Ural Humanitarian Institute distance education. Ural Humanitarian Institute

Private educational organization of higher education

Russia, Russia ,
Yekaterinburg Yekaterinburg

State accreditation

• On February 7, 2001, the Institute received state accreditation for the first time.
• On February 2, 2006, it was again accredited for 5 years with confirmation of the state accredited status of the “higher educational institution” type of the “institute” type.
• December 13, 2010 - Certificate of state. accreditation reg. No. 0796 series BB No. 000805 dated 12/13/2010.
• March 2, 2011 - License reg. No. 0776 of the AAA series No. 000788 of 03/02/2011.
• May 29, 2015 - License reg. No. 1457 series 90L01 No. 0008455 of 05/29/2015.
• June 25, 2015 - Certificate of state. accreditation reg. No. 1350 series 90A01 No. 0001434 dated 06/25/2015.

Forms of study

• Full-time education
• Part-time education
• Extramural studies

Faculties and specialties

Faculties

• Faculty of Practical Psychology
• Faculty of Economics and Management
• Faculty of Law

Areas of training

• Jurisprudence. Profiles: civil law and criminal law.
• Economy. Profiles: finance and credit; accounting, analysis, audit.
• Management. Profiles: small business management; human resource management; logistics and supply chain management; organization management in health care.

• Psychology. Profiles: psychology of personnel management; socio-psychological rehabilitation; psychological counseling (psychology and family psychotherapy).

teachers

The core of the institute is the teaching staff - highly qualified specialists, more than seventy percent of whom have academic titles and degrees. Candidates and doctors of sciences from academic institutes of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences and leading universities in Yekaterinburg teach at the USGI. There are “Honorary Workers of Higher Professional Education”, as well as practitioners who own advanced methods and have experience in managing and organizing production.

Achievements

• December 30, 1999 - moving into our own modernly equipped building, the distinguishing feature of which is comfort and safety.
• In April 2003, it was the first of the non-state universities to win the seventh regional competition "Leader in Business" in the nomination "The Best Educational Institution".
• , , 2009 - "Gold medal "European quality" in the nomination "100 best universities in Russia".
• March 2008 - awarded with the International award "European quality" ("European quality")
• April 29, 2010 - winner of the XIV inter-regional competition "Eurasia - a leader in business - 2010" in the nomination "Stable enterprises".
• May 2010 - laureate of the competition "100 best organizations of Russia in the field of science and education."
• June 2013 - laureate of the competition "100 best universities and research institutes of Russia"
• June 2013 - winner of the competition of the Independent Public Council "One Hundred Best Universities of Russia" in the nomination "Best Innovative University".
• June 2013 - winner of the competition of the Independent Public Council "One Hundred Best Universities of Russia" in the nomination "Best Non-State University".
• February 2014 - Rector of the UrGI M. N. Denisevich - torchbearer of the Sochi 2014 Paralympic Torch Relay in Yekaterinburg.
• May - July 2015 - The Institute received a certificate of professional public accreditation in all areas.

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An excerpt characterizing the Ural Institute for the Humanities

On the 24th there was a battle at the Shevardinsky redoubt, on the 25th not a single shot was fired from either side, on the 26th the Battle of Borodino took place.
Why and how were the battles at Shevardin and Borodino given and accepted? Why was the Battle of Borodino given? Neither for the French nor for the Russians it made the slightest sense. The immediate result was and should have been - for the Russians, that we approached the death of Moscow (which we feared most in the world), and for the French, that they approached the death of the entire army (which they also feared most of all in the world) . This result was obvious at the same time, but meanwhile Napoleon gave, and Kutuzov accepted this battle.
If the commanders were guided by reasonable reasons, it seemed, as it should have been clear to Napoleon, that, having gone two thousand miles and accepted the battle with the probable accident of losing a quarter of the army, he was going to certain death; and it should have seemed just as clear to Kutuzov that, accepting the battle and also risking losing a quarter of the army, he was probably losing Moscow. For Kutuzov, this was mathematically clear, as clear as it is that if I have less than one checker in checkers and I change, I will probably lose and therefore should not change.
When the opponent has sixteen checkers, and I have fourteen, then I am only one-eighth weaker than him; and when I exchange thirteen checkers, he will be three times stronger than me.
Before the battle of Borodino, our forces were approximately in relation to the French as five to six, and after the battle as one to two, that is, before the battle one hundred thousand; a hundred and twenty, and after the battle fifty to a hundred. And at the same time, the smart and experienced Kutuzov accepted the battle. Napoleon, the brilliant commander, as he is called, gave battle, losing a quarter of the army and stretching his line even more. If it is said that by occupying Moscow, he thought that by occupying Vienna he would end the campaign, then there is a lot of evidence against this. The historians of Napoleon themselves say that even from Smolensk he wanted to stop, he knew the danger of his extended position, he knew that the occupation of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, because from Smolensk he saw in what position the Russian cities were left to him, and did not receive a single answer to their repeated statements about their desire to negotiate.
Giving and accepting the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted involuntarily and senselessly. And historians, under the accomplished facts, only later summed up the intricate evidence of the foresight and genius of the generals, who, of all the involuntary tools of world events, were the most slavish and involuntary figures.
The ancients left us models of heroic poems in which the heroes are the whole interest of history, and we still cannot get used to the fact that for our human time this kind of history has no meaning.
To another question: how the battles of Borodino and the Shevardino battles preceding it were given - there is also a very definite and well-known, completely false idea. All historians describe the case as follows:
The Russian army, as if in its retreat from Smolensk, was looking for the best position for itself for a general battle, and such a position was allegedly found at Borodin.
The Russians supposedly fortified this position forward, to the left of the road (from Moscow to Smolensk), at almost a right angle to it, from Borodino to Utitsa, on the very spot where the battle took place.
In front of this position, a fortified advanced post on the Shevardinsky barrow was allegedly put up to observe the enemy. On the 24th, Napoleon allegedly attacked the forward post and took it; On the 26th, he attacked the entire Russian army, which was in position on the Borodino field.
So the stories say, and all this is completely unfair, as anyone who wants to delve into the essence of the matter will easily be convinced of.
The Russians did not look for a better position; but, on the contrary, in their retreat they passed many positions that were better than Borodino. They did not stop at any of these positions: both because Kutuzov did not want to accept a position that was not chosen by him, and because the demand for a popular battle had not yet been expressed strongly enough, and because Miloradovich had not yet approached with the militia, and also because other reasons that are innumerable. The fact is that the previous positions were stronger and that the Borodino position (the one on which the battle was given) is not only not strong, but for some reason it is not at all a position more than any other place in the Russian Empire, which, guessing, one would point with a pin on the map.
The Russians not only did not fortify the position of the Borodino field to the left at a right angle from the road (that is, the place where the battle took place), but never before August 25, 1812 did they think that the battle could take place on this place. This is evidenced, firstly, by the fact that not only on the 25th there were no fortifications in this place, but that, begun on the 25th, they were not completed on the 26th; secondly, the position of the Shevardinsky redoubt serves as proof: the Shevardinsky redoubt, in front of the position on which the battle was taken, does not make any sense. Why was this redoubt fortified stronger than all other points? And why, defending it on the 24th until late at night, were all efforts exhausted and six thousand people lost? To observe the enemy, a Cossack patrol was enough. Thirdly, the proof that the position on which the battle took place was not foreseen and that the Shevardinsky redoubt was not the forward point of this position is that Barclay de Tolly and Bagration until the 25th were convinced that the Shevardinsky redoubt was the left flank of the position and that Kutuzov himself, in his report, written hastily after the battle, calls the Shevardinsky redoubt the left flank of the position. Much later, when reports about the battle of Borodino were written in the open, it was (probably to justify the mistakes of the commander in chief, who had to be infallible) that unfair and strange testimony was invented that the Shevardinsky redoubt served as an advanced post (whereas it was only a fortified point of the left flank) and as if the battle of Borodino was accepted by us in a fortified and pre-selected position, while it took place in a completely unexpected and almost unfortified place.