Tallinn breakthrough. Tallinn crossing

Crossing the front line Such a transition is in any case a difficult task. If it is impossible to determine the location of your troops, then you should stay in place and monitor the direction of movement of enemy troops or their supply routes, for sounds and flashes,

2. New transition to the offensive The order instructed the army to go on an energetic offensive. The situation was portrayed as favorable: major successes in Galicia and on the front of the 4th Army south-southeast of Lublin. It was said about the weakness of the enemy in front of the front of the army. 17th Corps

Patrol ship of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet repels a German raid.
Photo provided by the author

The Tallinn breakthrough was one of the largest naval operations of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, carried out in its first period by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF) by decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (VGK), under the leadership of the Military Council of the North-West Direction (SZN). The purpose of the operation was the evacuation of the troops defending Tallinn from the deep rear of the enemy, and the withdrawal of the ships of the combat core of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to Kronstadt-Leningrad.

Despite the fierce opposition of the enemy, which led to heavy losses, this goal was achieved.

The crossing of the Yuminda mine-artillery position by 225 ships and vessels of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet during the breakthrough is an event that has no analogues in the world naval history. Rescue of 16,000 people from lost ships and vessels and transportation of 11,000 rescued from the islands of the Gulf of Finland to Kronstadt is an immortal feat of Baltic sailors. I conducted an in-depth study of this operation in 1998-2010.

Its result is presented in the military-historical work "Tallinn breakthrough of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (August-September 1941)", which is ready for printing.

Below are some fragments from it, including the lessons of the Tallinn breakthrough, which, in my opinion, are of lasting importance for the Russian Armed Forces.

RESULTS OF THE TALLINN BREAKTHROUGH

Scale of the operation

The duration of the operation is 11 days, from 08/28/1941 to 09/07/1941.

The task of the KBF to evacuate troops from Tallinn ended on 09/07/1941. Then the Tallinn breakthrough ended.

The depth of the operation (from Tallinn to Kronstadt in a straight line) is 162 miles (300 km).

The composition of the actually participating forces and personnel:

- 305 ships and vessels, including 211 warships and boats, 94 transports and auxiliary vessels (TR and APU);

- 57 aircraft - 41 fighters and 16 close-in maritime reconnaissance aircraft;

- about 40 thousand people of the Red Army (KA) and fleet: 20.4 thousand evacuees from Tallinn, about 9 thousand crew members of ships and vessels, about 7.6 thousand people of the Air Force units, several thousand more people - personnel of units, units and institutions of coastal defense (BO) and air defense, intelligence, rear, medical and sanitary service.

RESULTS OF THE PARTICIPATION OF SHIPS, VESSELS AND AVIATION IN THE OPERATION

On August 28, 1941, 225 ships left Tallinn, 62 were lost, of which 163 (72.4%) broke through to Kronstadt.

They were in the cover detachment on about. Gogland and were additionally sent from Kronstadt 80 ships and vessels. They suffered no losses during the operation.

The total losses of ships and vessels (62 out of 305) amounted to 20.3%.

Fighters of the KBF Air Force shot down a Yu-88 aircraft. Anti-aircraft artillery shot down a Yu-88 aircraft, an Me-110 aircraft, two Xe-111 aircraft were damaged. He-59 aircraft crashed while landing.

From August 5 to August 28, 59 warships, 47 TR and APU, about 60 aircraft were withdrawn from Tallinn, 18,947 people (including 5,450 wounded and 3,342 crew members) left Tallinn.

ESTIMATES OF THE TALLINN BREAKTHROUGH

Former People's Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov ("Combat Alert in the Fleets", 1971):

"The evacuation of Tallinn as a whole should be considered successful."

Doctor of Historical Sciences Captain 1st Rank Achkasov (doctoral dissertation, 1967):

“The task assigned to the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to break into the eastern bases was solved. However, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet failed to ensure the safety of vehicles at the crossing from Tallinn to Kronstadt and the evacuation of the garrison with the least losses.

Finnish naval historians Keskinen K., Mntykoski J. (Suomen Laivasto sodassa 1939–1945, 1991): "<┘>The Russians were successful in evacuating most of their troops and ships from Tallinn to the Leningrad area, where they later played a decisive role in the defense of Leningrad in the coming winter.

Professor Captain 1st Rank Alexei Platonov (“Tragedies of the Gulf of Finland”, 2005): “There is such a thing as “degree of defeat”, and so the loss of 50% of transports in a convoy is characterized as its defeat. Probably, this is the overall result of the Tallinn crossing.”

Strange score! Of the 192 ships and vessels that took people out of Tallinn, 34 (17.7%) perished. But the main criterion for the evacuation of troops is not vehicles, but people. 36% of them died during the evacuation.

Professor Captain 1st Rank Dotsenko [History of Naval Art, vol. 2, 2005] puts on a par with the defeat of the Russian fleet in the 2nd Rochensalm (1790) and Tsushima (1905) battles with the “defeat” of the KBF in the Tallinn breakthrough. But neither Vice-Admiral Prince Nassau-Siegen in the first case, nor Vice-Admiral Rozhestvensky in the second, completed the tasks assigned to them, and Vice-Admiral Tributs completed the task assigned to him.

Nassau-Siegen during the 5-hour battle lost 62 out of 152 (40.1%) ships and 7369 out of 14 thousand people (52.6%) personnel (dead, wounded and captured).

Rozhdestvensky in less than three days lost 34 out of 38 (89.5%) ships and vessels and 13.7 thousand out of 15.1 thousand people (90.7%) of the personnel (killed, wounded, captured and interned).

Tributz lost 62 out of 305 (20.3%) ships and vessels and 10,340 out of 28,573 (36.2%) troops in 11 days.

Facts and figures are clearly in favor of KBF! But the very idea of ​​comparing operations that are completely different in terms of tasks, content and combat means used is not clear either.

Dotsenko's estimates of human losses during the Tallinn breakthrough are very mysterious. Us. 170 of the book cited above, he claims that about 18 thousand evacuated military personnel died. Us. 172 this figure is reduced by him to more than 12 thousand, and on p. 426 increases again to more than 14 thousand people.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE TALLINN BREAKTHROUGH

1. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet, having made a breakthrough from the main base of Tallinn besieged in the rear of the enemy to the rear base of Kronstadt through the Yuminda-Gogland mine-artillery-aircraft blockade position created by the enemy, despite the heavy losses incurred in this case in people and ships, completed the task of evacuation of the troops defending Tallinn and retained the ship's combat core of the fleet, frustrating the enemy's plans to destroy them.

2. During the defensive battles in Estonia and during the defense of Tallinn, during the preparation and conduct of the Tallinn breakthrough, significant shortcomings appeared in the activities of the SZN command in combat control of the KBF directly subordinate to it, in organizing interaction between the KBF and the Northern (Leningrad) Front. A number of mistakes were made by the Supreme High Command, the command of the Navy, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and its formations.

The shortcomings and mistakes made had a direct impact on the amount of losses in people and ships during the Tallinn breakthrough.

Kuznetsov, a former People's Commissar of the Navy, recalled (“Combat Alert in the Fleets”, 1971): “Like many of my comrades, I, not allowing the thought of a deep invasion of the enemy into the territory of our country, nevertheless considered it possible that he would try to seize Libau on the move. That is why I put before the command of the Baltic Military District the questions of the defense of Libau from land. After all, just as the fleet is obliged to cover the deployment of the army, the task of army units is to cover the mobilization of naval bases. If the ground forces do not cover the deployment of the fleet, they will deprive it of the opportunity to fulfill its role.

The rapid advance of the Germans to Riga, Pskov and Tallinn naturally forced them to make extensive use of sea routes. The most suitable means for attacking transports was, of course, mine and torpedo aircraft. But due to emergency circumstances, the bulk of the aviation was aimed at the enemy tank columns moving towards Leningrad. In addition, she covered the 8th Army, which was fighting in Estonia, and bombed the German units advancing on the main base of the fleet - Tallinn.

Speaking about the battles for Libau, I mentioned that a common understanding of the interaction between the army and navy in this particular sector was not immediately achieved. Something similar happened in Tallinn. Contrary to peacetime plans, responsibility for the defense of Tallinn from land was immediately assigned to the military council of the Baltic Fleet, and the ground forces were subordinated to the naval command with a great delay.

Now about the ships and combat means. It has long been known that only a correctly “balanced” fleet gives the greatest effect in a war. It was the direct responsibility of the People's Commissar of the Navy and the Main Naval Staff to ensure this ratio of ships even in the prewar years.

Very painfully, especially in the Baltic Fleet, the shortage of minesweepers and minesweepers affected. All of us, the leaders of the fleet, understood that in the conditions of the Baltic shallow water, mines are a great danger. Theoretically, we expected this, but practically we were not prepared for the fight against enemy mines.

In addition to minesweepers, there were not enough anti-submarine defense ships and special patrol ships.

I experienced the Baltic Fleet and all the consequences of the weakness of our naval air defense systems.

The Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet noted (Report on combat control at the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in 1941 (1942):

“There was a clear duality of command on a general fleet scale in connection with the creation in Leningrad of a second command center (at the headquarters of the North-West direction) headed by the Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Comrade Isakov. While the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet focused on the situation in the area closest to him (especially by directly commanding the main base), this second center gave directives and orders not only to the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, but often directly to the command of the Kronstadt naval base , as well as the Naval Defense of Leningrad and the lake regions, which were in a known territorial separation from the main base area. As a result, the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet sometimes found out retroactively about measures being taken on its extreme right flank and in the rear, which, in turn, created an ambiguous situation and introduced unnecessary nervousness into the work.

Serious inconsistencies arose in relation to the operational control of the Air Force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. As the enemy advanced to the east, the KBF Air Force was involved with ever-increasing intensity in operations on the land front. Initially performing separate tasks, the KBF Air Force gradually switched over to operations on land, to the point that, by decision of the commander of the North-Western direction, they were operationally subordinate to the commander of the Air Force of the Northern Front and, based on instructions from the headquarters of the Northern Front, had to perform the tasks set by the command of 8 th army. Thus, there was a triple subordination (headquarters of the Air Force of the Northern Front, commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, commander of the 8th Army), and no one was involved in coordinating tasks.

The former commander of the KBF, Tributs, in his memoirs, reflected as follows (“The Baltics enter the battle” (1972):

“At the beginning of the chapter, I gave my explanation of why the mine weapons of the enemy could inflict such serious damage on us. Here, the list of these reasons should have been supplemented by one more - insufficient organization in rebuffing the enemy when he mined the fairways in the bay during July-August. It happened so because the commander and headquarters of the fleet had to give all their forces, energy, time to the “main direction” in the south-west of the theater - the defense of the main base of the fleet, Tallinn. At the same time, they missed the Gulf of Finland, its fairways, along which the supply of Tallinn and Hanko went, and along which we later had to break through to the east after fighting on land.

In this regard, I want to object to those comrades who consider the assignment by the commander-in-chief of the direction to the fleet commander of the leadership of the defense of Tallinn a necessary and correct act, for whom it is generally an axiom that military sailors should be in command in the defense of naval bases. And although this was not only during the defense of Tallinn, but also during the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol, I adhere to a different point of view on this matter.

It would have been wiser to organize the defense of Tallinn by sending here an army headquarters or a headquarters group with a combined arms commander at the head, who should have commanded the troops. The commander of the fleet must mind his own business.

Supplementing the above, one cannot help but focus on the fact that interaction with the Navy at almost all levels of command of the spacecraft was often understood one-sidedly: the fleet must help us without fail, but our assistance to the fleet is not obligatory.

Thus, the SZN military council was unable to organize the interaction of the Lenfront with the KBF during the Tallinn breakthrough so that the front troops would hold the territory for two days, on which the westernmost airfields of the fleet Lipovo and Kuplya were located. Nor was he able to reinforce the Air Force of the Fleet for one day with aircraft from the Leningrad Front.

The commander of the Air Force of the Lenfront, despite the directive of the Military Council of the SZN on the transfer of the KBF to naval aviation, which was under his operational subordination, ordered the use of naval aircraft of the Security Council on the land front, although according to the plan of the fleet, they were supposed to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields, acting against the forces of the KBF, breaking through from Tallinn.

The military councils of the SZN, the Northern Front and 8A did not take care to complete the evacuation of the civilian population from Tallinn in advance. These people, when landing troops on ships and ships, violated its planning, and during the breakthrough increased the list of losses.

SOME LESSONS FROM THE TALLINN BREAKTHROUGH

1. It seems expedient that the Joint Strategic Commands (USC), which have fleets (flotillas) under their direct or operational subordination, should be assigned the tasks of conducting armed struggle at sea (in the ocean) by the Supreme Command. OSK, on ​​the basis of the general tasks assigned to them by the Supreme Command, should set specific operational tasks for the fleets (flotillas) included in them, organize their implementation and be responsible to the Supreme Command for the results of actions at sea (in the ocean), including in remote areas in the interests of the war as a whole. They should also set tasks for formations and formations of other types of armed forces involved in combat operations jointly with fleets (flotillas) or in their interests at sea (in the ocean), in aerospace above it and on land. If the USC does not have permanent tasks for the fleet, without which it cannot effectively conduct combat operations, it does not need to have a fleet (flotilla) under its control. It is necessary to limit the USC rights to dismantle fleets (flotillas) in the interests of solving purely land tasks by removing formations and units of the Air Force and Air Defense, coastal and special troops from their composition. Such decisions should be taken by the Supreme Command.

2. It is USCs who, together with the commands of subordinate fleets (flotillas) and with the participation of the Navy High Command, are obliged to determine the requirements for the composition of their forces and infrastructure necessary to fulfill the assigned tasks. The developed requirements should form the basis of the program for the reconstruction of the Navy.

3. The development of requirements for naval types of weapons and military equipment, the development of programs for their production, the methodological guidance of the combat training of forces and the operational training of the command and staffs of formations and formations, and the training of personnel, of course, must be entrusted to the main command of the Navy. Personnel decisions related to the appointment to certain positions, with the assignment of the corresponding military ranks, with the awarding of state and departmental awards, should be made on the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

4. Features of the geography of our country require consideration of the feasibility of creating a USC in the Northeast (Pacific and eastern part of the Arctic oceans) and Northwest (Atlantic and western part of the Arctic oceans) ocean directions. It may be necessary to create three oceanic USCs: Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific. This should save the USC in the West, East and Center from the need to conduct combat operations of a completely different nature in several strategic directions remote from each other.

5. It seems inappropriate to assign to the commander of the fleet the command of an interspecific grouping of troops and forces to direct the defense of a certain territory with the bases of the fleet forces located on it. This is the function of the USC, and the business of the fleet commander is to direct its combat operations.

6. To ensure unity of command, the USC should not introduce the positions of Deputy Commander-in-Chief and / or Deputy Chief of Staff for the Navy. The USC Commander-in-Chief must resolve all issues of fleet (flotilla) management directly with their commanders, and all USC control bodies - with the relevant fleet (flotilla) control bodies. The commanders of the branches of forces (troops) of the USC should not have the right to give orders to formations, formations and parts of the fleets (flotillas) included in the USC.

It is advisable to form naval command and control groups at the USC from officers of fleet departments (flotillas), where it is necessary for them to have full-time positions. These groups are to be entrusted with ensuring the information interaction between the fleet and USC control bodies, as well as formalizing the decisions of the USC Commander-in-Chief on the actions of the fleet (fleets).

7. The composition and combat capabilities of the recreated Navy, as well as the Armed Forces of Russia as a whole, must correspond to the tasks set, and not to the capabilities of the country. The capabilities of the country should correspond to the tasks set by it, the implementation of which the country is able to provide with appropriate resources.

8. The system of the mobilization reserve of the Navy should be restored, including ships of the civil fleets, as well as personnel capable of using weapons and military equipment on mobilized ships (commandant teams) and manage convoys (convoy commanders).

9. It is required to carefully analyze both the likelihood and possible extent of the use of mine weapons by expected adversaries, and the readiness of the Navy for mine support and mine defense (AMD) of its forces. Based on this analysis, develop and implement a system of necessary PMO measures.

10. It seems expedient to restore all types of naval aviation in the Air Force and Air Defense fleets in quantities sufficient to fulfill the tasks assigned to the fleets, as well as to have the necessary number of anti-aircraft missile and radio-technical air defense units. Hope for the solution of the problems of the aerospace defense of the fleets by formations and units of the Air Force is built on shaky ground. Attempts to entrust long-range and front-line aviation of the Air Force with the task of combating enemy naval groupings and infrastructure, and supporting their own amphibious assault forces are good only for wars on maps. In reality, the Air Force will always have tasks that are not related to the fleets.

11. It is necessary to sharply increase the intensity of the combat training of the fleets, to ensure that in the course of combat training and combat service the total annual wear of ship crews in running days, flight hours of naval aviation in hours, the number of combat exercises performed by all branches of the forces of the Navy are at the level standards of the Navy of the leading maritime states, in which such are established by military budgets.

12. When acquiring combat experience in the fulfillment of international obligations in the oceans (seas), one must remember to conserve the technical life of ships, aircraft and weapons and military equipment, and also not to recklessly extend the acquired specific experience to all types of combat activities of the Navy.

In 1939-1940. The Soviet Union significantly expanded its borders in the west, new union republics appeared in its composition, each of which was given a certain importance in the implementation of the military doctrine that prevailed at that time and in the geopolitical interests of the USSR. If the "imperialist predators" (in the terminology of the time) attacked the Soviet Union, then the response to their aggression would be a war "with little blood, a mighty blow, on foreign territory." It was dangerous to doubt the correctness of such attitudes of the party and military leadership in those days.

Under these conditions, it seemed expedient to move the main strike forces closer to the western border, and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet1 was required to secure the right flank of the advancing Red Army. The basing of the fleet also moved to the west: well-equipped ports of the Baltic republics became its bases, and Tallinn instead of Kronstadt became its main base.

The attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the fleet, unlike the army, met in an organized manner. On the first day of the war, all enemy air raids on port cities were repulsed, not a single ship was sunk. Then things got worse. Under the onslaught of the enemy, the 8th Army of the North-Western Front rolled back to the east; in the first weeks of the war, the Germans occupied Liepaja and Riga. In this situation, the ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, with the almost complete dominance of German aviation in the air and with the ever-increasing mine danger, were drawn to Tallinn.

After a short pause due to the regrouping of forces, on July 30, Hitler ordered the resumption of the attack on Leningrad.

The main blow of the 18th German army was inflicted between Lake Ilmen and Narva in order to reach Leningrad and establish direct contact with the Finnish troops, another blow was against Tallinn. On August 5, its troops managed to reach the near approaches to Tallinn, and two more days later - to the coast of the Gulf of Finland to the west and east of the city and thereby block it
from sushi. Thus began the three-week defense of the capital of Soviet Estonia.

Tallinn was defended by units of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 28th Army, detachments of the Marine Corps, a regiment of Latvian and Estonian workers, a total of 27 thousand people, who were supported by naval artillery, coastal batteries and aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. By August 10, the advance of the enemy was stopped, despite the weakness of the defensive structures. On August 14, the defense of the city was entrusted to the Military Council of the KBF

On August 20, the Germans, having brought up fresh forces, resumed the offensive and reached the suburbs of Tallinn. In time, this coincided with their breakthrough to Leningrad. In view of the fact that the 10th SC fulfilled its task by pinning down significant German forces in the Tallinn region, in addition, army units and a fleet were required for the defense of Leningrad, on August 26, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to relocate the fleet and the garrison of Tallinn to Kronstadt and Leningrad. This decision is overdue. On August 27, the enemy broke through to Tallinn, where street fighting began.

On August 28, the evacuation began. The ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, merchant, passenger and auxiliary vessels left the Tallinn roadstead and headed for Kronstadt. This relocation went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War under the name "Tallinn crossing".

It cannot be said that in Soviet times the August tragedy in the Baltic was hushed up. However, very little has been written about the Tallinn epic. Even in fundamental scientific research, the defense of the capital of Soviet Estonia and the Tallinn crossing was usually given a few lines, at best paragraphs, and in the general context of the defense of Leningrad. The main emphasis in the description of the transition was made on the prowess of the Baltic sailors and on the preservation of the combat core of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. True, a trilogy has recently been released
I. Bunich "The Baltic Tragedy", in which the picture of the defense of Tallinn and the breakthrough of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet ships to Kronstadt is recreated in sufficient detail, objectively and accurately, and studies by a number of other authors.

Documents of the 3rd department of the KBF also speak about the last days of the defense of Tallinn, about the situation during the Tallinn crossing, most of which, until recently, were in secret storage in the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia. These documents provide an opportunity to look through the eyes of eyewitnesses into the circumstances of the defense of Tallinn, the passage through the densely mined Baltic Sea, as well as what happened on some ships during the passage, in a word, it is better to imagine the picture of events in the Tallinn section of the North-Western Front in August 1941 .

These documents can be fairly clearly divided into three groups;

The first group includes undercover reports drawn up in "hot pursuit" a few days after the arrival of ships from Tallinn to the Kronstadt naval base, when people felt relatively safe, when the shock from the experienced impressions had passed to some extent and it was possible to analyze what happened and recreate its comparatively objective picture.

These reports were compiled by agents of the state security organs. It seems that the same group includes documents written by other participants in the Tallinn crossing, who sent their thoughts on what happened in the Baltic on August 28-29, 1941 to the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

All these persons were specialists in one or another military registration specialty, they knew their business and therefore had the opportunity to professionally point out the mistakes made by the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the course of organizing the preparation and conduct of the transition. Their general opinion is that the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet organized the transition mediocre, thoughtlessly, and this led to huge losses in personnel and ships.

The second group is represented by reports, memorandums and other similar documents written by state security officers who participated in the transition from Tallinn to Kronstadt. Documents drawn up by Chekists, and not necessarily sailors by profession, paint an equally tragic picture, although the emphasis is mainly not on describing organizational failures and technical shortcomings, but on the “human factor”. In the documents, one can find examples of both heroism and self-sacrifice, as well as cowardice, cowardice, characteristic of super-stressful situations.

Finally, the third group consisted of extracts from the logbooks of the ships that took part in the passage. As a rule, these extracts cover the period from 28 to 29 or 30 August, i.e., from the moment the ship leaves the pier in Tallinn until it arrives in Kronstadt.

The value of such documents lies in the fact that the entire route of this transition can be traced literally in minutes and recreate a picture of what happened on each particular ship during the transition. However, relying on the chronometric accuracy of these records would be, in our opinion, reckless. You should not demand from the chief of the watch that he, after looking at his watch, make an accurate next record at the moment when he saw that a roaring Junkers dived into his ship, that a transport crowded with people was sinking nearby, blown up by a mine, when he I heard screams and pleas for help from drowning people.

The assessment given by the direct participants in those events often diverges from the official point of view. When analyzing these documents, one should definitely take into account the fact that they were written in the first days after the transition, when sometimes it was not an objective assessment of what happened, but feelings and emotions that prevailed. Hence the sharp criticism of the army and navy leadership, guilty, according to the participants in the breakthrough, in the ugly organization of the transition and in the deaths of many thousands of people.

What do the newly introduced documents into scientific circulation say?

In the intelligence report sent to the 3rd department of the KBF on August 31, 1941 and titled "The first report on the transition of the KBF from Tallinn to Kronstadt", the situation in the last days of the defense of Tallinn, evacuation, transition was summarized, its preliminary results were summed up and given analysis of the causes of the disaster. We will refer to this document several times in what follows.

In particular, it says that on August 22, 1941, Hitler's order, signed on August 17, was intercepted, demanding the destruction of the entire Red Banner Baltic Fleet at a mine-artillery position in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe middle part of the Gulf of Finland. This task was assigned to coastal batteries, torpedo boats, submarines and aircraft. Despite such a warning, no serious opposition to the enemy’s measures was organized: no actions were taken against his coastal batteries, some attempts to minesweep in the fairway turned out to be pointless, since after that the fairway was not guarded by anyone and the Germans again laid mines. The almost complete dominance of the enemy in the air was very acute.

In Tallinn itself, the headquarters and other naval institutions were overloaded with unnecessary units, for example, the financial department, with many superfluous employees. “A large number of political workers wandered around idle (as in the text of the report)," who were sent to the front just before the very end of the defense. A few days before the departure of the fleet, many more commanders and other employees, including typists, were called to the city. During the days of defense, most of the ships made voyages from Tallinn to Kronstadt and back relatively safely, that is, it was possible to unload the Main Base from unnecessary people and institutions in advance.

An intelligence report dated September 1, 1941, entitled "Summary of Tallinn Operations", states that several defensive lines were being built to protect the city, but none of them were ready by the start of military operations. In addition, they were erected without taking into account the experience of previous battles. On the Estonian sector of the front, tanks were a rare phenomenon, but the positions were equipped with an emphasis on capital anti-tank defense: gouges were erected, ditches were dug, which took a lot of money, time and effort.

At the same time, the construction of simple and cheap dugouts to protect against mortar fire, which was widely used by the Germans, was completely ignored. The infantry, fired by mortars, suffered heavy losses and retreated. “On the day of the withdrawal, it turned out that we also had about 50 mortars, but they were in the arsenal,” the author of the report wrote. - A few hours before the departure, 15 pieces [uk] were issued to our unit, but they could not be used, since<к>we received only mines, and the mortars with a car from the arsenal were stolen somewhere by the commandant of the city.

As can be seen from the memorandum of the head of the 3rd department of the KBF, divisional commissar Lebedev, which he sent to the people's commissar of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, the first defensive line, 180 kilometers long, began to be built 30 kilometers from the city. Local authorities, despite the pressure exerted on them, mobilized the population extremely slowly; in the first days, from 1.5 to 4 thousand people went to defense work. When the message came that the 10th SC would leave to the east, to join the 8th Army, these works stopped altogether. The main line of defense was a defensive line 10 kilometers from Tallinn, built under the guidance of the engineer of the KBF Kuzmin.

The personnel of coastal defense ships and batteries were transferred to the land front, 27 machine guns were assembled to arm the 10th SC, which was badly battered in previous battles, mortars were being prepared at the Arsenal plant, and armored trains were built (there were three of them on defense).

Judging by the documents at our disposal, the Tallinn garrison did not experience a shortage of weapons and ammunition. On the contrary, heavy fire of all calibers is noted in many documents.

The defenders of Tallinn did not believe in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht already in August 1941, that is, long before the defeat of the Germans near Moscow. For example, the Nazis broke through the line of defense several times and surrounded the advanced anti-aircraft batteries, but it was enough to send reinforcements of 50-60 people taken from the islands or distant batteries, leaving them with a reduced calculation for the enemy to retreat. “The enemy acted prudently and, at the same time, with an active rebuff, cowardly,” it was reported in an intelligence report from
September 1, 1941 - He was beaten in the area of ​​\u200b\u200b105, 106 and 794 batteries. We could have held on for a long time. Ship reserves, and coastal reserves were not fully used. One thing is clear, that if the people who turned out to be drowned were brought to the line of defense, and if they
I would have made dugouts for 1-2 nights, Tallinn would have remained in our hands for a long time.

In addition, our infantry did not yet have an offensive spirit in the summer of 1941. There were repeated cases when the enemy, swept away by the fire of naval artillery and coastal batteries, rolled back 10 kilometers or more, but no one thought to consolidate this success. From this, communication was lost, and for the parts it was a kind of withdrawal signal.

On September 1, 1941, the commander of the 10th anti-aircraft artillery division, senior lieutenant Kotov, brought to the attention of the Special Department of the KBF11 his personal thoughts regarding the defense of Tallinn, the circumstances of the evacuation and breakthrough to Kronstadt. He wrote: “There was no firm organizing hand in the defense of the Main B[aza]. Powerful fire weapons, naval and anti-aircraft artillery were not fully used, and often the latter were inactive due to the lack of communication and interaction between the various branches of the military, and especially the command of the army and artillery [Illerian] units.<…>The lack of communication and interaction led to the shelling of their troops. Intelligence worked badly."

In the twentieth of August, the Germans launched a decisive offensive against Tallinn. For three days of fighting, the 10th SC lost 6 thousand people out of 18 thousand, that is, a third of the personnel. Parts of Colonel Kostikov and Captain Pasternak were surrounded and left the calculation of defense. The 16th Rifle Division rolled back to Tallinn, and only the demand of the 3rd Division of the KBF to the divisional commander Colonel Borodulin to put the units in order and occupy the abandoned lines - or he would be shot - forced him to return to his positions.

As mentioned above, in connection with the general deterioration of the situation on the North-Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to evacuate the fleet and garrison from Tallinn to Kronstadt and Leningrad. The headquarters of the 10th SC and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet developed an evacuation plan approved by the Front's Military Council. The main idea was to pin down the Germans at the line of defense until night, intensified artillery fire at the time of landing personnel on ships while holding back the enemy with cover units.

The equipment of ships for the removal of personnel, equipment, ammunition and equipment began only on August 27, when street fighting was already going on in Tallinn. An undercover report dated August 31, 1941 shows how, for example, people and goods were loaded onto the Balkhash transport ship.

The news about the loading of the hospital was received on the night of August 28 and came as a complete surprise to everyone. The loading itself was extremely disorganized, without a single boss, so everyone loaded what they wanted: bicycles, chests, suitcases, and even beer. The personnel (about 4 thousand people) occupied the entire upper deck, and so densely that it was impossible to sit. When during the transition it became necessary to fire at the enemy, due to crowding, 9 people were injured, two of whom died. These injuries were caused by friendly fire.

The withdrawal of people from positions for boarding ships was carried out in an extremely disorganized manner. On August 30, 1941, the head of the 6th department of the 3rd department of the KBF, senior political instructor Karpov, reported to his leadership that as a result of ill-conceived withdrawal routes, the absence of "beacons" and signs, a large number of military personnel were sent to Bekker harbor, where there were no more transports. Karpov himself sent separate groups of fighters to the Mine Harbor, where the landing took place, and with the last group boarded the Neptune rescue vessel assigned to EPRON. four boarded the Neptune, only two arrived in Kronstadt. The fate of the other employees of the department is not traced according to Karpov's report.

The intelligence report dated August 31, 1941 also testifies to miscalculations in the organization of the loading of personnel: “The boarding of ships in Tallinn was not organized, unplanned and so hasty that it is now extremely difficult to establish not only the number and placement of those who retreated on the ships and the dead, but and make sure that everyone is evacuated from Tallinn and the islands. Many commanders do not deny, but assert that a fairly significant part of the people, especially those engaged in barricade battles, remained in Tallinn. Moreover, in the first days after arriving in Kronstadt, there was not even an exact number of ships that left Tallinn: some commanders called 163, others - 190 units.

The ill-conceived evacuation led to the fact that military equipment and vehicles had to be abandoned. So, when it became necessary to evacuate the personnel and materiel of the 3rd and 4th anti-aircraft defense regiments of the Main Base of the KBF, who distinguished themselves in the defense of Tallinn, not barges were submitted for loading, but transports that, due to shallow water, could not come closer to the pier 1000-1500 meters. Therefore, almost all the material part had to be either destroyed or abandoned. Due to the large wave, the boats for the personnel did not come for a long time, although the hour of departure had long passed. The idea of ​​\u200b\u200bcreating a partisan detachment had already taken shape, but then a boat came to the rescue, which transported everyone in 3-4 hours, since the “German slipped” (as in the text of the report) and made it possible to safely dive.

The chaos that prevailed during the evacuation is also confirmed by the commander of the 10th anti-aircraft artillery division, senior lieutenant Kotov, whose personal considerations, addressed to the 3rd division of the KBF, we have already quoted. For example, a forgotten group of fighters led by Lieutenant Lopaev until August 28 held back the onslaught of the enemy and left their positions only when it became known that all the neighbors and bosses had left. Kotov himself was ordered to concentrate his personnel and materiel, first at Wimsey Wharf, then at Becker Harbor. Kotov delivered the division's materiel to Bekker Harbor, “but there was nothing to load. The owner was not. Huge crowds of Red Army men, Red Navy men and commanders were subjected to panic. There were no bosses. Large crowds headed for the breakthroughs (I know from conversations that many of them returned after seeing the transport at the Merchant's Wharf). The material part of the guns, instruments, vehicles, horses and many other valuable property remained at the pier in large quantities. It is known from conversations that part of the personal [personal] staff also remained unloaded.”

The panic that arose as a result of the confusion, the lack of firm leadership in the evacuation led to the fact that armed crowds of Red Army and Red Navy men rushed about on the piers, seeing no way out. Detachments were spontaneously formed here, which, under the command of “impostor” commanders, left for Leningrad by land. One such huge crowd, heading to the center of the city for a breakthrough to Leningrad, was seen in the early morning of August 28 by the head of the 4th department of the 3rd department of the KBF, battalion commissar Gorshkov. You can look at the map where Leningrad is and where Tallinn is, and it will become clear whether these crowds could reach their goal.

So, it was not possible to load all the soldiers and commanders onto the ships, not to mention the materiel, which had to be destroyed or abandoned.

While loading was in progress, the Kirov cruiser, two leaders and six new destroyers fired continuously, hitting the enemy's firing points and preventing him from accumulating forces on the outskirts of the city.

The materials at our disposal do not allow us to recreate the full picture of the August tragedy in the Baltic. At the same time, the main circumstances of the transition can be traced quite clearly. The opinion of the surviving participants agrees on one thing: the passage of ships from Tallinn to Kronstadt was organized mediocre, if not criminally. Once again, we will make a reservation that the documents were drawn up in the first days after the transition, when the shock from the experienced upheavals had not yet passed.

In addition to the shortcomings that occurred during the preparation and conduct of the evacuation, the documents make it possible to highlight the main mistakes made by the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and led to catastrophic consequences.

In accordance with the developed warrant, the ships were to follow from Tallinn to Kronstadt in four (in some documents - three) caravans. Each caravan was guarded by MO boats, torpedo boats, patrol ships and minesweepers.

The fleet leaving Tallinn included warships (the Kirov cruiser, destroyers, patrol boats, minesweepers, submarines, hunting boats, etc.) and many civilian ships: passenger ships, icebreakers, tugboats, tankers, etc. , hastily adapted for transports. These two groups of ships differed sharply in speed, armament, mine protection, which affected almost immediately upon going to sea.

At the head of the caravans, minesweepers were to go, followed by transports crowded with soldiers of the Tallinn garrison, refugees and equipment, and the last - warships covering the withdrawal. The senior command staff of the KBF was mainly on the cruiser "Kirov".

After receiving the signal to withdraw, the simultaneous movement of all caravans began. In order to take their places, according to the order, the ships of the 1st and 2nd caravans were forced to leave the main fairway and overtake the slowly moving transports.

The fleet began to leave the Tallinn raid on the afternoon of August 28, 1941, although the loading of people, ammunition and materiel was basically completed in the morning. In the first half of the day in Tallinn there was cloudy weather, which interfered with the actions of enemy aircraft, which, we recall, reigned supreme in the air. In addition, it was possible during the daytime to force the area of ​​​​continuous minefields (Yuminda-Nina) and still before dark to reach the island of Gogland, which was in our hands.

The first few hours of the hike were relatively calm, but then all hell broke loose.

The minesweepers that went ahead cut mines, which either exploded in the trawls, disabling them, or floated to the surface. In the latter case, they were supposed to be shot, and this was not always done. The strip swept by the minesweepers turned out to be narrow. Many cases have been noted when a ship, having turned away from one mine, was blown up by another and sank in a matter of minutes. Higher-speed warships, overtaking transports and minesweepers, went to unswept places and perished.

So, for example, the division of old destroyers, on the orders of the commander of the detachment, Rear Admiral Rall, in order to overtake the transports, turned left and went along the unswept lane. The assistant commander of minesweeper No. 44, Lieutenant Dukhno, warned the admiral by megaphone that his ships were moving through a minefield and could be blown up, but the latter, having reached speeds of up to 16 knots, continued to move. Soon, the old destroyers Kalinin, Volodarsky and Artem hit mines one after another and sank.

When the sky cleared up, enemy aircraft came into action.

If the warships, which had anti-aircraft installations, met the Junkers with dense barrage fire, which interfered with at least aimed bombing, then civilian ships could only counter the raids with light small arms fire. Receiving severe damage from bombs and mines, almost defenseless transports, one after another, went under water.

The participants of the breakthrough saw the first Soviet fighters only the next day, already on the way to Kronstadt, which gave them reason to sneer gloomily: “We went from Tallinn to Kronstadt under the cover of German dive bombers.”

According to the general opinion of the surviving participants in the transition, the situation got out of control of the KBF command literally from the first hours after leaving the Tallinn raid. Each ship was actually left to the will of the captain, crew and passengers, and on some ships the principle of "save yourself who can" prevailed. To the credit of most other commanders, it should be said that even in those inhuman conditions they managed to organize anti-aircraft and mine defense, the struggle for the survivability of ships, and the salvation of people.

There were cases when ship commanders refused to take on board people from sinking ships, explaining that their ships were overloaded, and began to provide assistance only at the threat of using weapons or when warning fire was opened on them.

On the same ship one could see examples of cowardice and heroism.

The already mentioned destroyer Kalinin, which received several holes in the hull, kept afloat for several hours, slowly sinking into the sea. The first to leave the sinking ship, contrary to the charters, traditions, and elementary requirements of naval ethics, were its commander, captain of the 3rd rank, Stasov, and the military commissar, battalion commissar Shishov. Stasov, having moved 100-150 meters from the side of the boat and, apparently, feeling safe, began to shout: “Assistant, save people!” Shishov "like taking water in his mouth" (so in the text of the report). Apparently, the military commissar was in a complete stupor from what was happening. At the same time, assistant commander captain-lieutenant Russin, military technician Yurchenko, senior lieutenant Mironov, head of the supply service Chekluev remained on the doomed ship to the last, carried out the wounded, helped find means of rescue and showed passengers how to use them. They went into the water along with the rest of the personnel.

After an air bomb hit the transport "Kazakhstan" and a fire broke out, Major General Zashikhin, who was on the ship, not only did not take any measures to put out the fire and stop the panic that had begun, but got off on the first boat that approached the board and left the transport. Following him were the cries of the Red Army and Red Navy: "Open fire on Zashikhin leaving on the boat!" Having come to their senses, people began to carry water with helmets (!) Overboard and put out the fire. "Kazakhstan" came under its own power
to Kronstadt.

The agent reports, reports, memorandums and memos mentioned above were drawn up with an emotionality that is not typical for such documents. Moreover, emotionality is not typical for ship's logs. Their dry, official lines visibly show what a nightmare the participants in the Tallinn crossing had to go through. Here is what is recorded, for example, in the logbook of the destroyer "Severe" for August 28, 1941:

“18.20. Ahead, a large transport filled with people blew up on the course.

18.22. The blown up transport together with people went under water.

18.25. Ahead of the course, a transport with people was blown up.

18.30. The blown up transport with people went under water.”27

In total, in 10 minutes two transports “filled with people” go under water. Such entries are found in almost every ship's log.

Evening darkness reduced the air danger, but the mine danger increased many times over. I continue quoting the logbook of the destroyer "Severe":

“19.30. Ahead on the course, some kind of tug-type ship was blown up.

20.25. Ahead of us, a large submarine exploded.

20.26. The smoke cleared, and ahead, where the submarine had been, was the flat surface of the sea.

20.35. A colossal column of fire and smoke appeared ahead of the Kirov cruiser.

20.40. Behind, in the area where the Veronia should approximately be, a colossal column of fire and smoke appeared.

20.50. On the right, overtaking, there was some small transport. The explosion is black smoke.

20.51. The black smoke cleared and there was no transport.

22.10. Right on the nose was blown up transport.

22.58. On the right side, a transport was blown up by a mine.

23.24. A ship has blown up."

There are no names of the dead ships in the Surovoy logbook. At the same time, according to our documents, it is possible to draw a picture of the death of some specific ships.

For example, the Veroniya transport, which had on board a significant part of the management of the 10th Rifle Corps, as well as soldiers and commanders of various parts of the garrison, left the Tallinn raid at about 12 noon on August 28 and headed for Leningrad. At first, the navigation was relatively calm, attacks by individual enemy aircraft were repulsed by anti-aircraft fire from transports and guard ships. This continued until the evening, when the Junkers-88 dropped a series of bombs on the Veronia, one of which exploded next to the side of the ship and damaged the engine room. "Veronia" has lost its course. From the released vapors that enveloped the transport, a panic began on the ship, many rushed into the sea. Soon, however, it became clear that the Veronia could keep afloat on its own. The panic subsided, those remaining on board took up the rescue of those in the water. Not everyone was able to get on board, in particular, the prosecutor of the 10th rifle corps, Starostin, drowned. The rescue ship "Saturn", on which there were about 800 people, took the "Veronia" in tow, but, after passing several cables, was blown up by a mine. People from the "Saturn" went partly to the "Veronia", partly to some kind of tugboat. This tugboat, loaded to the limit, was soon itself torpedoed and immediately sank. Of the 800 people aboard the Saturn, only a small number survived.

Approximately at 22 o'clock, the Veronia was blown up again (according to other sources, it was torpedoed) and sank within 1-2 minutes. An eyewitness to the death of the transport, Deputy Head of the Special Department of the 10th Rifle Corps, State Security Lieutenant Doronin, wrote: “During the sinking of the Veronia, numerous revolver shots were heard.” Apparently, people committed suicide, not wanting to go alive into the depths of the sea. The picture of the death of this transport was also seen by another employee of the state security organs, the head of the 6th department of the 3rd department of the KBF, senior political instructor Karpov, who was mentioned above. His story differs from the previous one only in particulars.

Due to the sharply increased mine danger, many ships anchored at night. Floating mines tried to repel with poles. At the same time, some ships continued to move and perished in mines.

The events of that night, in particular, are reflected in the logbook of the Minsk leader, which was considered one of the best warships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

At 21.40, a mine exploded in the Minsk paravane. The ship started to leak, the team began to fight for its survivability. At 22.15, the destroyer Skory approached him to take him in tow, but after 15 minutes, having blown up on a mine, he broke in half and sank in another 15 minutes. The boats launched from Minsk were able to save only 44 people. At 22.45 the leader anchored as the minesweepers left. The struggle for his survivability continued all night.

At 6.20 on August 29, 1941, Minsk moved on, following the minesweeper Gak and the leader Leningrad. At 06:52, the shift commander of the "Minsk" recorded the first raid of enemy aircraft that day. From that moment until March 10, that is, in a little over 3 hours, the Germans made a total of 7 raids on the caravan. At 10.35 on the "Minsk", apparently, they breathed a sigh of relief when they saw our two reconnaissance aircraft. At 11.20, an entry appeared in the logbook: “We are being escorted by fighters” (the first in two days). At 17.16 "Minsk" moored at the wall of Ust-Rogatka.

Just as often, air raids were recorded in the logbooks of other surviving ships.

The mental stress of people who every second expected death, if not from a bomb, then from a mine, reached the highest limit. If the commanders, many of whom later became heroes of the Great Patriotic War, lost their heads in that situation, then what can we say about ordinary soldiers. For example, on the rescue ship Neptune, some Red Army men proposed to elect a Revolutionary Committee (!) and demand that the commander immediately head to the shore, even if it was someone else's, and disembark people.

However, even reaching their shore, people and ships continued to die. So, the authorized officer of the 3rd department of the 3rd department of the KBF, Lambroso, who made the transition from Tallinn to the island of Gogland on tanker No. 12, on August 31 reported to his leadership about the confusion that reigned at the time of unloading. The order was given to land the fighters from the shore, 150-200 people crossed on the boats. At that moment, the captain of the 2nd rank Cherny approached the tanker on a boat and, threatening with a weapon, ordered the captain to move away from the island and follow to Kronstadt. It ended up that the tanker, moving away from Gogland for 8-10 kilometers, came under bombardment and sank.

On August 30, on Gogland, people who had landed the day before began to be loaded for further movement to Kronstadt. Everything happened in good visibility, and enemy planes subjected the harbor and transports to a fierce bombardment. There were new victims. “This work could have been done after dark, but the command of the island didn’t even think of it,” political instructor Korytko, authorized by the 3rd department of the OVR37, informed his boss.

On the night of August 29-30, 1941, the lead ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet arrived in Kronstadt. Based on interviews with some commanders, the 3rd department of the KBF had information (as of August 31) that almost all the personnel of 5 destroyers, 2 guards,
1 submarine, 10-12 transports. Other commanders believed that about 30 transports with army and navy personnel left Tallinn and they all died.

In December 1941, the head of the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, divisional commissar Lebedev, sent two memorandums to the People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR Admiral Kuznetsov: "On the fighting of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet" and "On the withdrawal of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and units of the 10th SC from Tallinn to Kronstadt 28-29 August 1941", in which he gave an analysis of the August events in the Baltic. The documents contain loss figures: 12 warships were sunk, 3 more require dock repairs, 19 auxiliary ships and transports perished, 4 more, being damaged, washed ashore on the island. Gogland. He determined the human losses at more than 6 thousand people, including the crews of the lost ships (in other documents, the figure is 1044 and even 15 thousand dead). The exact figure, apparently, will never be established, no one kept any records of the evacuees, especially the lists of names, as far as one can judge from the documents. As of September 2, 1941, 14,800 people were saved.

Lebedev considered the following to be the main reasons for such high losses in personnel and ships. Firstly, the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, knowing that the enemy had a strong mine and artillery position in the Yuminda-Nina area, did not take appropriate active countermeasures to destroy it. Secondly, the issue of a clear organization of rescuing people and providing them with life-saving equipment was not worked out in advance. Thirdly, there was practically no air support for caravans.

Thousands of soldiers and commanders of the 10th Rifle Corps, who did not want to surrender, who gained invaluable combat experience in the battles for the capital of Soviet Estonia, as well as hundreds of Baltic sailors, i. e. soldiers who could significantly strengthen the defense of Leningrad.

The defenders of Tallinn did not consider their cause lost until the last day. Their mood was well reflected by the chief of staff of the 3rd Air Defense Regiment of the Main Base of the KBF, Major Mirolyubov: “How bravely the anti-aircraft gunners fought defending Tallinn, so ingloriously most of them died in the waters of the Baltic without causing any damage to the enemy. Tallinn was surrendered by traitors, t<ак>to<ак>separate anti-aircraft batteries for 3 days held back his (the enemy. - I. I.) advance to Tallinn, suppressing mortars and point-blank shooting manpower, and if the battery was surrounded, t<ак>to<ак>the infantry left their lines, it was enough to throw a group of fighters of 30-40 people, and the Germans shamefully rolled back, and if all the drowned Baltics with abandoned artillery were thrown into the offensive, then the enemy would be dealt a crushing blow in the back.

The scale of the Baltic tragedy of 1941 was compared by some participants in the Tallinn passage with the Tsushima disaster of 1905. They almost unanimously laid the blame for the death of many thousands of people and dozens of ships on the command of the KBF, believing that “the Russian fleet did not know such a terrible and shameful catastrophe for its entire history”, “such a nightmare can only be experienced once in a lifetime”, “we were fond of crackling phrases, slogans, brought up excessive self-confidence, but we didn’t learn to fight, we don’t know how and are not able to”, “The Baltic Fleet with personnel was sunk by traitors”. It did not fit in my head, how the enemy, who had forces in the Gulf of Finland, much less than ours, could inflict such a rout. In their opinion, he used these forces competently, and we - ugly. They recalled the large-scale repressions and “purges” of the 1920s and 1930s, as a result of which mediocre and unprincipled people were nominated.

Such were the characteristic moods of the participants in the Tallinn crossing that prevailed in the first days after their arrival in Kronstadt.

According to the FSB of Russia.

The main base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet - Tallinn - occupied an advantageous strategic position in the Gulf of Finland. A major port and an important junction of railways and highways - Tallinn was a strategic outpost of Leningrad.

Revel (that is how Tallinn was called until 1918) was taken by the troops of Peter I in 1710 during the Great Northern War. Since 1713, the advanced base of the Russian fleet was located here. Repeatedly, the fleets of Russia's opponents (Sweden and England) tried to attack Revel and Russian ships from the sea, but each time they retreated with losses. Only in 1918, after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russian ships left Revel. Again, the Soviet fleet came to the Tallinn raid in October 1939, and from July 1940 Tallinn became the main base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The accelerated construction of the infrastructure of the base, coastal batteries, airfields begins. However, before the start of the Great Patriotic War, this construction could not be completed in full, there were not enough berths, warehouses, the main base of the fleet had two small ship repair enterprises and three floating docks.

The ships of the squadron (the battleship Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya of the 3rd, 4th and 5th destroyer divisions), the 2nd submarine brigade, a detachment of minelayers, a division of patrol ships, ships of the OVR GB, and auxiliary ships of the fleet were based in Tallinn.

KBF squadron on the Tallinn roadstead.

Directly from the sea, the main base was defended by two separate coastal defense artillery battalions (94th and 96th OAD). Seven batteries (32 guns from 100-mm to 305-mm caliber) were located on the peninsulas of Suuropi (Cape Randvere) and Viimsi and the islands of Aegna and Naissaar. Already after the start of the war, a three-gun 130mm railway battery and two armored trains were built in Tallinn.

The air defense of the base was provided by three air defense regiments - the 3rd, 4th and 5th, consisting of 26 batteries (120 medium and small caliber guns). 85 aircraft of the KBF Air Force were based at the airfields of Tallinn.

The main base of the KBF was ready to repel an enemy attack from the sea and air. But the base did not have any fortifications from the land direction, and its defense system from this direction was not developed. The fleet had the only unit for operations on land - the 1st Marine Brigade with a total strength of more than 2.5 thousand people. With the beginning of the war, the brigade was given the task of defending the coast of the main base area from possible enemy landings.

Even in a nightmare, the General Staff of the Red Army and the Main Staff of the Navy could not imagine that the enemy would even reach Riga, let alone Tallinn. During the First World War, German troops took Riga only in September 1917, and Tallinn in March 1918, after the departure of the Russian fleet. In 1941, Nazi troops invaded Estonia on the 16th day since the start of the war.

At 23.37 on June 21, the fleet switched to operational readiness No. 1. On June 22, at 13.50, a signal was raised at the coastal post of the SniS: "I see enemy aircraft on the ost and south." Reconnaissance aircraft appeared over Tallinn. They were fired upon by anti-aircraft artillery of the battleship "October Revolution". On June 23, a detachment of ships left Tallinn for the first combat operation - laying a minefield at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland.

Already in June, ships from abandoned bases began to arrive at the main base. Submarines and transports arrived from Libava, from the Gulf of Riga - a detachment of light forces, a submarine brigade, several transports. Ships damaged in battles came from Moonsund for repairs. The base was not adapted to accommodate such a number of ships and vessels. In addition, there were many sailors from the lost ships and disbanded units in Tallinn.

Even before the start of the war, the enemy began mining fairways in the Gulf of Finland, so it was decided to relocate the October Revolution battleship from Tallinn to Kronstadt. On July 1–2, the battleship, accompanied by all available destroyers and the battleship, moved to Kronstadt. On July 1, the Ural minzag and several auxiliary vessels went to Kronstadt, and the floating base and 7 submarines of the 2nd brigade went to the Luga Bay.

In the very first days of the war, the mouth of the Gulf of Finland was blocked by several rows of minefields. But this fleet commander, Vice Admiral V.F. Tributz seemed a little. To cover the approaches to Tallinn, on July 2, on his orders, the minelayer Surop, accompanied by minesweepers Drummer, Crab and two MO boats, set 90 mines north of Cape Pakrinem. On July 3, the leaders "Leningrad" and "Minsk", the destroyer "Proud", in support of two BTShch and two TKA, set up 231 mines west of the island of Naissaar, and the mine layer "Marty", accompanied by three BTShch and two MO and two TKA, set 300 mines north of the island. While setting up, the ships were unsuccessfully fired upon by a Finnish coastal battery from Makiluoto Island.

Even before the start of the war, a line of booms was put up in the roadstead. On August 1–2, the Vyatka and Onega net barriers set up anti-submarine nets 2.6 miles long in the Tallinn roadstead. On August 11 and 14, to cover the approaches to the Tallinn roadstead, the Azimut hydrographic vessel deployed anti-submarine nets 3 miles long to the northeast of Keri Island.

On August 19, six enemy torpedo boats tried to penetrate the roadstead of the main base, but were discovered by a MO patrol boat off Keri Island and driven off by artillery fire. After that, on August 19-20, the net-layer Onega set up anti-submarine nets 2.8 miles long to the south-west of the island of Naissaar.

Already in early July, the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet began to show concern for its rear, especially in the southern direction. The commander of the fleet reported to the People's Commissar that telegraph and telephone communications with the ground units were broken. Aerial reconnaissance reported that enemy tanks were moving in two columns, one to Pskov, the other to Valk, that is, Tallinn. However, the commander-in-chief of the North-West direction, Marshal K.E. Voroshilov and his staff also did not know the situation.

After the war, People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov wrote in his memoirs: “It was precisely in these first days of July that we in the People’s Commissariat of the Navy should have correctly assessed the situation ourselves, made a realistic forecast regarding Tallinn and strongly insisted at the Headquarters:“ If we want to keep Tallinn longer, it is necessary to withdraw the entire 8th Army there and hastily set up several lines of defense." But, I must admit, in the first half of July we were more following the events on land near our bases than we were leading them. (N.G. Kuznetsov “Combat alert in the fleets”. Pp. 41–42.)

In connection with the retreat of Soviet troops from the Baltic States, the Armed Forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet took a number of measures in early July in case of a forced evacuation of the main base. On July 3, an order was signed by the commander of the fleet to prepare the fleet for the transition to Kronstadt. In accordance with it, the commander of the fleet with a marching headquarters (9 officers) was supposed to go on the destroyer "Yakov Sverdlov" (V.F. Tributs commanded this ship from 1935 to 1937), and the chief of staff and the second echelon of headquarters - on the cruiser " Kirov" (ZFKP). It was supposed to transfer the FKP of the fleet to the Luga Bay. However, the High Command of the North-Western Direction believed that it was expedient for the command of the fleet to remain in Tallinn. People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov reported on the situation to I.V. Stalin, to which he remarked: "Tallinn must be defended by all means." From that moment on, the fleet began to take measures to organize the defense of Tallinn. After all, Tallinn is not only the base of the fleet, but also the capital of the Estonian SSR. By this time, four capitals of the union republics - Riga, Vilnius, Chisinau - had already been abandoned, the battle for Kyiv had begun.

On July 14, Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Northern and North-Western Fronts, Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral I.S. Isakov sent the KBF Armed Forces the tasks of the fleet from the current situation. In particular, it said: the OLS should remain in Tallinn until the moment when the situation at the front forces them to destroy the base and begin a withdrawal by land, to support the struggle for Tallinn with ship fire. Support detachment (at least 4 EMs with TS and MO) - do not leave until the coastal units start moving from the Vimsey Peninsula. That is, it was assumed that the front would retreat to the east in an organized manner, and the fleet would support it. At that time, it was not yet assumed that Tallinn would be blocked from land.

The command of the North-Western Front, which was responsible for the defense of the Baltic republics, due to the prevailing situation at the front, was unable to take the necessary measures to defend the GVMB of the KBF of Tallinn; The fleet had to carry out this task. On July 15, the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet instructed the engineering department of the fleet to build defensive structures. On August 5, the GB Defense Headquarters was created.

Three lines of defense were built on the approaches to Tallinn. The main line with a length of 50 km passed 9-12 km from the city. The city's defense line ran along the outskirts of the city, and barricades were built in the city itself and resistance centers were equipped. For systematic fire assistance to the ground forces on the coastal flank, a fire support detachment was allocated as part of the gunboats Moskva and Amgun.

On August 5, German troops occupied the Tapa station, cut the railway and the highway, and battles unfolded on the distant approaches to the city. By August 8, enemy troops reached the coast of the bay in the Loksa-Kunda area. The 8th Army was divided into two isolated parts: the 10th Rifle Corps remained in the Tallinn area, the 11th retreated to Narva. On the same day, August 8, the destroyer Karl Marx was sunk by enemy aircraft in the bay of Khara-Lakht near the town of Loksa.

All attempts by the 8th Army to restore the situation with counter attacks by the 10th and 11th Corps were unsuccessful.

On August 9, units of the 10th SC went on the offensive and advanced 12-22 km to the east. In this advance, the parts of the corps were assisted by the gunboats "Moscow", "Amgun", an armored train, and the KBF Air Force. But in connection with the rollback of the eastern grouping of the 8th Army further east, the offensive was canceled, and the command of the 10th SC was ordered to "act according to the situation." Parts of the corps began to retreat west to Tallinn. Thus, the 10th SC ended up near Tallinn, not because it had the task of defending the main base of the fleet, but because it failed to retreat to the east along with the 8th army. If the corps had broken through to the east, the fate of Tallinn would have been decided in a matter of days.

Tallinn was blocked from land, communication with Kronstadt and Leningrad was possible only by sea.

The 4 German divisions advancing on the city outnumbered the forces defending it by more than two times (10th Rifle Corps, detachments of marines, worker regiments).

The number of troops of the 10th UK on August 20 was 18.5 thousand people. Only two artillery regiments, an anti-tank division, an anti-aircraft division and regimental artillery (64 guns of medium and small caliber) remained at the disposal of the 10th SC. This was very, very little, given the serious losses in materiel suffered in previous battles. And the 47th Corps Artillery Regiment, which was part of it, withdrew along with the 11th Rifle Corps in the direction of Narva. There were almost no tanks in the corps.

The position of the defenders of Tallinn was complicated by the fact that they did not have a reserve of forces, and it was impossible to hope for reinforcements to arrive. The transports leaving Tallinn took out the wounded and the civilian population, they delivered food, weapons and ammunition back, no reinforcements or new military units were sent to Tallinn - fighting began on the distant approaches to Leningrad.

About 16,000 sailors took part in the defense of Tallinn from land, operating as part of the 1st separate marine brigade, separate construction battalions and other units. Detachments of sailors were sent from warships to the land front. All hand weapons for them and machine guns were allocated from the stocks of ships and parts of the fleet. But, despite the courage and dashing, the ship's specialists could not replace the fired infantrymen.

Due to the difficult mine situation in the Tallinn-Kronstadt fairway, the chief of staff of the fleet submitted a report on August 12 to the KBF Military Council on the need to immediately relocate the Light Forces Detachment (the Kirov cruiser, two leaders and new destroyers) from Tallinn to the Luga Bay or Kronstadt.

On August 13, the Military Council of the Fleet turned to Headquarters with a proposal to transfer 20,000 soldiers from Hanko to defend Tallinn. But on August 14, a directive from the People's Commissar of the Navy was received, requiring them to remain in Tallinn and defend themselves with the available forces.

Moreover, on August 14, by order of the High Command of the North-Western Direction, responsibility for the defense of Tallinn was fully entrusted to the Military Council of the KBF. He was subordinated to the 10th SC, the corps commander, Major General I.F. Nikolaev was appointed deputy commander of the fleet for the defense of the State Security Guard from land.

On August 19, the enemy began shelling the southeastern and eastern sectors of the defense, bringing up infantry and tanks, and on the 20th went over to the offensive along the entire front. The main blow was delivered from the east in the coastal strip. For three days, Soviet troops, supported by aviation, naval and coastal artillery, repelled fierce enemy attacks.

During the preparation of the defense of Tallinn, anchor firing positions were equipped in the inner roadstead, areas for fire maneuvering of ships in the outer roadstead were provided, and sectors of shelling of ships were determined. Observation and correction posts for ships and coastal batteries were deployed. Naval artillery officers were sent to the troops, who corrected the fire of naval artillery and coastal defense batteries.

The 10th Rifle Corps had only 36 medium (85–152 mm) and 28 small (37–76 mm) caliber guns. In this regard, 96 guns of the fleet were involved in fire assistance to the ground forces - 37 coastal and 59 ship guns.

The cruiser "Kirov", the leaders "Minsk" and "Leningrad", the destroyers "Proud", "Glorious", "Fierce", "Fast", "Sharp-witted", "Kalinin", "Volodarsky", gunboats "Moscow", "Amgun", 7 coastal defense batteries. In total, 4 305-mm, 9 180-mm, 8 152-mm, 33 130-mm and 20 100-mm guns participated in repelling the offensive.

After the breakthrough of tanks and motorized infantry to the main defensive line of Tallinn, they were within the firing range of the main calibers of naval artillery. On August 22, the cruiser "Kirov" and the 305-mm tower battery of the island of Aegna opened fire on the enemy in the area of ​​the Keila manor.

The next day, other ships of the squadron and coastal batteries of the fleet entered the battle. Naval artillery helped the ground units to hold back the onslaught of the fascist troops, the pace of their advance slowed down.

On August 23, "Kirov", together with the leader "Leningrad", fired at the accumulation of German tanks at the crossing over the river. Kayla. 12 tanks were destroyed and damaged, and a large concentration of enemy infantry was dispersed. The Minsk leader suppressed a two-gun howitzer battery.

On August 25, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the main part of the Soviet troops retreated to the main line of defense of Tallinn, the rest - to Paldiski. By this time, the entire territory that was held by the Soviet troops, as well as raids and harbors, were being shot through by enemy artillery.

The cruiser "Kirov" is firing at the enemy.

Since August 25, due to increased artillery shelling and enemy air raids, the ships periodically dropped anchors and, following at low speeds and variable courses under the cover of smoke screens, shot down the sighting of German batteries, continuing to fire. The main target of the German pilots and gunners was the cruiser "Kirov". On this day, the ship had to repel seven massive air raids, the Nazis dropped about 50 bombs, but none hit the ship. The German gunners were more successful - a 6-inch shell hit the aft end. As a result of the explosion, a hole formed in the deck, a fire broke out, 9 sailors were killed, 30 were injured.

For 5 days, more than 500 shells were fired at the Kirov, Luftwaffe aircraft dropped 326 bombs on it. Thanks to skillful maneuvering and accurate anti-aircraft fire, the cruiser did not receive direct hits. From explosions of air bombs and shells near the side of the Kirov, 45 holes were formed in the outer skin of the side and superstructures, but the ship did not receive serious damage. The Kirov itself carried out 36 firings, unleashing 235 180-mm shells on the enemy, an average of 8 shells per firing. The gunners were forced to economize on the ammunition of the main caliber, since there were no 180-mm shells in the warehouses of the main base.

Due to the lack of guns in the defending units, naval artillery often solved the fire missions of regimental and battalion artillery. Ship and coastal defense artillery was more powerful than field artillery in caliber, but it was not intended to support infantry in close combat. This often led to overvoltage of naval artillery barrels and a high consumption of shells.

Especially stubborn resistance to the enemy was provided by the anti-aircraft artillery of the three air defense regiments of the fleet, deployed in the immediate vicinity of the forward edge. They were used in breakthrough places as anti-tank guns to repel attacks by motorized mechanized groups, destroy and disperse enemy infantry. Each battery was a kind of strong point.

But artillery, even the most powerful, could only delay the advance of the enemy troops, it could be stopped, with the support of artillery, only by infantry, and it was getting smaller. The last reserve was a detachment of cadets of the Higher Naval School. M.V. Frunze. For four years they studied naval sciences, and they were thrown into battle as infantrymen.

After units of the 42nd army corps of the enemy reached the coast of the Gulf of Finland on August 8, the supply of the forces of the fleet and the 10th SC operating in the Tallinn area became possible only by sea. With bases on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, enemy aircraft and ships have significantly intensified their actions to disrupt our sea communications in this area.

From August 12, the evacuation of the wounded and the civilian population from Tallinn on transports begins. On this day, the first batch of the wounded was sent on the Vyacheslav Molotov turboelectric ship and the Aurania transport. They were accompanied by the destroyer "Steregushchiy", three BTShch and four MO boats. On the transition, the Krumbol BTShch died, then the Guard was blown up and damaged. On the approach to the island of Gogland from a mine explosion, V. Molotov", and most of the wounded were landed on the island. Even then it became clear that the enemy had mined the fairway. However, the fleet command did not take any action to prevent the Germans and Finns from reinforcing minefields between Tallinn and Kronstadt. J. Meister also drew attention to this: “Although the Russians knew for sure that the Germans and Finns were working hard every night to strengthen the barriers, the Soviet cruiser and a dozen destroyers stationed in Tallinn did not make a single serious attempt to disperse or sink the minelayers” ( Y. Meister, p. 18). In addition to destroyers, the fleet had torpedo boats and patrol ships, but they were not used to deal with enemy minelayers.

On August 13, a convoy consisting of six transports, four minesweepers and four MOs left Kronstadt for Tallinn. The next day, in the area of ​​​​Cape Yuminda, the transports Vodnik and Utena, the minesweeper TShch-68, and on August 15, the BTShch Bui were killed by mines.

On August 20, in the area of ​​Seskar Island, it was attacked by German bombers and the Sibir ambulance transport, which was traveling with the Ural minzag from Tallinn, accompanied by six minesweepers, was killed.

On August 24 and 25, two convoys were sent from Tallinn with wounded and civilians - women and children - families of officers.

The convoy, which left on August 24, included tanker No. 11, transports Aegna, A. Zhdanov" and "Eestirand", GISU "Gidrograf", the icebreaker "Oktyabr" and the damaged destroyer "Engels". The escort behind the trawls was carried out by minesweepers Udarnik, No. 45, No. 46, Menzhinsky, Antikainen and Furmanov. On the same day, the Engels was killed by mines, and as a result of air attacks, the Eestirand and tanker No. 11. “A. Zhdanov" was damaged.

On August 25, the transports "Ewald", "Daugava", the icebreaker "Truvor", GISU "Helmsman" left Tallinn, guarded by two patrol ships and four MOs. Posting was carried out by four minesweepers. The icebreaker "Truvor" was lost at the crossing.

By the end of August 25, it became clear that Tallinn could not be held. The Armed Forces of the KBF reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction and the People's Commissar of the Navy that the defense order was being carried out, everyone capable was fighting, all weapons had been thrown into combat areas, all people who could be dispensed with had been removed from the ships. Under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the ring around Tallinn is shrinking, the fleet's Armed Forces reported. Parts of the 10th SC are suffering heavy losses, the defense line has been broken in several places, there are no reserves to eliminate the breakthrough, the ships in the roadstead are under fire. The enemy tanks entered the Nõmme forest. Reporting the situation, the KBF Armed Forces asked for instructions and decisions on ships, units of the 10th SC and coastal defense of the fleet in case the enemy broke through the city and our troops retreated to the sea.

The KBF and the 10th SC did everything possible to defend Tallinn, they inflicted heavy damage on the enemy, diverting his large forces from the main goal - Leningrad. But the possibilities for further defense of the Estonian capital were exhausted.

But the Commander-in-Chief of the North-West Direction K.E. Voroshilov ordered to counterattack the enemy. Only after the report of the Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov Headquarters about the critical situation in Tallinn was followed by an order to evacuate it. On August 26, the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western direction, given the extremely unfavorable situation, ordered the evacuation of the fleet and the garrison of Tallinn to Kronstadt and Leningrad. The corresponding encryption was received at 00.15 on August 26. The development of documents on the organization of the withdrawal of troops, their loading onto transports and the formation of detachments and convoys began.

From 4 p.m. on August 26, the enemy launched an attack on Tallinn along the entire front, approaching the outskirts of the city. Separate groups of the enemy were already 6 km from the city center. The raids were shot through by artillery fire. Enemy air raids followed one after another. There were direct hits on the leader "Minsk", a bomb hit the stern, but did not cause damage, then the projectile damaged the stern gun. From close explosions of bombs, the destroyer Glorious was slightly damaged. "Ambulance" received two direct hits of shells, but retained its combat capability.

Over the entire period of the defense of Tallinn, despite the bombing of aircraft and artillery shelling of ships and vessels, only one large ship perished - the Lunacharsky transport, sunk on August 26 by aviation in the roadstead, where it was waiting for loading, 7 people died.

The closer the German troops approached the city, the more the "fifth column" became more active. On the night of August 27, the Minsk leader was illuminated by a spotlight from the Maara schooner. The leader's stern guns immediately opened fire, sinking the ship.

From the dawn of August 27, the enemy resumed aimed artillery and mortar fire on port warehouses, harbors, and the raid, and his aviation resumed the bombardment of ships and transports. As a result of the bombing, a floating dock was sunk, and warehouses in the commercial port were damaged.

Fleet aviation lost its last landing site in the Tallinn area. Due to the relocation of the fleet aviation to the east, in the last days of the defense, the weak air cover of the base was especially affected.

On August 27, the Armed Forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, in accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters of the High Command, ordered the evacuation of troops and the main base of the fleet and the redeployment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet ships from Tallinn to Kronstadt. At about 12 o'clock on August 27, the chiefs of staff of the units defending Tallinn received an order to withdraw. The start of the withdrawal of advanced units was scheduled for 21:00 and boarding ships from 22:30. Starting from this time and until 23:00, motionless barrage curtains were set up along the planned lines by the entire artillery of the fleet, after which, until 5:00 in the morning, the lines were sequentially transferred.

In the afternoon of August 27, the troops defending Tallinn, under the cover of barrage fire from naval and coastal artillery, leaving barriers at the defensive line, began to retreat to the landing points. The landing of troops and the loading of equipment and other cargo on ships and ships were carried out in Merchant, Mine, Bekker and Russian-Baltic harbors, in Paldiski, near the Vimsi peninsula, as well as near the islands of Aegna and Naissaar under heavy artillery and mortar fire. As the vessels and ships were loaded, they left the harbors for the outer roadstead in the area of ​​the island of Naissaar, where convoys and detachments were formed.

By 20:00 on August 27, enemy artillery set fire to the berths of the Merchant Harbor and actually disrupted the work of loading the rear and units. As a result, the transports "Tobol" and "Second Five-Year Plan", intended for loading the withdrawn parts of the eastern sector, were transferred to the Bekker harbor, which led to confusion in the landing of the departing units. "Luga" and "Ella" retreated to the roadstead due to heavy shelling, where they continued to receive the wounded from boats and tugboats.

With the receipt of the order from the Headquarters to evacuate Tallinn, the ships were given the task of providing artillery cover for it. Setting barrage fire from ships and coastal batteries helped the ground units break away from the enemy and land. But the artillery of the fleet was already experiencing difficulties. There was a lack of ammunition on the ships, it was also necessary to have some kind of reserve for the upcoming transition to Kronstadt.

In total, naval gunners spent more than 2,120 shells from 100 mm to 305 mm caliber on barrage fire over a seven-kilometer section, that is, the average density of fire per kilometer per hour reached 42.4 shells.

On August 27, a combat order was signed by the fleet headquarters on the formation of detachments and convoys. According to the plan, four convoys were formed from the transports intended for the transport of troops, civilians and cargo, and three detachments of ships to ensure the transition.

The detachment of the main forces included the cruiser "Kirov", the leader "Leningrad", the destroyers "Sharp-witted", "Proud" and "Yakov Sverdlov", the submarines S-4, S-5, Kalev, Lembit, icebreaker "Suur-Tull", seven torpedo boats (ТКА No. 37, 73, 74, 84, 103, 113, 146), six small hunters (MO No. 112, 131, 133, 142, PK-202, PK-204) and five base minesweepers (T-204 Fugas, T-205 Gafel, T-206 Verp, T-207 Shpil and T-217). On the transition from the meridian of Cape Yuminda to Gogland Island, the detachment of the main forces, according to the plan, was supposed to cover the 1st and 2nd convoys.

On the "Kirov" were the Military Council of the KBF and the Banner of the Baltic Fleet, as well as the government of Estonia. The valuables of the State Bank of Estonia were loaded onto the cruiser.

The cover detachment included the leader "Minsk", destroyers "Glorious", "Skory", submarines Shch-322, Shch-405, M-95, four torpedo boats (TKA 33.53, 91, 101), four small hunter (MO-510, PK-207, PK-212, PK-213) and five basic minesweepers (T-203 "Cartridge", T-210 "Gak", T-211 "Rym", T-215 and T- 218). The messenger ship "Pikker" from the detachment of the main forces joined the detachment. On the transition from Keri Island to Waindlo Island, the detachment was supposed to cover the 2nd and 3rd convoys.

The rear guard included destroyers Kalinin, Artem, Volodarsky, patrol ships Sneg, Burya and Cyclone, two torpedo boats (TKA 51 and 61) and seven small hunters (MO-5, MO -195, -197, -204, PK-210, PK-211, PK-232). The task of the rear guard was to lay minefields on the Tallinn roadstead, on the approaches to it and in Kopli-Lakht Bay, and then to cover the passage of the 3rd and 4th convoys from the rear. As you can see, there was not a single minesweeper in the rearguard.

The commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet took over the general leadership of the fleet's transition. Vice Admiral V.F. Tributs and his marching headquarters were on the cruiser Kirov. The commander of the OLS V.P. was also on the cruiser. Drozd with his staff. First Deputy Commander - Chief of Staff of the Fleet Rear Admiral Yu.A. Panteleev - raised the flag on the leader "Minsk", there was also a spare command post. Second Deputy, Rear Admiral Yu.F. Rall, was on the destroyer "Kalinin".

Transportation of the evacuated garrison of Tallinn and Paldiski was carried out by ships of four convoys.

Convoy No. 1 included: transports "Vironia", "Agis Kronvaldis", "Jarvamaa", "Kolpaks", "Alev", "Ella", "Kazakhstan", "Ivan Papanin", floating workshop "Hammer and Sickle", rescue the vessel "Neptune", the icebreaker "Krisjanis Valdemars", the mother ship "Leningradsovet", the tugboat OLS-7, the schooner "Urme". The first convoy was accompanied by submarines Shch-301, Shch-307, Shch-308, M-79. The direct protection of the convoy included the destroyers "Svirepy" and "Severe", patrol ships "Amethyst" and "Kasatka", two small hunters MO-208, MO-507, seven low-speed minesweepers (No. 52 Buek, No. 56 Barometer, No. 57 Viesturs, No. 71 Crab, No. 72 Dzerzhinsky, No. 91 Lyapidevsky and Bayan) and six boat minesweepers (No. 1201, 1206, 1208, 1209,1210, 1211). Convoy commander captain 2nd rank N.G. Bogdanov was at the Leningrad Council.

The composition of convoy No. 2 was as follows: transports Naisaar, Ergonautis, Siauliai, Everita, tugboats KP-12 with torpedo boat No. 121, Tasuya with minesweeper No. 86, schooner Atta. The immediate protection was carried out by the Shchors patrol ship, the Moskva gunboat, the Onega, Vyatka and Azimut network barriers. One small hunter MO-200, six low-speed minesweepers (No. 43, 44, 47, 84, 88, 121) and eight boat minesweepers (No. 1203, 1204, 1205, 1509, 1510, 1511, 1512, 1514). Convoy commander captain 2nd rank N.V. Antonov was sailing on the Moscow canoe.

Minesweepers No. 43, 44, 47 left Tallinn on August 25, escorting another convoy, and were supposed to return to the beginning of the fleet's transition, but were delayed due to a storm.

Convoy No. 3 included the transports Luga, Tobol, Lake Lucerne, Vtoraya Pyatiletka, Balkhash, Ausma, Kumari, Skrunda, tanker No. 12, and the Kolyvan rescue ship. The gunboat "Amgun", two small hunters MO-501 and MO-502, four low-speed minesweepers (No. 33 "Olonka", No. 35 "Shuya", No. 58 "Sturgeon", No. 83), four boat minesweepers (No. 1101, 1104, 1106, 1109) and electromagnetic minesweeper 5MZ "Yastreb". Convoy commander captain 2nd rank A.F. Janson was on the Amgun gunboat.

The commanders of the first three convoys were supposed to be on the assigned vessels and ships of their Leningradsovet, Moskva and Amgun convoys, but in fact they immediately switched to "small hunters".

As part of convoy No. 4, the rescue ship Saturn, the tug KP-6, and the self-propelled barge TT-1 made the transition. The guard ships "Ost" and "Scout", the gunboat I-8, two electromagnetic minesweepers 5M2 "Piksha", 5M1 "Povodets", three boat minesweepers No. 1503, 1504, 1505, 1506 carried out direct protection. S.A. Glukhovtsev.

There was also another convoy. The transport “Vakhur” and the gunboat “Laine”, having received the 46th construction battalion in Paldiski, left Paldiski on August 27, but headed not to Kronstadt, but to Hanko.

The composition of detachments and convoys changed until the moment of release. So, the destroyer "Yakov Sverdlov" was initially included in the rearguard, but then in the detachment of the main forces. The leader "Leningrad" was initially included in the cover detachment, and "Minsk" - in the detachment of the main forces, but then they were swapped. The destroyer "Severe" was initially included in the rearguard, then in the 1st convoy.

In addition, the transport "Vormsi", the patrol ship "Topaz", three small hunters of the marine border guard P-214, 220, 233, the messenger ship "Jupiter", a dozen and a half boats KM and MKM, four boat minesweepers No. 1103 left Tallinn on their own without convoys. , 1108, 1313, 1501, Meteor rescue vessel, VRD-43 diving boat, Vostok and Lood hydrographic vessels, thirteen tugboats, five schooners, several barges and scows.

Visual communication was provided inside the detachments and convoys. The communication of detachment and convoy commanders with the commander of the fleet by radio was to be carried out in exceptional cases.

To cover the passage of the fleet from attacks by enemy surface ships, submarines M-98 and M-102 were sent to positions towards Helsinki. The boats were supposed to leave Tallinn with a cover detachment.

Even before receiving the order from the Headquarters to evacuate Tallinn, the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet took a number of measures. An order was given for the return of the ships from Moonsund. The commander of the Kronstadt naval base, Rear Admiral V.I. Ivanov was ordered in advance on the night of August 25: “All forces and means should be thrown to ensure communication, meet convoys near Vaindlo Island with a group of torpedo boats and small hunters, concentrate Kronstadt minesweepers near Gogland to meet transports at Rodsher, keep in the harbor of Suurkul and at Lavensari tugs to assist damaged ships and vessels.

By the directive of the commander of the Kronstadt Naval Base of August 26, a detachment was formed consisting of: two divisions of minesweepers - 12 units, 4 patrol ships of the Coral type, 6 torpedo boats, 8 SKA of the MO-4 type, the Shkval tugboat, the Tasuya icebreaker and a rescue ship "Meteor". Captain 2nd rank I.G. was appointed commander of the joy. Svyatov. By 24 o'clock on August 27, all the ships of the detachment concentrated in Suurkul Bay, and I.G. Svyatov reported to the commander of the fleet that the cover detachment on Gogland had been deployed and was ready to carry out the task.

The detachment was tasked with helping damaged ships, guiding them behind the trawls, removing people from ships that had lost their course and sinking ships, and helping people from sunken ships.

Three minesweepers from the detachment on the night of August 28 were sent to meet the 1st convoy, but since the exit of the convoy was delayed, the minesweepers, having not met anyone, arrived at the fleet’s parking lot near the island of Aegna at 11 o’clock on August 28.

It was obvious that the fleet commander assessed the evacuation of Tallinn not as a simple transition, but as a breakthrough with a fight, in which there would inevitably be losses. The location of the cover detachment - the island of Gogland - was not chosen by chance. Gogland was located exactly halfway between Tallinn and Kronstadt, and the main opposition of the enemy was expected on the segment between Tallinn and Gogland.

The Military Council of the Fleet asked the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction at dawn on August 28 and 29 to strike at enemy airfields with fleet bomber aircraft transferred by that time to the front, and, if possible, gather at the airfield in Lipovo a maximum of fighters with hanging tanks to cover ships and courts. In addition, they asked to temporarily return 16 "small hunters" from Lake Ladoga in order to put them along the fairway between the islands of Keri and Gogland at dawn on August 29 - to protect against submarines. But the commander of the fleet did not receive an answer to his request. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Lipovo airfield had to be abandoned.

In accordance with the transition plan, the detachment of the main forces was to begin the transition at 8.00, the covering detachment - at 10.00 and the rearguard - at 10.20 on August 28. The beginning of the movement of convoys: No. 1 - 22.00 August 27, No. 2–4.00–5.00 August 28, No. 3–4.00–5.00 August 28, No. 4 - 23.00 August 27. It was believed that with such a dispersed movement of convoys and detachments, they would not interfere with each other. At the same time, the path cleared by the minesweepers of the convoy or detachment in front could be relatively safe for escorting the convoy or detachment behind.

When developing the plan, the lack of fighter aircraft cover at the passage to Gogland was taken into account. That is why, despite the lack of sufficient experience in the joint night navigation of minesweepers and transports in difficult conditions of a mine situation, nightly piloting behind the trawls of the 1st convoy was provided. It was supposed to leave the Tallinn raid at 22:00 on August 27, having six of the best low-speed minesweepers in mine protection, and the 4th convoy (without minesweepers) was to leave at 23:00.

According to the same plan, the start of the movement of the 2nd and 3rd convoys, which included the bulk (70%) of transports and other large vessels, was scheduled for 4 and 5 hours on August 28, respectively. It was assumed that under such conditions, the 2nd and 3rd convoys, moving at an average speed of five to six knots, would be able to force the Yumind minefield in the dark and reach the Waindlo-Gogland area in the evening, where the mine danger was considered insignificant (and practically completely absent).

The fleet had to pass 321 km through the Gulf of Finland, where for 250 km both banks were occupied by the enemy, and 120 were mined.

The Germans and Finns assumed that the fleet would break through to Kronstadt, it had no other way, and they were also preparing for this. They reinforced the minefield on the Yuminda meridian (from July 11 to August 28, more than 2,500 mines and mine defenders were placed by the Germans to the northwest, north and northeast of Cape Yuminda). On the cape itself, they installed a 170-mm battery, creating a classic mine-artillery position, which was very difficult to force. The Germans sent attack and bomber aircraft to the Baltic airfields.

The fighter aviation of the KBF Air Force had enough vehicles to provide cover for the fleet. However, by the time Tallinn was evacuated, German troops had already advanced beyond the Luga River, and all the airfields that could be used were in the Leningrad region. Therefore, even new fighters could reliably cover ships and vessels only from Gogland, while the old ones could only hold out over the island for 10 minutes. If at least temporary airfields had been created on Gogland or Lavensari, enemy aircraft would have received a worthy rebuff.

Yet the main obstacle was the mines. It was the "horned death" that caused the death of most warships and transports. The main difficulty in organizing mine defense was that it was necessary to conduct over 100 ships and vessels behind the trawls, for which, according to the norms that existed at that time, at least a hundred minesweepers should have been allocated, meanwhile, by noon on August 28, there were only ten BTShch at the direct disposal of the KBF command and 17 low-speed minesweepers, as well as 21 boat minesweepers - a total of 48 units.

The minesweeping forces were unevenly distributed among the detachments. All ten BTShch were allocated for escorting detachments of the main forces and cover behind the trawls, and not a single minesweeper remained for escorting the rearguard ships. The 4th convoy also had to make the transition on its own, without minesweepers. Of the 17 low-speed minesweepers, seven were placed at the disposal of the commander of the 1st convoy, four low-speed minesweepers were allocated for escorting the 2nd and 3rd convoys, and, in addition, three more minesweepers were transferred to the command of the commander of the 2nd convoy, which arrived from Kronstadt. Minesweeper boats were distributed among all convoys, but, with the exception of two boats, they were not used for their intended purpose.

Already in the afternoon of August 27, due to the continued shelling, the parking of ships and vessels in the Tallinn roadstead became dangerous. By the end of the day, warships moved partly to the island of Naissaar, partly to the island of Aegna, continuing to fire on the advancing German troops, and the transports, as soon as they were ready, at night and in the morning of August 28, concentrated in the area of ​​​​Aegna island. The last boat of the Ministry of Defense left the Mine Harbor at about 8 o'clock on August 28.

On the morning of August 28, when all the ships and vessels went to the raid, the blocking of Tallinn harbors and the destruction of important objects began. By 8 o'clock, railway cars, steam locomotives and dredgers were flooded in the southern passage to the Merchant Harbor, and the Gamma transport was flooded in the northern passage. It was not possible to close the western entrance, as the Keri minesweeper intended for this purpose was thrown aground by the wind. In the Coastal Harbor, the former surface mine layer Amur was sunk to the bottom, the eastern entrance to the Mine Harbor was blocked by the Mardus tugboat. TFR "Storm" put five mine cans (19 mines in total) in the areas of the Kopli-Lakht Bay and the Surup pass. The boat minesweeper Waindlo laid mines in Merchant Harbor and in the Tallinn roadstead. After the detachments of the main forces went to sea and covered, the patrol ships "Sneg" and "Cyclone" laid banks for about 90 mines in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe island of Aegna Bank Leitegrund (a total of 112 mines were laid out in the roadstead).

Fleet ships leave Tallinn.

The personnel of the coastal batteries located in Paldiski, on the islands of Naissaar and Aegna, having completely shot the ammunition, blew up the towers, guns and cellars and joined the outgoing echelons of transports on boats.

Transports took about 30 thousand people, military and civilian. The loading of troops on warships was not supposed. Nevertheless, they took on board several dozen people, mainly from the fleet units. And the rearguard destroyers and three rescue ships, the last to leave the Mine Harbor, received the retreating troops - from 200 to 270 people,

The initial decision of the KBF command to make the transition from Tallinn to Gogland during daylight hours was prevented by unfavorable weather. In the second half of August 27, when the landing of troops on transports had already begun, a northwest wind blew up to 7 points. It became clear that in such weather, small ships, minesweepers, tugs would not be able to go, especially minesweepers with trawls. In addition, minesweepers, which were supposed to see off the 2nd caravan, have not yet returned to Tallinn. Loaded ships were in the area of ​​the Wulf-Naissaar Islands, subjected to artillery fire and air raids, and there was a high probability of attacks by torpedo boats. The Fleet Armed Forces decided to send convoys immediately.

According to the weather forecast, a weakening of the wind was expected in the second half of August 28. By noon, the wind strength had indeed decreased to 2 points. At 11.35 the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet ordered the 1st convoy to be sent to the sea at exactly 12 o'clock. All four convoys put to sea between 1200 and 1520 on 28 August, i.e. 10-14 hours later than originally scheduled.

At 12.18 the vessels of the 1st convoy began to move east. At the very beginning of the campaign of this convoy, there was an unexpected delay. A long wake column of ships and vessels had not yet had time to line up on the alignment of the Yekaterinental lighthouses, when at 13.09, a mine exploded in the trawl of the first pair of minesweepers four miles northwest of the island of Aegna. The trawl was killed by the explosion, and about an hour was lost to replace it.

At 15:00, reconnaissance flights began, and then attacks by enemy bombers, which continued with short breaks until 19:30. The dive-bombers that day did not act as decisively and famously as before. As it turned out after the war, these were not aces, but cadets of three Luftwaffe flight schools, who were practicing in the 61st training squadron. Nevertheless, at about 18.30 they managed to damage the Vironia transport, on which part of the headquarters and the political department of the fleet were evacuated. The bomb, breaking through the deck, exploded in the boiler room. The transport has lost its way. When evading the attacks of attack aircraft, he left the swept lane, exploded on a mine and the icebreaker Valdemars died. Earlier, at about 6 p.m., the minesweepers of the first and third pair of minesweepers were destroyed by explosions of four mines, and almost simultaneously the Yuminda battery opened fire on the transports. The destroyer Ferocious skillfully placed a smoke screen, thanks to which the shelling from the shore was unsuccessful.

Caused by damage to the trawls and lasting about 30 minutes, the convoy stopped in the western, most dense part of the minefield.

Transport "Ella" was demolished to the south of the swept lane, at 18.05 it was blown up by a mine and sank in two or three minutes. The tug S-101 went to help him, but he hit a mine and sank instantly. Of the 905 people on the transport, including 693 wounded, 74 people holding on to the wreckage of the transport were picked up by the Shchors patrol ship from the 2nd convoy at about 20:00. An hour later, "Shchors" picked up 25 people from the team of the icebreaker "Valdemars".

To assist the Vironia transport that had lost its way, the Alev transport was sent, and the destroyer Surovy and the boat MO-208 were left in guard. Subsequently, the Vironia was taken in tow by the rescue ship Saturn, which was sailing with the 4th convoy. At about 19:00, during the next raid, a bomb hit the Aleva superstructure, but did not cause serious damage.

In the meantime, the damaged minesweepers were replaced on the minesweepers, and the 1st convoy continued to move. At 19.20, shelling began again from Cape Yuminda, and again the smoke screen placed by the Ferocious forced the enemy to cease fire. The unsuccessful shelling from Cape Yuminda was repeated twice more: at 20.12 and 20.25.

At 19.40, while crossing the next line of minefield, the minesweeper "Crab" was blown up and sank five minutes later. Boats were lowered from the minesweepers "Dzerzhinsky" and "Visturs" to save his crew. The rest of the minesweepers continued to escort the convoy. Soon we had to stop for a few minutes in order to let the detachment of the main forces, which was overtaking the 1st convoy, now become the lead one, which made the task of the minesweepers of the 1st convoy easier. The commander of the convoy sought to use the favorable conditions created to advance as far east as possible before dark. The sun set at 20.40, soon after 21 o'clock it began to get dark, visibility decreased and by 22 it was only 1 cable. When it got dark, out of fear of blowing up ships on undercut and floating mines, the convoy commander began to send orders to them to anchor. Having only two MO boats for communication, it was difficult to maintain control of the convoy ships in the dark, so some of them anchored, while others, to which the order did not reach, continued to follow east. The transport “Kazakhstan” reached the furthest almost to the meridian 26 °, the captain of which did not receive instructions from anyone, kept the ship for a long time at the slowest speed against the wind and, finally, at 1 o’clock on August 29 ordered to anchor next to the transport “Ivan Papanin”, detached from the 2nd convoy at night.

The lead minesweeper "Visturs" broke away from the rest of the minesweepers at about 22:00 and at midnight anchored 10 miles west of Waindlo Island. By order from the flagship "Leningradsovet", minesweepers began to choose trawls. Perhaps because of this, the minesweeper "Barometer" was blown up at 22.05 and quickly sank. Only one person was picked up from his crew by minesweeper boat No. 217.

The rescue ship Saturn, which was towing the Vironia transport, was blown up by a mine at about 20.20, but remained afloat for a long time. The Azimut net fence passing by from the 2nd convoy at about 22.30 removed 131 people from the damaged Saturn. The Vironia transport, left without a tugboat, anchored. At 5.45 on August 29, a boat approached the board of the destroyer Glorious, on which there were 20 people who had escaped from the Vironia. According to them, at about 00.30 on August 29, three torpedoes hit the transport, and after 5 minutes it sank (most likely, it was blown up by floating mines).

From 6:30 p.m., the destroyer Surovy maneuvered for an hour and a half near the Vironia transport, which was idle, and shortly after 8 p.m., when the ships of the covering detachment began to approach from the west, together with the Alev transport, went east at eight knots. At about 20.45, when crossing a minefield, a mine, stuck in a guard paravane, began to approach the side of the "Severe". The destroyer immediately reversed and, holding the machines in place, a few minutes later disconnected the sweeping part of the paravane. With the onset of darkness, the destroyer entered the transport parking area. Carefully making her way between them and successfully passing through three more lines of mines, "Severe" at 23.40 anchored 15 miles west of Waindlo Island next to the damaged destroyer "Glorious".

The destroyer "Svirepy", from the very beginning of the campaign, went south of the convoy with paravanes, after the second setting of the smoke screen, hooked a mine. Around 22.20 "Svirepy" took the damaged destroyer "Proud" from the detachment of the main forces in tow.

As a result, by the end of the day on August 28, the 1st convoy, having lost two transports and an icebreaker, as well as two minesweepers, moved further than other convoys almost to the eastern edge of the Yuminda minefield. At night, the tugboat OLS-7 was killed by a mine explosion.

At 14.50 on August 28, the 2nd convoy moved. The convoy was guarded by the Moskva gunboat and the Shchors patrol ship, which sailed in the head of the wake column directly behind the minesweepers, as well as four MO boats, of which two kept behind the end pair of minesweepers to shoot floating mines.

The minesweepers assigned to escort the convoy alternately took coal and food from the Moskva gunboat. Moreover, two of them took supplies already on the move and moved away from the sides of the gunboat only at about 15.30. Between 17.30 and 18.30 the 2nd convoy overtook the ships of the detachment of the main forces. At 18 o'clock, five "Junkers" tried to attack the ships, escort minesweepers opened fire on them.

In the area of ​​Keri Island, the 2nd convoy began to overtake the ships of the covering detachment. When these ships opened fire on torpedo boats discovered in the north, the Moskva gunboat also opened fire on them.

At about 20.15, the minesweepers of the 2nd convoy entered the area of ​​the Yuminda minefield, but less than an hour passed, as the calm passage of the convoy was disturbed by several incidents. The leading minesweeper of convoy No. 2 decided to go five cables north of the fairway, along which convoy No. 1 and two detachments of ships passed. This was done in order not to run into mines in the dark, hit by minesweepers in front of the marching detachments.

At the same time, both trawls were killed by explosions of mine defenders. As it turned out, one of the minesweepers did not have spare trawls. The reloading of the spare trawl onto it and the subsequent setting took almost an hour and a half. Such a long stop of the 2nd convoy in the dark on a minefield, of course, was dangerous for the ships and vessels being conducted. They, not observing the alignment in the ranks, randomly piled one on top of the other. Under such conditions, the Everit transport, which was the trailer in the column, deviated from the swept lane somewhat to the south and at 22 o'clock died from a mine explosion. On board the transport was the garrison of the island of Naissaar (up to 1500 people). The boat MO-501 managed to save 42 people.

Around 22.40, bypassing the minesweepers of the 2nd convoy to the north, they began to overtake three destroyers of the rear guard. From the head minesweeper to the destroyer "Kalinin" they signaled: "You are going to the minefield, follow us, we are going with the trawl." In 2 cab. from minesweeper No. 44 at 22.45 "Kalinin" was blown up by a mine. Without removing the trawls, minesweepers No. 43 and No. 44 went to the damaged destroyer, but since three mines exploded one after another in the trawls, they had to clean up the trawls, and TShch No. 47 approached the destroyer at 22.52. Within a few minutes, he received 160 Human. A quarter of an hour before, 40 people were taken to the same minesweeper from a mine that had blown up and drowned GISU "Vostok". In the dark, control of the convoy was lost. At 22.35, the Moskva gunboat anchored 9.5 miles north of Cape Yuminda, net barriers, GISU Lood and two minesweepers were nearby. The transports soon after 10 p.m. began to anchor according to their ability, and the Ivan Papanin transport alone, breaking away from the convoy, went 17 miles to the east, safely passing eight lines of mines.

The captain of the ship "I. Papanin" A.P. Smirnov.

As a result, on August 28, the 2nd convoy, which lost one transport from its composition, got stuck in the western part of the Yuminda minefield and at the same time was left with only two minesweepers. Minesweeper No. 47, which took on board 200 people from the lost ships, went to Gogland, and the other three did not have spare trawls.

Somewhat earlier than the 2nd convoy, at about 14.15, the 4th convoy began to move. It was this convoy that was joined by some ships and vessels that arrived on the eve of August 27 and 28 from Moonsund, and submarines that returned from their positions, including Shch-301, Shch-405, the Saturn rescue ship, and the Povodets magnetic minesweeper. The convoy went without the provision of minesweepers. Minesweeper boats of the Rybinets type could have been used for these purposes, but for some reason they did not supply trawls.

The convoy was moving at a speed of less than 4.5 knots. For this reason, the 2nd convoy, which left later, but had a speed of 5.5 knots, began to overtake it at about 20:00.

After sunset, two ships were killed by mines - the gunboat I-8 (at 20.32) and the submarine Shch-301 (at 20.48). The MO boat picked up the submarine commander, Lieutenant Commander I.V. Grachev and 14 people, 22 sailors died.

The last to leave Tallinn was the 3rd convoy. Transports "Balkhash" and "Kumari" from the convoy, which took on board the garrison of Paldiski, in the protection of the TFR "Shchors" arrived at the Tallinn roadstead at about 14:00 on August 28. Consequently, and for this reason, the original plan of passage, which provided for the departure of the 3rd convoy from Tallinn at 5 o'clock on August 28, would probably have to be changed. Of course, the fleet command could have changed the original plan, ordering the 3rd convoy to start moving after the 1st convoy (due to the unavailability of the minesweepers of the 2nd convoy) and, if the two transports were late, include them in the 2nd convoy. This would allow the 3rd convoy to pass 12-15 miles further on August 28 than it actually did. But, despite the fact that both the initial and subsequent plans for the transition of the fleet were already largely violated, the Kirov, apparently, did not want to deviate from the established order of exit, as a result of which the 3rd convoy began to move only at 15.20.

The minesweepers, lining up in a ledge to the right, set up trawls. The first pair of minesweepers followed directly behind the terminal vessel of the 2nd convoy. At about 5 p.m., the 3rd convoy began to overtake the ships of the detachment of the main forces, and then of the covering detachment. Convoy No. 4 was ahead along the same fairway, so that in the end a traffic jam formed and the order of alignment in the 3rd convoy was violated. The ships reduced the course to a small one, and only on the meridian of the Keri lighthouse at 19.25, when about two hours remained before the onset of complete darkness, the appointed six-nodal course was given.

The covering detachments that overtook the 3rd convoy of the BTSC cleared the way, thanks to which the ships overcame four lines of mines without delay. But in the area of ​​​​Cape Yuminda, where the paths of the 3rd convoy and the covering detachment parted a little, from 21.43 mines began to explode in the minesweepers of the convoy.

Already in the darkness at about 22.30, the silhouettes of the ships and vessels of the 2nd convoy began to take shape ahead, anchoring. The minesweepers of the 3rd convoy, in order to get around them, evaded to the north, but the ships following them in the darkness did not notice this and continued to move on their previous course. At about 11 p.m., the Luga transport was blown up, with 1226 wounded on board. The transport remained afloat, and at 3 o'clock on August 29, 1206 people were transplanted from it to the approaching Skrunda transport. The captain and crew of the Luga, unlike the crews of other ships, did not organize a struggle for the ship's survivability, but, having reported its hopeless situation, opened the kingstones, and themselves moved on the boat to the Second Five-Year Plan transport. Between 11 p.m. and 11.30 p.m., the transports of the 3rd convoy, without any order, anchored in the same area where the ships and vessels of the 2nd and 4th convoys and the rear guard were anchored.

The flagship of the detachment of the main forces, the cruiser Kirov, by 23.54 on August 27, moved from the raid to the island of Naissaar. On August 28, from 1.24 to 5.10, he supported the landing units of 10 SC with artillery fire. The leader of "Leningrad" also fired at the enemy troops. At 11.01, Vice Admiral V.F. arrived at Kirov. Tributs, the flag of the fleet commander was raised on the cruiser. At 15.25, the ships repulsed the attack of four aircraft.

The ships of the detachment of the main forces, stationed near the eastern coast of the island of Naissaar, at about 4 p.m., on a signal from the cruiser Kirov, began to line up in marching order. The minesweeper "Shpil" (with the commander of the 1st DBTShch) was in the lead, followed by the formation of a ledge to the right "Fugas", "Gafel", "Verp" and T-217. The icebreaker Suur-Tyl followed directly behind the minesweepers, followed by the destroyer Smetlivy. The width of the trawl strip reached three cable lengths. Therefore, the destroyers "Yakov Sverdlov" and "Proud", which kept guarding the "Kirov" at a heading angle of 60 ° left and right sides at a distance of 3-5 cabins, had to go outside the swept lane, hiding behind only set paravanes. On the destroyer "Sharp-witted" in front of the cruiser and on the end leader "Leningrad", paravanes were also installed, the speed of the detachment was 14 knots.

The attacks of enemy aircraft (7 aircraft) that began at 18.02 were repelled by powerful fire from the ships' anti-aircraft artillery, and not a single bomb reached its target. At the same time, the transports of the 2nd and 3rd convoys, which the detachment overtook, were protected from air strikes, therefore, on this segment of the journey, approximately to the meridian of the Keri lighthouse, the task of the detachment of the main forces, which consisted in covering the transports from enemy attacks, was completed. However, having met a powerful rebuff, the German pilots chose the vessels of the 1st caravan as the target of their subsequent attacks, where the air defense was much weaker, and achieved hits on the Voldemars icebreaker and Vironia transport.

BTShch-206 "Verp".

Between 19:00 and 19:30, the Yuminda battery from a distance of 115–95 cab. twice opened fire on the cruiser. In response, he fired six volleys from the main battery guns. The smoke screen placed by the destroyers and boats did not allow the enemy to shoot.

Going the same way as the 1st convoy, the detachment of the main forces kept in the lane cleared by the minesweepers of the convoy, so the detachment's BTSHhch hit only two mines. Around 19.30, the detachment began to overtake the end ships of the 1st convoy, bypassing them from the south. Starting from 19.50, the BTShch "Fugas", "Gafel" and T-217, within a few minutes, fired two mine defenders and four mines, the explosions of which had killed their trawls by 20.10.

The order of movement of the BTSC when replacing the trawls was violated, while only three or two minesweepers went with the trawls. At this time, a detachment of the main forces overtook the ships of the 1st caravan, passing almost close to them from the south. The convoy ships stopped and drifted slowly to the south, hampering the movement of the detachment's ships. The order of alignment in their wake column was violated. Under such conditions, the S-5 submarine, which was following the Kirov, was blown up by a floating mine at 20.11 and sank 40 seconds later. Only nine people survived, including the brigade commander, captain 1st rank N.P. Egypt.

The experienced crews of the BTSC strove to quickly replace the trawls and take their places in the ranks. Nevertheless, Komflota from the Kirov repeatedly urged them on, transmitting via VHF, and then with a searchlight: “Fix the formation”, “Speed ​​up the setting of trawls”.

Having overtaken the ships of the 1st convoy, the detachment of the main forces went ahead of the entire fleet. Around 20.35 "Kirov" with the right paravane captured a mine that did not explode, but after a few minutes the paravane with the mine surfaced and began to approach the side of the cruiser. The sweeping part of the guard was cut off with an autogen, and this helped prevent a mine explosion. During this maneuver, the cruiser reduced its speed to a small one and therefore fell even further behind the BTSC, although even before that the distance from the end minesweeper to the cruiser was from one and a half to two miles.

In general, the formation of no other detachment or convoy was stretched to such an extent as the formation of the detachment of the main forces. The submarines did not keep well in formation, often dodging to the side and slowing down when floating mines were detected. Therefore, the end boats and the leader "Leningrad" often walked away from the trawl strip. Already at 18.30, the distance from the lead minesweeper "Shpil" to the trailing leader "Leningrad" was 6 miles and continued to increase. The current carried past the leader a lot of floating mines, torn from anchors by a storm and cut by minesweepers. The crew had to move these mines away from the side with hooks and poles. Despite this, both paravanes were captured by a mine. Unable to maneuver, the commander ordered the paravane cables to be cut off and reversed the leader out of the danger zone. Then he stopped the ship to put in new paravanes. At that moment, a battery from Cape Yuminda opened fire on the leader who was standing idle. "Leningrad" returned fire and silenced her. While the leader changed paravanes and fought off the battery, the detachment went ahead.

At 20.32, the trawl of the head BTShch Spiel was killed by an explosion, and the Gafel and T-217 had not yet had time to replace the trawls. The width of the trawl strip has decreased to 1.5 cab. The destroyer Yakov Sverdlov was warned from the Shpil BTSC that a cut mine was floating in its path. "Yakov Sverdlov" reduced the course to the smallest, but at such a move the guard paravane could not be useful. At 20.50 the destroyer hit a mine and broke in half. After 5-6 minutes, the ship sank, 114 people died from its crew and passengers on board. For a long time after the war, there was a beautiful legend in our literature that the destroyer took on a torpedo fired from a submarine at the Kirov cruiser, and thus covered the flagship. But neither the Germans nor the Finns sent their submarines to the very center of their own minefield.

In the right paravane of the "Proud" at 20.36 a mine exploded 5-8 m from the side. At the same time, the steering wheel jammed in the “port to side” position. The destroyer described the circulation to the left and, passing in front of the bow of the Kirov and under the stern of the Sharp-witted, stopped on the left shell of the cruiser. Damage to the "Proud" was very heavy. A leak appeared in the hull, through open seams and cracks in the skin, water flooded all three boiler rooms (the destroyer took 420 tons in total), for some time the ship lost its course. Destroyer Commander Captain 3rd Rank E.B. Efet, not wanting to risk the entire crew, ordered officers, foremen of groups, anti-aircraft gunners and personnel of emergency parties to remain on the ship. The rest were removed by the approaching BTShch "Gak" from the cover detachment.

At about 21 o'clock from the cruiser "Kirov" they opened fire on what was found on the left in 15 cab. periscope. Shortly before this, "Sharp-witted" was ordered to guard the cruiser from the port side to the place of "Yakov Sverdlov". On the "Sharp-witted" they carried out the order, but at the same time they reported that the destroyer was moving along an unswept lane. Following that mine explosion, the Verp trawl was killed, and a mine was found in the cruiser's paravane. Finally, at 21.15–21.17, the cruiser’s artillery fire repelled an attack by four enemy torpedo boats that hid under the cover of a smoke screen in room 70–80. north of the detachment of the main forces. After that, at 21.25 "Sharp-witted" was ordered to take its former place in the head of the flagship. At the same time, the commander of the KBF on the radio ordered the commander of the Kronstadt Naval Base to send the Oktyabr icebreaker to tow the damaged Gordy destroyer.

Not having full confidence in the absence of enemy minefields on the Western Gogland Reach, the fleet commander, even before sunset, decided not to expose the ships of the detachment of the main forces to the risk of being blown up by floating and cut mines that were not seen in the dark. It was decided to anchor in the area of ​​​​the Rodsher lighthouse, about which at 20.26 a radiogram was sent to two addresses - to the chief of staff of the KBF (to the leader of Minsk) and to the commander of the Kronstadt naval base. The same radiogram, signed by the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, ordered the minesweepers concentrated at Gogland to clear the fairway and approach the Kirov cruiser by 4.30 on August 29.

This order reached the commander of the Gogland detachment only at about 0.30 on August 29. The six low-speed minesweepers sent by him cleared the fairway, at about 6.40 met with a detachment of the main forces near Rodsher and received an order from the commander of the KBF to go towards the covering detachment. In the future, these minesweepers and other ships of the Gogland detachment were mainly engaged in towing damaged transports and delivering rescued people to the island of Gogland.

In view of the growing darkness, the ships of the detachment of the main forces at 23.05 anchored eight miles north of the Waindlo lighthouse, several miles short of the originally planned area. Five BTShch were placed in a circular guard of the detachment, which had greatly decreased in composition. In particular, there was no leader "Leningrad", with whom the cruiser "Kirov" had long lost visual contact and who eventually joined the cover detachment at about 23 o'clock.

Until 06:00 on August 28, the ships of the covering detachment fired cut-off fire, ensuring landing of troops and evacuees on transports, and mining harbors. Enemy batteries fired at the ships from the shore, the ships were forced to maneuver along the raid without ceasing fire.

At 6.50, Rear Admiral Yu.A. arrived at the leader of Minsk. Panteleev (he is also the commander of the cover detachment) and a group of headquarters commanders. The Fleet's SCP was deployed on the leader.

The commander of the cover detachment - the chief of staff of the KBF until September 1941, Yu.A. Panteleev.

At 7.50 torpedo boats appeared from the Finnish coast. They opened fire on them from Minsk and forced them to turn back. As it turned out later, these were boats sent for reconnaissance to the skerries.

The cover detachment began to move at 17.15. In the area of ​​the Aegna buoy, the submarines M-98 and M-102, on a signal from the leader "Minsk", separated from the detachment and, having submerged, went to the positions assigned to them.

As well as during the escort of the detachment of the main forces, the base minesweepers lined up with paravantrawls in the formation of a ledge to the right. The lead was the Gak BTSC, on which was the chief of staff of the trawling brigade, captain 3rd rank V.P. Likholetov, followed by Rym, BTShch-218, BTShch-215 and Cartridge.

In the wake column of the detachment, the leader "Minsk" was the leader, and the destroyer "Skory" was the trailer. Guard paravanes were placed on the leader and both destroyers. Moving at a speed of 12 knots, the cover detachment in the area of ​​the Keri lighthouse overtook the ships of the 3rd convoy. The enemy planes that had flown in several times before were driven off by anti-aircraft fire from the leader and destroyers, so that in this case, the presence of warships in the area where the transports were traveling served as a reliable cover for them from air attacks.

At 19.42 the signalmen found five torpedo boats on the left twenty degrees. Two minutes later "Minsk", "Glorious" and "Ambulance" opened fire (13 130-mm guns). The boats were forced to turn away. The second attack at 21.10 was also unsuccessful. Weak artillery fire from Cape Yuminda at 20.07 ceased immediately after the smoke screen was placed.

At 19.33, the first mine exploded in the western part of the Yuminda barrier, damaging the trawl. Undercutting mines and explosions of mines in trawls followed one after another and within two hours, until 21.39, five BTShch fired 21 mines and one mine defender. Therefore, the width of the trawl strip most often did not exceed 1.5 cab., while the strip itself was not always continuous. As a result, at 20.24 a mine exploded in the right paravane of the destroyer Glorious. As a result of the explosion, the destroyer's navigational instruments were damaged, but she continued to follow the wake of the submarines. The right paravane, torn off by the explosion, was replaced, but an hour later at 21.35 a mine exploded in it again. Both explosions occurred 10–15 m from the starboard side. In many places, the lining was pressed inward, through the seams that had parted, the water flooded two artillery cellars, a boiler room, and a central artillery post. A number of auxiliary mechanisms and electrical navigation devices failed due to strong shaking. The ship temporarily lost its course, a radiogram was sent asking for help. After winding the plaster, the main damage was repaired, but until dawn it was necessary to stay at anchor, since the compasses were inactive. Around midnight, the "Severe" anchored nearby was discovered. At the same time, a floating mine was noticed along the nose. She was pushed away with poles, and she walked along the side. After that, the observation of the mines was carried out from a lowered boat, which was kept ahead of the destroyer's stem.

At about 21.20, the Hak commando, which at that time was removing a trawl damaged by a mine explosion, discovered in the dark two submarines and the leader of the Leningrad, which had lagged behind the detachment of the main forces. Next was the destroyer "Proud" with a raised signal: "I am in distress, immediate assistance is required." Taking into account that the trawl had not yet been set on the Gak (it took 20–30 minutes), the chief of staff of the trawling brigade, having received permission from the commander of the cover detachment, at 21.25 turned to Gordom, ordering the commander who was on the BTSC-215 2nd DBTShch continue to escort the cover detachment.

On Gordom, the degree of damage received was exaggerated, and therefore almost the entire personnel was transferred to the minesweeper. "Gak" tried to take the destroyer in tow, but it turned out to be beyond the power of his machines, which was reported to "Minsk". As such, there was no need to immediately tow the distressed destroyer. Shortly after 10 p.m., the destroyer Ferocious approached from the west. The chief of staff of the trawling joy asked his commander to help the Proud. A similar indication of the "Svirepoy" was received from the commander of the light forces detachment from the "Kirov". On the "Svirepoy" they removed the paravane and began to approach the "Proud". At the same time, a floating mine was found on the nose, which they evaded. This new reminder that all this maneuver was carried out in a minefield, it would seem, should have caused an immediate stop to all attempts to tow and order all three ships to anchor. However, "Gak" set up a paravan-trawl and led both destroyers. Shortly after midnight, the tugboats burst. For some reason, the destroyers did not anchor and lay adrift until dawn. During the night they were blown about two miles south of where the Minsk was left standing.

After the Gak BTSC turned to Gordom at 21.25, only two BTSCs continued to go with trawls: T-215 and T-218. It was already quite dark, it was difficult to keep alignment in the general formation, in connection with which the leader of the "Minsk" deviated to the south of the cleared lane, and at 21.40 a mine exploded in his right paravane 10-12 m from the side. The ship suffered serious damage. A hole with an area of ​​2.5 m² was formed in the hull, while the hull was severely deformed, over 500 tons of water entered the hull, all the rooms below the lower deck and the first boiler room were flooded, a list appeared to starboard and a trim on the bow. All three turbines stopped, the lights went out, the steering, navigational instruments, and compasses failed.

Following the "Minsk", the ships of the cover detachment, having worked in reverse, stopped, but at the BTSC they did not notice an explosion in the leader's paravane and continued to move forward. After the report of the terminal BTSC that the leader was far behind and out of sight, on all four minesweepers, unable to stop with the set trawls, they only reduced their speed. Around 22.20, the BTShch finally broke away from the comfort of the cover, the commander of which did not give them any instructions.

On the leader "Minsk" they were so passionate about the struggle for unsinkability that at first everyone forgot about the minesweepers that had gone ahead. Vigorously and skillfully carried out measures, the flow of water was stopped, the pumping of water from the premises began. But there was still no confidence in the serviceability of all mechanisms. Night anchoring was not provided for by the plan for the transition of the fleet, and the command of the covering force had no desire to stay in place for too long. “Kirov” was told on the radio: “I was blown up by a mine, I took six hundred tons of water. I don't need help yet." The destroyer Skory was ordered to take the leader in tow. At the same time, they tried to return the departed BTShch, but while the corresponding radiograms were transmitted to them, and while these radiograms were received and decoded, all four BTShch ("Rym", "Patron", T-215, T-218), which had already approached the anchor area the parking lot of the detachment of the main forces, on the orders of the commander of the fleet, they entered the protection of the cruiser "Kirov".

The commander of the "Ambulance" intended to tow the "Minsk" side by side, but the leader was ordered to approach from the bow. Performing a dangerous maneuver in a minefield, the "Ambulance", bypassing the leader from the port side and then approaching in reverse stern to his bow, was blown up by a mine at 22.15. The explosion occurred in the area of ​​the second engine room, the destroyer's hull broke in two. The crew did not have time to do anything to save the ship. A few minutes later, both parts of the destroyer sank. Of the personnel of the ship, only 78 people were rescued by the boats of the Ministry of Defense and the messenger ship "Pikker". Commander Captain 3rd Rank A.N. Balandin and the destroyer commissar did not want to leave the ship, remaining all the time on the bridge.

After the death of the Ambulance, Minsk, along with other ships of the detachment, anchored 12 miles west of the Waindlo lighthouse, in the eastern part of the Yuminda minefield. In the same area, separate transports from the 1st and 2nd convoys, four destroyers and the leader "Leningrad" stopped in the dark. This ship received two conflicting orders within minutes. At 22.20, the commander of the cover detachment ordered him to take the destroyer "Proud" in tow (on the "Minsk" they did not know that the "Svirepy" was already leading it). On the "Leningrad" paravanes were put in order, and he went to the "Proud". But three minutes later, a radiogram from the commander of the KBF was received with an order to go to the left traverse of the Kirov instead of the Sharp-witted one, which was in the head of the cruiser. The leader turned to the east, but it was impossible to go further in the darkness among the accumulation of ships and ships. At about 11 p.m., the Leningrad anchored, sailors with oars and poles were placed along the sides to repel floating mines. From the leader "Minsk" to "Leningrad" shortly before midnight they ordered: "In the morning you will follow the lead minesweeper, Minsk will follow you, it does not have a compass." At about 2 o'clock on August 29, a mile from the "Minsk" anchored BTShch "Gak", the only one of the minesweepers of the cover detachment that returned to the detachment.

From the evening of August 27, the rearguard destroyers moved to Wulf Island and the Surop Pass, from where they conducted methodical fire all night. At 05:00 on August 28, the destroyers Kalinin, Artem, Volodarsky, Yakov Sverdlov and three rescue ships were ordered to head to the Mine Harbor, since the transports intended to receive the remaining troops did not arrive at the harbor. Part of the troops was loaded onto the destroyers. Under mortar and machine gun fire, the destroyers removed several hundred fighters and commanders from the Vimsey and Palyasari peninsulas (Kalinin received 273 people, Artem - 235 and Volodarsky - 232).

Destroyers of the Novik type on the march.

According to the plan, the rearguard was supposed to leave at 10.30 on August 28, but in reality, by 16 o'clock, only the detachment of the main forces had withdrawn. The destroyers "Noviki" at that time continued to conduct a rare fire along the coast and take separate boats with fighters. The rearguard held out in the raid until dark, covering the withdrawal of ships and repelling air attacks on transports. The ships repulsed more than 10 attacks, the destroyer Kalinin shot down one Ju-88.

Only at 21.15 did the rearguard destroyers leave the raid, firing on the move at the enemy batteries that had broken through to Pirita-Kadriorg. According to the combat order given by the rearguard commander Yu.F. Rallem on August 27, in the daytime, in front of the wake column of the destroyers, patrol ships with set paravantrawls were to go in the formation of the ledge, and at night, all six ships were to line up in a common wake column. Destroyers, day and night, had to go with guard paravanes. Under such conditions, only the lead patrol ship would be exposed to the danger of undermining. However, the established marching order was violated.

The patrol ships of the rear guard were not in the head, but behind the destroyers. In this regard, the destroyers at first went at low speed in order to enable the patrol ships to take their place in the march order. But due to the growing darkness or for some other reason, the paths of the destroyers and patrol ships diverged, and both groups of ships, going in parallel courses, no longer met.

At about 22.20 from the lead destroyer Kalinin, silhouettes of transports of the 2nd or 3rd convoy were found ahead. The destroyer evaded 3-4 cab. to the north, and it increased the speed to 12-14 knots. That is, the rear guard ships, trying to overtake the transports, went through the unswept area. This was signaled to them from minesweepers, but the destroyers did not react. Soon, the right paravane of the destroyer "Artem" was cut off by a mine explosion. On the ship, the speed was reduced for several minutes to eliminate minor damage, and then at full speed they began to catch up with the two destroyers that had gone ahead and at the same time prepared a spare paravane for setting up.

Around 22.45 "Kalinin" was blown up by a mine. Following the trailer "Artem" (braid pennant of the commander of the 3rd DEM L.N. Sidorov) immediately stopped, and the "Volodarsky" stopped the cars, having gone a little ahead. The commander of the rear guard Yu.F., shell-shocked by the explosion. Rall went on a boat to Gogland. The command of the rearguard passed to the division commander, captain 3rd rank L.N. Sidorov.

At first, no alarming news was received from Kalinin, but after 20–30 minutes they transmitted from it: “I need immediate help.” In order not to drift in the minefield, "Artem" anchored. After receiving a signal for help from Kalinin, Artem immediately weighed anchor. At this time (23.50), the Volodarsky was blown up by a mine and quickly sank. At 24.00, Artem, while trying to provide assistance to her brothers in distress, hit a mine and sank instantly. MO boats were able to save only 71 people from both destroyers. "Kalinin" stayed afloat for an hour, its crew was taken to the minesweeper number 47. So all the remaining Baltic "Noviki" perished.

Patrol ships "Sneg" (under the sail pennant of the division commander, captain 3rd rank V.N. Filippov), "Storm" and "Cyclone" approached the tail of the convoy of transports of the 2nd convoy at about 22:00. At 22.15 the end TFR "Cyclone" hit a mine and sank. "Storm" and "Snow", having passed at low speed forward, at midnight anchored among the accumulation of ships and vessels of the 3rd convoy.

Patrol ship "Sneg".

The night stay of the detachment of the main forces in the area of ​​​​the Waindlo lighthouse passed calmly, without a single shot and without much tension in radio communications, during which no special instructions were given by the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to the commanders of the detachments and convoys. It goes without saying that each of them would act independently with a single common goal - to complete the transition to Kronstadt as soon as possible. The exact situation in the areas of the overnight parking of the transport fleet on the cruiser "Kirov" was not known, since the commanders of the convoys themselves did not know the places where some of their ships and vessels were anchored. The trains of the convoys were mixed up in the dark, and order could only be restored at dawn.

The total length of the fleet's overnight anchorage area exceeded 30 miles. Furthest to the east, separated from the rest of the fleet, were the ships of the detachment of the main forces. 14-20 miles west of them, 8-10 miles north of the Mohni lighthouse, both leaders, four destroyers, several transports and separate ships and minesweepers of the 1st, 2nd and 4th convoys were stationed. The bulk of the transports of the 2nd and 3rd convoys stopped for the night in the western part of the area, 8-10 miles north of Cape Yuminda. The position of this group of ships was the most unfavorable, since it was in the sphere of effective fire of the Yuminda battery. In the middle part of the Yuminda minefield, for crossing which there were the most limited minesweeping forces, and, most importantly, these ships had at least eight to nine hours to go to the Gogland area, where they could hope for the help of fighters. But the transports that managed to move further east to the Mokhni region had at least 30 miles to go to Gogland.

Only warships could cover the transport fleet from the expected air attacks. However, out of ten destroyers, five have already died. "Proud" was seriously damaged, "Glorious" also had damage. "Severe" accompanied "Glorious". The Ferocious was busy towing the Proud. "Sharp-witted" guarded the cruiser "Kirov".

Consequently, only patrol ships, gunboats, minesweepers and net barriers that were in their protection could cover the convoys from attacks by enemy aircraft. But more could not be demanded of all these small ships than their weak anti-aircraft armament would allow.

Immediately after anchoring the cruiser Kirov, the commander of the KBF sent a radiogram to the commander of the Fleet Air Force with an order from dawn on August 29 to cover with fighter aircraft at least three groups of ships stretched along the Gulf of Finland. Another radiogram was ordered to send MBR-2 aircraft at dawn to continuously search for and destroy enemy submarines. And that was all that the KBF command could do for its part.

As soon as it began to dawn, the “beeches” signal was raised on the cruiser Kirov, and at 5.28 she weighed anchor. Five BTShch, who saw off the cruiser on August 28, lined up in the formation of a ledge with paravantrawls, and four BTShch of the cover detachment took up places in security on the left and right sides of the cruiser and the Suur-Tyl icebreaker. Minesweepers dropped depth charges for "preventive" bombing so often that in the end the entire supply of bombs was used up. Enemy planes, looking for easier prey, did not annoy the cruiser too much, and all the attacks made by him, which were fought off by well-controlled fire from naval anti-aircraft artillery, were unsuccessful, bombs dropped from aircraft fell 100–200 m from the cruiser. During the transition, the cruiser repulsed attacks by 32 aircraft, none of the more than 80 bombs dropped on the ship reached the target.

At 08.28, 2 MBR-2s arrived to escort the squadron, and at 08.45 - I-16 and I-153 fighters.

Starting from 8.30, radio reports began to arrive on the Kirov about the plight of the transport fleet. The commander of the gunboat battalion reported that enemy planes were bombing transports in the Mokhni area. The commander of the patrol ship "Storm" twice asked to send fighters to cover the convoy from bomber attacks.

Still not knowing about the death of the rearguard destroyers, the commander of the KBF at about 13.15 sent an order to assist the transports to the commander of the rearguard on the Kalinin, as well as to the commander of the Gogland detachment. But all the ships and vessels of this detachment were sent to the Western Holland Reach in the morning.

Having passed through the northern fairway, the detachment of the main forces, with the ships of the covering detachment that joined them, arrived at the Kronstadt roadstead at 16.40.

During the night, damage was repaired on the Minsk leader, turbogenerators were launched and the flooded compartments were drained. The machines were in good condition, the ship could go on its own. In view of the mismatch of the compasses on the "Minsk", the leader of the "Leningrad" was ordered to be the leader. At dawn, the Gak BTSC cleared the leader's camp, and two mines exploded in the trawl. At 6.40 the detachment moved forward. The Gak was followed by two leaders, two submarines, the Pikker messenger ship, as well as the destroyers Serovy and Glorious. From "Leningrad" they found three mines, which were shot from 45-mm guns.

At 6 o'clock the destroyer "Svirepy" resumed towing the "Proud". They safely left the Yuminda minefield, and the Fierce brought the damaged destroyer to Kronstadt at an eight-knot course. On the way, the destroyers twice, at 8.45 and about 13 hours, were subjected to fierce attacks from the air, but none of the bombs dropped hit the target. On this day, German pilots attacked especially fiercely, many ships were not subjected to such attacks during the entire two months of the war. The commander of the 4th DEM V.I., who was on the Fierce. Maslov reported on the radio that ammunition was running out, and fighters were sent to cover the destroyers. The patrol ship Amethyst, which was sailing in the wake of Gordom, shot down an enemy aircraft at 9.50.

To shorten the path of the BTShch, the Gak, not adhering to the fairway, went straight to the Rodsher. Enemy aircraft attacked the covering detachment several times, but were not successful. In particular, between 07:00 and 10:00, enemy planes, suddenly appearing in breaks in the clouds, tried twice to attack the leader "Leningrad" and three times - the destroyer "Glorious" - but thanks to the accurate firing of anti-aircraft artillery, the Germans dropped their bombs extremely randomly.

At 10.20, when the cover detachment, which was sailing along the northern fairway, was already approaching the area of ​​\u200b\u200bLavensari Island, the Minsk leader received a much belated radiotelegraphic response from the fleet commander to one of the requests for the return of four BTShch. In this radiogram, sent from the Kirov at 9.12, it was reported that at 6.45 seven minesweepers were sent towards the covering detachment. Having taken note of this telegram, which testifies to the poor performance of the fleet commander’s marching headquarters, the commander of the cover detachment, no longer seeing the need to move behind the trawl, which hampered freedom of maneuver when evading dive-bomber attacks, ordered the Gak BTSC to continue escorting submarines and a messenger ship " Pikker", and he himself, with both leaders and the destroyer "Sharp-witted", increased the speed from 12 to 22 knots at 10.30 and went to Kronstadt. At 10.35, two MBR-2s appeared over the ships, and then 15 I-16s flew in to escort them. Around 12.30 "Minsk" entered the wake of the cruiser "Kirov". At 5:05 pm, the ships anchored in the Kronstadt roadstead, and at 5:16 pm the Minsk moored to the wall of Ust-Rogatka.

During the night, the commander of the 1st convoy, with the help of boats of the Ministry of Defense, managed to restore contact with minesweepers and transports, and by dawn each transport was indicated its place in the general formation of the wake column. Transport "Kazakhstan" was put in the lead in the convoy, transport "Ivan Papanin" was also included in the 1st convoy.

As soon as it began to dawn, four minesweepers, setting up trawls, entered the head of the convoy. Soon they cleared two mines - the last ones cleared during the escort of the 1st convoy, since there were no minefields on the further route of this convoy. But instead of a mine threat, there was a serious threat from the air. On the passage from Waindlo Island to Kronstadt, the mine situation was uncomplicated and did not cause the loss of ships and vessels. The main danger on this section of the path was enemy aircraft. From 07:00 on the passage from Rodsher Island to Gogland, enemy aircraft in groups of 5-10 aircraft continuously bombed ships and vessels. Air cover for the convoys was not organized.

The first pair of fighters appeared over the ships only at 8.45, later all free fighter aircraft were taken into the air.

For almost an hour, simultaneously with the 1st convoy, but somewhat to the north, the ships of the covering detachment followed east, but they gradually increased the speed to 12 knots and quickly left behind the 1st convoy, which was moving at a five-knot speed. On the evening of August 28 and on the morning of August 29, they saw from the transports that the warships overtook them and "left them to the mercy of fate." This is what some captains of the lost transports later wrote in their flight reports, who knew that fighter aircraft could not cover the convoys either in the enemy minefield or on the Western Gogland Reach, but did not know the state of the warships that overtook the convoy on the morning of August 29 .

The destroyers "Svirepy" and "Severe", which were part of the security of the convoy, left the transports at night and on the morning of August 29 went with a cover detachment.

Transport "Kazakhstan", on which there were about 5,000 people, including 356 wounded, was subjected to fierce attacks by enemy aircraft throughout the day. As a result of the bombs hit, the transport lost speed, a fire broke out on the ship. The fire went on for several hours. Attacks by enemy planes did not stop. The ship stumbled into the shallows off Waindlo Island. 2300 fighters and commanders landed on the island. A few days later, the ships of the Gogland detachment evacuated them to Kronstadt.

The minesweeper No. 121, the Scout patrol ship and other ships came to the aid of the transport. On September 2, "Kazakhstan" was brought to Kronstadt. The heroic actions of the crew of "Kazakhstan" were noted in the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin No. 303 dated 09/12/1941

Assistant captain of the ship "Kazakhstan" L.N. Zagorulko, who led the fight to save the ship.

All other transports that were part of the 1st convoy on August 29 became victims of enemy aircraft. Two of them, "Ivan Papanin" and "Yarvamaa", sank on the Western Gogland reach. "Ivan Papanin" had on board more than 3,000 fighters and 300 vehicles. During another raid, the ship, which was 19 miles from Gogland, was hit by two bombs. 70 people were killed and injured. A fire broke out. The crew managed to bring the burning ship to Gogland and run it aground. More than 2,500 passengers were disembarked. A gust of wind swept the abandoned transport from the shallows into the sea. The next day he was finished off by aircraft. 11 passengers and 5 crew members escaped from the Järvamaa steamer. The floating workshop "Hammer and Sickle" was attacked by planes when approaching Gogland, a bomb hit the bow of the ship. The "Hammer and Sickle" threw itself onto the rocks at the southern tip of Gogland, 550 people landed on the shore. As a result of the hit of three more bombs, the floating workshop caught fire and completely burned out within two days. Transport "Alev", on which there were 1280 passengers (including 843 wounded) was damaged during an air raid, and then blew up on a mine. It sank a few miles west of Lavensari, killing 140 passengers and 9 crew members. As a result of 47 bomber attacks, about 17 hours east of Gogland, the Kolpake transport was killed. It killed 1,100 people, including 700 wounded soldiers. A significant part of the people who stayed on the water after the death of the ship were shot by fascist pilots from machine guns. The boats were picked up by 70 people, including 16 crew members. About 18 hours southwest of Lavensari, as a result of an attack by 14 bombers, the Atis Kronvalds transport, which had up to 1000 passengers on board, was killed. Some of the passengers were rescued, the death toll is unknown.

By this time, the anti-aircraft fire of minesweepers and escort ships had noticeably weakened, since almost all of the ammunition had been used up. For the same reason, the Shch-308 submarine, having no more shells, lay down on the ground. The training ship "Leningradsovet", which withstood many attacks by aircraft, successfully and skillfully evaded them by maneuvering. The minesweepers were also subjected to fierce attacks from the air, in particular, the minesweeper Lyapidevsky had to cut off the trawl to evade the attack of the dive bomber.

The commanders of the 2nd and 3rd convoys sent their navigators on boats before dawn to find out the places where the ships and vessels were anchored and to establish the order of the movement of the convoys, which was supposed to resume about half an hour before sunrise.

The Meadow transport was still afloat. At 6 o'clock, the boat MO-502 approached him and took off the three remaining wounded. Then, three explosive cartridges and a small depth bomb were suspended from the waterline. Their explosion coincided in time with the artillery shelling that began at 6.35 am from Cape Yuminda. The transport, standing helplessly in place, was an excellent target. It listed heavily, thick smoke poured out of the bow, but even two hours after the start of shelling by everyone, the abandoned ship remained on the surface of the sea.

The escort of the 2nd convoy was carried out by minesweepers No. 84 and No. 88. Their trawls were followed by the gunboat Moskva, the transport Siauliai, three net barriers, the hydrographic vessel Lood, the icebreaker Tasuya with the minesweeper No. 86 in tow and one or two vehicles.

Almost all the transports of the 2nd and 3rd convoys, quite randomly lining up in a wake column, followed the minesweepers of the 3rd convoy. At the same time, one ship - it is not known which one - at 6.51 was blown up by a mine and sank.

The navigator of the 8th division, who was on the minesweeper No. 88, often determined by the bearings of the lighthouses, quite accurately led the 2nd convoy along the axis of the fairway. On this way, two mines exploded in the trawls, the trawl had to be changed, but the convoy of transports did not stop.

Having started moving a little later than the 2nd convoy, the minesweepers of the 3rd convoy, having a slight advantage in speed, gradually overtook them, but, in general, both convoys up to the area of ​​​​the Rodsher lighthouse for almost six hours walked together in approximately parallel courses. The path of the 3rd convoy passed in 3-5 cab. south of track 2.

At about 7 o'clock, an enemy reconnaissance aircraft appeared, and dive-bomber raids soon began. During air attacks, the attention of transport captains to maintaining alignment in the ranks weakened, and, probably for this reason, the transports did not always go in the swept lane, especially since its width was only 1 cab., meanwhile, despite the fact that in the morning it was established calm weather, the noticeable drift current formed in the previous day continued to operate. Finally, some transports tried to maneuver to evade aircraft attacks. So, for example, at about 8.30 am the transport "Tobol" rolled out to the left, blocking the path of the ships coming from behind and violating the general order of alignment.

For all these reasons, during the escort of the 3rd convoy behind the trawls, heavy losses were incurred on mines. The minesweepers "Sturgeon" and "Shuya" cleared six mines, however, as a result of leaving the minesweeping strip at 7.43, the patrol ship "Sneg" (from the rearguard) that joined the 3rd convoy was blown up by a mine and sank half an hour later. The only survivor from the rearguard of the TFR "Storm" picked up 218 people from the water. The overloaded ship, without going to Gogland, went straight to Kronstadt, where it arrived on August 30 at 14.00.

The Naissaar transport was blown up by a mine and at 8.39 was sunk by German aircraft east of the island of Mohni. Several hundred wounded and most of the crew died. At 8.41 Ergonautis sank from German air strikes, killing more than 300 people. Finally, at 09.06, the Balkhash transport was blown up by a mine and after one and a half to two minutes disappeared under water, on board of which there were at least 3,000 fighters and commanders, of which only about 200 people were saved. Floating people were rescued by two transports and boats. The rescue ship "Kolyvan" was blown up by a mine and died.

Enemy air attacks continued throughout the day on 29 August. Rapid fire was opened on enemy dive-bombers from anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, from Maxim machine guns and rifles - from everything that could shoot. Rifle bullets were clearly harmless to the partially armored Junkers, but despite this, over 2,500 rifle shots were fired from some ships, such as the Vyatka net loader. According to the general impression, the attacks of enemy aircraft in most cases were not distinguished by special art and perseverance. Nevertheless, having become convinced of the relative weakness of the opposition to him, the enemy, through repeated raids, damaged and sank almost all the ships of the 2nd and 3rd convoys one after another with aerial bombs. Transports "Tobol", "Ausma", "Skrunda" and "Second Five-Year Plan" sank on the Western Gogland reach.

"Tobol" died northwest of Waindlo Island from direct hits by bombs dropped by 5 "Junkers" at the moment when he tried to approach the burning ship "Kazakhstan" to help him.

Ausma had on board the Paldiski garrison (up to 1200 people). At 13 o'clock, she sank in the area of ​​​​Rodsher Island from a direct hit by an air bomb. The death toll is unknown.

The Skrunda withstood 36 air attacks during August 29-30, 144 bombs were dropped on it, but it remained afloat. 5 miles from Waindlo Island, with a direct hit by a bomb, the steamer lost its course. All the wounded taken from the Luga transport and other passengers - a total of 2,000 people - were removed by minesweepers, boats, tugboats and taken to Gogland and Kronstadt. After that, the crew flooded the ship, because it was impossible to tow it.

The "Second Five-Year Plan" repeatedly repelled enemy attacks. During the 15th attack, after a direct hit by an air bomb, the ship began to sink. Minesweepers and boats removed and delivered to Gogland more than 2,500 people. As a result of subsequent attacks, the ship sank west of Gogland.

Transport "Lake Lucerne" at 15 o'clock was badly damaged by a direct hit of air bombs. 200 people died. The seriously wounded captain (G. Kask) managed to bring the ship to Gogland and put it aground. Over 2,500 people were brought ashore. The abandoned ship was attacked by aircraft, received new damage and sank.

"Siauliai" in the area of ​​Rodsher Island was damaged by a direct hit of an air bomb, but remained afloat. With the help of the rescuer "Meteor" and TShch-31, he came to the Suurkul roadstead. The entire personnel of the evacuated military unit with weapons was landed on the shore. The ship itself, having received damage during subsequent raids, sank.

Tanker No. 12 sank at 18.27 five miles east of Gogland. In the same area, the Vaindlo transport, which had left the Suurkul Bay to Kronstadt, was sunk by air bombs, which did not participate in the passage of the fleet from Tallinn.

Due to the damage received from air strikes, the Vormsi transport, which was going outside the caravans, jumped ashore on the island of Bolshoi Tyuters and was left by the crew. There is no information about the dead.

Only a small Kumari transport survived, which arrived in Kronstadt on August 30 without any damage.

Of the escort ships, only the gunboat "Amgun" received damage from attacks by enemy aircraft. The gunboat tried to cover the burning Ivan Papanin transport with anti-aircraft fire. The bomb hit the hold of the gunboat, pierced it and exploded in the water. The second bomb exploded near the side, damaging the refrigerator with shrapnel. The car had to be stopped. Soon the damage was repaired and Amgun, accompanied by the Moskva gunboat, moved on.

Convoy No. 1 arrived in Kronstadt at 7.30 on August 30 as part of the Leningrad Council and three submarines Shch-307, Shch-308, M-79. At 14.00, convoy No. 2 arrived: the Moskva gunboat, the Burya TFR, two net minelayers, three GISU, three Shch-type submarines, one "baby", four minesweepers, six tugboats, one schooner. Convoy No. 3, which arrived at 9.30 on August 30, consisted of only two units: the Amgun gunboat and the Kumari transport. Convoy No. 4 - SKR "Scout", two schooners and two minesweepers. Thus, only one small transport reached Kronstadt intact.

The ships of the Gogland detachment worked all day on August 29, all night and until half of the next day. As soon as information was received about the ships in distress, the ships of the detachment were sent to them. By the evening of the second day, they began to transfer people on small ships and boats to Kronstadt. In total, 12,160 people turned out to be on the island, of which 5,000 were picked up from the water and removed from burning transports, 5,160 descended from 5 transports to the island, and 2,000 from the “Kazakhstan” transport that stumbled onto Waindlo Island. At 1.40 on August 31, 5 BTSC arrived at Gogland and, having received 1350 people, went to Kronstadt. Minesweepers, tugboats, boats, schooners, aquarians, transports participated in the transportation of people to Kronstadt. Enemy aircraft almost continuously attacked ships on the way between Hogland and Kronstadt. The last 100 people left Gogland on the GISU "Hydrograph" on September 7th.

Preparations for the campaign were carried out hastily; there was no accurate accounting of the number of troops and civilians taken on transports. Therefore, in different documents there are different numbers of ships and vessels taken on board and delivered to Kronstadt and Leningrad. According to recent studies, 153 warships and boats and 75 transports and auxiliary vessels participated in the breakthrough. Died, according to various sources, from 19 to 22 ships and boats, from 34 to 43 transports and auxiliary vessels. A total of 65 ships, boats and auxiliary vessels.

About 30,000 fighters and commanders, the wounded and the civilian population were received by ships and vessels in Tallinn, 12,225 people were delivered to Kronstadt. Losses amounted to almost 18 thousand.

The loss of men and ships could have been much less if some serious mistakes had not been made. The course of the battles in the Baltic did not give grounds for optimistic conclusions either by the Headquarters, or even more so by the High Command of the North-West direction. It was obvious that the troops and the fleet would have to be evacuated from Tallinn, but the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was not given the task of preparing in advance for the evacuation. After receiving the withdrawal directive, there was no time to conduct serious preparations.

But the KBF command did not take the initiative either. Knowing that the enemy was reinforcing its minefields on the way to Kronstadt, it did not try to prevent this and attack the minelayers of the Germans and Finns. The boundaries of the minefield were not defined and no control trawling of the fairways was carried out. This is probably why, from the possible routes of movement - northern, central and southern - the central one was chosen, on which a destroyer, three transports, an icebreaker, and three battleships have already died. The command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet exaggerated the danger from enemy submarines and coastal artillery.

Could the losses have been reduced?

Mines (mainly on August 28) and enemy aircraft (during the day on August 29) were the cause of the death of ships and vessels during the breakthrough.

Encounters with mines could be half as much if it were possible to ensure the movement of all detachments and convoys along the same lane with a width of no more than 3 cab. It was this order of movement in one course that was outlined by the plan for the transition of the fleet.

However, in this regard, there were no instructions for navigation support. Without the use of floating landmarks (tanks, milestones), the possibility of making the transition on the same course was made dependent on the accuracy of the reckoning on ships and vessels and on the observance of alignment in the wake column - that is, on the skill of navigators and helmsmen.

When forcing the Yuminda minefield, five destroyers, two submarines, two patrol ships, a gunboat, two minesweepers, an armed tugboat, a hydrographic vessel, two rescue vessels, five transports and a self-propelled barge were killed by mines. In addition, the Luga transport was damaged by a mine explosion. Characteristically, the transports that followed the minesweepers in wake columns had fewer losses than warships that overtook the transports outside the swept lanes. Three destroyers of the rearguard were killed, violating the passage plan, and, instead of following the last convoy, they began to overtake the transports, walking through the minefield.

Preparing to break through the minefields, neither the fleet commander, nor the chief of staff, nor the chief of mine defense, nor their flagship specialists held meetings with the commanders of minesweeper divisions and minesweeper commanders in order to set them the task of crossing and developing tactical measures for mine support, provided for by the documents in force (NTSC-40).

These documents provided for the rarefaction of minefields by minesweeper boats with a shallow draft, which facilitated the task of minesweepers. The command had at its disposal 20 Rybinets-type boats and several KM and KLT boats armed with boat trawls. All of them could tow a boat trawl at a maximum speed of 6 knots, therefore, they would not delay the movement of convoys, since the speed of low-speed minesweepers was 5.5–6 knots.

On August 25–27, they were not used due to unfavorable weather. But on August 28 the weather improved. If, for example, 10-12 boats of the Rybinets type were put in front of the minesweepers conducting the 1st convoy, then, going with boat trawls, they could. significantly facilitate the task of low-speed minesweepers and thereby contribute to the solution of the general task of the fleet.

The rules provided for the designation of the swept lane with milestones. Specially designated boats were supposed to put sweeping milestones on the edges of the swept lane, which could prevent transports from being blown up by mines. These milestones would have served as landmarks for convoys until dark, therefore, there would not have been a long delay caused by the deliberate avoidance of minesweepers of the 2nd convoy from the axis of the fairway, and the convoy ships would not have crowded in the dense part of the Yuminda minefield. At night, boats were supposed to stand near the milestones and give light signals to passing ships and vessels. At the same time, it was possible to try to ensure the night passage of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th convoys through the eastern part of the Yuminda minefield. Perhaps, in this case, it would not have been without single losses on mines, or perhaps such losses would not have occurred.

There were such milestones in the database, including 50 luminous ones, but instead of distributing these milestones to minesweepers and escort boats, they were loaded onto one of the transports to be delivered to Kronstadt.

A lot of trouble was caused to ships and ships by mines cut by trawls, while not exploding and floating on the surface, it was difficult to notice them among the waves or in the dark. There were two ways to defuse these mines. Firstly, to mark floating mines with light buoys, as was done during the last trip to Hanko, or to place a boat near them, giving a signal.

Secondly, to try to shoot floating mines, for this special boats were allocated, which went directly behind the minesweepers' trawls. But there were so many mines that not all of the discovered mines were shot, which was explained by the crowding of moving transports, which, moreover, were overtaken by detachments of warships. Sometimes the boat opened fire on a mine, but was forced to stop it so as not to accidentally hit nearby transports. And the main task of the MO boats, which were part of the detachments of the main forces and cover, was to carry anti-submarine escort of warships, and floating and cut mines were shot only as far as possible.

Therefore, ships and vessels could only evade the mines found on the course. So, for example, the leader "Minsk" first evaded one, then two, and at 20.30 he discovered five mines at once. According to the report of the captain of the transport "Skrunda", he evaded five single mines and two "bushes", consisting of four and five ships that had apparently been cut by paravanes. Both in this report and in other voyage reports of the captains of the lost transports, as well as in the opinion of the Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, it is stated that the Navy, instead of guarding the transports, overtook them and went ahead, "cutting many mines, on which were undermined by transports.

In general, during the transition of the fleet on August 28–29, ships and vessels met at least 105 mines. 74 mines hit trawls and paravanes-guards, and at least 10 mines got stuck in abandoned trawls, 21 mines blew up ships and ships that were sailing without paravanes-guards.

For objective reasons, it was not possible to cover the detachments and convoys with fighters along the entire route. Only airfields in the Leningrad region remained at the disposal of the fleet aviation. No matter how useful the airfield on Gogland or Lavensari, but they were never built. Hopes for Soviet aviation in the last section of the transition did not materialize. The fighters did not manage to reliably cover the convoys in the final section, especially since warships were covered in the first place. Separate ships - a tanker and four transports - despite the periodic appearance of our fighters and MBR-2 reconnaissance aircraft, were nevertheless sunk by enemy aircraft on the Eastern Gogland reach.

The anti-aircraft artillery of warships was also not fully used, in the most critical area - on the Western Gogland Reach, warships abandoned transports. Yes, most of the ships were damaged by that time, but their anti-aircraft artillery was in order, and they could perform the task of providing air defense to transports. On the morning of August 29, the ships of the detachments of the main forces and covering forces could wait for the transports to approach and move at low speed, covering them with anti-aircraft fire. Of course, it is unlikely that they would have protected all the ships, but there could have been fewer losses. But both the commander of the fleet and the chief of staff rushed at full speed to Kronstadt.

In their memoirs, the admirals who led the operation assess it as an absolute victory. Post-Soviet historians call it nothing more than a tragedy, agony, and compare it with Tsushima.

The truth is probably somewhere in between these extremes. Most of the warships came to Kronstadt, and many transports, even damaged ones, managed to reach the shore, saving thousands of fighters and commanders. Sailors, military and commercial, commanders of ships and captains of ships, for the most part, did their duty, sometimes showing heroism. And it's not their fault that the operation had such an outcome.

The command of the Soviet fleet drew the appropriate conclusions, and the next evacuation of the naval base - Odessa - was carried out clearly, covertly and without losses.

Notes:

The exact boundaries of the minefield, the location of mine lines became known after the war from captured documents.

Our youth was not long
And covered with early gray hair.
Our youth vomited on mines,
It was flooded with a Tallinn wave ...
(O. Bergolts)

Alexandra Vasilievna Avanesova

Preface.

According to the memoirs of Alexandra Vasilyevna Avanesova (Kuzmina), a participant in the Great Patriotic War, from 1940 until the end of the war she worked in the hospitals of Tallinn and Leningrad as a nurse, awarded the Order of the Great Patriotic War, medals "For Military Merit" and "For the Defense of Leningrad". This is one of her stories about the Tallinn crossing in 1941, of which she was a direct participant.

One of the most little-known and little-studied pages of the Great Patriotic War is the so-called "Tallinn crossing". We are talking about a breakthrough on August 28-29, 1941 from Tallinn to Kronstadt of the main forces of the Baltic Fleet and ground forces that defended the Estonian capital. In the Military Encyclopedia, this transition is only mentioned. By the end of August, the Germans forced the defenders of Tallinn to retreat to the very last line of defense. Stubborn street battles were already beginning when the Headquarters of the High Command decided to relocate the fleet and units of the 10th Rifle Corps, which defended the city, to Kronstadt and Leningrad. On August 27, the Germans had already broken into the city, and on the 28th, the evacuation of our forces began. And although official sources still continue to assert that “the entire garrison of Tallinn was organizedly withdrawn from the defense lines and put on ships,” all this was far from being the case. The retreat took place under heavy fire from the enemy, in great haste, with unjustified losses of personnel and military property. Approximately in the same way, with huge casualties and losses, the withdrawal of naval forces from Tallinn took place. According to the Military Encyclopedia, 100 warships and 67 transport and auxiliary ships with troops (over 20 thousand people) took part in it. According to some modern historians, this was "the most tragic event in the history of the Baltic Fleet."

“Such a terrible and shameful catastrophe,” recalled one of the participants in the transition, the flag-miner of the mine defense detachment Goncharenko, “the Russian fleet has not known in its entire history. Such a nightmare can only be experienced once in a lifetime.

Another participant in the transition, the commander of the division of the OVR of the GB KBF (Protection of the Water District, the Main Base of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet), lieutenant commander Kapralov wrote: “The death of transports and a large number of people is the result of disorganization, the result of flight, since the armed ships went ahead, leaving the transports to their own devices . It was possible to send at least three fighters that would not allow bombarding transports, but this was not done, and enemy aircraft bombed transports with impunity, where thousands of people died.

In anticipation that they will still have to leave Tallinn, on August 24 and 25, two transports with the wounded are sent from the city, since a catastrophic situation has developed with them. Although Tallinn was the main base of the fleet and the capital city, the flow of the wounded literally overwhelmed all medical institutions: there were not enough personnel, medicines, or places. Therefore, the removal of the wounded was one of the most urgent problems. Until July 23, they, mainly from army units, were evacuated by rail. On July 27, the enemy occupied the Tapa railway station and, thus, cut the only highway to Leningrad. Now only the waterway remained.

By this time, the Baltic Fleet had only one ambulance "A. Zhdanov", which was equipped to transport 700 wounded. Also, for the transportation of the wounded, the motor ships “V. Molotov" and "Siberia", who were summoned to Tallinn for this purpose. The rest of the transports designated for the removal of the wounded were cargo-passenger ships, urgently very primitively equipped according to the instructions of the military transportation department.

The evacuation process itself experienced great difficulties due to the lack of medical equipment and medical staff, who did not return to the base after moving to Leningrad. The first batch of wounded was sent on August 11 and 12 on the ships “V. Molotov" and "Aurania", and then on August 18 another 890 people on the transport "Siberia". True, not all the places on these ships were occupied by the wounded and sick. Women and children were transported, mostly the families of officers. So, in addition to 900 wounded, 400 civilians were on the Siberian. Of course, sending the families of military personnel to Leningrad had the most favorable effect on the condition of the officers. However, on August 23, there were still more than 5,500 wounded in Tallinn.

*** *** *** *** ***

As in the cinema of a repeated film, various episodes float before me, the witness or participant of which I was, the figures and faces of commanders and comrades appear - living, although most of them have already passed away.

1940 My girlfriends and I study at the technical school at the Petrodvorets Watch Factory. We are taught how to grind stones, how to grind them, saw them, drill them, but corundum is very hard, unyielding ... it is very difficult, but I like to feel like a free person. I now have a specialty!

But the air already smells of war. And we, along with working specialties, also acquire the military specialties of medical instructors, and we are also taught to shoot, defend ourselves, and train as cadets of military schools.

Hooray! Finally we are running the factory. I grind stones, I was entrusted with a difficult and responsible area. The master has already paid attention to me, and soon I will be given a more responsible job. I like all this very much. And besides, I get a full salary for this, I can now help my family. Yes, they really noticed me, but they transferred me to another workshop by the distribution of work. I myself began to plan the necessary work for others. I was still the youngest distributor, but in my thoughts I already saw myself as a senior distributor of work. I liked walking around the shop and giving assignments. I was already a step above all my girlfriends. And suddenly they told me to come to the Komsomol Committee.

I ran there, and my heart was ready to jump out of my chest: they would tell me something, probably, they would praise me for my work. I stretched all over like a string, prettier and began to wait for my turn, since I was not alone there.

And in the Komsomol Committee they told me that I was going as a Komsomol member to work in a hospital as a surgical nurse. I began to say that I can't do anything. To which the secretary replied:

- You were taught at the school, there you will not be alone. For the fees of the day. Take winter and summer clothes, a blanket and a pillow with you. Gathering at 9.00.

We were brought to Tallinn. They instructed how to behave: not to speak Russian among themselves if we see someone in civilian clothes, not to leave the hospital, not to communicate with anyone. I was assigned to work at the Naval Hospital. There was no work, there were no wounded, sometimes military men were brought from the ships with minor bruises and wounds. We prepared dressing material, prepared tampons. In general, there was a calm and measured life.

And suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, although we had been waiting for this all the time, we were told that the war had begun.

So, a new phase of my life began. It was already July 1941. Ordinary life was still going on in the city, and in the mornings from our windows one could see how people flowed in streams along the narrow winding streets of Tallinn, hurrying to work, to shops, to meet friends, and even on the beach, vacationers were still calmly sunbathing. But my heart was still very disturbing. The formidable iron breath of war was already approaching us quite close. As before, there were lilacs on the tables, there was a well-fed and calm life around, somewhat reminiscent of a resort, and if it were not for the disturbing news in the newspapers and on the radio, you would not say that Kyiv, Moscow, Leningrad were being bombed somewhere. All the time I think about the house: how is my mother, father. The reports are very disturbing, they cause both anger and rage:

- Bastards! They will answer for it! We will make them cry and worry the same way!

There is no news from home. Mail is not working. Moscow is already being bombed by the Nazis for the third time.

So we heard the sounds of war: having broken through to the raid and the ships, the fascist planes began to throw bombs. And now we have not only heard, but also seen the war. The war, as it seemed to us then, was approaching Tallinn imperceptibly. Like a venomous snake, she slithered up to sting deadly and mercilessly. By mid-August, it had already become customary to hear day and night the rumbles of naval artillery, which fired at the enemy. We saw the explosions of enemy shells, we saw columns of white water that seemed to rise straight up to the sky. And very soon the enemy was already at the ancient walls of Tallinn. The city became harsh and unfriendly: institutions had already stopped working, shops were closed, barricades appeared on the streets, fires were visible, there was a burning smell in the air that did not disappear even at night. Tallinn was like a huge torch: warehouses and tanks with gasoline were burning, this torch, probably, could be seen in Finland ...

War, war ... it changed everything: the wounded immediately appeared, there was not enough prepared tampons and dressings, everything was spinning and spinning, there was no time left for anything. We worked almost day and night with a short break for sleep, and the Germans kept coming and coming, getting closer and closer to Tallinn. Every day we were informed that the enemy was already somewhere near us, and every day this distance was reduced by several tens of kilometers. And by the evening of August 25, it had already become known that the Germans went on the attack already in the coastal part of Tallinn. Artillery and heavy mortar shelling of the roadstead and port berths began. And the moment came when the city was already completely surrounded by the Germans, who were thrown away only by the powerful calibers of the artillery of the ships accumulated in the roadstead.

So, this day came, August 25, 1941, which turned not only my life upside down. On this day, Leningrad began, which later received the name "Tallinn Crossing". During this operation, the human losses of the Soviet fleet, civilian sailors, Red Army soldiers and evacuees from Estonia during the Tallinn crossing more than doubled the losses of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima battle.

We were told on the evening of August 25, 1941, that the loading of the wounded on a transport that would go to Kronstadt was about to begin. The ship was called "KALPAKS" (KALPAKS), and it was under the number BT-524 in convoy No. 1. It bore the name of the Latvian colonel Oskar Petrovich Kalpaks (1882-1919). From the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, all operating ships began to be called military transports under the corresponding numbers, and therefore our ship was simply called transport No. 524.

Loading began, everything began to spin, spun, began to seethe. It was necessary to arrange all the wounded on transport so that it would be convenient for everyone to get to Kronstadt. Temporary beds in 2 tiers were arranged on the transport, so we girls tried to put the seriously wounded on the lower shelf, and arrange the lightly wounded, and those who could somehow move around, on the 2nd tier. Only by 5 pm on August 27 was the landing of people and the loading of weapons and equipment onto warships and transports completed. We were ordered to move, but we moved in a strange way, everyone walked and walked in the harbor in a circle. When the wounded asked us if Kronstadt was already visible, we answered that we were already visible. Some of the wounded climbed onto the deck and saw that we were still in Merchant Harbor, told others ... and then it was our turn to calm the wounded. There were not enough dressing materials, and what could be done to help at sea, if we prepared for the fact that we would immediately bring the wounded to the equipped hospitals on the shore. We fed the wounded with porridge, stretching our supply for several days. According to the norm, it was necessary to place only 700 people on our transport, but they loaded more than a thousand people, and even lifted them from the sea, from those transports that were bombed. Everyone was in their places, and we all waited and waited for the Kirov cruiser to arrive.

Tallinn crossing. Covering the cruiser "Kirov" with a smoke screen. August 1941

And only about 15 hours on August 28 in the afternoon the entire squadron moved to Kronstadt. In front of and behind our transport, it seemed that, right up to the horizon, our ships, both combat and transport, were going and going. The transports slowly crawled out and crawled out of the harbor, and the cruiser "Kirov" and several other destroyers still remained in the roadstead and fired back from their guns at enemy batteries. At the sea gates in the Coastal harbor, the bulk of the old mine-layer "Amur" still towered. Before the war, we often ran to the harbor to look at this handsome man.

Surprisingly, what he saw and experienced in the cruel time of 1941 was imprinted in memory in all details. You don’t even need to tune in to a certain wave: as soon as you think about the war, it rises before your eyes: burning Tallinn, and columns of smoke, and ships and transports leaving the harbor, and the howl of shells, and bomb explosions on the water.

Memory is already fading. Often I don’t even remember what the weather was like yesterday, I can forget what I ate for breakfast today, but I always remember the names of my fighting girlfriends and friends, the places where the battles took place and those who died in that war.

There were a lot of people on our transport, more than a thousand people. There was nowhere for the apple to fall. The ships were loaded to capacity. It rained overnight and the planes flew in. And we worked and worked: bandaged, fed, calmed. There were only two of us for the entire transport: me and another nurse who fed the wounded.

Among our evacuees on the transport was one wounded named Gusev, who was already drowning in the Baltic Sea and was rescued by our crew. His naked body was covered only by someone's old torn trousers and overcoat. For some reason, he immediately imbued with respect for me. As soon as enemy planes flew in and began to bomb us, he immediately ordered me to go to the upper deck. When he and I were climbing the ladder, there was a strong blow, and fire blazed from the cabin. From there, a man rose up, holding his stomach, and presented a terrible picture. I immediately rushed to help him, but my escort abruptly grabbed my hand:

Shurochka, you can't help me anymore. You need to jump into the water and immediately swim as far as possible from the transport. Understood? Get as far away from traffic as possible.

- Not. No I can not. I'm afraid. But what about you?

There was no answer, and I flew overboard. He pushed me so hard that I really ended up in the water at some distance from the transport. People poured from the sides. They all jumped and jumped, and I swam farther and farther away from the transport, which lurched and was already half in the water. I screamed and screamed:

"Mommy, save me!" I'm drowning, help...

But there was only cold Baltic water around. I was wearing a rubber life jacket, but I couldn't inflate it, but I just screamed and screamed. And suddenly a young, but imperious female exclamation was heard nearby:

- Stop screaming, take care of your strength, no one will help you, you will only completely squander all the remaining strength.

I stopped screaming and saw a young woman from a nearby army hospital.

She said:

Hold on to me, to the vest, take a break.

She was wearing a hooded life jacket. I immediately grabbed her vest, and instinctively stopped screaming and took a breath.

I grew up on the Right Bank of the Neva. From our house, the church on the other side of the Neva was just visible, which now stands on a hillock in Yam-Izhor. Our house was built right by the water, and the trees in our garden bowed their heads right down to the water. Early in the spring we already started swimming in the Neva, although the water was very cold. The brothers were pulling out “dumps” from the Neva, these are logs that floated along the river during the ice drift in early spring. Often I also helped them, repeatedly ending up in the cold water of the Neva, forced to take cold baths. Yes, and we just started swimming with the guys very early: as soon as the sun warms up a little, we already run to the Neva and swim in a race. This, probably, saved me in the cold Baltic font of 1941.

And the Germans kept bombing and bombing... I fixed my eyes on our transport. It was no longer visible above the surface of the water, and only a large funnel of black water showed where my temporary home had been in these last few days.

And around on the black Baltic water here and there only heads were visible, there was a cry that merged into a single groan. Here and there cries and pleas were heard:

“Help, lonely ones, give me a life belt, I have a weak wife and two small children at home!” Help, give me the belt, how will they survive without me...

Moans and floundering in the water were heard here and there, when the stronger took away life jackets from the weak and wounded, exhausted by a long stay in cold sea water, those who could not resist, ... And from the air a “hot rain of bullets” poured from fascist machine guns, who incessantly beat from aircraft. I saw all the horror of this tragedy, I saw it, but I did not flinch, I did not save. I really wanted to live, I wanted to go home to my mother. I felt her warm hands on my cold, stiff hands, and she stroked and stroked me, and asked only to endure everything and survive. And the stormy waters of the cold Baltic closed over the heads of the sailors - the heroes who found their last abode on the seabed.

My neighbor and savior Katya took command of our movement into her own hands and said:

I could only obey, and I could not then make any decisions. And the Germans bombed and bombed, anti-aircraft guns fired from our ships. Our warships and civilian ships, our transports went under water. Falling from the sides, the soldiers shouted, and from the sinking and burning ships, our anti-aircraft gunners and machine gunners hit the planes. And we all swam and swam away from all this. It was a voyage into the unknown. And will we get to Kronstadt now - this grandmother said in two ...

The war has sunk into my memory for the rest of my life, and although it has long ended, I remember everything to the smallest moments, and how can one forget those people with whom I went to visit death together. I have always believed that if something happens to us, it is the result of our activities, and we deserve it. Just like that, God cannot punish his child. I had this perception of fate. Yes, of course, something is predetermined, some way, but, however, now I am sure that a person can change his fate, overcome all hardships.

It seemed to me that it lasted forever: I held on to the kapok vest of my savior, rested and swam again. She tried several times to inflate my life jacket, but it was very cold, neither her hands nor her lips would obey. We had already sailed far away from the main mass of people and I saw only black dots on the water - here and there heads emerged from the water ...

Pain and cold in me melted into something more valuable: experience. It was then, in the cold Baltic water, when the future seemed too terrifying for me to peer into it, and the past seemed too painful and scary for me to peer into it, at that moment I developed the ability to rejoice and be very attentive to the present. Let small, but real, today's happiness. Now I felt relatively safe. Every moment of my life was already more tolerable. I breathe in and breathe out - this means that I live, I must live and must survive. And clenching my teeth, I continued to swim and swim, on and on.

The cries and groans were no longer distinguishable, only the noise of the ships moving away from us was clearly heard on the water. And then we saw the schooners that were going next to us. We have hope that we will be heard or seen. But, alas, they passed by, and we were so weak that we could not only shout, but even whisper ... I saw how some of the heads on the water, far from us, rushed to these destroyers, but they only fell into a whirlpool, and there are fewer dots on the water. Our salvation, which was so close, passed us by...

And again there was a stupor: I am alone, alone in the sea, no one needs us, no one will help us. Everyone who survived a sea disaster knows that a cold font reconciles with death. After a few hours of swimming, the end seems like a release. Death comes when strength is exhausted, and exhaustion of strength occurs painlessly and is accompanied by complete indifference. But still hoping for something, I swam and swam. In my position, the main thing was to move. Water, a lot of water, all around to the horizon there is only water and darkness. I was very thirsty. There was water all around, and my throat was thirsty. At some point, like a mirage in the desert, fountains of fresh cold water surfaced in my memory that were beaten in our shop, where I once worked at the beginning of my youth. You need to think about salvation, look for a rescue boat in the sea, but for some reason I think about these fountains.

And suddenly, in this darkness, an Estonian schooner appeared, which slowly began to move near us. I gathered all the remaining strength and began to approach her. Thin ropes were thrown from the schooner, which you had to grab onto in order to be dragged up. I tried several times to cling to them with my hands, but there was no strength. And then they threw me a rope with a loop, at some point I bent over and climbed into this loop with my whole body. How I did it and now I can’t imagine myself, but they began to drag me and lifted me onto the schooner. There were no tears. I lay on the deck and was silent, I had no strength to rejoice at the rescue, there were no emotions either, some kind of stupor set in. My eyes were closed, but there were mostly only men around, and I lost all my clothes in the sea and only one vest remained on me, which tightly stuck around my body. The Estonian owner of the schooner gave me his shirt. It was hardly pulled over me: I didn’t even have the strength left to dress myself, they brought a glass of hot tea. Everyone who was pulled out of the water was now being taken on a schooner to Kronstadt. So, my second birth took place. When we arrived in Kronstadt, Katya was not among those rescued on this schooner. I still don't know if she survived or not.

Much later, we learned that our ship KALPAKS (KALPAKS), VT-524 (Captain - E. Weinberg was very seriously wounded) was sunk as a result of 47 attacks by German bombers. More than 1,100 people died, including 700 wounded soldiers. A significant part of the people who stayed on the water after the death of the ship were shot by fascist pilots from machine guns, which increased the total number of victims. The boats were picked up from the water by 70 people, including 16 crew members. Date and place of death of transport No. 524 - August 29, 1941, the Gulf of Finland, east of the island of Gogland. Ships, like people, everyone leaves their mark on life. For some it is small and inconspicuous, while for others it is large and deep.

Epilogue.

Later we learned that a total of 112 ships, 23 transports and auxiliary vessels had arrived in Kronstadt. More than 18 thousand people were transported from Tallinn on ships and transports. During the Tallinn crossing, 15 ships (5 destroyers, 2 submarines, 2 TFRs, 3 minesweepers, a gunboat and 2 boats), 31 transports and auxiliary vessels, more than 15 thousand people died.

The Baltic Sea, the sea in which I perished, was and remains for me not a symbol of death, but a symbol of life, a symbol of striving for a better future, a symbol of hope. Our generation is already passing away, but while we are still alive, and while we are not gone yet, our memory is still open to the young. We remember all our fighting friends and girlfriends, and call them only by their first names, despite the fact that they are already 90 years old.

The material for publication was provided by Lidia Kutsenko,
St. Petersburg, June 2007