"regional center of patriotic education". Assessment of the loss of the Soviet and Japanese sides in aviation

The reconnaissance platoon commander Nikolai Bogdanov wrote in his memoirs: “It was an excellent lesson for the samurai. And they adopted it. When the Fritz stood near Moscow, Japan did not dare to advance to the aid of an ally. Obviously, the memories of the defeat were fresh.

From the history. In May 1939, Japanese troops invaded the territory of the allied USSR of the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River. This invasion was an integral part of the Japanese plans to seize the Soviet Far East and Siberia, China and the possessions of Western countries in the Pacific Ocean. The imperial headquarters prepared two options for waging war: the northern one against the USSR and the southern one against the USA, Great Britain and their allies.

Despite the warning of the Soviet government that the USSR would defend the MPR as its own territory, the Japanese troops, having a three-fold superiority in forces (about 40 thousand people, 130 tanks, more than 200 aircraft), crossed the river on July 2. Khalkhin Gol and invaded the territory of the MPR, but after bloody battles they were forced to temporarily retreat. The Japanese were preparing to resume the offensive with the forces of an entire army on August 24, but the Soviet troops preempted the enemy and on August 20 themselves went on the offensive with the forces of the 1st Army Group created by that time under the command of commander G. Zhukov.

Outnumbered by the number of troops, the 1st Army Group outnumbered the enemy by about twice the number of tanks and aircraft. The Mongolian troops were led by Marshal of the MPR Kh. Choibalsan. The coordination of the actions of the Soviet and Mongolian troops was entrusted to the front group headed by the commander of the 2nd rank G. Stern.

The offensive was well prepared and came as a surprise to the enemy. As a result of six days of fighting, the Japanese 6th Army was surrounded and virtually destroyed. Its losses amounted to more than 60 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, the Soviet troops - 18 thousand killed and wounded. Air battles were especially intense, the largest by that time, in which up to 800 aircraft participated on both sides. As a result, the Japanese command requested a cessation of hostilities, and on September 16, 1939, they were suspended.

The events at Khalkhin Gol had important international consequences. Priority in Japanese plans was given to the southern version of the war - against Great Britain and the USA. Soviet diplomacy, skillfully acting in the current situation, achieved the conclusion of a neutrality pact with Japan on mutually beneficial terms. The pact was signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941, which allowed our country to avoid a war on two fronts.

93. The Soviet commander counts the trophies captured from the Japanese troops. In the foreground are several 70-mm Type 92 infantry guns. The area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

According to the nature of the hostilities and the tasks performed by the Soviet-Mongolian troops during the offensive, the entire operation can be divided into three periods: the first - from August 20 to 23; the second - from 24 to 27 August; the third - from 28 to 31 August.

At 0545 hours, our bomber aviation, with several hundred aircraft, made a powerful raid on the front line of the Japanese defenses, on their nearest reserves and artillery positions. Soviet-Mongolian artillery suppressed enemy anti-aircraft batteries with their fire. As a result of an air strike, fires broke out behind enemy lines.

After the air raid, powerful artillery preparation began.

15 minutes before the attack, our aircraft struck again. This was followed by a heavy fire raid of all artillery on the front line of the Japanese defense.

The morning mist allowed our infantry to covertly take up their starting position, and in places to approach the enemy so much that it was already possible to launch an attack.

At 9 o'clock the attack began along the entire front. Our blow was so unexpected for the enemy that during the first hour and a half he did not fire a single artillery shot in return.

On the very first day of the offensive, the command of the 6th Japanese Army was misled, unable to determine the main direction of the Soviet troops' attack. An order from the commander of the 23rd Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Kamatsubara, dated August 20, was found on the battlefield. It read: "The enemy advances evenly along the entire front, and strikes the main blow in the northern sector along the Fuyi height." In fact, the main enveloping blow from the beginning of the operation was delivered by the Southern Group of Soviet Forces.

On this day of the offensive, it was the Southern Group that achieved the greatest success. Its 8th cavalry division (of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army), having thrown back small parts of the Bargut cavalry, reached the front of the Eris-Ulyn-Obo height, the Khulat-Ulyn-Oyo height. The further offensive of the division was suspended, as it was connected with the crossing of the state border. In this area, on August 21, up to 250 Bargut and Chinese people crossed over to our side with weapons in their hands. Throughout the subsequent course of the operation, the 8th Cavalry Division remained on the occupied line, providing the right flank, and then the rear of the Southern Group.

The 57th Rifle Division attacked in two echelons.

In the first echelon, the 127th and 293rd rifle regiments advanced, in the second - the 80th rifle regiment with the task of operating from behind the right flank of the 127th rifle regiment in the direction of "Great Sands".

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 57th Rifle Division, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, advanced 11-12 km on the right flank and completed its immediate task. By 19:00 its 80th Rifle Regiment had reached the northern edge of the Great Sands, the 127th Rifle Regiment was successfully advancing in a north-westerly direction to the mark of 757; The 293rd Rifle Regiment, having shot down enemy cover units, approached directly to the front line of the Japanese defenses. However, repeated attacks on the front line of the main defensive position, undertaken by the regiment that day, were repulsed by the Japanese. In the four-kilometer gap formed between the 80th and 127th rifle regiments, in which small enemy groups remained, on August 21, the reconnaissance battalion of the 57th rifle division was introduced.

The 8th armored brigade, with difficulty overcoming a strip of sandy hillocks, by the end of August 20, reached the area 3-4 km southwest of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. Her reconnaissance reached the line of the state border southeast of this mountain.

The 6th tank brigade did not take part in the battle that day, as it was late to go to the starting area assigned to it.

On the night of August 18-19, along the pontoon crossings induced by sappers, Soviet rifle and tank units began to advance to the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River. The pontoon bridge built by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks, as a result of which it was decided to ford the river with tanks. Since the depth of the ford reached 1.5 m, the tankers used the material at hand, made extension nozzles for the exhaust pipes of vehicles, bringing them above the water level. All hatches and all kinds of gaps in the hulls and turrets of the tanks were sealed with tarpaulin and smeared with grease. In the dark, they conducted test dives of tanks and made measurements of the depth of the river, checked the bottom, and made descents to the water in the coastal slopes. A steel cable was stretched across the river to indicate the direction of movement.

On the night of August 20, 1939, the brigade began crossing the river, and tanks with their headlights off slowly moved across the river, sinking into the water along the base of the towers. At dawn, enemy aircraft appeared and began to bomb the crossings. The forcing of the river dragged on for the whole day, but despite the influence of the enemy, the tanks successfully overcame the barrier and the next day the brigade entered the battle.

94. BT-7 tanks from the 11th tank brigade before attacking Japanese positions. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

95. BT-7 tanks (with conical turrets) from the 6th tank brigade. Improvised two-digit tactical numbers are applied on the tank turrets in a white circle. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

The central group made little progress on the first day of the offensive. The 82nd Rifle Division, having in front of it strong centers of Japanese resistance in the area of ​​​​the Peschanaya hill and the Zelenaya hill, fought a stubborn fire battle all day and by the end of the day advanced only by its flanks by 500-1500 m. The immediate task is to capture the hill "Sandy" and "Green" high - the division could not fulfill.

The 36th motorized rifle division advanced with the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade, delivering the main blow from the left flank. The 5th rifle-machine-gun brigade and the 149th rifle regiment pinned down the enemy with active actions. At the same time, the 24th motorized rifle regiment, reinforced by a tank battalion of the 57th rifle division, successfully moving forward, destroyed the enemy's forward firing points and by the end of the day reached the enemy stronghold on the Peschanik height. Encountering strong fire here, the regiment could not advance further and, with the onset of darkness, entrenched itself at the reached line.

96. Wounded soldier of the 82nd Infantry Division of the Red Army. Central Group of Forces, area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

97. 152-mm howitzer model 1909/1930 from the 57th howitzer artillery regiment firing at the positions of Japanese troops. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

With a swift blow, the northern group threw back two regiments of the Bargut cavalry beyond the border line and on August 20 captured the enemy’s forward positions, approaching directly the heavily fortified resistance center located in the area of ​​​​Fui (“Finger”) height. An attempt to seize this node of resistance from the move was unsuccessful. Parts of the Northern Group were forced to deploy their main forces. A fierce battle ensued.

The enemy, putting up fierce resistance, repelled all attacks by units of the Northern Group.

Feeling a threat on the flanks, the Japanese command began to regroup after dark. According to the commander of the 23rd Japanese Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Kamatsubara, the main blow of the Soviet-Mongolian troops was inflicted on the right flank of the Japanese position. In reality, our troops delivered the main blow with their Southern group on the left flank. In order to stop the offensive of the Northern Group, the Japanese command took measures to strengthen the center of resistance in the Fui height area. To this end, it transferred the 26th Infantry Regiment to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthis height and placed it in cut-off positions with the front to the north. At the same time, the Northern Security Detachment was given the task of firmly holding part of the forces to the area west of Yanhu Lake, and with the main forces to secure the rear and the right flank of the Japanese troops.

Considering the position of their troops defending in the center to be the strongest, the Japanese removed one of the regiments (72nd) from here and put it in reserve in case of parrying attacks from the flanks.

Building on the success achieved on the first day of the offensive, the Soviet-Mongolian units in the following days continued a stubborn struggle inside the Japanese defensive zone. In the sector of the Southern Group, the 6th Tank and 8th Motorized Armored Brigades, bypassing the enemy flank and with great difficulty overcoming natural obstacles, by the end of August 21, occupied the entire Great Sands area. Thus, on the second day of the offensive, our mobile formations entered the path of retreat of the southern grouping of the Japanese to the east.

Acting on the right flank of the 1st Army Group in the first echelon, together with the rifle regiment and the Mongolian cavalry division, the 6th tank brigade, consisting of three battalions (the 4th battalion operated as part of the 9th motorized armored brigade), broke through into the depths of the enemy’s defense and, maneuvering, began to storm his strongholds from the rear. During the period of fighting from 21 to 23 August, the 6th tank brigade lost 15 tanks burned out and 20 knocked out, destroying up to two enemy infantry battalions. A similar combat mission on the left flank as part of the Northern Group was carried out by 2 tank battalions of the 11th tank brigade.

At the same time, on August 22, the rifle units of the Southern Group penetrated deeply into the main defensive zone of the enemy, defeated his nearest tactical reserves and captured a number of artillery positions. With swift blows, they dismembered the Japanese defenses into a number of knots that were losing communication with each other, blocked them and destroyed them in succession. Each firing point had to be taken by storm. At the same time, our artillery and flamethrower tanks played a big role. Guns of all calibers, including 152-mm, were advanced to open positions and fired at enemy firing points at close range. Flamethrower tanks burned manpower out of dugouts and underground shelters, and infantry with hand grenades and bayonets completed the extermination of Japanese soldiers and officers. Particularly stubborn resistance was offered by two strongholds, located 4-5 km south of the Khailastyn-Gol River. Parts of the 57th Infantry Division blocked them and, with the assistance of flamethrower tanks, destroyed the Japanese garrisons.

By the end of August 23, the entire Japanese defensive zone in the offensive sector of the Southern Group was broken into. Only one strong point remained untaken in the area of ​​mark 757. At the same time, the 8th motorized armored brigade, which reached the state border southeast of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, took up defenses with a front to the northeast and finally cut off the escape route to the southern enemy grouping.

98. Calculation of a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1932 model from the 37th anti-tank division in an ambush. Southern grouping of troops, area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol river, August 1939 (AVL).

In the sector of the Central Group, the advance of units of the 82nd and 36th rifle divisions was insignificant. Here, as before, the enemy offered stubborn resistance on the approaches to the Peschanaya hill and the Remizov height.

The northern group during August 21-22 was unable to capture the height of Fui. Instead of part of the forces blocking this height, and the main forces to continue the rapid offensive in a southerly direction, the commander of the Northern Group continued unsuccessful attacks.

Putting up fierce resistance, the enemy pulled up part of his reserves to the heights and delayed the advance of the Northern Group.

For several days and nights, fierce battles continued, which took on a focal character. The resilience of the Japanese soldier had its own reason. The commanders inspired him that, having been captured, he would still be shot, but before that he would be tortured to a pulp. And such a "moral" influence in many cases achieved its goal. In a number of cases, Japanese servicemen at Khalkhin Gol fanatically fought to the last man. Often, enemy dugouts and bunkers passed into the hands of the Red Army when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there.

By order of the commander of the 1st Army Group, the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade was moved out of the reserve on August 21 to help the Northern Group. The brigade was given the task of advancing along the border from the north in the direction of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo without delaying at the height of Fui in order to intercept the escape routes of the enemy’s northern grouping and destroy its warehouses in the area of ​​Lake Uzur-Nur. Fulfilling the task, the 9th motorized armored brigade, reinforced by one tank battalion of the 6th tank brigade, bypassed the height of Fui from the east and, advancing along the state border, on August 22, part of its forces raided the Japanese base in the area of ​​Lake Uzur-Nur. Our tankers defeated the enemy convoy, set fire to the fuel and ammunition depots, and destroyed the battery covering the Japanese base. The destruction of the base disrupted the supply of the Japanese-Manchu troops.

Meanwhile, the struggle in the Fuyi height area continued.

Blocked from all sides, the Japanese garrison continued to repulse all attacks. The enemy had strong defensive structures here, encircling the height from all sides. The dugouts, dug deep into the ground, had powerful ceilings, were connected by widely branched communication passages and were covered with barbed wire.

Only by the end of August 23 did units of the Northern Group, additionally reinforced by the 212th Airborne Brigade, manage to break the enemy's resistance. The Japanese had to be knocked out with hand grenades and bayonets literally from every crack. None of them surrendered; after the battle, more than 600 corpses of Japanese soldiers and officers were removed from the trenches and dugouts.

99. Japanese captured 75-mm gun Type 38 (model 1905/1925). The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

Having mastered the height of Fui, the Northern Group continued its offensive in a southeasterly direction.

At the same time, the 9th motorized armored brigade, having received reinforcements - 2 companies of border guards in vehicles and a rifle and machine gun battalion of the 11th tank brigade, reached Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo on August 23 and cut off the escape route of the northern Japanese grouping to the east. The next day, the brigade entered into fire contact with units of the 8th Motorized Armored Brigade of the Southern Group, thus closing the encirclement of the enemy.

100. BT-7 tanks (with cylindrical turrets) of the 6th tank brigade on the march. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

101. USSR Ambassador to Mongolia V.I. Ivanov examines the captured ammunition of the Japanese army. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

No less intense battles in the first period of the operation were waged by our Air Force, providing great assistance to the ground forces. In just one day on August 21, Soviet aviation bombers made 256 sorties in the areas of Lake Uzur-Nur, Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, Jin-Jin-Sume, Lake Yanhu, Ganchzhur and along the Khalun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway. They dropped over 86,000 kg of bombs of various calibers.

Thus, already at the end of the first period of the operation, our mobile formations completed the encirclement of the enemy. Rifle units, interacting with tanks and aircraft, broke through the front line and dismembered the entire defensive system of the Japanese into a number of centers that had lost contact with each other, which were successfully liquidated by the advancing troops.

By August 24, the Japanese still had three major centers of resistance. The first was located on the northern bank of the Khailastyn-Gol River, in the area of ​​the Remizov height; the second and third - on the southern coast, in the areas of the Peschanaya hill and the Green height.

In his order, the commander of the 1st Army Group on August 24 set the troops the task of eliminating the remnants of the southern enemy grouping and preparing the starting position for the offensive and destruction of the Japanese north of the Khailastyn-Gol River.

For this purpose, he ordered the commander of the Southern Group to combine the actions of the 57th and 82nd rifle divisions, providing himself from the east with the 80th rifle regiment, as well as the 8th motorized armored brigade and the 8th cavalry division of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, to attack and completely destroy the enemy south of the Khailastyn-Gol River.

By the end of the day, the Southern Group was to prepare the exit of the 57th Infantry Division with the 603rd Regiment of the 82nd Infantry Division to the northern bank of the Khailastyn-Gol River.

During August 24, the 36th motorized rifle division was to prepare for an offensive on August 25 against the northern Japanese grouping, organizing interaction with neighboring parts of the Northern and Southern groups.

The northern group was given the task of reaching the Far Sands area and, having entered into direct contact with the left flank of the 36th motorized rifle division and with the right flank of the 9th motorized armored brigade, also be ready for an offensive against the enemy’s northern grouping.

Thus, the idea of ​​​​the decision of the commander of the 1st Army Group was to, providing part of the forces from outside the actions of the main grouping, compress the encircled enemy with a dense ring and sequentially destroy him with concentric strikes, first on the southern coast of Khailastyn-Gol, and then on the northern.

During August 24, the 57th Rifle Division continued to successfully eliminate the remnants of Japanese strongholds. By the end of the day, its 127th rifle regiment had already reached directly the southern bank of the Khailastyn-Gol River, having entered into communication with its right flank with the 8th motorized armored brigade; The 293rd Regiment also continued to successfully move north. However, in the sector of the Central Group, the 82nd Rifle Division could not succeed. The Japanese, having pulled all the remnants of their forces and firepower located on the southern coast of Khailastyn-Gol, into the area of ​​​​the Peschanaya hill and the Zelenaya heights, offered stubborn fire resistance.

102. Soldiers of the 57th Rifle Division took another height. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

In the sector of the Northern Group, the 9th motorized armored brigade, successfully fighting the enemy, firmly occupied the Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo area.

The battle on August 24 took place in conditions of extreme heat. The temperature on the thermometer during the day reached 40 °. The scorching sun and merciless heat held back the onslaught of the already weary battalions. Reports began to arrive at Zhukov's headquarters about the need for a respite during the offensive operation. However, commander G.K. Zhukov was categorical: continue to advance. He feared that fresh troops of the Japanese Kwantung Army might approach the site of the interrupted battle.

In order to break the encirclement and help their units, on August 24 the Japanese command launched an offensive southeast of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo with two regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade, which approached from the east. The enemy's attack from outside turned out to be aimed at the 80th Infantry Regiment, which occupied the defense along the northeastern edge of the Great Sands. The regiment steadfastly withstood all the attacks of the enemy and inflicted significant losses on him with its fire.

On August 25, the enemy again went on the offensive, striking at the joint between the inner flanks of the battalions of the 80th regiment. The Japanese attack was accompanied by a massive air raid. The enemy strained every effort to release the encircled grouping.

But this time, too, he was not successful. To help the 80th Infantry Regiment, the 6th Tank Brigade and the 1st Regiment of the 82nd Infantry Division were advanced from the reserve.

Between August 24 and 27, the 6th Tank Brigade took part in the battles together with the 80th Infantry Regiment, covering the Southern Group of our troops from the east. During the counterattack, the enemy made a number of tactical miscalculations, leaving his flanks open. This circumstance made it possible for our tanks to have a wide maneuver, which shot the attackers from the flanks without going over to the attack. For two days of fighting, the enemy suffered heavy losses and was forced to go on the defensive.

On August 26, the commander of the Southern Group decided to counterattack the advancing enemy in order to finally eliminate his attempts to release the encircled grouping. This task was assigned to the 6th tank brigade. The tanks were to strike in two groups from behind the flanks of the 80th regiment and at such a time when the Japanese, having launched an attack, would approach its location.

On August 26, our troops attacked the Japanese from the flanks with the forces of one rifle battalion, three tank and two rifle companies. The enemy suffered great damage, but he stubbornly resisted. Having lost 2 tanks burnt out and 6 knocked out, our units retreated to their original positions.

With strong artillery fire, the enemy managed to stop the advance of the left group of our tanks, but the right group, going on the attack unexpectedly for the enemy a little later, suppressed the Japanese anti-tank artillery, and destroyed more than two enemy companies with fire and caterpillars.

Having suffered heavy losses in three-day battles, the enemy was completely demoralized by the blows of our tanks and after August 26 stopped the attacks.

By the end of August 26, the rifle units of the Southern and Northern Groups had even more firmly closed the encirclement of the Japanese troops, finally cutting off all their escape routes to the east.

At the same time, our aviation, with strong air strikes, effectively blocked the approach to the combat area of ​​new enemy reserves. In just two days (August 24 and 25), our bombers made 218 sorties, heavily bombarding the areas of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, Uzur-Nur Lake, Khalun-Arshan, Jin-Jin-Sume and Nufyntai station, dropping 96,000 kg of bombs; fighters conducted 10 air battles, shooting down 74 enemy aircraft from 24 to 27 August.

Meanwhile, a fierce struggle was going on inside the ring. The enemy, hoping to receive the promised help, continued to put up fierce resistance.

By August 27, units of the 57th and 82nd rifle divisions, squeezing the encirclement, completely blocked the Japanese defending in the area of ​​the Peschanaya hill and the Zelenaya height.

At the same time, on the northern coast of Khailastyn-Gol, our units from three sides waged a concentric offensive against the height of Remizov.

The 24th and 149th rifle regiments of the 36th motorized rifle division and the 5th rifle and machine-gun brigade advanced from the west and southwest, and the 601st rifle regiment of the 82nd rifle division advanced from the north; the 9th motorized armored brigade advanced from the east, covering itself from the border with the rifle and machine-gun battalion of the 11th tank brigade, two companies of border guards and the 212th airborne brigade.

By order of the commander of the 1st Army Group on August 27, the troops were given the task of finally destroying the encircled enemy. To accomplish this task, units of the Northern Group, together with the 36th motorized rifle division, were ordered to take their initial position no further than 700-1000 m from the foot of the Remizov height and, after a powerful three-hour artillery preparation, simultaneously attack the Japanese fortified at the height. The southern group, starting the attack at 10 o'clock, was supposed to, together with two regiments (602nd and 603rd) of the 82nd Infantry Division, destroy the Japanese grouping in the area of ​​the Peschanaya hill and the Zelenaya height.

Unable to withstand the blockade and having lost hope of outside help, the enemy on August 27, even before the start of the general attack of our troops, made an attempt to get out of the encirclement.

At dawn, a group of Japanese forces up to a battalion in a disorderly crowd began to retreat east along the valley of the southern coast of Khailastyn-Gol. She was covered by heavy artillery fire and then attacked; a reconnaissance company and one of the rifle companies of the 127th rifle regiment, which occupied positions directly on the south bank of the river, took part in the attack. As a result, part of the enemy group was destroyed, and the rest, rushing to the northern coast, came under fire from the 9th motorized armored brigade and were completely exterminated.

At about 11 o'clock, another group of Japanese up to a battalion with a 75-mm battery and several heavy machine guns tried to go east along the southern coast of Khailastyn-Gol, but was also met and attacked by units of the 57th Infantry Division and was also completely destroyed.

103. Heavy caterpillar Soviet tractor "Comintern" evacuates a 150-mm gun captured from the Japanese to the rear. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

On the same day, at 5 pm, a large group of Japanese officers and non-commissioned officers tried to jump out of the ring, which was shrinking more and more. However, it was also destroyed by a decisive attack by our units in the area of ​​the crossing over the Khailastyn-Gol.

Having destroyed almost the entire Japanese garrison defending in the area of ​​​​the Peschanaya hill and the Zelenaya height, during its attempts to break out of the encirclement, by the end of August 27, units of the 57th and 82nd rifle divisions completely captured all the fortifications on the southern coast of Khailastyn-Gol , and the 127th Infantry Regiment crossed to the northern bank of the river.

By the morning of August 28, the enemy remained only in the northern sector, in the area of ​​Remizov's height. Here the Japanese had the strongest fortifications, which made it possible for them to hold this height for themselves during August 27.

Thus, from August 24 to 27, the troops of the 1st Army Group not only repelled all the attacks of the enemy, who sought to unblock the encircled group, but also launched a strong counterattack. This firmly ensured the successful completion of the operation to destroy the encircled enemy. Parts of the Southern Group, together with the regiments of the 82nd Infantry Division, successfully completed the task of defeating the pockets of Japanese resistance on the southern coast of Khailastyn-Gol and could now be used to strike from the south at the center of resistance in the Remizov height area.

With the crossing of the 127th, and behind it the 293rd rifle regiments of the 57th rifle division to the northern coast of Khailastyn-Gol, the Japanese garrison, which continued to resist at this height, was completely blocked from all sides. The ring of our troops continued to shrink uncontrollably. Almost all Japanese artillery by this time had been put out of action by our gunners and tankmen. The enemy could mainly use his remaining mortars and machine guns.

Even on the night of August 28, part of the enemy garrison tried to get out of the encirclement. A group of Japanese in 400 people, having accumulated in sand dunes, intended to secretly make their way to the east along the northern coast of Khailastyn-Gol, but was discovered. To eliminate the enemy, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 293rd regiment acted. Having crossed the river, they attacked the Japanese and, after refusing to lay down their arms, completely exterminated them in hand-to-hand combat.

On the evening of August 28, the commander of the 24th motorized rifle regiment received personally from the commander of the 1st army group the task of destroying the enemy defending on the Remizov height, and capturing the top of the height no later than 24 hours.

Carrying out the assigned task, the regiment, with the support of tanks, attacked the height from the north and by 23 o'clock broke into its summit. The last seat of Japanese resistance was broken. During the night of August 29, the liquidation of small disparate enemy groups in the area of ​​Remizov's height continued. In the next two days, our units cleared the area of ​​hostilities from the last remnants of the defeated enemy. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of the Japanese invaders.

104. Commander of the 1st Army Group Corps Commander G.K. Zhukov personally inspects a captured Japanese gun. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

August 28 at 21 o'clock (Moscow time) commander G.K. Zhukov reported to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on the liquidation of the Japanese-Manchu troops in the border zone of the Mongolian People's Republic:

"Moscow - comrade Voroshilov.

The Japanese-Manchu troops that violated the border of the MPR were completely surrounded and destroyed by units of the 1st Army Group and the MPR.

At 22.30 28.8 the last center of resistance was eliminated - Remizovskaya Height, where up to three infantry battalions were destroyed. The remnants - 100-200 people who fled to the dunes, are destroyed in a night battle.

The border of the Mongolian People's Republic has been completely restored. Details by special report.

On this victorious Zhukovsky telegram, the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal K.E. Voroshilov imposed the following resolution:

"Comrade Stalin.

I am forwarding the report I have just received. Zhukov and Kalugin. As expected, there were no divisions in the encirclement, the enemy either managed to withdraw the main forces, or, rather, there were no large forces in this area for a long time, and a specially trained garrison was sitting, which is now completely destroyed ...

K. Voroshilov…"‹14›

The last fights continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khailastyn-Gol River. And only by the evening of August 31, the last shots on Mongolian soil subsided. Not a single Japanese soldier was left on it anymore.

105. The corpse of a Japanese infantryman killed in the battles for the height of Fui. The soldier wore a 1930 uniform and light rubber-soled shoes. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

Nevertheless, help from the destroyed 6th Imperial Army could arrive. The commander of the Kwantung Army, General Kenkichi Ueda, concentrated 3 fresh infantry divisions for the counteroffensive, reinforced by other troops, but did not have time to go on the counteroffensive. So quickly commander G.K. Zhukov completed the offensive operation he had conceived with the most decisive final goals.

On September 1, the Soviet-Mongolian troops began organizing the protection and defense of the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The active operations of the air forces on both sides continued into the last period of the operation. From August 28 to August 31, Soviet aviation conducted 4 air battles with enemy aircraft. The largest battle took place on 31 August. From the Soviet side, 126 fighters took part in it, flying out to repel an air attack by Japanese aircraft on the combat formations of our infantry. On the part of the Japanese, 27 bombers and 70 fighters participated in the battle. As a result of the battle, the Japanese lost 22 aircraft.

After the defeat in the area between the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Khalkhin-Gol River, the Japanese tried once again to invade the territory of our allied state.

Pulling up fresh units of the 2nd Infantry Division, on September 4, with two infantry battalions, they launched an attack on the height of Eris-Ulyn-Obo, but the counterattack of the Soviet units advanced from the reserve of the Southern Group was driven back, leaving over 350 corpses on the battlefield.

On the night of September 8, the Japanese tried to advance again in the same area, throwing four companies to attack, but were again driven back with heavy losses for them.

106. Heavy 220-mm gun of the Japanese army, inherited by the Soviet troops. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

When the ground units of the Japanese were already defeated, the air battles reached a special tension. During the first half of September, Soviet aviation conducted 6 air battles. The largest of them was the battle on September 15, when the Japanese, having collected all the aircraft they had at hand, decided to strike at our airfields, thereby depriving Soviet aviation of air supremacy. In this final battle, 120 fighters participated from the enemy side, and 207 from our side.

As a result of the battle, the Japanese lost 20 aircraft, and 6 aircraft did not return to their airfields.

In total, in September, the enemy lost up to 70 aircraft in air battles. Our losses amounted to 14 cars. Thus, this attempt to gain superiority over Soviet aviation also ended in complete failure for the Japanese.

Having received a crushing rebuff not only on the ground, but also in the air, the Japanese, through their ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, turned to the Soviet government with a request to cease hostilities.

Then negotiations took place on the demarcation of the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. On June 9, 1940, the state border of the MPR was completely restored on the former line.

The commander of the 6th Imperial Army, General Ogisu Rippo, happily escaped destruction on Mongolian territory with the remnants of his troops. Apparently, during the battle, he lost his sense of reality. In an address to his subordinates on September 5, 1939, Rippo, a samurai by birth and spirit, wrote the following:

“Despite the fact that the order to reorganize the 6th Army was given even earlier, we have to state with sorrow that due to the failure to comply with this order, the great mission to protect the northwestern region could not be carried out ...

At present, the army is preparing for the next offensive in the Jin-Jin-Sume area. The commander of the Kwantung Army decided this autumn to help us with the most trained troops in Manchuria, transfers them to the place of the upcoming battles under my command and outlines urgent measures to resolve the conflict ...

There is only one path along which the measures of the army should be directed, namely: to make the army united and monolithic and immediately inflict a crushing blow on the enemy, thereby grinding his growing impudence into powder. At present, the preparation of the army is progressing successfully.

The army will meet the upcoming autumn by stopping this mouse fuss with one blow and proudly showing the whole world the power of the elite imperial troops. From top to bottom, everyone in the army is imbued with a resolute offensive spirit and is confident in the inevitability of victory.

The army is always and everywhere ready to suppress and destroy the enemy with faith in its first marshal-emperor."‹15›

The commander of the Japanese 6th Army, General Ogisu Rippo, wishful thinking. The defeat at Khalkhin Gol for the Japanese turned into a defeat in moral terms. So there is reliable information. Thus, radio intelligence of the Soviet troops intercepted a radio message from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Head of the Personnel Department of the Ministry of War of Japan about the need to transfer to other positions the battery commander of the 1st Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, Artillery Captain Tsuchiya, and Adjutant of the Mulinsky Heavy Artillery Regiment, Lieutenant Kitamura, for the following reasons:

"1. During the Nomonhan battles, Captain Tsuchiya, suffering from the lack of the spirit of an artilleryman, which (spirit) is to connect his fate with the fate of the mass, climbed into the trench and, after lying there, returned from military operations.

Due to the fact that the regiment is being created anew, the further stay of Captain Tsuchiya in this position is not possible. Therefore, it is necessary to immediately transfer him to another position outside the military unit.

2. Lieutenant Kitamura during the Nomonkhan battles received an order from the regiment commander to break through the enemy's encirclement and prepare the necessary measures. But the lieutenant, caring only for his own safety, hid in a trench and, not even making sure that the regiment was completely destroyed, fled. Therefore, in view of the fact that the regiment is being formed a second time, Kitamura cannot remain in the troops.

3. I will report on administrative measures against these officers, as well as other officers who showed sabotage in the Nomonkhan incident, after the preparation of the materials. Given the state of the regiments, it is urgent to reassign the above two officers."‹16›

The intercepted radio message from the headquarters of the Kwantung Army in Tokyo spoke not only of the panicked mood of part of the Japanese officers during the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River. It also confirmed the actual destruction of the 1st field heavy artillery and Mulinsky heavy artillery regiments, since they had to be formed, in fact, anew.

107. Soviet specialists get acquainted with the device of 150-mm Japanese guns Type 89. The area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol river, August 1939 (AVL).

108. The Soviet-Japanese delegation on the day of the ceasefire. Most of the officers of the Japanese delegation are dressed in uniforms of the 1930 model, and the seated general is in the uniform of the 1938 model. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, September 17, 1939 (AVL).

On August 20, 1939, Soviet troops under the command of Zhukov launched an offensive against the Japanese army that had invaded Mongolia near the Khalkhin Gol River. The victory of the Red Army in the Mongolian steppes kept Japan from war against the USSR.

Providing assistance to Mongolia. The defeat of the Japanese troops thwarted the hopes of the ruling circles of Britain and the USA to pacify Japan at the expense of the USSR and the MPR, and to direct Japanese aggression against the USSR.

LESSON FOR SAMURAI

The reconnaissance platoon commander Nikolai Bogdanov wrote in his memoirs: “It was an excellent lesson for the samurai. And they adopted it. When the Fritz stood near Moscow, Japan did not dare to advance to the aid of an ally. Obviously, the memory of the debacle was fresh.”

In May 1939, Japanese troops invaded the territory of the allied USSR of the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River. This invasion was an integral part of the Japanese plans to seize the Soviet Far East and Siberia, China and the possessions of Western countries in the Pacific Ocean. The imperial headquarters was preparing two options for waging war: the northern one against the USSR and the southern one against the USA, Great Britain and their allies.
Despite the warning of the Soviet government that the USSR would defend the MPR as its own territory, the Japanese troops, having a three-fold superiority in forces (about 40 thousand people, 130 tanks, more than 200 aircraft), crossed the river on July 2. Khalkhin Gol and invaded the territory of the MPR, but after bloody battles they were forced to temporarily retreat. The Japanese were preparing to resume the offensive with the forces of an entire army on August 24, but the Soviet troops preempted the enemy and on August 20 themselves went on the offensive with the forces of the 1st Army Group created by that time under the command of commander G. Zhukov.

Outnumbered by the number of troops, the 1st Army Group outnumbered the enemy by about twice the number of tanks and aircraft. The Mongolian troops were led by Marshal of the MPR Kh. Choibalsan. The coordination of the actions of the Soviet and Mongolian troops was entrusted to the front group headed by the commander of the 2nd rank G. Stern.

The offensive was well prepared and came as a surprise to the enemy. As a result of six days of fighting, the Japanese 6th Army was surrounded and virtually destroyed. Its losses amounted to more than 60 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, the Soviet troops - 18 thousand killed and wounded. Air battles were especially intense, the largest by that time, in which up to 800 aircraft participated on both sides. As a result, the Japanese command requested a cessation of hostilities, and on September 16, 1939, they were suspended.

The events at Khalkhin Gol named after important international consequences. Priority in Japanese plans was given to the southern version of the war - against Great Britain and the United States. Soviet diplomacy, skillfully acting in the current situation, achieved the conclusion of a neutrality pact with Japan on mutually beneficial terms. The pact was signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941, which allowed our country to avoid a war on two fronts.

PU AND ABOUT EVENTS IN CHINA AT THE LATE 1930s

The commander of the Kwantung Army praised to me the power of the Japanese army and its amazing military successes ... On July 7, 1937, the war between Japan and China began and the Japanese army captured Beijing.

The Kwantung Army was like a strong source of high voltage current. I was an accurate and obedient electric motor, and Yoshioka Yasunori was an electric wire with excellent conductivity.

He was a short Japanese man from Kagoshima, with prominent cheekbones and a mustache. From 1935 until the surrender of Japan in 1945, he was by my side and was taken prisoner with me by the Red Army. Over the past ten years, he has gradually risen from lieutenant colonel of the ground forces to lieutenant general. Yoshioka held two positions: he was a senior adviser to the Kwantung Army and an attaché to the imperial house of Manchukuo. The latter was a Japanese name. As a matter of fact, how this name is translated is not so important, since it still did not reflect the very activities of Yoshioka. In fact, he was like an animated electrical wire. Every thought of the Kwantung Army was conveyed to me through him. Where to go to the reception, whom to salute, which guests to receive, how to instruct officials and people, when to raise a glass and offer a toast, even how to smile and nod your head - all this I did at the direction of Yoshioka. What kind of people I could meet and what not, what meetings to attend and what to say - in everything I obeyed him. He wrote the text of my speech to me in advance on paper in his Japaneseized Chinese. When Japan launched a war of aggression in China and demanded food, labor, and material resources from the puppet government, I had Prime Minister Zhang Jinghui read Yoshioka's appeal to governors at a meeting of provincial governors. In it, he urged the governors to make every effort to maintain the holy war ...

Whenever the Japanese army occupied a relatively large city in Central China, Yoshioka spoke about the results of the battles, and then ordered to stand with him and bow towards the front, thereby expressing condolences to the dead. After several such "lessons", when the city of Wuhan fell, I myself, without anyone's reminder, having listened to the end of the message, got up, bowed and honored the dead Japanese with a minute of silence.

Pu Yi. The First Half of My Life: Memoirs of Pu Yi, the Last Emperor of China. M., 1968.

FROM THE MEMORIES OF ZHUKOV

On August 20, 1939, the Soviet-Mongolian troops launched a general offensive operation to encircle and destroy the Japanese troops.
It was Sunday. The weather was warm and calm. The Japanese command, confident that the Soviet-Mongolian troops were not thinking about the offensive and were not preparing for it, allowed the generals and senior officers to take Sunday holidays. Many of them were far from their troops that day: some in Hailar, some in Khanchzhur, some in Janjin-Sume. We took this important circumstance into account when deciding to start the operation on Sunday.
At 0615 hours our artillery opened sudden and powerful fire on enemy anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft machine guns. Separate guns with smoke shells fired at the targets that our bomber aircraft were supposed to bomb.

In the area of ​​​​the Khalkhin-Gol River, the rumble of the engines of the approaching aircraft grew more and more. 153 bombers and about 100 fighters took to the air. Their blows were very powerful and caused an upsurge in the fighters and commanders.

At 0845 hours artillery and mortars of all calibers launched a barrage of enemy targets, pushing them to the limits of their technical capabilities. At the same time, our aircraft struck at the rear of the enemy. A command was transmitted through the established code through all telephone wires and radio stations - in 15 minutes to start a general attack.

At 0900, when our aircraft stormed the enemy and bombed his artillery, red rockets soared into the air, signifying the start of the movement of troops into the attack. The attacking units, covered by artillery fire, rapidly rushed forward.

The blow of our aviation and artillery was so powerful and successful that the enemy was morally and physically suppressed and could not open artillery return fire for the first hour and a half. Observation posts, communications and firing positions of the Japanese artillery were destroyed.
The attack took place in strict accordance with the operation plan and battle plans, and only the 6th tank brigade, unable to completely cross the Khalkhin Gol River, took part in the battles on August 20 with only part of its forces. The crossing and concentration of the brigade were completely completed by the end of the day.
On the 21st and 22nd there were stubborn battles, especially in the Great Sands region, where the enemy put up more serious resistance than we expected. To correct the mistake made, it was necessary to additionally bring the 9th motorized armored brigade into action from the reserve and strengthen the artillery.

Having defeated the enemy's flank groupings, by the end of August 26, our armored and mechanized units had completed the encirclement of the entire Japanese 6th Army, and from that day the fragmentation and destruction of the encircled enemy grouping began.

The struggle was complicated due to loose sands, deep pits and dunes.
The Japanese units fought to the last man. However, gradually it became clear to the soldiers the inconsistency of the official propaganda about the invincibility of the imperial army, since it suffered exceptionally heavy losses and did not win a single battle in 4 months of the war.

RESULTS OF THE BATTLE AT THE RIVER Khalkhin-Gol

(From the message of V. Stavsky about the negotiations held between the Soviet and Japanese military representatives in September 1939 - after the end of the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River)

VORONEZH. We report another entry of comrade. V. Stavsky about the meeting of delegations on September 20. We don't have any extras. We believe that the negotiations, in general, are proceeding normally.
Transferred to Chita for transmission to Moscow via the Bodo apparatus

OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE
18.09. ... A group of representatives of the Soviet-Mongolian troops climbs the hill. Japanese officers lined up at the Japanese tent. Ahead, two steps ahead of the formation - a short, round general. Away in the hollow - a row of Japanese cars, two trucks, goggle-eyed more than fifty Japanese soldiers. At our tent there are cars, a shining ZIS-101 and three telephone operators.
Japanese photo-film reporters rush about. Our comrades are not wasting their time either. One of them noticed how, a little later, two trucks of armed guards and a machine gun, standing on a tripod and directed towards the Soviet-Mongolian group, went inland towards the Japanese. Gentlemen Japanese officers prudently go to negotiations ...
From this hillock, on an uneven wide valley, sandy mounds are clearly visible, like the banks of a grassy river. There, along these hillocks, the advanced positions of the parties pass. In front of our line, the stinking corpses of the Japanese, the broken wheels of Japanese anti-tank guns, and all kinds of Japanese military junk are still lying in the grass. The Soviet-Mongolian group was seen off by the cheerful glances of riflemen, tankmen, and artillerymen.
The chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation, brigade commander Potapov, greets the general by the hand. They enter the tent. Everyone else follows them. And now, on both sides of the table, covered with green blankets, two worlds are located.
Japanese General Fujimoto leads the other side. Broad, plump, well-groomed face. Dull, black eyes, bags underneath. Occasionally, a mandatory smile, as if someone is putting on a dead mask. There are three rows of embroidered ribbons on the uniform. At the table, Colonel Kusanaki and Hamada, Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka - yesterday, at the first preliminary meeting, the former senior. By the way, yesterday he asked me to say hello to his acquaintance from Hasan, Commander Stern.
Among the Japanese there are also majors Nakamura, Shimamura, Oogoshi, Kaimoto and other officers.
On our side, brigade commander Potapov, tall, the Japanese against him are just little bastards; Brigadier Commissar Gorokhov and division commander of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, concentrated and silent Tseren.
Negotiations are started by the Japanese side.
GENERAL FUJIMOTO: We are members of the Japanese Army Commission appointed by the General Command. We draw your attention to the fact that it will be very unpleasant for us if we do not agree.
POTAPOV: We are members of the commission of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. We will give you our list. We want to achieve good results in negotiations on the basis of an agreement between the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Molotov and the city of Togo in Moscow.
FUJIMOTO: We are far from the government, and we are very afraid of making mistakes. We want to act strictly according to the order arising from the agreement ...
Both the general and his officers for a long time still express the wish that the results of the work turn out to be good, that the points of the agreement be fulfilled. In their hurried perseverance, in the expression of their faces - gloomy and vicious - I clearly see both dejection, and inner emptiness, and even fear, just fear.
From the central crossing over the Khalkhin Gol River, not far from the mouth of Khailastin Gol, to the place of negotiations with the Japanese - about 15 kilometers.
There was a time - this is at the beginning of July - when the Japanese hung a gloomy threat over this crossing as well. The range of their guns was more than enough here. Yes, how not to miss: that height dominating over this entire district, two kilometers from the river, was in the hands of the Japanese. Here the whole earth is pecked with shells, blown up by Japanese air bombs. The car, swaying on potholes, goes from hillock to hillock. Stunted vegetation. Low shrubs. Sandy cliffs, pits. This is the local Mongolian mankhans.
Already behind the cheerful valley of Khalkhin Gol. In the banks, bordered by bushes, a mighty stream tends, very reminiscent of the Kuban or Laba in the upper reaches. How many times did the Red Army men tell me: ""
The ridges are steeper and higher, the heights are wider. They all became family. At that height there was the headquarters of Remizov's regiment and the height now bears the name of the glorious Hero of the Soviet Union Remizov. And there is the height of “Boots”, “Egg”, “Two eggs”, “Sandy”. All these names are given during the fighting. At these heights, excellent fortified areas were created by the Japanese. These pits, manhans, turned out to be Japanese graves.
Here, in this district, eleven Japanese regiments were engulfed in the death ring of our troops. Captured and destroyed.
Here a bold and very subtle plan was carried out to defeat the Japanese.
When, on the morning of July 20, one and a half hundred of our bombers dropped their cargo on Japanese heads, fantastic flowers of explosions grew over the manhans, covered with a veil of fog, the earth trembled, the whole district gasped from the rumble. And immediately the artillery began to work.
Ten days of our continuous offensive and extermination of the Japanese! The notorious Lieutenant General Kamatsubara did not even understand what was happening, where the main blow was being struck, judging by his orders.
And here is the eloquent confession of the former commander of the 6th Japanese Army, Oogoshi Rippu. In his address of 5 September, he said:
"... Thanks to the bold and decisive actions of all units, led by Lieutenant General Kamatsubara, the chaos during the battle took on a smaller size." Just think about it. Feuilletonists have been hunting for such a line for years - "the chaos during the battle took on smaller dimensions." Day by day, it took on smaller dimensions (Japanese chaos) until all of them, surrounded here, were destroyed ...
And here we are again in the Japanese tent, in the neutral zone. This is the fourth day of negotiations, September 20. The Japanese today are even more gloomy and dejected than yesterday. You can see it in their faces.
Major General Fujimoto sits gloomy as an idol. But Brigade Commander Potapov is exquisitely kind.
During the days of the offensive, he commanded the southern group, which dealt the main blow to the Japanese. And he knows very well that there are not 5,000 Japanese corpses here, as they said, but at least twice as many. And Potapov himself - an ardent tanker - burst into the location of the Japanese on a roaring deadly tank. But how does this person now have such a rounded gesture, smoothness and clarity of speech!
Brigade commander POTAPOV says: “Yesterday I once again reported to the high command about your desire to remove and take out the corpses yourself. The main command, wishing to meet your needs, not to hurt your religious feelings and not violate your rites, decided to satisfy your request - to allow Japanese soldiers to dig up and collect corpses, on the following conditions.
Potapov reads out a whole instruction, according to which military teams of 20 soldiers, without weapons, will have to collect corpses. They will be accompanied by our commanders.
The general nervously writes in his book. The rest of the officers have completely stunned faces. In no way, apparently, the Japanese did not expect this ...
Finally the general comes to his senses. He says: “I thank you from the bottom of my heart. I will report to my high command. Now we are talking to each other...
The conversation proceeds smoothly. The Japanese are asking for a diagram with indications of the graves of Japanese soldiers - they will receive it tomorrow. They ask to enter ten commands - well, let them enter ten commands. They ask to consider personal belongings - ammunition, flasks, bayonets, binoculars, officer revolvers. They were denied this. They do not insist, but ask for permission: - do not remove bayonets, bags from the corpses, if they are right on them, - so that the soldiers do not have a bad impression.

Brigade commander Potapov replies: - We will not remove these things from the dead (...)

Vl. Stavsky
RGVA. F.34725. Op.1. D.11. L. 37-48 (Stavsky V.P. - author of military essays and stories. During the Great Patriotic War - military commander of Pravda. He died in the battles near Nevel).

LITERATURE:

Latest news of the Ivanovo region on the topic:
Memorable date of the military history of the Fatherland. August 20, 1939. Offensive near the Khalkhin-Gol River

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For the first time in Mongolia, the regular Soviet Air Force encountered modern and combat-experienced enemy air forces. The battles were fought in a limited space, and this was accompanied by a large concentration of forces of the parties. Fighter aircraft played a particularly important role. The Air Force of the Red Army did not have such experience in air combat until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The scale of the air battles is evidenced by the remark of the commander of the Soviet grouping in Mongolia since June 1939, Georgy Zhukov, who, in a conversation with Konstantin Simonov, said that he had not seen such battles in the air as over Khalkhin Gol even during the Great Patriotic War. The battles at Khalkhin Gol showed the importance of the quality level of fighter equipment, using the example of the fact that even rich combat experience cannot compensate for the superiority of the enemy in technology.

Background to the conflict

Since the beginning of 1939, in the border area between the Mongolian People's Republic (on whose territory, in accordance with the Soviet-Mongolian protocol of 1936, there were Soviet troops) and Manchukuo, which was actually controlled by Japan, several incidents occurred between the Mongols and the Japanese-Manchus.

The last skirmish took place in May. Both sides began to pull forces into the disputed area. Mongolia - behind which the Soviet Union stood - announced the passage of the border near the small village of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, and Manchukuo - behind which Japan stood - drew the border along the Khalkhin Gol River (which is why in Western historiography the subsequent local war received the name "Incident at Nomonkhan", and in the Soviet and Russian - "War on Khalkhin Gol"). The formal reason was explained by the presence of many maps of the area containing discrepancies, which were interpreted by each of the parties in their favor, as well as by the nature of the deserted and sparsely populated area with indefinite border markers separated from each other for many kilometers. It is noteworthy that at the beginning of the conflict, the parties considered it as an ordinary incident. They exchanged several mutual protests (the first of which was addressed to the government of the MPR). In Moscow, they generally learned about the incident only a few days after it began. But it is hardly correct to regard the confrontation as an accidental coincidence. It was brewing not only because frequent and minor border incidents accumulated and created fertile ground for confrontation.

The conflict at Khalkhin Gol, in addition to the military force, had a clear political and diplomatic dimension. It was important for both the Soviet Union and Japan to demonstrate their combat readiness to potential allies, since in Europe and in the United States there were quite serious doubts about the ability of the USSR and Japan to act as reliable and combat-ready partners in the upcoming coalitions, the composition and configuration of which had not yet been clarified.

It was during these months that Japanese diplomacy was engaged in a fierce bargaining about the terms of cooperation with Germany and Britain. On the other hand, Japan at that time was waging a heavy war of conquest in China, where it suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment. In 1939, in particular, about 900 combat aircraft were used there, of which about half were army aviation. The best forces of the Japanese imperial army were concentrated in China, and it is obvious that under such conditions the Japanese, for all their aggressiveness, were not interested in inflating a parallel major war that would divert their forces from their main goal.

In the summer of 1939, no less important negotiations were held by the military delegation of the USSR with representatives of the military missions of Britain and France in Moscow. We must not forget about the political situation around the Soviet Union. In the autumn of 1938, the USSR was not even invited to a conference in Munich, where the fate of Czechoslovakia, with which Moscow had an agreement on mutual assistance, was decided. This meant one thing - the fall of the authority of the Soviet Union in Europe, where in the spring of 1939 Republican Spain fell - the last ally of Moscow. In the West, it was reasonably believed that the Red Army, weakened by numerous purges, was unfit for combat. In addition, the USSR, which actively helped China with weapons and military specialists, was indirectly interested in dispersing Japanese forces.

Thus, the conflict that arose, which formally was a four-way one - the MPR and the USSR against Manchukuo and Japan - was in fact a showdown between the USSR and Japan. The conflict was an excellent opportunity for any of the parties not only to secure the disputed territories, but also to significantly increase their military and political prestige in the international arena.

Beginning of the air war

The first aircraft - a R-5 type vehicle that communicated with the sixth cavalry division - was lost by the Red Army Air Force in an air battle on May 22. This day became the starting point for air battles over the border.

The USSR accused Japan of aggression against Mongolia and declared that it would defend its borders "as if it were its own." From the Soviet Union, additional aviation and armored units began to be urgently transferred to the Khalkhin Gol region.

The first clashes with Japanese aircraft in May caused alarm among the military-political leadership of the USSR. Of course, the loss of even a few dozen aircraft could not undermine the combat effectiveness of the Soviet Air Force in the Far East. The negative impression came primarily from the very fact that Soviet aviation began to act inefficiently.

Especially indicative in this regard was the air battle of the 1st squadron of the 22nd IAP, which was personally led by the acting commander of the air brigade, Major T.F. Kutsevalov, which took place on May 27.

When Japanese planes appeared in the air, Kutsevalov’s plane did not take off due to an engine malfunction, and during the battle, four cars were forced to leave the battle and land for the same reason (this may have happened due to poor-quality fuel when refueling on the ground before takeoff) . Of the four remaining pilots, two were killed and one wounded.

The next day, May 28, the 4th squadron of the 22nd IAP on the I-15 was almost completely destroyed. Of the ten pilots, five were killed or missing, including the assistant commander of the 22nd IAP, Major P.A. Myagkov; at least three were injured, including the squadron captain A.I. Balashov.

Halkin Gol. Red star against the rising sun. I-16 against Nakajima Ki.27. Rice. Brooks Whelan

The role of the transfer of experienced aviators to the Mongolian People's Republic

One of the motives that prompted Stalin to agree with Hitler is also the incompleteness of the Soviet-Japanese conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. The peace agreement was signed only on September 15, 1939. Stalin could fear a war on two fronts. However, although by August 23 there were still battles at Khalkhin Gol, their outcome was no longer in doubt - the superiority of the Soviet troops was so great. And after them, Japan is unlikely, with all its desire, could continue the conflict. According to Japanese historians themselves, during these battles, the losses of Japanese troops amounted to 73% of the original number! (K.E. Cherevko, A.A. Kirichenko. The Soviet-Japanese War. Declassified archives. M., 2006) So if Japan had not signed a peace agreement at that moment, then it risked losing all of Manchuria in the fall of 1939 of the year!

Pilots who went through the war in Spain and China, who began to arrive in the MPR from the beginning of June, must first of all be considered as instructors and organizers, and not just as flight replacements with excellent training. It should also be noted that the opportunity to raise the level of pilots available in Mongolia in a relatively short period of time became possible due to the generally good quality of ordinary pilots, who quickly learned the lessons of veterans. Otherwise, such studies would not have been successful. This circumstance allows us to take a different look at the quality of the mass flight personnel of the Red Army Air Force during the beginning of the Second World War, in contrast to the widespread point of view that ordinary pilots had an extremely low level of training, and aviation as a whole was completely decomposed by repression.

A group of 48 pilots and technical specialists that arrived in the MPR was headed by Ya.V. Smushkevich, Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force; besides him, 11 pilots had the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. All of them were immediately dispersed among different units and began combat training.

The growth of the Red Army Air Force in the MPR at the beginning of the war

By the beginning of the war, all Japanese air forces in Manchuria and Korea consisted of 274 aircraft. Consequently, by mid-June, even with the concentration of all the above air forces against the MPR, the Japanese side could not have any numerical superiority in aviation. In reality, in June, the Japanese air force in the Khalkhin Gol area consisted of only 129 aircraft, including 77 fighters, 24 twin-engine bombers, 28 single-engine light bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. And the very first formation intended for operations in this area was the Temporary Air Force, created on May 12 and numbering 32 aircraft, including 20 fighters and 12 single-engine vehicles.

Thus, as of mid-June, the Soviet air forces transferred to the battle area were twice as large as the Japanese located there and were equal to all the Japanese air forces that were in Manchuria and Korea in general. It is no coincidence that since the end of May, the Japanese have not been active in the air for a long time, which, in general, was assumed by the Soviet side, which estimated the Japanese air fleet that could initially be used in battles at a hundred and a half cars.

High-quality materiel is the main source for ensuring the success of the Red Army Air Force at Khalkhin Gol

If the May failures could be partly explained by shortcomings in the organization of hostilities and the lack of combat experience among the pilots, then the air battle that took place on June 22 left no doubt about the alarming state of the Soviet fighter aircraft and its inconsistency with enemy aircraft. We are talking about the mass use of biplane fighters by the Red Army Air Force.

It should be noted that the loss of I-15 bis in this particular battle was by no means due to poor control of the battle or a small number of aircraft used. So, the fourth squadron of the 22nd IAP was under the command of an experienced pilot Evgeny Stepanov, who fought in Spain, where he flew the I-15. Stepanov himself, despite his skill, barely survived the battle with the Japanese and landed in his car with a broken engine control rod.

The percentage of losses of Soviet monoplane and biplane fighters from those used in air combat on June 22, 1939

The biplane trend was rooted in the experience of the war in Spain. The I-15 type aircraft, which showed themselves well in the battles of the initial period of this war, made a certain impression on the leadership of the Soviet Air Force. If before that there were hesitations regarding the use of machines of a similar design, then the reliability in operation and ease of piloting this machine compared to the more complex I-16 monoplane spoke for the fact that it has the right to exist. And although China later received completely different reviews about the I-15 bis biplane, which from the very beginning collided with high-speed Japanese monoplanes, it was already difficult to correct the situation - the car was launched into mass production at the country's largest aircraft factory No. 1. In 1939, fighters of the biplane scheme became the most massive fighters produced in the USSR, and among them, according to the results of the year, it was the I-15 bis aircraft that prevailed.

Khalkin-Gol, summer 1939 Preparing an I-15 fighter for a sortie.

Some Soviet and Russian researchers believe that the appearance of the I-153 "Chaika" fighters at Khalkhin Gol allowed Soviet air units, in addition to the I-16, to receive air weapons that were superior to Japanese fighters. This view appears to be clearly exaggerated.

One of the proofs of this is the demonstrative air battle held in early August between the commander of the 22nd IAP G.K. Kravchenko and the commander of the I-153 group, Colonel Kuznetsov. At the first approach, already on the third turn, the I-16 went into the tail of the "Seagull", at the second - this happened already after two turns.

It should be noted that the "Seagulls" operated under special conditions - they were considered the latest weapons, they were not allowed to fly across the border. The same can be said about the I-15 bis, which were used after the June battles only to attack ground targets under heavy fighter cover. Despite this, according to available data, at least 40 I-15 bis and I-153 biplanes were lost during the fighting, which, respectively, is at least a quarter of all the lost Soviet fighters. Of course, the losses of biplanes in battles were not catastrophic in absolute terms, but such statistics reflected alarming trends in the state of the materiel of Soviet fighter aircraft as a whole. The main and most modern Soviet fighter in battles was the I-16 monoplane. It is the presence of this machine in the ranks in mass quantities that can explain a significant share of the success of the Red Army Air Force at Khalkhin Gol.

The quantitative factor in the battles at Khalkhin Gol

As noted above, the Soviet command almost from the very beginning of the war (contrary to the assertions of some authors) had a numerical superiority over the Japanese forces.

Near Moscow, Georgy Zhukov took command of the Western Front, which no longer actually existed after the breakthrough of the German tank armadas. The front had to be urgently restored, collecting the remnants of the defeated armies, raising the militias and everyone who could be put into operation. Zhukov solved this problem by charging his unbending will to victory to the motley army that he inherited. In the most difficult, initial period of the battle, he outplayed the German generals tactically, distributing the troops in such a way that they were able to delay the advance of the enemy, who had a huge advantage in strength. Then reinforcements came up, including strong Far Eastern divisions, released after Japan refused to attack the USSR. This was largely a consequence of Khalkhin Gol. Thus, Georgy Zhukov in the autumn of 1941 could take advantage of the results of his own victory won two years ago.

This is due primarily to the Soviet military doctrine, which provided for the simultaneous conduct of battles against two opponents - in the West and in the East, and, accordingly, the saturation of the Red Army Air Force with the necessary amount of material for this.

A year ago, a similar scheme showed itself - in August, the Soviet Air Forces in the Far East were put on alert in connection with the events in Khasan. At the same time, a group of 2,000 aircraft was deployed in the European part of the USSR, intended for combat use in case of assistance to Czechoslovakia during the Munich crisis.

In 1939 the situation was similar. Almost immediately after the end of the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, a powerful grouping of the Red Army Air Force in the West was activated against Poland.

The Soviet aviation industry was also focused on not only equipping these autonomous groups (this task was actually solved), but also making up for their losses in the event of hostilities. With this task, he coped brilliantly. The Red Army Air Force did not experience any shortage of equipment.

Relying on a powerful aviation industry, the Soviet command, along with the qualitative improvement of materiel, also pursued a policy of increasing the quantitative level of aviation forces in the battle area.

In the first half of August, new powerful reinforcements arrived - up to 200 aircraft. By mid-August, Soviet air units (including a group of Mongolian R-5s) numbered at least 558 combat aircraft, more than twice the Japanese air force. Of this number, 181 aircraft were SB bombers, which were the main strike force of aviation during the breakthrough of the Japanese defenses during the offensive on August 20th.

The situation on the Japanese side was completely different. Army aviation could use a small number of twin-engine bombers (some of them were imported from Italy). Fighter losses were absorbing all of the country's current production. A slight quantitative increase in Japanese air forces at the end of the conflict (295 since September 9) was achieved, including through the transfer of about 60 obsolete biplane fighters.

Assessment of the loss of the Soviet and Japanese sides in aviation

On July 10, 1940, the Izvestia newspaper - a year after the events - cited the data of the Red Army General Staff on the losses of the parties for four months of fighting, from May 15 to September 15, 1939. According to them, Japan lost 660 aircraft, the USSR - 143.

Almost fifty years later, when 1988 came, the capital work of the Soviet work "Air Power of the Motherland" set out the following figures: Japan - 646, the USSR - 207 lost aircraft (including 160 fighters) and 211 aviators. As you can see, Soviet estimates of losses increased by one and a half times. The number of Japanese losses, respectively, was somewhat reduced - from 660 to 646.

For the reasons mentioned above, the Soviet leadership badly needed a favorable picture of combat operations in the air. Soviet diplomacy actively advertised the successes of the Red Army.

In Castel Fusano (a country residence of the Italian government. A.S.) met with Ciano (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy. A.S.). During the conversation, I pointed out to the minister that his statement the other day to me about the decent behavior of the Italian press in relation to the USSR no longer corresponds to reality: over the past three days, newspapers have been systematically printing fakes from Tokyo, citing obviously ridiculous numbers of downed Soviet airplanes.

(From the telegram of the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Italy L.V. Gelfand to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR)

The TASS statement (dated June 26) was widely published and brought tangible benefits. Nevertheless, it is very important not to leave the initiative to the Japanese in covering events. Thus, the dogfight of June 26 is now given by the newspapers, mainly according to our report, since the Japanese false version came later. Interest in the events in government circles is significant... As in the Hassan events, there are references in American newspapers to the "uncertainty" of the border and doubts about the responsibility for its violation."

(From the telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the USA K.A. Umansky to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR).

Due to a month-long delay in covering the battles, the Soviet plenipotentiaries had to spin like a frying pan, but then reports of "victories" began to come from Moscow more or less regularly. What was the real price of these victories?

In the memoirs of N.N. Voronov "In the service of the military" in 1991 (the author was the head of artillery of the Red Army in 1937-1940, took part in many local wars of the 30-40s) says the following:

"Immediately after my return, the people's commissar of defense summoned me following the results of work at Khalkhin Gol. ... Unexpectedly, the question followed:

According to reports, during the fighting, our fighters shot down about 450 Japanese aircraft. Is it true or not?

I didn't have exact data. Voroshilov apparently understood my confusion and concluded:

You can be satisfied if our aircraft shot down at least half."

If we accept the assessment of the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov as a basis (hardly anyone had more accurate information), it turns out that the Soviet side estimated enemy losses at 220 aircraft, that is, three times less than the originally announced official number.

The Japanese agency Home Tsushin, referring to the press department of the headquarters of the Japanese army, summing up the results of three years of the war, highlights: "On the border of Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia, Japanese aircraft shot down 1340 Soviet aircraft and destroyed 30 aircraft on the ground." In this case, own losses were estimated at 138 aircraft, which is about one and a half times lower than Voroshilov's estimate.

But still, it should be noted that although implausible figures (inflated by 4-6 times) were widely used by both sides for political purposes, it is hardly worth making a conclusion about the deliberate deception of the pilots of their own leadership. The fact is that the fighters of both sides, equipped mainly with rifle-caliber machine guns, could provide a significant number of hits on the enemy’s vehicle, which, however, did not reach the target. Various abrupt maneuvers and the saturation of the battlefield with a huge number of vehicles did not always make it possible to accurately assess the outcome of the struggle.

The real losses of the Japanese army aviation amounted to 164 aircraft of 12 types (this number includes the losses of the Manchurian airline), including 90 from combat causes and 74 from others (unfortunately, the author does not have a detailed transcript of the last term, they were probably cars broken on takeoff or landing, and possibly written off due to combat damage). The bulk of the lost vehicles fell on fighters - 99 vehicles, of which Nakajima Ki.27 - 96 vehicles, including 62 from combat causes, as well as 3 Kawasaki Ki.10 (all lost in battle). The relatively small number of lost twin-engine bombers (Mitsubishi Ki.21-I and Fiat BR-20) - 7 of both types from all causes, rather speaks of their overall insignificant number on the Japanese side.

The losses of the Japanese in personnel were quite large and, as Western authors note, there was nothing to make up for them. So, 17 officers of the rank of commander and above died, mainly in fighter aviation. The highest rank was Colonel Abe Katsumi, commander of the 15th Sentai (equivalent to the Soviet regiment), who was killed on 2 August. In addition, there were seriously wounded and captured Japanese army aviation officers (including the commander of the 1st Sentai, Major F. Harada, who was shot down on July 29).

The role of intelligence in the air war at Khalkhin Gol

Richard Sorge's intelligence network played an important role in providing the Soviet leadership with relevant information.

Sorge's agent Iyotoku Miyagi obtained information about new types of weapons and military equipment transferred to the Japanese ground forces and air force. Miyagi also reconnoitered the situation at the Japanese military bases in Hailar, Qiqihar, Harbin, Xingqing and counted the number of aircraft at the supply base in Kunchulin near Mukden.

Particularly valuable information was received by Branko Vukelic, the official representative of the French press agency. He was among the journalists who were invited by the Japanese General Staff to visit the combat area to monitor the progress of the Japanese troops, where he was from 3 to 15 July. From the trip, he brought important data about Japanese airfields, their equipment, the number and types of aircraft based on them, as well as military equipment depots.

As for Sorge himself, he was also among those invited by the Japanese to the combat area. In conversations with him, the German military attaché, Colonel Matzki, let slip that, according to his information, the Japanese General Staff was forbidden to use the battle by the river to further expand aggression against the USSR.

General conclusions on the results of the air war at Khalkhin Gol

For the first time in Mongolia, the regular Soviet Air Force encountered modern and combat-experienced enemy air forces. The battles were fought in a limited space, and this was accompanied by a large concentration of forces of the parties. Fighter aircraft played a particularly important role. The Air Force of the Red Army did not have such experience in air combat until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The scale of the air battles is evidenced by the remark of the commander of the Soviet group in Mongolia since June 1939, G.K. Zhukov, who, in a conversation with K. Simonov, said that he had not seen such battles in the air as over Khalkhin Gol even during the Great Patriotic War.

The battles at Khalkhin Gol showed the importance of the quality level of fighter equipment, using the example of the fact that even rich combat experience cannot compensate for the superiority of the enemy in technology.

There was also a need for the ability of the belligerent to quickly resume their losses over a fairly long period of time.

As regards the training of personnel, the experience of combat has shown that, for all its importance, this factor can advantageously supplement, in no case replace either the first or the second.

In conclusion, it can be noted that the success of Soviet aviation at Khalkhin Gol, without a doubt, was also the most important factor influencing the foreign policy situation around the USSR in terms of assessing its potential capabilities both by adversaries and allies.

79. T-26 tanks (model 1933 with a cylindrical turret and a handrail antenna and with a conical turret model 1939) move into the combat area. Apparently the tank on the left is out of order. Tank battalion of the 36th motorized rifle division. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

By the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, the Japanese had in the area of ​​​​combat operations the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, fully staffed according to wartime states, a mixed Manchu infantry brigade, the 8th border garrison, 3 heavy artillery regiments, 3 regiments of the Bargut cavalry . In addition, the 14th Infantry Brigade was approaching from Manchuria. To strengthen the anti-tank defense, the Japanese transferred all the anti-tank batteries of the 1st Infantry Division to Khalkhin Gol, and also brought part of the heavy artillery from the Port Arthur fortress. They also significantly strengthened aviation, concentrating in August in the combat area up to 450 aircraft transferred from China and Japan.

The enemy occupied a fortified line on sandy mounds and hills to the west of the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic. The front line of its defense passed along the southern edge of the Great Sands, along the southern and southwestern slopes of the Zelenaya height, went along the western slope of the Peschanaya hill (4 km east of Dungur-Obo), then crossed the Khailastyn-Gol River at 4 -6 km from its mouth and continued to the north, passing along the western slopes of the Fuyi ("Finger") height. The right flank rested on the state border in the area of ​​Lake Odon-Hyp.

The main line of defense was occupied by the following units. To the south of Khailastyn-Gol - a consolidated left-flank detachment, the 71st and 28th infantry regiments, north of the river - the 72nd, 64th and 26th infantry regiments. Fui Height was defended by the reconnaissance detachment of the 23rd Infantry Division under the command of Yoki and the 2nd company of the 26th Infantry Regiment. In the immediate reserve were the 25th and 27th Infantry Regiments. In addition, the Japanese had reserves that were concentrated north of Lake Yanhu, in the area of ​​Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, Jin-Jin-Sume, Depden-Sume. The flanks of the defensive position were covered by the Bargut cavalry.

The defense of the Japanese consisted of nodes of resistance and strongholds created on the hills, dunes and connected by communications. The trenches had a full profile; dugouts were with ceilings capable of withstanding bursts of 152-mm shells. Deep shelters were dug for cars and horses. The enemy fortified the Peschanaya hill, the Zelenaya, Remizov and Fui (Finger) heights especially strongly. The entire system of structures was adapted to the terrain and, in combination with a well-thought-out organization of fire, represented a fairly solid defensive line.

The notorious commander of the 23rd Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Kamatsubara, continued to command the entire grouping of Japanese-Manchurian troops.

The decision of the commander of the 1st Army Group to conduct an offensive operation in August 1939.

The Soviet-Mongolian troops, after a private operation undertaken on August 7-8 in order to improve the tactical situation, occupied bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River, 3-5 km east of it.

Until August 18, the 8th cavalry division of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the 82nd rifle division (without one regiment), the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade, two regiments of the 36th motorized rifle division and the 6th cavalry division of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army were stationed here. -revolutionary army. All other troops remained on the west bank. They began the crossing only on the night of August 19, that is, a day before the start of the general offensive. The crossing, and then the deployment of troops on the eastern coast, thanks to well-conducted preparations, went without interruption and were not detected by the enemy. Only the 6th tank brigade of Colonel M.I. was delayed a little. Pavelkin. It was supposed to cross over a previously explored ford, but due to the water level rising due to rains, the 6th tank brigade had to be sent to the crossing of the 57th rifle division, although this crossing was not designed for tanks.

By dawn on August 20, all our units, with the exception of the 6th Tank Brigade, were already on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River and were located as follows:

- The 8th Cavalry Division reached the border west of the heights of Eris-Ulyn-Obo and Khulat-Ulyn-Obo;

- The 8th motorized armored brigade concentrated in the area south of "Big Sands";

- The 57th Rifle Division (80th, 127th and 293rd regiments) occupied the front south of the "Malye Sands" and the "Green" heights;

- The 82nd rifle division (603rd and 602nd regiments) was located southwest of the Peschanaya hill in the area between Nuren-Obo and Dungur-Obo, adjoining the 57th rifle division on the right flank, and resting on the river on the left Khaylastyn-Gol;

- The 5th rifle-machine-gun brigade occupied a site on the northern bank of Khailastyn-Gol, northeast of the river mouth;

- The 36th motorized rifle division (149th and 24th regiments) deployed to the west of the height of Remizov, 2-3 km east of Khalkhi-Gol;

- The 7th Motorized Armored Brigade and the 601st Regiment of the 82nd Infantry Division concentrated 8 km northeast of Razvalin, on the eastern coast of Khalkhin Gol;

- The 6th Cavalry Division of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army covered the left flank.

The location of our troops occupied 74 km along the front.

The 7th Motorized Armored Brigade, the 601st Rifle Regiment and the 6th Cavalry Division looked to the east, while the front of the 8th Motorized Armored Brigade and the 57th Infantry Division, located on the right flank, was facing north.

The 6th tank brigade, following to the southern sector, was still at the crossing.

In the reserve of the commander of the 1st Army Group, in the area southwest of Mount Khamar-Daba, were concentrated: the 9th motorized armored brigade, the 4th battalion of the 6th tank brigade, the 212th airborne brigade.

|| Parties | Infantry battalions | Squadrons of cavalry | Machine guns easel and manual | Guns caliber 75 mm and above | Anti-tank guns and battalion type | Mortars | tanks | Armored vehicles | Fighters | Light bombers | Heavy bombers | Total aircraft ||

|| Soviet-Mongolian | 35 | 20 | 2255 | 216 | 286 | 40 | 498 | 346 | 376 | 181 | 23 | 581 ||

|| Japanese | 25 | 17 | 1283 | 135 | 142 | 60 bombers | 120 | unknown | 252 | 144 | 54 | 450 ||

A comparison of the above forces and means shows that superiority was on our side. In the infantry, the Soviet-Mongolian troops outnumbered the enemy by 1.5 times, in the cavalry the superiority was insignificant, in machine guns - by 1.7 times, in the number of guns - almost 2 times, in tanks - 4 times, in aircraft, especially in fighters, the advantage was also on the Soviet side.

Considering that the enemy did not dare to use his tanks in the August operation, the Soviet-Mongolian troops had absolute superiority in tanks and armored vehicles.

80. High-ranking political workers of the MNRA at the command post of the 1st Army Group. On the right is Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Head of the Political Department of the MNRA, Corps Commissar Zh. Lkhagvasuren. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

81. Political studies in positions. The personnel of the 185th long-range artillery regiment vows to crush the Japanese invaders. In the background is a 152-mm gun model 1910/1934. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

82. Commander of the front group of Soviet and Mongolian troops G.M. Stern (left), commander of the 6th Mongolian Cavalry Division Colonel L. Dandar (center), commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov. The region of the Khalkhin-Gol River, August 1939 (AVL).

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