First World Turkish Front. Caucasian Front of Russia in the First World War
Democratic Republic of Armenia
Georgian Democratic Republic
Dictatorship of the Central Caspian
Baku commune
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
mountain republic
Kaçi, Mehmet Vehip
Caucasian front- combined-arms operational-strategic association of Russian troops in the Caucasian theater of operations of the First World War (-). Officially ceased to exist in March 1918 in connection with the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by Soviet Russia.
The beginning of the war. balance of power
The war in the Caucasian theater of operations was waged by both sides in extremely difficult conditions for supplying troops - mountainous terrain and the lack of means of communication, especially railways, increased the importance of control over the Black Sea ports in this area (primarily Batum and Trabzon.
Before the start of hostilities, the Caucasian army was dispersed into two groups in accordance with two main operational directions:
- Kars direction (Kars - Erzurum) - approx. 6 divisions in the Olta-Sarykamysh area,
- Erivan direction (Erivan - Alashkert) - approx. 2 divisions and cavalry in the Igdyr area.
The flanks were covered by small independent detachments of border guards, Cossacks and militia: the right flank was the direction along the Black Sea coast to Batum, and the left flank was against the Kurdish regions, where, with the announcement of mobilization, the Turks began to form Kurdish irregular cavalry.
With the outbreak of World War I, an Armenian volunteer movement unfolded in Transcaucasia. The Armenians pinned certain hopes on this war, counting on the liberation of Western Armenia with the help of Russian weapons. Therefore, the Armenian socio-political forces and national parties declared this war fair and declared their unconditional support for the Entente. The leadership of Turkey, for its part, tried to attract Western Armenians to its side and offered them to create volunteer detachments as part of the Turkish army and persuade the Eastern Armenians to joint action against Russia. These plans, however, were not destined to come true.
The Armenian National Bureau in Tiflis was engaged in the creation of Armenian squads (volunteer detachments). The total number of Armenian volunteers amounted to 25 thousand people under the command of well-known leaders of the Armenian national movement on the territory of Western Armenia. The first four volunteer detachments joined the ranks of the army in various sectors of the Caucasian front already in November 1914. Armenian volunteers distinguished themselves in the battles for Van, Dilman, Bitlis, Mush, Erzerum and other cities of Western Armenia. At the end of 1915 - beginning of 1916. Armenian volunteer detachments were disbanded, and on their basis, rifle battalions were created as part of the Russian units, which participated in hostilities until the end of the war.
1914
Positions of the Russian army near Sarykamysh 1914
In the second half of the year, hostilities spread to the territory of Persia.
In October-December 1915, the commander of the Caucasian Army, General Yudenich, carried out a successful Hamadan operation, which prevented Persia from entering the war on the side of Germany. On October 30, Russian troops landed in the port of Anzali (Persia), by the end of December they defeated the pro-Turkish armed groups and took control of the territory of Northern Persia, securing the left flank of the Caucasian army.
1916
In December 1915 - February 1916. the Russian army carried out a successful Erzurum offensive operation, as a result of which, on January 20 (February 2), Russian troops approached Erzerum. The assault on the fortress began on January 29 (February 11). On February 3 (16), Erzurum was taken, the Turkish garrison retreated, losing up to 70% of its personnel and almost all of its artillery. The pursuit of the retreating Turkish troops continued until the front line stabilized 70-100 km west of Erzurum.
The actions of Russian troops in other directions were also successful: Russian troops approached Trabzon (Trebizond) - the most important Turkish port, won the battle at Bitlis. The spring thaw did not allow the Russian troops to completely defeat the Turkish army retreating from Erzurum, but spring comes earlier on the Black Sea coast, and the Russian army began active operations there.
The defeat of the Turkish army in the Erzurum operation and the successful Russian offensive in the direction of Trebizond forced the Turkish command to take measures to strengthen the 3rd and 6th Turkish armies in order to go on the counteroffensive. On June 9, the Turkish army went on the offensive in order to cut off the Russian forces in Trebizond from the main troops. The attackers managed to break through the front, but on June 21, having suffered heavy losses, the Turks were forced to suspend the offensive.
Despite a new defeat, the Turkish troops made another attempt to advance in the Ognot direction. The Russian command advanced significant forces to the right flank, which restored the situation with offensive actions from August 4 to 11. In the future, the Russians and Turks alternately took offensive actions, and success leaned one way or the other. In some areas the Russians managed to advance, but in others they had to leave their positions. Without particularly major successes on both sides, the fighting went on until August 29, when snow fell in the mountains and frost struck, forcing the opponents to stop hostilities.
The results of the 1916 campaign on the Caucasian front exceeded the expectations of the Russian command. Russian troops advanced deep into Turkey, capturing the most important and largest cities - Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, Erzincan and Bitlis. The Caucasian army fulfilled its main task - the protection of Transcaucasia from the invasion of the Turks on a huge front, the length of which by the end of 1916 exceeded 1000 miles.
An occupation regime was established in the territories of Western Armenia occupied by Russian troops, and military administrative districts subordinate to the military command were created. In June 1916, the Russian government approved the "Temporary regulation on the administration of the regions conquered from Turkey by the law of war", according to which the occupied territory was declared the temporary governor-general of Turkish Armenia, directly subordinate to the main command of the Caucasian army. With a successful end to the war for Russia, the Armenians who left their homes during the genocide would return to their native land. Already in the middle of 1916, the economic development of Turkish territory began: several branches of railways were built.
1917
1918
In the first half of February (according to the new style), Turkish troops, taking advantage of the collapse of the Caucasian Front and violating the terms of the December truce, launched a large-scale offensive in the Erzerum, Van and Primorsky directions under the pretext of the need to protect the Muslim population of Eastern Turkey, almost immediately occupying Erzincan. The Turks in Western Armenia were actually opposed only by the volunteer Armenian corps, which consisted of three incomplete divisions, which did not put up serious resistance to the superior forces of the Turkish army.
Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the Armenian troops retreated, covering the crowds of Western Armenian refugees who left with them. After the occupation of Alexandropol, the Turkish command sent part of its troops to Karaklis (modern Vanadzor); another grouping of Turkish troops under the command of Yakub Shevka Pasha on May 21 launched an offensive in the direction of Sardarapat (modern Armavir), with the goal of breaking through to Erivan and the Ararat plain.
February 10 (23), 1918 in Tiflis, the Transcaucasian Commissariat convened the Transcaucasian Seim, which included deputies elected from Transcaucasia to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, and representatives of local political parties. After a long discussion, the Seim decided to start separate peace talks with Turkey, based on the principle of restoring the Russian-Turkish borders of 1914 at the time of the start of the war.
Meanwhile, on February 21 (March 6), the Turks, having broken the three-day resistance of a few Armenian volunteers, captured Ardagan with the help of the local Muslim population. On February 27 (March 12), the retreat of the Armenian troops and refugees from Erzurum began. On March 2 (15), a retreating crowd of thousands reached Sarykamysh. With the fall of Erzurum, the Turks effectively regained control of all of Eastern Anatolia. On March 2 (15), the commander of the Armenian corps, General Nazarbekov, was appointed commander of the front from Olti to Maku; the Olti-Batum line was supposed to be defended by Georgian troops. Under the command of Nazarbekov there were 15,000 people on the front with a length of 250 km.
Peace negotiations, held from 1 (14) March to 1 (14) April in Trebizond, ended in failure. A few days earlier, Turkey had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Soviet Russia. According to Art. IV of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Russian-Turkish Supplementary Treaty, not only the territories of Western Armenia were transferred to Turkey, but also the regions of Batum, Kars and Ardagan inhabited by Georgians and Armenians, annexed by Russia as a result of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The RSFSR undertook not to interfere "in the new organization of state-legal and international legal relations of these districts", to restore the border "in the form it existed before the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78" and to dissolve on its territory and in the "occupied Turkish provinces” (that is, in Western Armenia) all Armenian volunteer squads.
Turkey, which had just signed a peace treaty with Russia on the most favorable terms and had actually returned to the borders of 1914, demanded that the Transcaucasian delegation recognize the conditions of the Brest Peace. The Sejm broke off negotiations and withdrew the delegation from Trebizond, officially entering the war with Turkey. At the same time, representatives of the Azerbaijani faction in the Seimas openly declared that they would not participate in the creation of a common union of the Transcaucasian peoples against Turkey, given their "special religious ties with Turkey."
For Russia, the war with Turkey was completed with the signing of the Brest Peace, which meant the formal cessation of the existence of the Caucasian Front and the possibility of returning to their homeland for all Russian troops still remaining in Turkey and Persia. However, the actual offensive of the Ottoman troops was stopped only at the end of May, as a result of
On October 28, 1914, Turkish ships fired on Sevastopol and Odessa without declaring war. The next day, the Turks fired at Novorossiysk. Thus began a new Russian-Turkish war.
Overwhelmed by the extravagant ideas of pan-Turkism, the Young Turks proclaimed their main goal to unite all Turkic-speaking peoples in a single state under the auspices of Sultan Turkey.
The future "great Turkish state" was also to include the Caucasus and Crimea, Bashkiria and Tataria, Central Asia, etc. This program had an openly anti-Russian orientation: it was Russia that the Young Turks considered the main enemy on the way to the implementation of their predatory goals.
By the beginning of the war, the Turks had concentrated the Third Army, consisting of 190 battalions, on the front from the Black Sea to Moosul. At the same time, most of the army's forces were stationed on the border of the Bagum and Kars regions.
The third army was commanded by Gassan Izet Pasha. The army included the 9th, 10th and 11th corps; one cavalry division; 4.5 Kurdish divisions; border troops and gendarmerie. The Third Army had 244 field guns. To reinforce the army from Mesopotamia, the 37th Infantry Division of the 13th Corps was brought up. The main forces of the army were concentrated in the Erzurum region.
The Turkish command assigned the Third Army the task of defeating the Russians at Sarykamysh, and then, leaving a barrier against the Kars fortress, advancing to capture Ardagan and Batum. In the event that the Russian Caucasian Army went on the offensive, the Third Turkish Army had the task of preventing the Russians from penetrating deep into Turkish territory and inflicting a strong counterattack on them. During the invasion of the main forces of the Russian army in the Erzurum direction, the Turks were to surround them east of Erzurum.
As in all previous Russian-Turkish wars, in 1914-1917. the Russian command considered the Caucasian front to be secondary.
The Russian Caucasian army was commanded by the viceroy of the tsar in the Caucasus, cavalry general Count Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov. By this time, the count was 77 years old, and in fact, his chief of staff, General Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich (1862–1933), was in charge of the troops.
By the beginning of hostilities, the Caucasian army included the 1st Caucasian, 2nd Turkestan corps and separate formations: the 66th infantry division, two Cossack divisions, two brigades and other units. The total strength of the Caucasian army was 153 battalions, 175 hundreds, 12 sapper companies, 350 field guns and 5 fortress artillery battalions. In total, over 170 thousand people. The Russian army relied on the fortresses of Kars and Batum.
The troops of the Caucasian Army were given the following tasks: to hold the Baku-Vladikavkaz railway and the Georgian Military Highway Tiflis-Vladikavkaz; to defend the most important industrial center of Baku and prevent the appearance of Turkish forces in the Caucasus. To accomplish the assigned tasks, the Russian forces had to invade Western Armenia, defeat the advanced units of the Turks and actively defend themselves on the occupied border mountain lines.
The army occupied a front with a length of 720 km - from the Black Sea to Lake Urmia. Since, according to the conditions of the theater, the troops could operate only in separate directions isolated from each other, the Russian forces were concentrated in four groups - in the Trebizond, Oltyn, Erzerum and Erivan operational directions. Each group consisted of two or three detachments of different numbers. The Russian command decided to strike the main blow in the Erzurum direction, since, according to the conditions of the terrain, the occupation of Erzerum by the Russians opened access through Erzinjan to Anatolia. In addition, this direction was better provided with roads and allowed the use of large forces. Actions in the main direction were provided by the offensive of part of the forces in the Oltyn and Kagyzman directions.
The Turks also decided to act offensively, delivering the main blow in the Kars direction and a secondary blow in the Batumi direction.
Operations on the Caucasian front in 1914 began with oncoming battles in the Erzurum direction (Keprikei operation).
Having crossed the border on November 2, the Sarykamysh detachment of the Caucasian army already on November 7 captured the Keprikey position, located 50 km from Erzurum, as well as a number of other important points.
Turkish troops were advancing from Erzurum. The Russians stubbornly resisted, but under the threat of bypassing the right flank, they retreated a little to the line of Ali-Kilis - Ardos - Khorosan. On November 14, a major battle broke out again, during which the Russians forced the Turks to go on the defensive from November 19. The third Turkish army began to consolidate in front of the Sarykamysh detachment. Autumn off-road began on the plains and in some places in the mountains. This made active combat operations extremely difficult. Nevertheless, on November 21, the Russian troops launched a general offensive, inflicted heavy losses on the Turkish troops and drove them back. In connection with the arrival of winter, a further offensive could not give tangible results, and the command of the Russian Caucasian army decided to stop and go on the defensive at the Maslakhat - Azankey - Yuzveran - Ardi line. During the Keprikey operation, Turkish troops lost 15 thousand people (including 3 thousand deserters). Russian losses did not exceed 6 thousand people.
On other areas of action of the Russian troops were also successful. On the Kagyzman, Erivan and Azerbaijani directions, the Russians occupied hard-to-reach natural frontiers that blocked the offensive of the Turks.
In the Batum region, an unfavorable situation developed for the Russian army. Having pulled up large forces to the Hopa region by November, the Turks on November 16 went on the offensive in several groups towards the border. Of these, the right group attacked Artvin, and the other three, putting forward a barrier against the detachment (about 1 thousand people) occupying the Liman, moved across the border along three almost parallel gorges, threatening to occupy the communication line Artvin - Borchkha - Maradida and go to the rear of Batum. The commandant of the Mikhailovsky fortress moved almost all available forces against the Turks. The Turks managed to be stopped, but suddenly the rebellious Adjarians attacked the Russians from the rear and flanks. The Russian command was confused and ordered to retreat to Batum. The Turks occupied Artvin, Borchkha, and from the sea they approached the Chorokh River.
Having pulled up reserves, at the end of November 1914, the Russians launched a counteroffensive and, with the support of naval artillery fire, pushed back the Turks.
By mid-December, the Third Turkish Army included: up to 121 battalions, about 22 squadrons, 263 guns, plus Kurdish detachments.
On December 22, the Turks launched an offensive against Sarykamysh. Enver Pasha himself arrived in Erzurum to lead the offensive. By December 25, the Turks from the north bypassed the Russian troops and went to Sarykamysh. The fight began on the streets of the city. The Russian authorities urgently arrived in Sarykamysh - Generals A.Z. Myshlaevsky and N.N. Yudenich.
The Russians managed to quickly remove troops from other sectors and transfer them to Sarykamysh. In addition, the Siberian Cossack brigade approached from Tiflis. As a result, the IX and X Corps of the Turks were surrounded. The remnants of the IX Corps surrendered on January 4, 1915 at Sarykamysh, and the remnants of the X Corps managed to escape along the mountain paths.
During the Sarykamyshk operation, the Turks lost about 90 thousand people (including 30 thousand frozen) and 60 guns. The Caucasian army also suffered heavy losses. More than 20 thousand people were out of action.
In the first days of January 1915, Russian troops launched an attack on Erzerum. At the same time, part of the troops was sent to clean up Adjara from pro-Turkish rebels.
With the outbreak of the war, Turkish-Kurdish detachments invaded Persian Azerbaijan. They managed to occupy the city of Tabriz. In the future, the Turks intended to cross the Russian border and move to Baku. Then the Russian troops entered the territory of Persia and on January 30, 1915 drove the Turks out of Tabriz.
In January - March 1915, the Batumi group of Russian troops continued the offensive against the Turkish I Corps and captured the city of Hopa.
But the most bloody battles took place north of Lake Van. In May - June, the Caucasian army advanced 80-100 km and captured the settlements of Dutak, Malazgirt, Van, Urmia.
The Caucasian army had real chances to defeat the Turkish troops and launch a decisive offensive deep into enemy territory. However, Nicholas II and his entourage not only did not send reinforcements to the Caucasian army, but vice versa, they periodically took away the most combat-ready units from it, replacing them with secondary formations. The Caucasian army was strictly limited in shells. By the beginning of the 1915 campaign, the artillery warehouses had a supply of shells and cartridges, based on the norm: 50 light, 75 mountain and 50 howitzer shells per gun, 50 cartridges per rifle.
All this made it possible for the Turks to launch a counteroffensive on July 9 and take the cities of Karakalise and Melazgirt. The position of the Russians became threatening for the entire Caucasian front.
General Yudenich urgently created a strike force with a force of 24 battalions and 31 cavalry hundred and on August 1 hit the left flank of the Turks. The Turkish troops retreated, and by the end of August the front had stabilized on the Buluk-Bashi-Erdzhish line (on Lake Van).
At the end of the story about the 1915 campaign, it is necessary to say about the personnel changes that took place in August 1915 both in the Caucasian army and in Russia as a whole. On August 23, Nicholas II removed the commander-in-chief of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the younger) from his post and appointed him viceroy in the Caucasus and commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army.
Nicholas II himself became the commander-in-chief of the Russian army and navy. When he was the heir, Nikolai commanded a guards battalion. But even then, contemporaries said that his military knowledge remained at the level of a guards lieutenant. Naturally, the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General M.V., led the war for the tsar. Alekseev.
The Turkish command did not have clear operational plans for the 1916 campaign. According to Enver Pasha, the war was decided not on the Turkish fronts, but in Europe, and he even suggested that the Turkish troops released after the Dardanelles operation be sent to Austria-Hungary.
The ruling circles of Russia also did not attach much importance to the war with Turkey, there were not enough soldiers in the Caucasus, and the tsar sent tens of thousands of Russian soldiers to the slaughter on the Western Front in France. Not to mention the fact that in August 1914 the French government gave thousands or even tens of thousands of Russian men who had the misfortune to be in France at the beginning of the war the choice: either join the French army or go to a concentration camp until the end of the war. To which neither the Russian military agent Count Ignatiev, nor the Russian ambassador in Paris, nor Nicholas II himself reacted in any way.
On the Caucasian front itself, both Russian and Turkish generals were belligerent and eager to attack. By the beginning of 1916, the Third Turkish Army had 121.5 battalions, 78 squadrons and Kurdish units. A total of 80,226 people, of which 56,195 bayonets and 2087 cavalry. There were 150 guns and 77 machine guns.
The Caucasian army had 118 battalions, 23 militia squads, 104.5 squadrons and hundreds, 338 guns, 10 aircraft and 150 trucks.
The Turks planned to launch an offensive in the spring, but the Russians got ahead of them and launched the Erzurum operation.
The offensive of the Russian troops began on the night of January 10, 1916 with an attack by the 2nd Turkestan Corps in the Olta direction in order to draw the attention of the Turks to their left flank, and then, after 2 days, the 1st Caucasian Corps, supported by the army, went on the offensive. reserve. For the Turks, the Russian offensive at the most inconvenient time of the year, carefully prepared, with secretly regrouping troops, was a complete surprise, which contributed to the success of the first stage of the operation - the capture of the Keprikey position.
The whole operation resulted in a series of tactical actions: the struggle for mountain passes and detours of the enemy along mountain ranges that reached a height of 2700 meters, with a 25-degree frost and with blizzards that immediately covered the trodden paths. The whole burden of the offensive fell on the infantry, who had to drag the guns in their arms. The troops of the 2nd Turkestan Corps had a particularly hard time, some of the columns of which, in the full sense of the word, made their way in the snowy tunnels.
The Russian offensive proceeded most rapidly in the Sarykamysh direction, mainly due to the greater number and better quality of roads.
In mid-January Gassan-Kala was occupied. Russian troops met almost no resistance, as the Turks hastily retreated to Erzerum. It could be considered that the task assigned to the Caucasian army was completed, since the manpower of the Turks was defeated and the center of their location was broken through. According to intelligence reports, the Turks in Erzurum lost heart, no one was preparing for defense, and the fortress could easily be taken on the move.
On the other hand, the Turks began to transfer troops to Erzerum from Constantinople and Mesopotamia. Therefore, General N.N. Yudenich proposed to immediately storm Erzurum. However, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who arrived in the army from Tiflis, did not agree with him. The Grand Duke justified his decision by the power of Turkish artillery on the forts of Erzurum (265 guns). Only after long squabbles Yudenich managed to insist on his own.
The Russians began their assault on Erzurum on 11 February at 8 pm. The 2nd Turkestan Corps advanced from the north, and the 4th Caucasian Rifle Division and the 1st Caucasian Corps advanced from the east. In total, 78 battalions, 54.5 hundreds, 4 companies of sappers and 180 guns were intended for the assault, of which 16 were heavy, delivered from Kars by car.
The Russian offensive was successful. Already on February 12, Russian troops captured two forts in important directions, which allowed them to reach the rear of Turkish positions from the north. On February 16, Russian troops broke into Erzerum, and the Turks were driven back 70-100 km to the west.
Upon reaching the line of Memakhatun on March 13 and Hibonsi on March 25, the Russian troops stopped the pursuit and stopped because of the difficulties of transporting food and ammunition along unprepared mountain roads in winter.
During the fighting, 8 thousand prisoners, 9 Turkish banners, 315 guns, large stocks of ammunition and food were captured. Russian losses since the beginning of the operation amounted to 2,300 killed, 14,700 wounded and frostbite. Only 17 thousand people. The Turkish army lost more than half of its composition and almost all of its artillery.
The spring thaw that began in mid-March and complete lack of roads suspended offensive operations in the Erzerum-Erzincan direction. But on the Black Sea coast, where spring comes earlier, the mud has already ended. Here, since February 5, the Primorsky Detachment has been advancing very successfully in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet. By March 25, this detachment was 50 km from Trebizond - the intermediate base of the Turks. By this time, the Primorsky detachment included 11 battalions, 9 militia squads, 3 hundreds, 4 engineering companies and 38 guns.
By April 14, the Primorsky detachment, consisting of 20 battalions, took up a position along the right bank of the Kara-Dere River. Turkish troops, almost twice as strong, fortified on the left bank, occupying Syurmen. On the same day, the Russians, supported by artillery from two ships, occupied Surmen, and the next day they advanced, not reaching Trebizond for about 15 km. Here the troops stopped and began to prepare for the assault on Trebizond, which was scheduled for April 19. This break in the offensive was used by the Turks, who on the night of April 16 retreated from the city. Two days later, on April 18, the Greek population of Trebizond, in order to avoid an assault, sent their representatives with a request to occupy the city left by the Turkish troops. So Trebizond was occupied by the Russians without a fight.
The whole operation to take Trebizond was undertaken with the aim of creating a powerful supply base there. Therefore, it was decided to cover the future base to create a strong circular position here, a fortified area that could serve as a support for the right flank of the army, for which it was planned to occupy Platana. But the Primorsky detachment was too small to hold the entire planned bridgehead, and Yudenich, through the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army, demanded that the Headquarters send him at least two infantry divisions to reinforce him. This reinforcement was given in the form of two third divisions, which were transported by sea at the end of May from Mariupol to Trebizond, where they were consolidated into the 5th Caucasian Corps.
The Turks did not accept the loss of Erzurum and Trebizond and decided to launch a counteroffensive. The Second Turkish Army, consisting of 10 divisions, was transferred from the Straits region to the Caucasian front.
By the beginning of the Turkish offensive, the forces of the Caucasian army consisted of 183 1/2 battalions, 49 militia squads, 6 Armenian volunteer squads, 175 hundreds, 657 machine guns, 470 guns, 28 engineering companies, 4 aviation and aeronautic detachments and companies, 6 automobile and motorcycle companies and teams, 9 armored vehicles. A total of 207,293 bayonets and 23,220 cavalry.
The Turkish offensive began in April. At the end of May, the Turks managed to recapture the city of Memakhatun. At this time, an officer of the Turkish General Staff ran across to the Russians. From the documents he brought and the testimony given by him, a complete picture of both the organization of the Turkish rear and the grouping of troops, which until now was known only in general terms, and the Turkish offensive plan became clear. Then General Yudenich decided to prevent the Turkish offensive with his counterattack, with the goal of advancing to the Gyumushkhan-Kalkit-Erzincan line, to defeat the Turkish Third Army before the Second Army was concentrated.
In order to divert the attention of the Russian command from the direction of the main attack, which was planned by the Turks east of Trebizond, on May 30, the Turks suddenly went on the offensive in the Memakhatun region and pushed the units of the 1st Caucasian Corps to Erzerum. But on June 6, the offensive of the Turkish troops here was stopped by a Russian counterattack. In the main direction, the Turks began the operation on June 22. Having concentrated up to 27 battalions against 12 Russian battalions in the breakthrough zone, they attacked the left flank of the 5th Caucasian Corps in the direction of Surmali, with the aim of cutting off the Russian forces in the Trebizond region. Having broken through the Russian front, the Turks pressed the Russians in this sector and found themselves only 20 km from the sea. But by July 4, the Turks suffered heavy losses, their onslaught weakened, and the left wing of the 5th Caucasian Corps, in turn, went on the offensive. Even earlier, on July 2, taking advantage of the weakening of the Turkish forces in front of their front, the 2nd Turkestan Corps went on the offensive.
On August 5, the offensive of the Second Turkish Army began in the Ognot direction. The Russians initially withdrew, but then, having transferred significant forces from other sectors of the front, on August 17 they launched a counteroffensive. Until September 11, the fighting went on with varying success, and then snow fell in the mountains and frost hit, forcing the opponents to stop hostilities and hastily prepare for wintering. With the onset of winter cold, both sides went on the defensive until spring.
According to the famous formula of Clausewitz: “War is the continuation of politics by other means”, already in November 1915 the governments of England and France began negotiations on the division of the Asian part of Turkey. Both sides have allocated their best experts in the Middle East for the talks: France - the former French Consul General in Beirut Picot, England - Sykes, an expert of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Middle East affairs. Negotiations about the fate of the Strait Zone, as well as hostilities in that area, are beyond the scope of the book, and I refer interested readers to my monograph "The Thousand-Year Battle for Constantinople."
Already in January 1916 the draft agreement was ready. In the British zone, it was decided to include Mesopotamia with Baghdad and Basra, but without Mosul. In addition, England received the Palestinian ports of Haifa and Acre. The French zone included Lebanon, the coastal part of Syria (west of the Aleppo-Homs line), part of Eastern Anatolia, Lesser Armenia and Kurdistan. Palestine (excluding Haifa and Acre) was to form the international zone.
The offensive of Russian troops in the Caucasus made serious adjustments to the plans of England and France. Fearing that the regions of Asiatic Turkey, on the division of which they agreed, would not be captured by Russia, France and England hastened to coordinate their plans with the tsarist government. In February 1916, Pico and Sykes urgently left for Petrograd. By an aide-memoire of the British and French embassies in Petrograd dated February 25 (March 9), 1916, the tsarist government was informed of the contents of the preliminary Anglo-French agreement on the division of Asiatic Turkey.
Reporting on the Sykes-Pico project to Nicholas II, Foreign Minister S.D. Sazonov pointed out that for Russia "the most significant" is the border proposed in this project between Russian and French future possessions. “From a topographical point of view,” Sazonov wrote in his most humble note dated February 29 (March 13), 1916, “it seems quite natural, following the direction of the main mountain range, but for political and strategic reasons it can hardly be considered acceptable. The appearance on a large stretch of our Asian border, in areas with a mixed and restless population, of a great European power, even if it is currently allied to us, and the introduction of its angle into the Russian-Persian border, must be recognized as undesirable. According to Sazonov, for Russia "the most advantageous would be a common border in the south with some Asian Muslim state in the form of either an Arab caliphate or a Turkish sultanate."
In conclusion of his most obedient note, Sazonov noted that if it had not been possible to achieve the creation between the Russian and French zones (by reducing the latter) of a buffer area, then “we should in any case insist on including the Urmia district and the Bitlis passages in our zone, providing the French with some rewards in Lesser Armenia in the region of the triangle Sivas - Harput - Caesarea.
The latter option ultimately formed the basis of an agreement between Russia and France and England on the delimitation of their future possessions in Asiatic Turkey. Having received the consent of the French government to include the Bitlis passages and the region of Urumi Lake in the Russian zone instead of the territory of Lesser Armenia, limited by the Sivas - Harput - Caesarea (Kaisari) triangle, on March 17 (30) Sazonov raised the issue of dividing Asiatic Turkey for discussion at a special meeting.
An agreement between Russia and France on the division of Asiatic Turkey was concluded on April 13 (26), 1916. Under this agreement, Russia received "the regions of Erzerum, Trebizond, Vann and Bitlis up to a point to be determined on the Black Sea coast west of Trebizond." In addition, she was given a part of Kurdistan, “located south of Van and Bitlis, between Mush, Sert, the course of the Tigris, Jezire ibn Omar, a line of mountain peaks dominating Amadia,” which, according to the Sykes-Picot plan, was intended for France. Instead, France received a conditioned part of Lesser Armenia. On April 26 (May 9) and May 3 (16), 1916, an agreement was reached between France and England - the so-called Sykes-Pico agreement. On May 17 (30), 1916, England acceded to the Franco-Russian agreement on the division of Asiatic Turkey.
The war for the Turkish rulers became an occasion to "solve the Armenian problem." In 1915–1916 Turks and Kurds slaughtered over 1.5 million Armenians.
MILITARY HISTORICAL LIBRARY
N.G. KORSUN
caucasian front
WORLD WAR I
UDC 355/359" 1914/1919" BBK 63.3(0)53 K69
The series was founded in 1998
Serial design by A.A. Kudryavtseva
Signed for publication from ready-made transparencies on April 28, 2004. Format 84x108 "/52. Printing paper. Offset printing. Conv. oven l. 36.12. Circulation 3000 copies. Order 1454.
Korsun N.G.
K69 Caucasian front of the First World War / N.G. Korsun. - M.: AST Publishing House LLC: Tranzitkniga LLC. 2004. - 685.)
Information material "young reader's corner"
Doctor who are far to destroy
Where to buy sulfuric acid?