Participated in the Battle of Kursk. The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk: causes, course and consequences

The Battle of Kursk is a turning point in the course of the entire Second World War, when the Soviet troops inflicted such damage on Germany and its satellites, from which they could no longer recover and lost their strategic initiative until the end of the war. Although before the defeat of the enemy there were many sleepless nights and thousands of kilometers of battles, but after this battle in the hearts of every Soviet citizen, private and general, there was confidence in victory over the enemy. In addition, the battle on the Oryol-Kursk ledge became an example of the courage of ordinary soldiers and the brilliant genius of Russian commanders.

The radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War began with the victory of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, when a large enemy grouping was liquidated during Operation Uranus. The battle on the Kursk ledge became the final stage of a radical change. After the defeat at Kursk and Orel, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. After the failure, the German troops were already mostly on the defensive until the end of the war, and ours were mainly engaged in offensive operations, freeing Europe from the Nazis.

On June 5, 1943, German troops went on the offensive in two directions: on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient. Thus began Operation Citadel and the Battle of Kursk itself. After the offensive onslaught of the Germans subsided, and its divisions were significantly bled, the command of the USSR launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the Army Groups "Center" and "South". On August 23, 1943, Kharkov was liberated, which marked the end of one of the largest battles of World War II.

History of the battle

After the victory at Stalingrad in the course of the successful Operation Uranus, the Soviet troops managed to carry out a good offensive along the entire front and push the enemy back for many miles to the West. But after the counter-offensive of the German troops in the area of Kursk and Orel, a ledge arose, which was directed towards the West, up to 200 kilometers wide and up to 150 kilometers deep, formed by the Soviet group.

From April to June, a relative calm reigned on the fronts. It became clear that after the defeat at Stalingrad, Germany would try to take revenge. The Kursk ledge was considered the most suitable place, striking which in the direction of Orel and Kursk from the North and South, respectively, it was possible to create a cauldron on a larger scale than near Kyiv, Kharkov at the beginning of the war.

As early as April 8, 1943, Marshal G.K. Zhukov. sent his report on the spring-summer military campaign, where he expressed his thoughts about Germany's actions on the Eastern Front, where it was assumed that the Kursk Bulge would become the site of the main enemy strike. At the same time, Zhukov expressed his plan of countermeasures, which included exhausting the enemy in defensive battles, and then inflicting a counterattack and his complete destruction. Already on April 12, Stalin listened to General Antonov A.I., Marshal Zhukov G.K. and Marshal Vasilevsky A.M. on this occasion.

Representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief unanimously spoke in favor of the impossibility and futility of delivering a preventive strike in the spring and summer. Indeed, based on the experience of past years, an offensive against large enemy groupings preparing to strike does not bring significant results, but only contributes to losses in the ranks of their troops. Also, the formation of forces for the main strike was supposed to weaken the groupings of Soviet troops in the directions of the main German strike, which would also inevitably lead to defeat. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a defensive operation in the area of the Kursk ledge, where the main blow of the Wehrmacht forces was expected. Thus, the Headquarters hoped to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, knock out his tanks and deliver a decisive blow to the enemy. This was facilitated by the creation of a powerful defensive system in this direction, in contrast to the first two years of the war.

In the spring of 1943, the word "Citadel" appeared more and more often in the intercepted radio data. On April 12, intelligence put a plan code-named "Citadel" on Stalin's table, which was developed by the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, but had not yet been signed by Hitler. This plan confirmed that Germany was preparing the main attack, where the Soviet command expected it. Three days later, Hitler signed the plan for the operation.

In order to destroy the plans of the Wehrmacht, it was decided to create a defense in depth in the direction of the predicted strike and create a powerful grouping capable of withstanding the pressure of the German units and carrying out counterattacks at the moment of the climax of the battle.

Composition of armies, commanders

To strike at the Soviet troops in the area of the Kursk-Oryol ledge, it was planned to attract forces Army Group Center commanded by Field Marshal Kluge and Army Group South commanded by Field Marshal Manstein.

The German forces included 50 divisions, including 16 motorized and tank divisions, 8 assault gun divisions, 2 tank brigades, and 3 separate tank battalions. In addition, the SS Panzer Divisions Das Reich, Totenkopf and Adolf Hitler, considered elite, were brought up to attack in the direction of Kursk.

Thus, the grouping amounted to 900 thousand personnel, 10 thousand guns, 2700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2 thousand aircraft, which were part of two Luftwaffe air fleets.

One of the key trump cards in the hands of Germany was to be the use of heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", assault guns "Ferdinand". It was precisely because the new tanks did not have time to get to the front, were in the process of being finalized, that the start of the operation was constantly postponed. Also in service with the Wehrmacht were obsolete tanks Pz.Kpfw. I, Pz.Kpfw. I I, Pz.Kpfw. I I I, having undergone some modification.

The main blow was to be delivered by the 2nd and 9th armies, the 9th tank army of the Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Model, as well as the Kempf task force, the tank 4th army and the 24th corps of the group armies "South", which were entrusted to command General Goth.

In defensive battles, the USSR involved three fronts - Voronezh, Stepnoy, Central.

General of the Army Rokossovsky K.K. commanded the Central Front. The task of the front was to defend the northern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front, the command of which was entrusted to General of the Army Vatutin N.F., was to defend the southern front. Colonel General Konev I.S. was appointed commander of the Steppe Front, the reserve of the USSR during the battle. In total, about 1.3 million people, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, almost 20,000 guns and 2,100 aircraft were involved in the area of the Kursk salient. Data may differ from some sources.

Armament (tanks)

During the preparation of the Citadel plan, the German command did not look for new ways to achieve success. The main offensive power of the Wehrmacht troops during the operation on the Kursk Bulge was to be carried out by tanks: light, heavy and medium. To strengthen the strike groups before the start of the operation, several hundred of the latest Panther and Tiger tanks were delivered to the front.

Medium tank "Panther" was developed by MAN for Germany in 1941-1942. According to the German classification, it was considered heavy. For the first time he participated in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. After the fighting in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht began to actively use it in other directions. It is considered the best German tank in World War II, despite a number of shortcomings.

"Tiger I"- heavy tanks of the German armed forces during the Second World War. At long distances, the battle was slightly vulnerable to the firepower of Soviet tanks. It is considered the most expensive tank of its time, because the German treasury spent 1 million Reichsmarks to create one combat unit.

Panzerkampfwagen III Until 1943, it was the main medium tank of the Wehrmacht. The captured combat units were used by the Soviet troops, self-propelled guns were created on their basis.

Panzerkampfwagen II produced from 1934 to 1943. Since 1938, it has been used in armed conflicts, but it turned out to be weaker than similar models of equipment from the enemy, not only in terms of armor, but even in terms of weapons. In 1942, it was completely withdrawn from the Wehrmacht tank units, however, it remained in service and was used by assault groups.

Light tank Panzerkampfwagen I - the brainchild of "Krupp" and "Daimler Benz", discontinued in 1937, was produced in the amount of 1574 units.

In the Soviet army, the most massive tank of the Second World War was supposed to resist the bulk of the German armored armada. Medium tank T-34 had many modifications, one of which T-34-85 is in service with some countries to this day.

The course of the battle

Calm reigned on the fronts. Stalin had doubts about the correctness of the calculations of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. Also, the thought of competent disinformation did not leave him until the last moment. Nevertheless, at 23.20 on July 4 and 02.20 on July 5, the artillery of the two Soviet fronts dealt a massive blow to the alleged positions of the enemy. In addition, bombers and attack aircraft of the two air armies carried out an air raid on enemy positions in the Kharkov and Belgorod regions. However, this did not bring much result. According to the reports of the Germans, only communication communications were damaged. Losses in manpower and equipment were not serious.

Exactly at 06.00 on July 5, after a powerful artillery preparation, significant forces of the Wehrmacht went on the offensive. However, unexpectedly for themselves, they received a powerful rebuff. This was facilitated by the presence of numerous tank barriers, minefields with a high frequency of mining. Due to significant damage to communication communications, the Germans failed to achieve clear interaction between units, which led to disagreements in actions: the infantry was often left without the support of tanks. On the northern face, the blow was directed at Olkhovatka. After minor success and serious losses, the Germans directed their attack at Ponyri. But even there it was not possible to wedge into the Soviet defense. Thus, on July 10, less than a third of all German tanks remained in service.

* After the Germans went on the attack, Rokossovsky called Stalin and announced with joy in his voice that the offensive had begun. Perplexed, Stalin asked Rokossovsky about the reason for his joy. The general replied that now the victory in the Battle of Kursk would not go anywhere.

To inflict defeat on the Russians in the South was the task of the 4th Panzer Corps, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the Kempf Army Group, which was part of the 4th Army. Here events unfolded more successfully than in the North, although the planned result was not achieved. The 48th Panzer Corps suffered heavy losses in the attack on Cherkasskoye, without moving significantly forward.

The defense of Cherkassky is one of the brightest pages of the Battle of Kursk, which for some reason is practically not remembered. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was more successful. He was given the task of reaching the Prokhorovka area, where, on a tactically advantageous terrain, to fight the Soviet reserve. Thanks to the presence of companies consisting of heavy "Tigers", the divisions "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich" managed to quickly break through the defenses of the Voronezh Front. The command of the Voronezh Front decided to strengthen the defensive lines and sent the 5th Stalingrad Tank Corps to carry out this task. In fact, Soviet tankers received an order to occupy a line already captured by the Germans, but threats of a tribunal and execution forced them to go on the offensive. Hitting the Das Reich on the forehead, the 5th Stk failed and was thrown back. The Das Reich tanks went on the attack, trying to surround the forces of the corps. They partially succeeded, but thanks to the commanders of the units that were outside the ring, communications were not cut. However, during these battles, the Soviet troops lost 119 tanks, which is undeniably the largest loss of the Soviet troops in one day. Thus, already on July 6, the Germans reached the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front, which made the situation difficult.

On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, after mutual artillery preparation and massive air strikes, 850 tanks of the 5th Guards Army under the command of General Rotmistrov and 700 tanks from the side of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps collided in a head-on battle. The fight lasted all day. The initiative changed hands. The opponents suffered enormous losses. The entire battlefield was covered with thick smoke from fires. However, the victory remained with us, the enemy was forced to retreat.

On this day, the Western and Bryansk Fronts went on the offensive on the Northern Front. The very next day, the German defenses were broken through, and by August 5, Soviet troops managed to liberate Orel. The Oryol operation, during which the Germans lost 90 thousand soldiers killed, was called Kutuzov in the plans of the General Staff.

Operation "Rumyantsev" was supposed to defeat the German forces in the Kharkov and Belgorod region. On August 3, the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front launched an offensive. By August 5, Belgorod was liberated. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated by Soviet troops on the third attempt, which marked the end of Operation Rumyantsev, and with it the Battle of Kursk.

* On August 5, the first salute in the entire war was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod from the Nazi invaders.

Side losses

Until now, the losses of Germany and the USSR during the Battle of Kursk are not exactly known. To date, the data diverge dramatically. In 1943, the Germans in the battle on the Kursk ledge lost more than 500 thousand people killed and wounded. 1000-1500 enemy tanks were destroyed by Soviet soldiers. And the Soviet aces and air defense forces destroyed 1696 aircraft.

As for the USSR, the irretrievable losses amounted to more than a quarter of a million people. 6024 tanks and self-propelled guns were burned out, out of action for technical reasons. 1626 aircraft were shot down in the sky over Kursk and Orel.

Results, meaning

Guderian and Manstein in their memoirs say that the Battle of Kursk was the turning point of the War on the Eastern Front. Soviet troops inflicted heavy damage on the Germans, who forever missed the strategic advantage. In addition, the armored power of the Nazis could no longer be restored to its former scale. The days of Hitler's Germany were numbered. The victory on the Kursk Bulge became an excellent tool for raising the morale of the fighters on all fronts, the population in the rear of the country and in the occupied territories.

Day of Military Glory of Russia

The day of the defeat of the Nazi troops by the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 is celebrated annually. This is the day of memory of all those who in 1943 in July-August, during the defensive operation of the Soviet troops, as well as the offensive operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" on the Kursk ledge, managed to break the back of a powerful enemy, predetermining the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Large-scale celebrations are expected in 2013 to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory at the Fiery Arc.

Video about the Kursk Bulge, the key moments of the battle, we definitely recommend viewing:

The Battle of Kursk, according to historians, was a turning point in. More than six thousand tanks took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. There has never been such a thing in world history, and probably never will be again.

The actions of the Soviet fronts on the Kursk Bulge were led by Marshals Georgy and. The number of the Soviet army amounted to more than 1 million people. The soldiers were supported by more than 19,000 guns and mortars, and 2,000 aircraft provided air support to Soviet infantrymen. The Germans countered the USSR on the Kursk Bulge with 900,000 soldiers, 10,000 guns and more than 2,000 aircraft.

The German plan was as follows. They were going to capture the Kursk ledge with a lightning strike and launch a full-scale offensive. Soviet intelligence did not eat its bread in vain, and reported the German plans to the Soviet command. Having learned the exact time of the offensive and the purpose of the main attack, our leaders ordered to strengthen the defenses in these places.

The Germans launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge. On the Germans gathered in front of the front line, a heavy fire of Soviet artillery fell, causing them great damage. The offensive of the enemy stalled, and went with a delay of a couple of hours. During the day of fighting, the enemy advanced only 5 kilometers, and in 6 days of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, 12 km. This state of affairs hardly suited the German command.

During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the largest tank battle in history took place near the village of Prokhorovka. 800 tanks from each side met in battle. It was an impressive and terrible sight. On the battlefield were the best tank models of the Second World War. Soviet T-34 clashed with the German Tiger. St. John's wort was also tested in that battle. 57 mm cannon that pierced the armor of the "Tiger".

Another innovation was the use of anti-tank bombs, the weight of which was small, and the damage caused took the tank out of combat. The German offensive bogged down, the tired enemy began to retreat to their previous positions.

Soon our counteroffensive began. Soviet soldiers took the fortifications and, with the support of aviation, made a breakthrough in the German defenses. The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted about 50 days. During this time, the Russian army destroyed 30 German divisions, including 7 tank divisions, 1.5 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns, 15 thousand tanks. The casualties of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk Bulge amounted to 500 thousand people.

The victory in the Battle of Kursk showed Germany the strength of the Red Army. The specter of defeat in the war hung over the Wehrmacht. More than 100 thousand participants in the battles on the Kursk Bulge were awarded orders and medals. The chronology of the Battle of Kursk is measured by the following time frames: July 5 - August 23, 1943.

BATTLE OF KURSK 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations carried out by the Red Army in the area of the Kursk ledge to disrupt the offensive and defeat the strategic grouping of German troops.

The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 over the vast expanse from the Baltic to the Black Sea undermined Germany's military power. In order to prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the aggressor bloc, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they linked their hopes for the return of the lost strategic initiative and a turn in the course of the war in their favor.

It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command revised the method of the planned actions. The reason for this was the data of Soviet intelligence that the German command was planning to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go on the counteroffensive and defeat his striking forces. The rarest case in the history of warfare occurred when the strongest side, having the strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start hostilities not on the offensive, but on the defensive. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.

FROM THE MEMORIES OF A. VASILEVSKY ON STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE SOVIET COMMAND OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK, April-June 1943

(...) Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive in the Kursk salient area using the latest tank technology on a massive scale, and then set the time for the enemy to go on the offensive.

Naturally, under the prevailing conditions, when the expected strike by the enemy with large forces was quite obvious, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command faced a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if defended, then how? (...)

Analyzing numerous intelligence data on the nature of the upcoming actions of the enemy and on his preparation for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and the Headquarters were more and more inclined towards the idea of transition to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief GK Zhukov in late March - early April. The most concrete conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place over the telephone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk ledge, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations on the plan of action in the area of the Kursk salient, in which it was noted: it will be if we wear down the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going over to a general offensive, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping.

I had to be at when he received G.K. Zhukov's report. I remember well how the Supreme Commander, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commanders." Having given the order to the General Staff to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging him to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan for the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked him to submit his views by April 12 according to the actions of the fronts (...)

At the meeting held in the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)

After a preliminary decision was made on a deliberate defense and on the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive, comprehensive and thorough preparations were launched for the upcoming actions. At the same time, reconnaissance of enemy actions continued. The Soviet command became precisely aware of the dates for the start of the enemy offensive, which were postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy’s plan to launch a strong tank attack on the Voronezh and Central Fronts using large groupings equipped with new military equipment for this purpose, the final decision was made on a deliberate defense.

Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan for the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, that the highest bodies of strategic leadership, and not other commanding authorities, played a decisive role in the development of this plan (...)

Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk M.: Nauka, 1970. S.66-83.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was the reserve of the Headquarters, was deployed. He was supposed to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going on the counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike from the depths.

The German side introduced 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, into the two strike groups intended for the offensive on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, which amounted to about 70% of the Wehrmacht's tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. An important place in the plans of the enemy was given to the massive use of new military equipment: the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand assault guns, as well as the new Foke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.

APPEAL OF THE Führer TO THE GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION "CITADEL", no later than July 4, 1943

Today you are launching a great offensive battle that may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.

With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will be strengthened stronger than before. In addition, a new cruel defeat of the Russians will further shake the faith in the possibility of the success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their faith in victory will disappear no matter what.

The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.

My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.

Their seemingly inexhaustible human masses have thinned out so much in a two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and oldest. Our infantry, as always, is superior to the Russians to the same extent as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tankers, our sappers and, of course, our aviation.

The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning must shake them to their foundations.

And you should know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle.

As a soldier, I clearly understand what I demand from you. In the end, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult this or that individual battle may be.

German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly rallying, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly for the sake of victory; they look with fervent hope at you, my soldiers.

ADOLF GITLER

This order is to be destroyed at divisional headquarters.

Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. THE EVE

From the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command worked on a plan for a strategic offensive, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of army intelligence to the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the command of the Wehrmacht itself plans to carry out a strike under the bases of the Kursk ledge, in order to surround our troops stationed there.

The idea of an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to strike in converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were also opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, was of the opinion that they should not be used as the main striking force in a big battle - this could lead to a waste of forces . The strategy of the Wehrmacht for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, was to be exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of expenditure of forces and resources.

However, the bulk of the German military leaders actively supported the offensive plans. The date of the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", was set for July 5, and the German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in terms of firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the beginning of Operation Citadel, the German forces of the Army Groups Center and South had at their disposal up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the fighting qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and putting an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. In total, the Wehrmacht strike groups in the area of the Kursk ledge by the beginning of the offensive had about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars. On the southern wing of the ledge, the strike forces of Army Group South under the command of Manstein were concentrated, which included the 4th Panzer Army of General Hoth and the Kempf group. The troops of Army Group Center von Kluge operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here was the forces of the 9th Army of General Model. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Goth and Kemp had about twice as many tanks as Model.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided not to be the first to go on the offensive, but to take up a tough defense. The idea of the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy's forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, having brought fresh reserves into action, go on the counteroffensive. Needless to say, it was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the Soviet high command remembered well that not once since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize defense in such a way that a pre-prepared German offensive would fizzle out at the stage of breaking through Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).

However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to hurry with the start of the offensive. A defense in depth was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as anti-tank. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions, respectively, on the northern and southern sections of the Kursk salient, another one was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and join the battle at the moment the Red Army went on the counteroffensive.

The military factories of the country worked uninterruptedly on the production of tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional "thirty-fours" and powerful self-propelled guns SU-152. The latter could already with great success fight the "Tigers" and "Panthers".

The organization of the Soviet defense near Kursk was based on the idea of a deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions. 5-6 defensive lines were erected on the Central and Voronezh fronts. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and along the left bank of the river. Don prepared the state line of defense. The total depth of the engineering equipment of the area reached 250-300 km.

In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy both in people and in equipment. The Central and Voronezh fronts included about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had up to 5,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 28,000 guns and mortars at their disposal. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand for us against about 2 thousand for the Germans.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. DEFENSE

The closer the launch date of Operation Citadel drew nearer, the more difficult it was to conceal its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy offensive was scheduled for 3 hours. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counter-preparation on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 minutes. After the roar of the cannonade subsided, the Germans could not recover for a long time. As a result of artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups, German troops suffered losses and launched an offensive 2.5-3 hours later than planned. Only after some time, the German troops were able to start their own artillery and aviation training. The attack of German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.

The German command pursued the goal of ramming through the defenses of the Soviet troops and reaching Kursk. In the zone of the Central Front, the main blow of the enemy was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the Central Front launched a counterattack against the advancing grouping by part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.

The first surprise for the German command both on the southern and northern wings of the Kursk ledge was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance on the battlefield of new German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". Moreover, Soviet anti-tank artillery and guns from tanks buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of the German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate into the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was heavily mined, and the passages in the minefields were well covered by artillery. While the German tankers were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to retain air supremacy. Increasingly, Soviet attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield - the famous Il-2.

Only on the first day of fighting, the Model group operating on the northern wing of the Kursk ledge lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that participated in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of the German "Tigers", advancing against the forces of the Central Front, destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period of July 5 - 6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the strike units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The result of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike force was forced to stop. Having advanced only 10 - 15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of his tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.

Meanwhile, on the southern flank of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, the shock units of the German motorized formations "Grossdeutschland", "Reich", "Dead Head", the Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler", several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army of Gotha and the Kempf group managed to penetrate the Soviet defenses up to 20 and over km. The offensive initially went in the direction of the Oboyan settlement, but then, due to the strong opposition of the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South von Manstein decided to strike east - in the direction of Prokhorovka . It was near this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO TWO Hundred TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is a largely collective concept. The fate of the opposing sides was not decided in one day and not on the same field. The theater of operations for the Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of more than 100 square meters. km. Nevertheless, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course not only of the Battle of Kursk, but of the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.

On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov from the Steppe Front to help the troops of the Voronezh Front, who was tasked with launching a counterattack on the enemy’s wedged tank units and forcing them to retreat to their original positions. It was emphasized that it was necessary to try to engage German tanks in close combat in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.

Having concentrated in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks moved to the attack. In quantitative terms, they outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of approximately 3:2, but the fighting qualities of the German tanks allowed them to destroy many "thirty-four" even on the way to their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that broke through met the German ones almost armor to armor. But this is exactly what the command of the 5th Guards Army wanted. Moreover, soon the battle formations of the opponents mixed up so much that the "tigers" and "panthers" began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal, to the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside towards the end of July 13, it was time to count the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army has practically lost its combat power. But German losses also did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorovka direction: the Germans had only up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles left in service.

The Soviet command hastily transferred new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually run out of steam. The Germans had the 24th Panzer Corps in reserve, but sending it into battle meant losing the last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably great. On July 15, the Headquarters decided to deploy the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev on the southern wing of the Kursk ledge - the 27th and 53rd armies, with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps. Soviet tanks were hastily concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and received an order on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tankers no longer had to participate in a new oncoming battle. The German units began to gradually move away from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?

As early as July 13, Hitler invited Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. On that day, he ordered the continuation of Operation Citadel and not to reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success near Kursk seemed to be just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans were falling apart. On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk Front went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and Left Wings of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation ""). The German defense here could not stand it and cracked at the seams. Moreover, some territorial gains on the southern wing of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle of Prokhorovka.

At a meeting at the Fuhrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuhrer did not object to the continuation of the attacks on the southern wing of the Kursk salient (although it was no longer possible to do this on the northern wing of the salient). But the new efforts of the Manstein group did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command of the German ground forces ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from the Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. OFFENSIVE

In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. On July 12 - 15, the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts went on the offensive, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk salient, they launched the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev "). Fighting in all areas continued to be extremely complex and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were inflicted not on a weak, but on a strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to shorten the time for preparing for offensive operations as much as possible, to catch the enemy by surprise, that is, precisely at the moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a solid defense. The breakthrough was carried out by powerful strike groups in narrow sections of the front using a large number of tanks, artillery and aircraft.

The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Orel and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army that won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, units of the Red Army had pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km and liberated Kharkov for the second time.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. Even greater were the losses of the Soviet troops: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. It had at its disposal an incomparably greater number of fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.

The offensive of the Red Army, after the introduction of new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. On the central sector of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This ancient Russian city, considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv region. Capturing several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river on the move, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag was raised over Kyiv.

It would be wrong to say that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more difficult. So, after the liberation of Kyiv, the enemy managed to launch a powerful counterattack in the region of Fastov and Zhytomyr against the advanced formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, stopping the offensive of the Red Army on the territory of the right-bank Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more tense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the areas east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had taken up a tough defense, did not lead to any significant results. Time was needed to concentrate additional forces in the Minsk direction, to give rest to formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944.

And in 1943, the victories near Kursk and then in the battle for the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of soldiers' and commanders' awards - the Orders of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order of Victory, as well as the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already taken place.

July forty-third ... These hot days and nights of the war are an integral part of the history of the Soviet Army with the Nazi invaders. The front in its configuration in the area near Kursk, the front resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the Nazi command. The German command prepared the offensive operation as a revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort on developing the plan.

Hitler's operational order began with the words: "I decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to launch the Citadel offensive - the first offensive this year ... It must end with a quick and decisive success." Everything was assembled by the Nazis into a powerful fist. Swift tanks "Tigers" and "Panthers" super-heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinands", according to the plan of the Nazis, were to crush, disperse the Soviet troops, turn the tide of events.

Operation Citadel

The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German operation "Citadel" would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle ... The most important decision was to be made by the Military Council of the front, and it was taken. On July 5, 1943, at two and twenty minutes, the silence exploded with the thunder of our guns ... The battle that began lasted until August 23.

As a result, the events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War turned into the defeat of the Nazi groups. The strategy of the operation "Citadel" of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead is crushing blows using surprise on the forces of the Soviet Army, encirclement and destruction of them. The triumph of the "Citadel" plan was to ensure the implementation of the further plans of the Wehrmacht. To disrupt the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.

The course of the Battle of Kursk

The actions of the Army Grouping "Center" and the Operational Group "Kempf" of the armies "South", speaking from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. The repulse of the strike from the side of Orel was assigned to the formations of the Central Front. The formations of the Voronezh Front were supposed to meet the advancing detachments from Belgorod.

The steppe front, consisting of rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, the Russian field near the Prokhorovka railway station saw the greatest through tank battle, noted by historians as unprecedented in the world, the largest through tank battle in terms of scale. Russian power on its own land withstood another test, turned the course of history to victory.

One day of the battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and nearly 10,000 casualties. Hitler's groupings were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovka field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, starting the implementation of Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat the enemy groupings in the Orel region. From July 16 to July 18, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts liquidated the Nazi groupings in the Kursk Triangle and began to pursue it with the support of the air forces. Together, the Nazi formations were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk

Unprecedented strength, the most powerful tank battle in history, was the key to the development of further offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War;
The Battle of Kursk is the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the plans of the 1943 campaign;
As a result of the implementation of the Kutuzov plan and the Operation Commander Rumyantsev, parts of the Nazi troops were defeated in the area of the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads were liquidated;
The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance to the West, liberating cities and towns.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The failure of the Wehrmacht operation "Citadel" presented to the world community the impotence and complete defeat of the Nazi campaign against the Soviet Union;
A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and throughout as a result of the "fiery" Battle of Kursk;
The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious, there was no longer any confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.

Dates and events of the Great Patriotic War

The Great Patriotic War began on June 22, 1941, on the day of All Saints who shone in the Russian land. The Barbarossa plan - a plan for a lightning war with the USSR - was signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940. Now it has been put into action. German troops - the strongest army in the world - advanced in three groups ("North", "Center", "South"), aimed at the rapid capture of the Baltic states and then Leningrad, Moscow, and in the south - Kyiv.

Kursk Bulge

In 1943, the Nazi command decided to conduct its general offensive in the Kursk region. The fact is that the operational position of the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, concave towards the enemy, promised great prospects for the Germans. Two large fronts could be surrounded here at once, as a result of which a large gap would have formed, allowing the enemy to carry out major operations in the south and northeast directions.

The Soviet command was preparing for this offensive. From mid-April, the General Staff began to develop a plan for both a defensive operation near Kursk and a counteroffensive. And by the beginning of July 1943, the Soviet command had completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk.

July 5, 1943 German troops began the offensive. The first attack was repulsed. However, then the Soviet troops had to withdraw. The fighting was very intense and the Germans failed to achieve significant success. The enemy did not solve any of the assigned tasks and was eventually forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.

The struggle on the southern face of the Kursk ledge, in the zone of the Voronezh Front, was also exceptionally tense.

On July 12, 1943 (on the day of the holy supreme apostles Peter and Paul), the largest tank battle in military history near Prokhorovka took place. The battle unfolded on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway, and the main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. As Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, the former commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, recalled, the struggle was extremely fierce, “tanks jumped on each other, grappled, could no longer disperse, fought to the death until one of them flared up torch or did not stop with broken tracks. But the wrecked tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire. The battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour. As a result of the battle near Prokhorovka, none of the parties was able to solve the tasks facing it: the enemy - to break through to Kursk; 5th Guards Tank Army - go to the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the way to the enemy to Kursk was closed and the day of July 12, 1943 became the day of the collapse of the German offensive near Kursk.

On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction, and on July 15, the troops of the Central.

On August 5, 1943 (the day of the celebration of the Pochaev Icon of the Mother of God, as well as the icon of "Joy of All Who Sorrow"), Orel was released. On the same day Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front. The Oryol offensive operation lasted 38 days and ended on August 18 with the defeat of a powerful group of Nazi troops aimed at Kursk from the north.

The events on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front had a significant impact on the further course of events in the Belgorod-Kursk sector. On July 17, the troops of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts went on the offensive. On the night of July 19, the general withdrawal of the Nazi troops began on the southern face of the Kursk salient.

On August 23, 1943, the strongest battle of the Great Patriotic War ended with the liberation of Kharkov - the Battle of Kursk (it lasted 50 days). It ended with the defeat of the main grouping of German troops.

Liberation of Smolensk (1943)

Smolensk offensive operation August 7 - October 2, 1943. In the course of hostilities and the nature of the tasks performed, the Smolensk strategic offensive operation is divided into three stages. The first stage covers the period of hostilities from 7 to 20 August. During this stage, the troops of the Western Front carried out the Spas-Demenskaya operation. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front began the Dukhovshchinskaya offensive operation. At the second stage (August 21 - September 6), the troops of the Western Front carried out the Yelnensko-Dorogobuzh operation, and the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front continued to conduct the Dukhovshchinskaya offensive operation. At the third stage (September 7 - October 2), the troops of the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, carried out the Smolensk-Roslavl operation, and the main forces of the Kalinin Front carried out the Dukhovshchinsky-Demidov operation.

On September 25, 1943, the troops of the Western Front liberated Smolensk, the most important strategic center of defense of the Nazi troops in the western direction.

As a result of the successful implementation of the Smolensk offensive operation, our troops broke into the enemy's heavily fortified multi-lane and deeply echeloned defenses and advanced 200-225 km to the West.