space between the Russian barriers of 1916 and 1917, where did 12? the artillery of both "koenigs" had the ability to shoot through the entire space up to about. Schildau, he intended to lie on the skeleton course and strike at Russian battleships, as well as all ships that would only be in the Kuivast area.

Around 7 am on October 4, the German flagship received a message that there was also a network barrier between both Russian minefields, stretching from north to south. From the point of view of following the plan worked out the day before, Vice-Admiral Behnke did not consider it insurmountable, but ordered that a passage also be cleared south of the 1917 barrier to the Larin Bank as an alternate direction for a subsequent possible breakthrough from there to Moonsund. This foresight of the German commander, seeking to follow the "need to be prepared for all sorts of accidents" after 6 hours abruptly changed the situation in his favor.

At 8.10 min. On October 4, with the rising of the sun, which revealed "a beautiful, clear, autumn day," the German ships, surrounded by minesweepers, set off in two columns in a northerly course, keeping on the meridian of the Paternoster lighthouse. In the right column, guarded by 8 large destroyers, there were dreadnoughts "Koenig" and "Kronprinz", in the left - the cruisers "Kolberg" and "Strasbourg". At about 9 o'clock, the minesweepers ran into the southwestern corner of the 1917 barrier and stumbled upon mines. The minesweepers set to work, and from 9.15 to 9.23 "Konig" unsuccessfully fired 14 12dm shells from a distance of 86-97 kb on two Russian destroyers, which zigzagged to the north at full speed. These were patrol destroyers of the XI division "Effective" and "Active", returning from SO to Moonsund along the skeleton shallows.

At 9.55 minutes, the Germans separated - the cruisers "Kolberg" and "Strasbourg" separated from the detachment and, preceded by the 8th semi-flotilla of minesweepers (6 ships) and the 3rd division of boat minesweepers (9 ships), turned away to the NW in the Small Sound. From here they were to cover the landing of ground forces on Moon. The 3rd semi-flotilla of minesweepers (10 ships) turned to 8R to the east towards the Larina Bank. Following them at low speed, each accompanied by two destroyers, keeping on the port side, moved "Konig" and "Kronprinz".

Vice-Admiral M.K. Bakhirev, having received information about the movement of the Germans for about 8 hours (a radiogram from the patrol destroyer "Active": "Enemy forces are going to Kuivast"), ordered those who spent the night at about. Shieldau "Glory" and "Citizen" go to the Kuyvast raid. Having received an order from Vice Admiral M. K. Bakhirev to move out of the anchorage, Captain 1st Rank V. G. Antonov announced to the battleship crew that the enemy was approaching, weighed anchor and moved to SS0, “finishing preparations for battle on the move of the ship ". Due to the urgency of the order, the ropes were riveted, so when the ship stopped, it had to stay in place, controlled by machines. At 9 o'clock "Glory" and "Citizen" arrived at the raid. At the same time, Vice-Admiral Bakhirev climbed onto the bridge of the Bayan cruiser.

At 9.12 smoke and the masts of the enemy appeared. On all three ships they played a combat alarm, raised the flags. On the "Glory" to monitor the movement of the enemy, determine its heading angle and fix the falls of shells, midshipman B. A. Pyshnov was assigned to the for-mars.

Soon followed by a raid on Kuivast by enemy airplanes, which had no effect on the preparations for the battle of large ships. At 0935, several planes flew over the city and dropped bombs on the quay wall and the ships along it, without reaching the hits. One of the airplanes flew over the Glory, but did not throw bombs. According to a predetermined decision, they did not open fire on the enemy, so as not to distract the calculations of large guns (the battleship's anti-aircraft guns were not equipped with a separate servant).

When the distance to the minesweepers was reduced to 110 kb, Vice-Admiral Bakhirev gave the order to move to a combat position - to the north edge of our minefield 30 kb to the south of the Kuivast parallel. At this time, an incident occurred, vividly described by S. N. Timirev. “... Simultaneously with the signal, “Bayan” weighed anchor and raised the balls “to the stop”. According to a pre-drawn plan, it was assumed that, at the signal, the “beeches”, “Slava” and “Citizen” were going at full speed to the position; Bayan, following them, had to fit a little behind, at a distance of 1.5 kb from the position. It should be noted that the role of "Bayan" was purely moral, since the range of its guns was 10-12 kb less than on battleships. Several tedious minutes passed after the signal was lowered: Slava and Grazhdanin raised anchors, lowered the balls to the “middle course”, but. did not move: not the slightest surf was visible under their noses. Is it again a “moral element”? Terrible moment! And the enemy was getting closer, and from minute to minute it could be expected that he would open fire from his 12? towers; it was clear to us that then no forces could pull the ships into position. Bakhirev came up to me and muttered through his teeth: “They don't want to go! What should we do?". It occurred to me that if we went ahead, the ships would follow us, partly from the habit of "following the admiral's movement", and partly from a sense of shame that they were "led" by the weakest ship. I expressed this to Bakhirev. So they did. We blew the balls and went full speed, turning into position. The trick worked - the big ships also lowered the balls and began to seethe under their noses. Bakhirev and I felt relieved from the heart ... "

So, having hesitated a little during the speech, the ships moved in an uneven column to the south - the lead "Bayan", followed by 4 kb "Slava", then in 2 kb "Citizen". On the Paternoster parallel, Bayan slowed down, turned to the east and, after passing a few more cables, stopped, letting the battleships go forward. "Citizen", firing range 12? whose guns did not exceed 88 kb (against almost 116 kb of Glory), went around her and went forward, taking a place seaward of Glory in her wake. In the process of rebuilding, the ships stretched too much, which was followed at 9.50 by the commander's signal "Keep close to the admiral."

At 10 o'clock the battleships began to turn to bring the enemy to the stern course angle. Thus, the Russian flagship, whose maneuvering was significantly hampered by the shallows of the islands of Moon and Werder, intended to fight on the stern corners of the port side, if necessary, acting on the retreat in the direction of NNW.

Yu. Yu. Rybaltovsky in his report draws attention to one circumstance that did not allow Glory to fire directly at the stern. According to the state, the ship had three 9-foot (base 2.7 m) Barr and Strood rangefinders, which were located on the bow and stern bridges, as well as on the platform between the chimneys. Three days before the battle, the stern rangefinder was transferred to battery No. 43 on Tserel, but for obvious reasons it was not received back. However, Slava did not take care to promptly transfer the medium rangefinder to the stern, as a result of which now both remaining instruments were obstructed by the chimneys looking directly at the stern. The "shadow zone" was about 45°.

At 10.05, having brought the enemy to a heading angle of 135 ° port side, Slava from the maximum distance (the correction of the day was 3 kb, which, with a range of 12? battleship guns of 115.5 kb gives 112.5 kb) opened fire with long-range shells at western group of German minesweepers. The first volley made a flight, the second shortfall and the third covered them, after which the minesweepers, under the cover of a smoke screen, withdrew. The fire was stopped. Half a minute earlier than Slava, Grazhdanin opened fire, but at a range of 12? 86 kb guns, he was soon forced to stop firing, waiting for the distance to decrease.

Shortly after the start of firing, at 10.15, German dreadnoughts opened fire on the ships of M.K. "Bayan", which turned out to be the south of all. At 10.18 "Kronprinz" opened fire on the "Citizen" with five-gun volleys, which gave small shortfalls. Having made 5 volleys, he ceased fire. "Glory", thus, at this stage of the battle remained unfired. "Bayan", which was between her and the German battleships, in order not to interfere with the fire of "Glory", on the orders of Vice-Admiral Bakhirev, turned left and retreated a few cables to the stop.

Waiting for the approach to the range of its 12? guns, "Grazhdanin" opened fire with the main caliber also on the western group of minesweepers. Due to the shorter range of his guns, he, receiving undershoots, stopped firing, waiting for the minesweepers to approach in order to open fire again. With an anti-mine caliber (6?), He tried to fire on minesweepers at the eastern edge of the barrier. Russian battleships were extremely constrained in maneuvering, being driven on the spot by machines. Therefore, at 10.30, an order from Admiral Bakhirev followed by a semaphore to stay in place and maintain fire "on the nearest enemy."

By 10.50, the German minesweepers, which had withdrawn and reorganized under the cover of a smoke screen, again began to work. Slava resumed fire on them from a distance of 98.25 kb, which gradually decreased to 96 kb, again achieving cover. "Bayan" and "Grazhdanin" also fired on minesweepers, which "worked hard, despite being in a lot of our bursts all the time." During this period of the battle, fire 12? The Slava's guns were divided: the bow turret fired at the destroyers holding on to the western group of minesweepers on the Paternoster meridian, and the stern turret fired at the dreadnoughts that continuously fired at our ships, but to no avail.

Battle of October 4 - "Koenig" and "Kronprinz" fire on Russian ships (from the collection of G. Staf)

"Koenig" and "Kronprinz", bound by the lack of freedom of maneuver at the southern edge of the minefield, despite the fact that all the minesweepers were sent to break through it, were in a risky position. German official history testifies: “Russian battleships transferred their fire to the III [linear] squadron [i.e. e. on dreadnoughts] and very quickly shot at her. They kept very skillfully on the border of the range of fire of our heavy ship artillery (20.4 km). The position of the squadron was extremely unfortunate: it could neither approach the enemy, nor, standing still, evade his fire.

Realizing the impossibility of staying still under the fire of the Glory (“to prevent the Russians from gaining an easy success”), Vice Admiral Behnke ordered his dreadnoughts to turn to starboard and lie on the westward course “in order to go beyond the maximum range of enemy fire”.

Meanwhile, the movement of the Germans in the main section of the breakthrough at the western edge of the field began to stall. The successful fire of Slava and Grazhdanin has already twice forced the minesweepers of the 8th flotilla and the minesweepers of the 3rd division to retreat, hiding behind a curtain. According to Russian battle reports, one German minesweeper was sunk and one damaged during this period. The German official history does not confirm these facts, but notes with restraint that “The 8th semi-flotilla of mine seekers, heading on the NNW course, did not move forward. She found herself in a difficult situation and came under fire from Russian warships and a [coastal] battery [near the village] Voy. She managed to move away, hiding behind a smokescreen. The 3rd minesweeper battalion, which was carrying out minesweeping work behind (south) the 8th mine-searching semi-flotilla, also came under fire and was forced to stop work. The Russians shifted their fire further south, onto the destroyers and cruisers [Kolberg and Strasbourg], which, in turn, had to withdraw so as not to be targets. Thus, the attempt to break through between the barriers ... and the mines set by the German submarines failed, it had to be completely abandoned.

The commander of the Glory, V. G. Antonov, describes this moment of the battle as follows: “It was noticed that several large destroyers were heading N on the Packerort meridian. They were given one shot from the bow 12? towers, which immediately covered them and caused an explosion or fire on one of the destroyers, after which the destroyers rushed south in disorder. Enemy shells were falling all this time near our ships, but after our hit on the destroyer and in view of the fact that our shells began to fall close to the cruisers, the entire enemy detachment was about 11 a.m. 10 minutes. began to retreat to the south and ceased fire from a distance of 128 kb.

The failure to break through along the western edge of the barrier brought the fallback option to the fore - past the Larin Bank in a northerly direction. Here, to help the 3rd semi-flotilla of minesweeper boats, 9 more boats of the 3rd division were transferred from the main direction and the number of minesweepers was increased to 19 ("to break through at all costs at least in one area"). Thus, the final success of the breakthrough to Moonsund now depended on the tenacity of the German minesweepers and how long they could hold out under the fire of the Glory and the Citizen until the dreadnoughts along the swept passage could not come close and deal a crushing blow to them. artillery strike.

Fight October 4th. Russian ships under fire from German dreadnoughts. The head is "Glory", followed by "Citizen". In the bottom photo, from left to right: Slava, Grazhdanin, Bayan, and Deyativny-class destroyer

In the last minutes of this battle, which ended with the retreat of the Germans to regroup forces, the first big problem arose on Slava - the bow 12? installation. The reason was that, as the commander of the battleship V. G. Antonov points out in his report, “double bronze gears were handed over for both guns and the lock frames dropped a little, because their shafts were warped.” Thus, it was impossible to close the locks: the gears of the cogwheels did not move them due to the misalignment of their shafts. The right gun managed to fire four shots per battle, the left seven. Both of them were installed on the ship in November 1916 and fired (including the battle) practical 34 and 45 combat shots. Initially, it was assumed that the malfunction occurred due to excessive inflation of the obturators, which they decided to change, but in the end, "despite the hard work of the tower servants and locksmiths from the ship's workshop, nothing could be done." According to both artillery officers of the battleship, Yu. Yu. Rybaltovsky and V. I. Ivanov, all the blame for the breakdown fell solely on the Obukhov plant, which "carelessly made gears from bad metal."

"Glory" in battle. The pictures were taken from the destroyer "Strong"

After the German forces left the battle and retreated beyond the horizon (about 150 kb) at 11.20 on the Bayan, the signal “The admiral expresses his pleasure for the excellent shooting” was raised on the Bayan, and at 11.30 - “Anchor”. "Slava" asked for permission to stay under the cars, since both anchor ropes were riveted. At 11.35 a.m., with a signal from Bayan, the commander ordered the destroyers of the VI division to stay near the ships, guarding them. The disposition of the Russian forces at that time was as follows. Seaward of all, on the Paternoster parallel, the Grazhdanin was anchored, and the Bayan was two cables to the north of it.

"Glory" at 11.40 began to descend in reverse to Werder, towards the enemy "for more favorable maneuvering in case the battle resumed" (the maneuver was completed by 12.08). On the battleship, the team sounded for dinner calculations 6? towers. Of these, all the diving shells prepared there to repel possible attacks by enemy submarines were thrown overboard. The order for this was given in view of the fact that the attacks of the boats were considered unlikely, "the danger from their explosion when they hit the ship was very great."

At 11.50, in view of the approach of minesweepers, the commander of the MSRP gave the order to weigh anchor. "Grazhdanin" and "Bayan" chose anchors (the latter hesitated somewhat). After the semaphore “If the minesweepers approach, open fire”, “Citizen”, due to the shorter range of his artillery, went down to the south. Turning left side to the enemy, at 12.04 he began to fire at 12? and 6? caliber minesweepers moving in the following order: 4 boats in front formation, two in their wake, a destroyer from the right beam. Behind him at 12.10 from the stern 12? towers from a distance of 115 kb began firing and stalled the course of "Glory", holding the enemy at a heading angle of 135 ° port side. Following the battleships, the rest of the ships opened fire - the cruiser "Bayan" and the patrol destroyers "Turkmenets Stavropolsky" and "Don Cossack" kept at the boom, the distance from which to the minesweepers did not exceed 65-70 kb. The shooting of the Russians at this stage was again effective: M.K. Bakhirev notes in his report that "many covers were noticed that forced the minesweepers to change courses."

Having passed the eastern corner of the 1917 barrier, the German minesweepers came to clear water - the space between the old and new minefields. Their successful advance was helped by the fact that the Russians (by oversight, or in a hurry) left the cormorants. Finally, after advancing under continuous fire a few more miles to the north, to the northeast corner of the minefield of 1916, the minesweepers, covered with a smoke screen, lay down to retreat. At this time, they were much north of both dreadnoughts of Vice Admiral Behnke, who, having received a report from the commander of the 3rd semi-flotilla, Lieutenant Commander Doflein that the path was clear, finally decided to launch a frontal attack on the Russian ships, introducing his dreadnoughts at high speed into squandered space. For some minutes, she was detained by a called artillery spotter seaplane, which "very unsuccessfully sat in front of the battleship itself, thereby delaying the transition to full speed."

At 12.10 in the fairway marked by buoys, they began their "jerk to the north." The German battleships were in bearing formation - the Kronprinz behind the König and somewhat to the left of its course. The stroke was 18 knots, which, just before the opening of fire, was reduced to 17, since at more there was an inexplicably strong vibration that made it difficult to use optics for aiming. Having gained momentum, both German dreadnoughts were moving closer. Having reduced the distance to 90 kb, "Koenig" at 12.13 (according to the watch log "Slava" - at 12.15) opened fire on the "Slava". The Kronprinz joined him two minutes later. The artillery attack on the approach continued until 12.22, when the mine alarm was broken on the dreadnoughts and they reduced their speed to a small one. After another 8 minutes, both ships stopped in the northeast corner of the 1916 barrier and, turning towards the Russian log, opened fire with full 5-gun volleys on the port side. At 12.40 dreadnoughts stopped firing.

On "Slava" events unfolded as follows. Upon receiving a message from Mars about the rapid approach of the German dreadnoughts, the ship opened rapid fire on them from a distance of 112 kb from the stern 12? towers. From the battle report of the commander of the battleship V. G. Antonov: “The enemy, having quickly taken aim, showered the ship with shells. Most of the shells fall around the nose. There are five shells in an enemy salvo, rarely four. Made a small move. At 12.18, in order to somewhat knock down the sighting of the enemy, he added speed to the middle one, putting a little to the right of the rudder.

The first ten minutes of the battle did not bring any results to the Germans, and finally, at 12.25, another Koenig volley laid down a cover, which gave three hits. The ship experienced a strong tremor (“shuddered and swayed violently”), eyewitnesses speak of a feeling of instantly lifting it up and quickly sinking down. All three German shells hit the underwater part of the left side: two in the nose below the shelf and one against the left engine room in the edge of the armor belt.

One of the shells hit 3–3.5 m below the armor against 25 sp., In the room of two bow combat dynamos. The gap followed either at the very side, or in the side corridor and produced, according to those who were on board, "a huge hole about 1.5 fathoms in diameter." The electricity in the entire bow immediately went out. Two machinists, who were at the dynamos, barely managed to get out of the compartment among the streams of water, which instantly flooded the entire room and reached the battery deck, the emergency exit and the hatch of which was immediately battened down (supports were placed on the hatch in advance). The situation was fatally complicated by the fact that in the dark, and also, apparently, due to the strongest fright, people did not have time to batten down the doors in the bulkhead of the turret compartment 12? installations and water also flooded the bow cellars. The capacity of all flooded compartments was about 840 tons.

Through the central post, the commander of the battleship V. G. Antonov gave the order to equalize the roll by flooding the aft side corridors of the starboard side. The order was duplicated by sending an orderly to the hold mechanical engineer K. I. Mazurenko. From the memoirs of the latter: “At that time, the ship was quickly listing to the port side ... I rushed to the battened down hatch 12? bow cellars on the battery deck in order to go down through its open neck, inspect the hole and isolate the flooded part of the compartment. Looking into the neck, I, unfortunately, saw that the water level was 12? compartment had already reached sea level and was six feet from the mouth. It only remained to batten it down in case of a possible ship sinking from further holes in the battle. Judging by the significant rate of flooding of the large compartment 12? cellar, which was almost 48 feet long, one can easily understand that the hole in it is almost the same size as in a mine explosion. As it turned out later, it had a diameter of about 15 feet ... All I had to do was equalize the dangerous list of 9 ° and take measures to ensure that the water did not spread and did not seep into the compartments of the adjacent compartment of the bow 6? cellars. I ordered to flood the outer side corridors on the starboard side against the stokers and engine rooms to equalize the roll - and the hold immediately began to perform stencil work, which they were familiar with from previous battles in 1915.

The second hit flooded the upper bow compartment of wet provisions and the skipper between 5 - 13 sp. The capacity of both rooms was 287 tons of water. As a result of these two hits and the resulting inflow of a total of about 1130 tons of water into the bow, a roll of 4.5 ° immediately formed, which reached 8 ° in less than 10 minutes. To equalize the roll and trim in the starboard compartments from 32 sp. water was taken into the stern and the list was quickly reduced to 3–4 °.

The third projectile, which hit the underwater part of the armor belt against the left vehicle, did not penetrate the side, but caused a violation of its integrity, “since only water filtration was noticed in the engine room and the water in the hold arrived so slowly that only drainage means could cope with it” .

A hit on the side near the dynamo compartment, which occurred at a very sharp angle (about 30–35 °), also affected the cellars of the left bow 6? towers, where a fire broke out in the helm compartment - the mats and pea coats of the sailors of the calculation of the supply of the cellar caught fire. From the report of midshipman Shimkevich, the commander of the tower: “The tower was filled with smoke, people put on masks and put out the fire. The galvanists who were there (two people) and one drill put out the fire and, when the feeder's servant wanted to leave the tower, persuaded them to stay in their places. According to Galvaner Chaikov, they reported the fire to the tower, but did not receive any answer, apparently, the communication pipe was broken. Then the sailors, having no connection with the chief, flooded the cellar on their own initiative.

The interior of the infirmary "Glory" (pre-war photo)

As a result of the damage received and the measures taken to combat them, the state of "Glory" by 12.30 is determined as follows. The entire bow of the battleship up to 26 sp. from the keel to the lower deck, with the exception of a few small compartments, filled with water. The ship landed with its bow 1.5 m, increasing the average recess by almost 0.5 m; the deepening of the bow became about 10 m and the average deepening was about 8.9 m. The bulkheads were kept well, only water was filtered through the glands of the electrical wires. Stability as a whole did not decrease, since water did not penetrate above the armored deck. Having received holes and a roll, Slava, carefully putting the rudder to the right so as not to increase the roll, lay down on a course of 330 °. At this moment, the German dreadnoughts were right on the stern, having the opportunity to hit their heavily damaged enemy with longitudinal fire.

The battle had reached a critical moment. Since the Germans stopped and no longer approached, the only chance for both Russian battleships and the Bayan to survive under the intense and aimed fire of the German dreadnoughts was to retreat north as soon as possible. From the report on the battle of Vice-Admiral Bakhirev: “About 12 o'clock. 30 minutes to withdraw the destroyers of the 6th and 9th divisions guarding the detachment from the enemy’s fire, since there was no need for protection, and so that our minelayers and other ships anchored to N from Schildau left the sphere of fire in advance and did not interfere with maneuvering large ships, I made a general “B” signal, which I then reinforced by radio: “MSRZ move away.”

By this time, the "Citizen" also had two hits from the "Crown Prince", which, however, did not lead to such dire consequences as on the "Glory". The first to break through the upper deck in the stern 12? the projectile caused significant damage in the interdeck space (a fire broke out, which was quickly dealt with). The second one, which pierced the side at the level of the upper edge of the armor at the middle left 6? towers, also caused multiple damage inside and damaged auxiliary mechanisms and pipelines, but had no effect on the combat qualities of the ship.

Here is how G. K. Graf describes these dramatic minutes: “Near the Glory. huge columns of water rose up, in its side, near the bow tower, several holes were clearly visible. With a large roll to the port side and sitting with her bow, she went north at a big speed. "Bayan", which managed to get out of the shelling relatively safely, went with a fire on the tank, holding the "Slava" signal "C", i.e. "stop the car". Apparently, Admiral Bakhirev was afraid that she, sitting in the canal, would block the exit for everyone else. The last to slowly retreat to the north was the Tsesarevich, who energetically fired back from his 12? guns. He also had a few hits."

Immediately after the order was given to withdraw to Glory at 12.29, two more shells hit - “one on the church deck, the other on the battery deck, almost in one place, near the fan shaft of the first stoker. The shells tore apart the lockers, fire horns, lagoons, the ladder connecting both decks, the mines in the cellars of small artillery, the stoker mine and fired command cabinets and lockers on both decks. Thanks to the energetic and selfless work of the senior officer, Captain 2nd Rank Haller and the hold fire division, the fire was extinguished in 10-15 minutes, despite the difficulties of work due to the mass of smoke and gases and therefore the difficulties of orientation "(from the report of the battleship commander V. G. Antonov) .

Some of the wounded were bandaged right there on the spot, some were immediately taken to the aft dressing station. Doctor Leppik was seriously shell-shocked by one of these shells, while bandaging midshipman Denisov, who also turned out to be shell-shocked, but lightly. The flame, smoke and gas from the explosion destroyed the bow dressing station, the medical staff of which immediately moved to the main feeding station.

The effect of the gap was also strongly felt in the central post located here under the armored deck, where the blast wave and smoke got through the damaged communication shaft with the conning tower. From the report of midshipman Denier, who was in the central post: “... there was a hit somewhere very close to the central post, which broke it and put it completely out of action. In which part of the central post there was a hit, I can’t say for sure; some of the crew said they saw a big flame; I myself, like many of the team, was stunned and thrown away from the table at which I was ciphering. During the gap in the post, besides me, there were Lieutenant Siebert and all the servants of the central post, everyone remained in their places, there were no dead or wounded in my part of the post ... the lighting weakened, the telephone and other electrical installations stopped working, the speaking pipes were broken and out of them water poured out, all the electric bells began to ring muffled. Lieutenant Siebert: “... a shell exploded near the cockpit, a flame appeared, the room was filled with smoke and TNT gases. The explosion threw me off the table, at which I was sitting with midshipman Denyer, busy deciphering the radio. Only the lamp on the starboard side survived of the lighting, the telephones began to ring, the transformers stopped. We took all the documents and stood at the entrance to the central post on the starboard side, since there was a small influx of fresh air. Roll to the left side increased significantly. Water leaked out of the speaking tubes and some small openings in the forward bulkhead…”.

As a result of the actual failure of the central post, Captain 1st Rank Antonov ordered aft 12? the tower, which was under the command of the junior gunner of the battleship Lieutenant V.I. Ivanov, switch to “plutong [i.e. e. independent] fire”. The enemy continued to hold on to a heading angle of about 180°.

The gases from the explosions of both shells got through the ventilation shaft into the bow stoker, but all the stokers remained in place and continued their work. From the memoirs of K. I. Mazurenko: “I went down the ladder there and, to my joy, I was convinced that the message [about the flow of water] turned out to be erroneous: everything was in order there and the stokers, under the supervision of the foreman, worked very calmly at boilers, despite the large roll. I thanked them for their excellent work and, after checking that all the valves and clinkets necessary to equalize the list, were open, I went up to the gun deck.

In the aft stoker, where water filtration was observed due to the skin joints diverging due to close gaps, due to a roll to the port side, the collected water approached the furnaces of boilers Nos. 11 and 16, in which it was ordered to stop the steam. It was not yet possible to pump out this water due to the fact that, due to the heel, the bilge pump located in the diametrical plane could not pick it up.

Again, the word of K. I. Mazurenko: “... I was informed that there was water in the aft stoker. Going down into it, I saw that from the list the water in the stoker hold overflowed to the port side, rose above the platforms and reached the fireboxes of the two extreme boilers: the bilge pump could not pump it out, since the drainage system receivers were in the middle part of the hold. Having ordered the mechanical engineer midshipman Balgits to stop the steam in the two leftmost boilers, and making sure that the right outer side corridors were being flooded, I went to the battery deck, where I was immediately reported from the left engine room about the penetration of water into it.

I ran downstairs and saw that the crank wells of the left machine were flooded with water almost to the shaft and the rotating cranks, together with their bearings, were immersed in it at the lower positions. Through the flanges of the pipes, adjacent at the top to the port side bulkhead, water seeped and flowed quite strongly.

It became clear that this bulkhead was damaged, the flanges of the pipes loosened, and their impermeability was broken by the burst of an enemy shell against the engine room. Apparently, the shell here hit the armor below the waterline at the end and did not pierce it, but when it exploded, it only loosened and damaged it and, along with it, the bulkhead; water penetrated into the side corridor and from there leaked into the engine room. I ordered to set in motion, to help the drainage pump, a powerful drainage turbine - and it began to quickly free the hold from water; along the way, I ordered to reduce the seepage as much as possible. Having then risen to the battery deck, he looked at the inclinometer and noticed that the list had decreased to 3 °.

One of the German shells of the same covering, which exploded in the water close to the side, raised a column of water above the fore-mars; its splash, falling down, flooded the nasal bridge. The control of the ship was difficult due to the roll. At 12.37 the list decreased to 4°. One of our volleys, as observed from Mars by midshipman Pyshnov, who was correcting the shooting, caused a fire in the bow of the lead ship of the line, which fired at the Glory.

At 12.39 (or 40), being already at the exit from the coverage area 12? guns of the German dreadnoughts, "Glory" received the last series of hits. Until now, it is not possible to clearly clarify whether there were two or three of them, since both of the latter (or one) fell almost at the same point; the evidence for this is split roughly evenly. The first hit was on the church deck - the shell pierced the forecastle deck and exploded "near the ship's images." Everything was destroyed here, the upper deck was torn apart in several places and three people were found killed, their names could not be established. A. M. Kosinsky in his work mentions that their heads were torn off.

The second shell (or two) hit the armor at the radio room, pierced it and turned the bulkhead of the onboard corridor, bending the bulkheads of neighboring coal pits with the force of the explosion. There were no big fires from these hits, but K. I. Mazurenko mentions a fire “in the reloading post of the middle left 6? towers, where there were carts with charges. The fire was extinguished by the commander of the tower, it seems, midshipman L. I. Agapov.

These last hits did not significantly affect the state of the Glory, but its position was already critical. A hull shattered by hits and close explosions of the German 12? shells, gave a strong leak, which the ship's pumps could hardly cope with. They tried to pump out the water that entered the left engine room with the available drainage means (pump and turbine), but their work was not effective enough and “the situation became threatening, because the working machine was immersed in water with bloodworms and the spraying of the latter created fountains that made it difficult to control the main mechanisms." As water entered the boiler rooms, the boilers had to be taken out of action, as a result of which the steam pressure constantly dropped, and the course of the ship was decreasing.

Having lost half of the heavy artillery, the battleship, with almost 2500 tons of water inside, was at the limit of exhaustion of combat capability and, with a bow draft increased to 10 m, had no chance of going north by the Moonsund Canal. This was perfectly understood by the command of the battleship, which, even before the last series of hits, became clear about its plight. The death of "Glory", slowly moving in a small course (34 turns) to the north and firing with rare shots from the aft tower, became only a matter of time.

The commander of the battleship Antonov, with a semaphore, asked the commander for permission "due to the fact that the ship had sunk heavily and the Grand Canal had become impassable for the ship, remove people and blow up the ship." At 12.41 all secret documents were destroyed. At 12.43, an attack of six enemy airplanes followed, which was repulsed by the fire of the battleship's anti-aircraft artillery, and in the report of V. G. Antonov it is reported that "one airplane was shot down by our volley and fell sharply down (the fire was controlled by Starleit Rybaltovsky)". At 12.45 the ship ceased fire, giving a number of undershoots from a distance of 115.5 kb.

At 12.47 "Bayan", which also had damage from 12? a shell that exploded in the nose under the bridge overtook both battleships and became the lead. When the cruiser passed, the Slava commander again reported to Vice-Admiral Bakhirev about the disastrous state of the ship through a megaphone, which was followed by an order to “let the Grazhdanin go forward, flood the ship at the entrance to the canal and, having removed the command on the destroyers, blow up the cellars.”

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From the book Adventures of the High Seas author Cherkashin Nikolai Andreevich

October 25, 1917 18 hours 10 minutes On the grand flight of stairs they met a mournful procession. Conductor Chumysh walked ahead, holding a stretcher behind him. The skirts of an overcoat hung from them, covering someone's body with the head. Headquarters officers silently descended the steps,

From the book Adventures of the High Seas author Cherkashin Nikolai Andreevich

On October 25, 1917, 19:00 The flasks on the Aurora beat off seven o'clock in the evening, when a black boat with passengers and a helmsman rolled off the Admiralteyskaya Embankment. - Pray tell me, the service has not been forgotten! - the conductor admired, hearing copper blows through the scream of the motor

From the book Adventures of the High Seas author Cherkashin Nikolai Andreevich

October 25, 1917 21 hours 40 minutes "Aurora" stood unshakable in the middle of the Neva, like an armored wedge driven into the very core of the city.

Slava is a Borodino-class battleship pre-dreadnought of the Russian Imperial Navy. The only ship of its type that did not take part in the Russo-Japanese War.

"Slava" was built at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. The battleship was laid down on November 1, 1902, launched on August 19, 1903, construction was completed in October 1905. By this time, after Tsushima, the ship was already considered obsolete.

After that, "Glory" was assigned to a separate training squadron.

The propulsion system of the ship consisted of 20 Belleville water-tube boilers, which produced steam under pressure up to 19 atmospheres, and two vertical triple-expansion steam engines, driving two 4-bladed propellers.

The ship had two dynamos driven by the main engine of 150 kW each, as well as two independent auxiliary generators of 64 kW each.

The design power of the power plant was 15,800 hp, but during tests it developed 16,378 hp, which allowed the battleship to have a speed of 17.64 knots (32.67 km / h)

Four 12-inch (305 mm) guns of the main caliber were located in two-gun turrets placed in the center plane of the ship. The rate of fire of the guns was about 1 shot per minute, and after the modernization of the ammunition supply system around 1914, it increased to 1 shot per 40 seconds

Medium-caliber artillery was represented by twelve 6-inch (152 mm) guns, which were also placed in towers located on the upper deck and had an electric drive. Their practical rate of fire was about 3 rounds per minute, ammunition - 180 rounds per gun

The anti-mine artillery consisted of twenty 3-inch (76 mm) guns with 300 rounds each. Four of them, designed to fight destroyers, were located in the bow casemate, directly under the forward gun turret of the main caliber, two on board, and were sufficiently raised above the waterline in order to fire in any wave. The rest were located in the casemates of the stern of the ship along the side, which made it problematic to fire from them in heavy seas.

All but four of the 47 mm Hotchkiss quick-firing guns envisaged by the project were removed during the construction of the ship, and the rest were used as salutes.
In addition to artillery armament, the ship had four 15-inch (381 mm) torpedo tubes - one surface in the stem and stern and two underwater along the sides.
Subsequently, already during the First World War, two 47-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed on the ship. According to other sources, at the beginning of 1917, the ship had four 76-mm anti-aircraft guns. By this time, her ship's anti-mine artillery had been reduced to 12 3-inch guns. In addition, in 1916, changes were made to the design of the main battery turrets, thanks to which the maximum elevation angle of the 12-inch barrels reached 25 °, and their range increased to 21 km.

Together with the battleship "Tsesarevich" and the cruiser "Bogatyr", "Glory" went on the first training voyage, during which she visited Bizerte, Tunisia, Toulon and other ports of the Mediterranean Sea.
Battleship Slava enters Bizerte.

In December 1908, when Slava was in the Sicilian city of Messina, there was a strong earthquake. The ship's crew took part in rescue work in the city, the wounded were evacuated on an armadillo to Naples. (I will tell you about this event in the next issues)
Sailors take part in the aftermath of the earthquake.

In 1910, the ship suffered a serious accident in the boiler room, after which it was towed by the Tsesarevich to Gibraltar, and then sent to Toulon, where in 1910-1911 the battleship was overhauled at the Forge e Chantier factory (fr. . Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée), which took about a year. After returning to Kronstadt, the ship was withdrawn from the training squadron and enrolled in the Baltic Fleet.
Battleship Slava in England.

Battleship Slava in France

Battleship "Glory" at the firing range.

Engine room

On the Battleship "Glory" before the distribution of wine.

Officers of the Battleship "Glory".

Sailors of the Battleship "Glory".

Sailors of the Battleship "Glory" during classes and work.

Sailors of the Battleship "Glory".

Battleship "Glory" 1910-1013.

At the beginning of the First World War, in the Baltic, Russia had only four obsolete pre-dreadnoughts, from which a brigade of battleships was formed; four dreadnoughts of the Gangut type were under construction. After they entered service and could begin to guard the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, Slava passed through the Irben Strait and joined the forces operating in the Gulf of Riga.
The commander of the battleship "Glory" Captain 1st Rank O. O. Richter announces to the team about the beginning of the war with Germany.

On August 8, 1915, the German squadron began sweeping minefields in the Irben Strait. "Glory" and the gunboats "Terrible" and "Brave" approached the place of work; the gunboats opened fire on the minesweepers. They were answered from a long distance by the German pre-dreadnoughts Alsace and Braunschweig, but Glory, despite the damage received from close shell explosions, did not leave the position. According to one source, Slava did not return their fire due to the insufficient range of the guns, and the Germans retreated, as there were much more Russian mines than they expected to meet. According to other information, Slava entered into an artillery duel with German battleships, and, having lost two minesweepers, T-52 and T-58, on mines, the Germans temporarily abandoned their breakthrough attempt.
Battleship "Slava" in Helsingfors during the First World War.

In the initial stages of the German operation "Albion" in October 1917, "Glory" was in position near the island of Saarema, guarding the entrance to the Gulf of Riga and the Kassar reach, which separates the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa. On October 15 and 16, she opened fire on German destroyers attacking Russian light forces in the Kassar reach, but without success.
On the morning of October 17, the Germans began sweeping Russian mines at the southern entrance to the Moonsund Canal. "Slava", pre-dreadnought "Citizen" (formerly "Tsesarevich") and armored cruiser "Bayan" on the orders of Vice Admiral Mikhail Bakhirev went to meet the German forces and opened fire on minesweepers at 8:05 CET, and at 8:12 " Glory "from a distance close to the limit, fired at the German dreadnoughts König and Kronprinz, covering the minesweepers. "Citizen", whose towers have not been modernized, and "Bayan" continued at this time the shelling of minesweepers. The German battleships responded, but their shots did not reach Slava's position. "Glory" also never hit, although some of its shells fell only 50 m from the "Koenig". As a result, the Germans, seeing the inconvenience of their position in the narrowness that made maneuvering difficult, retreated.
Battleship "Glory" after the battle in the Irben Strait.1917.

Meanwhile, the German minesweepers achieved great success, despite the constant bombardment from the Russian ships and the coastal battery. In addition, at this time, the Slava's nose turret failed after 11 shots due to deformation of the bronze ring gear and jamming of the horizontal aiming mechanism. The squadron was ordered to withdraw to the north for the breakfast of the crews. By 10:04, the Russian ships returned to their position, "Slava" opened fire with a stern tower from a distance of about 11 km. Meanwhile, while the Russians were having breakfast, minesweepers made a passage in the northern part of the minefield, after which the German dreadnoughts were able to come closer and join the battle. "Koenig" fired at "Slava" at 10:14, and from the third salvo covered the Russian battleship with three hits. The first shell hit the bow, penetrating the armor below the waterline and exploding in the bow dynamo room, causing it, as well as the ammunition magazine for the bow 12-inch guns and other compartments in the bow, to be flooded. The ship received 1,130 tons of water, got a trim on the bow and listed by 8 °, later the roll was reduced to 4 ° due to the action of the pumps. The third shell hit the armor belt of the left side opposite the engine room, but did not penetrate it. At 10:24, two more shells hit the ship, hitting the area of ​​​​the forward chimney, they damaged the cellar of six-inch shells and the forward boiler room; The fire started and was extinguished within 15 minutes. The cellar of the forward 6-inch port side turret had to be flooded. At 10:39 a.m., two more shells hit two people in the boiler room and flooded the coal bunker. At about the same time, Glory and the second battleship were ordered to retreat to the north, their retreat was covered by the Bayan.

The leak in the holds of the Glory increased so much that the ship could not leave with the rest of the fleet through the Moonsund Strait between the islands of Hiiumaa and Vormsi; the crew was ordered after the passage of the fleet to flood the battleship at the entrance to the strait. However, the Committee created on the ship after the February Revolution ordered the crew to leave the engine room due to the threat of flooding; soon the ship lay down on pitfalls to the southeast of the entrance to the strait. The destroyers removed the crew from the ship, after which, at 11:58, the shell magazine of the aft 12-inch turret was blown up. The explosion was considered not strong enough, so three destroyers were ordered to finish off the ship with torpedoes. After being hit by one of the six torpedoes fired at Slava, the ship lay down on the ground with a hole in the port side near the chimney.
The ship was finally deleted from the lists of the fleet on May 29, 1918, after the victory of the October Revolution.
In the mid-1930s, independent bourgeois Estonia dismantled the remains of the ship for scrap