Valery nightingale revolution. Valery Dmitrievich Solovey Revolution! Fundamentals of revolutionary struggle in the modern era

“Rumors spread around Moscow that the archive was being evacuated from the FSB building on Lubyanka by helicopters”

Five years have passed since the beginning of the mass protests that broke out in the capital in December 2011, after the announcement of the results of the elections to the State Duma. However, the question "what was it?" still does not have a definitive answer. According to MGIMO professor, political scientist and historian Valery Soloviev, this is an “attempt at a revolution” that had every chance of success.

Valery Solovey reflects on the origins and meaning of the Snow Revolution and the reasons for its defeat in an interview with MK.

Help "MK": “Recently, Valery Solovey published a book, the title of which will scare someone, and perhaps inspire someone: “Revolution! Fundamentals of the revolutionary struggle in the modern era. This work analyzes, first of all, the experience of "color" revolutions, to which the scientist ranks the Russian events of five years ago. The chapter dedicated to them is called "The Revolution Betrayed".

Valery Dmitrievich, judging by the abundance of reassuring forecasts issued on the eve of the 2011 Duma elections, the mass protests that followed them came as a complete surprise to many, if not most, politicians and experts. Tell me honestly: were they a surprise for you too?

No, they weren't a surprise to me. Back in the early autumn of 2011, my interview was published under the heading: "Soon the fate of the country will be decided on the streets and squares of the capital."

But in fairness, I will say that I am not the only one who turned out to be such a seer. Somewhere in the first half of September, I managed to talk with an employee of one of the Russian special services, who, on duty, is studying mass moods. I will not specify what kind of organization this is, but the quality of their sociology is considered very high. And I had a chance to make sure that this reputation is justified.

This man frankly told me then that since the beginning of the 2000s there had not been such an alarming situation for the authorities. I ask: "What, even mass unrest is possible?" He says: "Yes, it is possible." When asked what he and his department are going to do in this situation, my interlocutor replied: “Well, how what? We report to the authorities. But they don’t believe us. and that nothing will happen."

In addition, in the spring of 2011, the Center for Strategic Research, then headed by Mikhail Dmitriev, published a report that spoke of a high likelihood of public discontent in connection with the elections, up to mass protests. In a word, what happened was basically predicted. However, there is a huge gap between the categories "could happen" and "happen". Even if we say that something will happen with a high probability, it is not at all certain that it will happen. But in December 2011 it happened.

Vladimir Putin psychologically very accurately calculated the situation by choosing Dmitry Medvedev as his successor. No one else from Putin's entourage would have agreed to the "castling" that occurred after the end of the first presidential term, Valery Solovey is sure.

There is a version according to which the unrest was inspired by Medvedev and his inner circle. Is there any basis for such conspiracy theories?

Absolutely none. It is noteworthy that the core of the first protest action, which began on December 5, 2011 on Chistoprudny Boulevard, was made up of people who were election observers. They saw how it all happened, and had no doubt that the announced results were falsified. Only a few hundred people were expected to attend this first rally, but several thousand turned up. Moreover, they were very determined: they moved to the center of Moscow, breaking through the cordons of the police and internal troops. I personally observed these collisions. It was clearly visible that the behavior of the protesters turned out to be an unpleasant surprise for the police. She obviously did not expect such militancy from previously harmless hipsters.

It was an unadulterated moral protest. Spitting in the face of a man and demanding that he wipe himself off and perceive it as God's dew - and this is exactly what the behavior of those in power looked like - one should not be surprised at his indignation. Society, offended at first by Putin and Medvedev's "castling", was then shattered by the shameless manner in which the party in power tried to secure its monopoly position in parliament. Millions of people felt cheated.

Another thing is that some people from Medvedev's inner circle came up with the idea to use the rapidly expanding protest in the interests of their boss. And they got in touch with the leaders of the protest. According to some reports, Dmitry Anatolyevich was invited to speak on December 10, 2011 at a rally on Bolotnaya Square. And, so to speak, to replay the situation with the "castling". But Medvedev did not dare to do so. These rumors, however, were enough for a version of a conspiracy to be born in the heads of the Chekists, in which Medvedev participated on the one hand, and the West on the other.

I repeat, there are no grounds for such suspicions. However, the consequence of this version was that Putin had doubts about Medvedev's loyalty for a long time. The fact that he, so to speak, is pure in his thoughts and does not hatch "treacherous" plans. As far as we know, the suspicions were finally removed only a year and a half ago. But today, Putin, on the contrary, considers Medvedev a man who can be completely trusted. What manifested itself, in particular, in the situation with. The attack on the government was planned much larger. But, as we know, the president publicly confirmed his confidence in the government and personally in Medvedev, and thus drew a “red line” for the security forces.

Were the calculations of the "conspirators" at that time pure schemes, or did they rely on Medvedev's position?

I think that they acted on their own, hoping that the situation would "steer" in a favorable direction for their boss and, accordingly, for themselves. I am sure that Medvedev did not and could not give them such a sanction. This is not the psychological type.

By the way, there are different points of view on how Medvedev reacted to his "non-re-approval" as president. Someone, for example, believes that he had absolutely no reason to be upset: he brilliantly played in a play written at the time of his nomination for the presidency.

I do not believe in such a long and echeloned conspiracy theories. I have a feeling - and not only me - that Dmitry Anatolyevich was still going to be re-elected. But he found himself in a situation where he had to abandon this idea. A psychologically stronger partner broke him.

- And he resignedly obeyed?

Well, not completely resigned, of course. It must have been a personal tragedy. Sergei Ivanov, of course, would not behave like that. And no one else from Putin's entourage. In this sense, Vladimir Vladimirovich psychologically very accurately calculated the situation, the choice was made correctly.

However, the future looked different in 2007 than in 2011. There were some important and still hidden from the public circumstances that did not allow us to say with certainty that castling will occur in 2011.

You call the mass protest movement in Russia an "attempt at revolution." But today the prevailing point of view is that the circle of these revolutionaries was terribly narrow and they were terribly far from the people, and therefore did not pose a real threat to power. Like, the rest of Russia remained indifferent to this Moscow intelligentsia "Decembrist uprising", which therefore was nothing more than a storm in a teacup.

This is not true. It is enough to look at the results of sociological surveys made at the same time, in hot pursuit. Look: at the moment the protests began, almost half of Muscovites, 46 percent, approved the opposition's actions in one way or another. They were negatively treated by 25 percent. Only a quarter. And categorically against even less - 13 percent.

Another 22 percent found it difficult to determine their attitude or declined to answer. This is the data of the Levada Center. It is also indicative that 2.5 percent of the capital's residents declared their participation in the rally on Bolotnaya Square on December 10, 2011.

Judging by these data, the number of participants should have been at least 150,000. In fact, there were half as many - about 70 thousand. From this funny fact, it follows that at the end of 2011, participation in protests was considered an honorable thing. A kind of symbolic privilege. And remember how many representatives of the Russian elite were at these winter rallies. And Prokhorov came, and Kudrin, and Ksenia Sobchak pushed on the podium ...

- But outside of Moscow, the mood was different.

Until now, all revolutions in Russia have developed according to the so-called central type: you seize power in the capital, and after that the whole country is in your hands. Therefore, what they thought at that moment in the province does not matter at all. For elections it matters, for a revolution it doesn't. This is first.

Secondly, the mood in the provinces did not differ so much from those in the capital at that time. According to a poll by the Public Opinion Foundation conducted throughout the country in mid-December 2011, 26 percent of Russians shared the demand to cancel the results of the elections to the State Duma and hold a repeat vote. This is a lot. Less than half, 40 percent, did not support this demand. And only 6 percent believed that the elections were held without fraud.

Obviously, the population of large cities fluctuated. It could well have taken the side of Moscow's hipster revolutionaries if they had acted more decisively.

In short, it can not be called a "storm in a teacup". In fact, on December 5, 2011, a revolution began in Russia. The protest covered more and more territory of the capital, every day more and more people were involved in it. Society expressed ever more visible sympathy for the protesters. The police were running out of steam, the authorities were confused and frightened: even the phantasmagoric scenario of storming the Kremlin was not ruled out.

Rumors spread around Moscow that the archive was being evacuated from the FSB building on Lubyanka by helicopters. It is not known how true they were, but the very fact of such rumors says a lot about the then mass mood in the capital. During at least two weeks of December the situation was extremely favorable for the opposition. All the conditions were in place for a successful revolutionary action.

It is noteworthy that the protest developed rapidly, despite the fact that the government-controlled media, especially television, adhered to a policy of strict information embargo against opposition actions. The thing is that the opposition has a "secret weapon" - social networks. It was through them that she campaigned, alerted and mobilized her supporters. I can't help but notice, by the way, that since then the importance of social networks has grown even more.

As Donald Trump's recent campaign has shown, they can already win elections. I analyze this experience of using social networks in my classes with my students and in public workshops.

- Where and when was the move made in this game that predetermined the loss of the opposition?

I think if on December 10 the rally, as previously scheduled, had taken place on Revolution Square, events would have developed in a completely different way.

That is, Eduard Limonov is right when he claims that the protest began to be “leaked” at the moment when the leaders agreed to change the place of the action?

Absolutely. At least twice as many people would have come to Revolution Square than to Bolotnaya Square. And if you are familiar with the topography of Moscow, then you can easily imagine what 150,000 people are protesting in the very heart of the capital, a stone's throw from parliament and the Central Election Commission. Mass dynamics is unpredictable. One or two calls from the podium of the rally, spontaneous movement among its participants, awkward actions of the police - and a giant crowd moves towards the State Duma, the Central Election Commission, the Kremlin ... The authorities understood this very well, so they did everything in order to move the rally to Bolotnaya. And opposition leaders came to the aid of the authorities. Moreover, in fact, they saved this power. The consent to change Revolution Square to Bolotnaya meant, in essence, the refusal to fight. And politically, and morally, psychologically, and symbolically.

- What was the name of the yacht, so did it sail?

Quite right. Nevertheless, the opposition still had the opportunity to turn the tide of events both in January and February, right up to the presidential elections. If instead of fruitless chanting "We are the power here", "We will come again" some actions were taken, the situation could well unfold.

- What do you mean by actions?

All successful revolutions began with the creation of the so-called liberated territory. In the form of, for example, streets, squares, quarters.

- A la Maidan?

Maidan is one of the historical modifications of this technology. In all revolutions, it is critically important for revolutionaries to create a foothold, a foothold. If we take, for example, the Chinese revolution, which developed according to a peripheral type, then there a foothold was created in the remote provinces of the country. And for the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution, Smolny was such a territory. Sometimes they stay on the bridgehead for a long time, sometimes events unfold very quickly. But it all starts with this. You can gather even half a million people, but it won't matter if the people just stood still and dispersed.

It is important that the quantitative dynamics be supplemented by political, new and offensive forms of struggle. If you say: "No, we are standing here and will stand until our demands are met," then you are taking a significant step forward. Attempts to follow this path were made on March 5, 2012 on Pushkin Square and on May 6 on Bolotnaya. But then it was too late - the window of opportunity had closed. The March and post-March situation was fundamentally different from the December one. If society had serious and justified doubts about the legitimacy of the parliamentary elections, then Putin's victory in the presidential elections looked more than convincing. Even the opposition did not dare to challenge it.

But December, I emphasize, was an exceptionally convenient moment for the opposition. The mass rise of the protest movement was combined with the confusion of the authorities, who were quite ready to make serious concessions. However, by mid-January, the mood of the ruling group had changed dramatically. The Kremlin and the White House came to the conclusion that, despite the great mobilization potential of the protest, its leaders are not dangerous. That they are cowardly, unwilling and even afraid of power, and that they are easily manipulated. And one can only agree with this. Suffice it to recall the fact that on New Year's Eve almost all the opposition leaders went abroad to rest.

One of those people who formulated the political strategy of the authorities at that time told me the following after the fact: “On December 9-10, we saw that the opposition leaders were stupid. And in early January, we were convinced that they value their own comfort above power. And then they decided: We will not share power, but we will crush the opposition." I am quoting almost verbatim.

- And how far was the government ready to go in its concessions? What could the opposition possibly count on?

Concessions to the government would be directly proportional to the pressure on it. True, I do not really believe that the opposition could then win a complete victory - come to power. But it was quite realistic to achieve a political compromise.

It is known, for example, that in the corridors of power the possibility of holding snap parliamentary elections after the presidential ones was discussed. But after the leaders of the opposition showed a complete lack of strategy and will, this idea was removed from the agenda. However, I'm not going to blame anyone for anything. If God did not give volitional qualities, then He did not. As the French say, they have such a frivolous saying that even the most beautiful girl cannot give more than what she has.

The art of a politician is to see a historical chance, and not to push off from it with hands and feet. History rarely provides an opportunity to change something, and it is usually unmerciful to those politicians who miss their chance. She did not spare the leaders of the "Snow Revolution", as these events are sometimes called. Navalny was prosecuted, his brother ended up in prison. Vladimir Ryzhkov lost his party, Gennady Gudkov lost his deputy mandate. Boris Nemtsov left us altogether... All these people thought that fate would give them another, better opportunity. But in a revolution, the best is the enemy of the good. There may not be another chance.

It seems to me that the psychological pattern of the "Snow Revolution" was largely predetermined by the phenomenon of August 1991. For some it was a miracle of victory, for others it was a terrible trauma of defeat. The Chekists, who saw how the monument to Dzerzhinsky was being destroyed, who were sitting in their offices at that time and were afraid that a crowd would burst into them, have lived since then with fear: "Never more, we will never allow this again." And the liberals - with the feeling that one day the power itself will fall into their hands. As then, in 1991: they didn’t hit a finger on a finger, but ended up on a horse.

Let us imagine that the opposition would succeed in holding repeated parliamentary elections. How would this affect the development of the situation in the country?

I think that even with the most honest count of votes, the liberals would not be able to gain control over the State Duma. A total of 15, at most 20 percent of the seats would be content. However, the political system would become much more open, flexible and competitive. And as a result, a lot of what happened in subsequent years would not have happened.

We would now live in a completely different country. This is the logic of the system: if it closes, loses its internal dynamism, competition, if there is no one who could challenge the authorities, then the authorities can make any decisions. Including - strategically erroneous. I can say that in March 2014, most of the elite were horrified by the decisions taken then. In real fear.

- However, the majority of the country's population perceives the events of March 2014 as a great blessing.

In my opinion, the attitude of the majority of the country's population to this was best and most accurately described by the talented playwright Yevgeny Grishkovets: the annexation of Crimea was illegal, but fair. It is clear that no one can return Crimea to Ukraine. This would not have been possible even for the Kasparov government, if by some miracle it had come to power. But for society, Crimea has already been played out as a topic; it is not present in everyday discourse today.

If in 2014-2015 the problem of Crimea divided the opposition, stood up as an insurmountable wall, now it is simply taken out of the brackets. By the way, I would not be at all surprised at the restoration of the protest coalition that arose in 2011 and included both liberals and nationalists. As far as I know, this recovery is already underway.

How likely is it that in the foreseeable future we will see something similar to what the country experienced during that revolutionary winter?

I think that the probability is quite high. Although probability, as I said, does not mean inevitability. After the suppression of the 2011-2012 revolution, the system stabilized. The internal "capitulators", as the Chinese would call them, realized that they had to sniff into a rag and follow in the wake of the leader, the national leader.

At the end of 2013, when a system of repressive measures began to take shape in the country, there was a feeling that the regime had cemented everything, that nothing would break through this concrete. But, as is usually the case in history, everywhere and always the power itself provokes a new dynamic that undermines stability. First - Crimea, then - Donbass, then - Syria ...

It's not the Americans planted, not the opposition. Initiating geopolitical dynamics of this magnitude, you must be aware that it will inevitably affect the socio-political system. And we see that this system is becoming more and more unstable. Which is manifested, in particular, in the growing nervousness within the Russian elite, in mutual attacks, in the war of compromising materials, in the growth of social tension.

The turbulence of the system is growing. By the way, the revolution that took place in our country at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s has not ended in terms of the criteria of historical sociology. We are still living in a revolutionary epoch, and new revolutionary paroxysms are by no means excluded.

Tatyana Solovey, Valery Solovey

THE FAILED REVOLUTION

The present is a consequence of the past. In order to judge the former, it is necessary to recall the latter;

N. M. Karamzin

Immature strategy is the cause of sadness.

Miyamoto Musashi

Russian nationalism actually means a very simple thing - so that trains in Russia run on schedule, officials do not demand kickbacks, judges do not listen to phone calls, commodity businessmen do not take money to London, traffic cops live on a salary, and Rublyovka sits on Chistopolskaya covered.

Victor Pelevin

FOREWORD

Pavel and Fedor - with love and hope

This book crowns the authors' many years of research into Russian nationalism. In part, they have already been implemented: in the form of scientific and journalistic articles written by the authors separately and together, as well as lecture courses on the history of Russian nationalism and topical issues of Russian identity, read by Tatyana Soloveya within the walls of Moscow University. Combining efforts resulted in a conceptually non-trivial, unusual in genre and language, scientific work unprecedented in chronological coverage.

In a condensed form, its concept is set out in one of the chapters of Valery Solovey's book "The Blood and Soil of Russian History" (Moscow, 2008) - in a chapter written jointly with Tatyana Solovey. From the same book, several chapters migrated to the new one - in a more or less revised form.

The structure of the new book is traditional: in its three sections, the dynamics of Russian nationalism over the course of almost two centuries is examined in chronological order. The chapter devoted to the Old Believers, which we consider to be the first organized ethnic resistance to the empire or, in more familiar scientific language, a manifestation of pre-political nationalism, is somewhat out of the ordinary.

However, the content of the book is very unconventional. We have tried to answer the question that we consider central to understanding Russian nationalism: why did it lose all its major political battles and fail to have a decisive impact on Russia's historical trajectory. To understand this, it was not enough to study sources and scientific monographs; Equally, if not more important, were personal observations of contemporary nationalism and nationalists.

The authors had a chance to communicate with almost all prominent Russian nationalist leaders and ideologists of the last twenty years, and, to be honest, this acquaintance caused us, with rare exceptions, deep disappointment, if not to put it stronger and more clearly. But communication and friendship with ordinary nationalists, with the nationalist "infantry" turned out to be incomparably more positive and inspiring.

The conclusions of the book reflect not only the actual scientific reflection, but also the social experience of the authors, as well as their deep involvement in the fate of their native country. We can only repeat the famous: "Every nation has its own homeland, but only we have Russia."

Each chapter of the book is a completed and independent study, a mini-monograph. The chapters are connected logically, conceptually and united by a common subject, which sometimes entails some repetitions in the presentation. The first part of the book was written mainly by Tatyana Solovey, the third - mainly by Valery, the second part was written jointly.

First of all, we express our deep and sincere gratitude to the Feoria publishing house and its leaders, Andrey Pritvorov and Mikhail Filin, for supporting our plan, non-interference in the author's concept, careful and delicate editing, the beautiful appearance of the book and the honor to be in the same publishing series with worthy people.

Friends from the Presidential Administration and other state institutions provided us with great support and assistance, who, due to their inherent modesty, preferred to remain anonymous.

Tatyana Solovey is grateful to her colleagues in the Department of Ethnology of the Faculty of History of Moscow State University, who persistently stimulated her intellectually and morally.

We are eternally grateful to Alexander Antonov for opening our eyes to an impressive and dramatic page in Russian history.

Friendship with Alexander Samovarov and Sergei Sergeyev was not only pleasant, but also intellectually important. Their texts and conversations with them seriously influenced our vision of Russian nationalism.

We will say the same with pleasure about numerous conversations with the deep and subtle Viktor Militarev, warm communication with Leonty Byzov, Mikhail Malyutin (whom we wholeheartedly wish a full recovery!) and Alexander Melikhov.

Pavel Salin stimulated us intellectually and psychologically.

Articles by Konstantin Krylov and Mikhail Remizov turned out to be very useful for the book, and these people themselves are sincerely sympathetic to us.

We would like to express our gratitude to Vladislav Inozemtsev and Valery Bushuev for the opportunity to publish in the excellent journal Svobodnaya Mysl.

Yuri Polyakov, Igor Serkov and Sergey Trusevich gave us a unique opportunity to appear on the pages of one of the best newspapers in Russia - Literaturnaya Gazeta.

We note with pleasure the Russophile works of the Englishmen Peter Dunkin and Geoffrey Hosking, for whom we have deep respect.

At the same time, serious cultural and ideological differences with Alexander Verkhovsky and Vladimir Pribylovsky do not prevent us from highly appreciating the fruits of their intellectual activity.

A serious influence on the book was made by friendly communication with people of different ages, different professions and views. These are Karen Agamirov, Lev Anisov, Alexander Barsenkov, Natalya and Igor Bulkaty, Alexander Vdovin, Vladimir Goryunov, Zalina and Dmitry Dementiev, Alexander Ivanov, Andrey Kartalov, Leonid Milovanov, Mkrtich Mnatsakanyan, Ekaterina and Andrey Plachendovsky, Maria Plyasovskikh, Dmitry Podkolzin , Pavel Svyatenkov, Kirill Titov, Andrey Fursov, Galina and Timofey Charygin, Alexey Chernyaev, Sergey Chug-rov, Andrey and Alexander Shadrin and others. (We apologize to those whom we accidentally missed.) At the same time, the people named do not necessarily share our views.

"Our battle is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against authorities, against the rulers of the darkness of this world."

“How can virtue triumph when practically no one is willing to sacrifice themselves for it?”

(Last words of Sophie Schol, aged 21, executed by the Nazis)

For those who didn't give up

All rights reserved. The Book or any part of it may not be copied, reproduced in electronic or mechanical form, in the form of a photocopy, recorded in a computer memory, reproduction or in any other way, or used in any information system without obtaining permission from the publisher . Copying, reproduction and other use of a book or part of it without the consent of the publisher is illegal and entails criminal, administrative and civil liability.

Cover photo: Igor Chuprin / RIA Novosti

Dismantling of the monument to Vladimir Lenin on the main square of Kaliningrad on December 1, 2004. At present, it, already restored, is installed in a new place - at the House of Arts. The official opening took place on April 22 (date of event 01.12.2004).

Foreword

The idea for this book was born in the fall of 2015 after the following story. People very close to me asked me to speak with their teenage daughter who is into politics. In the course of the conversation, I discovered with increasing surprise that this doll-like young lady, together with her school friends, was making and posting leaflets against United Russia and Putin. To my natural question "Why?" she answered quite calmly, as if about something long thought out and endured: “What is happening is unbearable. We must at least do something." At that moment, it was as if the Russian people of Narodnaya Volya came to life in front of me.

The revolution as a phenomenon had occupied me quite a bit before, academically, but not only. And this interest is natural. Indeed, before the eyes of my generation, a grandiose, truly ancient tragedy of the collapse of the Soviet Union was unfolding - and that was a revolution. Before our very eyes, in September-October 1993, sparks of civil war ran through Moscow, but did not flare up. A decade later, a wave of revolutions swept through the former USSR, and then through the Arab countries. Before our eyes, and sometimes with our participation, history was being created.

As a historian by education, profession and way of thinking, I wanted to understand what was happening, to understand it, to fit it into a broad historical perspective. To the best of my ability, I tried to rethink what happened in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. and understand what is happening in the country and in the world at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. . Over time, more and more - which is natural - began to occupy me with "color" revolutions, and the feasible fruits of reflections on this subject were published in Russia and in the West.

And so, in the fall of 2015, I felt the need to put my observations, reflections, and scattered notes into a book. There was a feeling that the theme of the revolution had gone beyond the bounds of mere speculative interest, that intellectual reflection on the revolution reflected the currents of domestic life, not very visible yet, but increasingly intensifying.

The book focuses on the “democratizing” (in our country they are better known as “colored”) revolutions of the last fifteen years, as well as some little-known, forgotten or not fully understood events of Russian political post-Soviet history, considered through the prism of the theory of revolutions of the fourth generation.

And the results of this analysis, as readers will be able to see, are more than unexpected. Without anticipating further presentation, I will say the main thing. The turmoil that began at the end of the Soviet era continues. The revolution in Russia is not over.

As for revolutions in general and “colored” revolutions in particular, the view proposed in the book seriously revises generally accepted knowledge and opens up a new perspective for understanding them for the domestic reader.

Following the rule “he who thinks clearly, he clearly states”, I tried to clothe the intellectually non-trivial content in an accessible form. Moreover, the book is largely based on personal observations, meetings and conversations with people who participated in the revolutions. And not in the last roles. I was lucky to talk with important participants and inspirers of almost all the revolutions of the last quarter of a century (with the exception of the "lotus" revolution in Egypt) and even visit the epicenter of some of them. In this sense, the book was nourished not only by dry theory and academic texts, but by the juices and blood of life itself.

Accordingly, it is addressed not only and not even so much to research scientists, but to all who are interested in politics, and, most importantly, to those who, to the best of their ability, courage and understanding, try to participate in politics.

In addition to the actual revolutionaries, I will mention the communication with Mikhail Bobylev, the author of an interesting and fruitful idea of revolutionary branding.

Useful and important were the conversations with people who were on the other side of the barricade - on the side of the counter-revolution. The view from the side of the government attacked by the revolution provided a deeper understanding of the revolutionary process and gave the book a multidimensionality.

And, of course, the opportunity to explore, think and write was provided by my family, primarily by my wife Sveta, who stoically endures her husband’s eternal employment and inspires me to work more, write better, live more fun. I am grateful to my mother, son, sister and nephew for the conversations and jokes that stimulated the creative mood.

I am grateful to the respected publishing house "EKSMO" for the quick and high-quality publication of the book. Unfortunately, my close friend, Mikhail Filin, who gave his blessing to the idea of the book, was never able to see it.

I hope and believe that the book will not only help readers understand what a revolution is, but will also be instrumentally useful. "He who is not blind sees."

What is a revolution

The word "revolution" has gone through curious metamorphoses in Russia. By its use and attitude to the concept behind it, one can safely study the history of the country for the last hundred years. For more than seventy years of Soviet power, the revolution was not only surrounded by honor and respect: it was attributed a truly sacred meaning.

The Bolshevik revolution was presented as the beginning of a new era of mankind. Something like the appearance in the world of the new Christ - Lenin - with the Bolshevik leaders as apostles and the Communist Party as the new church. Continuing this series, the "building of communism" was seen as the second coming of Christ - the reign of the communist utopia on earth.

To prove the fruitfulness and greatness of the revolution, the achievements of Soviet history were cited: the creation of a powerful industrial base and advanced science, the formation of the Soviet model of a mass consumer society and a welfare state, space flights and sports victories, foreign policy expansion and cultural influence, and most importantly, victory in the Great Patriotic War.

It was implied or explicitly stated that, were it not for the intrigues of an external enemy in the person of the United States, the communist kingdom of love and justice would have spread throughout the world. A little more, more effort, - Soviet propaganda called - and the "Western devil" will be put to shame, and the communist Christ "in a white halo of roses" will sweep over the entire planet like a cleansing storm.

However, the titanic struggle between Good and Evil was lost. Heresy and treason nested in the very heart of the Bolshevik Grail. Interests took precedence over ideals, the sparkling communist dream collapsed.

Revolutions are an unpredictable phenomenon with unforeseen consequences, but they are always caused by the stupidity and meanness of the authorities. This opinion was expressed in an interview RIA "New Day" Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Head of the Department of Public Relations, MGIMO Valery Solovey within the framework of a special project dedicated to the revolutionary events of 100 years ago and the prospects of modern Russia.

Revolution is a form of political and social change when other forms are impossible for some reason. Usually revolutions are opposed to reforms, and if reforms are impossible for some reason, then changes can be realized in the form of a revolution.

Whether the revolution turns out to be bloodless and progressive, or bloody, leading to civil war and social regression, depends on the combination of circumstances.

Neither one nor the other is a foregone conclusion, although there is the following pattern: demographic overheating - high birth rates and a high proportion of young people in society contribute to the fact that revolutions turn out to be bloody. At the same time, the younger generation does not necessarily provoke cruelty, but most often contribute to it. Plus - the nature of the socio-political contradictions affects - the degree of cruelty of the revolution also depends on this.

No revolution leads to immediate progress: all, without exception, provoke decline and disorganization. But some revolutions, far from all, result in accelerated development, although there are no such guarantees. It depends on the confluence of circumstances, on the nature of those forces, political groups that have come to power, on their strong-willed efforts, on their ability to follow a certain plan, and, in the end, on the international environment.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 was an autochthonous, indigenous phenomenon. Of course, the German side was interested in getting out of the war, but to say that only the Germans established this revolution, or, as they say in books, that the British are behind everything bad, behind all conspiracies and revolutions, is absolute nonsense.

The Revolution of 1917 was an all-Russian, national phenomenon. Another thing is that the external factor is always present, but not at all in the way we usually think. Those who staged the February Revolution, those at the top, wanted to create a constitutional monarchy; they saw the contemporary West as their model.

All revolutions stand for justice, but it is desirable that there be some specific historical form of the ideal that revolutionaries aspire to - the realm of the utopia of liberation and justice. If there is nothing to compare with, there is no ideal, then most likely there will be no revolution.

The last grandiose revolution that took place in our country in 1991 was the collapse of the USSR. What drove this revolution? The West was an example. People naively believed that as soon as they got rid of the communists, proclaimed democracy, the benefits would flow like a river on them.

The latest Ukrainian revolution, the “revolution of dignity,” began when then-president Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement with the European Union. It was a classic social reaction.

But there is such an axiom: we know that there are certain forces at the entrance to the revolution - left, right, power, but what will happen during the revolution itself and what will happen at the exit from it, what will be its consequences - we cannot say this.

We can say that in October 1917 the Bolsheviks made rapid progress. They solved the problems that Western societies had already solved, but solved them in truly barbaric ways. They pressed their decision, which took the West a century and a half, for 30-40 years at the cost of colossal sacrifices.

Most of these sacrifices were unnecessary. These sacrifices stemmed from the Bolshevik ideology and the system of government they created.

Here it is important to understand that the Bolsheviks managed to create the most perfect machine of social suppression and oppression in the world - the machine of social repression. It was their tool for progress. Agree, this is a contradiction. If you make progress through social repression, then its fruits will be very doubtful, as it eventually turned out to be with the Soviet Union.

If you want to change the nature of man, and the Bolsheviks tried to do this, sooner or later this nature will take revenge on you.

The course of the revolution itself, its development, depends on chance and personality. If at the head of the movement there are not several or even one decisive person with authority, able to proclaim - "Forward!", There will be no revolution. And we will read in the history books that there were unrest. A mutiny is never considered successful, otherwise it is called something else.

The provisional government in 1917 was not lucky that at that moment Lenin was at the head of the Bolsheviks. If it were not for him, the Bolsheviks would not have come out, the Provisional Government would definitely have held on.

It was Lenin who enjoyed authority, possessed such frenzied energy to break the Bolshevik leadership and insist on an immediate armed uprising. His famous phrase turned out to be absolutely accurate: Yesterday it was early, tomorrow it will be late.

It was the greatest day in his biography. When he, correctly assessing the situation, pushed the Bolsheviks to action. He changed the course of history in the truest sense of the word. It was his personal triumph.

Now we have an obvious historical parallel with 1917.

The crisis we have entered is unprecedented. It is clear that this is a long time. People have a gloomy feeling that this is forever, for our entire lives. They begin to think: damn it, what do we have to lose then? If people suddenly feel that they have nothing to lose, how they will behave - no one knows. And the authorities do not know this, and it worries them very much.

We are literally standing in front of some serious reversal of mass consciousness. Now it rests only on loyalty to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin is what holds society together. The Russian state is a pyramid that stands not on the base, but on top, it is an inverted pyramid. And there is Putin. He enjoys authority, he keeps it all. But sooner or later his authority will be called into question.

Revolutions are always led by the actions of the authorities, and not by conspiracies initiated from outside, or by the opposition. The stupidity and meanness of power is what paves the way for revolution.

Can we call the current government in Russia very smart and very honest? With all the desire to praise her, it is hardly possible. Even the most furious simpotizants will not find such words.

To date, it is clearly seen that society in its attitude to power is now undergoing the same evolution as during the First World War.

The First World War began with an enthusiastic patriotic upsurge. Then this patriotic upsurge gave way to concern, then to hatred of the authorities.

Now we see that the patriotic upsurge has clearly subsided. The problem of Crimea does not occupy public consciousness, Ukraine - the same, the problem of Syria - even more so.

There is a shift in public consciousness. People do not understand what foreign policy has to do with such serious problems in society.

It is enough to look at sociology and we will see that the population is worried about low incomes, unemployment, and the collapse of social subsystems. A foreign policy is being imposed on them, and its senselessness raises growing questions: Syria - for what? The assault on Aleppo - what is all this for? Is someone threatening us from Syria? Will there be American missiles, NATO forces?

It is the actions of the authorities and the stupidity of their mistakes that pave the way to revolution. Nowhere in the world has the beginning of the revolution been retold. This is fundamentally unpredictable. It is in history books that we read about objective patterns, but when you live in this situation, you do not see any objective patterns. It is then that we find them.

Mass unrest is possible. This does not mean that they are inevitable, but this is something that can happen, probably as early as the 17th year.

At the same time, there is no need to talk about a possible civil war, because Russian society does not have the energy potential for this.

But the mass dynamics is unpredictable - this is an axiom. Today people say that they trust the authorities, and tomorrow these same people will be on the square because they are boiling, sick. And any reason is enough for it to break through. But we do not know where and when this is possible - there are no similar analytical methods to predict this. We can only say for sure that the risks are increasing.

Moscow, Maria Vyatkina

Moscow. Other news 21.11.16

Revolution! Fundamentals of revolutionary struggle in the modern era Valery Solovey

(No ratings yet)

Title: Revolution! Fundamentals of revolutionary struggle in the modern era

About the Revolution! Fundamentals of the revolutionary struggle in the modern era" Valery Solovey

Have you ever wondered what revolution brings into our lives? Why is it an opportunity for some to change their lives, while for others it is a hateful meeting that can destroy the lives of an entire humanity? You can find out about this if you start reading the book "Revolution!".

Valery Solovey is a person who is very familiar with the revolution in the modern world, as well as with what it can bring to the lives of modern people. Some people hope that the revolution can change life and make it more modern and interesting. Others are firmly convinced that it brings only devastation and misunderstandings into our lives.

By and large, those who do not like such processions are right. Why? Yes, because after them, usually a lot is turned upside down and becomes the way no one wanted to see it. In his book Revolution! Valery Solovey condemns the actions that took place in Russia in the distant past and in the present. The writer tries to tell about how to actually do not need to. Do you want to live properly and calmly? Valery Solovey is able to open the eyes of modern people on how to live correctly so as not to bring the country to destruction and disintegration.

In the book "Revolution!" the writer talks about what moments Russia missed in its development, what it could have done for its formation several centuries ago. Why didn't she do it? Valery Solovey willingly answers this question in his work. The author managed to create an interesting work especially for those who are interested in politics and are going to even participate in it in the future.

Based on the book "Revolution!" the writer talks about why revolutions are bad and why they should not be carried out. In his work, he also informs about what this revolution really is, why are there so many of its supporters and those who do not even want to think about it? Here you can learn about the consequences of revolutions, the author does not forget, and report that the change of president, the choice of parties and other actions in the country are exactly what leads to real coups in the country at the end. The book is easy to read, and it also gives you the opportunity to understand how best not to act in the modern world.

On our site about books lifeinbooks.net you can download for free without registration or read online the book “Revolution! Fundamentals of revolutionary struggle in the modern era” by Valery Solovey in epub, fb2, txt, rtf, pdf formats for iPad, iPhone, Android and Kindle. The book will give you a lot of pleasant moments and a real pleasure to read. You can buy the full version from our partner. Also, here you will find the latest news from the literary world, learn the biography of your favorite authors. For novice writers, there is a separate section with useful tips and tricks, interesting articles, thanks to which you can try your hand at writing.