Conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River 1939. Historical battles on the Khalkin Gol

Since 1905, Japan has been waiting for the right moment to achieve goals that were not achieved in the war with Russia in 1904-1905. Events in Russia were developing, as it seemed to Japan, in its favor.

In February 1917, the autocratic Great Russian Empire was actually destroyed. England, the USA and other countries of the West ruled in Russia, trying to divide it into many small territorial entities and forever deprive Russia of statehood, and the Russian people - the right to life. Their plans were not destined to come true at that time.

As we know, on October 25, 1917 (November 7, according to a new style), the Great October Socialist Revolution took place, which destroyed private property, private banks, capitalism, the exploitation of man by man and laid the foundation for a new social order - socialist. The Bolsheviks came to power. England and the USA have lost their former influence in Russia.

In 1918, at the most difficult time for the young Soviet Republic, Japan attacked the Far East and ... got bogged down in a civil war. The Japanese were casually beaten by the Reds, local gangs, and partisans.

In 1922, the Whites were defeated near Volochaevka and Spassk. In February, the red units entered Khabarovsk. Having defeated the main force, the Red Army in October 1922 threw out the Japanese invaders from Vladivostok "and ended its campaign in the Pacific."

Created after the revolution, the Far Eastern Republic, as an independent republic, was liquidated and became part of the RSFSR.

And this time, the Japanese could not create an empire at the expense of Russia. But again the Japanese shed Russian blood.

In August 1938, in the Primorsky Territory of the RSFSR, near the Posyet Bay, in the area of Lake Khasan, Soviet troops fought stubborn battles with the Japanese invaders. The Japanese crossed the state border of the USSR and captured the hills Bezymyannaya, Zaozyornaya, Black, Machine-gun Hill, located between the Tumen-Ula River and Lake Khasan. Soviet troops stormed the hills captured by the Japanese. As a result, the samurai were defeated and retreated from our territory. Over the Zaozernaya hill, the winners again raised the red flag. And in these battles, our soldiers died, beautiful young Russian guys who dreamed of a great, creative life, of happiness, of love.

The attack of the samurai at Lake Khasan was of a provocative nature, it was a test of our strength. Large-scale battles involving thousands of people, hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft were yet to come, at Khalkhin Gol.

In March 1936, there were several minor skirmishes along the Mongol-Manchurian border. At this time, the northeastern part of China, Manchuria, was captured and occupied by Japan. In response to provocations on the border with Mongolia, on March 12, a protocol on mutual assistance was signed between the USSR and the MPR. JV Stalin warned: "If Japan decides to attack the Mongolian People's Republic, encroaching on its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's Republic." Molotov confirmed that we would defend the border of the MPR as resolutely as we would defend our own border.

In accordance with the agreement on mutual assistance in September 1937, a "limited contingent" of Soviet troops was introduced into Mongolia, consisting of 30 thousand people, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles, 5000 cars and 107 aircraft. The headquarters of the corps of Soviet troops settled in Ulaanbaatar. The corps commander was N. V. Feklenko.

Since May 11, 1939, the Japanese have repeatedly, with forces of several hundred people, violated the border of the MPR. On May 28, the Japanese launched an offensive from the Nomonkhan-Burd-Obo region, pushing back the Mongolian and our units. But then they were beaten and retreated beyond the border line. If this battle can be called a draw, then in the air we suffered a complete defeat.

The commander of the corps of Soviet troops, N. V. Feklenko, was removed from his post; G.K. Zhukov was appointed to replace him.

On the night of July 2-3, 1939, the Japanese launched a new offensive with the participation of infantry divisions, tank, artillery, engineer and cavalry regiments.

Their task was to encircle and destroy our troops on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River. To do this, the Japanese troops advanced both on the eastern and crossing the river, and on the western bank of the river, cutting off our formations from the troops located on the eastern bank, that is, creating an external encirclement front on the western bank of the river. Formations of Japanese troops crossed the Khalkhin-Gol River to move units to the western bank in the area of Mount Bain-Tsagan.

The Japanese fought courageously, but were stopped and driven out from separate heights by the Soviet units with heavy losses for us, too, since at the time of the Japanese offensive we did not have the amount of forces and means sufficient to repel the enemy's attack.

The reason for the untimely arrival of our troops, equipment and delivery of ammunition was the remoteness of the railway station from the battlefield. The remoteness of the Japanese troops from the railway was 60 kilometers, the distance of our troops from the Borzya railway station was 750 kilometers. Some historians call this battle the "Bain-Tsagan Battle".

But here is what Nikolai Ganin, the navigator of the SB-2 bomber, a participant in the battles at Khalkhin Gol, writes: “Now some“ historians ”specializing in slandering our past accuse Zhukov of“ excessive losses. ”As you know, at a critical moment in the battle, when the Japanese entrenched on Bain-Tsagan (mountain) and our troops on the right bank of Khalkhin Gol were threatened with complete encirclement, Georgy Konstantinovich decided on a desperate step: he threw the eleventh tank brigade into battle, in violation of all the rules, without infantry cover, on the move, from the march. The tankers suffered heavy losses, up to half of the personnel, but they completed the task. I believe that Zhukov's decision in the current situation was the only right one. Georgy Konstantinovich simply had no other choice - if not for the counterattack organized by him, our entire grouping was doomed. And so - at the cost of the death of one brigade, it was possible to ensure a turning point in the war "... This counterattack not only provided a turning point in the war, but also saved thousands of lives of our soldiers and officers.

By August, experienced pilots arrived in the Soviet troops and began to beat the famous Japanese aces who had passed through China. The aircraft fleet has increased. Soviet aviation won air supremacy.

According to the master plan developed on August 20, the encirclement of the Japanese troops that invaded the territory of Mongolia began. The operation was started by 150 SB bombers, under the cover of 144 fighters, and all day they dropped bombs from a height of two thousand meters on the positions of the Japanese. The artillery preparation lasted two hours and forty-five minutes. At nine o'clock in the morning, Soviet troops went on the offensive along the entire front. On August 23, the encirclement of the samurai was completed. Attempts by the Japanese to break through the encirclement with an external blow were unsuccessful. On August 30, the last pockets of resistance were crushed. By the morning of August 31, 1939, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of the Japanese-Manchu invaders.

Our losses in killed and missing amounted to 7974 people. and 720 people. died in hospitals from wounds. Japanese losses in killed are at least 22,000 people. The wounded in the Red Army - 15,251 people, in the Japanese army - 53,000 people.

Losses in aircraft of all types in the aviation of the Red Army - 249 pieces, in the aviation of Japan - 646 pieces (there is information on the dates of losses and the types of aircraft shot down and destroyed at airfields).

As is obvious, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army fought the Japanese incomparably better than the tsarist army.

The I-16 fighters (at the time of the start of production the best fighters in the world), the I-153 biplane, Chaika, and the older model I-15 bis biplane, SB-2 medium bombers (speed-420 km per hour, ceiling -10 thousand meters, flight range-1000 km, bomb load-600 kg.) and heavy bombers TB-3. Tanks BT-5, BT-7 with a 45 mm gun, TB-26 (flamethrowers). Armored vehicles BA-20 - only a machine gun and BA-10 - a 45 mm cannon and two machine guns, i.e. armament is not inferior to the tank. Guns of various calibers, including 76 mm guns and 152 mm howitzers. Most of our species were superior to those of Japan.

By 1939, Soviet power had only 16 peaceful years to create these weapons, in many cases from scratch. This is the Soviet, Russian miracle.

Participants in the battles at Khalkhin Gol left their memories. It can be seen from them that as a result of major air battles, air supremacy passed to Soviet aviation, that our planes, tanks and artillery were superior to the Japanese, that the Japanese fought courageously, at that time the Japanese army was one of the best armies in the world, but we all articles were stronger. Nikolai Kravets, an artilleryman, wrote about the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops: “The long-awaited offensive began at dawn on August 20 ... At 5.45 loudspeakers installed along the entire front, the Internationale thundered. Then the "March of the Pilots" began to play - and an armada of our aircraft appeared in the sky; then the "March of the Artillerymen" and the artillery struck ... ".

Recalling the battles at Khalkhin Gol, Nikolai Ganin, the navigator of the bomber, wrote: “And here we are standing on Mount Khamar-Daba, where Zhukov’s command post was in the summer of 1939, Mount Bain-Tsagan rises to the left, behind which the most fierce battles took place, Khalkhin-Gol flows below us, across the river is the Remizov hill, where the remnants of the Japanese group were destroyed, and only far on the horizon is the same mountain Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, after which the Japanese named the entire war.

So I suggested that they set the distance from Khalkhin Gol to Nomon Khan with the help of a rangefinder - it turned out to be about 30 kilometers. Then I ask: so, who climbed into the garden to whom - you to the Mongols or they to you? The Japanese had nothing to cover. But, despite this, not only in Japanese, but also in Western literature, the battles of 1939 continue to be called the "Nomonhan Incident." With this name, Japan and the West accuse Russia of attacking Japan in 1939, which, according to the above facts, is not true.

And then Nikolai Ganin continues: “The generation of winners is leaving. There are very few of us, veterans of Khalkhin Gol, all of us over eighty. But we cannot calmly look at what we have turned our country into, what we have exchanged our great past for, we cannot reconcile ourselves to the lies that are being fed to today's youth. True, recently the traitors who ruined the Fatherland ... are crying with crocodile tears: they say, "the Soviet government deprived the youth of the first half of the twentieth century of childhood and youth."

Lie, "gentlemen"! Our generation knew neither drug addiction nor hazing in their youth, we were proud of our country and were happy to defend it, we did not have to be dragged to recruiting stations with the police, we did not hide from military service, but on the contrary, considered conscription into the army a great holiday. And the girls even avoided those who did not serve. For all our busyness, we managed to go to dances and go on dates, and kissed no less passionately - however, not on the subway escalators, but in a more suitable environment.

So our generation had a happy youth. While working at the factory, my friends and I graduated from the evening workers' faculty (workers' faculty). By 8 o'clock in the morning, at the workshop, at the end of the working day, from 5 to 10 pm, study - of course, it was not easy, but after graduating from the workers' faculty, I was accepted as an excellent student to the Faculty of History of Gorky University without exams and, of course, for free. At the same time, I also studied at the navigational department of the local flying club.

A generation of participants in the battles at Khalkhin Gol saved Russia.

Mongolia Mongolia 2 260 people (2 cavalry divisions)

In Japanese historiography, the term " Khalkhin Gol" is used only for the name of the river, and the military conflict itself is called " Incident at Nomon Khan”, by the name of a small village in this region of the Manchurian-Mongolian border.

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✪ Battles at Khalkhin Gol

✪ Battle of Khalkhin Gol in 1939.

✪ Military conflict "The enemy found a grave on the Khalkin Gol River" 1939, USSR, Mongolia, Japan

✪ War in the days of lotus blossom. Battles near Lake Khasan with the Japanese in 1938

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Background to the conflict

According to the Soviet side, the beginning of the conflict was laid by the demands of the Japanese side for the recognition of the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the railway being built by the Japanese in this area, bypassing the Great Khingan railway. Khalun-Arshan - Ganchzhur to the border of the USSR in the region of Irkutsk and Lake Baikal, since in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. According to the Soviet historian M. V. Novikov, in order to substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps with the border along Khalkhin Gol and “ a special order was issued to destroy a number of authoritative reference Japanese publications, on the maps of which the correct border was given in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River”, but the Russian historian K. E. Cherevko points out that the administrative border along the Khalkhin Gol channel was marked on a map published on the basis of Russian topographic surveys of 1906 and on the physical map of Outer Mongolia of the General Staff of the Republic of China in 1918.

May

The Soviet command took radical measures. On May 29, a group of aces-pilots headed by Ya. V. Smushkevich, deputy head of the Red Army Air Force, flew from Moscow to the combat area. 17 of them were heroes of the Soviet Union, many had combat experience of the war in Spain and China. They began to train pilots, reorganized and strengthened the system of air surveillance, warning and communications.

To strengthen the air defense, two divisions of the 191st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment were sent to the Trans-Baikal Military District.

In early June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M.V. Zakharov, G.K. Zhukov was appointed in his place. Brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Shortly after arriving in the area of the military conflict in June, the chief of staff of the Soviet command proposed a new plan of military operations: conducting active defense on the bridgehead behind Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack on the opposing grouping of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to be drawn to the combat area: the troops were brought along the Trans-Siberian railway to Ulan-Ude, and then across the territory of Mongolia they followed the march order for 1300-1400 km. Zhukov's assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry was the corps commissar Zhamyangiin Lkhagvasuren.

To coordinate the actions of the Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army from Chita, the commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern arrived in the region of the Khalkhin Gol River.

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor on June 20. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

July

Fierce battles unfolded around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired at the enemy with direct fire, and in the sky above the mountain at some points there were up to 300 aircraft from both sides. The 149th Infantry Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, the Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, withdrew to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka did not fulfill the task assigned to it.

The grouping of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan was in a semi-encirclement. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, on the orders of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge over Khalkhin Gol that they had at their disposal was blown up. In the end, the Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the estimates of the Japanese themselves, their total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8632 people. killed. The Japanese side lost almost all tanks and most of the artillery. These events became known as the "Bayan-Tsagan battle".

The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, the Japanese troops "no longer risked crossing to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River." All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on the territory of Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the focus of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the aim of completely defeating the entire Japanese grouping located on the territory of Mongolia.

July August

The 57th special corps was deployed into the 1st army (front) group under the command of commander G. M. Stern. In accordance with the decision of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, the Military Council of the army group was established to lead the troops, consisting of: commander of the army commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, chief of staff brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, commander of aviation corps commander Ya. commander G. K. Zhukov, divisional commissar M. S. Nikishev.

New troops urgently began to be transferred to the place of conflict, including the 82nd Rifle Division. The 37th tank brigade, which was armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow military district, partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal military district and the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions were formed.

General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for August 24th. At the same time, taking into account the sad experience of the battles for the Japanese on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Forcing the river was not planned.

During the preparation by the Soviet command of the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for the operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly observed. All movements of troops in the front line were carried out only at night, it was strictly forbidden to send troops to the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by the command staff was carried out only on trucks and in the form of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, all the time preparing for the offensive, the Soviet side conducted an active electronic warfare against the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were actively conducting radio reconnaissance and listening in on telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were only about the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. The radio exchange in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.

Despite the general superiority in the forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive, Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. For the offensive operation, two-week stocks of ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4,000 trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1,300-1,400 kilometers. It should be noted that one car trip with cargo and back lasted five days.

During the offensive operation, the Soviet command, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to surround and destroy the enemy with unexpected strong flank attacks in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational tasks as the main striking force of flank groupings that performed encirclement maneuvers.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern Group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was delivered by the Northern Group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of the brigade commander D. E. Petrov was supposed to tie down the enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. In the reserve, concentrated in the center, were the 212th Airborne, 9th Motorized Armored Brigade and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also participated in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions, as well as a motor transport division under the general command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The balance of forces of the parties before the start of the offensive

August

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.

At 06:15 a powerful artillery preparation and an air raid on enemy positions began. 153 bombers and about 100 fighters were lifted into the air. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with the plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred during the crossing of the tanks of the 6th tank brigade, since the pontoon bridge induced by the sappers could not withstand the gravity of the tanks during the crossing of Khalkhin Gol.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance in the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.

Already on the 21st and 22nd of August, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so the Soviet command had to bring into battle the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade.

Soviet aviation also operated well at that time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to support its troops defending on the flanks. The armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern Groups of the Soviet-Mongolian Forces united by the end of August 26 and completed the complete encirclement of the 6th Japanese Army. After that, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often, Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese on August 23 in the Central sector of the front, the Soviet command even had to bring into battle its last reserve: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, it took a considerable risk, since the closest reserve of the commander - the Mongolian armored brigade - was located in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to conduct counterattacks and release the group surrounded in the Khalkhin Gol region ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, engaged in battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment, which covered the border, but neither that day nor the next could break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo . After the fighting on August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, did not try to release its encircled troops anymore, resigning itself to the inevitability of their death.

The Red Army captured 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 easel and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million cartridges, and many other military equipment as trophies.

In total, during the conflict, the USSR lost 207 aircraft, Japan - 162.

During the fighting near the Khalkhin-Gol River, Soviet troops actively used artillery: according to incomplete data (the results of the shelling of a number of objects in the adjacent territory were not established), 133 artillery pieces were destroyed by artillery fire (six 105-mm guns, 55 pcs. 75- mm guns, 69 small-caliber and three anti-aircraft guns), 49 mortars, 117 machine guns, 47 artillery, 21 mortar and 30 machine-gun batteries were suppressed, 40 tanks and 29 armored vehicles were knocked out, 21 observation posts, 55 dugouts, 2 fuel depots and 2 warehouses with ammunition

Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government turned to the government of the USSR with a request to stop hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the MPR and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the region of the Khalkhin Gol River, which entered into force the next day.

But "de jure" the conflict ended only in May 1942 with the signing of the final settlement agreement. Moreover, it was a compromise settlement, largely in favor of the Japanese, based on the old map. For the Red Army, which suffered defeats on the Soviet-German front, then a rather difficult situation developed. Therefore, the settlement was pro-Japanese. But it lasted only until 1945, before the surrender of Japan in the Second World War.

Results

The victory of the USSR and the MPR at Khalkhin Gol became one of the reasons for the refusal of Japan's attack on the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the General Staff of Japan, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler's demand in a telegram dated June 30th to immediately fulfill their allied obligations and strike at the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 2nd, the final decision was made to wait until Germany was certain of victory.

In Japan, the defeat and the simultaneous (August 23) signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of Hiranuma's Kiichiro cabinet. On September 4, the new Japanese government declared that it did not intend to interfere in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on September 15 signed an armistice agreement, which led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact on April 13, 1941. In the traditional confrontation between the Japanese army and navy, the “sea party” won, advocating the idea of cautious expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The military leadership of Germany, having studied the experience of the Japanese wars in China and Khalkhin Gol, very lowly assessed the military capabilities of Japan and did not recommend Hitler to associate himself with her alliance.

The fighting on the territory of the MPR coincided with the negotiations of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Hachiro Arita with the British Ambassador to Tokyo Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for the aggression against the MPR and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the trade agreement with Japan, which was denounced on January 26, for six months, and then completely restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machines for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (till 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and oil products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941. However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow to Japan until the start of the war with the United States.

The events at Khalkhin Gol also became an important element of propaganda in the USSR. Its essence boiled down to the idea of the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Participants in the tragic events of the summer of 1941 have repeatedly noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of the great war.

The influence of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.

"Golden Star"

The government of the Mongolian People's Republic established the badge “Participant in battles at Khalkhin Gol”, which was awarded to distinguished Soviet and Mongolian military personnel.

Khalkhin-Gol was the beginning of the military career of G.K. Zhukov. The previously unknown division commander (deputy commander of the ZapOVO), after the victory over the Japanese, headed (June 7, 1940) the largest Kyiv military district in the country, and then became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

The commander of the 1st Army Group, Commander G. M. Stern and the commander of aviation Ya. V. Smushkevich, were also awarded the Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. After the end of the conflict, Smushkevich was appointed head of the Air Force of the Red Army, Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War.

The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 17, 1939. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the NKO of the USSR, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by a Decree of the Government of the USSR, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission for resolving disputes over the state border between the MPR and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of a provocation from the Japanese side, Bogdanov made "a gross mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR", for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was convicted under Art. 193-17 paragraph "a" for 4 years ITL. By the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with the removal of a criminal record and sent to the disposal of the NPO of the USSR. He finished the Great Patriotic War as a division commander and the rank of major general.

Side losses

According to official Soviet data, the losses of the Japanese-Manchurian troops during the fighting from May to September 1939 amounted to more than 61 thousand people. killed, wounded and captured, including about 25,000 killed (of which about 20,000 were actually Japanese losses). Officially announced losses of the Kwantung Army: 18 thousand people [ ] . Independent Japanese researchers give figures up to 45 thousand people. [ ] . In the studies of A. Nakanishi, only the Japanese lost 17,405 - 20,801 people killed and wounded, the losses of the Manchus are not taken into account.

According to Soviet data, 227 Japanese and Manchurian soldiers were captured during the fighting. Of these, 6 died in captivity from wounds, 3 refused to return to Japan, the rest were handed over to the Japanese side). Also, three Barguts refused to return to Inner Mongolia.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 9,703 people (including 6,472 dead, 1,152 dead from wounds in hospitals, 8 dead from diseases, 2,028 missing, 43 dead from accidents). Sanitary losses amounted to 15,952 people (including 15,251 wounded, shell-shocked and burned, 701 sick). According to official figures, the losses of the Mongolian troops amounted to 165 killed and 401 wounded (sometimes, with reference to a certain Mongolian historian T. Ganbold, data are given about 234 killed and 661 wounded, and a total of 895 people were the total losses of the Mongolian troops). In the studies of A. Nakanishi, the losses of the Soviet-Mongolian side amounted to 23,000 - 24,889.

During the fighting, 97 Soviet servicemen were captured. Of these, 82 were returned by prisoner exchange in September, 11 people were killed by the Japanese in captivity, 4 refused to return from captivity. Of the prisoners of war returned to the Soviet Union, 38 people were tried by a military tribunal on charges of voluntarily surrendering or collaborating with the Japanese in captivity.

Reflection in literature and art

The events at Khalkhin Gol were reflected in Soviet and world literature and art. Novels, poems and songs were written about them, articles were published in newspapers.

K. M. Simonov - the novel "Comrades in Arms", the poem "Far in the East", the poem "Tank", the poem "Doll".
F. Bokarev - poem "Memory of Khalkhin Gol"
H. Murakami - the novel "Chronicles Clockwork Birds" (a long story by Lieutenant Mamiya).
Gelasimov A. V. - novel "Steppe gods", 2008.

In cinema

"Khalkhin-Gol" () - documentary film, TSSDF.
“Listen, on the other side” () is a Soviet-Mongolian feature film dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
"I, Shapovalov T.P." (, dir. Karelov E. E.) - the first part of the dilogy "High rank", an episode in the film.
“By the Ways of the Fathers” () is a television film by Irkutsk TV journalist Natalia Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.
Khalkhin Gol. Unknown War ”() - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. The film uses a large number of chronicles, as well as comments by veterans participating in those events and historians.
Volunteers
My Way (film, 2011) (Korean: 마이웨이) is a Korean film directed by Kang Jae-gyu, released in 2011. The film is based on the story of Korean Yang Kyongjon and Japanese Tatsuo Hasegawa, who were captured by the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol.

FIGHTS ON HALKIN GOL (1939)

Material from Wikipedia

Battles at Khalkhin Gol- An armed conflict (undeclared war) that lasted from spring to autumn 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia (Eastern (Dornod) Aimak) near the border with Manchuria (Manchukuo), between the USSR and Japan. The final battle took place in the last days of August and ended with the complete defeat of the 6th separate army of Japan. A truce between the USSR and Japan was concluded on September 15.

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. A "puppet" state of Manchukuo was created on the occupied territory, which was planned to be used as a springboard for further aggression against Mongolia, China and the USSR.

The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran 20-25 km to the east). One of the reasons for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Khalun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway being built by the Japanese in this area.

In 1935 clashes began on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. In the summer of the same year, negotiations began between representatives of Mongolia and Manchukuo on the demarcation of the border. By autumn, negotiations had stalled.

On March 12, 1936, the Protocol on Mutual Assistance was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia.

In 1938, a two-week conflict had already taken place between the Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended in the victory of the USSR.

MAY 1939. FIRST BATTLE

May 11, 1939 A detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. May 11, 1939 - this day in history is marked as the day of the beginning of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol.

On May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko, sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a company of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and pushed the Japanese back to the border.

In the period from May 22 to May 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian troops had 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. The Japanese forces consisted of 1680 bayonets, 900 sabers, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank.

On May 28, the Japanese troops, having a numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting him off from the crossing to the western coast of Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan fell through, largely due to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bakhtin.

The next day, the Soviet-Mongolian troops launched a counteroffensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions.

JUNE 1939. FIGHT FOR AIR DOMINATION

Although there was not a single collision on the ground in June, an air war unfolded in the sky. Already the first clashes at the end of May showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. So, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one car.

The Soviet command had to take drastic measures: on May 29, a group of aces pilots headed by Yakov Smushkevich, deputy head of the Red Army Air Force, flew from Moscow to the combat area. Many of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union, and also had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. After that, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal.

In early June, N. V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G. K. Zhukov was appointed in his place at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M. V. Zakharov. Soon after G.K. Zhukov’s arrival in the area of the military conflict in June 1939, he proposed his plan of military operations: conducting active defense on the bridgehead behind Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack on the opposing grouping of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with the proposals put forward by G.K. Zhukov. The necessary forces began to be drawn to the conflict area. The brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov's assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of the Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, commander G. M. Stern arrived from Chita in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River.

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor in the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft.

Throughout June, the Soviet side was engaged in arranging defenses on the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here. So, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan, the superiority of Soviet aviation over the Japanese was ensured and it was possible to seize air supremacy.

At the same time, on June 26, 1939, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol.

JULY 1939. JAPANESE GROUP OFFENSIVE

By the end of June 1939, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called the "Second Period of the Nomon Khan Incident." In general terms, it was identical to the May operation of the Japanese troops, but this time, in addition to the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, the Japanese troops were tasked with forcing the Khalkhin Gol River and breaking through the defenses of the Red Army on the operational sector of the front.

On July 2, the Japanese group went on the offensive. On the night of July 2-3, the troops of General Kobayashi crossed the Khalkhin-Gol River and, after a fierce battle, captured Mount Bayan-Tsagan on its western bank, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to build extremely intensive fortifications and build defense in depth. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to strike at the rear of the Soviet troops defending on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River, cut off and further destroy them.

Fierce fighting also began on the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese, advancing with the forces of two infantry and two tank regiments (130 tanks) against one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers and two Mongolian cavalry divisions, numbering 3.5 thousand horsemen, initially achieved success. From a difficult situation, the defending Soviet troops were rescued by a mobile reserve created in advance by G.K. Zhukov, which was promptly put into action ..

Fierce battles unfolded around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft participated in them. Soviet artillerymen fired at the enemy with direct fire, and in the sky above the mountain at certain moments there were up to 300 aircraft from both sides. The 149th Infantry Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

The grouping of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan was in a semi-encirclement. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, on the orders of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge over Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, the Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. More than 10,000 Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan. Almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost.

The result of these battles was that in the future, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, the Japanese troops "no longer risked crossing to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River." All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on the territory of Mongolia and the military leadership of Japan planned new offensive operations. Thus, the focus of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, G.K. Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the aim of completely defeating the entire Japanese grouping located on the territory of Mongolia.

JULY - AUGUST 1939. PREPARATION FOR SOVIET COUNTEROFFENSIVE

The 57th special corps was deployed into the 1st army (front) group under the command of G.K. Zhukov. In accordance with the decision of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, the Military Council of the army group was established to lead the troops, consisting of commander - commander G.K. Zhukov, divisional commissar M.S. Nikishev and chief of staff brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov.

New troops urgently began to be transferred to the place of conflict, including the 82nd Infantry Division,. The 37th tank brigade, which was armed with BT-7 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow military district, partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal military district and the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions were formed.

On July 8, the Japanese side again began active hostilities. At night, they launched a large-scale offensive on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of a rifle and machine-gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this attack by the Japanese. As a result of this attack by the Japanese, the 149th Regiment had to withdraw to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were thrown.

Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out such sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the height, they, as a result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th tank brigade commander M. P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from a height and thrown back to their original positions. The line of defense on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored.

There was a lull in the fighting between 13 and 22 July, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took vigorous measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required for the offensive operation planned by G.K. Zhukov against the Japanese grouping. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead.

On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, launched an offensive on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place, so from July 21 to 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet only 20.

Significant efforts fell on the shoulders of the border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and guard the crossings over Khalkhin Gol, a combined battalion of Soviet border guards under the command of Major A. Bulyga was transferred from the Trans-Baikal Military District. In the second half of July alone, border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among whom dozens of Japanese intelligence officers were identified.

During the development of an offensive operation against the Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer hostilities from Mongolian territory to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the political leadership of the country.

As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive, Zhukov's 1st Army Group had about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, the Japanese group opposing it was specially formed by imperial decree the Japanese 6th separate army under the command of General Ogisu Rippo, had in its composition the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments, a Manchurian brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineer regiments and other parts, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 500 aircraft. It should also be noted that the Japanese group included many soldiers who received combat experience during the war in China.

General Rippo and his staff also planned the offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. At the same time, taking into account the sad experience of the battles for the Japanese on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet grouping. Forcing the river was not planned.

During the preparation by G.K. Zhukov of the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for the operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly observed. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, all the time preparing for the offensive, the Soviet side conducted an active electronic warfare against the enemy. Despite the general superiority in the forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive, Zhukov managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. For the offensive operation, two-week stocks of ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants were created.

During the offensive operation, G.K. Zhukov planned, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, to surround and destroy the enemy with unexpected strong flank attacks in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin-Gol River.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern Group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was delivered by the Northern Group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down the enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to maneuver. In the reserve, concentrated in the center, were the 212th airborne and 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also participated in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby forestalling the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, was a complete surprise for the Japanese command. At 06:15 a powerful artillery preparation and an air raid on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with the plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred during the crossing of the tanks of the 6th tank brigade, since the pontoon bridge built by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks during the crossing of Khalkhin Gol.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance in the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications - here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day. Already on the 21st and 22nd of August, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so G.K. Zhukov had to bring into the battle the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the 6th Japanese Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to support its troops defending on the flanks. The armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of the Soviet-Mongolian troops by the end of August 26 united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After that, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often, Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, G.K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took a considerable risk.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol region ended in failure. After the fighting on August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, did not try to release its encircled troops, resigning itself to the inevitability of their death.

The last battles still continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khailastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of the border conflict (in fact, Japan's undeclared war against the USSR and its allied Mongolia). So on September 4 and 8, Japanese troops made new attempts to penetrate the territory of Mongolia, but they were thrown back behind the state border line by strong counterattacks. Air battles also continued, which stopped only with the conclusion of an official truce.

On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the MPR and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the region of the Khalkhin Gol River, which entered into force the next day.

RESULTS

The victory of the USSR at Khalkhin Gol played a decisive role in Japan's non-aggression on the USSR. It is a remarkable fact that when in December 1941 German troops stood near Moscow, Hitler furiously demanded that Japan attack the USSR in the Far East. It was the defeat at Khalkhin Gol, according to many historians, that played a major role in abandoning plans to attack the USSR in favor of attacking the United States.

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, prompting the United States to enter World War II. The purpose of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize the US Pacific Fleet in order to ensure freedom of action for the Japanese army and navy in Southeast Asia.

In the fall of 1941, the leadership of the USSR received a message from intelligence officer Sorge that Japan was not going to attack the USSR. This information made it possible, during the most critical days of the defense of Moscow in late October - early November 1941, to transfer from the Far East up to twenty fresh, fully equipped and well-equipped rifle divisions and several tank formations, which played one of the key roles in the defense of Moscow, and also allowed in the future, Soviet troops go on a counteroffensive near Moscow in December 1941.

TODAY

On September 11, 2008, a regular meeting of the organizing committee under the chief federal inspector in the Trans-Baikal Territory was held in Chita on the reconstruction of the burial place of soldiers who died in hospitals in Chita from wounds received during battles near the Khalkhin-Gol river.

According to Alexander Baturin, an employee of the apparatus of the federal inspector, who is a member of the organizing committee, about 30 million rubles are required for the erection of the memorial, and about 1.5 million rubles have been collected so far. Many people are interested in the appearance of the monument - entrepreneurs, structures of the regional and city administrations, students and university authorities. According to Baturin, today the townspeople treat the old Chita cemetery, where participants of the Japanese war are buried, disrespectfully. Although the memorial could play a huge role in the military-patriotic education of young people, who, unfortunately, know too little about the Japanese war, which claimed the lives of more than 18.5 thousand people.

“In general, there are many white spots in the events of the battle at Khalkhin Gol,” says retired colonel Vladimir Palkin. It is not in vain that the military pensioner argues this way - he knows some details of the war with Japan, which historians are unaware of. With some chagrin, Palkin says that all the works do not take into account the huge role that the Trans-Baikal Military District played in the war.

Palkin believes that there are not enough monuments to the heroes of the Japanese war in Russia. “The Mongols treat Khalkhin Gol much more respectfully. For them, this war is like the Great Patriotic War for the Russians. In Mongolia there are a lot of museums, exhibitions of military equipment, the streets are named after heroes. And in Russia, the issue of restoring the memorial at the old Chita cemetery is being resolved for so long. In addition, we do not have a film about those events,” says Colonel Palkin. He wrote the script for the documentary, for which there is all the documentation, action maps and a film crew. The only thing missing is funding. In 2006, Vladimir Dmitrievich made requests to the city and regional administrations, but the 2.5 million rubles required for filming were not found. With bitterness, Palkin says that he will have to turn to the Mongols for help in making the film.

70th ANNIVERSARY OF THE VICTORY AT KHARKHIN GOL

In February 2009, a working group headed by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense, Major General M. Borbaatar, works in Dornod aimag. The main purpose of the group's trip is to get acquainted with the work and expenses necessary for this region to prepare for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the victory at Khalkhin Gol. The working group looked at the monument, visited the museum and the Khan-Uul school complex, then departed for the Khalkhgol somon to get acquainted with the state of the monument erected in honor of the Victory at Khalkhin Gol and inspect historical and memorial places. The celebration of the victory at Khalkhin Gol was scheduled by the commission for August 22-28, 2009. 1,600 war veterans still live in the country, 76 of whom participated in the war on the Khalkh River.

Fighting in the area of the Khalkhin Gol river. 05/11/1939-09/16/1939. Military chronicle. Photo-illustrated periodical 2-2001. Russian language. Pages 101.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Mongolian War Museum has in its collection more than 8,000 exhibits related to the history of the Mongolian army. Located in the eastern part of Ulaanbaatar in the 15th microdistrict.
Memorial House - Museum of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. Branch of the Mongolian military museum. New information. New photos. 2011.
East (Dornod) ayak of Mongolia. General information. Attractions.
Choibalsan. The administrative center of the Eastern Aimag of Mongolia.

PHOTO ALBUM PAGES

NOTES:

In "Western" historiography, in particular in American and Japanese, the term "Khalkhin-Gol" is used only for the name of the river, and the military conflict itself is called the local "incident near Nomon-Khan". "Nomon-Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this region of the Manchurian-Mongolian border.
Translated into Russian "Khalkhin-Gol" - the river Khalkha
The troops were brought along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed the order of march
During this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Fukuda Takeo, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured.
In total, in air battles from 22 to 28 June, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.
On June 26, 1939, the words “TASS is authorized to declare ...” were heard on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers.
Zhukov, without waiting for the escort rifle regiment to approach, threw into battle directly from the march the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander MP Yakovlev, who was in reserve, who was supported by the Mongolian armored division armed with 45-mm cannons. It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of the commander G. M. Stern. In fairness, it should be noted that later Stern admitted that in that situation the decision was the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was sent to Moscow, which fell on the table to I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov "intentionally" threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. A commission of inquiry was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G. I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational command and control of the troops, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in a telegram dated July 15 reprimanded him and recalled him to Moscow. After that, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mekhlis, was sent to Khalkhin Gol from Moscow with an order from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov.
The division was hastily formed in the Urals, many soldiers of this division never held weapons in their hands, so it was necessary to urgently organize the training of its personnel on the spot.
In a report dated July 16, 1939, to the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army on the moral and political state of the personnel of the 82nd Infantry Division, the facts of the abandonment of combat positions by the soldiers of one of the regiments of this division without an order, attempts to crack down on the political composition of the regiment, etc. were cited. Order in such undisciplined subdivisions was induced by exceptional measures, up to executions in front of the ranks.
MP Yakovlev died in this battle from a bullet from a Japanese sniper.
Former at that time the chief of staff of the Kyakhta border detachment.
Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov later recalled one of Stalin's statements on this subject: “You want to unleash a big war in Mongolia. The enemy in response to your detours will throw additional forces. The center of struggle will inevitably expand and take on a protracted character, and we will be drawn into a protracted war.
All movements of troops in the front line were carried out only at night, it was strictly forbidden to send troops to the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground, command personnel were carried out only in trucks and in the form of ordinary Red Army soldiers.
At first, the Japanese methodically fired at the areas that were sources of noise.
Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening in on telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were only about the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. The radio exchange in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.
More than 4,000 trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1,300-1,400 kilometers. It should be noted that one car trip with cargo and back lasted five days.
At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational tasks as the main strike force of flank groupings that maneuvered into encirclement.
Since Sunday, August 20, 1939 was a holiday, General Ogisu Rippo allowed many of his subordinate generals and senior officers to leave the location of his troops for rest.
The closest reserve of the commander - the Mongolian armored brigade - was in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.
On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, engaged in battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment, which covered the border, but neither on that day nor the next day could they break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo- Go.
So on September 2, 4, 14 and 15, Japanese aviation lost 71 aircraft in air battles, while Soviet aviation lost only 18 aircraft in the entire first half of September.
As is known, through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government turned to the government of the USSR with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. The final restoration of the status quo on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo took place on June 9, 1940 at the end of negotiations between the USSR and Japan.
During the days of the defense of Moscow on October 12, 1941, Stalin summoned to the Kremlin the commander of the Far Eastern Front I. R. Apanasenko, as well as the commander of the Pacific Fleet I. S. Yumashev and the first secretary of the Primorsky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks N. M. Pegov to discuss the possible transfer of troops from the Far East to Moscow, but no decisions were made that day. However, a few days later, when the situation near Moscow deteriorated sharply, Stalin called Apanasenko and asked how many divisions he could transfer to the west at the end of October and in November. Apanasenko replied that up to twenty rifle divisions and seven to eight tank formations could be transferred, if, of course, the railway services could provide the required number of trains. After that, the transfer of troops from the Far East immediately began, which took place under the personal control of I. R. Apanasenko:

One of the undeclared wars in which the Soviet Union fought was the battles at Khalkhin Gol (May 11 - September 16, 1939). It was in this war that the star of Marshal Zhukov rose, and he became the hero of the Mongolian Republic. The fighting took place on the territory of Mongolia near the border with the puppet state of Manchukuo (created by the Japanese Empire) in the region of the Khalkhin Gol River.

In the first photo, the tank attack of the Red Army. Khalkhin Gol, August 1939.

The beginning of the conflict

Since January 1939, on the border of Mongolia, the Japanese staged provocations, fired at the border guards of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), attacked their outfits.

On the night of May 8, a detachment of the Japanese tried to capture an island on the Khalkin-Gol River, the Mongolian border guards repelled the attack. On May 11, a detachment of Japanese cavalry penetrated 15 km deep into the territory of the MPR and attacked the border outpost, after the arrival of reinforcements, the Mongols pushed the enemy back to the border. On the 14th, the Japanese detachment, supported by aviation, attacked the 7th border outpost of Mongolia, the Japanese occupied the Dungur-Obo height, on the 15th the Japanese transferred 2 companies and 8 armored vehicles to the occupied height.

The Soviet Union was connected with the MPR by the "Protocol of Mutual Assistance", our army reacted immediately: on the morning of May 17, units of the 57th Special Rifle Corps of N. V. Feklenko were sent to the conflict area, on the 22nd Soviet units pushed the enemy back to the border. On May 22-28, the parties concentrated their forces in the conflict area: there were about 1,000 people from the USSR and the MPR, the Japanese concentrated more than 1,600 people. On May 28, the Japanese attacked with the aim of encircling the Soviet-Mongolian forces and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of the river. Our forces retreated, the encirclement plan was thwarted. On the 29th, our forces counterattacked and restored the situation.

Moscow declared that it would defend Mongolia's borders "as if it were its own," and the transfer of armored and aviation units began. So, on May 1, there were 84 aircraft, on May 23 - 147, on June 17 - 267 aircraft.

Japanese infantry crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol.

air war

In June, there were no land battles, but there was a fierce battle for air superiority. The first plane, a car of the R-5 type, was lost by the USSR on May 22. The very first clashes between the USSR Air Force and the Japanese caused concern in Moscow: on May 27, the 1st squadron of the 22nd IAP (fighter aviation regiment) was defeated, the fighter of Major T.F. battle and sat down for the same reason, of the four remaining pilots, two died. One was wounded.

On May 28, the 4th squadron of the 22nd IAP was almost completely destroyed: out of 10 pilots, 5 were killed or missing, three were wounded. In early June, pilots with combat experience in Spain and China began to arrive as instructors and organizers. It can be noted that the pilots, who did not have combat experience, quickly adopted their experience, which indicates their generally good training. A group of pilots and technical specialists of 48 people, headed by the deputy head of the Red Army Air Force Ya.V.

Japanese fighter Ki 27.

I-153 commander of the third squadron of the 56th IAP, major Cherkasov. Reconstruction by Vladimir Zagorodnev.

At the beginning of the war in Manchuria and Korea, the Japanese Air Force had 274 aircraft, that is, they did not have a numerical superiority. In June, the Japanese had 77 fighters, 24 twin-engine bombers, 28 single-engine aircraft (reconnaissance aircraft, light bombers) in the conflict area.

Another reason for the heavy losses of the Soviet Air Force (in total during this war the USSR lost 207, and Japan - 162-164 aircraft) was the massive use of biplane fighters. So, already on June 22, 13 out of 49 participating I-15 fighters (27%) and only one out of 13 I-16 fighters were lost in a battle with the Japanese. The commander of the 4th squadron of the 22nd IAP, pilot Yevgeny Stepanov (passed through the "school" of Spain), hardly got out of the battle and landed the I-15 with a broken engine control thrust. Biplanes showed themselves well in Spain and in 1939 became the most massive fighter of the USSR, although alarming information had already been received from China. There, our pilots collided with high-speed Japanese monoplanes.

Fierce air battles took place on June 22-28, on the morning of the 27th, the Japanese Air Force managed to deliver a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, they lost 5 aircraft, we were 19. During these days, the Japanese Air Force lost about 90 aircraft, we were 38.

The main and most modern monoplane of the Soviet Air Force in these battles was the I-16 monoplane, in many respects it was he who made it possible to turn the tide in favor of the Red Army Air Force.

Strategic planning in relation to the aviation industry and the Air Force was also successful: Soviet military doctrine assumed a readiness to wage two wars simultaneously - in the west and east. And for this, a material base was created, the Soviet aviation industry not only created two aviation groupings, but was also able to make up for losses in a timely manner. This made it possible in 1938 for the Air Force to support our troops during the conflict on Khasan and at the same time to keep 2,000 aircraft ready to support Czechoslovakia in the Western strategic direction. In 1939, in the East, the Air Force fought at Khalkin Gol and at the same time supported the operation to annex Western Belarus and Western Ukraine.

The USSR created a quantitative superiority on the front with Japan, in the first half of August a new replenishment arrived - about 200 aircraft. By mid-August, along with the Mongolian P-5s, the Soviet Air Force had up to 558 combat aircraft, twice as many as the Japanese. Of these, 181 aircraft are SB bombers, which became the main strike force of the Air Force during the breakthrough of the Japanese front line during the offensive on August 20. Japan, on the other hand, due to a weak industrial base and the simultaneous war in China (which absorbed most of the air force forces), was unable to increase its forces. Only at the end of the conflict, in September, they were able to transfer 60 obsolete biplane fighters, bringing their forces to 295 aircraft. In addition, the Japanese did not have a significant number of trained pilots, their losses were irreplaceable.

In the first half of September, 7 air battles took place, the largest on September 15, 1939 (the day before the armistice) - 120 Japanese aircraft against 207 Soviet ones.

Air battles at Khalkin Gol are unique in that significant forces of the parties collided in a small space. They showed the importance of a good condition of materiel, the need for rapid replenishment of pilots and equipment.

Khalkin-Gol, summer 1939 Preparing an I-15 fighter for a sortie.

Halkin Gol. Red star against the rising sun. I-16 against Nakajima Ki.27.

Kutsevalov Timofey Fedorovich (1904-1975), Hero of the Soviet Union.

Land fights

Zhukov was sent to Khalkin Gol as an inspector, it is believed that Budyonny contributed to his dispatch, the old marshal respected Zhukov as a tough and demanding division commander. On May 30, Zhukov sent a critical report to Moscow, in which he said that the corps commander was "poorly organized and not purposeful enough." In early June, N.V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and Zhukov was appointed in his place, the brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov became his chief of staff. It was an example of the Stalinist personnel principle: if you criticize - show yourself what you can do, Zhukov got a chance to stand out.

Soon the new headquarters proposed a plan: active defense on the bridgehead behind Khalkhin Gol and preparation of a counterattack against the Japanese grouping. The god of war gave Zhukov time to prepare, air battles went on throughout June, there were no major clashes on land.

The Japanese also did not sit idly by and at the end of the month they prepared their operation, its goal was to surround and destroy the forces of the Red Army on the eastern bank of the river, force the river and break through the Soviet front. On July 2, the Japanese attacked, crossed the river and captured Mount Bayan-Tsagan, 40 km from the border, the situation was difficult. The Japanese forces, at the same time developing success, hastily strengthened the bridgehead. Zhukov, acting at his own peril and risk, in order to save the situation, was forced to ask for a mobile reserve in battle - the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander MP Yakovlev with a Mongolian armored division, without the support of a rifle regiment. The brigade completed the task, the Japanese were defeated, although at the cost of losing more than half of the armored vehicles, but the situation was saved. Other units approached, the Japanese began to retreat to stop them, the Japanese command blew up the only pontoon bridge, but on the morning of the 5th it was already a flight. The Japanese lost only several thousand people killed, almost all armored vehicles and artillery.

Yakovlev, Mikhail Pavlovich (November 18, 1903 - July 12, 1939), Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.

Broken Soviet armored car BA-10.

On the east bank, the Soviet forces withdrew to the river, reducing their bridgehead, but were not defeated. In order to finally eliminate the threat of the MPR, it was necessary to defeat the Japanese on the eastern coast and restore the border. Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation. The Japanese also planned an offensive operation, but taking into account the sad experience, already without forcing the river. We decided to limit ourselves to the destruction of the Soviet bridgehead.

Additional forces were drawn up: the 82nd Rifle Division, the 37th Tank Brigade, in the Trans-Baikal Military District, carried out a partial mobilization and two new divisions were formed. A combined battalion of border guards was transferred from the Trans-Baikal District to strengthen the border of the MPR, they detained dozens of Japanese intelligence officers. The 57th Corps was reorganized into the 1st Army (Front) Group.

The number of Soviet forces increased to 57 thousand fighters, the army group had 542 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft. The Japanese, in the specially created 6th Army, had more than 75 thousand people, 500 guns, 182 tanks.

On July 8-11, fighting took place on the eastern bank of the river, the Soviet positions were held. On July 13-22, there was a lull, the Soviet side strengthened the bridgehead, the 24th motorized rifle regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to it. On July 23-24, the Japanese attacked, but they could not dislodge our forces from the bridgehead.

M. A. Bogdanov.

Komkor Zhukov and Marshal Choibalsan.

The defeat of the enemy

Soviet training took place in the strictest secrecy, all movements took place only at night, radio communications were conducted about the preparation of defense and plans for the autumn-winter campaign, at night sound installations broadcast the sounds of the movement of tanks, aircraft, so that the Japanese got used to night movement, and other events were carried out in order to introduce the enemy astray.

As a result, the offensive, launched on August 20, was unexpected for the Japanese army, the Japanese themselves planned to strike on August 24. It was a classic operation with flank strikes by mechanized and tank units, with the aim of encircling and defeating the enemy in the area between the Khalkin-Gol River and the state border of the MPR. The Red Army, under the command of Zhukov, carried out this experiment before the famous Wehrmacht strikes in Poland, France, and the USSR. The blow was delivered by three groups: the Southern group delivered the main blow (Colonel M. I. Potapova), the Northern group delivered an auxiliary blow (Colonel I. P. Alekseenko), the Central group held down the enemy in battle (commander D. E. Petrov).

At 6.15 artillery preparation and air strike began, at 9 o'clock the ground forces went on the attack. The most fierce battles were fought in the Central direction, here the enemy had powerful fortifications. On the 21st-22nd, Zhukov brought into battle a reserve - the 9th motorized armored brigade, on the 23rd in the Central direction the last reserve had to be brought in - the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. The Air Force actively helped, only on August 24-25 the bombers made 218 sorties. The Japanese command was unable to determine the direction of the main attack and provide timely assistance to their flanks. By August 26, the encirclement was completed and significant forces of the 6th Japanese Army fell into the "boiler".

The Japanese soldiers showed their best, fought to the last, did not surrender, attempts to release the encircled forces were repulsed. By August 31, the territory of the MPR was cleared of the Japanese.

On September 4 and 8, Japanese forces attempted to occupy the Mongol border areas, but were repulsed, suffering heavy losses (about 500 killed alone).

On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, Mongolia and Japan on the termination in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River, which entered into force on September 16th. The conflict was finally settled in May 1942, a final agreement was signed to resolve the problem: it was a compromise, largely in favor of Japan, the settlement of borders based on old maps. The USSR was in a difficult position and it was diplomatically wrong to insist on its own. True, the agreement lasted only until 1945, then the MPR returned the plots ceded in 1942.

Results:

The demonstration of the military power of the USSR at Khasan and Khalkin Gol showed Tokyo the danger of a war with the Red Army and became the main reason for the choice of the main direction of expansion by the Japanese elite - the South. And this, on the eve of the German attack on the USSR, was of great military and strategic importance, we received a relatively safe rear in the East.

Khalkin-Gol was the beginning of Zhukov's magnificent career, before one of the many commanders became the commander of one of the most important military districts of the country - Kyiv, and the chief of the General Staff.

Michitaro Komatsubara, who led the military operation of the Imperial Japanese Army near the Khalkhin Gol River, committed suicide in the fall of 1940.

Memorial "Zaisan", Ulaanbaatar.

N. V. Feklenko
(until June 6, 1939)
G. K. Zhukov (after June 6, 1939)
Khorlogiin Choibalsan

May 1939 First battles

On May 11, 1939, a detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. On May 14, as a result of a similar attack with air support, the Dungur-Obo height was occupied.

The next day, the Soviet-Mongolian troops launched a counteroffensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions.

June. Fight for air supremacy

The Soviet command had to take drastic measures: on May 29, a group of aces pilots, headed by the deputy head of the Red Army Air Force, Yakov Smushkevich, flew from Moscow to the combat area. Many of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union, and also had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. After that, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal.

In early June, N. V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G. K. Zhukov was appointed in his place at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M. V. Zakharov. Soon after G.K. Zhukov’s arrival in the military conflict area in June 1939, he proposed his own plan of military operations: conducting active defense on the bridgehead behind Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack on the opposing grouping of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with the proposals put forward by G.K. Zhukov. The necessary forces began to be drawn to the conflict area. The brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov's assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of the Soviet troops in the Far East and parts of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, commander G. M. Stern arrived from Chita in the region of the Khalkhin Gol River.

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor in the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft.

Throughout June, the Soviet side was engaged in arranging defenses on the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here. So, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan, the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese was ensured and it was possible to seize air supremacy.

At the same time, on June 26, 1939, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol.

July. The offensive of the Japanese group

The grouping of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan was in a semi-encirclement. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, on the orders of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge over Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, the Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. More than 10,000 Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan. Almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost.

The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (front) group under the command of G.K. Zhukov. In accordance with the decision of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, the Military Council of the army group was established to lead the troops, consisting of commander - commander G.K. Zhukov, divisional commissar M.S. Nikishev and chief of staff brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov.

New troops urgently began to be transferred to the place of conflict, including the 82nd Infantry Division,. The 37th tank brigade was transferred from the Moscow military district, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal military district and the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions were formed.

Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out such sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the height, they, as a result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th tank brigade, brigade commander M. P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from a height and thrown back to their original positions. The line of defense on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored.

During the development of an offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer hostilities from Mongolian territory to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the political leadership of the country.

As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive, Zhukov's 1st Army Group had about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, the Japanese group opposing it was specially formed by imperial decree the Japanese 6th separate army under the command of General Ogisu Rippo, had in its composition the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments, a Manchurian brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineer regiments and other parts, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft. It should also be noted that the Japanese group included many soldiers who received combat experience during the war in China.

During the preparation of G.K. Zhukov for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly observed. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the real regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, all the time preparing for the offensive, the Soviet side conducted an active electronic warfare against the enemy. Despite the general superiority in the forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive, Zhukov managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. For the offensive operation, two-week stocks of ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants were created.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern Group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was delivered by the Northern Group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down the enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to maneuver. In the reserve, concentrated in the center, were the 212th airborne and 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also participated in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby forestalling the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command. At 06:15 a powerful artillery preparation and an air raid on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with the plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred during the crossing of the tanks of the 6th tank brigade, since the pontoon bridge built by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks during the crossing of Khalkhin Gol.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often, Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese on August 23 in the Central sector of the front, G.K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took a considerable risk.

The last battles still continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khailastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of the border conflict (in fact, Japan's undeclared war against the USSR and its allied Mongolia). So on September 4 and 8, Japanese troops made new attempts to penetrate the territory of Mongolia, but they were thrown back behind the state border line by strong counterattacks. Air battles also continued, which ended only with the conclusion of an official truce.

Results

Literature

Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. Chapter seven. Undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002.

Shishov A.V. Russia and Japan. History of military conflicts. - M.: Veche, 2001.
Fedyuninsky I.I. In the East. - M.: Military Publishing, 1985.
Novikov M.V. Victory at Khalkhin Gol. - M.: Politizdat, 1971.
Kondratiev V. Khalkhin Gol: War in the Air. - M.: Techniques - Youth, 2002.
Kondratiev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol River. - M.: Aviation Assistance Fund "Russian Knights", 2008. - 144 p. - (Series: Air Wars of the XX century). - 2000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-903389-11-7

Cinema

The battles on the Khalkhin Gol River are dedicated to the Soviet-Mongolian feature film "Listen on the other side" directed by Boris Ermolaev and Badrakhyn Sumkhu (1971).

The 65th anniversary of the end of the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to the places of military glory is dedicated to the television film "By the Ways of the Fathers" by the Irkutsk television journalist Natalia Volina (2004).

Notes

Footnotes

including 6,472 killed and died during sanitary evacuation stages, 1,152 died of wounds in hospitals, 8 died of disease, 43 died in accidents and as a result of accidents
data is incomplete
In "Western" historiography, in particular in American and Japanese, the term "Khalkhin-Gol" is used only for the name of the river, and the military conflict itself is called the local "incident near Nomon-Khan". "Nomon-Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this region of the Manchurian-Mongolian border.
Translated into Russian "Khalkhin-Gol" - the river Khalkha
The troops were brought along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed the order of march
During this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured.
In total, in air battles from 22 to 28 June, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.
: On June 26, 1939, the words “TASS is authorized to declare ...” sounded on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers.
: Zhukov, without waiting for the escort rifle regiment to approach, threw into battle directly from the march the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander MP Yakovlev, who was in reserve, who was supported by the Mongolian armored division, armed with 45-mm cannons. It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of the commander G. M. Stern. In fairness, it should be noted that later Stern admitted that in that situation the decision was the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was sent to Moscow, which fell on the table to I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov "deliberately" threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. A commission of inquiry was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G. I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational command and control of the troops, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in a telegram dated July 15 reprimanded him and recalled him to Moscow. After that, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, the commissioner of the 1st rank, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol