The occupation of Belarus by German troops at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Nazi collaborationism in the occupied lands of Belarus (10 photos)

It would seem what nonsense, who would dare? However, for the second time in a short time, Lukashenka makes a panicky statement - they will soon capture us and it's time to distribute them to everyone! For the first time something similar sounded on the 8th of October. And now yesterday, October 29th.

« I will tell you for the first time and frankly what I spoke about in the narrowest circle. I always speak pragmatically: what if tomorrow you have to defend your homeland with a gun? Am I, as commander in chief, going to get by with just the structure and system that has been created in the Armed Forces and the police? No. We will have to distribute weapons to everyone, first of all, to a man, and even a girl, in order to protect, okay, not the Motherland, ourselves and our family, our children ...

Suddenly, God forbid, conflict, war - what structures do you use? How was it in the Great Patriotic War? Communists, Komsomol members forward. Because there was a powerful party organization, state power was concentrated in it, and a youth organization. People lived, fought, died and brought us victory. - This structure in a difficult, even if not a military moment, the head of state (there will be no me, there will be someone else[at this point, the president had a tear - author] ), the government will be able to use. This is a colossal reserve that has been created today».

When Lukashenka is under emotional stress, and this happens quite often (milk, gas and oil wars have demonstrated this many times), he, roughly speaking, is not able to keep silent and, moreover, "filter the market." In the above quote, there is just a sea of information, which, if it is cleared of emotions and innate tongue-tied tongue, looks like this.

1. The occupation of Belarus is being prepared.

3. We can only try to intimidate a potential occupier by distributing weapons to the entire population.

4. Of course, the population will not defend me, since I have driven them into poverty over the long years of my reign and deprived them of light at the end of the tunnel. But some part of it will try to defend itself and, thereby, will offer at least some resistance to the occupier, even if I am thrown off the presidential throne. These inconveniences and difficulties for the occupier are the only way I can frighten him.

The fact of preparing an attack on Belarus is indirectly confirmed by the Russian ambassador to Belarus - Babich, who considered it necessary to declare on October 21 that the attack on Belarus would be considered as an attack on Russia. "... We are a Union State, we have allied relations, there is a single military policy here, which guarantees absolute security for our citizens."

And here comes the most intriguing question. Why does Lukashenka ignore Babich's unequivocal statement, which, it would seem, should calm him down? This means that he does not consider Babich's words a guarantee. But why? After all, quite recently, a few days before his panicky statements about the distribution of weapons, Lukashenka, when examining Belarusian weapons, said: "... Well, except for Russia, we probably have no one to count on. And even on Russia we cannot % rely...". It was October 5, and then he still counted on both his army and Russia, although not 100%. And already on October 8, the first statement about the distribution of weapons followed ...

So, in the period from October 5 to 8, Lukashenka received some information that was convincing to him that Russia would definitely not help during the attack on Belarus and cannot be counted on! And this is possible only in one case - by the time Belarus is attacked, Russia will already be occupied!

Of course, the occupation of Russia will not be classical. The only possible option for the occupation of Russia is a pro-Western coup. Maidan. It is about the Maidan in Russia, as a settled matter, presumably, that Lukashenka received "reliable" information!

Once, the USSR was occupied in a similar way and the then Maidan, which began with perestroika, turned out to be successful. One of the many consequences of this catastrophe was the destruction of Yugoslavia, which Yeltsin's occupation regime did not want to help. Murdered by the West, Milosevic stands relentlessly before Lukashenka's eyes. The situation is complicated by the fact that Lukashenka unconditionally believes in the omnipotence of the West and in his view of Russia there is practically no more. The West destroyed the USSR, especially, in its opinion, it will destroy Russia. Therefore, Babich cannot calm him down. Where would he run then? He has nowhere to run. It remains to distribute weapons ...

And the Maidan in Russia is indeed being prepared by the liberal government of Russia. Rising gasoline prices, raising VAT, pension reform, etc. - so far this has not led to mass protests. But the work continues.

From the latest actions of the government to organize the Maidan: gasoline prices are rising again. Propane prices have increased by 50% over the year and continue to rise. Draconian taxes are being introduced on individuals (freelancers)...

The government does literally nothing to alleviate the plight of the people and develop the economy. Everything that is done only leads to a worsening of the situation, which is the goal. The expectation that the brutalized masses will start a senseless and merciless revolt, in which both the government and the president will be swept away. But the West will help its own people - the Maidan people are counting! ... But this is a completely different story, the end of which has not yet been written.

Lukashenko has been twirling the vector for too long and, for sure, no one will help him!

Yuri Felshtinsky
21-02-2016

Alexander Lukashenko is certainly a dictator. There can't be two opinions here. But he is not the only dictator in the world and probably not the most terrible. I am sure that there will be people who will argue with reason that he is the mildest dictator living today, that the victims of his regime are numbered in units, and that his country is not mired in civil wars and mass terror, like many others.

Nevertheless, Lukashenka as a dictator created a potentially dangerous situation for the European Union, since more than anything else Europe is afraid of dictators. She paid too high a price for the connivance of dictatorships and nationalism on the eve of World War II.

There are two superpowers in modern Europe: Russia and the European Union. From the point of view of military power, there are also two: Russia and NATO. The current Russian government, represented by senior FSB officers who run the state, sets itself several super-tasks. Those related to the internal situation are generally permitted. Power in Russia is seized by the FSB. Russia is completely controlled by the junta in the Kremlin, which consists of former and current heads of the Russian special services. The free press is stifled. The electoral system has been usurped. The political opposition has been eliminated. The market economy functions to the extent that it corresponds to the vision, understanding, qualifications and benefits of the Kremlin usurpers.

The foreign policy program of the usurpers is only now beginning to take shape. The main problem of the Russian government is that global external expansion requires not only an army, but also an ideology. However, the Kremlin was unable to formulate this ideology. The Soviet communist ideology had to be abandoned, because the monopoly on this ideology belongs to the bankrupt Communist Party, which claims political control over everyone, including the special services. It is impossible to openly proclaim the fascist ideology because of the compromised fascists, and the ideology of fascism in Russia is not prevented by Putin from using the fascist ideology itself, which he fully shares, but by the fact that it also suffered a historical defeat: Germany lost the world war.

It is very difficult to create a new, previously unpatented ideology. Therefore, the Russian leadership is faced with a linguistic problem: "Russian world", "Russian gene", "new world order", "patriotism" - all these are Putin's pathetic senseless attempts to plant fascism, replacing it with another word. But unfortunately for Putin, ideology depends so much on terms, symbols, cliches and slogans that at some point he will still have to call a spade a spade. The Soviet anthem, the Red Banner, the appeal "comrade" and the TASS news agency are not limited here.
In foreign policy, Putin, as the leader of modern Russia, faces several super-tasks. Some are simple, and therefore solvable by military means. For example, the seizure of the territories of neighboring countries. Since 2008, the Russian metropolis has swallowed up Abkhazia, South Ossetia and a number of Ukrainian regions (Crimea, Lugansk and Donetsk regions). Together with the unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, to which Russia unsuccessfully tried to break through the “land corridor” through Ukraine during the military campaign of 2014-2015, we are talking about about 60 thousand square meters. km of territories with 7 million people.

The implementation of the broader plans of the Russian government today is hindered by the European Union (as a political structure) and NATO (as a military one). Accordingly, the goal of Russian foreign policy at the present stage is to split the European Union and NATO. Politically, this is achievable, as seen from the Kremlin, through the strengthening of nationalist, and therefore centrifugal movements in the European Union, primarily in France, where the Kremlin actively and openly supports Marine Le Pen's National Front. The latter advocates France's withdrawal from the European Union and NATO. At the same time, Moscow is banking on right-wing politicians and nationalist movements in Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria and bribing or buying European leaders such as former Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and former German Chancellor Schröder.

The Kremlin backs up political pressure on the European Union and NATO with the military. Shortly after the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian army began to conduct exercises in all regions of the Russian Federation, build up groupings of its troops along the Russian-Ukrainian border, in the occupied Crimea and the Kaliningrad region, conduct literally daily testing of the strength of the air and sea borders of all its neighbors (including NATO members Sweden and Finland), the United States, and not even a border with Russia, but a member of NATO, the UK.

By their actions, the Russian authorities have provoked a debate about whether NATO will defend its members in the event of Russian aggression, in particular, whether NATO will defend the former Soviet republics that are members of NATO. By this time, it had already become clear that NATO would not protect the victims of Russian aggression who were not accepted into NATO. At the same time, residents of potential victims of aggression were asked whether they were ready to die for their country in the event of a Russian attack; citizens of Western European states - are they ready to die for freedom, for example, the Baltic countries; and the citizens of Russia - whether they are ready to die on the orders of their government.
It is clear that most of the respondents did not agree to die anywhere except in Russia. Nevertheless, the NATO leadership was able to convey to Putin that Russian expansion against any NATO country would mean the start of a war against NATO with all the consequences.

On September 30, 2015, without withdrawing the 40,000-strong army concentrated on the Russian-Ukrainian border, Russia opened the Middle East Front and sent a "limited contingent" of its troops to participate in the civil war in Syria on the side of President Assad. The prospects for a NATO split in this sector of the front seemed brighter to Putin because of the hopes that Turkey, a member of NATO, would be drawn into the ground war in Syria. In military and political terms, Turkey is by far the most vulnerable member of the North Atlantic Alliance due to the risk of creating an independent Kurdish state. The latter will inevitably lay claim to a number of areas in Turkey where the Kurds live. Therefore, Russia's intervention in the civil war in Syria had as its main goal drawing Turkey into a military conflict and excluding Turkey or withdrawing from NATO. At the same time, Russia was imposing itself as a partner in peace talks to resolve the Syrian-Kurdish-Turkish conflict, which was insoluble in the short term.

Against this background, the European Union, overwhelmed with numerous problems, could not afford to continue ignoring Belarus and subjecting Lukashenka to sanctions, thus pushing him into Putin's arms. In fact, the complete lifting of sanctions against Belarus and its leadership is an attempt by the European Union to win over Lukashenka to its side in a competitive political struggle with Russia. However, the lifting of sanctions on Belarus may not be the end of Lukashenka's problems, but their beginning. If Lukashenko turns to a truly democratic path (which is hard to believe), he will lose power in the next election. If he goes for an open political union with the EU, he will be overthrown by Russia.

In any case, not much depends on Lukashenka's behavior here. Russia is just starting to implement its aggressive foreign policy program, and the occupation and annexation of Belarus is only a matter of time. It can even be assumed that the annexation of Belarus by Russia is a litmus test, a prologue to the beginning of the next round of the world war unleashed by Russia. The last thing that will interest us at this moment is whether Lukashenka will remain in control of the territory once called Belarus, or another person with no less Belarusian surname will become the head of the Belarusian Republic within the Russian Federation.

Yuri Felshtinsky
apostrophe.com.ua

Occupational "new order". On the occupied territory of Belarus, the Nazi invaders introduced a "new order" aimed at the elimination of the Soviet system, the exploitation of the national wealth and resources of Belarus, the oppression and destruction of people. The ideological basis of this order was the misanthropic "racial theory" of the Nazis. According to this theory, the superiority of the Aryan race over all other peoples, the need to expand the "living space" for the Germans and their "right" to world domination were affirmed. The attitude of the occupiers towards Belarusians was defined in the “Ost” plan, according to which it was envisaged to physically destroy or evict 75% of Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Germanize the remaining 25% and turn them into slaves.

During the occupation, under the guise of fighting against partisans, the invaders carried out more than 140 punitive operations in Belarus. After them, entire areas turned into "desert zones". On March 22, 1943, by order of the Nazis, all the inhabitants of the village of Khatyn, near Logoisk, were burned alive. The fire killed 149 people, including 76 children, the youngest of whom was seven weeks old. The name "Khatyn" became a symbol of the tragedy of the Belarusian people during the war years. The tragic fate of Khatyn, burned along with the inhabitants, was shared by 627 villages, of which 186 were never restored after the war.

Politics of genocide. The occupiers' main means of achieving their goals was the policy of genocide. It was aimed at the complete or partial destruction of population groups on racial, national, ethnic, political or religious grounds. One could become a victim of genocide for various reasons: for belonging to communists or Jews, for any disobedience to the occupying authorities, or for racial reasons.

The Jewish population of Belarus was herded into special places of residence - ghettos, more than 110 of them were created in Belarus. About 100 thousand Jews died in the Minsk ghetto. To designate genocide against the Jewish population of Europe, the concept of the Holocaust is used (from Greek - burning, destruction by fire). In total, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, more than 600 thousand Jews became victims of the Holocaust in Belarus. The Righteous Among the Nations are those persons of non-Jewish origin who, during the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, saved persons of Jewish nationality. There are more than 700 Righteous Among the Nations in the Republic of Belarus (as of January 1, 2013).

More than 260 death camps have been set up in Belarus. There were five such camps in Minsk and its environs. One of them - Trostenets - in the system of camps of fascist Germany was in the sad fourth place after Auschwitz (Auschwitz), Majdanek and Treblinka in terms of the number of people killed - 206,500 people.

Belarusian Ostarbeiters. Soviet people, especially young people, were forcibly taken to hard labor in Germany. Those who evaded being sent to Germany were shot. During the occupation, almost 385 thousand people were taken from Belarus for forced labor in Germany and the countries occupied by it, mostly young people and the most able-bodied population, including more than 24 thousand children. In Germany, such people were called "Ostarbeiters" - Eastern workers, depriving them not only of their name, but also of their nationality. Once in hard labor, people died of hunger, various diseases, bullying, hard work, and were physically exterminated. According to incomplete data, only 120,000 people returned to Belarus after the defeat of Nazi Germany.

Activities of Belarusian collaborators. To approve the "new order", the occupiers formed the occupation administration and police units. An insignificant part of the inhabitants of Belarus, who found themselves in the conditions of a tough occupation regime, began to work in the bodies of the German administration. To carry out the occupation policy, the Nazis attracted and used in various ways those who were against the Soviet regime. Those who have embarked on the path of cooperation with the occupation authorities are called collaborators.

In order to create support for themselves among the population, the occupation authorities allowed those who began to cooperate with them to organize Belarusian schools, open theater and scientific institutions, and publish Belarusian newspapers. The occupiers even agreed to create such pro-fascist organizations as the Belarusian Central Rada, the Belarusian People's Self-Help, the Belarusian Regional Defense, the Union of Belarusian Youth (SBM). It was possible to join the SBM at the age of 10 to 20 years with written evidence of Aryan origin and a desire to serve with the invaders. The leadership of the SBM subjected the youth to indoctrination. So, for example, A. Hitler was presented as a liberator and friend of the Belarusian people, and the Bolsheviks-communists - as his mortal enemies.

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occupation regime- this is a strict order in which all organs of Soviet power were liquidated. The workers worked 12-14 hours a day, people were thrown into concentration camps.

More than 260 death camps were created in Belarus. Concentration camps, prisons, and ghettos operated in each district. 10 km. to the east of Minsk, the territory of death "Trostenets" was created. Here, the Nazis killed 206,500 people - this is the third largest number of deaths after Auschwitz and Majdanek.

genocide. The policy of genocide towards the Belarusian people was obvious. 209 cities were destroyed and burned, including Minsk, 200 settlements, 10338 industrial enterprises, all power plants were destroyed. In Belarus, 2,200,000 people died, along with the inhabitants, 628 villages were burned, of which 186 were not restored.

German occupation regime on the territory of Belarus during the Great Patriotic War

The liquidation of Jews in the USSR was mainly carried out by special units, the composition of which was limited and therefore they could not independently and quickly destroy the several million Jews remaining in the occupied territory. To help them, the German gendarmerie in the field, with the support of local policemen, had to concentrate the Jews in places of temporary detention. Although the forced detention of Jews was ideologically explained by the danger of their influence on the surrounding population, in reality the Nazis pursued several goals:

3) Obtaining free labor.

4) The acquisition of the sympathies of the rest of the population, to which the Nazis, for propaganda purposes, presented the persecution of the Jews as a struggle against the Jewish Bolsheviks, who were guilty of all hardships in the interwar years.

All Jews and Jewish women who were in the occupied territory and reached the age of 10 had to wear a white stripe up to 10 cm wide with a Sianist star painted on it or a yellow armband up to 10 cm wide on the right sleeve of their outerwear and dresses.

Jews and Jewish women provide themselves with such bandages.

On the territory of Belarus, the Nazis used five main types of places of detention in relation to Jews:

Ghettos are city blocks surrounded by barbed wire. On the territory of Eastern Belarus, ghettos began to be created from the end of June 1941. and almost all were liquidated between the autumn of 1941 and the spring of 1942.

On the territory of Belarus, as well as the USSR in general, there were closed and open ghettos.

Open ghettos arose in places with a significant Jewish population, where it was inexpedient to evict and then protect it. In addition, they arose in small settlements where the German authorities could not organize the protection of the closed ghetto. In open ghettos, Jews were ordered not to leave their settlements and not to visit public places. In these ghettos, Jews, as well as in closed ghettos, performed forced labor, were required to wear Jewish identification marks, and pay an indemnity.

All ghettos formed Judenrats (Jewish Council)-bodies introduced by the Nazi occupation authorities to control the Jewish population of some cities and regions, which were assembled from the Jews appointed by the authorities and were responsible for the implementation of Nazi orders that concerned the Jews. ; or elders were appointed, who often distributed and organized work, which, naturally, gave rise to discontent among a certain part of the prisoners, especially those who were unable to work - the first candidates for liquidation.

As for the partisans, they did not willingly accept the Jews in their detachments, even if they brought weapons with them. At the beginning of Nov. 1942 The head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, P. Ponomarenko, ordered the brigade commanders not to accept individuals or small groups of people who miraculously escaped from the ghetto, that is, Jews.

The pretext was more than absurd: they allegedly could be "agents sent by the Germans."

2.Prisons. Especially often prisons were used in small settlements as temporary places of detention (for example, in Oshmyany, Cherikov and Vileyka).

3. labor camps .

Basically, especially at the beginning, they contained Jews of working age, both men and women. However, in 1942-1943. skilled Jewish artisans with family members were also transported here from the liquidated ghettos. Some of these camps existed until liberation in 1944. On the territory of Belarus, as well as in Ukraine, there were both special labor camps for Jews (for example, in Beryoza, in Bortniki in the Beshenkovichi district, in Drozdy in Minsk), and general camps for civilians. persons in which Jews were a part, often a significant part, of all prisoners (for example, in Baranovichi).

POW camps. Some of the Jewish prisoners of war managed to hide their nationality. Attempts to hide nationality were often made, but success often depended, on the one hand, on the attitude of other prisoners towards them, and on the other hand, on the ability of German officers and local policemen to recognize nationality. In 1941-1942. On the territory of the prisoner of war camps, the Nazis also placed the Jews of nearby settlements in order to save forces for the protection of places of detention.

concentration camps. They differed in more stringent conditions of detention (for example, in Minsk on Shirokaya Street, in Bronnaya Gora, Berezovsky District). Jews were placed here - civilians, prisoners of war, both Jews and non-Jews, as well as non-Jews punished by the Nazi authorities for their activities.

Basically, places of forced detention fulfilled the tasks assigned to them by the Nazis. At the same time, there was inconsistency in the actions of the German command regarding the elimination of places of forced detention, which was determined by the difference in the vision of the goals and tasks assigned to such places. As a rule, in the clash of ideological and practical approaches to the Jewish problem, the supporters of the rapid liquidation of the Jewish population prevailed.

Supporters of the ideological approach to the problem misled themselves, exaggerating, on the one hand, the role of the Jews in Soviet government, and, on the other hand, the hatred of the rest of the population towards them.

death factories

They were designed and built not as places of detention, but as factories of death. It was assumed that in these camps, people doomed to death had to spend literally a few hours - just enough so that the executioner teams could kill them and "dispose" the corpses. A well-functioning conveyor was built here, turning several thousand people into ducks into ashes.

The task of the Einsatzkommandos was to catch Jews and Gypsies, transport them to camps and liquidate them there. The most famous and largest places of massacres were Babi Yar near Kyiv, where 30 thousand Jews were killed in two days on September 28-29, 1941, and the Maly Trostinets camp in Belarus, where 200 thousand people were shot in 1942-1943.

German occupation in Belarus

With the onset of the Great Patriotic War until the end of August 1941, Belarus was completely occupied by the Nazi invaders. The establishment of a strict occupation regime began on the territory of the republic. It was established as the territory was captured.

The occupation regime is a strict order in which all organs of Soviet power were liquidated.

The workers worked 12-14 hours a day, people were thrown into concentration camps. More than 260 death camps were created in Belarus. Concentration camps, prisons, and ghettos operated in each district. 10 km. to the east of Minsk, the territory of death "Trostenets" was created. Here, the Nazis killed 206,500 people - this is the third largest number of deaths after Auschwitz and Majdanek.

Having established the occupation regime, Germany planned to implement the Ost plan, which was an integral part of the blitzkrieg plan.

According to this plan, it was planned to destroy 80% of the Slavs, turn 20% into slaves, and destroy all Jews and Gypsies. The actions of the fascists with the aim of the complete or partial destruction of the people (nation) is called genocide. The policy of genocide towards the Belarusian people was obvious. 209 cities were destroyed and burned, including Minsk, 200 settlements, 10338 industrial enterprises, all power plants were destroyed.

In Belarus, 2,200,000 people died, along with the inhabitants, 628 villages were burned, of which 186 were not restored.

Genocidal policy towards the Jewish population

The imprisonment of Jews in places of forced detention on the territory of Belarus during the Soviet-German war, as well as in Eastern Europe, in general, was a stage in the general policy of their total extermination.

Unlike the rest of the population, Jews and Gypsies were destroyed on the territory of the USSR not for their actions or political beliefs, but on a national basis. While the German authorities, probably until 1942, did not have a clear program regarding the fate of the Gypsies in this territory, there was a program for their widespread liquidation in relation to the Jews.

Often, the Nazis did not have sufficient forces for the immediate and complete liquidation of the Jews.

To help them, the German gendarmerie in the field, with the support of local policemen, had to concentrate the Jews in places of temporary detention. Although the forced detention of Jews was ideologically explained by the danger of their influence on the surrounding population, in reality the Nazis pursued several goals:

1) Facilitate the subsequent liquidation of the Jews.

2) Preventing the resistance of the Jews, who, according to the not unfounded fears of the Nazis, knowing about the fate prepared for them, could more actively participate in the resistance than the rest of the population.

3) Getting free labor.

4) Acquiring the sympathy of the rest of the population, to which the Nazis, for propaganda purposes, presented the persecution of the Jews as a struggle against the Judeo-Bolsheviks, who were guilty of all the hardships in the interwar years.

According to the administrative order of the commander of the rear of Army Group Center, General of the Infantry von Schenckendorff, dated July 7, 1941, distinctive signs were introduced for the Jewish population:

1. All Jews and Jewish women who were in the occupied territory and who reached the age of 10 were required to wear a white stripe up to 10 cm wide with a Sianist star painted on it or a yellow armband up to 10 cm wide on the right sleeve of their outerwear and dresses.

2. Jews and Jewish women provide themselves with such bandages.

On the territory of Belarus, the Nazis used five main types of places of detention in relation to Jews:

1. Ghettos are city blocks surrounded by barbed wire.

Belarus during the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War (1939-1945)

On the territory of Eastern Belarus, ghettos began to be created from the end of June 1941. and almost all were liquidated between the autumn of 1941 and the spring of 1942.

On the territory of Belarus, as well as the USSR in general, there were closed and open ghettos. Open ghettos arose in places with a significant Jewish population, where it was inexpedient to evict and then protect it. In addition, they arose in small settlements where the German authorities could not organize the protection of the closed ghetto.

In open ghettos, Jews were ordered not to leave their settlements and not to visit public places. In these ghettos, Jews, as well as in closed ghettos, performed forced labor, were required to wear Jewish identification marks, and pay an indemnity. In all ghettos, Judenrats (“Jewish Council”, German) were formed - bodies introduced by the Nazi occupation authorities to control the Jewish population of some cities and regions, which were assembled from the Jews designated by the authorities and were responsible for the implementation of Nazi orders that concerned Jews .; or elders were appointed, who often distributed and organized work, which naturally gave rise to dissatisfaction with a certain part of the prisoners, especially those who were unable to work - the first candidates for liquidation.

Sometimes for members of the Judenrat or the headman, compiling lists for destruction was a heavy moral burden, with which some of them could not cope, committing suicide.

Despite the protection of these places of detention and harsh punishments for harboring Jews, some of them managed to escape and hide in the forests.

2. Prisons. Especially often prisons were used in small settlements as temporary places of detention (for example, in Oshmyany, Cherikov and Vileyka).

After the liquidation of the ghetto, prisons were especially often used for the temporary imprisonment of Jews. After that, the Jews were either shot or placed in labor camps.

3. Labor camps. Basically, especially at the beginning, they contained Jews of working age, both men and women. However, in 1942-1943. skilled Jewish artisans with family members were also transported here from the liquidated ghettos.

Some of these camps existed until liberation in 1944. On the territory of Belarus, as well as in Ukraine, there were both special labor camps for Jews (for example, in Beryoza, in Bortniki in the Beshenkovichi district, in Drozdy in Minsk), and general camps for civilians. persons in which Jews were a part, often a significant part, of all prisoners (for example, in Baranovichi).

POW camps. Some of the Jewish prisoners of war managed to hide their nationality. Attempts to hide nationality were often made, but success often depended, on the one hand, on the attitude of other prisoners towards them, and on the other hand, on the ability of German officers and local policemen to recognize nationality.

In 1941-1942. On the territory of the prisoner of war camps, the Nazis also placed the Jews of nearby settlements in order to save forces for the protection of places of detention.

5. Concentration camps. They differed in more stringent conditions of detention (for example, in Minsk on Shirokaya Street, in Bronnaya Gora, Berezovsky District). Jews were placed here - civilians, prisoners of war, both Jews and non-Jews, as well as non-Jews punished by the Nazi authorities for their activities.

Thus, the forced imprisonment of the Jews was part of a general plan for their extermination.

As a rule, in the clash of ideological and practical approaches to the Jewish problem, the supporters of the rapid liquidation of the Jewish population prevailed. Supporters of the ideological approach to the problem misled themselves, exaggerating, on the one hand, the role of the Jews in Soviet government, and, on the other hand, the hatred of the rest of the population towards them.

death factories

In the 1930s and 1940s, on the territory of Europe controlled by the Third Reich, there were several dozen concentration camps created for various purposes.

Some of these zones were created to hold prisoners of war, in others political opponents of the Nazis and unreliable elements were held and destroyed, others were simply “transfers”, from where prisoners were transported to larger concentration camps. The death camps stood apart in this system.

If the system of Nazi concentration camps - at least formally - was created to isolate criminals, anti-fascists, prisoners of war and other political prisoners, then Majdanek, Auschwitz, Treblinka and other death camps were originally intended specifically for the extermination of Jews.

A well-functioning conveyor was built here, turning several thousand people into ducks into ashes.

In addition, the Einsatzkommando began work - special detachments moving behind the regular units of the Wehrmacht.

But the Nazi leadership nevertheless considered that the extermination of Jews and Gypsies was proceeding too slowly.

Firing squads and gas wagons ("gas chambers"), according to Hitler, could not cope with the task. In 1941, a fundamental decision was made to develop a terrible technology that formed the basis of the death camps. The first such camp, designed for the mass liquidation of Jews, began to do its dirty work in Chelmno, Poland. More than 300,000 people were killed and gassed here, mostly from the Lodz ghetto. In addition to Jews, gypsies, as well as the mentally ill and other categories of people doomed by the Nazis to total liquidation, were sent to the death camps.

The technology developed by the Nazis suggested that, upon arrival at the camp, the echelon with prisoners, most of them should immediately go to the gas chambers.

So, in Auschwitz, the largest death camp, those doomed to death were undressed and driven into large hermetic rooms, where poison gas was supplied from above, which quickly killed all living things.

After some time, the corpses were pulled out of the gas chambers and transported to crematoria that worked around the clock. Of particular cynicism was the fact that the attendants who worked with the dead, and also collected clothes and valuables of the victims, were recruited, as a rule, from the same Jews who knew that in a few weeks or months they would also be sent to the gas chambers.

Famine reigned in all camps.

A portion of food was usually given out once a day and consisted of soup with a piece of bread. Various punishments were introduced in concentration and extermination camps across Europe.

They were generated not only by the desire to keep the prisoners from breaking the established rules, but also by the sadistic inclinations of the SS soldiers and their assistants. In each extermination camp, the Nazis created an orchestra from imprisoned Jews.

The orchestra was supposed to delight the ears of the SS men in their free time and play in front of those going to the gas chambers.

extermination camps

In accordance with the decision of the meeting in Wannsee, the extermination camps were fully operational. Concentration camps were converted for the mass extermination of Jews. Some of them were turned into extermination camps - the so-called "death camps", some performed a double function: forced labor and murder.

Thousands of Jews were brought to the extermination camps in overstuffed boxcars.

SS teams took people out of the trains and usually separated the men from the women. Then a “selection” was carried out, i.e. determined who to send directly to the gas chambers, and who to use for work in the camp. The operation to exterminate the Jews was carried out in secret. The killers took all measures to hide the purpose of the camp and the method of killing in it.

In six large extermination camps located on the territory of Poland, about 4 million Jews were killed. The worst of all was the Auschwitz-Birkenau (Auschwitz) camp. It contained a huge number of prisoners of war of different nationalities and Jewish prisoners - about 250,000 - at the same time. Auschwitz (Auschwitz) was used not only as a death camp, but also as a grandiose work camp, where thousands of prisoners worked for the benefit of the Reich.

Of all the camps, it was Auschwitz-Birkenau that was an example of the effective destruction of many people. He worked longer than all the other death camps, from 1942 until the beginning of 1945, that is, until the very end of the war, when he was liberated by the Soviet Army.

It used cyclone gas, more efficient than the gases used in Sobibor or Treblinka. The giant gas chambers could hold up to 800 people at a time.

In Auschwitz, there were also 5 huge furnaces, in 50 furnaces of which 10,000 bodies could be burned per day. Horrible medical experiments were carried out at Auschwitz under the guidance of the infamous Dr. Mengele.

In the spring of 1945, the horrors of the war that had lasted for six years ended.

But one nation did not take part in the general rejoicing: for the Jews, victory came too late. Six million Jews - a third of world Jewry - were wiped off the face of the earth.

"Father's Nazis": Russian media started talking about "Nazism" in Belarus (photo)

One of the most popular Russian resources, Lenta.ru, has published an article about Belarus called “Father’s Nazis”.

The Russians were outraged that on March 25, Minsk celebrated the centenary of the formation of the BNR on a grand scale, and Lukashenka did not ban this action, journalist Denis Kazansky writes on his Facebook page.

He noted that the article refers to people who came out to celebrate the events that took place in 1918 as “father’s Nazis”.

Kazansky also cited his favorite fragment - it lists the signs of “Nazism”, in which Belarus “plunges Lukashenka”: “The positions of nationalists in the field of culture and education were constantly strengthening.

A campaign began to expand the scope of the use of the Belarusian language, which ended with the complete destruction of Russian-language place names: now all signs on Belarusian streets and highways contain inscriptions in "mov" dubbed in Latin (and in some places in Chinese). The authorities began to pay more and more attention to the development of national culture, which suspiciously resembled what was happening in Ukraine with its “Vyshyvanka Days”. More and more goods with national symbols, mostly Lithuanian and collaborationist, appeared on the shelves of Belarusian stores.”

“In general, savagery.

While the Bandera reptile was being strangled, a new one formed at their side. Just think - pointers to "move"!

Vyshyvanka Days like in Ukraine! And goods with national symbols on the shelves in stores - this does not fit into my head at all. What other evidence is required that Lukashenka is a Nazi and a Russophobe?” the journalist emphasized. It seemed, continues Kazansky, that a more pro-Russian state than Belarus does not exist today. But the Kremlin mouthpieces are already writing down the Belarusians, led by the "father", as the Nazis.

“And this despite the fact that the Russian language has long been the state language in the country and totally dominates in all spheres of communication, and Belarus itself is not only in the Customs Union, but also in a union state with the Russian Federation.

There are virtually no borders between the countries,” he added.

“And this is a very revealing moment, which proves that Russia will always be small. No matter how many countries and rulers humiliate themselves before the Kremlin, it will demand ever greater loyalty. Up to complete dissolution and submission. Any manifestation of national identity, any, even the most harmless forms of honoring national culture, will always be interpreted in the Russian Federation as “Nazism” ... Only by completely abandoning their own national identity, a Ukrainian or Belarusian can become “good” for Russians, - the journalist summed up.

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Three powerful groups were created to attack the USSR - "North", "Center", "South".

The grouping of German armies "Center" was focused on the defeat of Soviet troops in Belarus, followed by an attack on Smolensk and Moscow. It consisted of two armies (4th and 9th), two tank groups (2nd and 3rd) - a total of 50 divisions (including 9 tank, 6 motorized and 1 cavalry) and 2 brigades . The advance of Army Group Center was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, the strongest in the Nazi army.

the General Plan "Ost" was developed - a plan related to one of the main goals of the German leadership to capture the "living space" necessary for the prosperity of the Third Reich, its colonization, the liberation of the "living space" from the "excessive" indigenous population. Hence the strategic concept of waging war in the East - a war of annihilation. Winning in the East was not enough.

It was necessary to destroy the army, the country, the people.

Hitler declared: “We are obliged to exterminate the population - this is part of our mission to protect the German population. I have the right to destroy millions of people of an inferior race who multiply like worms.

On March 30, 1941, at a meeting of the Wehrmacht's senior command staff, Hitler emphasized that in the war against the Soviet Union the struggle would be waged "to annihilate", that "the struggle would be very different from the struggle in the West.

In the East, cruelty is soft for the future." In accordance with the general plan "Ost", it was planned to destroy 120-140 million people on the territory of the USSR and Poland.

A terrible fate was prepared for the Belarusian people.

The number of local population that could be left in these cities was determined by an exact calculation: for every master of the "higher race", two slaves of the "lower" race. So in Minsk and the region it was planned to settle 50 thousand German colonists and leave 100 thousand of the local population, in Molodechno and its environs - respectively 7 thousand Germans and 15 thousand Belarusians, in Baranovichi 10 thousand Germans and 20 thousand local residents, in Gomel - 30 thousand Germans and 50 thousand local residents, in Mogilev and Bobruisk - 20 thousand Germans and 50 thousand inhabitants.

Documents such as the master plan "Ost", "Instruction on special areas to directive No. 21 (plan" Barbarossa ")", dated March 13, 1941, "On military jurisdiction in the area" Barbarossa "and on the special powers of the troops" dated May 13 1941, "The Twelve Commandments for the Conduct of the Germans in the East and Their Treatment of the Russians", June 1, 1941.

Great Patriotic War in Belarus

liberated fascist soldiers from responsibility for crimes and elevated atrocities against the civilian population to the rank of state policy.

By the end of August 1941 the entire territory of Belarus was occupied.

The German Soldier’s Memo, published for Wehrmacht personnel, said: “You don’t have a heart, nerves, they are not needed in a war. Destroy pity and sympathy in yourself - kill every Russian, Soviet, do not stop if in front of you is an old man or a woman, a girl or a boy - kill, by doing this you will save yourself from death, ensure the future of your family and become famous forever.

Politics of genocide

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During its centuries-old history, Belarus has repeatedly become the scene of bloody wars. Each of them left behind death and destruction. The Belarusian people suffered the greatest losses during the Great Patriotic War.

The general plan of the war against the USSR and instructions for its preparation and conduct were set out in Directive No. 21 of December 18, 1940, which received the code name "Barbarossa".

The fascist command intended to seize the European territory of the Soviet Union and reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line within 8-16 weeks by means of a "blitzkrieg".

In accordance with this directive, it was planned to use almost all German ground forces, as well as Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian troops with a total of 190 divisions.

Three powerful groups were created to attack the USSR - "North", "Center", "South".

Army Group "North" was ordered to destroy the Soviet troops in the Baltic States and the capture of ports on the Baltic Sea, including Kronstadt and Leningrad, to deprive the Soviet fleet of support bases.

Army Group "South" was aimed at conquering the wealth of the North Caucasus, seizing grain and oil.

The grouping of German armies "Center" was focused on the defeat of Soviet troops in Belarus, followed by an attack on Smolensk and Moscow.

It consisted of two armies (4th and 9th), two tank groups (2nd and 3rd) - a total of 50 divisions (including 9 tank, 6 motorized and 1 cavalry) and 2 brigades . The offensive of Army Group Center was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet - the strongest in the Nazi army.

Along with the preparation of military plans, a program of monstrous atrocities was being prepared in the territory to be occupied.

Hitler's occupation regime on the territory of Belarus during the Second World War

Winning in the East was not enough. It was necessary to destroy the army, the country, the people.

At a meeting of the Wehrmacht's senior command staff, Hitler emphasized that in the war against the Soviet Union the struggle would be waged "to annihilate", that "the struggle would be very different from the struggle in the West. In the East, cruelty is soft for the future." In accordance with the general plan "Ost", it was planned to destroy 120-140 million people on the territory of the USSR and Poland.

The main directions of this policy were outlined by Himmler in a secret memorandum "Some considerations of the Reichsführer SS Himmler on the treatment of the local population of the eastern regions."

Among the prepared documents of the Ost plan, the most frank remarks and proposals were made by the head of the colonization department 1 of the main political department of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions of Wetzel, according to which 25% of the Belarusian population was supposed to be Germanized, 75% were to be destroyed.

During the war, based on the plan "Ost", the Nazis developed short-term specific tasks for the destruction of the population.

Materials of such developments were found in the documents of the Reichskommissariat "Ostland". According to the map - scheme, dated November 17, 1942. Belarus from its western border to the Grodno-Slonim line, the southern part of the Brest region, the regions of Pinsk, Mozyr and the rest of Polissya along the line of Pruzhany, Gantsevichi, Parichi, Rechitsa was supposed to be completely cleared of the local population and settle only German colonists on it.

In all major cities of Belarus, the Nazis intended to create settlements for the privileged strata of German society.

The number of local population that could be left in these cities was determined by an exact calculation: for every master of the "higher race", two slaves of the "lower" race.

So in Minsk and the region it was planned to settle 50 thousand German colonists and leave 100 thousand of the local population, in Molodechno and its environs - 7 thousand Germans and 15 thousand Belarusians, respectively, in Baranovichi 10 thousand Germans and 20 thousand local residents, in Gomel - 30 thousand Germans and 50 thousand local residents, in Mogilev and Bobruisk - 20 thousand Germans and 50 thousand inhabitants.

Documents such as the master plan "Ost", "Instruction on special areas to directive No. 21 (plan" Barbarossa ")", dated March 13, 1941, "On military jurisdiction in the area" Barbarossa "and on the special powers of the troops" dated May 13 1941, "The Twelve Commandments of the Conduct of the Germans in the East and Their Treatment of the Russians" of June 1, 1941.

and others freed fascist soldiers from responsibility for crimes and raised atrocities against the civilian population to the rank of state policy.

Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war. By the end of August 1941 the entire territory of Belarus was occupied.

The implementation of the policy of genocide of the Belarusian people by the Nazis began from the first days of the war. Executions and mass executions took on enormous proportions.

Soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht carried out massacres against the civilian population everywhere. The practical implementation of the crimes was facilitated by the indoctrination of the soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the SS, carried out in preparation for aggression against the USSR.

The German Soldier’s Memo, published for Wehrmacht personnel, said: “You don’t have a heart, nerves, they are not needed in a war. Destroy pity and sympathy in yourself - kill every Russian, Soviet, do not stop if you have an old man or a woman, a girl or a boy in front of you - kill, by doing this you will save yourself from death, ensure the future of your family and become famous forever.

4Belarusian collaborationism- the designation of political, economic and military cooperation with the occupying German authorities during the Second World War on the territory of Belarus, adopted in Soviet and Russian historiography.

The main reasons for the Belarusian collaborationism were the dissatisfaction of part of the population with the Soviet authorities (including mass repressions [source not specified 244 days] and forced sovietization in Western Belarus, annexed to the USSR in 1939), as well as the activities of representatives of the Belarusian People's Republic, a group of supporters of the priest AT.

Godlevsky (he himself and some of his followers later became disillusioned with the Germans and switched to an underground struggle against them), etc.

Preparation of the Belarusian collaboration before the start of the war

The training of Belarusian collaborators by the Third Reich began in the mid-late 1930s, when a Belarusian representative office was created under the German Ministry of the Interior - first in Berlin, and then in other cities of Germany.

It was engaged in identifying and recruiting persons wishing to assist Germany in Belarusian issues. Thus, the third president of the BPR, Vasily Zakharka, wrote a detailed report on the political, economic and cultural situation in Belarus, and also addressed a memorandum to Hitler with assurances of support.

In addition, the Belarusian Self-Help Committee was created, an organization that actively recruited members from Belarusians living in Germany. With the outbreak of World War II, the German command created bases in Warsaw and Byala Podlaska for the transfer of Belarusian nationalist agents to the territory of the USSR. In Berlin, in the Wustavu camp, courses of propagandists and translators were organized from among the Belarusian nationalists to work in Belarus after the change of power.

[edit]Before the attack on the USSR

The leadership of the “right Belarusian emigration” suggested that the German leadership organize the activities of the Belarusian National Socialists, including training sabotage personnel from among the captured military personnel of the Polish Army in order to bring them to the territory of the USSR.

In the spring of 1941

the formation of the first Belarusian unit began. As part of the Brandenburg 800 regiment, the 1st assault platoon was trained in the amount of 50 people. Similarly, the Germans trained the paratroopers of the Warsaw-Belarusian Committee, which included captured Belarusian volunteers of the former Polish army. Once formed, these two units were placed under the operational control of the Wally headquarters.

The tasks of the saboteurs were to carry out sabotage in the near Soviet rear, the physical destruction of the command and command staff of the Red Army, and the transmission of intelligence information by radio.

[edit] During the German occupation of Belarus

Together with the advancing units of the German army, the main figures of the Belarusian nationalist movement from emigration arrived in Belarus: Fabian Akinchits, Vladislav Kozlovsky, activists of the Belarusian National Socialist Party, Ivan Yermachenko, Radoslav Ostrovsky and others.

In the initial period of the war, the development of political and military collaboration took place at an insignificant pace, which is explained by the successes of the Germans at the front and the lack of need for them to develop collaborationist structures.

The German leadership hoped for a quick victory in the war and was skeptical about the ability of the Belarusian population to nation-state construction due to the weakness of ethnic self-consciousness.

The activity of collaborators during this period was reduced mainly to the work of non-political structures, the largest of which was the Belarusian People's Self-Help, created on October 22, 1941, the purpose of which was proclaimed to be health care, education and culture.

With the help of Belarusian collaborators, the German authorities tried to use for their own purposes the scientific personnel who ended up in the occupied territory.

In June 1942, they created the "Belarusian Scientific Association". Gauleiter of Belarus V. Kube became its honorary president. However, Belarusian scientists boycotted the work of the partnership, and it existed only on paper.

Other non-political collaborationist structures were also created ("Women's League", trade unions, etc.). At the same time, attempts to create the Belarusian Free Self-Defense Corps were unsuccessful due to the opposition of the military authorities and the SS. Its creation was proclaimed in June 1942 in the amount of 3 divisions.

However, about 20 battalions were created, which they did not dare to arm, and in the spring of 1943 it was disbanded. The attempt to create a Belarusian autocephaly with the aim of separating Belarusian believers from the Moscow Patriarchate was also unsuccessful.

The situation that had developed by 1943 forced the German command to reconsider its attitude towards the collaborationist movement.

To a large extent, this was due to the efforts of the Minister of the Eastern Occupied Territories A. Rozenberg, who was a supporter of the creation of collaborationist administrations. On June 22, 1943, the Union of Belarusian Youth (SBM) was formally created, which became an analogue of the Hitler Youth in Belarus (in fact, it existed since 1942) .

On the initiative of Cuba, on June 27, 1943, the creation of a Council of Trust under the General Commissariat of Belarus was proclaimed.

This body was an administrative commission, the only task of which was to work out and present to the occupying authorities the wishes and proposals from the population. On December 21, 1943, instead of the Rada of Trust, on the initiative of K. Gotberg (who became the General Commissar after the assassination of Cuba by partisans), the Belarusian Central Rada (BCR) was created, the president of which was the head of the Minsk District Council R.

Ostrovsky (1887-1976). The activities of the Rada were not effective, since the Rada did not have real political power (only in matters of social care, culture and education it had the right to relatively independent decisions), and its members held different views on the future of Belarus and often did not know local conditions. In the eyes of the population, therefore, it could not have authority. The Rada was indirectly connected with war crimes - in particular, with ethnic cleansing against the Polish population.

In occupied Belarus, many collaborationist newspapers and magazines were published: "Belarusskaya Gazeta", "Pagonya" ( Chase), "Biełaruski holas" ( Belarusian voice), "Novy Shlyakh" ( New way) etc.

e. These publications carried out anti-Semitic, anti-Soviet and pro-fascist propaganda. In a special article published on September 25, 1943 after the destruction of Cuba in the Belorusskaya Gazeta, the editor of this newspaper, Vladislav Kozlovsky, wrote: “The heart is gripped by grief ... He (that is, Cuba - author) is no longer among us.

General Commissar Wilhelm Kube was one of the best, most cordial friends… who thought and spoke like every Belarusian nationalist…”.

Parade of the Belarusian Regional Defense near the current government house, Minsk, June 1944
German State Archives (Bundesarchiv), photo 183-1991-0206-506

On February 23, 1944, K. Gotberg issued an order to create the Belarusian Regional Defense (BKO) - a military collaborationist formation, headed by Franz Kuschel, and instructed the BCR to mobilize.

The 45 BKO battalions formed by the end of March were poorly armed. Their discipline gradually decreased, there were not enough officers. By the end of the occupation, the BKO was used to fight partisans, guard various facilities and do chores.

The most important activities of the BCR at the final stage of the war were the reorganization of the BKO units and the replenishment of Belarusian military formations by recruiting new soldiers, the creation of auxiliary contingents for use in the German defense system, and the organization of the anti-Soviet partisan movement on the territory of Belarus.

Initially, it was supposed to reorganize the BKO into the Belarusian Legion. In preparation for this reorganization, in September 1944, the first personnel battalion of the BKO (422 people) was created in Berlin under the command of Captain Piotr Kasatsky, which became a reserve and officer school for future units. At the same time, from among those recruited by the "Union of Belarusian Youth" as "air defense assistants" (from 2.5 to 5 thousand people).

people) groups were selected for training at the anti-aircraft artillery school. After completing the course of study, they were included in the air defense units of Berlin.

On June 27, 1944, the Second All-Belarusian Congress was held in Minsk, in which most of the active leaders of the collaborators took part. The congress was held in the conditions of the approach to Minsk of the Red Army, which was conducting a major offensive operation in Belarus.

At the congress, it was decided that the BCR is the only legitimate government of Belarus, and the full support of Germany was expressed.

Plans were also developed for anti-Soviet sabotage and partisan operations in Belarus, in the event of a complete retreat of German troops from its territory.

Z. Poznyak gave such an assessment of those events:

The invincibility of Belarus and the Belarusian national idea was witnessed in the meantime by the Second World War.

From 1941 to 1944, central Belarus (where the German civil administration headed by V. Kube operated) experienced a powerful national upsurge. This completely puzzled the Bolsheviks and infuriated Moscow. With the return of the Soviets to Belarus, hundreds of thousands of conscious Belarusians emigrated to the West.

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In 1917, the Russian Empire collapsed. This event gave the Belarusian people a chance to create their own national state. However, two neighboring states - Russia (RSFSR) and Poland - considered Belarus to be part of their territory.” They proclaimed themselves the "liberators" of the Belarusian lands, although in reality they sought to occupy them and establish their power here.

Thanks to the works of Soviet historians, it is well known how the inhabitants of Belarus met the Polish occupiers. Much has been written about the partisan and underground movement in the territories occupied by the Poles. But very little is known about the resistance to the Bolshevik occupation regime, which was much more brutal than the Polish one. If Soviet historians paid attention to this anti-Bolshevik movement, they always painted it in black colors, and saw the reasons in the "intrigues of the Polish gentry and world imperialism", or in "the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and kulaks on the irresponsible part of the peasantry."

In fact, the “peasant masses” were well versed in the “current moment”. For example, this is what the party instructor G. Shevkun, who attended a peasant meeting in the village of Borovoye, in the Koydanovo district (now Dzerzhinsk), said in his report to the “bosses” in January 1919:

"Some peasants began to declare that in Russia everything has become expensive because they began to introduce the commune, and that thanks to the latter, everyone is becoming lazy and does not want to work."

Shevkun tried to prove to them that the main causes of the famine in Russia were the war, the counter-revolution, the imperialists who supported it, as well as kulaks and speculators. But the peasants did not agree with him:

“At the end of the explanation, objections again rained down, in which they mainly indicated that they said they fought for 4 years and now they still have to fight, that other powers do not want to reckon with Russia, because there is no responsible person who would be at the head of the state, for example , president. Therefore, it would be necessary to convene a Constituent Assembly.”

It turned out that the peasants did not see the need not only for the commune, but also for the Soviet government:

“Shortly before the closing of the meeting, I proposed to the peasants that they adopt a resolution to support Soviet power with all their strength and material means. The resolution was heard with distrust, disputes arose, protests rained down, as a result of which the resolution was not adopted for fear that if, they say, they were accepted, then they would drive all of them to war and take away all the grain, cattle, etc. property. I explained what the resolution meant, etc., but in spite of everything the peasants stubbornly defended their positions and the resolution was not adopted. Not only that, when I asked if they wanted Soviet power at all and give an answer to this with a show of hands, no one raised their hands.”

Of course, not all Belarusian peasants were as politically literate as the inhabitants of the village of Borovoe, but still this example is very indicative. Moreover, there could be no question of any "kulak influence" in this case. Shevkun wrote:

“At the same time, I should note that the village of Borovoye is relatively poor. There are almost no fists. Almost all peasants own small plots of land, ranging from one to five acres” (1). /1 National Archives of Belarus (hereinafter NAB), f. 4, about. 1, d. 19, l. 38–39./

In the spring of 1920, the civil war in the European part of Russia was basically over. The troops of Baron Wrangel, blocked in the Crimea, did not pose a serious threat to the Bolshevik regime. The relative stabilization of the internal situation allowed the Bolsheviks to return to the project of class war against imperialism, which first arose in connection with the German revolution in late 1918 and early 1919. Poland, which, according to Stalin, was "a counter-revolutionary barrier between the revolutionary West and socialist Russia", became enemy number one for the RSFSR. It was through her "corpse" that the Red Army had to pass in order to bring "peace" and "happiness" to the peoples of Europe on their bayonets (words from the order of the commander of the Western Front M.N. Tukhachevsky).

Was the desire to “make happy” Europe sincere, or behind it, like behind a screen, were other, more pragmatic plans hidden? The answer to this question can be found in the work of V.I. Lenin, where he dealt with the events of the French Revolution of the 18th century. The leader of the Russian Bolsheviks wrote that "from the French national wars came imperialist wars, which in turn gave rise to national liberation wars against Napoleon" (2). /2 Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. (PSS) Volume 30, p. 5-6./

Approximately the same evolution can be seen in the foreign policy of Soviet Russia. In an effort to extend the "power of the Soviets" to the whole of Europe, the Bolsheviks objectively created the foundations for a totalitarian imperial system. In reality, "the war for the independence of Russia, for its alliance with socialist Poland and with the proletarians of Europe and the whole world" (3) became the beginning of Russia's imperial expansion to the West, just as the campaign in Italy was once the beginning of France's imperial expansion. revolutionary general Napoleon Bonaparte. /3 Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army. M., 1974. Volume 3, p. thirteen./

However, the international situation was not as favorable for the Bolsheviks as it was for the French revolutionaries, who were opposed by decrepit European monarchies. The idea of a world socialist revolution did not arouse enthusiasm among the proletarians of the West. And the Bolsheviks did not have commanders as brilliant as Bonoparte. As a result, Russia was defeated in the very first serious battle "for Europe".

The events of the war between Russia and Poland in 1919-1920, according to the Polish writer and publicist Zbigniew Załuski, "...created a new reality of being in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and, to a certain extent, Poland" (4). It is no coincidence that this war has always aroused the interest of historians*. However, Soviet historiography has always portrayed it as a "struggle for the liberation of the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples from Polish occupation." Was it really so? /4 Zalusky Z. Ways to reliability. In the book: Nalench D., Nalench T. Jozef Pilsudski. M., 1990, p. 226./

/* It is customary to call it "Soviet-Polish", but the Soviet Union did not exist then. The war was between "red" Russia and "white" Poland, but on the territory of formally independent Belarusian and Ukrainian republics. - Note. ed./

In the grandiose plans of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the international subversive organization the Comintern created by it, the “liberation” of Belarus was neither the main goal nor a secondary one. Soviet Belarus, proclaimed by the Bolsheviks in January 1919, and then as if forgotten due to the retreat under the onslaught of the Poles, and re-created in July 1920, automatically entered the future socialist Europe. In the meantime, this new Europe had not yet emerged, the Bolsheviks planned to use Belarus in their strategic interests.

First of all, the military-political leadership of the RSFSR considered Belarus as a springboard for operations against Poland. According to the plans of the Bolsheviks, the Belarusian lands were to become the main theater of military operations, because its terrain and roads were more conducive to the attack on Warsaw than in Ukraine (5). /5 Tukhachevsky M.N. Hike for the Vistula. M., 1992, p. 36./

True, at first they were somewhat worried about the position of Lithuania, which could threaten the right flank of the advancing troops. But the Bolsheviks solved this problem by "buying" the neutrality of the Republic of Lithuania with a part of the Belarusian lands. Under the terms of the peace treaty signed between the RSFSR and Lithuania in July 1920, almost the entire north-western part of present-day Belarus, including Smorgon, Oshmyany, Lida and Grodno, was supposed to go to the latter. Moreover, the Bolsheviks pledged to pay Lithuania 3 million rubles in gold (6). /6 Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR. M., 1959. Volume 3, p. 38./

However, the Belarusian peasants (80% of the population) were not interested in the issues of “high politics”. And in bourgeois Lithuania, no one prevented the peasants from engaging in farming and trade. The distrust and hostility of our peasantry towards the Bolsheviks was caused primarily by the actions of the latter. It is possible to point out the three most characteristic features of the “power of the Soviets”, which became the reasons for the hostile attitude towards it of a very significant part of the Belarusians - this is mass terror, robbery of the rural population and forced mobilization into the army.

Red terror

The Bolsheviks unleashed the "Red Terror" in Soviet Belarus from the first days of its existence. But it reached its apogee in a puppet pseudo-state - the Lithuanian-Belarusian SSR (Lit-Bel), created in March 1919.

The forms and methods of terror were different, from forced labor and imprisonment in concentration camps to the death penalty. The Extraordinary Commission of Lit-Bel (Cheka), an organ of extrajudicial execution, severely punished both those guilty of "counter-revolutionary activities" and the innocent. Even the Bolsheviks themselves, who held high positions in the government of Lit-Bel, were forced to admit this.

A clear idea of the essence of the "Red Terror" is given by a letter from the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Lit-Bel Vikenty Mickiewicz (Kapsuskas) and the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee Kazimir Tsikhovsky, sent by them in August 1919 to the Chairman of the Cheka of the RSFSR F.E. Dzerzhinsky:

Chairman of the Cheka

Tov. Dzerzhinsky

... To illustrate the uncontrolled behavior of the Litbel Cheka, we consider it necessary to cite a number of facts that are known to wide circles of Litbel party comrades.

Even earlier, we reported on the execution in Minsk without notifying the organization of two Polish communists: comrades Kwek and comrade Zanko, about whose guilt representatives of the Cheka Litbel could not tell us anything. So far, we have not been given the opportunity to get acquainted with their case, despite our repeated appeals.

The execution of these two communists is only a clear example of how our Cheka worked and how death sentences were carried out there. Regarding the latter, we have some information. By chance, a member of the Central Committee Mitskevich was once at a meeting of the "Troika" (comrade Tarashkevich and two comrades from the Special Department of the Western Front), where the death sentences were pronounced. At the same time, the cases of those sentenced were not considered at all, their cases were not even on the table, but sentences were pronounced from memory. There were cases when none of those present knew what such and such was accused of. Then one or another employee was asked about this and the name of the arrested person was entered on the list to be shot. Mickiewicz at first thought that this was some kind of preliminary meeting, but then it turned out that it was an official meeting of the Troika. Whether there were more such meetings, we do not know.

However, according to Cheka officials, it is known that sometimes members of the Troika and representatives of the Special Department actually went into the cell, questioned the arrested, what they were accused of, and immediately took some to the right, others to the left. One of these parties was immediately taken to be shot. Some escaped by hiding behind the door. Incidentally, this took place in the Minsk Cheka on the night of July 28-29 /1919/. Those who were to be shot sometimes immediately took off their shoes and undressed in the cell. Then the officers of the Cheka, in the presence of the arrested, noisily divided their property among themselves.

There was a case when a driver sent to be shot was accidentally identified by employees of the Special Department, who testified that he was not involved in the counter-revolution, and he was released and, it seems, began to work in the Special Department. (Detailed information from comrade Drongoshevsky from the Special Department of the Cheka).

It is difficult to say how many such executions there were, where some accident could not save the lives of innocent people, but judging by the methods of the Troika and the execution of the mentioned communists, it can be argued that these were not the only cases.

Those sentenced to death could sometimes bathe. This was done officially. A certain amount was assigned - 40 or how many thousand there. In case of contribution, he was released; in case of non-payment, he was shot. So a certain Footer was shot, for whom a ransom of 40 or 60 thousand was appointed, but this amount was not paid in a timely manner.

Rumors stubbornly circulated in Minsk that “speculation” had formed on the basis of the ransom. The workers were indignant that in this way speculators could be freed, and the poor would be shot.

Hostages were taken right and left to no avail. Among them there are many decrepit old women and young girls who do not represent any value as hostages. Often, those who are arrested, against whom no charges can be applied, are indiscriminately listed as hostages. There are more than a hundred of them in the Smolensk prison. Cheka Litbel did not give us the opportunity to control the hostages.

During the searches, valuables, clothes, clothes, food, and money were taken indiscriminately without the establishment of certain norms. All this was not handed over, according to the decision, to the food committee and the people's bank, but was kept in the Cheka, and the property was kept in a disorderly state.

During the evacuation, the Cheka, more than other institutions, succumbed to panic. In Minsk, back in the first days of July, it sank, and only through the efforts of the Litbel Defense Council was a part of it removed from the wheels and put back in its place.

/ Pay attention to the indicated date of the attempted escape of the Chekists: "the first days of July." The vanguard of Pilsudski's cavalry appeared in the vicinity of the city on August 5, and Minsk was occupied only on August 8, 1919 - Note. ed./

The same thing happened in Bobruisk. When the order was given for the institutions to evacuate their valuable property and affairs within 24 hours, the Cheka hastened to flee the city to the station. At the same time, individual employees of the Cheka jumped out into the street with revolvers in their hands and forcibly, indiscriminately, took away horses and carts for themselves (in this way, the horse on which the acting head of the Minsk Gubvoenkom of the Soviet Defense of the Bobruisk Knot, comrade Muklovich was riding) was detained. Despite the categorical prohibition of the Center and the repeated protests of the local authorities in charge of the evacuation, the Cheka nevertheless took out furniture, beds, etc. The chairman of the Cheka, comrade Tarashkevich, together with representatives of the Special Department of the Western Front and most of the employees, immediately left, a minority remained on wheels and this created a panic among some other institutions. The Cheka did this, despite the fact that the Litbel Central Committee, the Presidium of Gubrevkom, the Defense Council of the Bobruisk Knot and other Soviet bodies remained in the city and continued to work.

Obviously, in a state of panic before his flight, the chairman of the Cheka Litbel, together with the representative of the Special Department of the Western Front Antonov, as some employees of the Cheka claimed, drunkenly carried out an ugly execution of those sentenced to death. Before shooting them, they mocked them so much that some employees even protested in front of the Litbel Central Committee about this. When nothing could be extorted, seven people were shot; only Glukhovsky was left alive, whose mother and father were shot before his eyes. The bodies of the executed were left in the courtyard of the Cheka, in the basement, not buried in the ground. The entire Cheka left for the station. If the legionnaires had come the next day, they would have found these mutilated corpses. Since among the executed were prominent members of the Polish organization, the Polish counter-revolutionaries would have excellently used these corpses for their own purposes and would have shouted to the whole of Europe about the "new atrocity" as proof of the moral corruption of the Bolsheviks.

/ Isn't that right? This is what bandits and sadists do, by no means people "with a cold head and clean hands." - Note. ed./

With this in mind, the Central Committee of Litbel instructed Mickiewicz to ensure that the corpses were buried. Mickiewicz talked about this with Comrade Eidukevich, Tarashkevich's temporary deputy, and the next night the corpses were taken out of town and buried.

On the way to Smolensk, 10 arrested people fled. In response to this, 7 people were shot at various stations in front of the public. Shot indiscriminately. Among those shot there is the agronomist Zhaba, about whom the Central Committee of Litbel heard very good reviews. These executions aroused great indignation among our comrades who saw it.

Then Tarashkevich stated with satisfaction that he had shot 167 people in our country. This should serve as proof that the counter-revolution has been eradicated in Byelorussia in this way. In fact, the unsystematic executions right and left, in the situation we saw, only increased the hostile attitude of the population towards the Soviet government, and not only among the bourgeoisie, but also among the workers. To the depths of their souls, even many party comrades were outraged by the behavior of the Cheka. It cost us considerable effort to calm the Minsk Workers' Regiment, which was ready to smash the Cheka.

... We are sending a copy of the report to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party with a request to consider the issues raised.

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania and Belarus

V. Mickiewicz-Kapsukas, K. Tsikhovsky

Moscow 21.VIII.1919” (7). /7 NAB, F. 4, o. 1, d. 34, l. one./

Robbery of the population

Another significant factor influencing the attitude of Belarusians towards the Bolsheviks was the policy of surplus appropriation, with the help of which they sought to provide food for their troops. The peasants, whose economy had suffered greatly during the World War, could not understand why they should give up their last and starve to death. Numerous documents, including those published during the Soviet period, testify to the fact that this was actually the case. For example, describing the situation in the Serokarotnyansky volost, a representative of the Vitebsk Revolutionary Committee in February 1920 said in a report:

“The economic situation of the volost is the most critical. There can be no question of any surpluses of bread, and many citizens no longer have bread for their daily subsistence, which was confirmed by the sent agent of the food committee” (8). / 8 Revolutionary Committees of the BSSR, November 1918 - July 1920. Mn., 1961 (hereinafter: Revolutionary Committees), p. 322./

In addition to the surplus appraisal - that is, the forced gratuitous seizure of supposedly "surplus food" by authorized persons, unauthorized requisitions of military units became widespread. Of course, this caused indignation among the peasants. So, the division commander V.K. Putna noted in his memoirs:

“The sympathy of the population for the Reds, which was clearly felt in the Minsk region, began to fade in areas closer to the Bug. This was also facilitated by the fact that we, cut off from bases, having no supply for the army by rail, used a myriad of peasant carts. The peasant believed that the liberation from the yoke of the landlords, which we were preaching, was a good thing, but all this was still a guessing thing, but that he was forced to dangle with carts for weeks when the grain was overripe in the field, this was bad, this thing was more tangible and real "(9 ). /9 Putna V. To the Vistula and back. M., 1927, p. 73./

However, the matter is not only in the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the need to "dangle with horses and carts." Sympathy for the Soviet regime, which Putna wrote about, managed to “fade” much earlier than his division appeared in Belarus. Passing through the Belarusian lands, the red units took away the last food from the peasants, which they saved from the food detachments. Already in 1919 - early 1920, representatives of the Soviet government stated:

The relationship between parts of the troops, the population and the Volrevkoms in some places is hostile due to tactless requisitions, demands for carts for personal trips, extortion of unbearable treats, rude treatment of the Red Army soldiers ”(10). /10 Revolutionary committees…, p. 305./

The robbery of the peasantry reached its apogee during the offensive of the Western Front in the summer of 1920. The Bolsheviks considered the already badly damaged Belarusian lands as a base for providing their troops not only with food and fodder, but also with horse-drawn vehicles. The military "mobilized" over 48,000 horses and carts*. Commander of the 4th Army E.S. Sergeev wrote later about the rear services:

“Any of their transfers did not particularly hamper the troops, who placed all their hopes almost exclusively on local means” (11). /11 Sergeev E. From the Dvina to the Vistula. Smolensk, 1923, p. 39./

/* According to A.P. Gritskevich, the 4th army mobilized over 8 thousand carts from the population, the 15th and 3rd armies - about 15 thousand each, the 16th army - more than 10 thousand. Basically, these were single-horse carts capable of carrying no more than 300-400 kg. They often broke, driven horses fell. It was necessary to “mobilize” horses and carts again in the villages closest to the roads, which aroused the indignation of the peasants. - Note. ed./

The collection of products for the Red Army was carried out by special bodies - food distribution committees. Usually they demanded that this or that volost fulfill certain norms for the supply of bread requisitioned for the army. The deadlines for their implementation were very tight, and if the village or volost was late, then the food committees requisitioned everything:

“100% without taking into account any residues according to the norms; in the case of deliberate concealment of the surplus, along with the products, all cattle and horses are confiscated” (12). / 12 Collection of orders to the food production committees of the Western Front. Smolensk, 1921, p. 123-14 (hereinafter referred to as the “Collection of Orders…”)/

But even in the event that the local residents fulfilled the norms of the food committees within the period indicated by them, or according to the allocation, they still were not insured against repeated visits to the requisition detachments. The food distribution committees could carry out requisitions even in those villages where food requisitioning had already been carried out. The activities of the food committees quickly got out of control. The organized robbery became unorganized and reached such proportions that the Red Command was forced to state in a special order:

“The Red Army soldiers, seconded to the food committees and agents of the latter, inflict ugly violence on the population and forget the discipline that is obligatory for every soldier of the Red Army” (13). /13 Order to the field administration of the Reserve Army of the Western Military District. Smolensk, 1920 (Further: Order to the field administration ...) Order to the armies of the Western Front No. 25./

They actively robbed the local population and ordinary army units. At one time, even the commanders of the Red Army wrote about this, however, they called the robbery more gently - "self-supply". The red horsemen were especially distinguished in this respect:

“They waged war somewhat according to the precepts of the Middle Ages, alternating dashing blows against the enemy with an overly attentive attitude towards the belongings of the local population” (14). /14 Sergeev E. From the Dvina to the Vistula, p. 55./

The newly minted Soviet farms (state farms) also did not escape defeat, as, for example, in the Lepel district of the Vitebsk province (15). But most of all, the former estates were unlucky. Sergeev wrote: /15 Order to the field administration ... Order to the armies of the Western Front No. 1741./

“The agitators had a difficult task to convince the groups of laborers to take into their own hands the landowners' households, from which often only firebrands and horns of the “animal inventory” killed for meat were left. (16) /16 Sergeev E. From the Dvina to the Vistula, p. 82./

Someone might say that the “self-supply” of troops is a quite common phenomenon in cases where centralized food supply is insufficient, or even absent. But the Reds were not engaged in robbery at all because of the difficult situation with food. The food committees did their job well and supplied the troops with even more than was required. According to the headquarters of the Red Army, during the summer operations of 1920, 707,700 personnel of the troops of the Western Front were provided with: meat and fish - by 137.8%; flour - by 111.07%; cereals - by 96.3%; fodder grain - by 80.6%; fats - by 61% (17). /17 Kakurin N.E., Melikov V.A. War with the White Poles in 1920 Moscow, 1925, p. 52./

So it's something else. The bandit customs of the civil war were so deeply rooted in the Red Army that they were automatically transferred to the Soviet-Polish front as well. The Bolshevik command, which consisted mainly of professionals from the former tsarist army, was well aware that the army was decomposing in robberies, and tried, if not to stop, then at least to limit violent requisitions. But such measures were almost without success. A special telegram to the commanders of the 15th and 16th armies stated:

“Despite the order to the armies of the Western Front dated March 17, No. 77, information continues to be received about the intervention of troops and military commanders in the work of local food agencies, as well as unauthorized requisitions and illegal forced methods of self-supply in addition to food agencies at the expense of the resources of the local population” (18). /18 Collection of orders… p. 91-92./

As a result, the Belarusian villages were so devastated that during the retreat of their troops after the defeat near Warsaw, the Bolsheviks were no longer able to get any food from them. As Tukhachevsky reported to Moscow, “due to the poverty of the population, it is impossible to conduct procurements” (19). /19 Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army. Volume 3, p. 100./

As you can see, for the Belarusian peasants the campaign of the Red Army was not a liberation from the Polish occupation, but an invasion of bandits.

"Blood Tax"

The third negative factor in the relations between the Belarusian population and the Bolsheviks was the “blood tax”, which the latter forced the inhabitants of our country to pay.

After the conclusion of the military-political union of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Lit-Bel in March 1919 in order to obtain material and human resources from the formally independent Soviet republics, the Bolsheviks repeatedly mobilized Belarusians for military service.

These mobilizations took place in different areas at different times. Men from among the peasants and workers were drafted into the army. But even the class approach did not give the Bolsheviks the results they needed, and some of the appeals were generally unsuccessful. For example, on April 25, 1919, a decree was issued "On calling the middle and poorest peasantry to fight against the counter-revolution", according to which from 10 to 20 people were mobilized in each volost. However, the organizers of the mobilization faced insurmountable difficulties, as evidenced, for example, by the report of the Klimovichi district committee of the RCP (b) for June 1919:

“As for the mobilization of 20 people from the volost, this is not going well. It is not possible to outline candidates at a gathering, and it is also difficult to appoint them by the executive committee. The population at the gatherings is in favor of voluntary registration. Thus, there are no noticeable results of mobilization 20” (20). /20 Selivanov P.A. Strengthening the Rear of the Red Army: Activities of the Soviets and Revolutionary Committees of Belarus (1918–1920). Mn., 1987, p. 108./

It is possible that the peasants in 1919 would have reacted to the mobilization with more enthusiasm if they had been directed against the Poles. Instead, the Bolshevik authorities formed parts of the Western Front from Russians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians and even Chinese, and Belarusians were sent to fight Denikin and Kolchak. Thus, out of 200,000 residents of Belarus mobilized in the summer of 1919, only 40,000 (20%) ended up on the Western Front (21). /21 Latyszonek O. Bialoruskie formacje wojskowe 1917-1923. Bialystok, 1995, s. 114./

The natural reaction of the Belarusian peasants and workers, who were forced to travel thousands of kilometers from their place of residence and die there for no one knows what, was draft evasion and desertion. Both the first and the second were widespread and, in fact, became one of the forms of struggle of the inhabitants of Belarus against the Bolsheviks.

Already in 1919, the flight from the troops and from mobilization points acquired significant proportions. Both military and civilian authorities were involved in the fight against desertion. At each revolutionary committee (volost, district or provincial) there were special commissions to combat desertion.

However, neither local residents of military age, nor deserters hiding in the villages, were in no hurry to go to the front to fight for a cause that they did not support. Therefore, the command of the Western Front took cruel measures. In places where recruitment took place, from May 15 to June 1, 1920, a special campaign was carried out to combat desertion, which in essence was one of the many acts of Bolshevik terror and robbery of the population. Special temporary emergency commissions, with the help of special armed detachments (300 bayonets and 50 sabers each), staged a real hunt that engulfed the Smolensk, Gomel and partly Vitebsk provinces. The parish where the operation took place was declared under martial law, and the armed groups carried out raids. Those who refused to go to the front were ruthlessly shot, and their families were thrown into concentration camps (22). /22 Order to the field administration ... Order to the armies of the Western Front of 07/13/1920 Order to the armies of the Western Front of 11/16/1920/

Others were forced to join the army by the threat of confiscation of property, which condemned the family to starvation. Property was also taken away from those who hid deserters. So, in Gomel, on the orders of L.D. Trotsky in the families of the so-called "concealers" took away horses, livestock and personal property - even "regardless of the betrayal of the tribunal" (23). /23 Order to the field administration... Order for the Western Military District No. 957./

The most effective (according to the resolution of the 2nd conference of the Revolutionary Committees of the front line and representatives of the divisions of the XVI Army of the Western Front on April 26-27, 1920) were considered “the use of repressive measures through full and partial confiscation both from the deserter himself and from his harborers and bringing the latter to justice."

But, despite all their cruelty, the Bolsheviks could not cope with desertion until the very end of the war. In 1920, when reinforcements from Belarus were already sent against the Poles, the mobilized still ran away from mobilization points or from military units. In this regard, on September 1, 1920, the Commissariat for Military Affairs of the SSRB issued a special order:

“From the material available in the Investigative-Judicial part, it is clear that some Uyezdvoenkoms inform the mobilized, often unaware of the inadmissibility of such a phenomenon, the destination of this or that outfit, as a result of which the mobilized, not wanting to follow this or that destination, desert” (24). / 24 Revolutionary Committees ... S. 350. /

Desertion has reached enormous proportions. Back in May 1920, Trotsky wrote: "The fight against desertion in the Western District is now a matter of life and death for the Western Front" (25). Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks could not win this fight, because the question of "life and death" was decided not in favor of the Western Front. It was desertion that played a significant role in the results of the Battle of Warsaw, because at the decisive moment the Bolsheviks did not have enough strength. /25 Polish-Soviet War (previously unpublished documents and materials). Part 1. M., 1994, p. 89./

During the retreat of the Bolsheviks to the east, they again tried to make up for the losses of their defeated troops at the expense of the Belarusians. Lenin wrote on August 12, 1920, in a letter to Ephraim Sklyansky, deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR:

“Shouldn’t Smilga be told that it is necessary to take all adult men into the army without exception (after harvesting bread)? Necessary. Since Budyonny is to the south, it is necessary to strengthen the north ”(26). /26 Lenin V.I. PSS. Volume 51, p. 258./

Lenin had in mind the drafting of all adult men into the army in Belarus. To leave no doubt, here is the text of another letter written on August 19 in a typical “Leninist” style:

“It is necessary to go all out so that the Byelorussian workers and peasants, even in bast shoes and bathing suits, but with immediate and revolutionary speed, will give you replenishment in triple and quadruple numbers” (27). /27 Lenin V.I. PSS. Volume 51, p. 261./

However, "Belarusian workers and peasants", not only "in bast shoes and bathing suits", but even in uniforms and boots, did not seek to fight for Soviet power. Sabotage of drafts and desertion were significant even during the victories of the Red Army, and when the Bolshevik troops defeated near Warsaw retreated to the east, they acquired catastrophic proportions. The Soviet military and civilian authorities did everything they could, from banning conscripts from leaving for other areas to shooting fugitives, but failed to remedy the situation.

In November 1920, the military authorities of the SSRB were generally forced to take a desperate step, announcing a “week of surrender” and promising forgiveness to all who voluntarily appear before November 25 (28), but this measure did not bring much success. /28 NARB, f. 32, o. 2, d. 22, l. 181./

However, those Belarusians who remained in the army fought the Poles very reluctantly. In general, the spirit of the troops of the Western Front in that war was far from the best, so the command “encouraged” its soldiers with the so-called detachments. Before the start of the first offensive, Commander-in-Chief S. Kamenev handed over to Tukhachevsky five such formations, consisting of "warriors-internationalists", i.e. from foreign mercenaries (29). / 29 Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army. Volume 3, p. 39./

However, the detachments did not add decisiveness to the Red Army. Almost all Polish commanders noted uncertainty, trampling on the ground by large units of the Red Army, especially in the initial periods of the first and second offensives. For example, all day on July 4, 1920, the 4th Red Army was held back by one 33rd Polish regiment with ten field guns! (30) And in the future, until the resistance of the Poles was broken and their retreat did not acquire the character of flight, the Red troops acted extremely indecisively. Commander E. Sergeev wrote in one of the orders: /30 Pilsudsky Yu. War of 1920. M., 1992, p. 146./

“I demand to stop the constant fear for the flanks and take into account the morale of the enemy; it is absolutely unacceptable that individual companies of a frustrated enemy, who accidentally did not have time to escape, would be mistaken for fresh regiments, under the threat of which the advance of entire divisions would be delayed ”(31). /31 Sergeev E. From the Dvina to the Vistula, p. 122./

During the civil war, his troops gained sufficient combat experience. The reason for their “uncertainty” is a lack of fighting spirit, which in turn was caused by a misunderstanding of the goals of this war. Neither the appeals of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), nor the inspired appeal of Tukhachevsky touched the souls of the Red soldiers.

Active resistance to the Bolsheviks

Other forms of resistance of local residents to the Bolsheviks are also known, more active than desertion and sabotage of conscription into the army. These included the burning of military warehouses, damage to railways and telegraph lines. Thus, on May 2, 1920, Trotsky wrote:

“Fires are already breaking out on the railways. At certain points (reserve army), arson was ascertained ... Among the railroad workers there are many elements that are bitter to the last degree ”(32). /32 Polish–Soviet War, p. 118./

The enraged Bolsheviks took cruel measures. At different times and in different places, they made the local population responsible for the condition of the railways, as well as telegraph lines. So, according to the order to the armies of the Western Front, all local residents who lived within 15 miles from the railway were responsible for its condition (33). / 33 Order to the field administration ... Order to the armies of the Western Front No. 865.

The Bolsheviks retained the responsibility of the population for damaging communications even after the war, during the struggle against the so-called banditry. For example, order No. 2 of the Bobruisk political commission for combating banditry stated: “... for damage or oversight of the person in whose area this happens, they will be held accountable (up to and including execution)” (34). /34 NAB, f. 4, inventory 1, file 287, sheet 53. /

But neither threats nor even terror could stop the resistance of Belarusians to the Bolshevik occupation. It acquired more and more active forms, and quickly reached its highest level - armed struggle. During the Soviet-Polish war, there were several possibilities for this struggle.

Armed struggle against the Bolsheviks

The first of these was the entry into the Polish units - on a voluntary basis, because, unlike the Bolsheviks, the Poles did not mobilize Belarusians into their army.

In 1919, the 1st Belarusian-Lithuanian Division (LBD) was formed, almost entirely from the natives of Belarus. By the summer of 1920, the 2nd LBD was also formed. Both of them operated on the Polish Northern Front. During the Battle of Warsaw in August 1920, the 1st LBD was the last reserve of the city's defenders. The command brought her into the battle near Radzimin, and when the counteroffensive of the Polish troops began, Pilsudski sent her to the vanguard so that she could take part in the liberation of her Fatherland (35). /35 Pilsudski Yu. War of 1920, p. 246./

The natives of Belarus also made up a significant part of the Belarusian detachment of the famous Stanislav Bulak-Balakhovich, who fought on the side of the Poles. On September 26, 1920, this detachment fell through the front line at the Nevelsk crossing, blew up the railway bridge near the Molodkovichi station, and then captured Pinsk. The line of defense of the 4th Red Army was cut into two halves, its troops had to retreat far to the east. This daring raid alarmed even Lenin. In his telegram he demanded:

“Request the conditions for the loss of Pinsk. Was the danger known before? (36). /36 Lenin V.I. PSS. Volume 51, p. 291./

But the basis of the armed struggle of the population against the Bolsheviks was not the participation of its representatives in the regular formations of the Polish army, but the uprisings in the rear of the Red Army and the partisan movement.

Such major uprisings as the uprisings in Starokopytov and Velizh are well known. In Rechitsa on March 25-26, 1919, a guard company rebelled, quickly seizing power in the city. All local Bolsheviks were beaten and imprisoned, their apartments were vandalized. The rebels also defeated the revolutionary committee, the emergency committee and the department of justice (37). / 37 Revolutionary committees ..., p. 133./

In the same March 1919, uprisings took place in Slutsk and Borisov, where Soviet institutions were also smashed. Uprisings occurred later, both in 1919 and in the 1920s. In fact, there was not a month that an armed uprising did not take place in some village, volost or even city.

For example, in March 1920, a series of uprisings took place in the Bykhov district. The peasants of the villages of Kulezhy, Urechye, Zapolyannaya, Privol, Lebedevka, Ryabinovka destroyed Soviet institutions, destroyed documents, searched the apartments of Soviet employees. On March 10, the rebels attacked Propoisk (now Slavgorod), disarmed the anti-desertion department there, and seized the telegraph office (38). /38 Selivanov P.A. Cit. op, p. 219./

The Bolsheviks declared these uprisings "kulak". Meanwhile, both wealthy and poor peasants opposed them. For example, responding to a report on the uprising in the Beloruch Volost, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Lit-Bel wrote:

“While making a report on the “kulak” uprising in the Beloruchskaya volost, a member of the Executive Committee points to such kulaks as a shoemaker, etc., which makes us think that the Minsk District Executive Committee is completely incomprehensible to the definitions of the word “kulak” and they are not brought under this rubric only ordinary peasants, but also workers. The inept, tactless behavior of the Executive Committee itself is often the culprit of an uprising, which is then called kulak, but which have completely different grounds” (39). /39 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 25, l. 12./

The uprisings were caused, of course, not so much by the "tactless behavior" of leaders at various levels, as by the policy of "war communism". Driven to despair by the requisitioning and looting of the Red Army, the peasants, from whom the last stocks of grain, horses and livestock were taken away, rose with pitchforks and axes against the machine guns of the CHONs and food detachments for an unequal struggle.

As a result of mass resistance, a tense situation developed in the rear of the Reds. As early as March 19, 1919, at a meeting of the Minsk Gubernia Committee, it was stated:

“The external front is not terrible for us. It is necessary to pay more attention to the internal front and take all measures to combat the counter-revolution, to combat the discovery of a conspiracy within" (40). /40 Revolutionary committees…, p. 127. /

Moreover, in 1920 the Bolsheviks faced new problems. It was officially announced that the workers' and peasants' Red Army was liberating the workers of Belarus from the yoke of bourgeois Poland. However, local residents were in no hurry to meet the "liberators" with flowers. At best, they were indifferent to the Soviet regime. For example, in the order, which was issued on November 14, 1920 by the military commissar of the SSRB Adamovich, it is said:

“Even the workers and the poorest peasantry in some localities remained passive towards Soviet power. The registration of volunteers was extremely sluggish” (41). /41 NAB, f. 32, o. 2, d. 22, l. 178./

The matter, of course, was not limited to "passivity towards the Soviet regime." The farther to the West the red units moved, the more hostile was the mood of the population, the more often they met with hidden, and sometimes open resistance. In the rear of the Western Front, sabotage, arson of military facilities, and attacks on small units were not uncommon. In this regard, a special order was issued for the garrison of Minsk on July 22, 1920:

“... The Polish gentry, who fled from Minsk after the defeat of their White Guard gangs, left spies and arsonists within the Minsk province and the city to destroy especially important warehouses and government institutions, as evidenced by the arson of a sawmill along the Borisovsky tract on July 18 and a number of other fires during the stay of Soviet power in the city of Minsk” (42). /42 NAB, f. 32, o. 2, d. 4A, l. eight./

It is clear that sabotage and arson were not only and not so much the merit of spies and saboteurs, who allegedly left the notorious "Polish gentry" on Soviet territory. The Belarusian population, especially the peasants, who had previously suffered from the Polish occupation, and now again faced with requisitions and outright robbery, had enough reason to oppose the "liberators". Having got to know the Bolsheviks better, they quickly realized that the Soviet regime was not only no better, but much worse than the Polish one. The population of even those places that were not affected by the war in 1919 quickly understood the essence of the “liberation” that the Bolshevik troops carried on their bayonets.

The example of Bialystok is typical. At first, the inhabitants of this city and its district were quite loyal to the Bolsheviks, especially the poorest part of the population, to whom the slogans about getting rid of "lords and capitalists" seemed attractive. However, the Bolsheviks immediately introduced their own rules here, which could not please even the "class close" social elements. For example, this is what § 4 of Order No. 101 of August 9, 1920 for Bialystok and its district read:

“The local population is allowed to have a supply of food in the amount of no more than a month's need at the following rate: flour per eater - 25 pounds / 11.35 kg /, meat - 7½ pounds / 3.4 kg /, potatoes - 3 pounds / 48 kg /, sugar - 2 pounds / 0.9 kg /, salt - 3 pounds / 1.36 kg /, fish or canned food - 7½ pounds / 3.4 kg /, fat - 3 pounds, cereals - 7½ pounds. Excess stocks against the specified rate must be immediately registered with the District Food Committee. Discovered hidden, unregistered food stocks will be confiscated, and the concealers will be brought to trial by the Revolutionary Military Tribunal” (43). /43 Polish-Soviet war. Part 1, p. 149./

Even less liked the peasants of the Bialystok district those methods by which special detachments obtained food for carrying out food requisitions in the front line - the so-called food committees. At a meeting of representatives of Pozap, the department of revolutionary committees of the front, the Poarms and Revarmovs * of the 3rd and 15th armies, where the reasons for the defeat of the Reds in the war with the "White Poles" were discussed, it was said:

“... The food committees did not reckon with anything, they slaughtered two-month-old calves, left one cow for three families. The estates were recognized as lords, even if they were actually divided among the peasants. A special department fought speculation "in Moscow style" (44). /44 Polish-Soviet war. Part 2, p. 35./

/* Pozap - Food Department of the Western Front, Poarm - Food Department of the Army, Rewarm - Revolutionary Department of the Army./

As a result, the loyal mood of the inhabitants of Bialystok was replaced by sharply hostile. They were only waiting for an excuse to oppose the Bolsheviks with weapons in their hands, and quickly waited for it. The troops of the Western Front, defeated near Warsaw, retreated through areas that had been hit hard by them before, including through Bialystok, whose population took advantage of this opportunity for revenge. On August 28, Pyatakov, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 16th Army, sent a telegram to Moscow, in which he reported how the retreating Red troops were met in Bialystok:

“In Bialystok, according to the report of the commander of the 27th, who made his way with the brigade through the already occupied city, he had to fight more with the population of Bialystok than with the Polish troops, and the Jewish population also took an active part in hostile actions” (45). /45 Polish-Soviet war. Part 2, p. 24./

Partisans in 1919-1920

Local residents, primarily peasants, formed anti-Bolshevik partisan detachments, which were called "gangs" in the language of the Reds. They had nothing to do with organized criminal structures. Tukhachevsky himself defined the term "gang" as follows: "The self-organizing local peasant power relies on local armed peasant formations, which we usually call gangs" (46). /46 Tukhachevsky M.N. Fight against counter-revolutionary uprisings / Journal "War and Revolution". 1926, No. 7-8, p. 7./

Thus, any peasant armed groups that opposed Bolshevism were called "gangs", although their activities were not of a criminal, but of a military-political nature. There were many partisan detachments in the forests of Belarus during the Soviet-Polish war.

The nature of their actions depended on the number of fighters, weapons and commanders. They mainly attacked food detachments, individual military units and detachments of the Chekists. For example, on August 24, 1919, near the Zaolsha station in the Vitebsk province, partisans attacked a detachment of the provincial Cheka and killed its commander. Another detachment of 70 people was sent to help the Chekists, but the partisans dispersed it too, seized a machine gun (47). The partisans acted even more decisively in the Bykhov district in March 1920. They captured the convoy of the 8th Infantry Division (48). Sometimes partisan detachments interacted with Polish units. So, near Borisov, a detachment of Captain Semyannik, consisting of local residents, teamed up with the 3rd Lancers Regiment and went with him to a raid on the rear of the Reds, which forced the Bolsheviks to leave Borisov in the summer of 1919 (49). /47 Revolutionary committees…, p. 193./ /48 Selivanov P.A. Cit. op., p. 219./ /49 Latyszonek O. Op. cit., c. 123./

The Bolsheviks responded to the partisan movement with a new wave of red terror. According to the decrees of the Soviet authorities of various levels, persons involved in "banditry" and arson were to be shot on the spot, and persons who did not have documents, or whose documents seemed "suspicious", were ordered to be transferred to the police or the Cheka (50). /50 Selivanov P.A. Decree. op. P. 146./

But it was impossible to stop the resistance of the population by terror during the war.

Already in May 1920, in response to the campaign against desertion, in the Vitebsk, Smolensk, Gomel and Pskov provinces, there was an increase in local "banditry", which forced Tukhachevsky to leave the troops of the VOKhR in the rear and not trust them with combat missions (51). /51 Kakurin N.E., Melikov V.A. War with the White Poles, p. 90./

After the armistice

The defeat near Warsaw, then the defeats on the Neman and Shchar determined the further course of the Soviet-Polish war. The Bolsheviks had to give the Poles the areas they occupied. However, by the autumn of 1920, both sides suffered significant losses, were very tired and were forced to conclude a truce.

The fighting on the Western Front ended, but the anti-Bolshevik struggle in Belarus continued after October 12, 1920. It seemed that at the end of 1920 and the beginning of 1921 it intensified even more.

The situation of the Belarusian village, devastated by the surplus appropriation, robberies and military destruction, was terrible. So, in the summary of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the SSRB for May 1-3, 1921, it was noted:

“In terms of food, the position of the peasantry is at present the most critical. In many places they starve and eat bread containing up to 70% of herbs and roots” (52). /52 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 282, l. nineteen./

In this situation, the continuation of the collection of surpluses caused not only the indignation of the peasants, but open uprisings. Chairman of the Cheka SSRB reported:

“With regard to state appropriation, as reported in previous reports, the situation is extremely unsatisfactory. There were cases when citizens armed with stakes and pitchforks shouted: “Everyone is robbing us, but they don’t give us salt or iron” (53). /53 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 282, l. eleven./

It was also unsettled in the cities. The proletariat, which the communists considered their natural social base, began to grumble. The Chairman of the Cheka reported:

“In connection with the tariff policy, the situation of workers in Belarus is becoming catastrophic. The wages of workers are from two hundred and fifty to three hundred and sixty thousand rubles. The absence of banknotes makes it impossible to pay the workers the amount they earn, which causes discontent on their part, and on this basis partial strikes take place” (54). /54 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 282, l. ten./

Even among the Red Army soldiers there was discontent. The next report of the Borisov Politburo dated July 10, 1921 says:

“The mood of the Red Army soldiers has not improved over the period of the summary. Food in the military units is the worst, as a result of which discontent among the Red Army soldiers is growing, open grumbling has not yet been noticed. Political work in the units is carried out intensively, but does not bring the desired results, as the Red Army soldiers are passive about all the efforts of political workers to cheer up the Red Army masses. From everywhere during lectures, conversations, etc. exclamations “they don’t feed” are heard (55). /55 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 287, l. 37./

However, the Red Army soldiers often solved food problems by unauthorized requisitions and robberies, as during the war. The report of the special commission of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Minsk region of July 23, 1921 stated:

/separate red parts/ “... they allowed themselves to arrange all sorts of experiments on the population, such as breaking into barns and stealing food, and even in some cases beating the population. The 32nd Cavalry Brigade was especially distinguished in this regard" (56). /56 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 287, l. fifty./

Such "experiments" further complicated the already difficult situation of the peasantry, showed them that the Red Army was their enemy. The same summary says:

“The relationship between the peasants and the Red Army soldiers is aggravated on the same basis of a general hunger strike, since the theft of food products by the Red Army soldiers from the peasants is intensifying” (57). /57 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 287, l. 37./

The response of the peasantry was the partisan movement. By the beginning of 1921, it had reached considerable proportions. If in 1919-1920 the number of "gangs" ranged from several tens to several hundred people, then in 1921 there were detachments of two and even three thousand fighters. So, at the end of 1920, a “green army” of several thousand operated in the Borisov district. For several days she occupied the place of Pleschenitsy. The Borisov garrison was melting away from desertion, and the cavalry detachment of the Borisov military commissariat deserted in full force. About half of the Borisov policemen followed him (58). /58 Latyszonek O. Op. cit., c. 174.

Borisov uyezd was no exception in this sense. For example, in the Igumen district, a partisan detachment was operating, numbering 3 thousand people, it even had two 6-inch guns and 160 shells for them (59). /59 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 282, l. 17.

There were smaller teams. For example, in the Borisov district, a detachment of Captain Korotkevich operated up to 800 people, in Minsk - a detachment of Kolas - 100 people, in Igumensky district, a detachment of Orlov - up to 500 people (60). /60 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 282, l. 45./

Partisan detachments differed not only in numbers. Among them were armed formations of local origin and created on the territory of Western Belarus with the help of the Polish authorities, and then crossed the border. The latter were created by the "People's Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom", headed by Boris Savinkov, from people recruited in different cities and towns in the territory occupied by the Poles. There were also underground recruitment centers on Soviet territory (in Koidanovo and Minsk) (61). /61 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 289, l. eight./

Bulak-Balakhovich created a group of troops called the Belarusian People's Army and tried to liberate Belarus from the Bolsheviks. This campaign of his is well known. Despite the defeat in November 1920, he did not stop his activities, units of his army actively participated in the partisan struggle on the territory of the SSRB in 1921. They crossed the border and replenished with volunteers from the local population.

Local residents provided the partisans with food and ammunition (usually, the products were not requisitioned, but bought from the peasants). As evidenced by the intelligence report of the Cheka of the SSRB on banditry for the period from August 5 to 20, 1921, “it should be noted that gangs have a strict prohibition to offend the local population”) (62). /62 NAB, fund 4, inventory 1, file 289, sheet 12./

According to Bolshevik agents, the commanders of the detachments, among whom were many officers of the former Russian army, trained their soldiers in shooting and tactics on the battlefield. As a result, the anti-Bolshevik partisan detachments were not inferior to the regular units of the Red Army in their combat effectiveness.

The first half of 1921 was determined by the extreme activity of the partisans, which even exceeded the activity of the "bands" operating in Belarus in 1919-1920. The chairman of the Cheka of the SSRB in each report to Moscow reported on the increase in "banditry". In March-April 1921 he wrote:

“Despite the decisive measures being taken to combat banditry, which is highly developed in Belarus, it is getting stronger every day” (63). "Banditism in Belorussia has taken on colossal proportions" (64). /63 NAB, fund 4, inventory 1, file 282, sheet 2./ /64 Ibid., sheet 8./

He was seconded by lower-level bosses. In a summary for April - May 1921, the head of the Bobruisk Politburo reported:

“In general, banditry is developed throughout the county, there are no volosts where it does not exist” (65). /65 Ibid., sheet 40./

The Bolsheviks had reason to be alarmed. Not only the number and organization of the “gangs” has changed, but also their tactics. If earlier the partisans attacked small rear units and places where there were Soviet authorities, or limited themselves to sabotage on the railway and arson of warehouses and military facilities, now they resolutely attacked large detachments of the Reds, even in cases where the latter had a numerical superiority. At one of the meetings of the SSRB commission on combating banditry, it was stated:

“There was a case when a detachment outnumbering a gang of bandits, upon meeting with the latter after a shootout, fled, leaving a machine gun to the enemy” (66). /66 NAB, f. 4, about. 1, d. 119, l. 27./

This case, which the members of the Commission considered outrageous, was in fact no exception. More than once or twice, the red units became victims of the partisans. No luck, for example, to the light artillery division No. 21, which was stationed in the town of Pogoreloye (in the Igumen district). On the night of May 17-18, 1921, partisans attacked him, disarmed and stripped the Red Army soldiers (67). /67 NAB, ibid., d. 282, l. 45./

Partisan detachments also attacked large towns, overthrew the Bolshevik government in them and set up their own. This happened, for example, in the Lyaskovichi volost of the Bobruisk district (68). In the Mogilev province, they blocked the town of Glusk, so that without their permission it was impossible to either leave it or enter it. The 8th detachment of CHON sent against them was defeated, and the partisans got its machine gun (69). /68 NAB, ibid., sheet 31./ /69 NAB, ibid., sheet 40./

The partisans had their own people in the enemy camp, even among those who held quite significant positions. So, in the Igumen district, the military commissar Zhilinsky and the military leader Konopatsky collaborated with the partisans. Among the documents that they handed over to the headquarters of Colonel Pavlovich's detachment were "... plans for the work of the Komband, the Politburo and the deployment of the troops of Belarus, passes for walking around the city of Igumen inclusive on 10/VI and other documents" (70). /70 NAB, fund 4, inventory 1, file 288, page 24./

But the main reason for the success of the partisans was not in this, and not in the fact that forests and forests impeded the military operations of the Bolsheviks, as the commanders of special forces complained. The partisan movement in Belarus in 1921 would never have reached such proportions if it had not relied on the support of the peasantry. The peasants kept in touch with the partisans, informed them about the actions of the red units, hid the fighters of the partisan detachments, provided them with weapons and food, and themselves took part in sabotage and military operations (71). /71 NAB, fund 4, inventory 1, file 282, sheets 39, 58./

Driven to a desperate situation by surplus appropriation and looting, the locals had such a negative attitude towards the Bolsheviks that they willingly helped everyone who fought with them, and especially their own peasant brothers, who formed the basis of all partisan detachments. The chairman of the Cheka of the SSRB, Rotenberg, wrote in a summary for May 1-5, 1921:

“The attitude of the peasants towards the Soviet power in some localities is satisfactory, in some it is passive, towards the Communist Party it is hostile, caused by the lack of essential products, the lack of salt, manufactory and other things indispensable in the economy and the state appropriation, which they carry out with such difficulty and reluctance. On this basis every counter-revolution finds its place. Especially affects the mood of the peasants - this is banditry, which has taken on colossal proportions. They, i.e. bandits, all sorts of White Guard proclamations are scattered, the population is kindled on the basis of anti-Semitism, especially the prosperous peasantry and the gentry, which distinguishes even entire volosts, which are very sympathetic; and how not to relate, because most of the bandits are the local population. They are very close to the peasant masses, and Belarusian peasants have long been distinguished by distrust” (72). /72 NAB, fund 4, inventory 1, case 282, sheet 21./

No less significant was the fact that the peasants clearly saw the difference between the red units and the partisan detachments. If the first allowed themselves robbery and violence, then the others, as already mentioned, had a categorical prohibition to "touch" the peasant economy. It is obvious that this prohibition was practically not violated, and it would be strange if the peasants, of whom the “gangs” mainly consisted, would rob their own. As a result, as the same chairman of the Cheka, Rotenberg, wrote, “the attitude of the peasants towards the bandits is very good, towards the Red Army soldiers it is hostile” (73). /73 NAB, fund 4, inventory 1, case 282, sheet 27./

Punitive actions of the Bolsheviks in

The Bolsheviks quickly realized to what extent the success of the partisans depended on the support of the local population. They directed all their efforts to deprive the “bandits” of their social base. But instead of improving the material situation of the peasantry and thereby changing its attitude towards the Soviet regime, the Bolsheviks again turned to terror.

One of the first steps in this direction was the formation of provincial commissions for the fight against banditry (“gubernia committees”), which received extremely wide powers. They were subordinate only to the Cheka. The special instructions say:

“The orders and instructions of the provincial gangs cannot be suspended in action locally by the order of the local authorities, which can only, in case of disagreement with them, appeal them to the next commission” (74). /74 NAB, fund 4, inventory 1, file 282, sheet 20./

The instruction also determined the main methods of work of the commissions:

"... the widespread use of eviction from the front of the families of bandits and other populations compromised by assisting the bandits" (75). /75 NAB, ibid., sheet 21.

However, the teams did not limit themselves to these recommendations and went further. Thus, the Bobruisk political commission for the fight against banditry, in its very first order, spoke in favor of

“notify the entire population of the county that the most severe measure will be applied to all accomplices and harborers (these are not only those who shelter and feed the bandits, but also those who see them, know their location and do not inform the nearby executive committees and unit commanders) punishment up to confiscation of property, eviction from Belarus and execution” (76). /76 NAB, ibid., file 287, sheet. 52./

As you can see, they could have been shot for failure to inform. In general, denunciations were made the duty of all loyal citizens, even if it was necessary to denounce one's neighbor or friend. in order No. 2 of the Bobruisk team it is stated:

“Every citizen who knows who has a weapon or where it is hidden is charged with the duty to inform the military command or the organs of the Cheka” (77). /77 Ibid., sheet 53./

And what awaited those who hid their weapons and who the neighbor in the village was obliged to report on? Order No. 2 gives an unequivocal answer to this question:

“After a three-day period, residents who have not handed over weapons, upon discovery of such weapons, will be considered enemies of the workers and shot without trial or investigation, their families will be evicted outside Belarus, their property will be confiscated and distributed by councils among honest citizens” (78). /78 Ibid., sheet 53./

The last lines are noteworthy. It does not take much insight to guess that "honest citizens" were considered primarily those who denounced the "enemies of the working people." The Bolsheviks, therefore, borrowed the methods of ancient Rome, where denunciations were not only a duty, but also a profitable business.

Simultaneously with the commandos, there were revolutionary tribunals created in each combat sector. These bodies were more punitive than judicial. In any case, the instruction that was given to the military departments of the Revolutionary Tribunal was more suitable for a punitive than a legal institution:

“When establishing guilt in banditry, harboring and aiding banditry, in desertion and non-fulfillment of food tax, the tribunal of the military unit when imposing punishments: imprisonment, imprisonment in a concentration camp, eviction from the borders of Belarus and execution, necessarily combine these punishments with the confiscation of property of persons found guilty and with restriction of voting rights” (79). /79 Ibid., sheet 42/

Despite the end of the war, the Bolsheviks kept the Western Front on the territory of Belarus. Soviet historians wrote:

“The commander of the front has more than once had to develop and carry out military operations to eliminate Socialist-Revolutionary-Kulak revolts in Western Belarus (?) and destroy the rampant White Guard gangs, incited and supported by the White Poles” (80). /80 Ivanov V.M. Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky. Moscow, 1990, p. 185./

This "liquidation" was carried out in an extremely cruel way. Tukhachevsky himself testified that the methods of combating "banditry" in Belarus were mainly "Tambov". What is Tukhachevsky's "Tambov methods" is now well known. Their essence lies in the widespread use of concentration camps, where families were taken, the men of whom were suspected of participating in the struggle against the Soviet regime. If the "bandit" did not surrender within the specified period, the family was exiled. Here is what Tukhachevsky wrote:

“Of the repressions, the most effective are: the eviction of families of bandits who shelter their members, the confiscation of their property and the transfer to Soviet-minded peasants. If the eviction is difficult to organize immediately, then it is necessary to set up wide concentration camps. For harboring, for not reporting the whereabouts and actions of the bandits, mutual responsibility should be established” (82). /81 Tukhachevsky M.N. Fight against counter-revolutionary uprisings / Journal "War and Revolution". 1926. No. 9, p. sixteen./

It is obvious that in Belarus they used the "Tambov" methods of Tukhachevsky. For a complete resemblance, only aviation and chemical weapons were missing, which the future red marshal also successfully used against the Tambov peasants. The punitive measures that worked against the "Antonovshchina" proved their effectiveness in Belarus as well. Through bloody ruthless terror, the Bolsheviks were able to turn the tide in their favor. In the second half of 1921, the partisan movement declined.

This does not mean, however, that it has completely declined. For a very long time, the situation in Belarus remained unsettled for the Bolsheviks, so they liquidated the Western Front only in 1924.

The Soviet-Polish war became another of the many tragedies of Belarus. It was as a result of the events of 1920-21. first half, and then the whole of Belarus was under Soviet occupation, which determined its difficult and difficult fate in the next 70 years.

Moscow looked at Belarus as its own property, where it could do whatever it wanted. Organized and unorganized robbery, mass repression caused a corresponding reaction of the population, for the most part, they saw invaders and enemies in the Bolsheviks.

The facts leave no doubt that there was a strong anti-Bolshevik movement in Belarus, and that this movement was truly popular. The Bolsheviks, who in 1920 launched a campaign for a world revolution, faced desperate resistance in Belarus, and partly due to this resistance they were defeated near Warsaw, on the Neman and Shchara. In any war, the situation in the rear plays no less a role than the situation at the front, and as the military commissar of the SSRB Adamovich noted in his order, “the army did not feel behind itself a strong rear, capable of providing proper assistance to the front at the right time.”

Thus, although the anti-Bolshevik struggle in Belarus had no chance of a final victory, it became an important factor influencing the results of the Soviet-Polish war.

Kirill Markovich Mal (born 19) is a professional historian, researcher at the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. Author of the book "The Civil War in the USA 1861-1865" (Minsk, 2000).

Kirill Mal, /* Based on articles in the journal “Belarusian Historical Review”: volume 4, citation 1-2 (1997), p. 61-70; volume 6, sshtak 1-2 (1999), p. 49-71/

German occupation.

Today they say in our country that the BNR is not worth a line in the history books, because the period of the BNR was - if not all, but for the most part - a period of German occupation.

However, that German occupation is very different from the occupation under Hitler. You can't mix completely different things. But it is precisely this mixing that is deliberately produced by the enemies of Belarusian independence.

Firstly, it was only during the German occupation in 1918 that Belarusian was proclaimed the state language for the first time in Belarus. Neither the Poles nor the Russians allowed this. And the Germans were not sorry. They did not interfere in the "old dispute of the Slavs" (according to Pushkin). On the contrary, Belarusians were allowed to make their “mova” the language of the state bureaucracy. For this alone, you can say "thank you" to them.

Secondly, the Germans allowed the Belarusian national institutions, which had previously been banned by the Poles and Russians. In a short time, 350 Belarusian schools and several gymnasiums began to operate in the BNR, newspapers in the Belarusian language began to appear, cultural and educational societies and publishing houses were created, even national theaters appeared. Belarusians were able to award their heroes with Belarusian orders and medals!

For the first time, Belarusians got rid of the "gentry" (Poles and Russians), from whom only their forelocks crackled. For the first time, people felt themselves outside the “prison of peoples,” as Lenin called Russia before the revolution.

This is not a praise of the Germans of those years. It's just that the Germans in the current situation - for their own benefit - took the BNR under patronage. This is one of the many paradoxes of history.

By the way, this paradox is quite understandable. In 1918, the Germans, unlike in 1941, did not have a plan to assimilate Belarusians in order to turn them into "German-like". Therefore, they were sincerely surprised at how the Russians for two centuries did not give the Belarusians the opportunity to realize themselves as an independent people. Unlike the Russians, the Germans allowed the Belarusian leaders to do whatever they wanted with their language, education and culture. After a little thought, they did not even interfere with the work of the Belarusian administration in the center and in the regions. Of course, subject to the supremacy of the occupation command.

The German occupation in 1918 was far more benign than the occupation by Russia or Poland. Because they were not interested in Belarus as an “apple of discord” between Poles and Russians. According to the “divide to rule” principle, they did not prevent the Belarusians from building a national state, as this removed Belarus from the ideological and political influence of both Poland and Russia.

In the summer of 1918, the passport of a citizen of the BNR was established, consulates of the BNR were opened in Ukraine, Lietuva, and then in several other countries.

“After the defeat of Germany on the Western Front and the evacuation of German troops, the BPR remained defenseless against the Bolsheviks and the Polish legions” (Belarusian Encyclopedia, 1995, volume 1, p.

The main thing here is not the departure of the German army (it left, and good riddance). And the fact that Belarus was again left face to face with Russia and Poland, who started a new war between themselves. Everything was repeated once again: the Belarusians again had only two options: to be together either with Warsaw or with Moscow.

And the neighbors did not give the third option - the Belarusian one.

Perhaps some of the readers will not agree with me, but I believe that the Germans, not wanting and not planning the benefit of the Belarusians, did good to Belarus (the vectors coincided not in motives, but in direction).

Under the conditions of the German occupation (as if "hothouse", that is, without the pressure of Polish and Russian chauvinists), it was possible to lay the foundation of the Belarusian statehood. It was thanks to this that Warsaw and Moscow had to reckon with it in the course of the struggle between themselves in subsequent years.

They began to compete in who would promise the Belarusian people more. Belarus from an “empty place” (according to Pushkin) miraculously turned into a beautiful bride, for whom two “famous lads” (an expression of the poet Jan Dyuzhsky) argued - Poland and Russia. The Poles promised autonomy to Western Belarusians, and Moscow agreed to return to Minsk a part of Eastern Belarus taken from it.

Both sides did a lot of things that had never been done in tsarist Russia. But when they realized that the situation had stabilized, the rollback immediately began, and at a terrifying speed. Belarusian publications began to be closed both in Poland and in the USSR, activists of the Belarusian movement (members of national parties and public associations, intellectuals, priests) were imprisoned (in Poland), executed, sent to concentration camps and exile (in the USSR). The Belarusian language has again become an outcast.

Instead of national ideas, the imperial ideology was implanted in the form of the history, culture and language of Greater Poland and Greater Russia. In these areas, everything has not just gone backward, but even further than in tsarist Russia. The term BNR itself became banned in Poland and the USSR. Mentions of her were unanimously removed from their history textbooks by both the "White Poles" and the Bolsheviks.

When the Germans came here again in 1941, they found the Belarusian people offended by both the Poles and the Russians. But these were no longer those “normal” Germans that 23 years ago, but National Socialists who had gone crazy on the basis of racial theory. Inspired by the elimination of the Bolsheviks, the Belarusian nationalists were required by the invaders only as helpers.

It was not possible to enter the same river twice. So it turned out that the Belarusian nationalists, with their idea of an independent Belarusian state (under the protectorate of the Third Reich) and all the national symbols (flag, coat of arms, anthem, etc.), did not achieve their goal, but they gave Russian chauvinists reason to declare them “traitors to the Soviet Union” in our time. socialist homeland.

This time, cooperation with the Germans did not give Belarusians anything constructive. On the other hand, the tragic delusion of the Belarusian national figures of the period 1941-1944 armed the opponents of the Belarusian state - both Russians and Poles - with trump cards. Like, everyone who wants Belarusian independence is fascists. Russian ideologists, as well as their Belarusian supporters (“fifth column”) actively use film footage of processions of collaborators under white-red-white flags to inspire Belarusians: only fascists could think of such a muck as an independent Belarusian state!

Nevertheless, today we live just in this "muck" - in an independent and sovereign Belarus.

I am deeply convinced that every nation has the right to its own statehood. However, its implementation is always hindered by neighbors pursuing their own interests. So the point is not the fascists at all, but the Russian and Polish chauvinists.

But back to BNR.

From the book The Great Civil War 1939-1945 author Burovsky Andrey Mikhailovich

Occupation After the defeat of Greece, Bulgaria annexed eastern Macedonia and western Thrace; the rest of the country was divided into Italian (western) and German (eastern) occupation zones. Political situation The king was in exile. Metaxas died on January 29, 1941

From the book West Wind - Clear Weather the author Mozheiko Igor

Chapter I. The Occupation

From the book Secrets of Belarusian History. author Deruzhinsky Vadim Vladimirovich

German occupation. Today we are told that the BNR is not worth a line in the history books, because the period of the BNR was - if not all, but for the most part - a period of German occupation. However, that German occupation is completely different from the occupation under Hitler. Can't be mixed

From the book Parisians. Adventure story in Paris. by Robb Graham

Occupation 1 It is said that children living in cities grow up faster than other children. Almost every day they see and hear unusual things, and even if they develop a spirit of indifference and try to be inconspicuous, their routines and beliefs will always be

From the book The Crusades. Medieval Wars for the Holy Land author Asbridge Thomas

Occupation of Damascus After Saladin had made Egypt his base of operations, Damascus was to be the first target in bringing Nur al-Din's dominions under his rule. Seizing on Ibn al-Muqaddam's decision to bargain for peace with the Kingdom of Jerusalem in

From the book Makhno and his time: On the Great Revolution and the Civil War 1917-1922. in Russia and Ukraine author Shubin Alexander Vladlenovich

3. German Occupation and the Hetmanate The Central Rada and its General Secretariat returned to Kyiv in the convoy of German troops, now headed by the Socialist-Revolutionary V. Golubovich. The leaders of the Rada naively thought that the German troops, "friendly to us, would fight the enemies of the Ukrainian People's

From the book Secrets of the Moscow Patriarchy author Bogdanov Andrey Petrovich

3. Occupation Things seemed to be going well. The clashes were resolutely suppressed, and the Pole who shot at the icon was put to death by the hetman's court, and the one who took away the Moscow girl was flogged with a whip. Zholkiewski and Hermogenes had a nice conversation, only the hetman scraped

From the book Blitzkrieg in Western Europe: Norway, Denmark author Patyanin Sergey Vladimirovich

4.1. Occupation of Denmark The operation of the XXXI Corps in Denmark proceeded exactly according to plan. Having advanced from the concentration areas in Central Germany, units of the 170th Infantry Division and the 11th Motorized Brigade arrived in Schleswig on the night of April 8 and occupied the lines on the border.

From the book German Occupation of Northern Europe. Combat operations of the Third Reich. 1940-1945 by Zimke Earl

Occupation of Denmark The operations of the XXXI Corps in Denmark proceeded in strict accordance with the plan. On the night of April 8, the 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 170th Infantry Division, having set out from their assembly points in Northern Germany, encamped along the Schleswig-Flensburg road. Parts of the 198th Infantry

From the book The Illusion of Freedom [Where the new Bandera people are leading Ukraine] author Byshok Stanislav Olegovich

From the book German Occupation of Northern Europe. 1940–1945 by Zimke Earl

Occupation of Denmark The operations of the XXXI Corps in Denmark proceeded in strict accordance with the plan. On the night of April 8, the 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 170th Infantry Division, leaving their assembly points in northern Germany, camped along the Schleswig-Flensburg road. Units of the 198th Infantry Division

From the book of Athena: the history of the city author Llewellyn Smith Michael

German occupation and famine In April 1940, Italian troops occupied Albania. On October 28, the Italian ambassador presented Metaxas with an ultimatum demanding that Italy be allowed to take up strategic positions in Greece within three hours.

From the book History of Ukraine author Team of authors

Chapter 1. The Revolution and the German Occupation

From the book History of Ukraine author Team of authors

German occupation and dispersal of the Central Rada German and Austro-Hungarian troops moved to Ukraine. The Red Guard, numbering about 25,000 fighters, could not stop the German front of 200,000 soldiers. Despite the formal world, the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries did not

From the book History of Ukraine author Team of authors

The occupation of Germany and its allies divided Ukraine into several parts. August 1, 1941 Eastern Galicia was annexed to the Polish General Government. On August 20, the Reichskommissariat "Ukraine" was created, the territory of which was divided into 6 districts. Residence

From the book The Baltic States on the Fracture of International Rivalry. From the invasion of the Crusaders to the Peace of Tartu in 1920 author Vorobieva Lyubov Mikhailovna

VIII.2. German occupation of Estonia. The liquidation of the gains of the October Revolution With the adoption of the Decree on Peace in October 1917, the Bolsheviks led Russia out of the imperialist war shortly before the victory of the Entente, but at the same time plunged it into the abyss of a long-term foreign