Tactical operation for the withdrawal (withdrawal) of troops during the Second World War, on the Soviet-German sector of the front.



YELNINSK OFFENSIVE OPERATION 1941

operation of the troops of the 24th Army (Major General K.I. Rakutin) of the Reserve Front (Army General K. Zhukov) on August 30. - 9 Sept. in the region of Yelnya during the Smolensk defensive operation of 1941 in Vel. Fatherland. war 1941-45. The purpose of the operation is the defeat of the Yelnin group of German-Fash. troops of the 4th Army (Field Marshal General Kluge). During the battle of Smolensk, the enemy forced the owls. troops by the end of August to withdraw to the line of Velikiye Luki, r. Vop, Yartsevo, east of Yelnya, r. Gum. In the Yelnya region, a ledge with a width of approx. 30 km and a depth of 26 km, wedged into the line of defense of the owls. troops. Aug 25 The headquarters of the Supreme Command put the armies of the West. and the Reserve Fronts the task of inflicting a series of strong counterattacks in order to defeat the enemy in the Smolensk direction. The reserve front was supposed to have troops of its lion. wing to eliminate the Elninsk ledge and further develop the offensive on Pochinok and Roslavl. Aug 30 The 24th Army went on the offensive. For 5 days, the enemy stubbornly resisted, introducing operational reserves. On the night of 5 Sept. units of the 24th army suddenly attacked the enemy troops and, having broken their resistance, forced them to a hasty retreat. On the night of 5 to 6 Sept. parts of the 19th shooter. division Yelnya was liberated, and by September 9. owls. troops advanced 24 km to the west and reached the line east of Plotka, the river. Stryan, west of Stryan. The Elninsky ledge was eliminated, but it was not possible to develop a further offensive due to a lack of forces. The success of the troops of the 24th Army was facilitated by the counterattacks of the troops of the 16th (Major General K. K. Rokossovsky) and the 20th (Major General M. P. Lukin) of the Zap armies. front to Dukhovshchina and Dobrynino, which diverted part of the enemy’s reserve from the Yelnya region. In the course of E. n. about. troops of the 24th Army defeated 6 German. infantry and one tank. divisions, captured 102 guns. For successful combat operations, the 100th, 107th and 120th riflemen. divisions of the 24th Army were awarded the title of Guards.

Lit .: History Vel. Fatherland. the wars of the owls. Union. 1941-1945, v. 2, M., 1961.

Elninskaya operation 30.VIII - 9.IX.1941

Soviet historical encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. Ed. E. M. Zhukova. 1973-1982 .

See what the "ELNINSK OFFENSIVE OPERATION 1941" is in other dictionaries:

Yelny operation of 1941 Great Patriotic War Date August 30 - September 8, 1941 Place Yelnya, Smolensk region, USSR ... Wikipedia

The Great Patriotic War Conflict The Yelnin operation of 1941 Date August 30 - September 8, 1941 Place Yelnya, Smolensk region, USSR Outcome ... Wikipedia

Yelninskaya operation 1941- OLNINSKAYA OPERATION 1941, coming. operation of the troops of the 24th A of the Reserve French, carried out on August 30. – 8 Sept. during the battle of Smolensk 1941 in order to eliminate the so-called. Yelninsky ledge. The Elninsky ledge was formed in the middle. July as a result ... ... Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia

The complex will defend. and they will come. battles and operations of the troops Zap. (Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko), Reserve (gen. army G. K. Zhukov), Central (gen. colonel F. I. Kuznetsov) and Bryansk (gen. lieutenant A. I. Eremenko) fronts against him. fash. groups… … Soviet historical encyclopedia

Dukhovshchina operation of 1941 World War II Great Patriotic War Date August 8 September 10, 1941 Place ... Wikipedia

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The withdrawal (withdrawal) of troops is one of the types of hostilities, as well as a military operation, as a rule, meaning that the retreating forces continue to maintain contact with the enemy. Withdrawal or withdrawal of troops may be carried out as part of a general retreat, to save strength, to take up positions that are easier to defend or to direct the enemy into an ambush.

Withdrawal or withdrawal is considered a relatively risky military operation that requires preparation so that it does not turn into a disorganized rout. Or in the most extreme case - did not produce a serious drop in the morale of the troops.

The Second World War, especially on the Soviet-German front, shows us some of the most beautiful withdrawal operations. These operations are divided into operations:

- tactical level- for example: the withdrawal of German troops near Yelnya in July - August 1941;

• - operating level- for example, the withdrawal of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht from the Rzhev region in the period from March 1 to March 22, 1943;
• - strategic level- for example, the withdrawal of the army group " BUT from the Caucasus in January - February 1943.

Soviet and modern Russian historiography deals exclusively with operations carried out by Soviet troops, of which there is not a single one that could be called a successful operation to withdraw Soviet troops. As always, we are not going to review the operations of the Second World War based on any Soviet sources.

The main Soviet sources of the Second World War are still closed, no one is going to digitize them, and most importantly, even if they are ever open, they will still require registration. The German sources of World War II have been discovered and digitized for a long time, any researcher can watch and study them.

Recently, since 2010, there have been some archival soviet maps dated 1941, and which, for example, show " Breakthrough of the Germans and the encirclement of the Bryansk Front"(Figure 1st). You can pay attention to the poor quality of the map.

Soviet military headquarters always and at all times (taking their continuity from the Russian imperial army) were distinguished by a special reverence for art, in terms of working out any cards. Because looking at this map environment”For 1941, displayed carelessly, it becomes surprising and incomprehensible, where did the artistic talent of Soviet staff workers go? Other Soviet maps depicted in Figures 2 and 4 are also not distinguished by the beauty of headquarters culture.

Figure 1st. Part of a Soviet map showing the breakthrough and encirclement of the Bryansk Front in October 1941 (the authenticity of the map is doubtful).

Figure 2. Working map of the head of the operational department of the Western Front with the situation on the front of the 20th and 24th armies, in the period from September 1 to September 6, 1941. (Compare it with figure 3, part of the German map for September 4, 1941 - the Soviet command does not know which German divisions were in the Yelnin ledge on September 4).

Figure 3. Part of the German map for September 4, 1941. Compare the data on the situation in the area of ​​the Elninsk ledge with the Soviet map, in Figure 2.

Figure 4th. Work map of senior lieutenant Antonov, data on the situation in the area of ​​the Elninsk ledge on August 22, 1941.

The data on the German units located in the ledge also do not correspond to the actual ones. Most likely, Senior Lieutenant Antonov was a scout if he uses a 1:100,000 scale map, in which case the result of the work of Soviet intelligence is very revealing. For comparison, figure 5 shows a part of the German map for August 22, 1941, please note that the numbering of the Soviet units fully corresponds to the Soviet map.

Figure 5. Part of the German map for August 22, 1941. This situation on the German map is more than a clear indicator of the work of their intelligence.

The tactical level of the operation to withdraw troops - the withdrawal of German troops near Yelnya in August 1941

On the outskirts of Yelna, the German units left on July 18, 1941 (Figure 6). On July 19, 1941, German units of the 10th Wehrmacht Panzer Division entered Yelnya (Figures 7 and 8). On July 20, 1941, the German Elninsk defensive and distracting operation begins (Figure 9). For parts of the Soviet army in 1941 (RKKA) the Elninsk operation was an offensive operation.

Figure 6. Part of the German map for July 18, 1941, the advanced units of the German 10th Panzer Division, 2nd Panzer Group (not getting involved in battles with Soviet units) are on the outskirts of the city of Yelnya.

Figure 7th. Part of the German map for July 19, 1941. Part of a map showing the general situation in the Smolensk region on July 19, 1941, the beginning of the formation of the Smolensk encirclement of the Red Army in July 1941.

Figure 8. Part of the German map for July 19, 1941. The advanced - the reconnaissance battalion of the German 10th Panzer Division captured the city of Yelnya.

Figure 9. Part of the German map for 20 July 1941. The actual beginning of the Soviet offensive operation near Yelnya.

The German defensive operation continued until September 4, 1941 (Figure 3) inclusive. German map dated September 5, 1941 (Figure 10), which shows that the Germans are no longer in the Yelny ledge. However, the Soviet troops still surround him, that is, this map confirms that the Soviet intelligence did not notice the German withdrawal.

Just think about it, from July 20 to September 4, 1941, ‒ 47 days, the Soviet command every day conducts an offensive in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Yelnya. Four - six attacks per day, let's average, let there be 5 attacks per day, so for 47 days the German units (on average) withstood ‒ 235 Soviet attacks (Figures 11 to 19 ).

Figure 10. Part of the German map for September 5, 1941. Please note that there are no German units in the Yelninsky ledge, and the Soviet units are still in their positions.

Figure 11. Part of the German map for July 31, 1941. Please note that the Germans use Soviet defensive positions to defend Yelnya.

Figure 12. Part of the German map for August 1, 1941. The Germans completed the encirclement of the Soviet units (begun in July) near Smolensk. Please note that the Soviet command does not attempt to help its own encircled units.

Figure 13th. Part of the German map for August 3, 1941. The general situation in the area of ​​​​the Elninsky ledge (and the Smolensk battle in general).

Directly near Roslavl, the encirclement of units of the Soviet 28th Army is observed: 4 rifle divisions: 135th, 145th, 149th and 222nd; 3 rifle brigades: 132nd, 160th and 162nd, as well as 5 tank brigades (222nd tank division): 6th, 65th, 55th, 129th and 133rd th.

Figure 14th. Part of the German map for August 5, 1941. The general situation in the area of ​​​​the Elninsky ledge and the entire Smolensk battle.

Figure 15th. Part of the German map for August 5, 1941. The position of the Yelny ledge is unchanged.

Figure 16th. Part of the German map for 23 August 1941. The general situation in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Elninsky ledge and the beginning of the offensive of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian in the direction of the settlement of Lokhvitsa (on September 16, 1941, one of the greatest encirclements in world military history, Soviet troops near Kyiv, will take place).

Figure 17th. Part of the German map for August 30, 1941. The general situation in the area of ​​the Smolensk battle. The Germans leveled (since July 19) the front line, in addition, it can be observed that on August 30 the Germans entered the settlement of Pochep.

Figure 18. Part of the German map for September 1, 1941. The general situation in the area of ​​the completed Smolensk battle. The German units completely leveled the front line.

Figure 19. Part of the German map for September 2, 1941. The position of the Yelnin ledge is unchanged, however, the German command no longer needs it. The risk that was offered at the headquarters of the army group " Centre"(Günther von Kluge) fully justified itself. From September 2, the preparation of German units to leave the Yelninsky ledge begins.

Now, seeing from the maps the situation in the Smolensk region, we will analyze three questions when studying the Yelnin battle. The first question is - Why did the Germans need the settlement of Yelnya at all? The second question - Why did the Germans capture it, as they say on the move, and then, in the course of leveling their own front line from north to south, they stubbornly hold it, and then, also quickly leave it? The third question - Was the Soviet offensive operation near Yelnya really as important as it is presented to us?

First question: Why did the Germans need Yelnya at all??

The settlement of Yelnya (Smolensk region) is a nodal settlement, not only a railway, but also a junction of ordinary roads in the Smolensk region, to the present. The next junction station after Yelnya (along the same railway line) is Spas-Demyansk.

On ordinary roads, Yelnya (through Dorogobuzh) has access to Vyazma (further on to Moscow). That is, Yelnya is not just a settlement, Yelnya is, first of all, a settlement that is of the greatest interest in terms of operatives. That is, the implementation of logistics.

But in the existing operation of the summer of 1941, Yelnya did not represent any tactical or operational interest, since several Soviet armies were surrounded in the Smolensk region, the 2nd Panzer Group pulled far ahead, it was the Yelninsky ledge that was at its peak. At the same time, the right flank for the 2nd Panzer Group, the 1st Panzer Group was located on the Dnieper in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Kremenchug. Between the troops of the 2nd Panzer Group and the 1st Panzer Group, a giant funnel was formed by the bend of the Dnieper River.

Second question: Why did the Germans capture him, as they say, on the move, and then, in the course of leveling their own front line from north to south, they stubbornly hold him, and then leave him?

An analysis of the German maps of the Soviet-German front of the Second World War for the end of July, the whole of August, and the beginning of September 1941 shows that the Germans most likely carried out the defense of Yelnya solely as a distraction operation against the Soviet troops. And what is most surprising is that the Soviet high command does not notice this German trick, does not want to pay attention to the ongoing German operations in the south (south of Kyiv), as well as in the north (near Leningrad). As a result, the settlement of Yelnya for the Soviet command turned not just into a goal, but into a goal for the sake of a goal. It is simply impossible to explain this from the point of view of normal logic.

It is difficult for us people of the 21st century to understand the need for everyday offensive operations carried out according to the same scenario, day after day. And every day for 5 - 6 times. The Soviet command, focusing its attention on the village of Yelnya, does not pay attention at all to the fact that on August 3, 1941, German units of the 4th Panzer Division, for example, capture the city of Roslavl.

But the most important thing is not even that. To the greatest regret for the dead Soviet soldiers during the Second World War (no matter how we treat them), the Red Army was commanded by not quite developed militarily " commanders", who did not understand at all the actions that the Germans carried out in 1941.

After all, the Soviet command was well aware that the initial stage of the German offensive in 1941 - it lost. Therefore, in the current situation of the ongoing German offensive, there is only one method of deterrence - it is called - defense. However, the Soviet command was not going to defend.

For the success of leveling the font line (and diverting the attention of the Soviet command from the events south of Smolensk), the headquarters of the army group " Centre"under the leadership of Günther von Kluge, offered to take a certain risk (in carrying out a distraction operation). Günther von Kluge knowing commitment and " love"The Soviet command to converging operations deliberately offered to hold the Yelnin ledge.

And so it happened, this ledge fettered the attention of the Soviet command, and literally diverted many reserves from other equally significant operations in 1941. By holding the Yelninsky ledge, that is, holding it with small forces against several Soviet armies, the 4th Army received a strategic alignment of the front line, and the 2nd Panzer Group developed an offensive to encircle the Soviet troops near Kyiv.

Therefore, the abandonment of the nodal settlement occurs with such ease, after the German units have leveled their own front line from north to south, which indicates that they were not tied to settlements. Binding to them was only in the case when one or another offensive operation took place.

Ultimately, the village of Yelnya was captured by the Germans in the same 1941, on October 4, 1941.

Third question: Was the Soviet offensive operation near Yelnya really as important as it is presented to us?

The Soviet offensive operation near Yelnya, which lasted from July 20 to September 4, 1941, was completely pointless. Successful, she became only for the reason that the Germans left her. Moreover, the Germans left it only after they completed other operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. In addition to wasting their own resources and pathetic explanations that " during that operation, the Soviet guard was born»Soviet historiography has nothing more.

However, all this born Soviet guard» On October 4, 1941, he was surrounded, and in the period from October 7 to 11, 1941, he was taken prisoner.

« Greatness» Yelninskaya offensive operation of 1941 Soviet « historiography” was created only to lead any researcher into a dead end. Second " purpose of greatness"of this offensive operation, so that people get the impression that absolutely no other operations, except for the offensive near Yelnya, were carried out in July, August and early September 1941 on the Soviet-German front.

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In the central sector in the Yelnya region, Army Group Center went on the defensive. There, the approaching army corps were transferred to the 4th Army, and both tank groups were again withdrawn from its composition. Until the last days of August, the Russians made strong attacks against the army group, whose front was arching in a wide arc to the east, apparently still in the hope of recapturing the Smolensk area.

In the Elninskaya arc, which G.K. undertook to liquidate. Zhukov, according to the Great Patriotic War encyclopedia, there were 6 German divisions (all infantry) - 15, 137, 78, 292, 268, 7. Zhukov had 8 divisions at his disposal, of which 5 were rifle divisions (107, 100, 19, 120, 303), two mechanized (106, 103) and one tank (102nd). First of all, while still at the General Staff, he timely assessed the danger of the Yelnya ledge, formed as a result of a breakthrough in mid-July by the troops of the 2nd German tank group south of Smolensk and the capture (July 19) of the city of Yelnya. From this bridgehead, the German command had the opportunity to strike at the flank of the Western Front and develop an attack on Moscow in the shortest direction.

The concept of the operation provided for a decisive operational maneuver - a two-sided envelopment of the salient in order to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping in this area with strikes from the north and south under the base of the Yelnin salient. At the same time, active offensive actions from the east were envisaged in order to forge it, dismember it and destroy it piece by piece. Despite the approximately equal balance of forces, the commander of the front troops managed to create a significant superiority over the enemy in terms of forces and means on the axes of strikes.

DIRECTIVE OF THE STAVI VGK N001253 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE RESERVE FRONT TROOPS ON THE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATION TO DESTROY THE ENEMY'S YELNINSK GROUP.

On August 30, the left-flank armies of the 24th and 43rd armies go on the offensive with the following tasks: to put an end to the enemy’s Yelny grouping, to capture Yelnya and, inflicting further strikes in the directions of Pochinok and Roslavl, by September 8, 1941, go to the front of Dolgie Niva, Khislavichi , Petrovichi, why:

a) The 24th Army, consisting of eight rifle divisions, one artillery division, one artillery division, with concentric strikes, destroy the enemy’s Yelnin grouping and reach the front of st. Bolshaya Nezhoda, Petrovo, Stroina; in the future, developing the offensive, strike in the direction of Pochinok and, having mastered the latter, reach the front of Dolgie Niva, Khislavichi by September 8;

b) the 43rd Army, leaving the 22nd and 53rd Rifle Divisions on the occupied defense front and the main forces of the army on the defense of the Spas-Demen and Kirov positions, two rifle and two tank divisions on August 30, go on the offensive in the general direction of Roslavl and , having mastered Roslavl, by September 8, go to the front of Khislavichi, Petrovichi; ...

On August 30, 1941, after a short artillery preparation, the troops of the 24th Army under the command of General K.I. Rakutin went on the offensive, overcoming fierce resistance, broke through the fortified defenses of the enemy and by July 6 created a threat to encircle the entire Yelninskaya group. The German command additionally brought four infantry divisions into the battle, but all enemy counterattacks were repulsed, although at times very acute situations arose. Fearing complete encirclement, it began a hasty withdrawal of its troops. Pursuing the enemy, our troops advanced 25 km, liberated the city of Yelnya, and defeated the dangerous enemy grouping. Only an extremely limited number of tanks and aircraft did not allow our troops to complete the encirclement and complete defeat of the Yelninskaya grouping of Nazi troops. In contrast to the private offensive operations previously undertaken in 1941 on various fronts, where passivity on the remaining sectors allowed the enemy to transfer forces from other directions and localize our offensive, in the Yelnin operation, offensive operations were undertaken to assist the 24th Army and ensure success. 16th and 20th armies of the Western Front in Smolensk and 43rd Army of the Reserve Front in Roslavl directions.

Our losses amounted to 31,853people, of which 10,701 were killed or missing and 21,152 people were injured.

Zhukov submitted a generalized report on the results of the operation to the Headquarters. On the basis of his Supreme Command Headquarters, the General Staff issued an order and directives summarizing the experience of the Yelnin operation with the aim of bringing it to the entire Red Army. To instill an offensive spirit, the Soviet Guard was established. In particular, the 100th, 127th, 153rd and 161st rifle divisions were the first to be awarded the title of guards.

The Yelny operation, despite the fact that it was not possible to encircle and destroy the German troops, became the first successful offensive operation of the Great Patriotic War on a front scale.

the USSR Commanders Gunther von Kluge G. K. Zhukov
Side forces 70,000 people
500 guns 60,000 people
800 guns Losses according to Soviet data - 45,000 people, including the wounded according to Soviet data - 17,000 people

Yelninskaya operation- Army offensive operation of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. It began on August 30, 1941 with the offensive of two armies (24th and 43rd) of the Soviet Reserve Front (commander - General of the Army G.K. Zhukov). It ended on September 6 with the liberation of the city of Yelnya and the liquidation of the Yelnya ledge. In accordance with Soviet historiography, it is part of the Battle of Smolensk.

Previous events

By the beginning of the operation, the German 20th Army Corps (commander Friedrich Matern) was defending in the Yelnin ledge on a front of more than 70 km in length: the 78th, 292nd, 268th and 7th infantry divisions. In total, about 70 thousand soldiers and officers, 500 guns and mortars of 75 mm caliber and above, and about 40 tanks.

To the north of the Elnisky ledge, the 9th Army Corps (G. Geyer) held the defense: the 15th, 137th and 263rd Infantry Divisions.
To the south, in the direction of Roslavl, - the 7th Army Corps (V. Farmbacher): 267th, 23rd and 197th Infantry Divisions.

The 10th Panzer Division was located in the reserve of the German command behind the Elnin ledge, and the 252nd Infantry Division of the 53rd Army Corps was located in the Roslavl region.

Side Plans

The idea of ​​the Elninsk operation provided for the breakthrough of the defense by counter strikes of the troops of the 24th Army from the north and south under the base of the ledge and the development of the offensive in order to encircle the main enemy forces. At the same time, it was planned to cut the German grouping with a strike from the east and destroy it in parts. The defeat of the Yelninskaya grouping was supposed to be completed by September 3rd. In the future, building on success, the army was to capture the city of Pochinok and on September 8 reach the line of Dolgie Niva, Hislavichi.

The ratio of forces in the zone of the 24th Army was approximately equal: in people - 1.1: 1 in favor of the German grouping, in artillery - 1.6: 1 in favor of the Soviet 24th Army. Tanks on both sides were used to a limited extent. Air support was not planned, since all combat aircraft of the front were transferred to the Bryansk Front by the beginning of the operation at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The Elninsk operation was part of a large-scale offensive by Soviet troops on three fronts: Western, Reserve and Bryansk.

To the north of the 24th Army against the German 9th Army (the Dukhovshchina group), the troops of the Western Front acted.

South of the 24th Army, the Soviet 43rd Army was advancing towards Roslavl.

Further south, the troops of the Bryansk Front (50th, 3rd and 13th armies) carried out the Roslavl-Novozybkovskaya offensive operation (August 30 - September 12).

The course of hostilities

Actions of the 24th Army

Operation results

The result of the Yelnin offensive operation was the elimination of the Yelnin ledge. This improved the operational position of the troops of both the 24th Army and the Reserve Front as a whole. The threat of an invasion by German troops into the operational depth of the Soviet defense and a blow to the flank of the Western and Reserve fronts was removed.

The Yelninsk offensive operation was one of the first in the Great Patriotic War, during which a strong focal defense of the enemy was broken through, his group was defeated and expelled from a significant part of Soviet territory. Despite the lack of overall superiority in forces, the command of the Soviet 24th Army managed to covertly create strike groups and achieve superiority in breakthrough areas in the main directions.

At the same time, the planned large-scale Soviet offensive ended in failure: repeated attempts by the 24th Army to develop the offensive did not produce significant results, and the actions of the 43rd Army were generally unsuccessful. In addition, it was not possible to fully implement the plan to encircle the entire Yelninskaya grouping of German troops.

The appearance of guards units, formations and associations in the Red Army is associated with the Elninsk operation.
On September 18, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, the 100th (Major General I.N. Russianov) and 127th (Colonel A.Z. Akimenko) rifle divisions of the 24th Army were the first to be awarded the title of Guards, receiving the names of the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Divisions.
On September 26, 1941, the ranks of the guards were assigned to the 107th and 120th rifle divisions - they were transformed, respectively, into the 5th and

In July 1941, after the capture of Yelnya during the attack on Moscow, German troops met stubborn resistance from the Soviet army. Unable to overcome it and move closer to Moscow, the enemy was forced to go on the defensive.

At this time, a plan for the Yelninskaya offensive operation was developed at the headquarters of the Reserve Front of the Soviet Army. The operation began on August 19, 1941. Due to the lack of military equipment and aviation, Soviet troops advanced slowly and unevenly in different sectors of the front. As a result, the so-called Elninsky ledge was formed, which created a threat to the Soviet troops in the Vyazma direction. From this bridgehead, the German command planned to deliver the main blow to Moscow.

Repeatedly during July-August, units of the 24th Army tried to level the front, but the enemy steadfastly held the line.

The chief of the Hitlerite General Staff, Colonel-General F. Halder believed that battles in the Yelnya region became a typical example of positional warfare. The relative calm at the front allowed the German command to replace mobile troops with infantry divisions on the territory of the Yelnin ledge.

By order of the commander of the Reserve Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, about units of the 24th Army, weakened in previous battles, ceased active hostilities in the Yelnya area and began preparing for a new, powerful blow.

The fighting of the Soviet troops inflicted significant damage on the enemy, although it was a time when the enemy still completely dominated the air and had a huge superiority in technology. The German formations suffered the greatest losses from our artillery strikes, which had a strong psychological impact on the Wehrmacht soldiers. Particularly destructive, both physically and morally, were the reactive guards mortars.. Thus, a battery of rocket-propelled mortars under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov moved through the positions of divisions conducting combat operations in the Yelnya region, inflicting terrible blows on the enemy. However, the Germans stubbornly rushed forward. During the next attack, the enemy tanks in an unstoppable avalanche went to our positions and almost came very close to the observation post of the battery of rocket-propelled mortars. When Captain Flerov transmitted data for the salvo to the battery, the radio operator, thinking that he had misunderstood the command, asked again: Flerov again transmitted the coordinates of positions that were very close to his observation post. During the volley, the dugout was shaken, the stereo tube was overturned by the blast wave, the earth fell from the ceiling and filled up the front door. The gunners, who had experienced the blow of rockets and deafened by the roar, with difficulty got out of the dugout. The charred corpses of enemies lay around, the whole earth was covered with craters from explosions, tanks were blazing with bright fires. Having called fire on himself, Captain Flerov did not allow the German tanks to break through to our positions.

On August 25, 1941, the 24th and 43rd armies launched an offensive. Having divided into three groups of troops - Northern, Southern and Central - the units of the Red Army were supposed to liberate Yelnya by September 8 to reach the Khislavichi-Petrovichi region.

On August 30, 1941, after intensive artillery preparation, the 24th Army began fighting for Yelnya. Each unit stood to the death at its line, even the wounded did not leave their positions. Mass heroism and courage were manifested everywhere, in every sector.

So, the soldiers and commanders of the regiment of I.M. Nekrasov, being surrounded in the village of Voloskovo near Yelnya, fought for three days, and managed not only to break through, but also to take possession of the railway station.

And the fighters of one of the rifle regiments more than once captured prisoners from selected Wehrmacht formations sent to the Yelnya region: "Great Germany", "Viking", "Fuhrer". During one of the interrogations of the prisoners, it became known that a convoy of 25 vehicles with infantry was to arrive in the battle area. The reconnaissance platoon was tasked with blocking the road along which reinforcements should pass.. Commander Calabun with eight fighters made their way behind enemy lines and took refuge in a fork in the road. After a while, cars appeared around the corner and began to descend into the hollow. One of the fighters deftly threw a grenade. From the explosion, the lead car turned around. The movement has stopped. The soldiers, taking advantage of the delay, hit the Nazis with machine guns. Panic arose, but the German officer managed to lead the soldiers on the attack. The forces were unequal. The platoon commander quickly made a decision. He quietly made his way to a frozen truck, on which there was a machine gun, and opened fire on the Nazis. The first burst killed an officer and several soldiers. Deprived of a commander, the enemy soldiers could not offer decisive resistance and began to surrender.

The German defense was broken through, the Soviet troops advanced 12 kilometers, but were stopped by the Nazis. On the morning of the next day, the enemy's counterattack on the flanks forced our units to retreat to the Desna, but there, in the Bogdanov area, the German divisions had already closed the encirclement.

Meanwhile, the enemy, thrown back to the Stryan River, launched a series of counterattacks that stopped the advance of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces.

The retreat of 5-6 kilometers of the 211th division, which operated in the Roslavl region, greatly complicated the situation in the main offensive sector.

The liquidation of the Yelninsky ledge was Zhukov's first independent front-line operation. Therefore, the delay in the advance of the Southern Group of Forces, which threatened a complete failure of the operation, forced the front commander to personally go to the 211th division and from September 1 to 9 take over the leadership of its military operations instead of the commander arrested for panic. Zhukov's decision "...to go to the site of the 211th division at night and restore order there ..." was approved by Stalin in their telephone conversation on September 1.

On September 3, after restoring order in the 211th division and stabilizing the general situation on this sector of the front, the offensive of the divisions of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces was resumed. By the end of the day, the distance between the troops of the Northern and Southern groups reached 6-8 km, German troops were threatened by the environment. autogyros - prototypes of the first helicopters. They were used to correct artillery fire and reconnaissance. Autogyros flew behind enemy lines to the partisans. They also scattered leaflets over the positions of the Germans.

On September 5, 1941, Soviet troops broke into Yelnya. In the forefront was the 19th Infantry Division. Yelnya was released the next day. The liberation of Yelnya was the first major victory of the Red Army over the Nazis in the Great Patriotic War.