Why Hitler did not take Leningrad. Why did the Nazis not take Leningrad

The website of the Zvezda TV channel publishes a series of articles about the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 by the writer Leonid Maslovsky, based on his book Russkaya Pravda, published in 2011.

In his author's materials, Maslovsky, according to him, exposes "the myths invented by Russia's ill-wishers about the events of the Great Patriotic War and shows the greatness of our Victory." The author notes that in his articles he is going to "show the unseemly role of the West in preparing Germany for war with the USSR."

In October 1941, the 7th Army under the command of K. A. Meretskov, after 3 months of fighting and retreats, stopped the Finns, reinforced by German troops, on the Svir River from the eastern side of Lake Ladoga, preventing them from connecting with German troops and completely closing the encirclement ring Leningrad. The plans of the German command were thwarted. The Finns and the Germans were not allowed to go to Vologda from the side of Lake Onega.

The German troops failed to crush the Red Army and take Leningrad, but the German troops remained under it. Thus, the connection of the city of Leningrad and the Leningrad Front with the country by land was interrupted. The supply through Lake Ladoga was complicated by the fact that a group of German troops crossed the Volkhov River, cut the Tikhvin-Volkhov railway, and captured Tikhvin on November 8, 1941.

Famine came to Leningrad. The bread ration, which averaged about 800 grams per day, was rapidly declining. On October 1, the bread ration was reduced for the third time - workers and engineers received 400 grams of bread a day, employees, dependents and children 200 grams each. From November 20 (5th reduction) workers received 250 grams of bread per day. All the rest - by 125. Sick and weak people began to die of hunger and cold, as the amount of food delivered did not meet the needs of the city's inhabitants, despite the significant number of people evacuated from the city.

In total, more than half of the pre-war population - 1.7 million people - was evacuated from Leningrad. But for a relatively short time, German troops interrupted the supply of the city along Ladoga. On December 9, our troops liberated Tikhvin and drove the Germans across the Volkhov River, ensuring the movement of trains to the station. Voyglass. Cargoes went to Leningrad in a continuous stream. From December 25, 1941, the norms for issuing products began to increase.

At the end of December, the Red Army troops captured several bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. As a result of the Tikhvin offensive operation, Soviet troops advanced 100-120 km and liberated a significant territory.

By the end of January 1942, a successful military operation allowed the railway workers to lay an additional railway line to Lake Ladoga itself, and cargo from the wagons began to be unloaded directly into the bodies of trucks that were standing on the ice of the lake. Further along the ice of the lake and roads, cargo was delivered to Leningrad, which made it possible to significantly increase the nutritional standards of the inhabitants of the city and the fighters of the Leningrad Front, as well as improve the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition.

Since February 1942, the supply of food to the inhabitants of the city in sufficient quantities for life was established and maintained until the blockade was broken.

A. M. Vasilevsky wrote that day and night, cars loaded with food, medicines, fuel, equipment, ammunition went to Leningrad in a continuous stream, and women, children, the elderly, the wounded and the sick were taken away on return flights.

K. A. Meretskov, pointed out that even before the spring thaw (spring of 1942 - L. M.) on Ladoga, more than 300 thousand tons of all kinds of cargo were delivered to Leningrad and about half a million people who needed care and treatment were taken out of there.

In navigation, cargo continued to be delivered by water transport of the North-Western River Shipping Company, as well as by ships of the Ladoga military flotilla.

In my opinion, the contribution of rivermen to the supply of the city and the Leningrad Front is underestimated. As in winter, car drivers, so in navigation, day and night, day and night, they carried goods to Leningrad and took people out of Leningrad, and from the summer of 1942 also the products of industrial enterprises.

In documentary footage, in particular from the film "The Unknown War", Leningraders leaving for the front, working in factories and cleaning the streets of the city in the spring of 1942, do not look exhausted, like, for example, prisoners of German concentration camps.

Someone really wants to make the city-concentration camp Leningrad out of the hero city of Leningrad. The trend of turning Soviet heroes into victims is visible in all liberal works, and the number of these victims of the besieged Leningrad, published in the media, is growing from year to year. In fact, the city worked, fought, children went to school, theaters and cinemas worked.

Leningrad was defended by the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. The Leningrad front was in blockade, the Volkhov front was on the outer side of the blockade ring and stretched for 250 km along the Volkhov River, grinding the Nazi troops thrown at Leningrad and preventing them from connecting with the Finnish troops stopped north of the Svir River.

In this regard, the besieged Leningrad is unacceptable to be considered in isolation from the Leningrad front. The front positions could be reached by tram. Leningrad and the Leningrad Front fought together and were a single fortress.

It was during the evacuation and to the Leningrad Front that the bulk of the inhabitants of Leningrad departed, and did not die of starvation. Fighters and commanders of the Leningrad Front, the militia are buried along with the dead and dead residents of the city in the cemeteries of Leningrad.

To consider Leningrad in isolation from the Leningrad Front means deliberately making a mistake and coming to conclusions that do not correspond to reality.

Our troops carried out three operations to break the blockade, and only the last of them was successful. In the period from January 7 to April 30, 1942, the forces of the Volkhov and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front carried out the Luban operation in order to unblock Leningrad, but they failed to push the Germans back from Lake Ladoga.

Only 16 kilometers separated the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. To break the blockade, these troops had to meet. On August 19, 1942, the troops of the Leningrad Front, and on August 27, the troops of the Volkhov Front, with the assistance of the forces of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, went on the offensive towards each other. The Sinyavino military operation began, which was also carried out with the aim of deblocking Leningrad. Our troops were sure of victory.

Meretskov wrote: “The troops intended for the offensive gave us in the chosen direction more than three times superiority over the enemy in manpower, four times in tanks, two times in artillery and mortars. So we thought, not knowing about the arrival of Manstein's divisions from the south.

These Manstein divisions arrived from near Sevastopol to storm Leningrad as having experience in storming a large seaside city during the six-month battle for Sevastopol. But they did not have to storm Leningrad. The offensive of our troops disrupted the prepared new German assault on Leningrad. E. Manstein wrote: "And now, instead of the planned offensive against Leningrad, a battle unfolded south of Lake Ladoga."

Outlining the events of the Sinyavino operation, most historians cite Manstein's description of it. But honestly and clearly, it was not E. Manstein who spoke about it, but K. A. Meretskov, who wrote the following about the results of the operation: “The bulk of the troops finished reaching the eastern coast by dawn on September 29. The remaining units left on the night of 30 September. After that, active hostilities were stopped. Our troops, as well as the enemy troops, returned approximately to their old positions. The artillery duel and mutual air raids, as if by inertia, then continued for several days, but no offensive actions were taken.

Neither the commander of the Volkhov Front, K. A. Meretskov, nor the chief of the General Staff, A. M. Vasilevsky, mention the encirclement of German or our troops in the Sinyavinsk operation. The Neva Operational Group fought until 6 October. The fascist command made a lot of efforts to throw the units that crossed the Neva into the water, but the glorious soldiers of the Leningrad Front, thanks to the courage of the soldiers and the artillery that fired across the Neva, managed to hold two small footholds. Such was the end of the Sinyavino operation. The Volkhov and Leningrad fronts failed at that time to break the blockade of Leningrad. However, the calculations of the Nazi command to storm Leningrad suffered a complete collapse.

In the song "Volkhovskaya Table" there are lines about the Sinyavin operation: "Our bayonets on the heights of Sinyavin, our regiments near Mga will be forever glorified in legends under a machine-gun blizzard."

The loss of German troops in killed and captured amounted to about 60 thousand people, and in equipment - 260 aircraft, 200 tanks, 600 guns and mortars. According to the testimony of prisoners in the companies of most divisions, 20 people remained in the ranks. “It is better to visit Sevastopol three times than to stay here,” the prisoners said. The soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, with their counterattacks and two major offensives, defended the inhabitants of the besieged city. Leningrad continued to live, work and fight.

Cargo continued to be delivered to Leningrad around the clock in a continuous flow by rail and then by road or river transport (depending on the time of year) for 25 km across Lake Ladoga.

Not only the city, but the entire Leningrad front was supplied with weapons, shells, bombs, cartridges, spare parts and food. Cars and river boats returned back to the railway with people, and from the summer of 1942 with products manufactured by Leningrad enterprises.

It should be noted that the degree of risk of both the winter and summer routes along the lake is exaggerated - this route did not exceed 25 kilometers and was reliably protected from enemy aircraft and ground forces. Of course, there were losses, but compared to the amount of cargo delivered, the losses were insignificant.

“In the summer, Leningrad received the first tons of liquid fuel through a 25-kilometer pipeline laid to supply the city and the front along the bottom of Ladoga. Later, current from the partially restored Volkhovskaya hydroelectric station began to flow here again through the submarine cable. This allowed a number of enterprises to resume the production of military products, ”K. A. Meretskov points out.

Thus, in 1941-1942, the army and the government did everything possible to supply the city and the Leningrad front, protect the inhabitants of Leningrad and break the blockade by land.

On December 28, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the third plan for the operation to break the blockade and gave it the name Iskra. “The idea of this operation was to defeat the enemy grouping in the Shlisserburg-Sinyavino ledge, break through the blockade and restore the land connection of Leningrad with the central regions of the country with counter strikes from two fronts - Leningrad and Volkhov.

Our soldiers near Leningrad had to fight in difficult conditions: in summer there are a huge number of mosquitoes that do not give soldiers rest day or night, in winter severe frosts and snow drifts. There are forests and swamps all around, which are difficult for a person to pass through, not to mention the movement of cars, artillery pieces, tanks and other equipment.

After careful consideration of all options, it was decided to break through the German fortifications somewhat north of the place where they tried to break through the blockade from August 19 to October 10, 1942 during the Sinyavino operation. “This direction was the most difficult due to the presence of extremely powerful enemy fortifications here, but also the shortest. We had to overcome only a 12-kilometer strip between Shlisselburg and Lipki, or six kilometers to each of our two fronts,” wrote K. A. Meretskov.

The Leningrad Front could deliver a counterattack only in the place where the troops of the Volkhov Front were closest. The Leningrad Front did not have enough forces for a deeper operation, since all the supply of the front and the city was carried out along the Road of Life, that is, on the ice of Lake Ladoga.

The Germans tried to cut off the road of life, but they were defeated near Sukho Island. Due to the position of the Leningrad Front and the difficulty of moving equipment in the swampy terrain, it was necessary to plan an attack on the area of the Shlisselburg-Sinyavino ledge, which was most fortified by the Germans. The Germans' density of troops in this area was twice as high as provided for by their charters.

But the Headquarters was also able to provide an average of 160 guns and mortars for every kilometer of the front. This allowed our troops to create an extremely high density of fire, sufficient to destroy the German fortifications. All front-line aviation as part of the 14th Air Army, Major General I.P. Zhuravlev, was redirected to the offensive site. The long-range aviation of Colonel-General A.E. Golovanov was also involved in the operation. The offensive of our troops was supported by the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla.

On January 12, 1943, aviation and artillery preparation began. Our artillery destroyed the German fortifications for about 2 hours. Dozens of tons of metal, brought down on the enemy, thoroughly destroyed the German positions and suppressed many firing points. Our troops went on the offensive.

The enemy offered maximum resistance in the area of the Kruglyaya grove. All day there was close combat, which repeatedly turned into hand-to-hand combat. By the evening, the specified node of resistance was taken. The 327th division was renamed the Guards for the accomplished feat. On January 13 and 14, Lipki and Rabochy settlement No. 8 were isolated and cut off. All attempts by fresh German formations to break through to them from Mga were unsuccessful.

Only two, the most difficult, kilometers remained for our fronts to pass in order to break through the blockade. And they passed. On January 18, 1943, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts met. The blockade of Leningrad, which lasted 500 days and nights (1 year 4 months and 10 days), was broken, the connection between the city and the country by land was restored.

It was the millions of heroic deeds of the Soviet people at the front and in the rear that ensured our victory. The history of the Great Patriotic War has a great many examples of mass manifestations of heroism. Not a single country and not a single army in the world knew such mass heroism.

“When the formations of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts at the end of January 1943 turned south, taking up positions along the Sinyavin line, work was already in full swing in their rear: in the corridor north of Sinyavin, they began to build a railway to Leningrad. The railroad brigades moved behind the advancing troops. They came to the aid of the local population, and then the fronts allocated a number of military units to build the road ... A temporary ice-pile bridge was erected on the Neva, which connected the branch with the track from the Black River to the village of Morozov.

Already on February 2, as soon as the last rails were lowered and fixed from the repair and construction railcars, a trial train passed, and four days later a long-distance freight train rushed along the 36-kilometer line. The Victory Road - the result of two weeks of heroic work - has entered service, ”writes the commander of the Volkhov Front, K. A. Meretskov. Roads were laid parallel to the railway.

The Germans began to shell the constructed section of the railway, but the railway workers laid another branch of the railway in a safer place, and the large-caliber artillery of both our fronts and the guns taken from the ships of the Baltic Fleet destroyed the German batteries, and they fell silent.

For almost twelve months, the troops of the fronts waged either flaring up or fading hostilities in the direction of the Mga station, trying to expand the strip of liberated land, and not allowing the Germans to return the recaptured native land. But our armies did not have forces sufficient to break through the German defenses. And the Headquarters could not allocate additional troops, since the main reserves went to Stalingrad and Kursk, where the fate of the entire war was decided.

In the battles after the blockade was broken on January 18, 1943, Soviet artillery and aviation haunted the Germans. A. E. Golovanov writes that the German troops in the Sinyavino area were bombarded by large groups of aircraft massively, which gave the most tangible results. So, in eleven raids on this area, only 1299 aircraft of the Long-Range Bomber Aviation took part. Massively bombed by German troops and front-line aviation.

It is known that during the attack on Leningrad, the siege of the city and the retreat, not only ours, but also the German military units had huge losses. But our historians and politicians are silent about them, thereby presenting our losses near Leningrad as unjustified.

Some even write that there was no need to defend the city, but it was necessary to surrender it to the enemy, and then the Leningraders would avoid starvation, and the soldiers would avoid bloody battles. And they write and talk about it, knowing that Hitler promised to destroy all the inhabitants of Leningrad.

I think they also understand that the fall of Leningrad would mean the death of a huge number of the population of the northwestern part of the USSR and the loss of an enormous amount of material and cultural values.

In addition, the released German and Finnish troops could be transferred near Moscow and to other sectors of the Soviet-German front, which in turn could lead to the victory of Germany and the destruction of the entire population of the European part of the Soviet Union.

Only haters of Russia can regret that Leningrad was not surrendered to the enemy. Hitler was going to take Leningrad in 4 weeks by July 21, 1941 and send the liberated troops to storm Moscow, but he could not take the city by January 1944 either.

Hitler ordered the proposals to surrender the city to the German troops not to accept and wipe the city off the face of the earth, but in fact, the German divisions stationed near Leningrad were wiped off the face of the earth in January 1944 by the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts.

Hitler stated that Leningrad would be the first major city captured by the Germans in the Soviet Union and spared no effort to capture it, but did not take into account that he was fighting not in Europe, but in Soviet Russia. I did not take into account the courage of the Leningraders and the strength of our weapons.

To be continued…

The opinions expressed in the publications of Leonid Maslovsky are the opinions of the author and may not coincide with the opinions of the editors of the Zvezda TV channel website.

Almost 2 years ago, I published in my journal the memoirs of a former Red Army officer who, fortunately, fled to the West.
His memoirs are fundamentally different from the parade-victory memoirs that came out for a long time in the USSR and in present-day Russia.
Comparable with this book is that Nikulin's memories of the war

Both of them served on the Leningrad front and their memories of that time seem to complement each other.

But this is what moment in the history of the defense of Leningrad drew my attention then, 2 years ago, and now (somehow everything coincided in time).
This is a fact that the Germans could easily enter Leningrad without encountering any resistance.

Here is what D.V. Konstantinov writes in his book. I fought in the red army. - Buenos Aires: New Word, 1952 about this moment in the defense of Leningrad:

Someday history will reveal the secret of these days. For me personally, it still remains unclear why the German army did not enter Leningrad these days. The city could be taken with bare hands.

On the front, which took place in a number of places along the outskirts of the city, the remnants of the already significantly demoralized troops were fighting, defending, or rather, retreating to Leningrad. Their resistance was not in any way a serious obstacle to the German army. New reinforcements have not yet arrived. The German tanks freely walked around the southern part of the city, reached the Narva Gate, aroused fear in one and curiosity in the other part of the population, and slowly left back.

And today, I read an interview with a writer, Daniil Granin, who also fought against the German socialists on the Leningrad front. and he also talks about how the Germans could safely enter Leningrad:

On September 17, 1941, I left Pushkin. We did not run, but we left Pushkin. And when they left, there were Germans in the park. We reached the tram ring, there was no outpost, no pickets, the city was wide open. I got on the tram, came home, I could no longer move. And when I woke up, I was sure that the Germans were in the city. Then it began: the defense was created, some units, the Red Navy. But that day never left my mind. Why didn't they come in?

About seven or eight years ago, the picture began to clear up, from German sources it became known that on September 14 or 15 Hitler gave the order not to enter the city. This caused outrage among the German generals.

In my soldier's psychology, I could not understand what it means to reach the city and not enter. But Germans are Germans. We would not have resisted, we would have entered. Hitler rightly counted on the capitulation of Leningrad, Moscow, and the Soviet government in general. All the essentials have already been taken. It was decided to strangle the city. They knew: if the city turns into a cemetery, then there will be no Leningrad Front. But the city did not capitulate. Although there was everything inside.

Two people, independently of each other, one emigrant, the other Soviet writer favored by the authorities, are talking about the same thing.
By the way, the opinion of both about the people's militia is also very similar.
Very intersting.
It is also very informative in terms of the fact that the “great Soviet people” didn’t really want to fight, a change in consciousness has not yet occurred, people have not yet understood that German socialism is not nearly better than Soviet, and maybe even worse for them personally. ..
The realization that it is necessary to fight for ourselves, and not for power, has not yet come.

Saved

In the initial stages of the war, the German leadership had every chance to capture Leningrad. And yet, this did not happen. The fate of the city, in addition to the courage of its inhabitants, was decided by many factors.

Siege or assault?

In early July 1941, Halder made the following entry in his diary: "The 4th Panzer Group must set up barriers from the north and south of Lake Peipus and cordon off Leningrad." This record does not yet allow us to say that Halder decided to limit himself to blockade the city, but the mention of the word "cordon" already tells us that he did not plan to take the city right away.

Hitler himself advocated the capture of the city, guided in this case by economic rather than political aspects. The German army needed the possibility of unhindered navigation in the Baltic Gulf.

Luga failure of the Leningrad blitzkrieg

So, both sides understood the importance of capturing the Northern capital. The Soviet side began the construction of fortified areas in places of possible attacks by German troops. The most powerful, in the Luzhek area, included more than six hundred bunkers and bunkers. In the second week of July, the German 4th Panzer Group reached this line of defense and could not immediately overcome it, and here the German plan for the Leningrad blitzkrieg collapsed.

Hitler, dissatisfied with the delay in the offensive and the constant requests for reinforcements from Army Group North, personally visited the front, making it clear to the generals that the city must be taken and as soon as possible.

Dizzy with success

By the beginning of autumn, it seemed that Leningrad was about to be taken, but Hitler, who focused on the plan to capture Moscow and believed that with the capture of the capital, the war against the USSR would be practically won, ordered the transfer of the most combat-ready tank and infantry units from Army Group North. near Moscow. The nature of the battles near Leningrad immediately changed: if earlier the German units sought to break through the defenses and capture the city, now the first task was to destroy industry and infrastructure.

"Third Option"

1. Taking the city after the completion of the encirclement;
2. The destruction of the city with the help of artillery and aircraft;
3. An attempt to deplete the resources of Leningrad and force him to surrender.

Hitler initially had the highest hopes for the first option, but he underestimated the importance of Leningrad to the Soviets, as well as the resilience and courage of its inhabitants.
The second option, according to experts, was a failure on its own - the density of air defense systems in some areas of Leningrad was 5-8 times higher than the density of air defense systems in Berlin and London, and the number of guns involved did not allow fatal damage to the city's infrastructure.

Thus, the third option remained Hitler's last hope for taking the city. It resulted in two years and five months of bitter confrontation.

environment and hunger

By mid-September 1941, the German army completely surrounded the city. The bombing did not stop: civilian objects became targets: food warehouses, large food industry plants.

From June 1941 to October 1942, many residents of the city were evacuated from Leningrad. At first, however, very reluctantly, because no one believed in a protracted war, and even more so they could not imagine how terrible the blockade and battles for the city on the Neva would be. Children were evacuated to the Leningrad region, but not for long - most of these territories were soon captured by the Germans and many children were returned back.

Now the main enemy of the USSR in Leningrad was hunger. It was he, according to Hitler's plans, who was to play a decisive role in the surrender of the city. In an attempt to establish a food supply, the Red Army repeatedly attempted to break through the blockade, organized "partisan convoys" that delivered food to the city right across the front line.

The leadership of Leningrad also made every effort to fight hunger. In November and December 1941, terrible for the population, active construction of enterprises producing food substitutes began. For the first time in history, bread was baked from cellulose and sunflower cake, and in the production of semi-finished meat products, offal was actively used, which no one would have thought of using in food production before.

In the winter of 1941, food rations hit a record low: 125 grams of bread per person. The issuance of other products was practically not carried out. The city was on the verge of extinction. The cold also became a severe test, the temperature dropped to -32 Celsius. And the negative temperature kept in Leningrad for 6 months. In the winter of 1941-1942, a quarter of a million people died.

The role of saboteurs

The first months of the siege, the Germans shelled Leningrad from artillery almost without hindrance. They transferred to the city the heaviest guns they had, mounted on railway platforms, these guns were capable of firing at a distance of up to 28 km, with 800-900 kilogram shells. In response to this, the Soviet command began to deploy a counter-battery fight, detachments of reconnaissance and saboteurs were formed, who discovered the location of the Wehrmacht's long-range artillery. Significant assistance in organizing counter-battery combat was provided by the Baltic Fleet, whose naval artillery hit the German artillery formations from the flanks and rear.

International factor

A significant role in the failure of Hitler's plans was played by his "allies". In addition to the Germans, Finns, Swedes, Italian and Spanish units participated in the siege. Spain did not officially participate in the war against the Soviet Union, with the exception of the volunteer Blue Division. There are different opinions about her. Some note the steadfastness of its fighters, others - a complete lack of discipline and mass desertion, soldiers often went over to the side of the Red Army. Italy provided torpedo boats, but their land operations were unsuccessful.

"Road of Victory"

The final collapse of the plan to capture Leningrad came on January 12, 1943, it was at that moment that the Soviet command launched Operation Iskra and after 6 days of fierce fighting, on January 18, the blockade was broken. Immediately after this, a railway was laid to the besieged city, later called the "Road of Victory" and also known as the "Corridor of Death". The road was so close to military operations that German units often fired cannons at trains. However, a flood of supplies and food poured into the city. Enterprises began to produce products according to peacetime plans, sweets and chocolate appeared on store shelves.

In fact, the ring around the city held out for another year, but the encirclement ring was no longer so dense, the city was successfully supplied with resources, and the general situation on the fronts did not allow Hitler to build such ambitious plans anymore.

Initially, the Barbarossa plan involved the rapid capture of the city on the Neva by the North army group, but there was no unity among the German command: some Wehrmacht generals believed that the city needed to be captured, while others, including the chief of the general staff, Franz Halder, assumed that you can get by with the blockade. In early July 1941, Halder made the following entry in his diary: "The 4th Panzer Group must set up barriers from the north and south of Lake Peipus and cordon off Leningrad." This record does not yet allow us to say that Halder decided to limit himself to blockade the city, but the mention of the word "cordon" already tells us that he did not plan to take the city right away. Hitler himself advocated the capture of the city, guided in this case by economic rather than political aspects. The German army needed the possibility of unhindered navigation in the Baltic Gulf.

The Soviet command understood the importance of the defense of Leningrad, after Moscow it was the most important political and economic center of the USSR. The city housed the Kirov Machine-Building Plant, which produced the latest heavy tanks of the KV type, which played an important role in the defense of Leningrad. And the name itself - "City of Lenin" - did not allow it to be handed over to the enemy. So, both sides understood the importance of capturing the Northern capital. The Soviet side began the construction of fortified areas in places of possible attacks by German troops. The most powerful, in the Luzhek area, included more than six hundred bunkers and bunkers. In the second week of July, the German 4th Panzer Group reached this line of defense and could not immediately overcome it, and here the German plan for the Leningrad blitzkrieg collapsed. Hitler, dissatisfied with the delay in the offensive and the constant requests for reinforcements from Army Group North, personally visited the front, making it clear to the generals that the city must be taken and as soon as possible.

As a result of the Fuhrer's visit, the Germans regrouped their forces and in early August broke through the Luga line of defense, rapidly capturing Novgorod, Shiimsk, and Chudovo. By the end of the summer, the Wehrmacht achieved maximum success in this sector of the front and blocked the last railway going to Leningrad. By the beginning of autumn, it seemed that Leningrad was about to be taken, but Hitler, who focused on the plan to capture Moscow and believed that with the capture of the capital, the war against the USSR would be practically won, ordered the transfer of the most combat-ready tank and infantry units from Army Group North. near Moscow. The nature of the battles near Leningrad immediately changed: if earlier the German units sought to break through the defenses and capture the city, now the first task was to destroy industry and infrastructure.

The withdrawal of troops proved to be a fatal mistake for Hitler's plans. The remaining troops for the offensive were not enough, and the encircled Soviet units, having learned about the confusion of the enemy, tried with all their might to break through the blockade. As a result, the Germans had no choice but to go on the defensive, limiting themselves to indiscriminate shelling of the city from distant positions. There was no question of a further offensive, the main task was to preserve the siege ring around the city. In this situation, the German command has three options left: 1. Taking the city after the encirclement is completed; 2. The destruction of the city with the help of artillery and aircraft; 3. An attempt to deplete the resources of Leningrad and force him to surrender. Hitler initially had the highest hopes for the first option, but he underestimated the importance of Leningrad to the Soviets, as well as the resilience and courage of its inhabitants. The second option, according to experts, was a failure on its own - the density of air defense systems in some areas of Leningrad was 5-8 times higher than the density of air defense systems in Berlin and London, and the number of guns involved did not allow fatal damage to the city's infrastructure. Thus, the third option remained Hitler's last hope for taking the city. It resulted in two years and five months of bitter confrontation.

Siege or assault?

Hitler himself advocated the capture of the city, guided in this case by economic rather than political aspects. The German army needed the possibility of unhindered navigation in the Baltic Gulf.

Luga failure of the Leningrad blitzkrieg

Dizzy with success

"Third Option"

Thus, the third option remained Hitler's last hope for taking the city. It resulted in two years and five months of bitter confrontation.

environment and hunger

By mid-September 1941, the German army completely surrounded the city. The bombing did not stop: civilian objects became targets: food warehouses, large food industry plants.