The oldest armies in the world.
The Sumerians were the first... This mysterious people appeared in the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates at the end of the 4th millennium BC. e. The Sumerians gave humanity many truly great discoveries: the state, fortified cities, writing, schools, codes of laws, the wheel, irrigation agriculture - this is not a complete list of Sumerian innovations. The Sumerian city-states were located close to each other (at a distance of 30-40 km), and therefore territorial and property disputes inevitably arose between them. City governments were forced to acquire armies. Interstate wars and armies are also the invention of the Sumerians. The oldest military conflict known to historians took place in the middle of the 4th millennium BC. e. between the Sumerian city-states of Kish and Uruk.

Very little is known about the weapons of the Sumerian warriors of that time. In the epic text, which tells about the war between Kish and Uruk, battle axes are mentioned, obviously made of copper. Undoubtedly, spears were used, the main weapon of the warriors of Mesopotamia, as well as slings (archaeologists have found cores for slings of the Uruk period). Apparently, shortly after the war with Kish, the ruler of Uruk surrounded his city with colossal fortress walls, the remains of which have recently been discovered by archaeologists.
Much more information about the armament and organization of the Sumerian army has been preserved from the next, so-called early dynastic period (approximately 3000-2350 BC). At this time, one after another, the Sumerian cities of Ur, Lagash, Umma, Nippur and others rose and flourished. The role and strength of the state apparatus increased sharply. The first standing armies appeared, at first very small, only a few hundred warriors.
Historians judge their weapons, device, and even tactics of warfare mainly by the few images that have come down to us, the main of which are the famous standard from Ur and the Stele of Vultures.
The Sumerian army of the early dynastic period consisted of three types of troops: heavy and light infantry and chariots. The main force of the army was heavy infantry, and spears with copper tips were the main offensive weapons. In pre-Sumerian times, stone or copper points were inserted into a wooden shaft with a wedge and secured with straps or ropes. Such a mount quickly weakened and loosened, moreover, the shaft split and the tip could fall out at the most inopportune moment. The Sumerians improved the method of fastening the tip: they made several holes in its narrow base and fixed it on the shaft with copper pins or rivets.

Heavy infantry went on the attack in a tightly closed formation. Ahead, such a phalanx was covered by warriors with large rectangular shields. Probably, the shields were made of wood, covered with leather and additionally reinforced with copper plaques. The phalanx of Lagash, depicted on the Stele of Vultures, consisted of six rows of spearmen in copper helmets, 9 people in a row, that is, a total of 54 warriors.
In the wars of the early dynastic period, light infantry, armed with javelins and clubs (and later with battle axes), apparently did not play a big role. The highest achievement of Sumerian military technology and the main means, if not extermination, then at least intimidation of the enemy, were undoubtedly the world's first war chariots. They were rather clumsy wooden carts on four wheels with a high protective wall in front, to which quivers for darts were attached. A couple of donkeys were harnessed to the chariot (the horse had not yet been domesticated), and two people got into the cart: a driver and a warrior who fought with a long spear and threw darts. Driving a Sumerian chariot cost a lot of work, and not only: the stubbornness of the recently tamed steppe donkeys - onagers. The fact is that the wheels of the Sumerian fighting carts were solid wooden circles, without spokes and rims, and the mowers were fixed motionless. Therefore, the left and right wheels rotated at the same speed, and when cornering, one of them always slipped and burrowed into the ground. Although this military equipment did not differ in maneuverability and speed, even such clumsy wagons terrified the enemies.

Historians believe that in combat conditions, the oldest army could, keeping order, move only in one direction - forward. The Sumerians did not yet know how to set up ambushes or go in from the flanks. Or maybe they simply considered such tricks unworthy. Therefore, the system was covered, with shields only in front.

The Sumerian warriors were armed with copper (and later bronze) daggers and axes. In the middle of the III millennium BC. BC, shortly after the invention of metal armor (cloaks with copper plates), battle axes changed markedly: their blades became narrower and longer to cut through scaly armor. Such axes, sometimes called "crow's beaks", were the most effective weapons in close combat when the phalanx was broken up and it became impossible to use spears. It is believed that the honor of inventing combat swords also belongs to the Sumerians. The first samples of this weapon were forged no later than the middle of the 3rd millennium BC. e. The oldest swords had a rather strange curved shape, indicating that their ancestor was most likely a peasant sickle. Such sickle-shaped swords at the beginning, apparently, were only in service with the nobility and were used mainly for the execution of the Captives.
The army of a new model appeared in the reign of Sargon the Ancient in 2261. BC e.). The main force was the mobile light infantry, which operated in loose formation and included detachments of archers, spearmen and warriors with battle axes. Heavy, slow phalanxes and clumsy chariots were powerless against the swift attacks of Sargon's light infantry, which outflanked the enemy and showered him with clouds of arrows. Sargon, who became the first emperor in the world, united the Northern and Southern Mesopotamia under his rule, and made the new city of Akkad the capital. He created the largest regular army at that time. Cuneiform chronicles, as something unheard of, report the number of his permanent army: warriors who always eat and sleep with their king - 5400 people!

Times have changed, and now Mesopotamia was threatened by hordes of steppe nomads, their military art had advanced so much that the archaic Sumerian phalanxes could not ensure the safety of the cities. Sargon ruled the country for 55 years and fought 34 major battles. After his death, the Akkadian empire did not last long, it was captured by the nomadic Kutians.
On the ruins of the Sumero-Akkadian kingdom at the beginning of the 2nd millennium BC. e. there were two great powers - Babylon in the south and Assyria in the north. For one and a half millennia, they disputed dominance over Mesopotamia, and sometimes over the entire Middle East, from each other. In conditions of constant single combat, military affairs developed rapidly. Even at the turn of the III and II millennia BC. e. in Mesopotamia, there was a final transition from copper weapons to bronze (bronze was most likely the first to be invented by the better Sumerians), and by the end of the 2nd millennium, iron weapons began to spread (at first only offensive; defenses continued to be made from bronze for a long time). At the beginning of the II millennium BC. e. the inhabitants of Mesopotamia finally managed to tame horses, and they immediately began to be used in military affairs. Chariots drawn by two, three or four horses represented a much more formidable force than the Sumerian fighting carts. The chariots themselves also changed radically: they were now made not four-wheeled, but two-wheeled; wheels (no longer solid, but with spokes and a rim) were movably attached to the axle, which significantly increased speed and maneuverability. The crew of the Assyrian war chariot consisted of four people: a charioteer, an archer and two shield-bearers.
At the end of the II millennium BC. e. The Assyrians mastered horseback riding and were the first to introduce cavalry armed with bows and darts into the troops. Stirrups were not yet known, and at first it was difficult for riders to control both the horse and the weapon at the same time. The first cavalrymen needed the help of foot soldiers: the shield-bearers held the horses by the bridle and covered the horsemen with shields while they fired or threw darts. Somewhat later, the Assyrian horsemen learned to skillfully control the horse with their feet, which made it possible for them to do without the support of the infantry. The cavalry was indispensable for the pursuit of defeated enemies.

In the first third of the 1st millennium BC. e., during the period of the highest prosperity of Assyria, the Assyrian army was by far the strongest in the world in terms of numbers, weapons, organization, and military discipline. The army of Shalmaneser III in 845 BC e. numbered 120,000 soldiers - an unprecedented figure for that time. Numerous innovations contributed to the military success of Assyria, such as cavalry, siege engines, and iron weapons. However, all these innovations were quickly adopted by their neighbors, including the Babylonians, although, unlike their northern neighbors, they did not introduce anything new into military science.

The sickle-shaped swords of the Assyrians were gradually replaced by shorter ones - and straight ones, borrowed from the Western peoples - the Hittites and Achaeans

The Assyrian king Tiglath-Pileser III (744-727 BC) carried out a military reform, as a result of which the power of the Assyrian army reached its maximum. The basis of the army was the tsarist regiment - a permanent army, which consisted of full tsarist support and was formed by recruitment (including from the poorest segments of the population). The army included seven main branches of service. The elite of the troops are charioteers recruited from the nobility. From two to four people were placed on the chariot, one drove the horses, and the rest fired bows, threw darts, fought with spears or held shields, blocking themselves and their comrades. For the first time, the cavalry became a truly formidable strike force. The riders were dressed in bronze scaly armor and armed not only with bows, but also with spears, axes, swords. Heavy infantry in armor and pointed helmets fought with spears and short swords. Light infantry - archers, slingers and javelin throwers - fought without armor and often without helmets; the warriors were protected by special shield-bearers, who blocked the shooters with high shields. The army also had
siege troops, reconnaissance and convoy.
Heavy infantry was usually built in three lines. The first row of spearmen was covered by huge, man-sized, trapezoidal shields, and the second and third rows were covered with lighter and more comfortable round shields. Light infantry could act independently of other branches of the military, sometimes forming a single formation to repel attacks by enemy infantry and chariots, and then scattering. The first row consisted of shield-bearers (they could also throw darts), followed by archers in three rows, and behind all slingers, whose actions required a lot of free space. The slingers fired over the heads of their comrades.
A powerful, combat-ready army allowed the Assyrian kings to extend their power to the whole of Asia Minor. However, at the end of the 7th c. BC e. the greatest of the empires of the ancient world collapsed under the blows of numerous enemies - the Babylonians and the Medes.

Sacred or priestly weapons were used for ritual purposes. In ancient times, such weapons were considered as a manifestation of the deity, its symbolic essence. Sacred weapons were considered the body of a deity, and the sacraments performed with their help reflected the mystical life of a deity.
The cults associated with sacred weapons varied, but they were all united by the difference between sacred weapons and military weapons, as well as the need for initiation and inauguration of their bearers. Almost every nation had a ritual weapon, but not always sacred. It differed in that either it carried a divine particle in itself, or it got from the gods to people.
Each sacred weapon had its own fate, connected with the bearer priest, with his life and death, and with the revival of the cult. Violation of cult rituals entailed a violation of the mystical body of the deity, its metaphysical incarnation, and could lead to unpredictable consequences.
The manufacture of sacred weapons was accompanied by a special ceremony. Moreover, each cult had its own methods of uniting the bearer with the weapon. For example, when forging a blade for cat cults (lions, leopards, panthers, etc.), the priest's blood was forged into it from a cut on his hand, and the cut was cauterized with a red-hot blade. In this way, the blood brotherhood of the weapon and the priest was achieved, since, according to legend, the weapon itself was originally forged from the blood of a god. Upon the "death" of the sacral blade (breaking of the blade), the wearer took the fragment of the blade into his chest, giving the blade the opportunity to be reborn in twinning with the new priest. It was believed that during reforging, the souls of its bearers entered the sacred sword in order to be reborn in the blade again and again.
In the "royal" burial of Ur, dating back to the III millennium BC. e., along with other precious items, a magnificent dagger was discovered. It is difficult to say whether this was the burial of a lugal (leader), one of the ensi (high priests) or an even (priest builder), but there is no doubt that the dagger was a cult, because it was made of gold and lapis lazuli.
There was no gold of its own in Sumer, so the precious metal was dedicated only to the gods, and only for the gods and temples were products made from it. The handle of the dagger is made of lapis lazuli - a stone "pleasing to the deities" and having a symbolic and sacred meaning.
The supreme deity in Ur was worshiped by the moon god Nanna. His cult was associated with the movement of the moon across the starry sky: at night, on his barge, the deity traveled through the sky, and during the day, through the country of ancestors. The priests and priestesses of the lunar deity predicted and calculated lunar eclipses, which was very important, because the tides depended on the phases of the moon, affecting merchant shipping.
Nanna was considered the lord of oracles, and his priests divined for the whole of Sumer by the liver, heart, lungs and other entrails of sacrificial animals. For predictions and feeding deities and priests, animals were always cut with a sacred dagger. A complex ritual was accompanied by the smoking of incense, the libation of sacrificial water, oil, beer, and wine. To the sounds of lyres, harps, cymbals and tambourines, prayers were raised for the well-being of the donor. The priests in charge of the rite knew what dishes and drinks were pleasing to the gods, what could be considered “clean” and what was “unclean”. The more generous the gifts were, the more solemn the ceremonial became.
In the ritual of the "sacred marriage" held during the spring equinox, the lugal's wife, who bore the title "en", stabbed a sacrificial bull, a yak, dedicated to the lunar Nanna, with a sacred golden dagger, and the lugal predicted from its insides. The blood of the sacrificial bull once again watered Nanna's garden.
By the XXVI century BC. e. Semitic shepherd tribes of the Chaldeans came to Sumer.
The ritual of the "sacred marriage" was no longer performed. The rites were not performed, and the gods left Sumer. Having taken sacred objects to the land of their ancestors, the priests completed their cult service on this land. Their time has passed. Sacred weapons were buried along with their servants.

Perhaps, wars and battles originate from the creation of the world. Some troops died due to insufficient training, others developed entire strategies. Many historical testimonies have come down to this day about the special soldiers of antiquity who fought for ten. Now such troops are called elite.

1. Spartans

The famous 300 Spartans, whose image is glorified in legends and so popular in modern cinema, belonged to the military elite - the hippies. Despite the fact that "gippei" in Greek means "horsemen", among the Spartans there were mostly foot units.

The famous episode of the Battle of Thermopylae remains in history. King Leonidas could not raise an army against the Persian king Xerxes due to the fact that celebrations were held in Sparta in honor of the gods, and the Delphic oracle predicted either the defeat of Sparta or the death of one of its kings. Leonid took only his personal guards on the campaign - 300 hippees. None of the warriors dared to retreat, because he could return home only with a shield or on a shield. The Spartans held back the Persian army of many thousands until the local resident Ephialtes led the enemy army along a mountain path, and it surrounded the Spartans.

2. Ancient Greek warriors from Thebes

Another 300 no less brave warriors, about whom legends were laid down, were in Thebes. It is curious that the detachment consisted of 150 pairs of homosexuals. The military leaders believed that the soldiers would not run away from the battlefield, leaving their dear friend alone. After a series of victories, the detachment was defeated during a clash with the forces of King Philip, father of Alexander the Great. Despite the fact that the detachment from Thebes died, the Macedonian king noted the bravery and courage with which 300 soldiers fought.

3. Persian "immortals"

Ancient Persia also had its own military elite. Here are just these super-warriors, there were not 300 people, but 10,000. They were called the army of "immortals", because in the event of the death of a soldier, another one took his place in order to maintain the same number. The "immortals" had their own privileges: during the campaigns they were provided with women and servants, clothes made of expensive materials. But, judging by history, the training of the Persian military elite was very inferior to ordinary Spartans. After a series of Greco-Persian wars, the "immortals" were disbanded.

4. Janissaries

The Janissaries were considered the Turkish military elite. They were Christian youths who were taken to monasteries-barracks and brought up in Islamic traditions. Officially, the personal guard of the Sultan was considered his slaves. The Janissaries participated in aggressive campaigns and suppressed uprisings within the country.

Until the 16th century, Janissaries were forbidden to marry and acquire their own home. In the 17th century, the military elite suddenly realized their power, and already the sultan had to be afraid of his "defenders". The Janissaries were engaged in trade with might and main, tied the knot and participated in palace intrigues. In 1826, the Janissaries were abolished as a guard. When they tried to rebel, their barracks were shot.

5. Varangi

In Byzantium, the emperor also had his own special army, only it did not consist of local soldiers, but of immigrants from Western and Northern Europe, united by one common name "Varangi" (derived from "Varangians"). Comparing the skills of the Byzantines and Europeans, one of the historians called the former "clay pots", and the latter - "metal cauldrons".
The mercenaries were very devoted to the emperor, they consisted of the palace guards and elite units in military campaigns. Varangi were considered disciplined warriors who passed on the honorary right to serve under the emperor from father to son. After the victory of the Crusaders in 1204 and the capture of Constantinople by them, the Varangians dispersed in all directions.

The warriors of Ancient Russia were also not timid. The artist Oleg Fedorov was imbued with the history of their battles. He created a series

The structure and chronology of military conflicts of past eras Pereslegin Sergey Borisovich

Wars of the Ancient World.

Wars of the Ancient World.

We will begin our review of the "decisive wars of the past" with Egyptian-Hittite conflict dating back 1300 BC . It can be called the first "real" war. Unlike "hunts", military expeditions against more or less wild tribes and "domain" civil strife in which ancient states were forged, two great powers took part in the war of 1300, perceiving each other as subjects of international law, that is, official belligerents. By the way, this conflict also went down in history as the first war that ended with an official peace treaty ( 1296 BC ).

4. Kadesh (Kinza) - a city on the upper Orontes, now the settlement of Tell-Nebi-Mend, was the scene of numerous military conflicts in the second millennium BC. On the border of XV and XIV, Kadesh led the anti-Egyptian coalition of the Palestinian-Syrian city-states, which was defeated by Thutmose III at Megiddo. Repeatedly besieged by Egyptian troops (with varying success).

In this war, the Hittites showed great skill, while the Egyptians showed great valor.

Ramses III, using a significant superiority in forces, launched a direct attack on Kadesh. Muwatallis, taking advantage of the shortcomings in the work of Egyptian intelligence, managed to disrupt the interaction between the Egyptian detachments. He hid his army in ambush outside the city, while the pharaoh camped carelessly in the sight of Kadesh.

The attack of the Hittites was sudden. They succeeded in defeating Ra's detachment. The pharaoh himself, as part of the Amon detachment, was surrounded by the enemy, while the main forces of the Egyptians were still behind the Orontes. In the situation that arose, Ramses did not lose his head. First of all, he made an effort to report the battle to the main forces. In anticipation of reinforcements, the pharaoh "dressed in armor" almost single-handedly repulsed the Hittite attack, in which he succeeded.

The battle after the approach of the Ptah detachment ended in a draw.

It demonstrated for the first time that through the art of war, the weakest can defeat the strongest , and that, nevertheless, the outcome of the battle is decided after all, not only by abstract strategic skill, but a real clash of manpower on the battlefield . So, the battle at Kadesh can be considered both the thesis and the antithesis of the provisions of Liddell Garth.

The war itself, like the vast majority of wars in which the strongest side demonstrates exclusively direct actions, did not lead to a decisive result and only institutionalized the confrontation between the Egyptian and Hittite powers, turning it into a centuries-old conflict.

From the statistics on this war, only the number of the Hittite army is known (according to Egyptian sources) - 28 thousand infantry and 6,000 cavalry, which is plausible. Based on the known data on the structure of the Egyptian army, its size is estimated at 20,000 infantry and 2,500 chariots. Since the forces of the Hittites were not united (up to half were detachments from Syrian and Palestinian city-states that had never fought together before), given the superiority of the Egyptians in weapons, one can speak of their significant superiority.

The next great war broke out a century later ( 1200 BC ), its episode associated with the siege of Troy, forever remained in European history.

In full accordance with the views of Liddell Hart and in confirmation of the formula of Sun Tzu ("The worst thing is to besiege fortresses ..."), the war ended in a total defeat of all parties involved in it. The Hittite state and the Asia Minor union of cities ceased to exist. The Mycenaean army was eventually defeated by the Egyptians, who, however, never recovered from the consequences of their victory. Greece was conquered by the Dorian tribes, the Mycenaean culture was destroyed, and Europe was plunged into darkness for centuries. Due to the decline that has taken place in all the warring countries, the statistics of the war are of a purely legendary character.

The death of the "great powers" at the turn of the 1st - 2nd millennium BC. caused a wave of expansion from Assyria. Period from 912 to 606 BC may be called the "Assyrian Wars" . Their content was the creation and then destruction of the first "world empire" in history.

The military art of the Assyrians is interesting primarily from the point of view of improving the organizational structure of the armed forces: for the first time, sapper units were created and widely used in battles. Assyria gave military art an information dimension: the army received an established intelligence and communications service, always traditionally headed by the heir to the throne. During the siege of Jerusalem, the Assyrians tried to break the resistance of the enemy with the help of propaganda (the first recorded case of the use of ideological weapons).

The armed forces of the Assyrian state were very significant (120,000 troops participated in one not too large and not the most successful campaign of Shalmaneser in Syria in the middle of the 9th century BC).

Assyrian military art was characterized by cruelty that went beyond the generally accepted boundaries even of that time. This was initially successful. Very quickly, however, it became clear that the territories subject to the Assyrians were depopulated, did not produce anything, and, on the contrary, required resources to hold them. A period of unstable equilibrium set in, during which the Assyrians invented a new kind of "appeasement" - mass deportations of the population.

Almost all the victories of the Assyrian army were victories of organization and power, but not of military art. Almost the only exception was campaign of Sargon against the kingdom of Urartu (714 BC) In full accordance with the logic of indirect actions, Sargon moved not to the north - to Urartu, but to the east. The Urartian king Rusa tried to go behind his lines. Here, the eternal downside of detour maneuvers, slowness, played its role. Having received information about the enemy army due to the excellent work of the Assyrian intelligence, Sargon, leaving the infantry, with chariots and cavalry, hit to the west, meeting the Urartian army on the march. In a short and bloody battle, Rusa was defeated, which was not least facilitated by the violation of the psychological stability of his army due to the effect of sudden and completely indirect actions of the enemy.

After the victory of the city of Urartu and its allies, the temples and the treasury went to the winner. An indirect consequence of the victory was the capture of Babylon four years later with the establishment of dominance over Mesopotamia.

The end came in 612, when Media and the Babylonian kingdom entered into an alliance aimed at "deleting from Reality" the Assyrian power. By 605, Assyria was defeated, its people, culture and language completely destroyed.

It would not be a mistake to say that it was the tragedy of Assyria that marked the beginning of attempts to introduce military operations into the mainstream of some kind of ethical restrictions. In any case, in the historical sources that tell about the fate of the Assyrian kings, the motif of retribution for sins is present and occupies a prominent place.

The next and much more successful attempt to create a world empire is associated with the peoples inhabiting the Iranian plateau. Media after the victory over Assyria expanded to the west and east. After an inconclusive battle on the Galis River, interrupted by a solar eclipse (May 28, 585 BC), peace was concluded between her and Asia Minor Lydia. A generation later, Media passed into the hands of its own tributary Persians, led by Cyrus. For fourteen years - from 553 to 539, Cyrus not only conquered Media, Parthia, Hyrcania, Lydia, the territories of modern Iran and Central Asia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, but also created normal conditions for agriculture, crafts and trade in the occupied lands, for the first time in history by organizing empire space . Interestingly, although ancient sources cover the life of Cyrus in detail, very little is said about his military leadership. As Sun Tzu remarked: "When he who fought well won, he had neither the glory of the mind, nor the feats of courage."

The contribution of the Achaemenid state to the art of war is significant. Persia was apparently the first country to consciously put into practice the fundamental position of the strategy of indirect action: the goal of war is peace, better than before the war . Cyrus the Great managed to bind politics, war and diplomacy into a single art, for which victory was not the defeat of the enemy, hetacombs of enemy corpses and strings of slaves, but the transformation of the enemy into an ally. The heirs understood the external side of Cyrus's actions - the Persian policy remained religiously tolerant 5 (and generally tolerant), but the internal - the creative content of his policy "the happiest of mortals" took to the grave.

5. An exception is the actions of Cambyses in Egypt (the murder of the sacred bull Apis, etc.), which contemporaries already explained by a mental disorder after the hardships of the Ethiopian campaign.

For the historian, the Achaemenid state is interesting in that it is the first world state organized on modern principles (primarily as a single legal and commercial protected space). Accordingly, it was the Persian Empire that first encountered transport theorem , according to which the connection of the province with the metropolis can be ensured only if the trade between them grows faster than the economy of the province . In 500 - 499 years. BC. in the Greek cities of Asia Minor (self-governing, but part of the Empire), an anti-Persian uprising broke out, resulting in the first great war of European civilization - Greek-Persian .

Miletus, which is the center of the uprising, was besieged. The city-states of mainland Greece, including Athens, intervened in the events. The intervention did not have much success, in the end, in 494, Miletus was taken. It must be said that the Persians, traditionally treating the vanquished kindly, severely punished the traitors (which is probably explained more by the vicissitudes of internal political "showdowns" in the empire). Miletus was burned, its inhabitants sold into slavery. In response, the Democratic Party in Athens organized a theater production of the tragedy The Capture of Miletus, which sharply tilted public opinion in its favor. War between Athens and Persia became inevitable.

The events of the following decades were already considered by contemporaries as a single war between the Hellenes (=Europe) and the Barbarians (=Asia). In fact, the main and only meaning of this war was the formation of European identity, European (Greek) culture and European civilization.

The first Persian campaign of 492 was a model of actions, indirect to such an extent that neither contemporaries nor descendants could really understand their course and outcome.

Mardonius moved to Thrace, dissolving, however, rumors about his attack on Athens. He achieved his goals in Thrace at the cost of several minor skirmishes and returned beyond the Hellespont. As a result, the Greeks, without any reason, imagined themselves to be the winners. Their jubilation increased when it turned out that part of the Persian ships (it is not clear how significant) were lost during the storm. The result of this unquestionably successful campaign for Mardonius was the enthusiasm among the Greeks and the acceleration of the creation of the Athenian fleet.

two years later ( 490 BC ) Persian troops finally landed in the vicinity of Athens, which led to the first great battle of Europe and Asia - Marathon battle .

The marathon is described in detail in many works on military history, but the most profound, perhaps, is precisely the interpretation of Liddell Hart (P....). We can only add that Miltiades provoked Persians to transfer troops to Athens, and when the cavalry (in which Datis and Artaphernes, who led the expedition, had absolute superiority) was loaded onto ships, the Ionian Greeks informed their compatriots of this by a prearranged signal.

The strength of the parties: 10,000 Athenians, 1,000 inhabitants of Plataea against a slightly larger Persian army ("official" Greek data - 10,000 cavalry, which, by the way, did not participate in the battle, and the same amount of light infantry). Losses (Greek official version) - 192 Greek hoplites and 6,400 Persians. The last figure is given by Herodotus, and apparently close to the truth 6, as for the losses of the Greeks, modern historians estimate them at no less than a thousand killed and wounded.

6. The Greeks promised to sacrifice a goat for every killed enemy. Due to the heavy losses of the Persians, the sacrifice had to be stretched out over many years. It is unlikely that with such a vow the losses of the enemy will be greatly exaggerated.

One can agree with Liddell Hart that the entire Battle of Marathon was regarded by the Persians as a purely diversionary maneuver. However, Miltiades' counter-march to Athens was carried out so quickly that Datis and Artafrenes were going to have to attack the city head-on. The Persian ships, having hovered in front of Athens for several days, left.

There is no doubt that in 490 BC. the Persians could purely direct actions defeat the Athenians and take the city. Apparently, Artaphernes was too good a commander to implement such a plan... Indirect actions lead to a decisive result when and if they are accompanied by a violation of the enemy's psychological stability. But in an intercivilizational conflict, the thinking of the parties intersects so weakly that even well-defined signs are "unreadable" and do not have the proper effect on the will of the enemy troops and command. That is why the indirect actions of the Persians in 492-490. not only turned out to be fruitless, but also contributed to a noticeable strengthening of the specific pan-Hellenic (European) mentality.

The next attack of the Persians, on the contrary, was emphasized by direct. Xerxes concentrated a huge army (the sources refer to absolutely mythological data - up to 1.7 million soldiers, historians agree on 50-70 thousand fighters, up to 200,000, along with all the convoy and transport "periphery"), 207 combat and about 1,000 transport ships. The Hellenic Union had about 400 warships, 39,000 hoplites, and a total of about 110,000 people. The armies of both sides were very unreliable: the Persian troops included Greeks of Asia Minor, whose loyalty left much to be desired, and the Hellenic army consisted of polis militias, not prepared for joint actions and did not trust each other.

Xerxes began with harmless, but also useless measures, such as the creation of the Athos canal or a bridge over the Hellespont. Then ( 480 BC ) the Persians set out on a campaign and passed Thessaly without a fight, replenishing their troops with excellent Thessalian cavalry. The Hellenes gave them battle at Thermopylae . This battle was included not only in history books, but also in books for the education of youth, however, on both sides it was conducted so ugly that one wants to talk about "serving a number." The Persians repeatedly directly attack a strong and short defensive position, defended by selected infantry, superior in quality of weapons to the attackers. The Greeks are concentrating all their troops on this position, apparently not wanting to think that it can be neutralized by a detour - by sea or by land 7 . Another sea storm thwarted the maneuver of the Persian ships to the rear of the Thermopylae position, which gave the Greeks the opportunity to safely retreat.

7. The Greeks cursed the name of Ephialtes, who showed the Persians the way through the mountains. Apparently, the Hellenic commanders seriously assumed that the huge army of Xerxes, which had excellent intelligence (and, in the end, including Thessalian volunteers), was not able to independently find the mountain paths.

The stats for this battle are legendary through and through. Modern historians speak of 10,000 Persians attacking 4,500 Leonidas. The losses of the Greeks are precisely counted, the Persian losses are said only that they were "heavy". With such an organization of the battle, it is easy to believe.

The Thermopylae victory gave Central Greece into the hands of the Persians. The Persians, apparently, expected that, under the threat of complete ruin of the country, Athens would agree to fairly mild peace terms. But the logic of the intercivilizational conflict did not allow such a solution.

The decisive battle of the campaign was played out at sea - at Salamis Islands . The most difficult thing for the winner - Themistocles - was to organize this battle, given that it was in the interests of the Persians to delay it as much as possible, and the fleet of the Hellenic alliance was on the verge of disintegration and the Spartan ships leaving for the Peloponnese. Sources report the most complex open and secret diplomacy of Themistocles, which in the end led the Persians to go ( September 28, 480 BC .) to fight at a disadvantageous moment. I am not inclined to agree with Liddell-Harth that Themistocles tactically used indirect actions in this battle. Given the higher quality of the Greek warships and the extremely unfortunate configuration of the Persian fleet in a narrow strait, he had an advantage in forces (378 warships against 200 warships and 600 transport ships), which he used. Persian losses appear to have been catastrophic. In any case, they immediately lose their dominance in the Aegean. The psychological shock was so strong that Xerxes himself fled to the metropolis, and the Persian fleet further evaded any clashes with the Greeks. (Almost simultaneously in a naval battle under Himera in Sicily, the allies of the Persians, the Carthaginians, were defeated.)

After wintering in Thessaly, Mardonius, left by Xerxes to command the land army, again invaded Attica. AT Battle of Plataea (479 BC) he attempted to tactically turn the tide of the campaign in his favor. Mardonius achieved surprise. His blow was inflicted on the ranks of the Greeks, who were frustrated by the movement in sight of the enemy. However, in direct confrontation with the heavily armed Spartan infantry, the Persians had no chance.

The Greek army of Pausanias consisted of 39,000 hoplites and about 70,000 auxiliaries. Mardonius had about 150,000 people (of which 20 - 30 thousand Greeks from Northern Greece). As at Marathon, the superiority of the Persians in cavalry was absolute. After a fight on rough terrain that was inconvenient for the cavalry, the Persian army was completely defeated, the fortified camp was taken, Mardonius died.

The fighting was moved to Asia Minor. Persian fleet at Cape Mycale (479 BC) did not dare to accept the battle: the ships were pulled ashore. After landing, the Greeks destroyed the remnants of the Persian fleet.

This ended the first stage of the war, with the victorious Hellenic Union immediately disintegrating into the pro-Spartan Peloponnesian League and the Athenian-controlled Delian Maritime League, which in the near future led to a fierce struggle for hegemony in Greece.

However, the intercivilizational conflict between Europe and Asia was far from exhausted by this war. A century and a half later, Alexander the Great invaded Persia.

As a rule, historians consider the campaign of Alexander separately from the wars of the fifth century BC. Indeed, the historical situation was different, the goals of the war were different, the art of war was different. But on the other hand, contemporaries perceived Alexander's campaign as a direct continuation of the events begun by the Miletus uprising: Alexander himself interpreted the war in this way (at least at its first stage). Undoubtedly, the Macedonians were as ethnically distant from the Greeks as the Persians, but they also belonged to the European civilization with its cult of individualism, dynamics, craving for non-despotic forms of organizing social life. We must not forget that Alexander declared war on Persia, first of all, as the Protector of the All-Hellenic Union.

In the beginning of the war, the Persians claimed dominance at sea (400 ships against 160). In terms of the main fighting force of that time - heavy infantry - Alexander had an advantage (30,000 against 20,000) 8 . For heavy cavalry (which Western historians sometimes call knightly), the forces were, apparently, equal to 9. In terms of light cavalry and light infantry, the Persians outnumbered the enemy many times over.

8. This was due to the logic of the conflict of civilizations. Hoplites were recruited from free wealthy farmers - a specifically European social class, the existence of which determined the characteristic features of the European mentality (individualism, the desire of large social groups to participate in government, etc.) Actually, all Persian heavy infantry was hired and predominantly Greek in origin.

9. According to Greek sources, the Persians had 12,000 heavy cavalry against 5,000 Macedonian, however, the Macedonians themselves point to the superiority of training and weapons of their heavy cavalry. Apparently, only the elite cavalry are included in the number of Macedonians, while the Persians are considered wholesale.

From the very beginning, the Persians went on the defensive. The strategist Memnon (a Greek by birth) tried to put into effect a plan based on the predominance of the Persians at sea: to avoid a pitched battle, attack the mainland coast of Greece and eventually transfer the war there by landing an army behind Alexander's lines. Historians praise this plan for a military talent that bordered on genius, but perhaps in vain. First of all, in Hellas, Alexander left a significant strategic reserve under the command of Antipater - 14,000 people. Further, the actions of the Persians against mainland Greece would only serve to strengthen the Pan-Hellenic alliance. Finally, Alexander bought time: his army was concentrated and ready for action, while Memnon's plan was just beginning to be prepared for implementation. With such an outstripping pace, the Persians were losing fleet bases in the Mediterranean before Memnon would have achieved tangible success in Greece (if he had achieved them at all, which also needed to be proved). Ultimately, the outcome of the war was determined by the fact that in the right battle, the Persians could not resist the Macedonian phalanx . Memnon's plan did not allow the Persians to find a worthy "asymmetric" Asian response to the military challenge of Europe 10 .

10. Such an answer could be found in the field of application of specifically Asian types of troops - light irregular cavalry and elephants.

Alexander's campaign led to several major battles, each of which marks the end of another phase of the campaign.

334 BC battle on the Granik river . A typical avant-garde battle - 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry under the control of Alexander, without rest and reconnaissance, rushed to the Persian army - 10,000 light infantry, 10,000 Greek mercenaries, 5,000 cavalry. Although in this battle Alexander thought more about personal glory than about victory, he successively defeated the enemy's cavalry, then his light infantry. Greek mercenaries were surrounded and destroyed or sold into slavery as traitors to the common Hellenic cause. The Persian army was destroyed almost completely. Alexander lost 30 infantry and about 100 horsemen, though there were a lot of wounded. The victory gave the Macedonians Asia Minor.

Autumn 333 BC the battle of Issa . A battle with an inverted front, structurally reminiscent of Sargon II's operation against Urartu. The difference is not in favor of Alexander, who allowed for a rough operational oversight and was going to have to tactically win a strategically lost battle with 40,000 men against Darius' 60,000 men. In this battle for Alexander, everything hung in the balance. The outcome of the battle was apparently decided only by the fact that at the decisive moment, when the strike groups of the opponents achieved success almost simultaneously, Alexander led the troops from the very center of the battle, while Darius remained in the rear 11 until the very end. Loss data is not provided. Apparently, they were significant among the Macedonians, while the Persians again completely lost their army. The victory at Issus meant the end of Persia as a great power and the resolution of the intercivilizational conflict. Further actions of Alexander were not justified.

11. This was a decisive moment in the intercivilizational conflict. There is a profound logic in the fact that Alexander personally led his cavalry in what could very well be the last attack, while the Persian despot waited in his tent for the outcome of the battle. And in the fact that, being face to face with Alexander, he trembled and rushed to run, leaving control of the battle, which in most areas was victorious for the Persians.

January - August 332 BC - struggle for the Mediterranean coast . For Alexander - the period of "harvest", spent not in the best way. After Issa, Syria, Palestine and Egypt could not be held by the Persians. Establishing his dominance over these territories, Alexander first spent a lot of time on a direct siege of Tire, and then also destroyed this city, selling 30,000 of its inhabitants into slavery. It was difficult to justify this act even for historians who were apologetic towards Alexander. Even leaving aside ethical motives, the death of this great city was extremely disadvantageous for the Macedonians 12 .

12. There is a point of view explaining the sharp change in the personality of Alexander after Issa by a mental illness.

October 1, 331 BC - Gaugamela . An attempt by Darius to "replay" the battle of Isskoe in an unfavorable situation for himself. 40,000 Macedonian infantry and 7,000 cavalry faced 60,000 Persian infantry, 15,000 horsemen with 200 chariots and 15 war elephants. The most mature of the battles of Alexander, who, by deliberately pre-calculated precise maneuver, forced the enemy to create a gap in the operational center of position 13. Such gaps always occur during sudden formations of not very well-solidified troops and, as a rule, are not dangerous. However, Alexander, who was waiting for a gap to appear, threw his elite cavalry - hetairoi and elite medium infantry - argyrospides against the resulting weakness.

13. Alexander applied a similar operational scheme later in Battle of the Hydaspes (326 BC) against the Indian king Pora. Alexander had 25,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry against 30,000 infantry, 3,000-4,000 cavalry, 300 chariots, 200 war elephants. Having created a gap with a pendulum movement, Alexander broke through the enemy's front. The Indians were defeated, leaving up to 23,000 men on the battlefield. The battle secured a new Empire from the east.

The Persian state could not bear this defeat.

Summarizing the above, it must be said that from the point of view of the inter-civilizational conflict, Alexander's actions at all stages were direct (forceful decision), and after the battle of Issus they were also erroneous. As a result, the conflict ended in the defeat of both cultures: the Hellenistic kingdoms that arose after the campaign of Alexander were stillborn neoplasms that did not belong to either European or Asian culture 14 . In internecine troops and conspiracies, almost all of Alexander's commanders perished and the remnants of the Macedonian army were killed.

14. The later prosperity of the European way of life can in no way be credited to Alexander. The Romans, who created the greatest European-oriented empire in history, adopted the European way of thinking not from the Hellenistic overlords, but from the Sicilian and Italic Greek colonists.

Wars for hegemony in Greece "filled the time" between the period of Persian expansion and Alexander's "response". The continuous one and a half century "struggle of all against all" did not lead to any positive result. The result of the conflict was the spiritual disintegration of the Hellenic culture, the loss of civilizational priority by Greece and the loss of its independence.

In fact, "wars for hegemony" differed little from "nome" ("domain") conflicts in Egypt, Mesopotamia, or much later - medieval Europe. One should agree with Marxist historiography, which sees the causes of wars in the 5th - 4th centuries BC. in the crisis of the polis structure of the ancient world. The stability of the policy, as a form of organization of life, was explained by the extremely rugged terrain of Hellas, since ancient times devoid of roads. With the growth of civilization, however, both transport connectivity and the capabilities of siege equipment increased. As a result, an isolated policy became defenseless, and conditions arose for the military unification of the country under the rule of the strongest.

Without bringing anything positive to European history, the "wars for hegemony" contributed, however, to the transformation of the military affairs into the military art . It was during this historical period that strategists and generals in the modern sense of these terms first appeared in Europe.

The attitude to war as an art form led to a noticeable complication of the structure of troops. Elite units like the Theban "Holy Band" appear. Along with light and heavy infantry, medium infantry (peltasts) is being created, combining combat stability with mobility (Iphicrates, 390 BC ). It is the elite medium infantry of the argyrospids (silver shields) that will become the "key" branch of the troops in the victories of Alexander the Great 15 .

15. Note that the appearance of pelstasts led to profound and unobvious changes in public life. The hoplite needed expensive weapons and significant general physical training, but they didn’t imply special military skills as part of the phalanx, so this type of troops could be recruited from the wealthy peasantry. The middle infantrymen, if they did not want to die ingloriously and quickly, had to be trained in the art of individual combat. But if, in a difficult time for the state, a peasant could leave the plow, dressed in a hoplite shell, then he was clearly not able to engage in constant military training. In other words, military affairs for the peltast could only be a profession . As a result, mercenarism begins to develop in Greece and there is a gradual transition to a mercenary army. But in itself this meant that the state was losing concern for the well-being of the free peasantry, the foundation of the policy.

The first and most important among the "wars for hegemony" was Peloponnesian War (431 - 404 BC) . It enters the history of military art as the rarest collection of exceptions to the rule: a side that is more developed economically, politically and culturally, controls more extensive financial and material resources, surpasses the enemy in population, has undeniable dominance at sea, has generally more capable political leaders. and military leaders, who has chosen and consistently implemented a winning strategic plan, suffers a complete defeat.

The structure of the Peloponnesian War is extremely intricate. The parties maneuvered, changed allies and opponents, combined "an imperialist war (for power in Hellas) with a civil war." The combat zone covered the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor, the Black Sea straits, the islands of the Aegean Sea, Sicily and almost Carthage. Without dwelling on all the vicissitudes of this struggle, let us focus on the decisive event of the war - the failure of Pericles' plan.

As you know, in the plan of Pericles, the territory of Attica was given for plunder. The population took refuge in a fortified camp, including Athens, Piraeus and Falera. This camp, protected by the Long Walls and fed by sea, was virtually impregnable. Relying on him, Pericles intended to convince the Spartans of the futility of the war with strikes along the coast of the Peloponnese. In essence, it was a formal naval blockade of the state dominating on land. The experience of Napoleon, Wilhelm II, Hitler and others like them showed that it is difficult to oppose such a strategic scheme with something real: albeit slowly and without much brilliance, but sea power always breaks the land.

The failure of Pericles is associated with the historical accident - an epidemic of plague in Athens. First of all, we note that the prevalence of this version, to which Liddell-Harth also paid tribute, can only be explained by the tendency of historians to copy each other uncritically. With the overcrowding of the population in the Athenian fortified camp, with the then state of medicine and sanitation, the plague epidemic would have lasted not two years, but a maximum of 2.5 months. During this time, from 95 to 100 percent of the population of Athens would have died out and about 23 of the besieging army would have died. Further, the epidemic would have swept through the cities of the Athenian Maritime Union, collecting a somewhat smaller harvest. It is difficult to assess whether the epidemic would have covered the entire peninsula or not, but in any case, the war between Athens and Sparta would have ended immediately due to the absence of those fighting. So, both ordinary logic and Thucydides' presentation of the symptoms of the disease convince us that it was not about the plague, but about the most common typhoid fever.

But here it is already necessary to throw a reproach to Pericles. The medicine of that time knew about the danger of such diseases in besieged cities, and Pericles was obliged to consider this possibility. (Actually, given the crowding, lack of running water , bad water and a hot climate, one should not be surprised at the epidemic itself, but at the fact that Athens avoided it for so long.)

That is why it is extremely difficult to give a balanced assessment of the plan of Pericles. The historian must avoid the temptation to rely only and exclusively on the result, in this case - unsuccessful. On the other hand, one does not want to "blame" the outcome of the war on pure chance. In all likelihood, the Athenian war plan could be successfully implemented. However, in order to fend off the inevitable accidents in the war and carry out the plan for any Under the circumstances, 16 this operational scheme should have been carried out in a completely different way.

16. These "accompanying circumstances" that Pericles did not take into account or underestimated include: the financial assistance of Persia to Sparta, the laconicism of wealthy aristocratic circles almost throughout Greece, the instability of the mood of the Athenian demos.

In general, when studying the events of the Peloponnesian War, one gets the feeling that this war was not interesting to Pericles. Pericles put his soul into the construction of Athens, into the Sicilian colonial policy, into the painstaking "adjustment" of the Athenian democratic state, but only his mind into the creation of the plan. In the lazy blockade of the Peloponnese, there is almost no presence personalities Pericles. Perhaps it was the lack of a personal dimension in strategy that led Pericles and his plan to collapse 17 .

17. From a purely technical point of view, Pericles did not take into account that the Maritime Union was created primarily to ensure freedom of trade in the Aegean Sea and, therefore, could not be stable under long and a very expensive war. Accordingly, it was necessary to act quickly. The answer to the arrival of the Spartan army in Attica was not to be a blockade with separate sorties disturbing the enemy, but the transfer of the Athenian army to the Peloponnese, the capture of Messene and the isolation of Sparta in the Peloponnese by a ring of states dependent on Athens (within the ideas of Epaminondas, implemented fifty years later).

Statistics: Athens started the war with 300 triremes, 13,000 hoplites, 16,000 fortress garrisons, 1,200 cavalry, 1,600 archers. The Spartans and their allies deployed up to 60,000 field army men, their fleet is estimated at 100-120 ships. The result of the war was the complete destruction of the maritime and financial power of Athens, the collapse of the Maritime Union and the instigation of "wars for hegemony" into a century-long conflict.

The decisive blow to the power of Sparta was dealt by Epaminondas during Boeotian Wars (371 - 362 BC) 18 V Battle of Leutra (August 5, 371 BC) Epaminondas used not so much the "oblique battle formation" as an incredible operational reinforcement. With 6,000 hoplites and 1,500 horsemen against 10,000 invincible Spartan infantry with 1,000 cavalry, Epaminondas, with an equal front width (according to the fashion of that time), could only oppose 12 enemy ranks with 8 - 9 ranks. This guaranteed him defeat, even if you do not take into account the qualitative superiority of the Spartan infantry. However, on his left flank (in violation of all traditions - on the left) Epaminondas placed his only elite detachment, lining it up in 50 lines, and this detachment went through the enemy’s battle formations like a knife through butter. The psychological blow was so strong that for the first time in history, the Spartan army ran 19 .

18. The activity of Epaminondas is the best antithesis to the classical Marxist explanation of everything in the world by economic causes. Thebes, both before and after and during Epaminondas, did not stand out in any way against the general Hellenic background, except for the laziness and stupidity of their inhabitants that entered into jokes and sayings. Under Epaminondas, Thebes becomes the hegemon of the Balkan Peninsula. After his death, this hegemony is lost immediately.

19. Of course, this is only a bare operational scheme, and in reality Epaminondas' actions were much more subtle. For example, a strong Theban cavalry in one short (almost no loss!) Combat clash (1) hid the features of the deployment of Epaminondas' troops, (2) threw the enemy cavalry back on the infantry with an obvious loss of time by the Spartans, (3) reorganized to the flank of the "sacred detachment" and took part in completing the defeat of the enemy, reinforcing the "oblique attack" with coverage. It is precisely such "trifles and particulars" that characterize a major commander.

AT Battle of Mantinea (July 362) on the side of Epaminondas there was an ideal strategic situation and a general superiority in forces (30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry against 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry). The battle was brilliantly organized, which at least confirms the fact that the Thebans won it, even having lost command. (Text, p...)

The result of the Boeotian wars was the complete military and political defeat of Sparta.

The first period of "wars for hegemony" ended with the Macedonian war against the Pan-Hellenic Union. In August 338 BC. under Chaeronea almost equal forces met: both Philip of Macedon and the Panhellenic Union had 30,000 people each. Philip won the battle in the spirit of the main ideas of Epaminondas: a breakthrough-envelopment was carried out with a sharp operational strengthening of the shock flank.

The collapse of Alexander's empire led to a new round of "wars for hegemony". Now it was not the policies or their associations that fought among themselves, but the centralized Hellenistic kingdoms. Approximately in the same protracted and stupid style. Liddell Hart Highlights battle of Ipsus, (301 BC) put an end to attempts to recreate a unified Empire. From the point of view of military art, this battle, in addition to its scale, 20 is distinguished by the fact that in it for the first time an army, mainly Asian, won a victory over an army of the European type.

20. Antigonus had 85 - 90 thousand people against 70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry.

The overall result of the Hellenistic stage of the "wars for hegemony" can be attributed to the exhaustion of the states participating in it and the creation of favorable conditions for the Roman conquest.

The Roman state also knew the period of "struggle for hegemony" ( Wei war 406 - 396 BC, Latin war 340 - 338 BC. , Samnite Wars 327 - 290 AD BC. Tarentum War 280 - 275 BC. - only the most important of the clashes that determined the spread of the power of the Roman polis to the entire Italian peninsula.) There is a noticeable clear difference in the course and outcome of the Roman and Greek wars. In Greece, we see beautiful battles (Luctra, Mantinea, etc.), subtle strategic plans (Pericles, Alcibiades, Brasidas, Lysander, Iphicrates, Epaminondas, Philip), heroic deeds and black betrayals, and - as the price of all this - complete ruin countries and the death of the policies involved in the struggle. In Italy, the situation is quite the opposite. A rare historian will name the names of the Roman generals of the period of the Latin or Samnite wars. In essence, there is no strategy: if the republican consuls shied away from purely direct actions, then, as a rule, only for political (moreover, rather internal political) considerations. The result is the flourishing of Rome and its transformation into the strongest Mediterranean power.

If one battle (or war) can be won by chance, then there is no need to talk about a chain of "random" victories two centuries long. The Romans, therefore, had their own strategy, their own special - impersonal - the style of military art.

Of course, the Romans contributed a lot to the organization of the army. The legion, divided into maniples and centuries, was a flexible and at the same time quite stable formation. Actually, the Romans were the first in history to create the idea of ​​an independently operating tactical unit. But! The manipulative structure of the legion was finally formed only after the Tarentum War.

The Romans were masters of political preparation for war (only Bismarck in the 19th century AD surpassed the level of Roman "military" diplomats). However, by referring to skillful diplomacy as the reasons for the victories of Roman weapons, we change the form, but not the content of the problem. The question remains, what is the secret of Roman diplomacy? It cannot, of course, be reduced to the simplest formula "Divide and Conquer", which was a banality even in the time of Muwatallis.

Explaining the invincibility of the Roman state (despite the fact that the Roman legions were repeatedly beaten by an equal, strongest, and weakest enemy), let's pay attention to the Roman contribution to civilization, to those realities that were brought to the world by the Romans and "work" until now. This refers to Roman roads and laws, the so-called "Roman law".

The Romans were the first to create a coherent, logical, reasonable and interconnected legal system. They organized legal space with a very special mentality based on the ideas of measurable (objective) law. The relations of Rome with the surrounding peoples were built in a complex chain of laws, rules, statuses (Roman citizenship, Latin citizenship, the status of "friend and ally of the Roman people", the status of "surrendered", etc.) The Romans invented and properly formalized the scheme of "limited citizenship", which allowed them to fairly generously grant legal rights to the policies, but not the ability to influence Roman politics by voting 21 . Perhaps this is the key to Roman military power. Roman laws removed the lawlessness characteristic of Greek history from war and peace negotiations. Surrendered, as a rule, knew what he could count on.

21. It was the problem of "citizenship" that turned out to be disastrous for the Athenian Maritime Union. The Athenians could not freely leave it to their allies and were forced to put even the most loyal of them in a markedly dependent position. The Romans, without risking anything, granted "citizenship without the right to vote in comitia" to entire policies, and to individuals who provided special services to Rome, and full citizenship. Thus, among the conquered peoples, a layer of people was created, not out of fear, but out of conscience, devoted to the Roman state. As for the masses, having limited citizenship, they enjoyed all the advantages of entering a single and stable legal space. In general, this provided a more stable life than before accession. As a result, Roman alliances tended to be very strong.

A feature of Roman diplomacy was a paradoxical reaction to defeat: after the defeat, the Roman demands on the enemy became tougher. On the contrary, successes softened the terms of peace or surrender. This indirect , diplomacy turned inside out (together with the ingenious invention of limited citizenship) could either quickly destroy Rome or make it the hegemon of Italy.

The Romans consolidated their military and diplomatic successes by creating magnificent roads, which, along with the Egyptian pyramids, are one of the "wonders of the world" that have survived to this day (and are used for their intended purpose!). Roads and stable laws promoted trade so that Roman dominion could not be undermined by the Transportation Theorem. And, of course, the roads made it possible to quickly move troops if necessary.

Hegemony in Italy put on the agenda the issue of dominance in the Mediterranean and, then, the creation of a world empire. Rome solved this problem during the Punic Wars, which were monstrous in tension.

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Chapter 1 Wonders of the Ancient World

In world history, many civilizations were born and died, but this article discusses the most dangerous and prosperous and their ancient warriors. Not the best side of humanity and history in particular is collected here. In those days, this may have been the norm, but today it seems simply monstrous and unimaginable. You know many civilizations from this rating, some films were made in which everything is shown from the best side, but now you will find out how it really was. So, from worst to worst in human history, the most fierce ancient warriors and civilizations of the world.

10. Sparta

Sparta was very different from other ancient Greek city-states. The word "Spartan" has come down to us to describe self-denial and simplicity. Spartan life was war. The children were more children of the state than their parents. They were born soldiers, statesmen, strong and disciplined.

Despite the noble portrayal of them in the movie "300" Spartans, they were a very cruel people. To represent: every Spartan male was a soldier. The rest of the work was done by slaves; the Spartans were warriors, that's all. All their lives they fought to the point of physical exhaustion and finally retired at 60. Death betrayed the Spartan into oblivion. The only Spartans who have been commemorated with tombstones are those who died in battle while winning. They and only they had to have graves in order to amaze future generations with heroism. The one who lost the shield was executed. By Spartan logic, the warrior must retrieve it or die trying.

9. Maori

The Maori were the original inhabitants of New Zealand. They built up a reputation for being "for themselves" by actually eating all the intruders up until the 18th century. Maori believed that by devouring the flesh of their enemies, they become stronger, absorbing their best qualities.

They practiced cannibalism during the war. In October 1809, a European ship with convicts was attacked by a large group of cannibal warriors - in retaliation for the cruel treatment of the leader's son. The Māori killed most of the 66 people on board. Victims - both dead and alive - they sent in boats back to the shore, to be eaten. The few "lucky" survivors who were able to take cover were horrified to see their comrades being devoured by the Maori all night long.

8. Vikings

The Vikings were North Germanic people of the sea who raided, traded and settled, exploring, in vast areas of Europe and Asia, as well as the North Atlantic islands from the late 8th to the middle of the 11th centuries. Notorious for terror and looting throughout Europe.

They were ferocious ancient warriors who never shied away from a fight. Their physical strength was reinforced by their military skills, as well as the use of various types of weapons such as axes, swords and spears. Perhaps their religion can be called military. The Vikings firmly believed that all people have a purpose in this life, and they fought to the death. This was their goal. Each of them was a soldier and fully proved it on the battlefield, sweeping away everything in its path.

7 Apache Tribe

Known for their fearlessness in combat, the Apaches were like America's ninjas. They were not like the Native Americans themselves. With amazingly cunning skills, they were quite adept at using primitive weapons made of bone and stone. Apaches could sneak up behind you, and you would not even have time to realize that your throat was cut. These were the greatest knife fighters the world has ever seen; they were pretty good with the tomahawk, great at throwing axes. They terrorized the southwestern United States, and even the military had problems with them, scalping their victims. As fighters the Apaches had great success. Today, their descendants train special forces in hand-to-hand combat.

6. Roman Empire

The Roman Empire included almost everything that can now be considered Western Europe. The empire dictated the way of life in the conquered countries. The main countries conquered were England/Wales (then known as Britain), Spain (Hispania), France (Gaul), Greece (Achaia), in the Middle East - Judea and the coastal region of North Africa. Yes, Rome was the greatest empire, but it is impossible to deny the horrors of this empire. criminals, slaves, ancient warriors and others were forced to fight each other to the death in gladiatorial games. Everyone knows the greatest villains of Rome - Nero and Caligula. In AD 64, the first Christians were the object of terrible persecution. Some were torn apart by dogs, others burned alive like human torches. Before becoming an empire, Rome was a republic. The emergence of Rome is allegedly legendary and is associated with a she-wolf who nursed Roma and Remulus. Combined with an excellent military and administrative system, the Roman Empire is one of the longest. Ancient Rome lasted a whopping 2214 years!

5. Mongols

The Mongol Empire existed in the 13th and 14th centuries AD and was the largest landowner in human history. The Mongol Empire emerged from the unification of the Mongol and Turkic tribes under the leadership of Genghis Khan. The Mongols were considered barbarians and savages. Throughout Europe and Asia, they became famous for horseback riding and archery. They were highly disciplined. They used a composite bow, wielded spears and sabers. They were masters of psychological warfare and built the second largest empire (after the British). It all started with the fact that Genghis Khan swore in his youth to take over the whole world. He almost made it. Then he set his sights on China, and the rest is history. During the invasion of India, they built a pyramid in front of the walls of Delhi from human heads. They, like the Celts, had a clause about severed heads. The Mongols loved to collect them and catapult them into the camp of the enemy. They did the same with plague corpses. When the Mongols ran into pregnant women, they did…things that we won't discuss here.

Communism is responsible for millions of deaths. Stalin killed 10-60 million people. The Soviet Union was probably one of the greatest enemies of the US. The ideology of total fear.

3. Celts

The Celts lived on lands from the British Isles to Galatia. The Celts were in contact with the cultures of multiple neighbors, and there is no written mention of them. The Celts enjoyed a reputation as headhunters. Many Celts fought completely naked and were famous for their long swords. They cut off the heads of their dead enemies and fastened them to the necks of their horses. Bloody trophies the Celts gave to servants and sang hymns. The heads of the most prominent enemies they embalmed and preserved to be proud of. Like, instead of a bag of gold, we got an absolute victory and the head of the enemy. They are the third among the most cruel ancient warriors and civilizations of the world.

2. Aztecs

The Aztecs were an ethnic group in Mexico that spoke the Nahuatl language (14th-16th centuries). They had a complex theocracy. The Aztecs made human sacrifices. Cannibalism was also encouraged. They killed 20,000 people a year to "make the gods happy." The hearts of the victims were cut out and solemnly eaten. Someone was drowned, beheaded, burned or thrown from a height. And that's not even the worst. According to the rites of the "rain god", children were killed in different places so that their tears could cause rain. During the sacrifice to the "god of fire", a couple of newlyweds were thrown into the fire. In the rite of the "corn goddess" virgins danced for 24 hours, then they were killed and skinned. Aztec priests then carried this skin with them. And at the coronation, Ahuizotl is said to have killed 80,000 people to please his idols.

1. Nazi Germany

The most violent civilization in history. Nazi Germany (Third Reich) refers to Germany during the era when the country turned into a totalitarian state, being under the rule of Adolf Hitler as the leader of the German National Socialist Workers' Party, until the destruction by the Allied forces in May 1945. Despite its short duration, this civilization greatly influenced the world. Nazi Germany started the worst war in human history - World War II. At least 4 million people were killed during the Holocaust. The Nazi swastika is perhaps the most hated symbol in the world. Nazi Germany owned about 268,829 square miles of land. Hitler was one of the most powerful people in the history of the world, and his empire was by far the most terrible.

Victory in the Greco-Persian Wars led to the rise of Athens, the richest and most democratic of the Greek city-states. Even during the war under the auspices of Athens in 478 BC. e. the so-called Delian Maritime Union was formed - an association of Greek policies that had a common treasury and fleet in case of war. At the same time, the members of the union were obliged to provide their lands to Athenian settlers (cleruchs). Unlike ordinary colonists, the cleruchs remained citizens of Athens, and their lands were part of the Athenian state. With the creation of the Delian League, Athens took the first step towards the formation of the Greek Empire.

The rise of Athens was watched with suspicion by Sparta and other Greek city-states. The association of policies, created a little earlier, located on the territory of the Peloponnese peninsula (Peloponnesian League), increasingly conflicted with the Delian Union, headed by Athens. In 447 BC. e. the Spartans opposed the construction of walls connecting Athens with their seaport of Piraeus, arguing that the Athenians were thus preparing for a big war. Mutual accusations led to the fact that hostilities began.

The Peloponnesian League managed to achieve a decisive turning point in the war with the help of the old enemy of all Greeks - the Persian state. The Persians gave the Spartans money to build a large fleet, which in 407 BC. e. defeated the Athenians at Cape Notius. The last, decisive defeat of Athens, from which almost all allies fell during the war, was the battle of Aegospotami, where in 405 BC. e. Spartan Lysander captured almost without a fight all the Athenian ships.

As a result of the Peloponnesian War, the hope of creating a politically unified Greek state collapsed. Athens was deprived of all external possessions, was obliged to tear down the Long Walls and give the Spartans all the ships remaining at the policy. Sparta became the new hegemon of the Greek world. However, her power could not be strong - the political structure of Sparta was very different from other city-states (here, for example, royal power was preserved), the warlike Spartans were not loved, and often simply hated. Therefore, many Greek city-states supported in 371 BC. e. Thebes, who went to war with the Spartans.

In the battle near the city of Leuctra, the Spartan army was utterly defeated by the talented Theban strategist Epaminondas, and Thebes for a short time became the most powerful policy in Greece. Taking advantage of the weakening of Sparta, the Athenians created a second maritime union, which lasted, however, less than the first - only 20 years. And in 362 BC. e. in the battle of Mantinea, the Thebans were successful, but the death of Epaminondas stole their victory from them, and the short hegemony of Thebes came to an end. After centuries of civil strife, the Greek states weakened, and their northern neighbor, warlike Macedonia, clearly began to threaten them.

By 335 BC. e. a significant part of the city-states of Northern Greece recognized the authority of the Macedonian king, and in 338 BC. e. after the Battle of Chaeronea and was forced to submit to the Macedonians. Although formally the Greek cities retained self-government, they actually became part of the vast Macedonian Empire. After the death of Tsar Alexander

Macedonian and the beginning of wars between his heirs, the Greek policies periodically turned out to be dependent either on Macedonia, or on Epirus, or on other neighboring states, never reaching such power as in the 5th century. BC e.

Wars between Macedonia and Rome at the end of the 3rd - beginning of the 2nd century. BC e. led to the fact that most of the Greek policies became part of the Roman Republic. As Roman domination grew stronger, local Greek traditions were increasingly replaced by Roman law. In case of disobedience, severe punishment followed immediately. In 146 BC. e. Corinth and his few allies rebelled against the Romans; the city was taken by storm and almost completely destroyed, and all its inhabitants were sold into slavery. After that, all Greek lands were united into the Roman province of Achaia. Independent ended.