Workers. Labor armies German labor army

Goncharov G.A.

Chelyabinsk State University

LABOR MOBILIZATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR (1941-1945)

The article is devoted to the study of the issue of labor organization in the USSR in wartime conditions. The Great Patriotic War demanded a huge army. A significant part of the able-bodied population was diverted from social production. On the other hand, for the wide deployment of military production, a large number of workers in the rear were required. To solve the problem, the experience of the Civil War was used, the forms and methods of organizing labor during the period of “war communism” were revived.

The entry of the USSR into the war with Nazi Germany in June 1941 put on the agenda the issue of mobilizing all available forces and means. One of the most important and complex problems was the provision of the national economy with labor resources. The Patriotic War demanded, on the one hand, a huge army, in connection with which a significant part of the most able-bodied population was diverted from social production, and on the other hand, a wide deployment of military production and, consequently, a large number of workers in the rear. In the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 29, 1941 and the speech of the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin on July 3, 1941, a program was outlined for mobilizing the country's forces to fight the aggressor, the direction, nature and scale of practical measures to create a rapidly growing military production in a short time were determined. The goal is "... to strengthen the rear of the Red Army, subordinating all ... activities to the interests of the front, to ensure the enhanced work of all enterprises ...". The Soviet economy was largely prepared for the solution of the set task by the previous course of its development.

First of all, labor service was revived. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941 "On martial law" in areas declared under martial law, the military authorities were given the right to involve citizens in labor service to perform defense work, protect communications, build communications and other critical facilities , to regulate the working hours of institutions and enterprises, to declare auto-drawn duty. Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of June 26, 1941 “On the regime of

working hours of workers and employees in wartime "temporarily canceled regular and additional holidays for workers and employees with their replacement with monetary compensation (since April 1942, the payment of monetary compensation for unused vacations was discontinued until the end of the war), and the introduction of overtime work was also legally allowed, including for persons under 16 years of age. In the regions, an 11-hour working day began to be introduced. Some local authorities have taken decisions on additional extension of the working day. In July 1941, for example, the plenum of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided: “... establish such an order that everyone who does not fulfill the norm during the working day should not leave work until he has fulfilled his production rate." Similar decisions were made in other regions of the Urals. But these measures proved insufficient. A tense balance of labor resources began to take shape in those regions of the country where the concentration of production increased significantly. To a large extent, this affected the Urals. According to Ural researchers, in the Chelyabinsk region, for example, on December 10

In 1941, more than 50 thousand additional workers were required in the most important branches of the defense industry. In order to solve this problem, the entire able-bodied population was taken into account and mass explanatory work was carried out on employment at industrial enterprises. The situation was complicated by the evacuation of enterprises to the eastern regions, during which part of the workforce was lost. In mid-September 1941, the Committee for the Distribution of Labor Force was forced to state that during the evacuation of enterprises, only 20-40%

sent along with the plant, the rest go to the people's militia or are evacuated in the general order and in the future do not work in their specialty. In addition, not all evacuees were able-bodied. According to available data, in July 1943 in the Urals, the share of the able-bodied evacuated population was 53.9% of the total.

Other methods were needed to fundamentally solve the problem. From the end of 1941, the Soviet leadership, as in the years of the Civil War, was forced to move to a systematic, phased implementation of the mobilization of the civilian population. The workers and employees of military industry enterprises were the first to be mobilized. On December 26, 1941, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the Responsibility of Workers and Employees of Military Industry Enterprises for Unauthorized Leaving Enterprises” was adopted, according to which all workers and employees of military industry enterprises were mobilized for permanent work in production. In February 1942, the able-bodied urban population was subjected to mobilization - men aged 16 to 55 years, women - from 16 to 45 years. First of all, the mobilized were sent to work in the aviation and tank industries, the People's Commissariat of Arms and Ammunition, in the metallurgical, chemical and fuel industries.

In April 1942, the number of civilians who fell under the category of "mobilized" was significantly expanded. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 13, 1942 “On the procedure for mobilizing the able-bodied population of cities and rural areas for agricultural work, collective farms, state farms and MTS” allowed the able-bodied population of cities and rural areas to be recruited for work in the countryside areas that did not work at industrial and transport enterprises. The age limits of persons subjected to mobilization were also expanded: men - from 14 to 55 years old, women - from 14 to 50 years old.

The transition to the militarization of labor through the mobilization of the civilian population required a legislative generalization

In 1942, a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the procedure for attracting citizens to labor service in wartime" was adopted, which summarized the basic principles for attracting citizens to labor service. Labor service was introduced to perform defense work and other military needs, to procure fuel, to perform special construction work and other government tasks, to fight fires, epidemics and natural disasters, to protect facilities. Citizens were involved in labor service for up to 2 months with a working time of 8 hours a day and 3 hours of mandatory overtime. Persons involved in labor service could be used both at their place of permanent residence and outside it. Age limits for work were set: men from 16 to 55 years old and women from 16 to 45 years old. Starting from the second half of 1942, the Soviet leadership took a number of measures aimed at involving in the production of the civilian population, which had not previously fallen under the category of mobilized. On August 28, 1942, the people's commissars of social security of the union republics were obliged to send non-working disabled persons of group III (men under the age of 55 and women under the age of 45) to work at their place of residence in enterprises and institutions within 3 months, taking into account the relevant conclusions VTEK. Disabled people who refused to work from December 1, 1942 stopped paying pensions. In September 1942, by amending the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 13, 1942, the mobilization age of women for work in production and construction was increased from 45 to 50 years. In the same month, all workers employed in state institutions in areas close to the front were transferred to the position of mobilized. They were assigned to the enterprises and institutions in which they had previously worked.

The introduction of the system of universal labor conscription of the population was accompanied, as in the years of the Civil War, by the introduction of criminal liability for civilians in accordance with the laws of wartime.

me. On June 29, 1941, the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was published to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions on the mobilization of all forces and means to defeat the fascist invaders, which set the task of immediately restructuring the activities of party and Soviet bodies in relation to wartime conditions, mobilization all the forces and means of the country to help the Red Army and bringing to court a military tribunal all those who, with their alarmism and cowardice, interfered with the cause of defense, regardless of their faces. Those who violated the labor regime were sentenced either to imprisonment or to forced labor served at their workplace. These crimes fell under the jurisdiction of both civil and military courts. Military tribunals were obliged to consider criminal cases related to violation of labor discipline immediately on an extraordinary basis. In the period from July 1941 to April 1942, the possibility of criminal punishment for violation of the labor regime was extended to the entire civilian able-bodied population of the USSR, which was legally confirmed in the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 10, 1942 "On the procedure for attracting citizens to labor duties in wartime.

On the ground, the introduction of universal labor service was carried out in accordance with a phased plan for the mobilization of the civilian population.

A typical example is its introduction in the regional center of the Southern Urals, Chelyabinsk. At the end of February 1942, under the executive committee of the Chelyabinsk city council of working people's deputies, a bureau was created for accounting and distribution of labor. During the war in Chelyabinsk, registration and re-registration of the population (including those evacuated) was carried out monthly. The chiefs of district police departments were required to report daily to the district executive committees lists of persons of mobilization age who arrived or were registered in the city; house managers (or chairmen of street committees) provided lists of persons subject to mobilization in connection with the changes that had taken place. In 1942, the population was registered by sex and age.

my principle. In June 1942, given that in wartime the use of all labor resources became important, the city executive committee ordered the social security department to keep an accurate record of all non-working disabled people of group III.

The attraction of the population in the city to labor and horse-drawn duty began to be carried out from the autumn of 1941. Every decade the mobilization of the population to combat snow drifts was carried out every year of the war until April inclusive. The city authorities carried out the mobilization of the population for the procurement of fuel: unloading and loading fuel on the railway. Art. Chelyabinsk, peat extraction (extraction and drying of peat), wood harvesting, extraction and shipment of coal at the Kopey mines, etc. In pursuance of the GKO decree of February 21, 1942, paid labor and horse-drawn duty was introduced in the city for the collection and transportation of scrap and waste ferrous metals. Men aged 16 to 55 and women aged 16 to 45 were subject to mobilization. In February-March 1942, the first mass mobilization of the urban population was carried out in the city. It was decided to mobilize 3,000 people. Mobilization was announced from March 1, 1942, able-bodied men aged 16 to 45 from among those who did not work in state institutions and enterprises were subject to conscription. On March 17, 1942, a decision was made to carry out additional mobilization in the amount of 3,700 people. In parallel, less massive mobilizations are carried out: March 6 - 391 people, March 14 - 200 people, March 16 - 650 people, March 30 - 535, April 16 - 400, etc. The mobilized were sent to factories No. 34, 62, 78 , 200, 549, zem, Ferroalloy, im. Ordzhonikidze, Kolyushchenko, Compressor, electrode, Kirovsky and Vtorcher-met. In April 1942, in Chelyabinsk, the population was mobilized for agricultural work. On April 20, 1942, the city executive committee decided to mobilize the population (3,000 people) for agricultural work within 3 days, who did not work at industrial and transport enterprises, as well as from among employees of state, cooperative and public institutions. Since the summer of 1942, invalids of the III group began to be involved in the work.

py . Similarly, events developed in other cities of the Urals. As a result, the entire able-bodied population was mobilized.

In conditions when the entire "trustworthy" population of the country worked for the defense of the country, the Soviet government did not leave politically unstable citizens without attention. But allowing them to work with others would be dangerous. Where to find for each overseer? Here, the experience of the “labor armies” of the period of the Civil War, and then the “labor units”, where the main forms became labor, military and work units in the form of work battalions, separate work companies and columns, construction teams, and their composition was completed both at the expense of citizens with limited rights, and at the expense of full-fledged citizens of the USSR. The analysis of documents makes it possible to distinguish this category into a special social group. She was united by a special social status, which determined the relationship with the authorities and local residents, living conditions, the regime of maintenance and sources of supply, forms of labor organization. The beginning of the involvement of this social group in labor was laid by order No. 322 with the stamp of the SS of the State Defense Committee (GKO) of June 29, 1941, which announced the creation of separate battalions. Their formation was entrusted to the People's Commissariat of Defense. On September 11, 1941, the GKO adopted a resolution according to which the construction battalions were reorganized into work detachments and columns. Simultaneously with the NPO, the NKVD also organized construction battalions from the beginning of the war. In accordance with the order of the NKVD of the USSR of September 26, 1941, they were reorganized into work columns and removed from the quartermaster supply. In November 1941, in a letter to the heads of the camps, the status of construction battalions was clarified.

and construction battalions: “... Construction battalions work like labor columns. Those mobilized into these columns are liable for military service and cannot leave the columns without permission ... ”In the spring of 1942, the State Defense Committee of the USSR suspended the formation through NPOs and the transfer of work columns to economic people's commissariats, obliging them to independently provide themselves with labor. The NKVD, in turn, received the right to form work columns from certain categories of Soviet citizens. At the same time, it should be noted that the NCO did not turn out to be completely excluded from the mobilization of the civilian population into work columns. The fact is that the mobilization of those liable for military service to the labor front continued to be carried out through military registration and enlistment offices, and the NKVD took part in the formation of "work columns". On October 14, 1942, a resolution of the State Defense Committee of the USSR was adopted, according to which the NGOs and the NKVD of the USSR were to mobilize Soviet Germans and Soviet citizens of other nationalities fighting the USSR into work columns of the NKVD. In addition, the State Defense Committee of the USSR instructed NGOs to mobilize the civilian population in the Central Asian Military District (SAVO) through local military commissariats, and the NKVD to participate in its distribution. The "working columns" of the NKVD included mobilized from the Central Asian military district and certain categories of citizens declared politically unstable. To a large extent, these were special settlers.

Thus, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the methods of organizing labor during the period of "war communism" were reproduced. Labor mobilization, the introduction of universal labor service, the revival of paramilitary labor units made it possible to solve the problem that arose in the new military hard times.

List of used literature:

1. The CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. M., 1985. T. 7. S. 222.

2. Ural XX century. Yekaterinburg, 1998.

3. Potemkina M.N. Evacuation during the Great Patriotic War to the Urals: people and destinies. Magnitogorsk, 2002, pp. 117, 118, 260.

4. The decision of the party and government on economic issues (1917 - 1968). T. 3. S. 64, 68, 104.

5. Wartime labor legislation. M., 1943. S. 9. 13, 18, 29-33.

6. OGACHO. F. 220. Op. 2. D. 99. L. 20 - 32.

7. RGASPI. F. 644. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 140.

8. RGASPI. F. 644. Op. 2. D. 102. L. 47, 48, 72, 73.

This was the name given in 1920 to the armies transferred to the economic front. While maintaining their military organization, these armies carried out certain economic operations (logging, fuel for transport, work in coal mines, etc.).

Labor armies were one of the stages in the development of the militarization of labor. Universal labor service was only the starting point of this development. The need for labor armies began to be felt when it became clear that the task of organizing labor required not only measures of centralized accounting and distribution of labor, but also direct management of the labor process in the new conditions. Interdepartmental commissions on labor service did not satisfy this last goal, since they were more like meetings to coordinate individual labor assignments, rather than bodies of direct management of labor service; moreover, they were not connected in their daily work with the production itself. All these shortcomings were eliminated by the creation of labor armies that had a ready-made apparatus and a cadre of disciplined workers and took an active part in the production process itself. According to the meaning of their existence, they were temporary bodies, intended to function only until the national economy recovered from the wounds inflicted on it by the war. But during this period they were that "link, to keep which meant to keep the whole chain." With the further development of the labor armies, they became a connecting and unifying center in the localities, which, on the basis of certain economic plans, could unite and combine the work of various local economic institutions. Thus, they began to turn into regional economic bodies. Both the militarization of labor in general and one of its highest forms, labor armies, at first aroused opposition in the ranks of the party (on this see note 84). At the beginning of 1921, in view of the comparative strengthening of the economy and the emerging change in the direction of the NEP, the labor armies were liquidated, and the military labor units were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Labor Service Committees. /T. fifteen/

1st Army of Labor. - After the defeat of Kolchak, the 3rd Army, located in the Urals, raised the issue of using it for labor purposes. Signed by the commander of the 3rd Army Comrade. Matiyasevich and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council Gaevsky On January 10, 1920, a telegram was sent to the Chairman of the Soviet Defense and the Pre-revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, in which the question of turning the 3rd Army into an army of labor was raised.

"In order to restore and organize the economy throughout the Urals as soon as possible (in the Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk and Tobolsk provinces)," the telegram read, "Revsovar three proposes: 1) to apply all the forces and means of the Red Army to the restoration of transport and the organization of the economy in the above area, 2 ) rename the Red Army of the Eastern Front into the 1st revolutionary labor army, 3) establish a revolutionary labor council consisting of three persons with a chairman at the head, appointed and led directly by the Defense Council, "etc.

"I fully approve your proposal. I welcome the initiative. I am submitting the question to the Council of People's Commissars. Begin to act subject to the strictest coordination with the civil authorities, giving all your strength to the selection of all surplus food and the restoration of transport."

January 15 Com. Trotsky had already introduced a project for the organization of the 1st Army of Labor. The decision of the Council of Defense on this matter read:

"The 3rd Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is used for labor purposes on a regional scale as an integral organization, without destroying and crushing its apparatus, under the name of the 1st Revolutionary Army of Labor."

On the same day Com. Trotsky sent a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army, in which he warned of difficulties and set a number of priority tasks:

“It is necessary,” Comrade Trotsky wrote, “to overcome departmentalism and mutual distrust. It is necessary, by all external and internal means, to give the work the character of communist service, and not of serving official service. For this, all local communist forces must be involved. Your experience is of tremendous importance. If only he broke down in a squabble or unforeseen - this would be a very cruel blow for the Soviet Republic.

On the same day, it appeared in Pravda, signed by comrade. Trotsky, order-memo on the 3rd Red Army - 1st Revolutionary Labor Army.

Representatives of economic departments were introduced to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Labor Army; it was headed by a board of 8 people. According to Article 9 of the 1st Labor Army, the Council of the Labor Army includes: plenipotentiaries of the People's Commissariat of Food, the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat of Transport, the People's Commissariat of Labor and members from the military department. At the head of the Council was a specially authorized Council of Defense with the rights of chairman of the Council of the Labor Army. Since the 1st Labor Army was the first attempt, the first experience in the use of labor armies, its work was of decisive importance for all further economic construction. January 23 Com. Trotsky wrote to the Soviet of the Labor Army: "The main thing is to firmly remember that every step of practical work is more important than all organizational restructuring and renaming." Decree STO comrade. Trotsky was placed at the head of the Soviet of the Labor Army. The members of the Soviet Labor Army were: 1) Sergeev, 2) Gaevsky (member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army), 3) Lokatskov (representative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions), 4) Paper (authorized by the People's Commissariat of Labor and head of the labor department of the Yekaterinburg Provincial Executive Committee), 5) Maksimov (representative of the Supreme Economic Council), 6) Muravyov (authorized by the People's Commissariat of Food), 7) Dovgalevsky.

On February 20, on the issue of using the army apparatus of the 3rd Army, comrade. Trotsky wrote to Lenin the following:

"Further preservation of the entire apparatus of the 3rd Army seems inexpedient. The army has only one rifle and one cavalry division at its disposal. Everything else is army departments and institutions. Under these conditions, the army can send only 23% to work. We will not need an army apparatus. Military units "We will preserve and strengthen. From the composition of headquarters institutions and departments we will single out shock labor detachments of specialist technicians, communists, etc. The field headquarters agrees with the disbandment of the army apparatuses. I have given appropriate preparatory orders. I believe that there will be no objections from the Defense Council."

It soon became clear that it was necessary to concentrate all local economic work in one center, in connection with which Comrade. Trotsky raised the question of turning the 1st Labor Army into a regional economic body. Even in his draft resolution on the 1st Labor Army Comrade. Trotsky proposed to operate with the forces of the 1st Labor Army on a regional scale. Now the practice of economic work has confirmed the need for this, and the Defense Council, in repeal of its first resolution on the 1st Army of January 15, 1920, worked out a regulation "on the Revolutionary Council of the First Army of Labor", in which it instructed

"To the Revolutionary Council of the 1st Army of Labor, the general leadership of the work to restore and strengthen normal economic and military life in the Urals"

Steam. 2 of this provision reads: "Sovtrudarm acts as a regional body of the Council of Labor and Defense of the RSFSR." According to par. eight,

"Sovtrudarm 1 consists of: 1) the chairman appointed by the Council of Labor and Defense, 2) the Ural district military commissar, 3) the representative of the Supreme Economic Council, 4) the representative of the People's Commissariat for Food, 5) the authorized NKPS, 6) the authorized People's Commissariat of Agriculture, 7) the authorized All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions."

The work of the 1st Labor Army was carried out mainly in logging, food collection, assistance to railway transport and in the Chelyabinsk coal mines.

The 1st Labor Army played a huge role in the field of labor mobilization. Having a ready-made military apparatus and a cadre of disciplined workers, it greatly advanced the cause of general labor mobilization in the Urals. The leadership in this work belonged entirely to the Soviet Labor Army. Despite the unfavorable general working conditions, the relatively high labor productivity of the Labor Army and the general pace of work of the entire apparatus of the 1st Labor Army as a regional economic body proved the possibility and profitability of using labor armies in those areas where war and devastation had so destroyed economic life that it could be restored to normal. means was hardly possible. Starting from March, a number of labor armies are being established in other parts of the Republic. /T. fifteen/

Incomplete definition ↓

Victory in the Great Patriotic War was paid dearly to all our people: victims on the fronts, in the rear, innumerable hardships. And it's a lot of work. Including Soviet Germans evicted from pre-war places of residence in remote areas of the country.

The leadership of the USSR proceeded, as is known, "from the interests of defense capability" and took "radical measures." Among these measures was the decision to deport the Volga Germans to Akmola, North Kazakhstan, Kustanai, Pavlodar, Dzhambul and other regions.

The Germans living in the Voronezh and neighboring regions were not "ignored". In the fall of 1941, a direct order from Lavrentiy Beria followed to deport five thousand Voronezh Germans. Among them were, for example, the whole family of Engelgart, an engineer at the Michurinsk locomotive repair plant, a worker at the Telman Guley Voronezh plant ... They were sent to the Urals after the Volga Germans. But the Germans of Voronezh and the same Volga region are citizens of our country.

A significant part of the Germans appeared in Ivdel, the northernmost taiga city of the Sverdlovsk region. Here they were engaged in logging, timber hauling, performed warehouse and loading tasks, built logging roads, were engaged in sawmilling, rafting, took out an airboard, a deck, airbeams, gun blanks, boat lumber ...

In those years, the population of the Ivdelsky district was comparable to the number of the entire working contingent: on December 5, 1942 - 18988 people.

The Germans were organized into construction battalions, and soon they became known as the "Labor Army". The regime is strict, those mobilized into this army were liable for military service, they could not voluntarily leave their columns. Accommodation - barracks. The internal order was established by the local leadership; wages and supply through the trade network - like civilians.

But it was not always so. The day came when the Germans were removed from the quartermaster allowance, and then social conditions deteriorated sharply, which gave rise to the appearance of denunciations - one more terrible than the other.

For example, Ivan Andreevich Gessen was accused of being engaged in anti-Soviet agitation. His words were cited: “... It’s enough to drink blood from us and mock people ... It is necessary for everyone, as one, not to go to work, then we would achieve this improvement in nutrition and the supply of things of contentment.” Should we expect anything good after such a denunciation? On December 21, 1942, the Judicial Collegium for Criminal Cases of the Sverdlovsk Regional Court sentenced I. Gessen to capital punishment. On March 26, 1943, the sentence was carried out.

The most massive mobilization of Russian Germans into the "labor army" was carried out in the first months of 1942. In total, until August 1944, about 400 thousand men and women were called up, of which about 180 thousand were placed under the "vigilant control of the internal affairs bodies." Most of them were located on the territory of the Sverdlovsk region. Many were "demobilized" for health reasons.

The housing and living conditions and the morale of the German Labor Army were very difficult. Accused of aiding the enemy, deprived of all property and food supplies, settled mainly in rural areas where there was no rationing system, the German population found itself in a terrible financial situation.

In the country, as a result of hostilities and moral and psychological pressure, mortality and disability among those employed in forced labor have significantly increased. For example, one of the leaders in Ivdel, Budenkov, officially reported: "... A serious condition with the uniforms of the mobilized who are forced to walk, for lack of shoes, at a high temperature in felt boots or completely barefoot." He also pointed out the existence of facts of "rudeness and insults on the part of some chiefs of detachments and columns towards the mobilized, ... which negatively affects the political and moral state."

Despite the fact that the vast majority of the Labor Army humbly treated their fate and worked conscientiously, an atmosphere of alienation and suspicion persisted around them.

Some of the Germans saw their salvation in submitting a report with a request to be sent to the front. Thus, the secretary of the party bureau, Valento, wrote in a letter to Comrade Stalin that instead of being at the front, he actually found himself in a concentration camp behind barbed wire, behind sentry towers, that the labor army was no different from imprisonment. He showed dissatisfaction with food, while adding that “you can’t go far on water alone.”

Those dissatisfied with their position were placed on special account. During the year 1942 alone, 1,313 people were sentenced to many years in prison or shot in the Sverdlovsk region.

And in Ivdel in 1945, an “anti-Soviet insurgent organization” of 20 people was opened, which allegedly had been actively operating among the mobilized Germans since 1942. Adolf Adolfovich Dening, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1938-1944, was identified as its main organizer, and until 1941 he was chairman of the Mariental cantispolkom (district executive committee) of the Volga German ASSR. By the decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on November 17, 1945, he received a long term in labor camps, and on June 20, 1956 he was rehabilitated.

On the basis of the Decree of the State Defense Committee of October 7, 1942, German women were called up through the military registration and enlistment offices. By the end of the war, there were 53 thousand of them in the work columns, while 6436 women had children in their places of mobilization. Left without parents, they were begging, homeless, and often died. From March 1944 to October 1945 alone, more than 2,900 homeless children from families of German labor army were identified and placed in orphanages.

During 1946-1947, the work columns of the labor army were disbanded, and the Germans employed there were transferred to permanent cadres with the right to call their families to them. At the same time, all of them were taken into account by special commandant's offices. The process of reuniting torn families dragged on for many years - enterprises did not want to let go of skilled labor, drew the attention of higher authorities to the fact that mobilized Germans should be detained for "systematic absenteeism, for refusing difficult tasks," and so on.

The judiciary was right there: everyone who deserved punishment was "given" 4-5 months of corrective labor. After everything experienced, such a "short term" punishment was a trifle.

The final solution to the problem of "family reunification" occurred after the liquidation of the special settlement regime in December 1955.

Bulletin of the Chelyabinsk State University. 2011. No. 34 (249).

Story. Issue. 48. S. 60-64.

THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR AND THE POST-WAR TIME

G. A. Goncharov

The article discusses the categorical composition of labor mobilized into work columns, who carried out production activities in the Urals during the Great Patriotic War. The categories of "Labor Army" members, their numerical composition in the region are determined, the stages of labor mobilization are identified.

Key words: the Great Patriotic War, the Ural region, "Labour Army", work columns, "labor mobilized", special settlers.

During the Great Patriotic War, the Urals became the most important center of defense production. This was due to both its geographical position (the region was located in the rear) and the industrial infrastructure available at the beginning of the war (industrial centers, railway communications). During the first two years of the war, 730 enterprises were evacuated here from the European part of the country1. A significant number of workers, employees of the intelligentsia and members of their families were displaced. During the war years, the Urals received, according to Ural historians, 40.3% of the total number of people evacuated to the territory of the RSFSR2. They worked as mobilized in production, construction, agriculture, institutions. The evacuees worked in the same conditions as the local population. At the same time, the archives and recently published collections of documents contain a large amount of materials about civilians working and living under special conditions. They called themselves "Labour Army".

In the official documents of the period of the Great Patriotic War, the concept of ‘labourer’ did not exist. Its appearance was caused by the popular memory of the Civil War, when the revolutionary armies of labor ("labor armies") were active. They were created on the basis of military units. They included labor formations from the civilian population in the form of work columns (detachments, battalions, companies, platoons), who lived and worked in special conditions: a centralized paramilitary system

management, a regime of work and maintenance different from the rest of the working population. It was those who worked during the years of the Great Patriotic War in such conditions who called themselves "Labor Army", thereby emphasizing their commonality with the civilian population mobilized for the labor front.

The military registration and enlistment offices and internal affairs bodies were engaged in the formation of work columns. The personnel were assigned the status of conscripts. For the non-appearance of a mobilized person at a recruiting or assembly point, for unauthorized leaving work or desertion, criminal liability was established3. De facto, a special group of people was formed, which was supposed to work until the end of the war as part of work columns. This group was heterogeneous in its social and national composition. It included both full-fledged citizens of the Soviet state, and those with limited rights. It included representatives of those nations whose states were at war with the USSR, and those who fought against Nazi Germany and its allies.

The first mass mobilization into labor units were the Soviet Germans. On August 31, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the Germans living on the territory of the Ukrainian USSR”, which marked the beginning of the process of mobilizing Soviet Germans into the labor army.

On September 8, 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense prepared directive No. 35105, in accordance with which the "withdrawal" of German military personnel from

Table 1

No. Name of the camp Time of foundation of the camp Location

Region Locality

1 Bogoslovlag 11/15/1940 Sverdlovskaya Serovsky district, settlement of Turin mines

2 Ivdellag 08/16/1937 Sverdlovsk Ivdel

3 Sevurallag 02/05/1938 Sverdlovsk, Irbit

4 Solikamlag 04/01/1939 Molotovskaya r. Borovsk village, Voroshilovsky district

5 Tavdinlag 04/17/1941 Sverdlovsk city of Tavda

6 Usollag February 5, 1938 Molotovskaya Solikamsk

7 Bakallag (since 01.1943 ITL "Chelyabmetal-Lurgstroya") 11/17/1941 Chelyabinsk, Chelyabinsk

8 Vosturallag 05/08/1942 Sverdlovsk city of Tavda

9 Tagillag 01/27/1942 Sverdlovsk Nizhny Tagil

ranks of the Red Army4. The document ordered the soldiers of ordinary and commanding staff of German nationality to be sent to the internal districts and construction units. Together with the Soviet Germans, representatives of some other "unreliable" nationalities also recalled from the Red Army.

It was during this period that the first labor mobilized people appeared in the Urals: in the Sverdlovsk region - columns No. 390, 1527, 1528, 1529, 1049; in the Chelyabinsk region - No. 765, 776, 779, 793. A significant part of them was placed in 3 labor camps - Ivdellag, Bogoslov-lag, Solikamlag. Those recalled from the Red Aria were sent to the Molotov region and the Udmur ASSR (2437 people)5. In March - August 1942, Soviet Germans from construction units were transferred to work columns and merged with the main staff

Labor Army soldiers, which was associated with their re-subordination to the NKVD6.

January - February 1942 became the milestone of the transition from partial to mass mobilization of Soviet citizens of German nationality into work columns for the entire duration of the war. On January 10, 1942, the USSR State Defense Committee adopted Decree No. 1123 SS. "On the procedure for the use of German migrants of military age from 17 to 50 years." On February 4, 1942, the GKO adopts Decree No. 1281 SS "On the mobilization of Germans - men of military age from 17 to 50 years old, permanently residing in the city, territories, autonomous union republics." In accordance with the new directive, it was planned to send 64,000 people to the Urals. By May 1942, 9 of the

15 ITL of the USSR, where work columns of mobilized Germans were stationed.

table 2

The composition and size of the contingent of corrective labor camps in the Urals

No. camp name Total number of contingent Including % of mobilized Germans in relation to the total number of ITL contingent

Prisoners Mobilized Germans

1 Bakallag 26530 50 26480 99.8

2 Ivdellag 31887 18988 12899 40.4

3 Sevurallag 18232 9791 8441 46.3

4 Usollag 33326 28386 4940 14.8

5 Bogoslovlag 28668 16357 12311 42.9

6 Solikamlag 4527 1990 2537 56.0

7 Tavdinlag 4104 2186 1918 46.7

8 Tagillag 37071 33700 3371 9.0

9 Vosturallag 16281 11834 4447 27.3

10 Total 200626 123282 77344 42.6

About 73,000 Soviet Germans were kept in these camps. It should be noted that out of 100% of the Soviet Germans to be mobilized in the USSR for the labor front in January 1942, 43% ended up in the Ural region8.

The mobilized Germans were kept in the ITL of the Urals together with prisoners, as evidenced by the following table.

A study of the size of the ITL contingent suggests that by the summer of 1942, the corrective labor camps in the Urals had turned from places of detention of convicts into places where free citizens of the Soviet Union were kept. On average, in the Urals, by the summer of 1942, of the total number of the existing contingent in forced labor camps, there were 42.6% of the "Labour Army".

Table 3

Distribution and number of mobilized Germans at the enterprises and construction sites of Narkomugol and Narkomneft in the Urals (December 1942 - January 1943)10

No. Enterprise Number of mobilized Germans, pers. Region, republics

I. Narkomugol

1 Chelyabinskugol 10200 Chelyabinsk

2 Chelyabshakhtstroy 2500 Chelyabinsk

3 Korkinugol 900 Chelyabinsk

4 Korkinshakhtstroy 600 Chelyabinsk

5 Sverdlovskugol 6400 Sverdlovskaya

6 Molotovugol 3450 Molotovskaya

7 Kizelshahstroy 5700 Molotovskaya

8 Chkalovugol 500 Chkalovskaya

TOTAL: 30250

II. Narkomneft

1 Molotovnefte- 3048 Molotovskaya

plant

2 Bashneftekombi- 3000 Bashkirskaya

3 Bashneftegaz- 1350 Bashkirskaya

system ASSR

4 Glavneftestroy 3264 Chkalovskaya

TOTAL: 10662

update No. 2383СС "On additional

mobilization of the Germans for the national economy

stva”, in accordance with which it was adopted

then the decision on the new mobilization of Soviet Germans with their subsequent dispatch to enterprises in the extractive industries of the national economy. This was the third mass mobilization of Soviet Germans into work columns.

As a result of the special measures carried out in the winter of 1942-1943. 40,912 people found themselves at enterprises and construction sites in the extractive industries in the Urals.

Most of them entered the Chelyabinsk region (14200 people), Molotovskaya (12198 people) and Sverdlovsk region (6400 people). These three regions, as in the previous mobilization of citizens of the USSR of German nationality, became the main consumers of labor in the Urals. The result was an increase in the number of mobilized Germans stationed there, the total number of which amounted to more than 118,000 people. In practice, this meant that in the three Ural regions, as a result of special measures in January-December 1942, more than 40% of the Soviet Germans mobilized in the USSR in work columns11 turned out to be. In general, in the Ural region, the number of mobilized Germans held in camps and at construction sites of the NKVD in 1944 was 61,318 people, in the "zones" at industrial enterprises and construction, their number was 50,645 people12.

The second category of the civilian population mobilized into work columns in the Urals were "labor mobilized from the Central Asian Military District (SAVO)". On October 14, 1942, the State Defense Committee of the USSR (Decree No. 2414SS) announced the labor mobilization of 350 conscripts from the SAVO

thousand people13

In the Urals, a significant part of those mobilized from SAVO in the spring of 1943 were those who arrived from Uzbekistan. On April 15, 1943, out of 67,000 people stationed in the region, 48.6% were representatives of the Uzbek SSR: in the Sverdlovsk region there were 15131 people, Chelyabinsk - 7427, Molotov - 2212, Chkalov - 2523, Bashkir ASSR - 2357 and Udmurt ASSR -2970. In addition to the Uzbeks, representatives of other nationalities - Tajiks, Turkmens, Kirghiz and Kazakhs - were accommodated and worked here. Their total number was more than 30,000 people. The share of those mobilized from the SAVO in the Urals from their total number in the spring of 1943 was 41.5%. Summer

In 1943, their number in the region reached more than 73,000 people, of which about 8,000 people worked in the Chkalov region, 12,692 people in the Molotov region, about 27,000 people in the Sverdlovsk region, about 20,000 people in the Chelyabinsk region, in Bashkir ASSR - more than 2500 people, Udmurt - about 3000 people. From the autumn of 1943, the number of labor mobilized from Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the region began to decrease and by mid-1944 amounted to about 22,000

person14.

The third category of "Labour Army" in the work columns were special settlers, who were represented in the region by former kulaks and their families, special settlers from the Baltic states and representatives of the deported peoples of the USSR.

The mobilization of special settlers into work columns, unlike other categories of laborers, was not massive and was carried out depending on the needs of enterprises and construction in the labor force. The absence of a unified mobilization plan does not allow us to trace the dynamics of their numbers on the scale of the entire Ural region. But, as archival documents testify, the time of increased mobilization of special settlers into work columns was 1943, which was due to the need to quickly complete the construction of defense facilities, the development of the mining industry, and limited labor resources. In the spring of 1943, a large-scale mobilization of special settlers was carried out to the construction sites of the NKVD - "Tagilstroy" and "Usollag". In August 1943, 1150 people. was sent to work columns of enterprises and constructions of the coal industry of the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions. In the autumn of 1944, there were 5,170 special settlers in the work columns15.

Summarizing the above, we can say that the work columns in the region were staffed by three categories of the population of the USSR: “Soviet Germans” (this category included representatives of the nationalities of those countries that fought with the USSR), “labor mobilized from SAVO”, “special settlers” . During the war years, the Urals became a place of concentration for more than 40% of those mobilized into work columns. The labor army in the region reached the largest number of personnel in the middle of 1943, when it

numbered more than 190,000 labor army, of which: 61.7% were mobilized Germans, 35.0% were labor mobilized from Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and 3.3% were special settlers. Since the autumn of 1943, their numbers began to decrease due to a decrease in the number of labor mobilized from the SAVO and in the middle of 1944 amounted to about 140,000 people. was put on a par with the special contingent.

Notes

1 Ural: twentieth century. People. Events. A life. Essays on history / ed. A. D. Kirillova. Yekaterinburg, 2000, p. 131.

2 Zorina, R. F. The solution by the party of the problem of locating evacuated enterprises and the population in the Urals during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941-1942): auto-ref. dis. ... cand. ist. Sciences. Chelyabinsk, 1985, p. 5; Potemkina, M. N. Evacuation during the Great Patriotic War to the Urals: (People and Fates). Magnitogorsk, 2002, p. 260.

3 GARF. F. 9414. Op. 1s. D. 1169. L. 6-6v.

4 Shulga, I. I. Withdrawal of German servicemen from the ranks of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) // Germans of Russia in the context of national history: common problems and regional features: scientific materials. conf. (Moscow, 17-20 September 1998). M., 1999. S. 347358.

5 OGACHO. F. 915. Op. 1. D. 50. L. 14-14v.; GARF. F. 9414. Op. 1s. D. 1157. L. 7; F. 9479. Op. 1s. D. 112. L. 129; F. 9401s. Op. 1a. D. 110. L.10-11.

6 GARF. F. 9414. Op. 1s. D. 1157. L. 5a.

7 The table is compiled according to the data: The system of corrective labor camps in the USSR. 1930-1960: a handbook. M., 1998. S. 172, 227, 272, 388, 472, 491.

8 RGASPI. F. 644. Op. 2. D. 36. L. 175-178; GARF. F. 9401s. Op. 1a. D. 110. L. 10-11.

9 The table was compiled according to: GARF. F. 9414. Op. 1s. D. 1118. L. 7-11; F. 9479. Op. 1s. D. 110. L. 125; D. 112. L. 65.

10 Table compiled by: GARF. F. 9479. Op. 1s. D. 110. L. 51, 188-188v.

11 Calculated according to: GARF. F. 9414. Op. 1s. D. 1207. L. 2-9; D. 9479. Op. 1s. D. 110.

L. 51-62, 125; 186-190; D. 112. L. 59-70.

12 Calculated according to: GARF. F. 9414. Op. 1s. D. 1172. L. 2-16v; D. 1207. L. 1; D. 1215. L. 3-26v; F. 9479. Op. 1s. D. 110. L. 187-191; D. 111. L. 57, 92, 150-152, 175, 239.

13 RGASPI. F. 644. Op. 2. D. 102. L. 72-73.

14 RGASPI. F. 644. Op. 2. D. 138. L. 70-74; TsGAOORB. F. 122. Op. 22. D. 29. L. 404; TsSNIOO. F. 371. Op. 7. D. 153. L. 1; TsDOO-SO. F. 4. Op. 38. D. 172. L. 9; Antufiev, A. A. Ural industry on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War. Yekaterinburg, 1992, p. 266; Societies. science in Uzbekistan. 1980. No. 5. S. 45; Orazov, K. The working class of Kazakhstan during the Great Patriotic War. Alma-Ata, 1975, p. 45; Khusenov, K. Patriotic labor of workers-

Uzbeks at enterprises and construction sites of the Urals and Siberia during the Great Patriotic War // Materials of XXIII scientific. conf. prof.-teacher composition. Samarkand. state un-ta im. A. Navoi. Story. Samarkand, 1966, p. 23; Ural - to the front. M, 1985. S. 162.

15 GARF. F. 9479. Op. 1s. D. 110. L. 36; D. 128. L. 14-14v, 22-22v, 23-23v.

16 Calculated according to: GARF. F. 9479. Op. 1s. D. 110. L. 51, 125, 187-191; LONG. L. 57, 92, 150-152, 175, 239; D. 112. L. 65; RGASPI. F. 644. Op. 2. D. 138. L. 72; TsGAOORB. F. 122. Op. 22. D. 29. L. 262, 404; TsDNIUR F. 16. Op. 14. D. 602. L. 52, 55-58; TsDNIOO F. 371. Op. 7. D. 153. L. 1; TsDOOSO F. 4. Op. 38. D. 172. L. 9; OGACHO. F. L-288. Op. 7. D. 216. L. 70, 82.

Labor mobilizations, forced attraction of the population to work in the interests of the state-va. M. t. began to be widely used during the years of the Civil War by both opposing sides. acc. with a decree of May 6, 1919 Russian production could attract to the state. service of persons of "intellectual professions" in the order of labor. duties. This measure was carried out in relation to physicians, lawyers, food workers. After the restoration of the owls. authorities in Siberia M. t. were widely used in various branches of production. Labor was created. army, to-rye used to restore prom. objects and transport. communications, logging. Places the population was widely involved in clearing communications, building roads, performing horse-drawn service, the Red Army was used to clean the fields. M. t. became massive in connection with the need to combat epidemics and the fuel crisis.

In Jan. 1920 in connection with the completion of the large scale. military campaigns in the east. front and the need to restore the bunk. households, the Third Army was transformed into the First Labor Army. Places were called to its composition. population of the Urals, the Urals and Siberia. Finally, the M. t. system was approved after the adoption on January 29. 1920 Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR on universal labor service. Unlike Europe. Russia, replenishment of branches of the people. households were carried out by workers through the mobilization of not three, but five ages (born in 1892–96). M. t. covered not only the peasants and the mountains. ordinary people, but also qualified. workers, scientific and technical. intelligentsia. In key sectors of the economy, workers were equated with military personnel (mobilized) and held accountable for failure to meet production standards. Militarization covered workers and employees of 14 industries, including mining, chemical, metallurgy, metalworking, fuel, as well as higher education workers. and cf. textbook establishments.

In the Urals from autumn 1919 to April. 1920 mobilized 714 thousand people. and attracted 460 thousand carts, Ch. arr. for logging. City enterprises of Siberia (without Novonikolaevsk and Irkutsk) in these years required 454 thousand workers. Department of Labor Sibrevcoma was able to send 145.5 thousand people to work on the mobilization, or 32% of the need. Total for constant and time. work in the industry, transport and logging Sib. region in 1920, 322 thousand people were mobilized. Overcome the shortage of workers. strength failed. In the 1st half of 1921, the lack of qualifications. workers amounted to 99.4 thousand, employees - 73 thousand. In total, 262 thousand workers were required in the cities of Siberia during this period, the Sibtrud bodies were able to mobilize 47 thousand, or 17.8%. But ch. the problem was in the quality of the execution of work, specialists were often involved in the execution of unskilled workers. labor. With regard to the intelligentsia and the so-called. mountains bourgeoisie, this policy was carried out consciously and bore the character of "class retribution". The labor productivity of the labor army and the mobilized was extremely low, and the level of desertion from work was high.

Forsir. economic growth in con. 1920s caused a severe shortage of skilled workers. personnel, especially specialists. In the beginning. 1930s people. economy of Siberia required an additional 5.5 thousand engineers and approx. 10 thousand technicians. Under these conditions, the forms and methods of mobilizing intellectual workers were recreated. labor to provide them with the leading branches of industry and "shock" construction projects. Mobilization objects. campaigns that took on a permanent character, groups became qualified. specialists, and the goal was, first of all, the “voluntary-compulsory” return of the latter to their core field of activity. Work on accounting, mobilization, transfer of "specialists" and control over their use was concentrated in the union and republics. People's Commissariats of Labor and their region. organs. In the Center and in the field at the institutions of the NKTrud there were special. interdepartmental. Commission, which included representatives of various departments and bodies, including trade unions. Passed in con. 1920s 1st campaigns were hidden mobilization. har-r and consisted in the movement of specialists from the management. devices for production, first on a voluntary basis (through the trade unions), then - according to the "appropriation", and from 9 November. 1929 (post. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR) - already in a directive manner. As a result of the campaign, by May 1930, out of the planned 10 thousand specialists, 6,150 people were transferred to production. In Siberia, out of the planned 150 engineers, 104 people were transferred. (69%). acc. from post. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of July 1, 1930 on the construction of new metallurgists in the East. factories (Magnitka and Kuznetskstroy) provided for the transfer of 110 construction specialists to these regions (the campaign produced about 90 people). The mobilization of specialists from beyond the Urals did not radically solve the personnel problem. Required within the region. redistribution of specialists and mobilization of personnel according to internal. order for the trade union. lines. Announced in con. In 1930, the leadership of the All-Union Intersectional Bureau of the Engineering and Technical Section, the mobilization of mining specialists for Kuzbass in Moscow and Leningrad, actually failed.

To carry out the orders, different ones were used. methods of influencing specialists, up to holding "public demonstration trials" (in Moscow in February 1931 - under the slogan "Thirty-three deserters of Kuzbass") and transferring cases to the courts. institutions and bodies of the OGPU. Despite the strict regulation and adoption in 1930–31 Siberian regional executive committee (Zapsibkrai executive committee) more than 10 resolutions on the identification and mobilization of specialists to work in the core industries of the people. households (logging, transport, industry, finance, etc.), mobilization. movements were not very efficient. For the full provision of timber rafting in the USSR in 1931, approx. 60 thousand qualified personnel, including workers. Actually, about 24 thousand people worked on the alloy. (40%). Forest industry mobilization gave approx. 9 thousand people, which was recognized as successful. Mobilization in 1931 of water transport specialists on the scale of Zap. Siberia made it possible to attract 75% of the number of transport specialists identified by the accounting to the industry.

In connection with the creation of a system of forced labor, a network of special settlements was also formed, which required social-cult. and productions. mobilization infrastructure dep. detachments of the intelligentsia - doctors, teachers, cultural enlightenment workers. According to post. SNK of the USSR of April 20. 1933 schools and medical institutions were provided with personnel through mobilization from the regions of expulsion. To staffing schools ped. personnel in acc. from post. Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League of October 5. 1931 involved the Komsomol. org-tion. However, the directives did not guarantee a full staffing of specialists. AT special settlements in con. 1931 ped. frames were even taking into account the extraordinarily carried out. measures no more than 1/3 of the required number. By 1933 at the beginning. schools of commandant's offices in the Narym region. out of 447 teachers, there were 247 civilians, the rest - special settlers, past short-term ped. courses.

In 1930-33 for work in special settlements were held annually. mobilization of doctors and cf. medical staff as from the center. parts of the country, and from Sib. region. However, as of Nov. 1931, in commandant's offices West Siberian region medical state. institutions were only 60% staffed. Among honey. about 1/3 of the workers were civilians, the rest of the specialists were exiles, prisoners sent by the SibLAG. The situation stabilized due to the mobilization in 1932–33 for 2 years of almost 70 medical personnel. workers from Europe. parts of the country. After their departure from 1935 in the commandant's offices, there was again a shortage of qualified personnel. medical staff.

In 1941–45, the mobilization forms of redistribution of labor potential across the country received a new impetus. From the beginning Great Patriotic War due to the large scale. military mobilizations The economy of Siberia has entered a period of acute shortage of workers. strength, especially in X. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in an effort to solve the problem of personnel through the utmost intensification of labor, on June 26, 1941, adopted a decree "On the working hours of workers and employees in wartime", according to Krom, obligations were established. overtime work, and regular and extra. holidays were cancelled. 13 Apr. 1942 post came out. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On increasing the mandatory minimum workdays for collective farmers" from 100 to 150 per year. Adolescents aged 12 to 16 were required to work at least 50 workdays. Failure to comply with established standards was considered corners. crime and severely punished.

But to solve the problem of shortage of slave. hands by the marginal intensification of labor was impossible. Therefore, the emphasis was on mobilization. the principle of formation and use of labor force. Dec 26 In 1941, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the responsibility of workers and employees of the military industry for unauthorized departure from enterprises" proclaimed the right of the state to fix workers in enterprises. From now on, all persons employed in the military industry or in industries serving the military industry were considered to be mobilized for the period of the war. Later military. the provision was introduced on the railroad, speech. and sea. transport.

Feb 13 In 1942, a decree was issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet "On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for work in production and construction for the wartime period." After that, they were called up for production in the same way as for the army. Mobilization the principle was also in effect when enrolling students in schools of factory training (FZO), crafts. and railway schools. M. t. were subject to men from 16 to 55 years old and women from 16 to 45 years old. Women with children under the age of 8 were exempted from M. t. and higher textbook establishments. Subsequently, for women, the draft age was increased to 50 years, and the age of children, giving the mother the right to deferment from M. t., was reduced to 4 years.

In 1942 post. SNK of the USSR "On the procedure for bringing to labor service in wartime" mobilization. recruitment principle. strength has been expanded. M. t. as a form of recruitment of the labor force and the relationship of the state with workers extended to the time. and seasonal work. The mobilized worked at the harvest, at beet stores, sugar factories and glass factories, repaired roads and bridges. In 1942–43, on the basis of a number of decrees of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, in the slave. columns and detachments with strict centralization. the army structure mobilized the adult population of German, Finnish, Romanian, Hungarian. and Bulgarians. nationalities. Only owls. Germans (men and women) in the so-called. During the years of the war, the Labor Army was mobilized by St. 300 thousand people Most of the mobilized worked at NKVD facilities.

In total in Siberia for the period from 13 Feb. From 1942 to July 1945, 264 thousand people were mobilized for permanent work in industry, construction and transport, in the schools of the FZO, crafts. and railway schools - 333 thousand; and temporary work - 506 thousand people.

Evasion from M. t. and shoots of the mobilized were regarded as desertion and were punished by Ch. arr. by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 26. 1941 "On the responsibility of workers and employees of the military industry for unauthorized departure from enterprises", which provided for a prison sentence of 5 to 8 years. After the completion of the Great Fatherland. war, the org system was restored. set of slave forces, were also practiced by societies. appeals of youth to construction sites people. households and virgin and fallow lands development.

Lit.: Proshin V.A. On the issue of conducting universal labor service in Siberia during the period of war communism (end of 1919–1921) // Questions of the history of Siberia. Tomsk, 1980; German A.A., Kurochkin A.N. Germans of the USSR in the labor army (1941-1945). M., 1998; Pystina L.I. Mobilization as a form of solution of specialists for industry in the late 1920s - early 1930s. // Culture and intelligentsia of the Siberian province during the years of the "Great Break". Novosibirsk, 2000; Isupov V.A. Human resources of Western Siberia during the Great Patriotic War: problems of formation and use // Economic development of Siberia in the context of national and world history. Novosibirsk, 2005.

V.A. Isupov, S.A. Krasilnikov, V.A. Proshin, V.M. Markets