Operation Bagration. Complete liberation of Belarus from Nazi invaders

For three years, Belarus was under the yoke of the enemy. The occupants plundered the territory of the republic: cities were devastated, more than a million buildings in the countryside were burned, and 7 thousand schools were turned into ruins. The Nazis killed more than two million prisoners of war and civilians. In fact, there was no family in the Byelorussian SSR that did not suffer from the Nazis. White Russia was one of the most affected territories of the Union. But people did not lose heart and resisted. Knowing that in the East the Red Army repulsed the enemy's onslaught on Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus, defeated the Nazis on the Kursk Bulge, and liberated the regions of Ukraine, the Belarusian partisans were preparing for decisive action. By the summer of 1944, approximately 140 thousand partisans were operating on the territory of Belarus. The general leadership of the partisans was carried out by the underground organizations of the Communist Party of the BSSR, headed by Panteleimon Kondratievich Ponomarenko, who at the same time was the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement of the USSR. It should be noted that contemporaries noted his amazing honesty, responsibility and deep analytical abilities. Stalin highly appreciated Ponomarenko, some researchers believe that the leader wanted to make him his successor.

A few days before the start of the operation to liberate Belarus, partisan detachments delivered a series of sensitive blows against the Germans. The partisans destroyed their transport infrastructure, communication lines, actually paralyzed the rear of the enemy at the most crucial moment. During the operation, the partisans attacked individual enemy units and attacked the rear structures of the Germans.

Operation preparation

The operational plan of the Belarusian operation began to be developed back in April. The general plan of the General Staff was to crush the flanks of the German Army Group Center, encircle its main forces east of the capital of the BSSR and completely liberate Belarus. It was a very ambitious and large-scale plan, the simultaneous crushing of an entire enemy army group was planned very rarely during World War II. It was one of the largest operations in the entire war of mankind.

By the summer of 1944, the Red Army had achieved impressive success in Ukraine - the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, the Soviet forces carried out a number of successful offensive operations, liberating most of the territory of the republic. But things were worse in the Belarusian direction: the front line approached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin, forming a huge ledge that was turned deep into the USSR, the so-called. "Belarusian balcony".

In July 1944, the German industry reached the highest point of its development in this war - in the first half of the year, the Reich factories produced more than 16 thousand aircraft, 8.3 thousand tanks, assault guns. Berlin carried out several mobilizations, and the strength of its armed forces was 324 divisions and 5 brigades. Army Group Center, which defended Belarus, had 850-900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1350 aircraft. In addition, at the second stage of the battle, Army Group Center was supported by formations of the right flank of Army Group North and the left flank of Army Group Northern Ukraine, as well as reserves from the Western Front and various sectors of the Eastern Front. The Army Group "Center" included 4 armies: the 2nd field army, it held the Pinsk and Pripyat region (commander Walter Weiss); The 9th field army, it defended the area on both sides of the Berezina southeast of Bobruisk (Hans Jordan, after June 27 - Nikolaus von Forman); The 4th Field Army (Kurt von Tippelskirch, after June 30, the army was commanded by Vinzenz Müller) and the 3rd Panzer Army (Georg Reinhardt), which occupied the interfluve of the Berezina and the Dnieper, as well as a bridgehead from Bykhov to the area northeast of Orsha. In addition, formations of the 3rd Panzer Army occupied the Vitebsk region. The commander of Army Group Center was Field Marshal Ernst Busch (on June 28, Bush was replaced by Walter Model). His chief of staff was Hans Krebs.

If the command of the Red Army was well aware of the German grouping in the area of ​​the future offensive, then the command of Army Group Center and the headquarters of the Reich ground forces had a completely wrong idea about Moscow's plans for the summer campaign of 1944. Adolf Hitler and the High Command of the Wehrmacht believed that a major Soviet offensive should still be expected in Ukraine, north or south of the Carpathians (most likely north). It was believed that from the area south of Kovel, Soviet troops would strike towards the Baltic Sea, trying to cut off Army Groups Center and North from Germany. Large forces were allocated to parry a possible threat. So, in the army group "Northern Ukraine" there were seven tank, two tank-grenadier divisions, as well as four battalions of heavy tanks "Tiger". And the Army Group "Center" had one tank, two tank-grenadier divisions and one battalion of heavy tanks. In addition, they feared an attack on Romania - on the oil fields of Ploiesti. In April, the command of Army Group Center submitted to the top leadership a proposal to reduce the front line and withdraw troops to better positions beyond the Berezina. But this plan was rejected, Army Group Center was ordered to defend in the same positions. Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk were declared "fortresses" and fortified with the expectation of all-round defense, a possible struggle in the environment. For engineering work, forced labor of local residents was widely used. Aviation, radio intelligence and German agents were unable to reveal the preparations by the Soviet command for a major operation in Belarus. Army Groups Center and North were predicted to have a "calm summer"; the situation inspired so little concern that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the Red Army operation. But, it should be noted that the front in Belarus stood still for a long time, and the Nazis managed to create a developed defense system. It included "fortress" cities, numerous field fortifications, bunkers, dugouts, interchangeable positions for artillery and machine guns. The Germans assigned a large role to natural obstacles - wooded and swampy terrain, many rivers and streams.

Red Army. Stalin made the final decision to conduct the summer campaign, including the Belarusian operation, at the end of April. Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. I. Antonov was instructed to organize work in the General Staff on planning operations. The plan to liberate Belarus received a code name - Operation Bagration. On May 20, 1944, the General Staff completed the development of an offensive operation plan. A. M. Vasilevsky, A. I. Antonov and G. K. Zhukov were called to the Headquarters. On May 22, the commanders of the fronts, I. Kh. Bagramyan, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, and K. K. Rokossovsky, were received at Headquarters to hear their views on the operation. The coordination of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to Vasilevsky and Zhukov, they left for the troops in early June.

The rate provided for the application of three powerful blows. The 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts advanced in the general direction towards Vilnius. The troops of the two fronts were supposed to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk grouping, develop an offensive to the west and cover the left-flank grouping of the Borisov-Minsk group of German forces. The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to defeat the Bobruisk group of Germans. Then develop the offensive in the direction of Slutsk-Baranovichi and cover the Minsk group of German troops from the south and south-west. The 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left-flank grouping of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, was to move in the general direction towards Minsk.

From the Soviet side, about 1 million 200 thousand people participated in the operation as part of four fronts: the 1st Baltic Front (General of the Army Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan); 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky); 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Georgy Fedorovich Zakharov); 1st Belorussian Front (General of the Army Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky). The coordinator of the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts was Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, and the coordinator of the actions of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts was the chief of the General Staff Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky. The Dnieper military flotilla also took part in the operation.

Preparation of the Belarusian operation (from left to right) Varennikov I. S., Zhukov G. K., Kazakov V. I., Rokossovsky K. K. 1st Belorussian Front. 1944

Operation "Bagration" was supposed to solve several important tasks:

Completely clear the Moscow direction from German troops, since the leading edge of the "Belarusian ledge" was 80 kilometers from Smolensk. The configuration of the front line in the BSSR was a huge arc extended to the east with an area of ​​almost 250 thousand square kilometers. The arc stretched from Vitebsk in the north and Pinsk in the south to the Smolensk and Gomel regions, hanging over the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The German high command attached great importance to this territory - it protected the distant approaches to Poland and East Prussia. In addition, Hitler still cherished plans for a victorious war if a “miracle” was created, or if major geopolitical changes took place. From the bridgehead in Belarus, it was possible to strike at Moscow again.

Complete the liberation of the entire Belarusian territory, parts of Lithuania and Poland.

Reach the Baltic coast and the borders of East Prussia, which made it possible to cut the German front at the junctions of Army Groups "Center" and "North" and isolate these German groups from each other.

To create profitable operational and tactical prerequisites for subsequent offensive operations in the Baltic states, in Western Ukraine, in the Warsaw and East Prussian directions.

Main milestones of the operation

The operation was carried out in two stages. At the first stage (June 23-July 4, 1944) the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk front offensive operations were carried out. At the second stage of Operation Bagration (July 5–August 29, 1944), Vilnius, Shauliai, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Kaunas and Osovets front-line offensive operations were carried out.

The first stage of the operation

The offensive began on the morning of June 23, 1944. Near Vitebsk, the Red Army successfully broke through the German defenses and already on June 25 surrounded five enemy divisions to the west of the city. The liquidation of the Vitebsk "cauldron" was completed by the morning of June 27, on the same day Orsha was released. With the destruction of the Vitebsk German grouping, a key position on the left flank of the defense of Army Group Center was captured. The northern flank of the Army Group "Center" was actually destroyed, more than 40 thousand Germans died and 17 thousand people were captured. In the Orsha direction, after breaking through the German defenses, the Soviet command brought the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. Having successfully crossed the Berezina, Rotmistrov's tankers cleared Borisov of the Nazis. The withdrawal of troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front to the Borisov region led to significant operational success: the 3rd Panzer Army of Army Group Center was cut off from the 4th Field Army. The formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front advancing in the Mogilev direction broke through the powerful and deeply echeloned defense of the Germans, which the enemy had prepared along the Pronya, Basya and Dnieper rivers. On June 28 they liberated Mogilev. The withdrawal of the 4th German Army lost organization, the enemy lost up to 33 thousand killed and captured.

The Bobruisk offensive operation was supposed to create a southern "pincer" of the huge encirclement conceived by the Soviet Headquarters. This operation was entirely carried out by the most powerful of the fronts - the 1st Belorussian under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky. The 9th Army of the Wehrmacht resisted the offensive of the Red Army. We had to advance through very difficult terrain - swamps. The blow was struck on June 24: from the southeast to the northwest, gradually turning to the north, the 65th army of Batov (reinforced by the 1st Don tank corps) moved, from the east to the west the 3rd army of Gorbatov advanced with the 9th tank body. For a quick breakthrough in the Slutsk direction, the 28th Army of Luchinsky and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps of Pliev were used. The armies of Batov and Luchinsky quickly broke through the defenses of the stunned enemy (the Russians made their way through the swamp, which was considered impassable). But the 3rd army of Gorbatov had to literally bite into the orders of the Germans. The commander of the 9th Army, Hans Jordan, threw his main reserve against her - the 20th Panzer Division. But soon he had to redirect his reserve to the southern flank of the defense. The 20th Panzer Division was unable to close the gap. On June 27, the main forces of the 9th Field Army fell into the "boiler". General Jordan was replaced by von Forman, but this could not save the situation. Attempts to deblockade from the outside and from the inside failed. Panic reigned in encircled Bobruisk, and on the 27th its assault began. By the morning of June 29, Bobruisk was completely liberated. The Germans lost 74 thousand people killed and captured. As a result of the defeat of the 9th Army, both flanks of Army Group Center were open, and the road to Minsk was free from the northeast and southeast.

On June 29, the 1st Baltic Front attacked Polotsk. The 6th Guards Army of Chistyakov and the 43rd Army of Beloborodov bypassed the city from the south (the guards of the 6th Army also bypassed Polotsk from the west), the 4th shock army of Malyshev - from the north. Butkov's 1st Panzer Corps liberated the city of Ushachi south of Polotsk and advanced far to the west. Then, with a sudden attack, the tankers seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dvina. But it did not work out to take the Germans into the "ring" - Karl Hilpert, who commanded the garrison of the city, arbitrarily left the "fortress", without waiting for the withdrawal routes to be cut by the Russian troops. Polotsk was occupied on July 4th. As a result of the Polotsk operation, the German command lost a strong stronghold and a railway junction. In addition, the flank threat to the 1st Baltic Front was eliminated, the positions of the German Army Group North were outflanked from the south and were under the threat of a flank strike.

The German command, trying to rectify the situation, replaced the commander of Army Group Center Bush with Field Marshal Walter Model. He was considered a master of defensive operations. Reserve units were sent to Belarus, including the 4th, 5th and 12th tank divisions.

The 4th German Army, in the face of the threat of imminent encirclement, retreated across the Berezina River. The situation was extremely difficult: the flanks were open, the retreating columns were subjected to constant Soviet air strikes and partisan attacks. The pressure from the 2nd Belorussian Front, which was located directly in front of the 4th Army, was not strong, since the plans of the Soviet command did not include the expulsion of German troops from the future "boiler".

The 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in two main directions: to the southwest (toward Minsk) and west (to Vileyka). The 1st Belorussian Front advanced on Slutsk, Nesvizh and Minsk. German resistance was weak, the main forces were defeated. On June 30, Slutsk was taken, and on July 2, Nesvizh, the escape routes to the southwest were cut off for the Germans. By July 2, tank units of the 1st Belorussian Front approached Minsk. The advancing units of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to endure a fierce battle with the 5th German Panzer Division (reinforced by a battalion of heavy tanks), which arrived in the Borisov region on June 26-28. This division was full-blooded, did not participate in hostilities for several months. In the course of several bloody battles, the last one took place on July 1-2 north-west of Minsk, the tank division lost almost all its tanks and was driven back. On July 3, Burdeyny's 2nd Panzer Corps broke into Minsk from the northwest. At the same time, advanced units of Rokossovsky approached the city from the south. The German garrison was not numerous and did not last long, Minsk was liberated by lunchtime. As a result, units of the 4th Army and units of other armies that joined it fell into the encirclement. The Red Army actually avenged the "cauldrons" of 1941. The encircled were unable to organize a long-term resistance - the area of ​​​​the encirclement was shot through with artillery fire, it was constantly bombed, the ammunition ran out, there was no outside help. The Germans fought until July 8-9, made several desperate attempts to break through, but were defeated everywhere. July 8 and. about. commander of the army, the commander of the XII Army Corps Vinzenz Müller signed the surrender. Even before July 12, there was a “cleansing operation”, the Germans lost 72 thousand killed and more than 35 thousand were captured.

The poverty of the road network in Belarus and the marshy and wooded terrain led to the fact that many kilometers of columns of German troops crowded together on only two major highways - Zhlobin and Rogachev, where they were subjected to massive attacks by the Soviet 16th Air Army. Some German units were practically destroyed on the Zhlobin highway.

Photo of destroyed German equipment from the area of ​​the bridge across the Berezina.

The second stage of the operation

The Germans tried to stabilize the situation. The head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Kurt Zeitzler, proposed to transfer Army Group North to the south in order to build a new front with the help of its troops. But this plan was rejected by Hitler for political reasons (relations with the Finns). In addition, the naval command opposed - the withdrawal from the Baltic worsened communications with the same Finland and Sweden, led to the loss of a number of naval bases and strongholds in the Baltic. As a result, Zeitzler resigned and was replaced by Heinz Guderian. Model, for its part, tried to erect a new defensive line that ran from Vilnius through Lida and Baranovichi in order to close a hole in the front about 400 km wide. But for this he had only one whole army - the 2nd and the remnants of other armies. Therefore, the German command had to transfer significant forces to Belarus from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and from the West. Until July 16, 46 divisions were sent to Belarus, but these troops were not brought into battle immediately, in parts, often "from wheels", and therefore they could not quickly turn the tide.

From July 5 to July 20, 1944, the Vilnius operation was carried out by the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky. The Germans did not have a continuous front of defense in the Vilnius direction. On July 7, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps of Obukhov reached the city and began to encircle it. An attempt to take the city on the move failed. On the night of July 8, new German forces were brought up to Vilnius. On July 8-9, the city was completely surrounded and its assault was launched. German attempts to unblock the city from the western direction were repulsed. The last centers of resistance were crushed in Vilnius on 13 July. Up to 8 thousand Germans were destroyed, 5 thousand people were taken prisoner. On July 15, units of the front occupied several bridgeheads on the western bank of the Neman. Until the 20th, there were battles for bridgeheads.

On July 28, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on a new offensive - they were aimed at Kaunas and Suwalki. On July 30, the German defense along the Neman was broken through; on August 1, the Germans left Kaunas so as not to be surrounded. Then the Germans received reinforcements and went on a counteroffensive - the battles went on with varying success until the end of August. The front did not reach several kilometers to the border of East Prussia.

Bagramyan's 1st Baltic Front received the task of reaching the sea to cut off the North group. In the Dvina direction, the Germans were initially able to hold back the offensive, since the front was regrouping forces and waiting for reserves. Dvinsk was cleared in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front advancing to the right only on July 27th. On the same day they took Siauliai. By July 30, the front managed to separate the two enemy army groups from each other - the advanced units of the Red Army cut the last railway between East Prussia and the Baltic in the Tukums region. On July 31 Jelgava was captured. The 1st Baltic Front went to the sea. The Germans began to try to reconnect with Army Group North. The fighting went on with varying success, and at the end of August there was a break in the battles.

The 2nd Belorussian Front advanced to the west - to Novogrudok, and then Grodno and Bialystok. The 49th army of Grishin and the 50th army of Boldin participated in the destruction of the Minsk "boiler", therefore, on July 5, only one army, the 33rd, went on the offensive. The 33rd Army advanced without encountering much resistance, covering 120-125 km in five days. On July 8, Novogrudok was liberated, on the 9th the army reached the Neman River. On July 10, the 50th Army joined the offensive and the troops crossed the Neman. On July 16, Grodno was liberated, the Germans were already putting up fierce resistance, a series of counterattacks was repulsed. The German command tried to stop the Soviet troops, but they did not have enough strength for this. July 27 Bialystok was recaptured. Soviet soldiers reached the pre-war border of the Soviet Union. The front was unable to carry out significant encirclements, since it did not have large mobile formations (tank, mechanized, cavalry corps) in its composition. On August 14, Osovets and the bridgehead beyond the Narew were occupied.

The 1st Belorussian Front advanced in the direction of Baranovichi-Brest. Almost immediately, the advancing units collided with German reserves: the 4th Panzer Division, the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division, the 28th Light Infantry Division, and other formations went. July 5-6 was a fierce battle. Gradually, the German forces were crushed, they were inferior in number. In addition, the Soviet front was supported by powerful Air Force formations, which inflicted strong blows on the Germans. On July 6, Kovel was liberated. On July 8, after a fierce battle, Baranovichi was taken. On July 14 they took Pinsk, on the 20th Kobrin. On July 20, units of Rokossovsky crossed the Bug on the move. The Germans did not have time to create a line of defense along it. On July 25, a “cauldron” was created near Brest, but on the 28th, the remnants of the encircled German group broke out of it (the Germans lost 7 thousand people killed). It should be noted that the battles were fierce, there were few prisoners, but a lot of Germans were killed.

On July 22, units of the 2nd Panzer Army (which was attached to the front during the second phase of the operation) reached Lublin. On July 23, the assault on the city began, but due to the lack of infantry, it dragged on, the city was finally taken by the morning of the 25th. In late July - early August, Rokossovsky's front captured two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula.

Operation results

As a result of the two-month offensive of the Red Army, White Russia was completely cleared of the Nazis, part of the Baltic states and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. In general, on a front of 1100 kilometers, the advance of troops to a depth of up to 600 kilometers was achieved.

It was a major defeat for the Wehrmacht. There is even an opinion that it was the largest defeat of the German armed forces in World War II. Army Group Center was defeated, Army Group North was threatened with defeat. The powerful line of defense in Belarus, protected by natural barriers (swamps, rivers), has been broken. The German reserves were depleted, which had to be thrown into battle in order to close the "hole".

An excellent groundwork has been created for a future offensive into Poland and further into Germany. Thus, the 1st Belorussian Front captured two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula south of the capital of Poland (Magnushevsky and Pulawsky). In addition, during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the 1st Ukrainian Front occupied a bridgehead near Sandomierz.

Operation Bagration was a triumph of Soviet military art. The Red Army "answered" for the "boilers" of 1941.

The Soviet army lost up to 178.5 thousand dead, missing and captured, as well as 587.3 thousand wounded and sick. The total losses of the Germans are about 400 thousand people (according to other sources, more than 500 thousand).

Fighting in Karelia was still going on when a plan under the code name "Bagration" was put into action on the central sector of the front.

The 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts, the Dnieper flotilla, long-range aviation and large forces of Belarusian partisans were involved in the offensive in Belarus.

Soviet troops struck simultaneously in the Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk directions.

The idea of ​​the operation was to first defeat the flank groupings of Army Group Center in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, and then, developing the offensive in converging directions to Minsk, encircle and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center.

The solution of this problem was to provide the Soviet troops with the further development of the offensive to the borders of East Prussia and the Nareva and Vistula rivers.

In accordance with the concept of the operation, the 1st Baltic Front delivered the main blow to Beshenkovichi, Lepel and subsequently to Daugavpils and Kaunas; 3rd Belorussian Front - to Borisov, Minsk and later on Grodno; 2nd Belorussian Front - Mogilev, Minsk; 1st Belorussian Front - to Bobruisk, Baranovichi and part of the forces to Minsk. On June 23-24, Soviet troops went on the offensive.

On the very first day, the enemy's defenses were broken through in a number of directions. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan, in cooperation with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, commanded by Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, struck around Vitebsk from the northwest and southeast.

On June 26, Soviet troops liberated Vitebsk, and the next day they completed the defeat of five encircled enemy divisions.

At the same time, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the offensive along the Minsk Highway and liberated Orsha on June 27.

In these battles, a heroic feat was performed by Guards Private Yuri Smirnov. Being seriously wounded, he was captured by the Nazis. They subjected Smirnov to brutal torture, trying to force him to give information about the Red Army.

But the Komsomol fighter did not say a word. The Soviet soldiers who captured the enemy line of defense found the corpse of Smirnov crucified on the wall of the dugout. Nails were driven into the forehead, arms and legs of the soldier. For perseverance and courage, Yu. Smirnov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The offensive of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Colonel-General G.F. Zakharov also developed successfully. On June 27, the troops of the front reached the Dnieper, crossed it north and south of Mogilev, broke through the enemy defenses on the western bank of the river, and on June 28 captured Mogilev.

The troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky also achieved great successes, which went on the offensive on June 24th.

They attacked Bobruisk, broke the enemy defenses in a short time and surrounded five German divisions in the Bobruisk area. On June 29, the encircled grouping was destroyed. Army Group Center was facing disaster.

In an effort to somehow rectify the situation, the new commander of the group, Field Marshal V. Model, who replaced Field Marshal E. Bush on this post on June 28, tried to organize defense along the Berezina with the help of forces taken from the Northern Ukraine and North ".

But it was already too late. The troops of all three Belorussian fronts, rapidly advancing, thwarted the enemy's plan.

More than 100,000 enemy soldiers and officers turned out to be in the "cauldron" formed east of Minsk.

In the battle for Borisov, a tank crew consisting of a communist lieutenant P. N. Rak and Komsomol guards sergeants A. A. Petryaev and A. I. Danilov immortalized himself. Breaking into the city along the bridge over the Berezina, which was immediately blown up by the enemy, the Soviet tank fought alone for 16 hours on the streets of the city.

All three heroes died, causing significant damage to the enemy. They defeated the fascist commandant's office, the headquarters of one of the German units.

On July 3, the residents of Minsk enthusiastically greeted the Red Army units and partisan formations that took part in the liberation of the capital of Belarus.

Without stopping the offensive, the Soviet troops began to destroy the encircled enemy formations. On July 11 it was all over. On July 17, about 60 thousand German soldiers, officers and generals captured in Belarus passed through the streets of Moscow under escort.

Only as prisoners the fascist conquerors were able to see the Soviet capital.

The offensive of the Soviet troops continued on a broad front until the end of August.

On July 13, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated the capital of Soviet Lithuania, Vilnius, from Nazi invaders. The 1st Baltic Front, developing an offensive to the northwest, entered Latvia and at the end of July captured the city of Jelgava, an important communications hub that connected the Baltic states with East Prussia. The mobile units of the front broke out on the coast of the Gulf of Riga in the region of Tukums.

Communications of the German Army Group North with the Army Group Center and East Prussia by land were interrupted.

True, in the future, the Nazis managed to push the Soviet troops back from the coast of the bay and temporarily create a land corridor. However, the position of Army Group North, deeply engulfed by the troops of the three Baltic fronts, remained extremely difficult.

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, having liberated Vilnius, reached the Neman on a wide front, crossed it and continued the offensive towards the borders of East Prussia.

In the battles for the bridgehead on the Neman, along with Soviet pilots, the French aviation regiment "Normandy" fought, which was given the honorary name "Nemansky" for these battles. Two French pilots - Marcel Albert and Rolland de La Puap - were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, developing the offensive, threw back the enemy troops behind the Narew and by the end of August reached the nearest approaches to East Prussia from the southeast.

The offensive of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front developed especially successfully, the actions of which proceeded in close contact with the neighboring 1st Ukrainian Front, which began to advance in the direction of Rava-Russkaya on July 13.

Continuing the offensive, the troops of the left wing of the front reached the Vistula and captured bridgeheads on its western bank in the area of ​​Magnuszew, Demblin and Pulawy.

Together with the Soviet fighters, the soldiers of the 1st Polish Army, formed in the USSR, under the command of Lieutenant General 3. Berling, fought bravely for the liberation of Poland. Polish partisans actively helped the Red Army.

The population greeted the liberators with joy, paying tribute of gratitude and respect for the selfless courage of the Soviet soldiers.

At the end of July, fighting broke out on the outskirts of Warsaw - Prague, culminating in the expulsion of the Nazis from it in mid-September.

The Belarusian operation, carried out by the forces of four fronts, was one of the largest operations of the Great Patriotic War.

Fascist Army Group Center suffered a complete disaster.

Soviet troops liberated all of Belarus, most of Lithuania, part of Latvia and Polish lands east of the Vistula and Narew.

The Red Army stood on the threshold of East Prussia.

The enemy's strategic front in the central direction was destroyed in an extremely short time to a depth of up to 600 km.

As a result of the crushing defeat of the Army Group "Center" and the elimination of the Belarusian ledge, favorable conditions were created for the liberation of Western Ukraine, the Baltic states and a successful offensive in the countries of South-Eastern Europe.

During the course, several large-scale military offensive campaigns of the Soviet troops were carried out. One of the key was the operation "Bagration" (1944). The campaign was named in honor of the Patriotic War of 1812. Let us further consider how Operation Bagration (1944) took place. The main lines of advance of the Soviet troops will be briefly described.

preliminary stage

On the third anniversary of the German invasion of the USSR, the military campaign "Bagration" began. years spent on the Soviet troops managed to break through the German defenses in many areas. In this they were actively supported by the partisans. The offensive operations of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts were intensive. With the actions of these units, the military campaign "Bagration" - the operation (1944; the leader and coordinator of the plan - G.K. Zhukov) began. The commanders were Rokossovsky, Chernyakhovsky, Zakharov, Bagramyan. In the area of ​​Vilnius, Brest, Vitebsk, Bobruisk and east of Minsk, enemy groups were surrounded and eliminated. Several successful offensives were carried out. As a result of the battles, a significant part of Belarus was liberated, the capital of the country - Minsk, the territory of Lithuania, the eastern regions of Poland. Soviet troops reached the borders of East Prussia.

Main front lines

(operation of 1944) assumed 2 stages. They included several offensive campaigns of the Soviet troops. The direction of the operation "Bagration" in 1944 at the first stage was as follows:

1. Vitebsk.
2. Orsha.
3. Mogilev.
4. Bobruisk.
5. Polotsk.
6. Minsk.

This stage took place from June 23 to July 4. From July 5 to August 29, the offensive was also carried out on several fronts. At the second stage, operations were planned:

1. Vilnius.
2. Siauliai.
3. Bialystok.
4. Lublin-Brestskaya.
5. Kaunas.
6. Osovetskaya.

Vitebsk-Orsha offensive

In this sector, the defense was occupied by the 3rd Panzer Army, commanded by Reinhardt. Directly at Vitebsk stood its 53rd Army Corps. They were commanded by Gen. Gollwitzer. Near Orsha was the 17th corps of the 4th field army. In June 1944, Operation Bagration was carried out with the help of reconnaissance. Thanks to her, the Soviet troops managed to penetrate the German defenses and take the first trenches. On June 23, the Russian command struck the main blow. The key role belonged to the 43rd and 39th armies. The first covered the western side of Vitebsk, the second - the southern. The 39th Army had almost no superiority in numbers, however, the high concentration of forces in the sector made it possible to create a significant local advantage during the initial stage of the implementation of the Bagration plan. The operation (1944) near Vitebsk and Orsha was generally successful. Quite quickly managed to break through the western part of the defense and the southern front. The 6th Corps, located on the south side of Vitebsk, was cut into several parts and lost control. Over the following days, the commanders of divisions and the corps itself were killed. The remaining units, having lost contact with each other, moved in small groups to the west.

Liberation of cities

On June 24, units of the 1st Baltic Front reached the Dvina. Army Group North tried to counterattack. However, their breakthrough was unsuccessful. Corps Group D was surrounded in Beshenkovichi. To the south of Vitebsk, Oslikovsky's mechanized cavalry brigade was introduced. His group began to move quickly enough to the southwest.

In June 1944, the operation "Bagration" was carried out rather slowly in the Orsha sector. This was due to the fact that one of the strongest German infantry divisions, the assault 78th, was located here. She was much better equipped than the rest, had support for 50 self-propelled guns. Parts of the 14th motorized division were also located here.

However, the Russian command continued to implement the Bagration plan. The 1944 operation of the year involved the introduction of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Soviet soldiers cut the railroad from Orsha to the west near Tolochin. The Germans were forced to either leave the city or die in the "boiler".

On the morning of June 27, Orsha was cleared of the invaders. 5th Guards the tank army began to advance towards Borisov. On June 27, Vitebsk was also liberated in the morning. Here, the German grouping was defending itself, having been subjected to artillery and air strikes the day before. The invaders made several attempts to break through the encirclement. 26.06 one of them was successful. However, a few hours later, about 5 thousand Germans were again surrounded.

Breakthrough Results

Thanks to the offensive actions of the Soviet troops, the 53rd German Corps was almost completely destroyed. 200 people managed to break through to the fascist units. According to Haupt's notes, almost all of them were wounded. The Soviet troops also managed to defeat parts of the 6th Corps and Group D. This became possible thanks to the coordinated implementation of the first stage of the Bagration plan. The 1944 operation near Orsha and Vitebsk made it possible to eliminate the northern flank of the Center. This was the first step towards further complete encirclement of the group.

Fighting near Mogilev

This part of the front was considered auxiliary. On June 23, effective artillery preparation was carried out. The forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front began to force the river. Pronya. The defensive line of the Germans passed along it. Operation "Bagration" in June 1944 took place with the active use of artillery. The enemy was almost completely crushed by it. In the Mogilev direction, sappers quickly built 78 bridges for the passage of infantry and 4 heavy 60-ton crossings for equipment.

A few hours later, the number of most of the German companies decreased from 80-100 to 15-20 people. But units of the 4th Army managed to retreat to the second line along the river. Bass is quite organized. Operation "Bagration" in June 1944 continued from the south and north of Mogilev. On June 27, the city was surrounded and taken by attack the next day. About 2 thousand prisoners were captured in Mogilev. Among them was the commander of the 12th Infantry Division Bamler, as well as the commandant von Ermansdorf. The latter was subsequently found guilty of a large number of serious crimes and hanged. The German retreat gradually became more and more disorganized. Until June 29, 33,000 German soldiers and 20 tanks were destroyed and captured.

Bobruisk

Operation "Bagration" (1944) assumed the formation of the southern "pincer" of a large-scale encirclement. This action was carried out by the most powerful and numerous Belorussian Front, commanded by Rokossovsky. Initially, the right flank participated in the offensive. He was resisted by the 9th field army of Gen. Jordan. The task of eliminating the enemy was solved by creating a local "cauldron" near Bobruisk.

The offensive began from the south on 24.06. Operation "Bagration" in 1944 assumed the use of aviation here. However, weather conditions significantly complicated her actions. In addition, the terrain itself was not very favorable for the offensive. The Soviet troops had to overcome a fairly large marshy swamp. However, this path was chosen deliberately, since the German defense was weak on this side. On June 27, the interception of roads from Bobruisk to the north and west took place. Key German forces were surrounded. The diameter of the ring was approximately 25 km. The operation to liberate Bobruisk ended successfully. During the offensive, two corps were destroyed - the 35th Army Corps and the 41st Tank Corps. The defeat of the 9th Army made it possible to open the road to Minsk from the northeast and southeast.

Fighting near Polotsk

This direction caused serious concern among the Russian command. Bagramyan began to eliminate the problem. In fact, there was no break between the Vitebsk-Orsha and Polotsk operations. The main enemy was the 3rd Panzer Army, the forces of the "North" (16th Field Army). The Germans had 2 infantry divisions in reserve. The Polotsk operation did not end with such a rout as near Vitebsk. However, it made it possible to deprive the enemy of a stronghold, a railway junction. As a result, the threat to the 1st Baltic Front was removed, and Army Group North was outflanked from the south, which meant a blow to the flank.

Retreat of the 4th Army

After the defeat of the southern and northern flanks near Bobruisk and Vitebsk, the Germans were squeezed into a rectangle. Its eastern wall was formed by the Drut River, the western by the Berezina. Soviet troops were stationed from the north and south. To the west was Minsk. It was in this direction that the main blows of the Soviet forces were aimed. From the flanks, the 4th Army had virtually no cover. Gene. von Tippelskirch ordered a retreat across the Berezina. To do this, I had to use a dirt road from Mogilev. On the only bridge, the German forces tried to cross to the west bank, experiencing constant fire from bombers and attack aircraft. The military police were supposed to regulate the crossing, but they themselves withdrew from this task. In addition, partisans were active in this area. They carried out constant attacks on the positions of the Germans. The situation for the enemy was further complicated by the fact that groups from broken units in other sectors, including from near Vitebsk, joined the crossing units. In this regard, the retreat of the 4th Army was slow and was accompanied by heavy losses.

Battle from the south side of Minsk

In the offensive, mobile groups were in the lead - tank, mechanized and cavalry-mechanized formations. Part of Pliev quickly began to advance towards Slutsk. His group went to the city in the evening of 29.06. Due to the fact that the Germans suffered heavy losses in front of the 1st Belorussian Front, they offered little resistance. Slutsk itself was defended by formations of the 35th and 102nd divisions. They put up organized resistance. Then Pliev launched an attack from three flanks at the same time. This attack was successful, and by 11 am on June 30, the city was cleared of the Germans. By July 2, Pliev's cavalry-mechanized units occupied Nesvizh, cutting off the group's path to the southeast. The breakthrough came fairly quickly. Resistance was provided by small unorganized groups of Germans.

Battle for Minsk

German mobile reserves began to arrive at the front. They were withdrawn mainly from units operating in Ukraine. The 5th Panzer Division arrived first. She posed a fairly serious threat, considering that over the past few months she had hardly participated in the battles. The division was well equipped, re-equipped and reinforced with the 505th heavy battalion. However, the enemy's weak point here was the infantry. It consisted either of security or of divisions that had suffered significant losses. A serious battle took place on the northwestern side of Minsk. Enemy tankers announced the elimination of 295 Soviet vehicles. However, there is no doubt that they themselves suffered serious losses. The 5th division was reduced to 18 tanks, all the "tigers" of the 505th battalion were lost. Thus, the connection lost the opportunity to influence the course of the battle. 2nd Guards Corps on July 1 approached the outskirts of Minsk. Having made a detour, he broke into the city from the northwest side. At the same time, a Rokossovsky detachment approached from the south, the 5th Panzer Army from the north, and detachments of combined arms forces from the east. The defense of Minsk did not last long. The city was badly destroyed by the Germans already in 1941. Retreating, the enemy additionally blew up the structures.

Collapse of the 4th Army

The German group was surrounded, but still made attempts to break through to the west. The Nazis even went into battle with bladed weapons. The command of the 4th Army fled to the west, as a result of which the actual control was carried out instead of von Tippelskirch by the head of the 12th Army Corps, Müller. On July 8-9, the resistance of the Germans in the Minsk "cauldron" was finally broken. The cleansing lasted until the 12th: regular units, together with partisans, neutralized small groups of the enemy in the forests. After that, hostilities east of Minsk ended.

Second phase

After the completion of the first stage, the operation "Bagration" (1944), in short, assumed the maximum consolidation of the success achieved. At the same time, the German army tried to restore the front. At the second stage, the Soviet units had to fight the German reserves. At the same time, personnel changes took place in the leadership of the army of the Third Reich. After the expulsion of the Germans from Polotsk, Bagramyan was given a new task. The 1st Baltic Front was to carry out an offensive to the northwest, towards Daugavpils, and to the west - to Sventsyany and Kaunas. The plan was to break through to the Baltic and block the communications of the Sever Army formations from the rest of the Wehrmacht forces. After the flank shifts, fierce battles began. German troops, meanwhile, continued their counterattacks. On August 20, the attack on Tukums began from the east and west. For a short period, the Germans managed to restore communication between parts of the "Center" and "North". However, the attacks of the 3rd Panzer Army at Siauliai were unsuccessful. At the end of August, there was a break in the battles. The 1st Baltic Front completed its part of the offensive operation "Bagration".

“On the central sector of the eastern front, our brave divisions are fighting fierce defensive battles in the areas of Bobruisk, Mogilev and Orsha against large forces of the advancing Soviets. West and southwest of Vitebsk, our troops retreated to new positions. East of Polotsk, numerous attacks by infantry and tanks of the Bolsheviks were repulsed.

In the early summer of 1944, Army Group Center occupied a front line that ran from Polotsk in the north, through Vitebsk in the east, east of Orsha and Mogilev to Rogachev on the Dnieper, and from there turned and stretched west to the area north of Kovel, where there was a junction with army group "Northern Ukraine" (this name was given to the former army group "South" on March 30, 1944).

Spring-summer 1944

The command post of the Army Group "Center" in early June 1944 was in Minsk. The commander, as before, remained Field Marshal Bush, the chief of staff - Lieutenant General Krebs.

The office of the 3rd Panzer Army, Colonel-General Reinhardt, was located in Beshenkovichi. He was in charge of the front line on the northern flank of the army group 220 kilometers wide. On the very left flank were the 252nd Infantry Division and Corps Group D of the 9th Army Corps, commanded by General of Artillery Wutman. (Corps Group "D" was formed on November 3, 1943 after the merger of the 56th and 262nd Infantry Divisions). Near Vitebsk, they were bordered by the 53rd Army Corps of General of the Infantry Golwitzer, which included the 246th Infantry, 4th and 6th Airfield and 206th Infantry Divisions. The right flank of the army was held by the 6th Army Corps of Artillery General Pfeiffer. It included the 197th, 299th and 256th infantry divisions. The 95th Infantry and 201st Security Divisions were in reserve.

The 4th Army of Colonel-General Heinrici, who was ill in those days and was replaced by General of the Infantry von Tippelskirch, set up headquarters in Godevichi near Orsha in the center of the army group's zone. From left to right in its lane were: the 27th Army Corps of Infantry General Voelkers (78th Assault, 25th Motorized Infantry, 260th Infantry Divisions). Next to it was the 39th Panzer Corps of General of Artillery Martinek (110th, 337th, 12th, 31st Infantry Divisions). The 12th army corps of Lieutenant General Muller included the 18th motorized infantry, 267th and 57th infantry divisions. The width of the army strip was 200 kilometers. The 4th Army in the rear had the 14th Infantry (Motorized) Division, the 60th Motorized Infantry Division and the 286th Security Division.

The 300-kilometer strip adjacent to it was occupied by the 9th Army of General Jordan of the Infantry. Its headquarters was located in Bobruisk. The army included: the 35th Army Corps of General of the Infantry Wiese (134th, 296th, 6th, 383rd and 45th Infantry Divisions), the 41st Tank Corps of General of Artillery Waidling (36th Motorized Infantry, 35th and 129th Infantry Divisions) and the 55th Army Corps of Infantry General Herlein (292nd and 102nd Infantry Divisions). In the reserve of the army were: the 20th tank and 707th security divisions. They were located in the northern part of the strip near Bobruisk, the largest city in the area.

The 2nd Army of Colonel General Weiss, whose headquarters was located in Petrikov, defended the longest front line 300 kilometers wide, passing through forests and swamps. The army included: the 23rd army corps of the general of sapper troops Timann (203rd security and 7th infantry divisions), the 20th army corps of the general of artillery Freiherr von Roman (3rd cavalry brigade and corps group "E") , 8th Army Corps of General of the Infantry Höhne (Hungarian 12th Reserve Division, 211th Infantry Division and 5th Jaeger Division). The 3rd Cavalry Brigade was formed in March 1944 from the Center Cavalry Regiment, the 177th Assault Gun Battalion, the 105th Light Artillery Battalion, and the 2nd Cossack Battalion. Corps Group "E" was created on November 2, 1943 as a result of the merger of the 86th, 137th and 251st Infantry Divisions.

To protect the huge roadless region of Pripyat, the 1st Cavalry Corps of General of the Cavalry Hartenek was used with the 4th Cavalry Brigade. On May 29, the brigade consisted of the North and South cavalry regiments, now the 5th and 41st cavalry regiments, the 4th cavalry artillery battalion, the 70th tank reconnaissance battalion of the 387th communications battalion.

On June 1, 1944, there were only 442,053 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in Army Group Center, of which only 214,164 could be considered trench soldiers. These include another 44,440 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of individual parts of the reserve of the Supreme High Command, who served throughout the entire strip of the army group as artillerymen, tank destroyers, signalmen, orderlies and car drivers.

In those days, the command of the army group reported to the high command of the ground forces that not one of the formations located at the front was incapable of repelling a major enemy offensive. The following were suitable for limited offensive operations: 6th, 12th, 18th, 25th, 35th, 102nd, 129th, 134th, 197th, 246th, 256th , 260th, 267th, 296th, 337th, 383rd infantry and motorized infantry divisions, as well as corps group "D".

Fully suitable for defense were: 5th, 14th, 45th, 95th, 206th, 252nd, 292nd, 299th infantry divisions, 4th and 6th airfield divisions .

Conditionally suitable for defense were: 57th, 60th, 707th infantry and motorized infantry divisions.

The 6th Air Fleet of Colonel General Ritter von Greim, whose headquarters was located in Priluki, at the beginning of June 1944 had the 1st Aviation Division of Major General Fuchs (based in Bobruisk) and the 4th Aviation Division of Major General Reuss (based in Orsha). The 1st Aviation Division included the 1st Squadron of the 1st Attack Squadron and the 1st Squadron of the 51st Fighter Squadron. Both were based in Bobruisk.

The 4th aviation division included the 3rd squadron of the 1st assault squadron (in Polotsk), the 3rd squadron of the 51st fighter squadron and the 1st squadron of the 100th night fighter squadron (both based in Orsha).

At that time, there was not a single bomber formation in the air fleet, since the bomber squadrons intended for operations on the central sector of the eastern front were being reorganized. The 4th Aviation Corps of Lieutenant General Meister in Brest was responsible for it. In May, the following formations were to be formed (which were not combat-ready even at the beginning of the Russian offensive):

3rd bomber squadron (Baranovichi),
4th bomber squadron (Bialystok),
27th bomber squadron (Baranovichi),
53rd bomber squadron (Radom),
55th bomber squadron (Lublin),
2nd night assault group (Terespol),
long-range reconnaissance squadron 2/100 (Pinsk),
4th close reconnaissance group (Byala Podlyaska).

The 2nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Corps of General of Anti-Aircraft Artillery Odebrecht, whose headquarters were in Bobruisk, was responsible for air defense in the entire zone of Army Group Center. In June 1944, the corps included the 12th anti-aircraft artillery division of Lieutenant General Prelberg with headquarters in Bobruisk. Parts of the division were located in the bands of the 2nd and 9th armies. The 18th anti-aircraft artillery division of Major General Wolf, with headquarters in Orsha, was responsible for the 4th Army strip, and the 3rd Panzer Army strip was covered by the 10th anti-aircraft artillery brigade of Major General Zaks with headquarters in Vitebsk (17 batteries in total).

Such was the situation in the zone of Army Group Center, over which hell broke loose on June 22, 1944, and which ceased to exist a few weeks later.

The end of the Army Group "Center" was outlined in February 1944, when the Soviet command developed a plan for the encirclement and destruction of German troops in this area. The last meetings of the command of the four fronts of the Red Army, which included 23 fully equipped armies, were held on May 22 and 23 in Moscow.

At dawn on June 22, 1944, 10,000 guns of the Red Army unleashed devastating fire on German artillery positions on the ledge of the front near Vitebsk and began the largest battle that led to the death of Army Group Center.

Only 30 minutes had passed and the artillery fire struck again. From the east, the roar of the engines of hundreds of heavy and medium tanks was approaching, and the tread of thousands of Red Army soldiers was heard.

The 3rd Panzer Army was the first target of the 1st Baltic Front, which was advancing with five armies from the north and south on the ledge of the front near Vitebsk. The leftmost flank was defended by the Silesian 252nd Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Meltzer. Its front was immediately broken through by the Soviet 12th Guards Corps to a width of 8 kilometers. Army Group North was cut off from Army Group South.

During the offensive of the Soviet troops south of Vitebsk, the Hessian-Palatinate 299th Infantry Division of Major General von Junck was defeated. Before noon, three big breakthroughs were made here, which were no longer able to be eliminated by counterattacks by combat groups of Hessian, Thuringian and Rhineland soldiers of the 95th Infantry Division of Major General Michaelis and the Saxons and Lower Bavarians of the 256th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Wüstenhagen.

A report from the 252nd Infantry Division that day stated:

Tank attacks, which always took place in conjunction with infantry attacks, did not stop all day long. Where the enemy, thanks to his unheard-of superiority, the support of tanks and aircraft, wedged into our positions, he was repelled in the course of counterattacks. Even when individual strongholds had long been abandoned, they were captured again in the course of a counterattack. In the afternoon, there was still hope that, on the whole, it would be possible to hold positions. The main line of defense in some places was pushed back, but not yet broken through. Separate enemy tanks broke through. Most often they were knocked out at the turn of artillery firing positions or destroyed by faustpatrons. Small local reserves were all used up on the first day and quickly disappeared. After particularly fierce fighting on the evening of June 22, an infantry position north of Sirotino was lost. But even before that, the village of Ratkov had to be abandoned due to a lack of ammunition. The cut-off position was occupied systematically.

In the darkness everywhere, the divisions were put in order. Separate command posts were moved back, as they were under heavy fire. The commander of the 252nd artillery regiment was forced to move his command post to Lovsha. During the night it turned out that the front remained intact, but too rare, except for some places where there were gaps. But the enemy has not yet discovered and used them. There was no communication with the left flank of the division. Therefore, there was an impression that this area was attacked. This part of the division was separated by the Obol River.

The division commander tried by all means to find out the situation from the right neighbor and in the sector of the 461st Grenadier Regiment. The right neighbor received information about the situation in the hull lane. There, too, the enemy led strong attacks. But the situation was difficult only on the left flank of Corps Group D, where the battle was still going on in places. The dispatched officer reconnaissance patrols and communication groups brought some clarity to the situation in the areas with which communication was lost. On the left flank of the division, in the sector of the 461st Grenadier Regiment, continuous enemy attacks continued all day on June 22. Positions in the regiment's sector changed hands several times. During the day the regiment suffered heavy losses. There were no more reserves. With a blow along the Obol River, the enemy really cut off the regiment from the rest of the division. At dawn on June 23, the enemy again launched attacks with undiminished force. Fighting with varying success on the main battlefield, due to heavy losses, moved to the positions of artillery batteries, which in some places were forced to engage in close combat already in the first half of the day. Now the enemy has already cut through, and in some places broke through the main line of defense. Since it was no longer possible to restore the situation in the central sector with the help of reserves, on the left flank of the division, in the sector of the 461st Grenadier Regiment, on June 23 at 0400, the first units of the arriving 24th Infantry Division began to be deployed on the heights near Grebentsy south of Zvezdny Lesochka. This was the infantry of the 24th Infantry Division, which was introduced into the battle behind the right flank of the 205th Infantry Division to defend the southern flank of the 16th Army (Army Group North).

The 24th Infantry Division received the task of holding the isthmus near Obol and stopping the enemy who had broken through northwest of Vitebsk. The 32nd Grenadier Regiment, the 24th Fusilier Battalion and the 472nd Grenadier Regiment launched a counterattack on both sides of the Cheremka-Grebentsy road. The counterattack was soon stopped and did not bring the intended success.

The Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, in its official summary of June 23, announced:
“On the central sector of the front, the Bolsheviks launched the offensive we expected ...”

And the offer below:
"There are still fierce battles on both sides of Vitebsk."
These battles continued into the night.

Field Marshal Bush, who had never thought of a major Red Army offensive, hastily returned to his command post from Germany, where he was on leave. But the situation could no longer be changed. On the left flank of the 3rd Army, it has already developed into a crisis. The command of the army group already on the evening of the first day of the battle recognized:

"A major offensive northwest of Vitebsk meant ... complete surprise, since until now we did not assume that the enemy could concentrate such large forces in front of us."

The error in assessing the enemy could not be corrected, since already on June 23 new enemy attacks followed, as a result of which the 6th Army Corps was defeated. The divisions lost contact with each other and small battle groups retreated hurriedly to the west through forests and lakes. The commander of the 53rd Army Corps received an order directly from the Fuhrer's headquarters to advance to Vitebsk and defend the city as a "fortress".

But even before the command of the Army Group had time to intervene, on June 23 the battle spread to the front of the 4th Army.

There, the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front began, which immediately attacked the German 26th Army Corps with all its might. The Württemberg 78th Assault Division under Lieutenant General Trautai and the Württemberg 25th Motorized Infantry Division under Lieutenant General Schurman were pushed back along the highway to Orsha. Only with the help of army reserves - the 14th infantry (motorized) division of Lieutenant General Flerke, at least on the first day, managed to prevent a breakthrough.

The next day, another bad news was received: the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts with thirteen armies (among which was the 1st Army of the Polish Army) launched an offensive in the zone of the German 9th Army between Mogilev and Bobruisk.

The right-flank division of the 4th Army - the Bavarian 57th Infantry Division of Major General Trowitz - spent the day like this:

At 0400, a powerful artillery shelling began on the sector of the right regiment of the division. The entire front of the 9th Army south of this area was also under fire.

Under the cover of artillery preparation, large Russian forces managed to temporarily capture the village of Vyazma, 33 kilometers north of Rogachev. The commander of the 164th Grenadier Regiment managed to quickly gather forces, defeat the Russians and regain lost positions.

The battle was very difficult south of Vyazma in the area of ​​the 1st battalion of the 164th Grenadier Regiment, the 1st and 2nd companies of which were located on the western bank of the Drug. The Drug flows from the northwest and turns sharply to the south near Vyazma. Its channel is very wide, the western bank is steep and high. In summer, the river flows in a narrow channel a hundred meters from the steep western bank. Willows and reeds completely cover this coastal strip. Every night, numerous reconnaissance groups and patrols made their way along it to intercept enemy patrols and scouts. Enemy preparation for crossing or building a bridge has not been established.

On the morning of June 25, the commander of the 1st company met in the trenches at the forefront in order to receive reports from his patrols from 3.00. He was just listening to the report of the senior right-flank patrol from the right flank of his stronghold, which was also the right flank of the division and the army, when the Russians opened artillery fire at 0400. He immediately gave the order to take up defense and fifteen minutes later was seriously wounded in the right hand.

Lieutenant-General Philipp's 134th Infantry Division, left-flanked in the 9th Army, with soldiers from Franconia, Saxony, Silesia and the Sudetenland, found itself in the hellfire of a battle of annihilation.

It was 2.30 am on June 24, when suddenly hundreds of guns of the Soviet 3rd Army hit the main line of defense of the 134th Infantry Division. Shells continuously rained down on trenches, strongholds, firing points, dugouts, gati and artillery firing positions. As dawn broke on the horizon, the stormtrooper regiments began swooping down to their forward positions. There was not a single square meter of land left that had not been plowed up. At that moment, the grenadiers in the trenches could not raise their heads. The gunners did not have time to reach their guns. Communication lines were broken in the first minutes. Hellish rumble stood for 45 minutes. After that, the Russians shifted their fire to our rear. There he came to the locations of the rear services. At the same time, the quartermaster service was damaged and the 134th field gendarmerie detachment was almost completely destroyed. Not a single convoy wagon survived, not a single truck would start. The earth was on fire.

Then, on a narrow front, the 120th Guards, 186th, 250th, 269th, 289th, 323rd and 348th Rifle Divisions went on the attack. In the second echelon, heavy tanks moved across the Drug along bridges built by Soviet sappers. The guns of the 134th Artillery Regiment, which had survived the fiery whirlwind, opened fire. The grenadiers on the front line clung to their carbines and machine guns, preparing to sell their lives dearly. Several assault guns of the 244th division drove in an easterly direction. Close combat began.

The offensive had to be repelled almost along the entire front. Although the first chains of enemy riflemen were repulsed before the line of defense, the attackers of the second wave were already able to break into positions. There had been no communication between regiments, battalions and companies since morning. A wave of Russian riflemen, and then tanks, seeped into all the gaps.

The 446th Grenadier Regiment could no longer hold the defense south of Retka. His 3rd battalion withdrew to the area of ​​​​the Zalitvinye forest, when communication with the neighbors had long been lost. The 1st Battalion held firm in the ruins of Ozeran. The 2nd and 3rd companies were cut off. Part of the 4th company under the command of sergeants Ench and Gauch held out at the Ozerani cemetery. Thanks to this, it was possible, at least, to cover the withdrawal of the battalion. The battle groups of these two sergeants, Lieutenant Dolch and Sergeant Mittag, held the line all day. Only in the evening, sergeant major Ench gave the order to break through. His battle group saved most of the 446th Grenadiers. Later, Sergeant Major Jench received the Knight's Cross for this battle.

The 445th Grenadier Regiment, which was defending south of Ozeran, could not hold the line for a long time. The losses were great. All company commanders were killed or wounded. Lieutenant Neubauer (adjutant of the 1st Battalion), who died a few days later, and Lieutenant Tsang, an errand officer of the 2nd Battalion, were wounded. Colonel Kuszynski was exhausted from his wound. When the regiment was subjected to a massive air raid in the evening, the main line of defense was broken through. The 445th Grenadier Regiment ceased to exist as a military unit.

Thus, on June 24, 1944, battles were fought along the entire front of Army Group Center, with the exception of the strip south of the Pripyat marshes, which was covered by the 2nd Army.

Everywhere, Soviet ground forces and aviation units were so superior that in some areas the desperate resistance of small battle groups continued for several hours, while the Russian offensive could not be stopped.

The 3rd Panzer Army in the Vitebsk region was surrounded on the third day of the battle. The concentric offensive of the Soviet 39th and 43rd armies at 16.10 on June 24 led to the encirclement of Vitebsk. To the north of the city, a gap 30 kilometers wide was punched in the German defense, and 20 kilometers to the south. The Vitebsk garrison was left to itself.

The remnants of the tank army, if they still existed, made their way to Vitebsk. During these hours, the 4th and 6th airfield divisions of Lieutenant Generals Pistorius and Peschel, as well as the 299th Infantry Division, had long been defeated. The Rhenish-Saar-Palatinate 246th Infantry Division of Major General Müller-Büllow fought in encirclement, while the East Prussian 206th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Hitter and the main forces of the West Prussian 197th Infantry Division of Major General Hane retreated to Vitebsk, the 256th Infantry Division was pushed back to the south.

The commandant of the "fortress" Vitebsk, General of the Infantry Golwitzer, was forced to report the next day: "The situation is extremely difficult." Since large Russian forces have already broken into Vitebsk. Three hours later - at 18.30 on June 25 - the command of the army group received a radiogram from Vitebsk: “The general situation forces us to concentrate all forces and break through in a southwestern direction. The attack will start tomorrow at 5:00.

The breakthrough was finally allowed, however, with the order of the 206th Infantry Division to hold Vitebsk "to the last man."

But before this order could be carried out, the general situation changed dramatically once more. Infantry General Gollwitzer ordered to break through in a south-westerly direction. Among those who broke through were soldiers of the 206th Infantry Division.

The commander of the 301st Regiment withdrew the main force (1,200 men) south of a swampy area of ​​approximately 5 square kilometers. At the same time, the 2nd strike group (about 600 people with the headquarters of the division) walked along the forest road and made its way from the east to the swampy area. The wounded were transported on a large tractor and wagons.

Our attack was stopped by heavy fire from infantry, mortars and enemy tanks. After crossing the swampy terrain mentioned above, everyone was very tired. The units returned to the forest (June 26 in the morning).

Russian aviation conducted reconnaissance and directed artillery and mortar fire at the edge of the forest occupied by us. After rifle and machine gun shots were heard in the rear of our strike group, at 16.00 the last attempt was made to break through this line. The detachment, divided into platoons, rose from the forest with shouts of "Hurrah!". But after 200 meters, the attackers lay down under enemy infantry fire. The enemy combed the forest and before dark captured the main forces of the division.

The remnants of the battle groups that had broken through as early as June 26 and 27 got in touch with the army group headquarters by radio, but from June 27 all radio contact with them ceased. The battle of Vitebsk is over.

Only 200 soldiers of the 53rd Army Corps managed to break through to the German positions, of which 180 were wounded!

10,000 troops of all ranks never returned. They were taken prisoner by the Red Army, who stormed the destroyed Vitebsk in those days. Between the Dvina near Vitebsk and Lake Sara, 20 kilometers southwest of the city, 20,000 dead German soldiers remained.

The position of the 3rd Panzer Army that day was desperate, although it did not cease to exist.

The army headquarters was in Lepel. Her divisions, or their remnants, were defending on a 70-kilometer front between Ulla in the north and Devino in the southeast. Fortunately, Army Group North, adjacent to the left, closed the gap with vigorous action by the 24th and 290th Infantry Divisions, and then by the 81st Infantry Division. The Saxon 24th Infantry Division established contact with the remnants of the almost defeated 252nd Infantry Division, which managed to withdraw from June 26 to the lake area north of Lepel. Corps Group "D" of Lieutenant General Pamberg with part of the 197th Infantry Division and the 3rd Assault Engineer Battalion was able to break through east of Lepel to the security positions of the 201st Security Division of Lieutenant General Jacobi.

A 30-kilometer gap began from here, behind which, near the Vitebsk-Orsha highway, were the remnants of the combat groups of the 197th, 299th and 256th infantry divisions. The Saxon 14th Infantry (Motorized) Division established contact with them and prevented the final defeat of the 6th Army Corps, whose commander died on the front lines in those days.

On June 26, the rest of the armies of Army Group Center also fought their last battles in their history.

On that day, the 4th Army no longer occupied either the left or right flank. Located in its center, in Mogilev, the 39th Panzer Corps was already dispersed. Lieutenant General Bamler's Pomeranian 12th Infantry Division received strict orders to defend Mogilev. The remaining divisions received an order from the corps commander: "All troops break through to the west!" Hitler, who was at the distant "Führer's Headquarters" in Rastenburg (East Prussia), ordered him to report hourly on the situation in the army group and in the armies and gave direct instructions to the division commanders by "orders of the Fuhrer". Thus, the 78th Assault Division was ordered to defend Orsha.

In accordance with the order of the Fuhrer, General Trout and his staff went to Orsha. He knew that this order was a death sentence for him and his division. But she was in the position of "Tiger", and one could hope that events stronger than this order would occur. And so it happened.

Already early in the morning, fierce fighting broke out at the Tiger position and on the highway. The enemy's breakthrough between the Nuts and the Lake was eliminated. More unpleasant was a breakthrough in the strip of the left neighbor north of Devino at the northern tip of Lake Kuzmine, with which nothing could be done. A shaft of enemy tanks was already rolling along the highway. In full view of the defenders, they fought their way to the west. The front of the left neighbor began to fall apart. The situation on the left flank of the division, near the 480th Grenadier Regiment, would have become unbearable if it had not been possible to close the gap near Lake Kuzmino.

At this critical moment, the division commander ordered the northern battle group to fight its way along the highway in the direction of Orsha. There she had to take up defense. The ring around Orsha began to close. The situation became more and more unclear. How to proceed? The soldiers of the 78th knew only one thing, that during the withdrawal they managed to prevent an attempt by the enemy to break through.

On June 26, Orsha was blocked from three sides. Only the road to the southeast remained open for the division. On the evening of June 26, Orsha was in the hands of the Russians, before elements of the 78th Assault Division arrived in the city. The 4th Army managed to transport only half of its troops across the Dnieper.

Now the army was pushed back from the highway. They departed on foot. Behind him was a spacious wooded and swampy area, crossed by numerous rivers. It stretched all the way to Minsk. But there were still 200 kilometers to go. The "old men" of the 78th knew this area. They knew the sandy roads in which the wheels of cars got stuck, the swampy marshy places along the banks of the rivers, and the enormous stress that had to be endured then in order to keep up with the enemy. Now the enemy was pressing. He was already on the flanks, and soon he will be in the rear. Added to this were the active actions of the partisans in the area. But for the 4th Army, there was no longer any other road to the new line of defense of German troops being created in the deep rear, except for the one that led through Mogilev, Berezino, Minsk. It became a trail for retreat, and to the north, as part of the 27th Army Corps, the 78th Assault Division was to retreat.

But even here the orders came too late, so the remaining two Württemberg divisions of the 17th Army Corps (25th motorized infantry and 260th infantry) could not free themselves from Russian coverage.

The main forces of the 260th Infantry Division were resting in the forest east of Kamenka on the morning of June 28. After gathering at 14.00, the units continued the march. The 1st Battalion of the 460th Grenadier Regiment (Major Wincon) was in the forward detachment. But soon fire was opened on the battalion from the direction of Brashchino. It became clear that the Soviet troops now approached the route of movement from the south. The 1st Battalion of the 460th Grenadier Regiment, supported by five assault guns and three self-propelled gun carriages, went on the attack and captured Braschino. The enemy defended desperately, however, he managed to push back two kilometers. Once again, 50 prisoners were captured.

Then we moved on. Small battle groups of Russians tried again and again to disrupt the marching columns or stop them. One of these attacks was repulsed by fire from a 75-mm anti-tank gun. When the advance detachment approached Ramshino, it was stopped by heavy fire.

Colonel Dr. Bracher hurried forward. He formed his regiment to attack. The 1st battalion - on the right, the 2nd - on the left, in this order the grenadiers went into battle. The regimental commander rode at the head of the attackers in his amphibian. Captain Kempke's 2nd Battalion attacked Ramshino from the front. His soldiers were forced to lay low on the eastern outskirts. But the 1st Battalion was more fortunate. He went on the attack around and by midnight went to the stream near Akhimkovichi. At the same time, combat groups of the 199th Grenadier Regiment ensured an offensive from the north, in one place they reached the highway southeast of Krugly and held it for some time.

The division, which, despite all the efforts of the radio operators, could not contact the army and therefore did not know the general situation, on June 29 made its way to the Drug River. Again, the 1st Battalion of the 460th Grenadier Regiment (Major Vinkon) went ahead through Olshanki to Zhupen, and from there to the Drug. The battalion captured the Likhnichi-Teterin road and took up defense with the front to the west. The 2nd Battalion following it turned north, and the remnants of the 470th Grenadier Regiment provided defense from the south. But far along the river there was not a single bridge. They were destroyed by Soviet troops or units of the 110th Infantry Division, who wanted to ensure their withdrawal in this way. The soldiers of the 653rd engineer battalion came to the conclusion that it was necessary to build an auxiliary bridge as soon as possible. The work was hampered not only by the lack of equipment for building bridges, but also by the indiscipline of the suitable mixed units, each of which wanted to get to the other side first. Although the command of the division placed traffic control officers everywhere, among whom were Major Ostermeier, Counselor Jansen, Lieutenant Rueppel and others, they had to restore order by force.

At the same time, it is worth recalling two more parts that have endured inhuman trials in the past few days and which are not mentioned in any message. These were the soldiers of the 260th communications battalion, who were constantly trying to establish radio contact with the higher command or with neighboring divisions, pulling communication lines under fire and creating an opportunity for the division to some extent be able to control its forces. At the same time, Lieutenant Dambach especially distinguished himself.

We must not forget about the nurses. There was no rest for them day or night. The major of the medical service, Dr. Hengstman, ordered immediately to organize a dressing station and a collection point for the wounded on the steep western bank of the Drug, so that at least the remaining wagons could evacuate the wounded to a safe place from here. Their provision has become one of the biggest problems of the day.

Russian artillery and mortars at times interfered with the construction of the bridge. But the sappers did not stop. Troops began to cross the river in the afternoon. Russian attack aircraft tried to stop the crossing. They inflicted casualties and sowed panic. Complete confusion began, order was restored only by the cruel orders of brave officers. A bomb hit the divisional headquarters, and Colonel Fricker was wounded.

The 1st battalion of the 460th so far, which had already crossed over the bridges and in boats, at 18.00 was ordered to take possession of the crossroads six kilometers northwest of Teterin and keep it open for the further withdrawal of the division. But the Russians by this time had intensified so much that it was no longer possible to fulfill this order. Now it became clear that the division was surrounded for the second time.

On June 27, the commander of Army Group Center arrived at the Fuhrer's headquarters. Here, the field marshal demanded that the army group be withdrawn beyond the Dnieper and leave the “fortresses” of Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk. (He did not know that on this day the fighting for Mogilev was already ending, after Major General von Erdmansdorff's small battle group managed to stop the advancing Russian troops for only a few hours. From June 26, only Soviet banners fluttered over Mogilev.) Here on in the south, the same thing began that had previously happened on the northern sector of the front: an inglorious retreat or an even more shameful flight of German combat groups in a westerly direction. On June 27, the organized front of Army Group Center no longer existed!

The commander of the 4th Army on that day ordered, without the permission of the command of the army group or even the headquarters of the Fuhrer, to begin a general retreat. Infantry General von Tippelskirch moved his command post to the Berezina. He gave the order to his troops, those with whom he could still contact by radio, to retreat to Borisov, and then to the Berezina. But many battle groups have not managed to get out of here. Among them was the headquarters of the 39th Panzer Corps, which went missing somewhere in the forests and swamps near Mogilev. The 12th Army Corps did not leave the encirclement either. Its remnants capitulated somewhere in the forests and swamps between Mogilev and Berezina.

In the same days, the history of the 9th Army ended. Its right flank - the 35th Army Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Freiherr von Lutwitz on June 22, was defeated on the first day of the battle. His 134th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Philipp, and the 296th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Kulmer, were dissected near Rogachev and to the south of it.

Russian tanks simply crossed the Drut, a tributary of the Dnieper. (There, a few days earlier, Red Army sappers had built bridges that were below the surface of the water. The German artillery could not interfere with the construction, since it had no ammunition.) The infantry of the 35th Army Corps, bypassed by powerful tank battalions, was able to offer serious resistance only in several places. Then the mechanized units of the enemy paved their way to the west.

June 24, 1944, at 4.50, as expected, after an unusually strong artillery preparation forty-five minutes along the entire front, the enemy went on the offensive. The attack was supported by a large number of attack aircraft: up to 100 aircraft were constantly located above the division's defense zone, causing particularly heavy damage to anti-tank and field artillery in positions. The plan of fire destruction of reconnoitered and probable enemy concentration areas was carried out. Communication lines were soon broken, and the division command found itself without wired means of communication with its regiments, neighboring divisions, and the command of the 41st Panzer Corps. The enemy, who had broken into our trenches during artillery preparation in many areas, with the support of tanks on the left flank of the division, managed to penetrate deeply into our defenses in two places. These breakthroughs, despite the use of all reserves, the division failed to liquidate.

Significant is the assertion that during the artillery preparation, fire was not fired on separate strips of swamps and hollows. Even during the cannonade, the advance detachments of the attackers advanced from the depths along them. The enemy divisions were advancing on a front with a width of 1 to 2 kilometers. Using this tactic, the enemy partially bypassed the trenches from the rear, partially, not paying attention to anything, broke through into the depths of the defense. Since our heavy infantry weapons and artillery were themselves at that time under heavy enemy artillery fire, and some of the resistance centers were destroyed and defeated, their return fire did not bring the desired results.

On the right flank, the Russians also advanced with the support of tanks, broke through in a north-western direction and soon approached artillery firing positions from three sides. By noon, she had already reached the second line of defense. The enemy was constantly pulling up new forces of infantry and tanks from the depths to the breakthrough areas.

ORDER FOR A BREAKTHROUGH TO THE NORTHERN TO THE 4TH ARMY:

1. The situation, especially the lack of ammunition and food, compels quick action.

2. The 35th Army Corps to break through the divisions located in the northern encirclement east of the Berezina. Breakthrough area - on both sides of the Podrechye. The direction of the main blow is Kozulichi, Uzechi, then - a section of the Olza River. The point is that, by concentrating all forces under the leadership of decisive commanders, at night, suddenly break through the enemy front of the encirclement and with one jerk, quickly break through to the final goal and win freedom of action.

3. Tasks:

a) the 296th Infantry Division from the area of ​​concentration south of Bereshchevka to break through the ring of enemy guards and, having built a battle formation with a ledge to the right, continue the attack in the north-western direction to Novye Velichki, and then to Podrechye. The direction of the further offensive is Kozyulichi, Kostrichi, Bazevichi on the Olza.
b) the 134th Infantry Division from the general area of ​​​​concentration southwest of Staraya Zhareevshchina to break through in the direction through Yasnaya Les to Dumanovshchina, then through Mordevichi, Lyubonichi to Zapolya on Olza.
c) the 20th Panzer Division and the 36th Infantry Division from the area of ​​​​concentration southeast of Titovka to break through the area east of Titovka, west of Domanovshchina to Merkevichi, and then along the route of the 134th Infantry Division (in front of it). This plan comes into force only if she fails to pass through Bobruisk.
d) the 6th, 45th Infantry Divisions and parts of the 383rd Infantry Division follow the 134th Infantry Division. Divisions provide cover from the rear, and then separate the rear guards.

4. Organization of the fight:

a) the beginning of the attack: suddenly at 20.30.
b) take with you only vehicles carrying weapons, field kitchens and a small number of vehicles with food. Leave all other cars and horse-drawn carts. They must be destroyed. Drivers sent to the front as foot soldiers.

Communication: radio only.

6. Corps HQ advances behind the left flank of the 296th Infantry Division.

Signed: von Lützow.

The army command in Bobruisk was stunned by the catastrophic situation that had developed on the very first day, and immediately ordered Lieutenant General von Kessel's 20th Panzer Division, which was located east of the city in reserve, to launch a counterattack. But while the German tank companies were lining up, the order came: “Set aside!” Now heavy fighting was already going on along the entire line of defense of the army. The defense of the 41st Panzer Corps located in its center was broken through, and its divisions retreated. On this site, the Don Guards Tank Corps advanced directly on Bobruisk.

Therefore, now the 20th Panzer Division had to urgently turn 180 degrees in order to launch a counterattack in a southerly direction. But before she reached the battlefield, the Russian tanks were already far to the northwest. Another 24 hours passed, and the first tanks with a red star on their armor reached the outskirts of Bobruisk. Since at the same time the Soviet 9th Panzer Corps was striking in the direction of Bobruisk from the northeast, on June 27 the main forces of the 9th Army were surrounded between the Dnieper and Bobruisk.

The Directorate of the 41st Panzer Corps, commanded shortly before the start of the Soviet offensive by Lieutenant General Hofmeister, the only one that had a working radio station that day, on the night of June 28 transmitted the last radiogram to the army headquarters. It said, among other things, that there was no connection with the 35th Army Corps, that its defeated divisions were retreating to Bobruisk, and that the battle groups were scattered around the district.

Chaos already reigned in Bobruisk that day. Infantrymen, artillerymen, nurses, sappers, convoys, signalmen, generals and thousands of wounded spontaneously retreated to the city, which was already brutally bombed by Soviet attack aircraft. Major General Haman, appointed commandant of the "fortress", could hardly bring order to these defeated troops.

Only energetic officers rallied the remnants of their units and again created battle groups, which in some places and somehow on the outskirts of the city were preparing for defense. The army command tried to surrender Bobruisk, but Hitler forbade it ... When he finally gave his permission in the afternoon of June 28, it was already too late.

A variety of combat groups that had gathered last night, on the morning of June 29, tried in some places to break through from the surrounded Bobruisk in the northern and western directions.

On that day, about 30,000 soldiers of the 9th Army were in the Bobruisk area, of which about 14,000 were able to reach the main forces of the German troops in the following days, weeks, and even months. 74,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of this army were killed or captured.

The 55th Army Corps, located on the right flank of the army, in those days was not subjected to direct attacks by the Russians, but was cut off from other formations of the army. The 292nd and 102nd Infantry Divisions were transferred to the 2nd Army and retreated to the Pripyat swamps, which were infested with partisans. With the same maneuver, the 2nd Army itself was forced to withdraw its left flank, which was standing near Petrikov, to the Pripyat region in order to prevent the enemy from bypassing it.

The office of Army Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal Bush, who flew by plane to report to the Fuhrer's headquarters, was transferred to Lida on June 28. At 20.30 of the same day, Field Marshal Model arrived here by mail plane. When he entered the working room of the headquarters, he briefly said: "I am your new commander!" To a timid question from the Chief of Staff of the Army Group, Lieutenant General Krebs, who was already Chief of Staff of Model when he commanded the 9th Army: “What did you bring with you?” The model replied: “Yourself!” However, the new commander, who became a field marshal on March 1, 1944, actually brought with him several formations, which he, being the commander of the Northern Ukraine Army Group (and now he commanded two army groups at once), ordered to be transferred to the central sector of the eastern front .

At first it was about a formation consisting of motorized battle groups under the command of Lieutenant General von Saucken, who had previously been commander of the 3rd Panzer Corps. Saucken had orders with Lieutenant-General Decker's 5th Panzer Division, the 505th Tiger Battalion, elements of the Sapper Training Battalion, and police companies to first establish a defensive front on the Berezina. There, in the area of ​​Zembin, the 5th Panzer Division was even able to vigorously resist the Russian tank formations that had broken through, so that the enemy suspended his offensive. The battle group took up positions near Borisov.

From left to right, without forming a solid front, units of the 31st Tank Regiment and the 14th Motorized Infantry Regiment of the Silesian 5th Tank Division were located from Minsk to Borisov. To the right, the 5th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion fought in the Zembin area, while the 13th Motorized Infantry Regiment and the 89th Engineer Battalion of the same division took up positions northeast of this area to intercept the Russian tanks striving for Borisov.

On the very right flank were the police units of SS Gruppenführer von Gottberg, whose tenure as Gebitskommissar of Weisruthenia (Belarus) had expired these days.

Before the new commander of Army Group Center on June 29, the situation on the map appeared as follows: 3rd Panzer Army: the enemy reached the line of the Minsk-Polotsk railway near the village of Vetrina. The remnants of the army were thrown back through Lepel to the lakes Olshitsa and Ushacha. In the areas of Brod and Kalnitz, the enemy crossed the Berezina.

4th Army: the enemy is trying to surround the army before it withdraws to the Berezina. A bridgehead is being held near Borisov by the von Saucken battle group.
9th Army: the enemy turned from Osipovichi to the south-west in the direction of the Slutsk-Minsk road.
2nd Army: systematically withdraws the left flank to the Pripyat region.

Based on this, Field Marshal Model issued the following brief orders: 3rd Panzer Army: stop and restore the front!
4th Army: systematically withdraw the divisions from the flanks behind the Berezina. Reestablish contact with the 9th Army. Leave Borisov.
9th Army: send the 12th Panzer Division in a southeasterly direction to hold Minsk as a "fortress". Evacuate the wounded.
2nd Army: hold the line Slutsk, Baranovichi. Close the gap at the junction with the 9th Army. The 4th Panzer and 28th Chasseur Divisions will be transferred to the army for reinforcement.

On the same day, the High Command of the Ground Forces informed the command of the army group that from June 30 some formations would be transferred to the central sector of the eastern front. Among them are the Franconian-Thuringian 4th Panzer Division under Major General Betzel and the Silesian 28th Jaeger Division under Lieutenant General Heistermann von Zilberg. Both will immediately be delivered to the Baranovichi region. The North German 170th Infantry Division, Major General Hass, will arrive from Lake Peipsi from the Army Group North zone to Minsk. In addition, the main command of the ground forces sent seven combat marching battalions and three anti-tank battalions of the reserve of the high command to Minsk. Thanks to this, on June 30, for the first time, a “calming down” of the situation followed, about which the combat journal of Army Group Center reported:

“For the first time after nine days of constantly lasting battle in Belarus, this day brought temporary relaxation.”

In the east there were still dozens of German battle groups cut off from the main forces. They tried to get through to theirs. Many Russian troops identified, destroyed, dispersed again. Only a few of them managed to reach the German defense lines.

Large parts here no longer acted. Only the radio stations of the army group constantly heard radio communications confirming the existence of such groups. As an example, we can cite a radiogram from the headquarters of the 27th Army Corps dated 19.30 on July 5:

"Breaking our way to the west on our own!"

This was the last news from this corps, the last news from small combat groups scattered through the forests and marshes east of the Berezina.

The commander of the army group ordered the former chief of artillery of the 9th Army, Lieutenant General Linding, to stand up with the battle group near Osipovichi and ensure the reception of the fighting groups making their way. There, between Bobruisk and Maryiny Gorki, the regiments, battalions, and divisions of Lieutenant-General Freiherr von Bodenhausen's Pomeranian 12th Panzer Division managed to meet many of these small battle groups and bring them to safety.

The last day of June 1944 was characterized by the emerging consolidation of the army group front. Although the 3rd Panzer Army south of Polotsk finally lost contact with the neighboring Army Group North, the remnants of the 252nd, 212th Infantry Divisions and Corps Group D managed to hold the Polotsk-Molodechno railway for some time. The gap on the right was somehow closed by the police units of the commander of the Wehrmacht in Ostland (Baltic).

The 170th Infantry Division was still en route between Vilnius and Molodechno.

But near Minsk, in the zone of the 4th Army, the situation developed dramatically. The battle group of Lieutenant General von Saucken was forced to leave the bridgehead near Borisov and hastily transfer the 5th Panzer Division to the left flank in the direction of Molodechno in order to prevent the enemy from enveloping. The 12th Panzer Division withdrew to Minsk.

A hole continued to gape in the zone previously occupied by the completely routed 9th Army. There, between Minsk and Slutsk, there was no one except for guard patrols of SS Gruppenführer von Gottberg.

Colonel-General Weiss's 2nd Army, whose troops had left Slutsk on the left flank, now had to close the gap that had formed. Therefore, in the first days of July, from the line of Slutsk, Slonim, the army launched a counterattack in a northerly direction. The 102nd Infantry Division of Major General von Berken, withdrawn from the front south of Slutsk and turned northwest in the direction of Baranovichi, took part in it. To the north, units of the Hungarian cavalry corps moved in the same direction. The 4th Panzer Division of Major General Betzel, located east of Baranovichi, at that time attacked the southern flank of the Soviet tank formations that had crossed the Minsk-Baranovichi railway. Lieutenant General Heistermann von Zilberg's 28th Jaeger Division set up a bridgehead north of Baranavichy to wait for Lieutenant General Lang's 218th Infantry Division and the 506th Tiger Battalion to approach from Slonim.

At this time, Field Marshal Model decided to abandon the battle for Minsk. On July 2, he ordered the immediate abandonment of the Belarusian capital. Before the arrival of the Russians, 45 trains were sent from Minsk.

But the battles near Minsk still continued. In dense forests and marshy swamps east of the city, 28 divisions and 350,000 of their soldiers continued to bleed. The forces of Army Group Center were exhausted.

Although Field Marshal Model west of Minsk again managed to create a line of defense, on which the 4th, 5th and 12th tank, 28th chasseurs, 50th and 170th infantry divisions were located, around which the remnants of the defeated units gathered, but Baranovichi fell on July 8, Lida on July 9, Vilnius on July 13, Grodno on July 16, and Brest on July 28.

Army Group Center was once again standing where it had set off on a campaign against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

Behind were thousands of cemeteries buried in them by military personnel of all ranks. Echelons with thousands of prisoners were left behind, traveling further and further east into the unknown...

The history of Army Group Center, the most powerful formation of German ground forces, which crossed the Soviet-German border three years ago, ended there. But her troops were not finished. Its remnants were once again able to stop on the Vistula and on the border of East Prussia and take up positions. There, with their new commander (from August 16, 1944) - Colonel General Reinhardt - they defended Germany and on January 25, 1945 were renamed Army Group North. Since that time, the name Army Group Center was given to the former Army Group A, which retreated from southern Poland to the Czech Republic and Moravia, where it was forced to capitulate on May 8, 1945.

A unit of the 3rd Belorussian Front is forcing the Luchesa River.
June 1944

This year marks 70 years since the Red Army carried out one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War - Operation Bagration. During it, the Red Army not only liberated the people of Belarus from occupation, but also significantly undermined the forces of the enemy, brought the collapse of fascism closer - our Victory.

Unparalleled in terms of spatial scope, the Belarusian offensive operation is rightfully considered the greatest achievement of the national military art. As a result, the most powerful grouping of the Wehrmacht was defeated. This became possible thanks to the unparalleled courage, heroism of determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and partisans of Belarus, many of whom died a heroic death on Belarusian soil in the name of Victory over the enemy.

Map of the Belarusian operation

After the offensive in the winter of 1943-1944. the front line formed in Belarus a huge ledge with an area of ​​\u200b\u200babout 250 thousand square meters. km, facing east. It penetrated deeply into the location of the Soviet troops and was of great operational and strategic importance for both sides. The elimination of this ledge and the liberation of Belarus opened the Red Army the shortest route to Poland and Germany, endangered flank attacks by the enemy army groups "North" and "Northern Ukraine".

In the central direction, the Soviet troops were opposed by the Army Group Center (3rd Panzer, 4th, 9th and 2nd Armies) under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush. It was supported by aviation of the 6th and partly of the 1st and 4th air fleets. In total, the enemy grouping included 63 divisions and 3 infantry brigades, in which there were 800 thousand people, 7.6 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, and more than 1300 combat aircraft. The reserve of the Army Group "Center" had 11 divisions, most of which were involved in the fight against the partisans.

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to conduct a strategic operation for the final liberation of Belarus, in which the troops of 4 fronts were to act in concert. The troops of the 1st Baltic (commander general of the army), 3rd (commander colonel general), 2nd (commander colonel general G.F. Zakharov) and 1st Belorussian fronts (commander general of the army) were involved in the operation. , long-range aviation, the Dnieper military flotilla, as well as a large number of formations and detachments of Belarusian partisans.

Commander of the 1st Baltic Front General of the Army
THEM. Baghramyan and Chief of Staff of the Front Lieutenant General
V.V. Kurasov during the Belarusian operation

The fronts included 20 combined arms, 2 tank and 5 air armies. In total, the grouping consisted of 178 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps and 21 brigades. 5 air armies provided air support and cover for the troops of the fronts.

The idea of ​​the operation was to break through the enemy defenses in 6 directions with deep strikes from 4 fronts, encircle and destroy enemy groups on the flanks of the Belarusian ledge - in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, after which, advancing in converging directions on Minsk, surround and liquidate east of the Belarusian capital the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, increasing the force of the strike, reach the line Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin.

When choosing the direction of the main attack, the idea of ​​​​concentrating forces in the Minsk direction was clearly expressed. The simultaneous breakthrough of the front in 6 sectors led to the dissection of the enemy's forces, making it difficult for him to use reserves in repelling the offensive of our troops.

To strengthen the grouping, in the spring and summer of 1944, the Stavka replenished the fronts with four combined arms, two tank armies, four breakthrough artillery divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and four engineering and engineer brigades. In the 1.5 months preceding the operation, the numerical strength of the grouping of Soviet troops in Belarus increased by more than 4 times in tanks, almost 2 times in artillery, and by two-thirds in aircraft.

The enemy, not expecting large-scale actions in this direction, expected to repel a private offensive of the Soviet troops with the forces and means of Army Group Center, located in one echelon, mainly only in the tactical defense zone, which consisted of 2 defensive lanes with a depth of 8 to 12 km . At the same time, using the terrain favorable for defense, he created a multi-lane, defense in depth, consisting of several lines, with a total depth of up to 250 km. Defense lines were built along the western banks of the rivers. The cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Borisov, Minsk were turned into powerful defense centers.

By the beginning of the operation, the advancing troops included 1.2 million people, 34,000 guns and mortars, 4,070 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and about 5,000 combat aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in terms of manpower by 1.5 times, guns and mortars by 4.4 times, tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts by 4.5 times, and aircraft by 3.6 times.

In none of the previous offensive operations did the Red Army have such a quantity of artillery, tanks and combat aircraft, and such superiority in forces, as in the Belorussian one.

By the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the tasks for the fronts were determined as follows:

Troops of the 1st Baltic Front to break through the enemy defenses northwest of Vitebsk, capture the Beshenkovichi area, and part of the forces, in cooperation with the right-flank army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, encircle and destroy the enemy in the Vitebsk area. Subsequently, develop an offensive on Lepel;

Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the Berezina. To accomplish this task, the front had to strike in two directions (with the forces of 2 armies in each): on Senno, and along the Minsk highway on Borisov, and part of the forces on Orsha. The main forces of the front must develop an offensive towards the Berezina River;

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Fronts, to defeat the Mogilev group, liberate Mogilev and reach the Berezina River;

Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front to defeat the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy. To this end, the front was to deliver two blows: one from the Rogachev area in the direction of Bobruisk, Osipovichi, the second - from the area of ​​​​the lower reaches of the Berezina to Starye Dorogi, Slutsk. At the same time, the troops of the right wing of the front were to assist the 2nd Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Mogilev grouping;

The troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts, after the defeat of the enemy's flank groupings, were to develop an offensive in converging directions to Minsk and, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front and partisans, encircle its main forces east of Minsk.

The partisans were also given the task of disorganizing the work of the enemy's rear, disrupting the supply of reserves, capturing important lines, crossings and bridgeheads on the rivers, and holding them until the approach of the advancing troops. The first undermining of the rails should be carried out on the night of June 20.

Much attention was paid to the concentration of aviation efforts on directing the main attacks of the fronts and maintaining air supremacy. Only on the eve of the offensive, aviation made 2,700 sorties and carried out powerful aviation training in areas of front breakthrough.

The duration of artillery preparation was planned from 2 hours to 2 hours and 20 minutes. Support for the attack was planned by the methods of barrage, successive concentration of fire, as well as a combination of both methods. In the offensive zones of the 2nd armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, operating in the direction of the main attack, support for the attack of infantry and tanks was carried out for the first time using the double barrage method.

At the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. The chief of staff, Colonel General M.S., is on the phone. Malinin, far left - Front Commander General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky. Bobruisk region. Summer 1944

The coordination of the actions of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to the representatives of the Headquarters - the Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union and the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union. For the same purpose, the head of the operational department of the General Staff, General, was sent to the 2nd Belorussian Front. The actions of the air armies were coordinated by Air Chief Marshal A.A. Novikov and Air Marshal F.Ya. Falaleev. Marshal of Artillery N.D. arrived from Moscow to help the artillery commanders and headquarters. Yakovlev and Colonel-General of Artillery M.N. Chistyakov.

The operation required 400,000 tons of ammunition, about 300,000 tons of fuel, over 500,000 tons of food and fodder, which were delivered on time.

According to the nature of the hostilities and the content of the tasks, the operation "Bagration" is divided into two stages: the first - from June 23 to July 4, 1944, during which 5 front-line operations were carried out: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk, and the second - from July 5 to August 29, 1944, which included 5 more front-line operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin-Brest.

The 1st stage of the Bagration operation included breaking through the enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth, expanding the breakthrough towards the flanks and defeating the nearest operational reserves and capturing a number of cities, incl. the liberation of the capital of Belarus - Minsk; Stage 2 - development of success in depth, overcoming intermediate defensive lines, defeating the main operational reserves of the enemy, capturing important lines and bridgeheads on the river. Wisla. Specific tasks for the fronts were determined to a depth of up to 160 km.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts began on June 23. A day later, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front joined the battle. The offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force.

The actions of the troops during the operation "Bagration", as in no other operation of the Soviet troops before that, almost exactly corresponded to its plan and the tasks received. During 12 days of intense fighting in the first stage of the operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated.

German captured soldiers of the Army Group "Center" are being escorted through Moscow.
July 17, 1944

The troops, advancing 225-280 km at an average daily pace of 20-25 km, liberated most of Belarus. In the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk, a total of about 30 German divisions were surrounded and defeated. The enemy front in the central direction was crushed. The results achieved created the conditions for a subsequent offensive in the Siauliai, Vilnius, Grodno and Brest directions, as well as for the transition to active operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

Fighter, liberate your Belarus. Poster by V. Koretsky. 1944

The goals set for the fronts were fully achieved. The success of the Belorussian operation was timely used by the Headquarters for decisive actions in other directions of the Soviet-German front. On July 13, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. The general offensive front expanded from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. Soviet troops on July 17-18 crossed the state border of the Soviet Union with Poland. By August 29, they reached the line - Jelgava, Dobele, Augustow and the Narew and Vistula rivers.

Vistula river. Crossing tanks. 1944

Further development of the offensive with an acute shortage of ammunition and fatigue of the Soviet troops would not have been successful, and by order of the Stavka they went on the defensive.

2nd Belorussian Front: Front Commander General of the Army
G.F. Zakharov, member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin and Colonel General K.A. Vershinin are discussing a plan to strike the enemy from the air. August 1944

As a result of the Belorussian operation, favorable conditions were created not only for inflicting new powerful strikes against enemy groupings operating on the Soviet-German front in the Baltic States, East Prussia and Poland, in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, but also for deploying offensive operations of the Anglo-American troops, landed in Normandy.

The Belarusian offensive operation of the group of fronts, which lasted 68 days, is one of the outstanding operations not only of the Great Patriotic War, but of the entire Second World War. Its distinguishing feature is its huge spatial scope and impressive operational and strategic results.

Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front. From left to right: Chief of Staff of the Front, Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky, a member of the Military Council of the Front, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov, commander of the front troops, General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky. September 1944

The troops of the Red Army, having launched an offensive on June 23 on a front of 700 km, by the end of August advanced 550-600 km to the west, expanding the front of hostilities to 1,100 km. The vast territory of Belarus and a significant part of eastern Poland were cleared of the German occupiers. Soviet troops reached the Vistula, on the outskirts of Warsaw and the border with East Prussia.

Battalion commander of the 297th Infantry Regiment of the 184th Division of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front Captain G.N. Gubkin (right) with officers on reconnaissance. On August 17, 1944, his battalion was the first in the Red Army to break through to the border of East Prussia

During the operation, the largest German group suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 179 divisions and 5 brigades of the Wehrmacht, then operating on the Soviet-German front, 17 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed in Belarus, and 50 divisions, having lost more than 50% of their personnel, lost their combat capability. German troops lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers.

Operation "Bagration" showed vivid examples of the high skill of Soviet generals and military leaders. She made a significant contribution to the development of strategy, operational art and tactics; enriched the art of war with the experience of encircling and destroying large enemy groupings in a short time and in a variety of situational conditions. The problem of breaking through the powerful defense of the enemy, as well as the rapid development of success in the operational depth through the skillful use of large tank formations and formations, was successfully solved.

In the struggle for the liberation of Belarus, Soviet soldiers showed mass heroism and high combat skills. 1500 of its participants became Heroes of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and those awarded were soldiers of all nationalities of the USSR.

Partisan formations played an exceptionally important role in the liberation of Belarus.

Parade of partisan brigades after liberation
the capital of Belarus - Minsk

Solving tasks in close cooperation with the troops of the Red Army, they destroyed over 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The motherland highly appreciated the feat of the partisans and underground fighters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and 87 who especially distinguished themselves became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

But the victory came at a high price. At the same time, the high intensity of hostilities, the advance transition of the enemy to the defensive, the difficult conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain, the need to overcome large water barriers and other natural obstacles led to heavy losses in people. During the offensive, the troops of the four fronts lost 765,815 people killed, wounded, missing and sick, which is almost 50% of their total strength at the beginning of the operation. And irretrievable losses amounted to 178,507 people. Our troops also had heavy losses in armament.

The world community appreciated the events on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Political and military leaders of the West, diplomats and journalists noted their significant influence on the further course of the Second World War. “The swiftness of the advance of your armies is amazing,” wrote President of the United States of America F. Roosevelt on July 21, 1944 to I.V. Stalin. In a telegram to the head of the Soviet government dated July 24, British Prime Minister W. Churchill called the events in Belarus "victories of great importance." One of the Turkish newspapers on July 9 stated: "If the advance of the Russians continues to develop at the same pace, the Russian troops will enter Berlin faster than the allied troops will finish operations in Normandy."

Professor of the University of Edinburgh, a well-known English specialist in military-strategic problems, J. Erickson, in his book “The Road to Berlin” emphasized: “The defeat of the Army Group Center by the Soviet troops was their biggest success achieved ... as a result of one operation. For the German army... it was a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, bigger than Stalingrad."

Operation Bagration was the first major offensive operation of the Red Army, carried out at a time when the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain began hostilities in Western Europe. However, 70% of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht continued to fight on the Soviet-German front. The catastrophe in Belarus forced the German command to transfer large strategic reserves here from the west, which, of course, created favorable conditions for the offensive operations of the allies after the landing of their troops in Normandy and the conduct of a coalition war in Europe.

The successful offensive of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts in the western direction in the summer of 1944 radically changed the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, led to a sharp weakening of the combat potential of the Wehrmacht. By liquidating the Belarusian ledge, they eliminated the threat of flank attacks from the north for the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which were advancing in the Lvov and Rava-Russian directions. The capture and retention of bridgeheads by the Soviet troops on the Vistula in the areas of Pulawy and Magnuszew opened up prospects for conducting new operations to defeat the enemy in order to completely liberate Poland and advance on the German capital.

Memorial complex "Mound of Glory".

Sculptors A. Bembel and A. Artimovich, architects O. Stakhovich and L. Mitskevich, engineer B. Laptsevich. The total height of the memorial is 70.6 m. An earthen hill 35 m high is crowned by a sculptural composition of four bayonets lined with titanium, each 35.6 m high. The bayonets symbolize the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts that liberated Belarus. Their base is surrounded by a ring with bas-relief images of Soviet soldiers and partisans. On the inside of the ring, made in the mosaic technique, the text is beaten off: "Glory to the Soviet Army, the Liberator Army!"

Sergey Lipatov,
Research Fellow at the Research
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation .