Creation of a regular army under Peter 1. What did Peter do? Infantry armament under Peter I
Army of Peter 1- a regular army created by the Russian emperor Peter I on the basis of those who began to appear in Russia during the reign of his father, the so-called. foreign regiments, taking into account the latest European achievements in this area. It replaced the irregular local troops, which were a feudal relic, and the streltsy units that opposed Peter I during the struggle for power and then were repressed by him. The army was recruited on the basis of recruitment (also, until the middle of the 18th century, the compulsory service of the nobles was preserved).
Russian army before Peter
The Russian state of the 17th century was able to put more than 200 thousand people into the field. But this huge army at that time was very heterogeneous in its composition and training. Basically, it consisted of a militia of service people who lived on the land provided to them by the state “for service”. At the call of the government, they had to go on a campaign on horseback and with weapons that corresponded, according to a special painting, to the amount of land given to a serviceman.
The core of the Moscow army was actually a militia and did not at all resemble a regular army. It was a hereditary army. The son of a serviceman was to become a serviceman with age. Each warrior went on a campaign and supported himself in the army at his own expense; this army did not have any training bearing and monotonous weapons.
From the 17th century, service people were settled especially densely on those outskirts of the state, which at that time were especially threatened by enemies - the Crimean Tatars and the Commonwealth, that is, service people lived more along the southern and western borders of the state. In the 17th century, wars began with Sweden, and the northwestern border, less densely populated by service people, acquires special significance. Due to this, the Russian army could not concentrate here quickly enough and therefore often suffered defeat.
The Moscow government was aware of all these shortcomings in the organization of its troops. Even in the early days of the Russian state, in support of the equestrian service militia, the government began to start detachments of infantry and artillery that constantly served and trained in their work - these were regiments of archers and detachments of gunners and gunners. The structure of the streltsy army, however, was such that the streltsy, living in peacetime in their settlements and doing crafts and petty trade, looked more like a settled militia than a regular army. In addition, the training of this army was delivered very weakly from a military point of view. When meeting with the better trained regular troops of the Swedes, the Russians, if they were not overwhelming, were forced to retreat.
Since the time of Vasily III, the Moscow government began to hire entire detachments of foreign infantry. At first, these detachments played only the role of an honorary escort under the sovereign, but since the time of the Time of Troubles, detachments of hired foreign servicemen began to enter the Russian army. The government of Tsar Michael in 1631, expecting a war with Poland, sent Colonel Alexander Leslie to Sweden to recruit 5,000 infantry soldiers.
However, as happened in 1634 in the Russian-Polish war near Smolensk, it was possible for foreign mercenaries to go over to the side of the enemy. Therefore, several foot and cavalry regiments were created, including from free and low-ranking service people who were trained by foreign officers. By the end of the reign of Fyodor Alekseevich, there were already 63 regiments of such an army numbering 90 thousand people.
Together with the organization of the regiments of the foreign system, a change in the structure of the army of the Russian state was also planned, according to "new in military fictions", for which, under Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich, a commission was drawn up in 1681 from elected representatives from all service ranks, chaired by Prince V.V. Golitsyn.
The introduction of troops of a foreign system changed the composition of the army: it ceased to be based on estates. In the soldiers' regiments it was impossible to recruit only service people - landowners. Soldiers were required to serve constantly and be constantly trained in military affairs; they could not be allowed to go home in peacetime and called only in wartime. Therefore, soldiers in foreign regiments began to be recruited in the same way as subsequently recruits.
Peter's transformations in military affairs
Thus, Peter inherited from his predecessors an army, if not meeting all the requirements of the then military science, then already adapted for further reorganization in view of the new requirements. In Moscow there were two "elected" regiments (Butyrsky and Lefortovsky), which were headed by Peter's teachers in military affairs: P. Gordon and F. Lefort.
In his "amusing" villages, Peter arranged two new regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky - completely according to a foreign model. By 1692 these regiments were finally formed and trained. Colonel Yuri von Mengden was at the head of Preobrazhensky, and Ivan Chambers was appointed colonel of Semenovsky, "originally a Muscovite of the Scottish breed".
Kozhukhovsky maneuvers (1694) showed Peter the advantage of the regiments of the "foreign" system over the archers. The Azov campaigns, in which, along with the archery army and irregular cavalry, four regular regiments (Preobrazhensky, Semyonovsky, Lefortovsky and Butyrsky regiments) participated, finally convinced Peter of the low suitability of the troops of the old organization. Therefore, in 1698, the old army was disbanded, except for 4 old regiments (their total number was 28 thousand people), which became the basis of the new army:
- Pervomoskovsky Regiment (Lefortovsky)
- Butyrsky regiment
- Preobrazhensky Regiment
- Semyonovsky regiment.
Preparing for the war with Sweden, Peter ordered in 1699 to make a general recruitment and begin training recruits according to the model established by the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovites. At the same time, a large number of foreign officers were recruited. This first recruitment gave 25 new infantry regiments and 2 cavalry dragoons. The entire newly recruited army of 35-40 thousand people was divided into three "generalships" (divisions): A. M. Golovin, A. A. Veide and Prince A. I. Repnin.
The war was supposed to start with the siege of Narva, so the main focus was on the organization of the infantry. The operations of the field army were supposed to be provided by the local cavalry (from the "new" cavalry, only two dragoon regiments managed to form). There was simply not enough time to create all the necessary military structure. There were legends about the impatience of the king, he was eager to enter the war and test his army in action. Management, a combat support service, a strong equipped rear still had to be created.
By the beginning of the Northern War, Peter's teachers, Generals P. Gordon and F. Lefort, as well as Generalissimo A. S. Shein, died, so the new army was entrusted to F. A. Golovin, who received the rank of Field Marshal. However, Peter did not dare to entrust the excellent administrator, but not the commander, with his army in a real battle against the Swedes. On the eve of the Battle of Narva, he, together with F. A. Golovin, left the Russian army, and the main command was entrusted to the Saxon Field Marshal Duke de Croix.
The defeat at Narva showed that everything had to be started virtually from the beginning. The appeal of the Swedish king Charles XII against the Saxon elector and the Polish king August II gave Peter time to carry out the necessary transformations. The campaigns of 1701-04 in Ingermanland and Livonia made it possible to give combat experience to the emerging Russian units. Peter I assigned general military administrative orders to the boyar T. N. Streshnev.
In 1705, Peter I introduced a regular recruitment. In the same year, despite many objections, Peter introduced separate command of the infantry and cavalry: the infantry was led by Field Marshal Lieutenant G. B. Ogilvy, the cavalry by Field Marshal B. P. Sheremetev (thus the concept of the Big Regiment ceased to exist) . G. B. Ogilvy introduced brigades of 4 regiments and divisions of 2-3 brigades. In the autumn of 1706, G. B. Ogilvy entered the service of the Saxon elector; after that, the Russian infantry was headed by B.P. Sheremetev, and the cavalry - by Prince A.D. Menshikov.
By the beginning of the campaign of Charles XII against Russia (summer 1708), the infantry of the Russian field army consisted of 32 infantry regiments, 4 grenadier regiments and 2 guards regiments (a total of 57,000 people). The Russian cavalry in 1709 consisted of 3 horse-grenadier, 30 dragoon regiments and three separate squadrons (Menshikov General, Kozlovsky and Domashny B.P. Sheremetev). The Russian army also included garrison infantry regiments and landmilitia units. In addition, the archery regiments existed until the second half of the 18th century: in 1708 there were 14 of them, in 1713 - at least 4.
As a result, during the Northern War of 1700-1721, a new Russian army was created, built on recruitment. It became constant and regular, in which all the people of the Russian state were obliged to serve without distinction of class (except for the inhabitants of a part of the national outskirts). Simultaneously with the creation of the army itself, the management of this military force of the country was also developed, institutions were created that were in charge of the economy of the troops, the combat training of soldiers and officers, uniforms and equipment. By the end of Peter's reign, these functions were transferred to the Military Collegium with subordinate departments, which were headed by: General Proviantmeister, General Krieg Commissar (Chief Military Judge), General Feldzeugmeister (Chief of Artillery, Engineers and Sapper Unit) and the General Staff (General Staff) .
Infantry regiment under Peter I
The infantry regiment of Peter the Great's times consisted of two battalions, with some exceptions: the Preobrazhensky Life Guards Regiment had 4 battalions, the Semyonovsky Life Guards Regiment, as well as the Ingermanland and Kyiv Infantry Regiments - three each.
Each battalion had four companies, the companies were divided into four plutongs. The captain was at the head of the company. He had to "educate" his company militarily, and for this everything "military orders to be prudent". In addition to the commander, three more officers were supposed to be in the company - a lieutenant, a second lieutenant and an ensign. the lieutenant was an assistant to the company commander and had to “report in detail” about everything to the latter. The lieutenant helped the lieutenant, while the ensign was obliged to carry the banner in the ranks; besides, he had to "to visit the weak all day long" and intercede for the lower ranks "when they fall into punishment".
Among the chiefs from the lower ranks, the first place in the company was occupied by two sergeants, who had "a lot to do in the company"; the lieutenant had as his task to replace the ensign at the banner, the captain was in charge of weapons and ammunition, the corporals commanded the plutongs.
At the head of the regiment was a colonel; according to the charter, he should "like a captain in his company, have the same and even more first respect in his regiment." The lieutenant colonel helped the regiment commander, the prime major commanded one battalion, the second major the other; moreover, the first major was considered older than the second major and, in addition to command, had the duty to take care of “whether the regiment is in a good condition both among the soldiers and in their weapons, ammunition and uniform.”
Cavalry
The diverse cavalry of the beginning of Peter's reign (reiter, spearmen, hussars) in Peter's army was replaced by dragoon regiments.
The dragoon (horse-grenadier) regiment consisted of 5 squadrons (2 companies each) and consisted of 1200 people. In the dragoon regiment, 9 companies were fusilier and one grenadier. A separate squadron consisted of 5 companies (600 people). According to the states of 1711, the regiment included headquarters and chief officers - 38 people, non-commissioned officers - 80 people, privates - 920 people, non-combatants - 290 people. The company consisted of 3 chief officers, non-commissioned officers - 8, ordinary dragoons - 92.
Artillery
The artillery of Peter the Great's time consisted of 12-, 8-, 6- and 3-pounder guns (a pound is equal to a cast-iron core with a diameter of 2 English inches (5.08 cm); the weight pound is exceeded by 20 spools (85.32 kg) , one-pound and half-pound howitzers, pound and 6-pound mortars (a pound is equal to 16.38 kg).It was inconvenient for transportation of artillery: a 12-pound gun, for example, weighed 150 pounds with a gun carriage and limber, and was carried by 15 horses. constituted regimental artillery, at first there were two such guns per battalion, and since 1723 they were limited to two per regiment.These regimental guns weighed about 28 pounds (459 kg). - and depended on the caliber of the gun.
From the gunners and grenade men of the past, Peter ordered the formation of a special artillery regiment in 1700, and schools were established for the training of artillerymen: engineering and navigation in Moscow and engineering in St. Petersburg. Arms factories on Okhta and in Tula, organized by Peter, produced artillery and guns for the army.
Garrison troops
Garrison troops in the Russian imperial army were intended for garrison service in cities and fortresses in wartime. Created by Peter I in 1702 from city archers, soldiers, reiters and others. In 1720, the garrison troops consisted of 80 infantry and 4 dragoon regiments. In the 2nd half of the 19th century, they were transformed into local troops (garrison artillery - into fortress artillery).
Armament and uniforms
The armament of each soldier consisted of a sword with a harness and a fusee. Fuzeya - a gun that weighed about 14 pounds; his bullet weighed 8 spools; the fusil castle was made of flint; in necessary cases, a baguinet was mounted on the fusee - a five- or eight-pointed trihedral bayonet. The cartridges were placed in leather bags attached to a baldric, to which a horn gunpowder with gunpowder was also attached. Captains and sergeants instead of fusees were armed with halberds - axes on a three-yard shaft.
One of the companies in each regiment was called the grenadier, and a feature of its weapons were match bombs, which were kept by the grenadier in a special bag; the grenadier's fusees were a little lighter and the soldiers, when throwing a bomb, could lay their fusees on a belt behind their backs. The lower ranks of the artillery were armed with swords, pistols, and some with a special "mortar". These "mortars" were something between a fusee and a small cannon attached to a fusee box with a fuze lock; when firing from mortars, they had to be supported by a special halberd; the length of the mortar was 13 inches, but she fired a bomb, equal to a pound core. Each soldier was supposed to have a satchel for carrying things. Dragoons for foot combat were armed with a fusee, and for equestrian combat they were armed with a broadsword and a pistol.
Since 1700, the uniform of a soldier consisted of a small flattened cocked hat, a caftan, an epanchi, a camisole and trousers. The hat was black, the edges of the brim were trimmed with braid, and a copper button was attached to the left side. When listening to orders from the elders, the younger ones took off their hat and held it under their left armpit. The hair was worn by soldiers and officers long to the shoulder and in ceremonial occasions powdered it with flour.
The caftans of the infantrymen were made of green cloth, and those of the dragoons were made of blue, single-breasted, without a collar, with red cuffs. By measure, the caftan was to the knees and was supplied with copper buttons; epancha for cavalry and infantry was built of red cloth and had two collars: it was a narrow cape that reached to the knees and poorly protected from rain and snow; boots - long, with light bells - were worn only on guard duty and during a campaign, and ordinary shoes were stockings and blunt-toed greased heads with a copper buckle; the stockings of the army soldiers were green, and those of the Preobrazhenians and Semyonovites after the Narva defeat were red, according to legend, in memory of the day when the former "amusing" regiments did not flinch, with a general "embarrassment" under the onslaught of Charles XII.
The grenadiers of the guard differed from the fuselers only in their headdress: instead of a triangular hat, they wore leather helmets with an ostrich feather. The cut of the officer's uniform was the same as that of the soldiers, only sheathed along the edges and along the side with gold galloon, the buttons were also gilded, the tie, instead of black cloth, like the soldiers, was white linen. A plume of white and red feathers was attached to the hat. In full dress, officers were required to wear powdered wigs on their heads. The officer was also distinguished from the private by a white-blue-red scarf with silver, and the staff officer had gold tassels, which were worn high on the chest, at the collar. The officers were armed with a sword and in the ranks they also had a protazan, or, in the then-style, “partisan” - a kind of spear on a three-yard shaft. The grenadier officers had a light fusee on a gold belt instead of a protazan.
By the end of Peter's reign, the regular army had in its ranks more than 200 thousand soldiers of all branches of the armed forces and over 100 thousand irregular Cossack cavalry and Kalmyk cavalry. For the 13 million population of Petrine Russia, it was a heavy burden to support and feed such a large army. According to an estimate compiled in 1710, a little more than three million rubles went to the maintenance of the field army, garrisons and fleet, artillery and other military expenses, while the treasury spent only 800 thousand with a little for other needs: the army absorbed 78% of the total budget .
To resolve the issue of financing the army, Peter ordered by decree of November 26, 1718 to count the number of the taxable population of Russia, all landowners, secular and church, were ordered to give accurate information on how many male souls live in their villages, including old people and babies. The information was then checked by special auditors. Then they accurately determined the number of soldiers in the army and calculated how many souls, counted according to the census, are for each soldier. Then they calculated how much the full maintenance of a soldier costs per year. Then it became clear what tax should be imposed on each paying soul in order to cover all the expenses of maintaining the army. According to this calculation, for each taxable soul it was necessary: 74 kopecks for the owner (serfs) peasants, 1 ruble 14 kopecks for state peasants and one-dwellers; 1 ruble 20 kopecks for petty bourgeois.
By decrees on January 10 and February 5, 1722, Peter outlined to the Senate the very method of feeding and maintaining the army, and proposed to “lay out the troops on the ground.” Military and foot regiments were supposed to support them. In the newly conquered regions - Ingria, Karelia, Livonia and Estonia - no census was carried out, and here regiments were to be assigned to stay, the feeding of which was entrusted to separate provinces that did not need constant military protection.
The Military Collegium compiled a list of regiments in the areas, and for the cantonment itself they commanded 5 generals, 1 brigadier and 4 colonels - one in each province. Having received from the Senate for layout, and from the Military Collegium, a list of regiments that were to be deployed in a given area, the sent staff officer, having arrived in his district, had to convene the local nobility, announcing the layout rules and inviting them to assist the layouts. The regiments were placed as follows: for each company, a rural district was assigned with such a population that each infantryman had 35 souls, and 50 souls of the male population per equestrian. The instruction instructed the spreader to insist on the resettlement of the regiments in special settlements, so as not to place them in peasant households and thus not cause quarrels between the peasants and the inns. To this end, the spreaders had to persuade the nobles to build huts, one for each non-commissioned officer and one for every two soldiers. Each settlement had to contain at least a corporal and be at such a distance from the other that the horse company was placed no further than 10 miles, and the foot company - no further than 5 miles, the horse regiment - over 100, and the foot - 50 miles . In the middle of the company district, the nobility was ordered to build a company yard with two huts for the company's chief officers and one for the lower servants; in the center of the regiment, the nobles were obliged to build a yard for the regimental headquarters with 8 huts, a hospital and a barn.
Having located the company, the spreader handed over to the company commander a list of villages in which the company was located, indicating the number of households and the number of souls listed in each; another similar list was handed over by the spreader to the landlords of those villages. In the same way, he compiled a list of villages in which a whole regiment was stationed, and handed it over to the regimental commander. The nobles of each province had to jointly take care of the maintenance of the regiments stationed in their area and, for this, elect from their midst a special commissar, who was entrusted with taking care of the timely collection of money for the maintenance of the regiments settled in the given area, and in general to be responsible to the nobility as a clerk and an intermediary of the estate in relations with the military authorities. Since 1723, these elected zemstvo commissars have been given the exclusive right to collect poll tax and arrears.
The regiment, settled in this area, not only lived at the expense of the population that supported it, but, according to Peter's plan, had to become an instrument of local government: in addition to drill exercises, the regiment was assigned many purely police duties. The colonel and officers were obliged to pursue thieves and robbers in their district, that is, the location of the regiment, to keep the peasants of their district from escaping, to catch those who had fled, to watch the fugitives coming into the district from outside, to eradicate innkeepers and smuggling, to help forest overseers in pursuing illegal forest clearings, send their people with officials who are sent to the provinces from the governor, so that these people do not allow officials to ruin the county townsfolk, and help officials to cope with the willfulness of the townsfolk.
According to the instructions, the regimental authorities were supposed to protect the rural population of the county "from all kinds of taxes and insults." V. O. Klyuchevsky writes about this:
In fact, this authorities, even against their will, themselves laid down a heavy tax and resentment on the local population and not only on the peasants, but also on the landowners. Officers and soldiers were forbidden to interfere in the economic orders of the landowners and in peasant work, but the grazing of regimental horses and domestic officers and soldiers' cattle on common pastures, where both landowners and peasants grazed their cattle, the right of the military authorities to demand in certain cases people for regimental work and carts for regimental parcels and, finally, the right to general supervision of order and security in the regimental district - all this was supposed to create constant misunderstandings between the military authorities and the townsfolk. |
Obliged to monitor the poll tax payers feeding the regiment, the regimental authorities carried out this supervision in the most inconvenient way for the layman: a peasant, if he wanted to go to work in another district, had to receive a letter of leave from the landowner or parish priest. With this letter, he went to the regimental yard, where this vacation letter was registered in the book by the zemstvo commissar. Instead of a letter, the peasant was given a special ticket signed and stamped by the colonel.
The proposed separate soldier's settlements were not built anywhere, and the ones that had been started were not completed, and the soldiers were placed in the philistine yards. In one decree of 1727, introducing some changes in the collection of the poll tax, the government itself recognized all the harm from such a deployment of soldiers, it recognized that “poor Russian peasants are ruined and run not only from the lack of grain and the poll tax, but also from the disagreement of the officers with the zemstvo rulers, and the soldiers with the peasants”. The fights between the soldiers and the peasants were constant.
The heaviest burden of military standing became during the periods of collection of the poll tax, which was collected by the zemstvo commissars with the military teams assigned to them "for the Anstalt", that is, for order, with an officer at the head. The tax was usually paid in thirds, and three times a year the zemstvo commissars with military people traveled around the villages and villages, collecting fees, levying fines from non-payers, selling off the property of the poor, feeding themselves at the expense of the local population. “Each detour lasted two months: for six months a year, villages and villages lived in panic fear under oppression or in anticipation of armed pickers. The poor peasants are afraid of the entrance and passage of officers and soldiers, commissars and other commanders; there is a lack of peasant belongings in paying taxes, and the peasants not only sell their livestock and belongings, but also mortgage their children, while others flee separately; commanders, who are often replaced, do not feel such ruin; none of them thinks of anything else, as soon as taking the last thing from the peasant in tribute and currying it, ”says the opinion of Menshikov and other high officials, presented to the Supreme Privy Council in 1726. The Senate in 1725 pointed out that “by paying per capita money, zemstvo commissars and officers oppress so much that the peasants are not only forced to sell their belongings and livestock, but many also give away the grain sown in the land for a pittance and therefore must be forced to run abroad”.
The flight of the peasants reached enormous proportions: in the Kazan province, in the area of \u200b\u200bsettlement of one infantry regiment, after less than two years of such military and financial management, the regiment did not count 13 thousand souls in its district, which accounted for more than half of the revision souls obliged to support them.
Production to ranks and training
Promotion to the ranks in the Peter's army took place in the order of strict gradualness. Each new vacancy was filled at the choice of the officers of the regiment; the commander of the “generalship”, that is, the corps, the general-in-chief, and the field marshal, up to the colonel, claimed the rank up to the captain. Until 1724, patents for all ranks were issued with the signature of the sovereign himself. Production in the colonel's and general's ranks depended on the sovereign. So that tribal ties, patronage, affection and friendship would not lead people who were not familiar with military affairs among the officers, Peter decreed in 1714: for they did not serve in low ranks, and some served only for appearances for several weeks or months, therefore, such people need a statement of how many such ranks there are since 1709, and henceforth to issue a decree so that they do not write noble breeds and others from outside, which did not serve as soldiers in the guard. Peter often looked through the lists of persons promoted to the ranks himself.
In 1717, Peter demoted Lieutenant Colonel Myakishev "to the Preobrazhensky Regiment in the bombardment company as a soldier because he got that rank by intrigue, and not by service."
The tsar made sure that the nobles who entered the guards regiments as soldiers underwent a well-known military education, "decent for officers."
In special regimental schools, minors of the nobility (up to 15 years of age) underwent arithmetic, geometry, artillery, fortification, and foreign languages. The training of the officer did not stop even after entering the service.
In the Preobrazhensky Regiment, Peter demanded that the officers know "engineering". For this, in 1721, a special school was established at the regiment.
Having made the guards regiments like schools for studying everything that “a good officer should be in charge of,” the practice of studying abroad continued.
In 1716, the Military Charter was issued, which strictly defined the rights and obligations of the military in their service.
The results of Peter's reforms in the army
As a result of Peter the Great's transformations, Russia received a permanent, regular, centrally supplied modern army, which later for more than a century (until the Crimean War) successfully fought, among other things, with the armies of the leading European powers (Seven Years' War, Patriotic War of 1812). Also, the new army served as a means that allowed Russia to turn the tide of the struggle against the Ottoman Empire, gain access to the Black Sea and spread its influence in the Balkans and Transcaucasia. However, the transformation of the army was part of the general course towards the absolutization of the power of the monarch and the infringement of the rights of the most diverse social strata of Russian society. In particular, despite the abolition of the local system, the duty of service was not removed from the nobles, and the functioning of the industry necessary for the technical equipment of the army was ensured through the use of serf labor along with civilian labor.
The power of Russia was built on the talent of its people, the Orthodox Faith and the combat effectiveness of the army. Almost every Russian tsar, starting with Ivan III, contributed to the future great victories of Russian weapons.
cannon yard
The young Russian state under Ivan III found itself in tight isolation from the countries of Western Europe, which was carried out by Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, the Teutonic and Livonian orders, who did not want to strengthen Muscovy. To break through this "iron curtain", not only a modern army was needed, but also a person at the head of the state, capable of carrying out his plan. To match the Grand Duke was a government that acted "according to the laws of the enlightened mind." Attempts were made to improve the army, which numbered 200 thousand people in its ranks, "the arts that were most necessary for the success of military and civil" were called upon. So, in 1475, the Italian architect and military engineer Aristotle Fiorovanti appeared in Moscow, whom Ivan III appointed as the head of the Russian artillery. During the siege of Novgorod in 1479, the Moscow gunners showed their skill. In 1480, the Cannon Yard was built in Moscow - the first state enterprise that marked the beginning of the development of the Russian defense industry.
Pishchalniki
Under Vasily III, detachments of “pishchalniks” are created in the Moscow army, and artillery and infantry are gradually introduced into battles. However, the main force of the army, as in former times, was still the cavalry. Cannons were not considered very necessary in the field: cast by Italian masters for the defense and siege of cities, they stood motionless in the Kremlin on gun carriages.
Sagittarius and hollow cores
Ivan the Terrible attempted to break through to the Baltic Sea and unleashed the Livonian War. This required the king to constantly build up and improve the armed forces. Instead of the oprichnina army, which had lost its combat value, in 1550 a streltsy army was created, which began to receive a monetary salary, firearms (hand squeaks) and uniforms. Ivan IV placed special emphasis on the development of artillery: by the end of the 16th century, Russia had the most powerful artillery in Europe. In the middle of the XVI century. cannons with a caliber of 24-26 inches and weighing 1000-1200 pounds, as well as multi-barreled guns, were already being cast. Regimental artillery appeared. During the siege of Pskov in 1581 by the troops of Stefan Batory, Russian gunners used hollow cannonballs filled with saltpeter-gray coal powder, ahead of the countries of Western Europe in this by 60 years. For their manufacture, a special technical institution "Garnet Yard" was built in Moscow.
New military regulations
Vasily Shuisky tried to strengthen the army after the humiliating defeats inflicted on the tsarist army by the supporters of False Dmitry. Under him, a new military charter appeared in Russia "Charter of military, cannon and other matters related to military science". Here were given detailed information about the organization and armament of the infantry, cavalry and artillery, as well as data on the action of troops on the march and field war. Of the 663 articles of the statute, 500 are devoted to questions of the Pushkar business (the casting and installation of guns, the production of ammunition, their combat use, etc.). Much attention in the charter is paid to the siege and defense of fortresses, the disposition of troops in a fortified camp and in battle order, and the rules for command and control of troops on the march and in battle. The appearance of the charter contributed to the emergence of Russian artillery science. The Charter was a new stage in the development of Russian military-theoretical thought. In terms of depth of development and coverage of issues, it stood above many Western European statutes of its time.
Military-industrial complex
The first "Romanov" tsar, Mikhail Fedorovich, began with the reorganization of the "Rurik" military organization of the state. Its main drawbacks were the slow mobilization of the local militia, the lack of a centralized supply of ammunition and food, insufficient maneuverability due to the abundance of carts, a low level of discipline, etc. The identified shortcomings prompted the king to form regiments of a foreign system. The rank and file of these soldier, dragoon and reiter regiments was formed from forcibly recruited taxpayers from the taxable population, as well as volunteers - “eager” people from the free population. This business was dealt with by the Orders for the collection of data-bearing people and the collection of military people. The advantage of the Reiter regiments on the battlefield led to a consistent reduction in the archery troops. In the 30s. In the 17th century, the government of Mikhail Fedorovich made the first attempt to expand metallurgical production by using foreign experience and attracting foreign capital. By 1637, the Dutch industrialist A.D. Vinius built three water-working plants in the Tula region, which constituted a single industrial complex. In addition to military products (cannons, cannonballs, muskets), they also produced agricultural implements.
Conscription and rearmament
Alexei Mikhailovich continued to dismantle the "Rurik" military system. One of the important decisions aimed at increasing the combat capability of the state was the organization of forced recruitment into the army. In addition, Alexei I re-equipped the army from heavy and uncomfortable squeakers to lighter and more comfortable muskets and carbines. From the middle of the 17th century, military districts began to be created in the most dangerous sections of the border, in which the entire guard, stanitsa and sentinel service was concentrated. The increased production of weapons was carried out by enterprises and craftsmen subordinate to the Pushkar Order, the Armory and the Barrel Order.
Regular army
The eldest son of Alexei Mikhailovich and the elder brother of Peter I, Tsar Fedor Alekseevich, did a lot to strengthen the Russian army. Fate gave Tsar Fyodor only 6 years to transform his activities, but he managed to lead the exhausted Russia out of the bloody war with the Ottoman Empire and begin a radical reform of the army, making it 4/5 regular. Soldiers and archers continued to be armed with uniform muskets and edged weapons (sabers, swords, reeds and pikes). Both already had regimental artillery and grenadiers trained in throwing heavy hand grenades. Dragoon horse artillery and a very maneuverable Pushkar regiment appeared - the prototype of the future reserve of the main command. By the end of his reign, a wide variety of cannons were being cast at the factories of Vinius. The purpose, weight and caliber of the guns was also the most diverse. Guns were cast: for aimed shooting - squeaks, for mounted fire - mortars, for action with buckshot - shotgun mattresses, for firing in one gulp - "organs" - multi-barrel guns of small caliber. Appropriate technical manuals were also developed, such as: “Painting of squealing samples of the old and new factory” and “Painting of exemplary artillery guns with all sorts of supplies that are needed for that building, and why those guns became a price.” In the Moscow region, 121 blacksmiths produced 242 hand squeaks per year. According to the list of 1679/80, the army accounted for 62.2% of the expenditure part of the state budget.
The article uses the materials of V.A. Yermolov "Rulers of Russia and their role in the formation of the armed forces"
When the first infantry regiments of the regular army were formed in 1699, the staff of the regiment was taken in 12 companies (there were no battalions yet). The regiment had 1000-1300 personnel. Dragoon regiments consisted of 5 squadrons, 2 companies each. There were 800-1000 people in the dragoon regiment. In 1704, the infantry regiments were brought into a 9-company structure - 8 fusilier companies and 1 grenadier company, consolidated into 2 battalions. At the same time, the number was established: in the infantry regiments - 1350 people, in the dragoons - 1200 people.
During the war, the actual number of people in the regiments did not exceed 1000 people.
In 1706-1707. grenadier companies were withdrawn from infantry and dragoon regiments. Infantry regiments consisted of 8 companies; the dragoons continued to be ten companies.
The grenadier companies were consolidated into separate grenadier infantry and dragoon regiments. In 1711, a new state was introduced, according to which an infantry regiment consisted of 2 battalions, and a battalion of 4 companies. The regiment consisted of 40 staff officers and chief officers, 80 non-commissioned officers, 1120 combat soldiers, 247 non-combat soldiers. In total, there were 1487 officers and soldiers in the infantry regiment.
The dragoon regiment consisted of 5 squadrons, each squadron had 2 companies. The composition of the regiment - 38 staff officers and chief officers, 80 non-commissioned officers, 920 combat soldiers, 290 non-combatants. In total, there were 1328 officers and soldiers in the dragoon regiment.
It must be admitted that the staff of the infantry regiment was somewhat unfortunate. The regiment is weak. With the inevitable shortage in the war, its actual number was about 1000 people; the two-battalion organization of the regiments limited the possibilities of tactical combinations. A three-battalion organization would be more flexible.
The dragoon regiment was somewhat large compared to the infantry. On the other hand, the five-squadron composition of the regiment made it difficult to manage it, and the number of companies in the squadron (2) was clearly insufficient.
In 1712 the first artillery regiment was formed. It consisted of 1 bombardier, 6 gunnery and 1 mining companies, "engineering" and "show-off" captains, second-captains, lieutenants, second-lieutenants, conductors and battery masters *. Thus, artillery and engineering troops were united in the regiment.
* (Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire, ed. 1830, vol. IV.)
The material part was stored in the arsenal. During the campaign, the guns were transported on horses, which were taken from the peasants as needed.
In 1705, Peter issued a decree according to which regular mounts and horses were introduced into the artillery. This achieved a permanent organizational unification in the artillery of people, materiel and horses. In Western European armies, such an order was established only in the middle of the 18th century.
Peter I retained the regimental artillery that existed in the regiments of the "new system", each infantry and dragoon regiment received two 3-pounder guns. The Russian army, with regard to the introduction of horse artillery, was half a century ahead of the armies of Western Europe, if we consider the Peter the Great reform as the beginning of horse artillery. But from the previous presentation, we saw that the regimental artillery was already in the Reiter and Dragoon regiments of the "new system" even before Peter.
The number of regiments remained the same in peacetime and wartime.
In 1699, as already noted, new 27 infantry and 2 dragoon regiments were formed. To this must be added the already existing 4 regular infantry regiments - Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and the former regiments of the "new system" Lefort and Gordon.
Thus, by the beginning of the war with the Swedes in Russia there were 31 infantry and 2 dragoon regiments.
In 1701, Boris Golitsyn formed 9 dragoon regiments. In 1702, the Apraksin Corps was created from the regiments of the "new system" of the Novgorod and Kazan discharges, consisting of 5 infantry and 2 dragoon regiments. In the same year, 4 infantry regiments were formed from the former Moscow archers, and in 1704, 2 more infantry regiments were formed from the archers.
By 1706, 10 more infantry and 15 dragoon regiments were formed. Thus, in 1706 there were 2 guards, 48 infantry and 28 dragoon regiments in the army.
In 1710, the number of regiments was reduced to 2 guards and 32 infantry regiments due to the fact that 16 infantry regiments located in Izhora land were transferred to garrison regiments. The number of dragoon regiments increased to 38.
The development of the Russian army under Peter I can be traced in the following table (data are given only for field troops).
1 Of these, 5 regiments of grenadiers.
2 of them 3 regiments of grenadiers.
In addition to the listed field troops, Peter I also formed garrison troops. By 1724 there were 49 infantry and 4 dragoon regiments.
Having mastered the southwestern shores of the Caspian Sea, Peter I formed 9 new infantry regiments of the so-called Persian, or grassroots, corps to protect them.
Therefore, if we take into account all the formations of the regular army, then we can say that by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century in Russia there were 2 guards, 5 grenadiers, 40 field infantry, 9 infantry regiments of the Persian corps, 49 infantry garrison regiments, 3 grenadier dragoons, 30 dragoons field and 4 dragoon garrison regiments. In total there were 105 infantry and 37 dragoon regiments.
The staff strength of the combat infantry was: field 59,480 people, Persian corps 11,160 people, garrison troops 60,760 people. Total infantry 131,400 people.
The cavalry was: field 34,254 people, garrison 4152. A total of 38,406 people.
The entire combat strength of the army numbered 170,000 people, and with non-combatants - 198,500 people. These figures do not take into account the personnel of the artillery regiment and the central directorates.
The highest organizational units in the army were divisions, or generalships. The divisions included a different number of infantry and cavalry regiments, depending on the tasks facing the divisions. The composition of the regiments was also inconsistent.
In 1699, from the beginning of the formation of the army, three generalships were established - Golovin, Weide and Repnin, each of which included from 9 to 11 regiments. During the war, an intermediate unit between a regiment and a division was introduced - a brigade, which included 2 - 3 infantry or cavalry regiments. Several brigades made up a division.
Thus, Peter did not create an organic connection of all branches of the military. There were no similar formations in the Western European armies. They first appeared only almost a hundred years later, in the army of the French bourgeois revolution of 1789-1794.
The Cossack troops remained in the same organizational state, only their numbers decreased significantly as a result of losses in the war, after the betrayal of Mazepa and the uprising of Bulavin on the Don. Ukrainian Cossacks instead of 50,000 by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century, there were 15,000; Don Cossacks instead of 14,000 were 5,000.
The ratio of military branches in the army of Peter I, compared with the pre-reform army, has changed dramatically. In the pre-reform army, the infantry only slightly outnumbered the cavalry. She was not yet the main branch of the army. In the army of Peter there were 131,400 infantry, and only 38,406 cavalry, that is, 23 percent of the total number of troops. If we take the field troops, then even then the cavalry will be only 38 percent.
Thus, by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century, the post-reform Russian army represented a great force - there were 170,000 regular troops alone, and 198,500 people with non-combat troops. The Russian army was the largest army in Europe; the Prussian army only by 1740 totaled 86,000 people, the Austrian and French had about 150,000 people by the end of the first quarter of the 18th century. The Russian army became the most powerful army in Europe, not only in numbers, but also in moral and combat terms.
Peter I adopted the most advanced weapon of that time - a gun - into service with his army.
A gun (fusil) - a fusee with a flintlock was invented in 1640 in France. In circulation, it was much more convenient than a heavy musket with its long barrel. However, the range of the gun was less than that of the musket.
The latter had an aiming range of up to 600 steps, and the gun hit only 300 steps. The accuracy of the gun was also less than that of the musket. But the gun had less weight. It was much faster and easier to handle. The relatively small weight of the gun made it possible to attach a bayonet to it, which solved the problem of creating a universal firearm and edged weapons.
In the armies of Western Europe, the gun was considered mainly as a hunting weapon. They preferred to arm the infantry with long-range and heavy muskets that did not have bayonets.
The gun was appreciated primarily by the soldiers themselves. The military leadership for a long time did not want to introduce it into service with the army and defended the old models. At the end of the 17th century, the organizer of the French regular army, Minister of War Lavoie, even issued orders forbidding the use of rifles in the infantry, and demanded that army inspectors strictly monitor the implementation of these orders.
The best European armies at that time, such as the French and Swedish, at the beginning of the 18th century were armed with muskets, and one-third of the infantry was armed with pikes. Only a few fusilier regiments were formed, destined for a strong short-range fire strike.
The merit of Peter lies in the fact that he, earlier than any of his contemporaries, understood the significance of the gun in the conditions of linear tactics and boldly introduced it into the mass armament of the army.
Peter did not immediately manage to rearm the army. Russian factories did not yet know how to make guns. In Western Europe, there was no mass production of guns, and therefore it was impossible to immediately purchase the necessary number of them to equip the first formations of Peter's regular army. In the regiments besieging Narva, there were still many soldiers armed with muskets and even pikes. Only in subsequent years, with the establishment of the production of guns in Russia, the rearmament of the army was completely completed.
However, as a relic of the old mistrust of the bayonet, for the first time in the army, the infantry still had swords. Subsequently, they disappeared from service.
Peter's cavalry - the dragoons - also received a gun, having, in addition, a broadsword and two pistols. Such weapons made it possible to use cavalry on a larger scale than in the armies of Western Europe, where most of the cavalry did not have guns.
Dragoons of Peter, dismounted, could fight against the enemy, which consisted of all branches of the military. So it was near Kalisz, where Menshikov, having only dragoons, defeated the Polish-Swedish army, which consisted of all branches of the military; so it was with Lesnoy.
Dragoons were also in the Western European armies, but they made up an insignificant part of the cavalry and could perform limited tasks,
In relation to the cavalry, Peter also managed to choose the most advanced of all its existing types, capable of performing numerous tasks and corresponding to the conditions of the theater of operations.
Peter paid special attention to artillery. He created his own, original, perfect for his time models of artillery pieces. Peter demanded from artillery, along with firepower, great tactical mobility, mobility. Regimental artillery (3-pounder) had good mobility. The regimental cannon weighed 9 pounds.
Field artillery was also significantly lightened, but still did not have sufficient tactical mobility due to the unsuccessful carriage design. 6-pound guns weighed from 36 to 46 pounds; 12-pound guns with a carriage - 150 pounds. At least 15 horses were required to transport a 12-pounder. If the carriage device were more perfect, then only 6 horses would be needed to move such a gun.
The 9-pound mortar weighed already 300 pounds, its mobility was low.
According to the statement in 1723, the artillery included:
1) siege - 120 guns 18 - 24-pound, 40 mortars 5 - 9-pound;
2) field - 21 guns 6 - 8 - 12-pounder;
3) regimental - 80 3-pounder guns.
It should be noted that the regimental and field artillery in the statement, apparently, was not fully taken into account. According to the state, 2 guns were supposed to per regiment, therefore, for 105 infantry and 37 dragoon regiments there should have been 284 guns of only regimental artillery.
There are references that during the war, some infantry and dragoon regiments had more than two guns.
So, for example, the grenadier regiment of Repnin's division had 12 "screw squeakers".
A powerful industrial base allowed Peter I to create strong artillery. Russian artillery throughout the 18th century remained the most numerous and technically advanced artillery in the world.
Peter I paid great attention to the form and quality of uniforms. The infantry and cavalry were dressed in caftans, green for the infantry, blue for the cavalry. The soldiers also had felt hats, cloth coats in inclement weather, stockings and shoes.
It cannot be said that such uniforms were comfortable in the Russian climate. The soldiers suffocated in their thick cloth caftans in summer and froze in winter under cloth cloaks.
Peter put up with all this, apparently wanting to emphasize the difference between his army and the old, pre-reform Moscow army with new uniforms.
Russian army before the war. By the beginning of the war with Sweden, Peter I was in a hurry to rebuild the Russian army. In the 17th century it consisted of local cavalry, semi-regular archery troops and regiments of the "foreign system". The horse noble militia, poorly trained and undisciplined, did not show itself in the best way in clashes with European regular armies. The Swedes and Poles usually defeated him. The fighting efficiency of the archers was higher, but they stained themselves in the eyes of Peter I by participating in riots and political struggle. After the uprising of 1698 and the bloody search, most of the archery regiments were disbanded. “Not warriors, but dirty tricks,” the king said about them. As for the regiments of the "foreign system", under Peter's predecessors they were never able to become a truly regular army, since they borrowed only certain features of the European military order and existed only in wartime. According to a modern historian, it was "a new shoot on an old tree".
The beginning of the formation of a new army. The core of the new regular army was the "amusing" Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments, which were created for the children's and youthful military amusements of Peter, and in 1700 were proclaimed guards. At the same time, according to the new principles, the "elected" soldiers' Butyrsky and Lefortovsky regiments were built, led by the associates of the young tsar P. Gordon and F. Lefort. Among the privileged were also the Streltsy Sukharev and Stremennoy Regiments, who remained loyal to Peter during the rebellion - they also acquired the features of a regular army. During his stay in Europe as part of the Great Embassy, Peter hired a large number of military specialists who were to rebuild and train the Russian army in the European manner. Abroad bought a lot of modern weapons.
A set of soldiers. At the end of 1699, it was decided to recruit a "direct regular army." Across the country was a set of soldiers from volunteers. The annual 11-ruble salary and the soldier's "bread and fodder" content attracted many poor and "walking" people. (For example, in Saratov, which was then a small outlying town, 800 people wished to enroll in the army.) In addition to the "freemen", the army was forcibly recruited from the peasants. At the same time, there was an accelerated training of officers from the nobility for new soldier regiments. The restructuring of the cavalry into regular dragoon regiments by the beginning of the Northern War was not completed. The cavalry consisted mainly of noble militia. In a short time, more than 30 thousand people were recruited into the army in addition to the local army, "amusing" and "elected" regiments.
Swedish army. Apparently, the allied countries - Russia, Saxony and Denmark, as well as Poland - together could put up more troops than Sweden, which in the year of Charles XII's accession to the throne had a 60,000-strong standing army. But the Swedish army was perfectly trained, armed and combat-ready, and the Swedish fleet reigned supreme in the Baltic, which made the main territory of Sweden almost invulnerable to opponents. Recall that the plans of the Allies included the reconquest of lands and cities on the southern and eastern shores of the Baltic Sea. Denmark hoped to regain Holstein. The Polish-Saxon king planned to capture the fortress-ports in Livonia. Russia wanted to recapture Ingria and Karelia.
Read also other topics part III ""Concert of Europe": the struggle for political balance" section "West, Russia, East in the battles of the XVII-beginning of the XVIII century":
- 9. "Swedish Deluge": from Breitenfeld to Lützen (September 7, 1631-November 16, 1632)
- Battle of Breitenfeld. Winter Campaign of Gustavus Adolphus
- 10. Marston Moor and Nasby (July 2, 1644, June 14, 1645)
- Marston Moor. The victory of the parliamentary army. Cromwell's army reform
- 11. "Dynastic wars" in Europe: the struggle "for the Spanish inheritance" at the beginning of the XVIII century.
- "Dynastic Wars". The struggle for the Spanish inheritance
- 12. European conflicts take on a global dimension
- War of the Austrian Succession. Austro-Prussian conflict
- Frederick II: victories and defeats. Treaty of Hubertusburg
- 13. Russia and the "Swedish question"
- Russia at the end of the 17th century. An attempt to solve the "Baltic question"
- Russian army under Peter I
- 14. Battle of Narva
To which all the economic and administrative resources of the empire were subordinated, was the creation of the army, as the most effective state machine.
The army inherited by Tsar Peter, who had difficulty perceiving the military science of contemporary Europe, can be called an army with a big stretch, and the cavalry in it was much less than in the armies of the European powers.
The words of one of the Russian noblemen of the late 17th century are known:
“It’s a shame to look at the cavalry: the horses are worthless, the sabers are blunt, they themselves are scarce, without clothes, they don’t know how to wield a gun; some nobleman does not even know how to charge a squeaker, not only to shoot at a target; they kill two or three Tatars and marvel, bet on their success, but even if they put a hundred of their own - nothing. Many say: "God forbid the great sovereign to serve, and do not remove the saber from the scabbard." one
And the Brunswick envoy Weber, who lived at that time in Russia, characterized the local cavalry as "a deplorable crowd" ...
The basis of the local cavalry was the lower nobles and landowners (“sleepers, and stewards, and lawyers, and Moscow nobles, and residents” 1), as well as their armed servants. As a rule, noble boyars commanded these detachments.
In pre-Petrine times, detachments were given as a reward for wounds received and shed blood, to those who returned from enemy captivity, as well as to the sons of boyars who died in battles and campaigns.
The stewards and solicitors joined the ranks of the local cavalry not only because of the need to replenish the army after the losses suffered - the service made it possible to obtain a higher noble rank. One way or another, but between 1681 and 1700 the number of local cavalry increased from 6835 to 11533 sabers.
By order of the king, they had to come to the service not only "horse and arms", but also accompanied by their armed servants; it was also allowed to replace personal participation in the campaign by placing a hired equestrian warrior in his place.
| 1 |
Boyarin, commander of the township cavalry detachment. |
| 2 |
Horseman of the Moscow Posad Cavalry. |
| 3, 4 |
Horsemen of the Smolensk Posad Cavalry. |
On November 8, 1699, Tsar Peter began the formation of a new army on the Western model, and by the time of his death in 1725, Peter the Great managed to bring Russia into a number of leading states and created a military machine that changed the balance of power in Europe.
At the end of January 1700, two new dragoon regiments were created in the village of Preobrazhensky near Moscow, the organization and training of which were entrusted to two Saxon officers - Colonel Joachim Gulitz and Colonel Schneventz. According to the custom of that time, the regiments bore the names of their commanders, and for reinforcement and better training, these dragoon regiments were reinforced by more experienced cavalrymen from other units.
The number of the first and second regiments was equal to 998 and 800 officers and soldiers, respectively. These regiments had ten companies of 80 to 100 men each. According to the staffing table, the company was supposed to have a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, eight non-commissioned officers and two musicians; the rest are soldiers.
The companies were reduced by two into squadrons. Thus, the full strength regiment consisted of five squadrons. The squadron was commanded by a staff officer or staff captain (most of whom were Germans).
In 1702-03, three more dragoon regiments were formed, and the same number - in 1705.
The horse composition of the dragoon regiments was of very low quality. There were no heavy horses necessary for operations in close cavalry formation in Russia at that time. Undersized light steppe horses, which were issued to the dragoons, were burdened with heavy "German" saddles, ammunition, and harness. Even after several decades, the horses in the Russian dragoon cavalry remained so small that "the dragoons, getting off their horses, knocked them to the ground."
In 1705, a cavalry grenadier company of 100 sabers (soldiers and officers) was established in each regiment. Soldiers of the regiment were transferred to the mounted grenadiers at the choice of the commander.
By decree of March 10, 1708, it was ordered that from now on all linear dragoon regiments were named after the place of their formation (city or province), and not by the name of the commander.
The decree of February 19, 1712 became the basis for further reforms of the Russian army. According to this document, the number of personnel of the dragoon regiment was set at 1328 people, reduced to ten companies, with 1100 combat horses.
The list of the regiment included:
Colonel;
Two staff officers;
22 chief officers;
10 ensigns;
40 sergeants and senior non-commissioned officers;
60 corporals;
One timpani player;
11 drummers;
two trumpeters;
900 enlisted dragoons;
94 servants;
31 craftsmen;
100 baggage;
34 non-combatants.
The total number of the regiment in 1720 was somewhat reduced: in peacetime, the regiment provided for the presence of 35 officers, 1162 "lower ranks" and 54 servants.
These states remained until the death of Peter I in 1725.
In the winter of 1699-1700, when Tsar Peter established two new dragoon regiments, he was given a uniform"French style", that is, immediately upon formation, the Russian dragoons received uniform, which did not differ in essence from the attire of the dragoons of the European armies. At the same time, the local metropolitan and provincial cavalry retained their old “Russian” style clothing, as did the irregular cavalry.
As in the infantry "new instrument" regiments, the color of the dragoon caftans remained at the discretion of the regimental commanders. Their decision was determined for the most part by the availability of fabric of one color or another and the cost of "building" the uniforms themselves.
Cut uniforms was established uniform for the entire army, and both foot soldiers and dragoons wore generally the same clothes.
The caftan was supposed to be knee-length. Collar in the form of a very low stand or turn-down. Sleeves with large cuffs, with three cuff buttons. Cuffs and lining of caftan loops made of “instrument” (regimental) color cloth.
On the caftan floors there are two large pockets with "toothed" flaps and four small tin buttons, 13-16 tin buttons were sewn along the side of the uniform.
The camisole, which was worn under the caftan, had the same cut, but was narrower and shorter, and also did not have a collar and cuffs. Along the side, the camisole was fastened with 18 buttons; three more buttons were sewn on each sleeve, and four on the pocket.
| 1 |
Private Ingrian Dragoon Regiment. |
| 2 |
Private Horse Grenadier Regiment Kropotov. |
| 3 |
Drummer of the Ingrian Dragoon Regiment. |
| 4 |
Ensign of the Ingrian Dragoon Regiment. |
| Information: "Cavalry of Peter the Great" (New Soldier No. 190) | |
The main difference between the dragoon uniforms from the "soldier" was shoes. Instead of shoes, each dragoon received a pair of heavy black cavalry over the knee boots with square toes. On foot, the boots could be turned down.
Under the boots, the dragoons wore knee-length white woolen stockings, which were held in place by black leather garters.
The color of ties and capes-epanches in the dragoon regiments varied even more widely than in the infantry. Yet, apparently, epanches and ties of various shades of red predominated. However, here the choice remained with the colonel.
Leather gloves with leggings, fawn in color, were more often worn in horseback ranks. Rough gloves gave some protection from the blow of an enemy sword, but made it difficult to handle the fusee and pistol.
Hats, as in the infantry, were varied. Some regiments received black cocked hats, in others the soldiers wore cheaper caps ("karpuzy") with regimental color trim. Mounted grenadiers received grenadier miter caps similar to those given to infantry grenadiers.
There were no special differences between the shelves. The variety of colors and shades of uniforms in the regiments, and even in the smoke, dust and dirt of battles, led to serious embarrassment. There is a story about how in one of the battles, while lining up the ranks for the next attack, the Swedish guards dragoons found six Russian dragoons in their ranks, falling into place in their squadron: the soldiers confused their squadron with the enemy ...
Some idea of diversity uniforms Russian dragoons of the first decade of the 18th century are given by the following table:
And only in 1720, with the introduction uniforms new sample, the prescribed colors were clearly defined. From now on, Russian dragoons received blue caftans with a white turn-down collar and red cuffs, folded lapels and trimmed loops.
Under the caftan it was supposed to wear a light brown camisole. Short pants, the color of a camisole, were supposed to be worn over blue woolen stockings.
The uniform was complemented by red neck ties and epanches.
| 1, 2 |
Privates of the Line Dragoon Regiment. |
| 3 |
Private garrison dragoon regiment. |
| 4 |
Ensign of the Line Dragoon Regiment. |
| Information: "Cavalry of Peter the Great" (New Soldier No. 190) | |
The equipment of the dragoons originally included a black leather ammo bag. It was supposed to be worn on a wide leather sling (light yellow or fawn) over the right shoulder. The sum, thus, was located on the left, next to the scabbard.
Later, large ammo bags were replaced by small ones - carcasses, similar in appearance to grenadier carcasses. Lyadunki could be worn both on slings and directly on waist belts.
The second sling, over the left shoulder, was intended to carry a carbine. To fasten the weapon, the sling was supplied with an iron hook. Behind the bandage had a massive copper or brass buckle.
A heavy leather saddle of the “German” (Western European) type was placed on a saddle when saddling a horse. The color of the saddlecloth was set by the regiment commander (in most regiments the saddlecloths were red).
The saddle and saddle were held in place by a wide leather girth. On the left, a large leather pistol holster-olstra was attached to the front pommel of the saddle; The olstra was fixed with crosswise superimposed belts.
In addition to the girth, stirrups and bushmat were attached to the saddle - a leather glass into which the end of the carbine barrel was inserted. Thus, in the equestrian formation, the carbine was fixed on the right side of the rider with a sling hook fastened to the bracket and a bushmat located in front.
Peter I did not consider it necessary to form an elite cavalry unit, but his two commanders created their own escort units. These were the Life Squadron of Prince Menshikov and the General's Dragoon Company of Count Sheremetev. Both units were formed in 1704 and were more purely cavalry than dragoon training.
A uniform these squadrons as a whole was the same as that of the linear dragoons.
In the Sheremetev company, the caftans were red, and in the Menshikov squadron, the soldiers wore the uniform of the Preobrazhensky Guards Regiment (administratively, the squadron was assigned to this regiment).
In 1719, Peter the Great ordered the squadrons of Menshikov and Sheremetev to merge with the dragoon company of the governor of St. Petersburg (this company was formed in 1706 as a police unit of the capital). The new part was called the Life Regiment (or the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment).
| 1 |
Private Guards Cavalry, Life Regime. |
| 2 |
Major of the Guards Cavalry, Life Regime. |
| 3 |
Prince Menshikov. |
| Information: "Cavalry of Peter the Great" (New Soldier No. 190) | |
After a number of Cossack actions against the tsar, Peter I decided, as an experiment, to create a light cavalry regular unit and place it along the border with Austria. If successful, it was supposed to form several regular regiments on its base and replace unreliable Cossacks with them.
In 1707, the first hussar "gonfalon" (squadron) of 300 sabers was created. It was commanded by the Wallachian nobleman Apostol Kigich, and the hussars themselves were recruited from the Wallachians, Serbs, Hungarians and Moldovans who had previously been in the Austrian service.
This unit was deployed on the Russian border with Turkish Wallachia and served as a border garrison cavalry.
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