Foreign policy activity of the USSR struggle for collective security. The struggle to create a system of collective security
38. The struggle of the USSR for peace and collective security.
In 1937 the capitalist world was engulfed in a new economic crisis, which aggravated all the contradictions of capitalism.
The main force of imperialist reaction was the aggressive military side of Germany, Italy and Japan, which launched active preparations for war. The goal of these states was a new redistribution of the world.
To stop the impending war, the Soviet Union proposed the creation of a collective security system. However, the initiative of the USSR was not supported. The governments of Britain, France and the USA, contrary to the fundamental interests of the peoples, made a deal with the aggressors. The behavior of the leading capitalist powers predetermined the further tragic course of events. In 1938, Austria became a victim of fascist aggression. The governments of Britain, France and the USA did not take any measures to curb the aggressor. Austria was occupied by German troops and incorporated into the German Empire. Germany and Italy openly intervened in the Spanish Civil War and helped to overthrow the legitimate government of the Spanish Republic in March 1939 and establish a fascist dictatorship in the country.
In 1938, Germany demanded from Czechoslovakia the transfer to her of the Sudetenland, populated predominantly by Germans. In September 1938 in Mungen, at a meeting of the heads of governments of Germany, Italy, France and England, it was decided to wrest from Czechoslovakia the region demanded by Germany. The representative of Czechoslovakia was not admitted to the meeting.
The head of the British government signed a declaration of mutual non-aggression with Hitler in Munich. Two months later, in December 1938, the French government signed a similar declaration.
In October 1938, the Sudetenland was annexed to Germany. In March 1939, the whole of Czechoslovakia was occupied by Germany. The USSR was the only state that did not recognize this capture. When the threat of occupation hung over Czechoslovakia, the government of the USSR declared its readiness to provide her with military support if she asked for help. However, the bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia, betraying national interests, refused the offered assistance.
In March 1939, Germany seized the port of Klaipeda and the territory adjacent to it from Lithuania. The impunity of Germany's aggressive actions encouraged fascist Italy, which in April 1939 captured Albania.
A threatening situation was also developing on the eastern borders of our country. In the summer of 1938, the Japanese military provoked an armed conflict on the Far Eastern state border of the USSR in the area of Lake Khasan. The Red Army, as a result of fierce battles, defeated and pushed back the aggressors. In May 1939, militarist Japan attacked the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, hoping to turn the territory of the MPR into a springboard for further aggression against the USSR. In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the MPR, Soviet troops acted jointly with the Mongolian soldiers against the Japanese aggressors. After four months of stubborn fighting, the Japanese troops were utterly defeated.
In the spring of 1939, at the initiative of the Soviet government, negotiations began between the USSR, Britain and France on the conclusion of a tripartite mutual assistance pact. Negotiations, which lasted until July 1939, ended in vain due to the position taken by the Western powers. The governments of England and France also opposed the conclusion of a tripartite agreement on military cooperation directed against fascist Germany. For negotiations in Moscow, they landed delegations that were not endowed with the necessary powers.
At the same time, in the summer of 1939, secret negotiations began between Britain and Germany on the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on military, economic and political issues.
By August 1939, the stubborn unwillingness of the Western powers to take effective measures to curb fascist aggression and their desire to come to an agreement with Germany became evident.
Under these conditions, the Soviet Union agreed to the German proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact. In August 1939, such an agreement was concluded for a period of 10 years. By agreeing to conclude an agreement with Germany, the Soviet Union destroyed the plans to create a united anti-Soviet front of the imperialist states and frustrated the calculations of the inspirers of the Munich policy, who were striving to hasten a military clash between the USSR and Germany. The Soviet government understood that the treaty did not rid the USSR of the threat of a German military attack. However, it gave a gain in time, necessary to further strengthen the country's defense capability.
RESULTS: The XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held in March 1939, determined that the USSR had entered the period of completing the construction of a socialist society and a gradual transition from socialism to communism. The congress formulated the main economic task: to overtake and overtake the main capitalist countries in per capita output. It took 10-15 years to solve this problem. The plan of the third five-year plan (1938-1942) was considered and approved at the congress.
The decisions of the congress were met with enthusiasm. New enterprises were put into operation, much attention was paid to increasing the activity of the masses. However, the moral and psychological state of society remained contradictory. On the one hand, the Soviet people were proud of their labor successes, which were constantly reported by the mass media, believed in a bright distant future, and on the other hand, mass repressions gave rise to a sense of fear and uncertainty about the future. In addition, a number of harsh measures have already been taken aimed at strengthening labor and production discipline. So, in 1940, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued decrees “On the transition to an eight-hour working day, a seven-day working week and on the prohibition of unauthorized departure of workers from enterprises and institutions”, “On the prohibition of unauthorized departure from work of tractor drivers and combine operators working in machine and tractor stations”, for which absenteeism and leaving the enterprise without the permission of the administration were criminalized. Thus, the state actually attached workers and employees to the enterprise. Production rates were increased, prices were reduced, and failure to produce a minimum of workdays by collective farmers could lead to criminal prosecution. However, the attempts of the country's leadership to achieve the set goals, developing the enthusiasm of the masses and at the same time using the method of intimidation, did not give the desired result. The three-year plan of the Third Five-Year Plan was not fulfilled.
In connection with the threat of war, great importance was attached to the development of military production, especially in the East of the country. In the Volga region, in the Urals, in Siberia, there was an intensive construction of defense enterprises based on the local fuel and metallurgical base. The pace of development of the defense industry was high. If during the three years of the Third Five-Year Plan the growth of industrial production was on the whole 13.2% per year, then in the military branches it was 39%. Particular importance was attached to the creation of the latest types of military equipment. Research organizations were enlarged, design bureaus and experimental workshops were created at the leading defense plants; the so-called sharashki (special prison No. 1 in official documents) were actively operating - closed design bureaus, where repressed specialists worked (in particular, the famous aircraft designers A.N. Tupolev and P.O. Sukhoi). Promising models of military equipment were developed: the KV heavy tank, the T-34 medium tank; aircraft: Yak-1, LaGG-3, MIG-3 fighters; Il-2 attack aircraft, Pe-2 bomber; rocket launchers on machines ("katish"), etc. However, it was not possible to establish the production of new equipment on a mass scale by the beginning of the war.
Since the end of the 1930s, and especially after the war with Finland, which revealed many of the weak points of the Red Army, intensive measures were taken to increase the combat effectiveness of the armed forces. Their total number by June 1941 amounted to 5.7 million people; Rifle, tank, aviation, mechanized divisions were additionally formed, airborne troops, engineering and technical units were increased; the network of military schools expanded, 19 military academies operated, in which command personnel were trained. However, it was not possible to make up for the monstrous losses from the mass repressions of the 30s, when 80% of the senior officers of the army were destroyed. The professional level of command personnel was low, advanced methods of armed struggle were not mastered, the Soviet military doctrine was based on an offensive character and practically did not involve long-term defensive actions. All this predetermined the major defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.
In 1933-1936. the contours of a system of collective security and the consolidation of fighters against fascism began to take shape. The Soviet Union was the first to come up with the initiative to preserve peace and prevent aggression. In February 1933, he submitted to the Disarmament Conference a draft Declaration on the Determination of the Attacking Party. The draft contained a list of actions of states, the commission of which was to be recognized as a violation of the peace and aggression.
The idea of creating a collective security system was supported by many political leaders in Europe. Thus, the closeness of positions with a number of influential figures in France - L. Barthou, J. Paul Bonour, E. Herriot - was revealed. The King of Yugoslavia and the Minister of the Interior of Romania, as well as a number of politicians in England, joined in the attempts to create a system of collective security. In 1934 the USSR joined the League of Nations, in 1933 diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the USA were established, in 1935 the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance treaties were signed.
The creation of a united front to counter fascism was hampered by a serious split between democratic and leftist forces in the capitalist countries of Europe. This was also facilitated by the tactics of the Comintern, whose documents stated that "social democracy, at critical moments for capitalism, often plays a fascist role." These settings were revised only at the VII Congress of the Comintern (1935). The Comintern laid a certain part of the blame for the coming of the fascists to power on the communist parties themselves, which made a number of serious mistakes in the struggle for the masses. Second half of the 30s. characterized by a noticeable rise in the international labor and democratic movement. In many countries, the interaction of communists and social democrats, of all anti-fascist forces, has developed. In France, Spain, Chile, such unity was expressed in the form of broad blocs on an anti-fascist platform. Here was put a barrier to fascism.
In 1936, the International Peace Congress was held in Brussels. It was attended by 4.5 thousand delegates from 35 countries representing 750 national and 40 international organizations. The Congress worked out a unified platform for the peace forces. During the civil war and the Italo-German intervention in Spain (during the war more than 200 thousand Italian and German soldiers arrived in Spain), anti-fascist organizations provided great assistance to the Republicans of Spain: more than 50 thousand volunteers went from 54 countries of the world, a wide an international campaign for the collection and delivery of material resources, the removal of Spanish children and the wounded, etc. England, France, the USA and other Western states concluded an agreement (August 1936) on non-interference in Spanish affairs. However, at the final stage of the war, the French government closed the Franco-Spanish border in the summer of 1938, and the Non-Intervention Committee decided to withdraw all foreign volunteers from Spain. The international brigades were withdrawn, while the regular Italo-German military units remained. Finally, the governments of England and France officially recognized the fascist government of Franco.
The Soviet Union was the only state that consistently defended the legitimate rights and interests of Republican Spain. He provided Spain with a loan in the amount of 85 million dollars, supplied weapons, and provided great assistance through the Red Cross. Dozens of steamships with food, medicine, clothing went to the Spanish Republic. All over the country there was a fundraiser for Spain. But the strengthening of the blockade of the republic made it difficult to help Spain.
In March 1938, when the Nazi troops entered Austria, only the Soviet Union condemned the aggressor. The impunity of aggression encouraged Germany to new conquests.
In the context of the aggravation of the international situation in the late 30s. and the deployment of hostilities by fascist Germany, the Soviet leadership takes a clear and unambiguous position. When the threat of aggression hung over Czechoslovakia, the government of the USSR offered France to start negotiations between the general staffs of the armed forces of the USSR France and Czechoslovakia to discuss specific assistance to Czechoslovakia. It was also proposed to convene an international conference in defense of Czechoslovakia and apply to the League of Nations to influence the aggressor. There was no response from France and Czechoslovakia.
April 26, 1938 Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.I. Kalinin made a statement saying that the USSR was ready to fulfill its obligations, to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia without waiting for France. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. On August 22, 1938, Litvinov informed the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, that if it came to war, the Soviet Union would support Czechoslovakia, "keep its word and do everything in its power." Measures of a military nature were taken: 30 divisions were brought up to the Western border, tank formations and aircraft were brought in, and units were replenished with reservists. Soviet-Czechoslovak military cooperation could also play an important role in repelling aggression. In terms of basic parameters, Czechoslovak tanks in 1938 were superior to German ones. The Czechoslovak army had a significant amount of first-class artillery (after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Germans captured 2675 guns of all types). The leading Czechoslovak car factories produced off-road vehicles, which were considered the most modern at that time - the share of the Czechoslovak military industry in the world arms market was 40%.
According to the German plan "Grun", the use of 30 divisions in operations against Czechoslovakia was envisaged, while Czechoslovakia alone had 45 divisions (over 2 million people), 1582 aircraft, 469 tanks; on the border with Germany there were powerful border fortifications that were not inferior to the French Maginot Line. Joint actions of the USSR, France, England threatened Germany with a military catastrophe. However, the Western allies, having concluded the Munich deal on the division of Czechoslovakia, obliged her to abandon the agreement with the USSR. And the Czechoslovak government, rejecting Soviet military assistance, capitulated.
In the spring of 1939, in connection with the sharp escalation of the aggressive actions of the fascist states, the Soviet government turned to England and France with specific proposals for concluding an agreement on mutual assistance, including a military convention in the event of aggression in Europe. The Soviet government believed that in order to create a real barrier of peace-loving states against the further deployment of aggression in Europe, at least three conditions were necessary:
1) the conclusion between Britain, France and the USSR of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression;
2) the guarantee of security by these three great powers to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, which are under the threat of aggression, including here also Latvia, Estonia, Finland;
3) the conclusion of a specific agreement between Britain, France and the USSR on the forms and amounts of assistance provided to each other and to the guaranteed states, without which (without such an agreement) mutual assistance pacts run the risk of hanging in the air, as the experience with Czechoslovakia showed.
English security guarantees extended only to Poland and Romania, which is why the northwestern borders of the USSR from Finland, Estonia, and Latvia remained uncovered.
On June 2, 1939, the Soviet government handed over to the governments of England and France a draft treaty that took into account all the proposals put forward during the negotiations.
The head of the French government could not but recognize the proposals of the Soviet side as logical. Under the pressure of ever-increasing criticism from various social strata of England about the slow progress of negotiations, only an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had previously been an adviser to the British embassy in the USSR, was sent to Moscow.
The British proposals did not provide for guarantees from Estonia, Latvia and Finland, at the same time they demanded guarantees of assistance from the USSR in relation to Poland, Romania, Belgium, Greece and Turkey, then raised the question of extending the guarantees of the three powers to Holland and Switzerland.
The British and French dragged out the negotiations in every possible way: from the moment the first English proposal was received, i.e. April 15, 75 days have passed; of these, the Soviet government needed 16 days to prepare responses to various British projects and proposals, and the remaining 59 days were spent on delays and delays on the part of the British and French.
The British and French governments considered their contacts with the USSR primarily as a means of putting pressure on Germany. Dirksen, the German ambassador in London, stated that "England wants to strengthen itself and catch up with the Axis through armaments and the acquisition of allies, but at the same time she wants to try to negotiate an amicable agreement with Germany."
The American Chargé d'Affaires in France, Wilson, wrote to the State Department on June 24, 1939, about his impression that a second Munich might be on the way, this time at Poland's expense.
On July 14, Lloyd George, in a conversation with the Soviet plenipotentiary in London, criticized the policy of the British government, expressing great concern about the progress and prospects of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. According to him, the Chamberlain clique cannot come to terms with the idea of a pact with the USSR against Germany.
On July 18, and then again on July 21, 1939, conversations took place between Chamberlain Wilson's confidant and Hitler's emissary Wohltath, an official for special assignments in Goering's department. Wilson proposed to conclude an Anglo-German non-aggression pact and sign a declaration of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. On July 20, at the initiative of Wilson, Wohltath met with the Minister of Overseas Trade of England, Hudson, who expressed the opinion that “... there are still three large areas in the world in which Germany and England could find wide opportunities for applying their forces, namely: English Empire, China and Russia".
On July 29, during a meeting of representatives of the Labor Party of England with the adviser of the German Embassy in London, proposals were considered for concluding an "agreement on the delimitation of spheres of interest" between England and Germany.
In July 1939, an agreement was signed in Tokyo under which England recognized the Japanese seizures in China and pledged not to hinder Japanese aggression there. It was the "Far Eastern Munich", according to which China was assigned the same role of a victim of aggression in Asia as Czechoslovakia was in Europe. The agreement was signed at the height of the armed conflict unleashed by Japan against the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic near the Khalkhin Gol River.
On August 3, 1939, Wilson had a meeting with the German ambassador in London, Dirksen. Outlining the content of the proposed British program of negotiations, Dirksen wrote: “... An Anglo-German agreement, including a renunciation of attacks on third powers, would completely free the British government from the guarantee obligations it has currently assumed with respect to Poland, Turkey, etc. etc."
As can be seen from the above documents, in the event of an Anglo-German agreement being reached, the British government was ready to immediately stop negotiations with the Soviet government, as well as renounce its guarantees to the countries of Eastern Europe, blessing the Nazis to continue their Drang nach Osten.
At the same time, Germany stepped up its penetration into the Baltic states. In the summer of 1939 secret visits to Estonia and Finland were made by the chief of staff of the German army, General Halder, and the head of German military intelligence, Admiral Canaris. During the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, treaties were signed between Germany and Estonia, Germany and Latvia.
On July 25, 1939, the British government finally accepted the Soviet proposal to begin negotiations on an Anglo-French-Soviet military agreement. On July 26, the French Foreign Minister announced that a French delegation would leave for Moscow.
To conduct military negotiations, the Soviet government appointed a delegation headed by the people's commissar of defense, Marshal Voroshilov. The members of the delegation were Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Shaposhnikov, People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov, Chief of the Air Force of the Red Army Loktionov and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Smorodinov.
The British delegation included Admiral Drax, Marshal of the British Air Force Barnet and Major General Haywood. The delegation was instructed to "negotiate very slowly." The American embassy in London reported to the US State Department on August 8 that the British military mission "has been instructed to do everything possible to ensure that the negotiations continue until October 1."
The head of the British delegation, Drax, declared that he "had no written authority" and that he was "authorized only to negotiate, not to sign a pact (convention)."
The French military delegation included a member of the Supreme Military Council of France, General Doumenc, the commander of the 3rd Air Division, General Valen, a professor at the Vuillaume Naval School, and others. The French delegation had the authority only to negotiate, but not to sign any agreement.
To the question of the head of the Soviet military mission: “Do the missions of England and France have corresponding military plans?” - Drax replied that when he came to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet government, he "expected that the project would be proposed by the Soviet mission."
The cardinal issue of the negotiations was the question of the passage of Soviet troops through Polish territory, "in order to directly contact the enemy if he attacks Poland", or "through Romanian territory, if the aggressor attacks Romania." These issues were not resolved during the negotiations, since the Polish government, even in the face of immediate danger from Germany, did not change the anti-Soviet course of its foreign policy. As early as May 11, 1939, the Polish ambassador in Moscow declared that Poland did not consider it possible to conclude a mutual assistance pact with the USSR. During negotiations in Moscow on August 20, Polish Foreign Minister J. Beck sent a telegram to his ambassador in France: “Poland is not bound by any military treaties with the Soviets, and the Polish government is not going to conclude such an agreement.”
In Paris, however, anxiety was growing in connection with the growing German aggressiveness.
French diplomacy, balancing between the old policy of appeasement and the fear of German aggression, behaved inconsistently during the negotiations, but on August 21 the French government authorized its representatives to sign the tripartite military convention. At the same time, the representatives of France in Warsaw tried to influence the Polish government, agree to the passage of Soviet troops through Polish territory in the event of a war with the aggressor (meaning Germany) and include this agreement in the text of the convention. But the negotiations stalled because of the position of the British government, which did not give its delegation the authority to sign a military convention. “The British government,” it was said in the instructions approved at the meeting of the Defense Committee of England on August 2, 1939, for the delegation at the Moscow negotiations, “does not want to be drawn into any definite obligation that could tie our hands under any circumstances. Therefore, in relation to a military agreement, one should strive to limit oneself to as general formulations as possible ... not to negotiate on the issue of the defense of the Baltic states.
Poland and Romania also did not give consent to the passage of Soviet troops through Polish and Romanian territories in order to participate in hostilities against Germany.
The ineffectiveness of the Moscow negotiations, the Munich agreement between the Western countries and the Nazis, pushing Hitler's aggression to the East, secret Anglo-German negotiations in London on the basis of the global program proposed by England to resolve the Anglo-German contradictions: the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression and non-interference in each other's affairs, the return of Germany's colonies , the recognition of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe as a sphere of German interests, the division of world economic markets, such as China, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, etc., put our country in conditions of international isolation. The military threat also increased from the East, where the Japanese militarists again undertook an act of aggression.
Already in late 1938 - early 1939. numerous departments of the Reich, including such as the "research institutes" of Rosenberg, the Ministry of Propaganda and military intelligence, were engaged in plans for the annexation of Ukraine and other regions of the Soviet Union.
In August 1939, the Soviet government received information that the German army was being brought to combat readiness and concentrated near the Polish border. It became known that in the period from 25 to 28 August, military operations of Germany against Poland may begin. Therefore, the Soviet Union had to think about an alternative way out.
Germany was interested in a non-aggression pact with the USSR, as it wanted the USSR to remain neutral after its attack on Poland. According to the documents, it is known that the decision to attack Poland was made when there was no talk of a non-aggression pact. In June, when the Soviet-Anglo-French negotiations were in full swing, Hitler says that the attack will take place regardless of whether an agreement is concluded between England, France and the USSR, that the German-Polish conflict will be resolved as planned in Berlin .
After the capture of Austria and especially Czechoslovakia, the Nazi Wehrmacht sharply took the lead in terms of military-technical equipment in comparison with all other armies. After all, Czechoslovakia was the largest arms exporter. And all this was at the disposal of Hitler. The superiority of the Wehrmacht became undeniable. Hitler wrote to Mussolini: “... The Polish army will be defeated in the shortest possible time. I doubt it would be possible to achieve such a success in a year or two."
An analysis of secret correspondence between the German embassy in Moscow and Berlin in June-August 1939 suggests that the Soviet government was cautious about the German proposal to conclude a treaty. This is how the German embassy and ambassador assesses the first stage of diplomatic probing in May-June: “We did everything possible, but we cannot drag Molotov and Mikoyan into the Brandenburg Gate.” On July 30, Hitler instructs: "Given the behavior of the Russians, to abandon further actions in Moscow." Later, after a meeting with Molotov, held on August 3 by telegraph from Berlin, Ambassador von Schulenburg reports: "My general impression is that the Soviet government has now decided to conclude an agreement with France - England, if they fulfill all its wishes."
On August 15, Ribbentrop announces through his ambassador in Moscow that he is ready to "make a short trip to Moscow in order to lay the foundation for clarifying German-Soviet relations." But the Soviet leadership replies: "Such a trip will require appropriate preparation."
On August 18, a new order to the ambassador: to seek agreement on an “urgent visit”, bearing in mind that “the start of a German-Polish conflict is also possible in the near future ...”. The next day, in response, the German ambassador was handed a Soviet draft non-aggression pact, and with regard to Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow, it was said that it would become possible after the announcement of the signing of the economic agreement, and if this announcement was made today or tomorrow, then the minister could arrive August 26-27.
On August 19, a Soviet-German loan agreement was signed in Berlin. The Soviet Union was given a loan of 200 million German marks for the purchase of industrial products in Germany, including military materials. The signing of this treaty gave a certain guarantee that Germany was not going to attack the USSR in the near future.
On August 20, Berlin fully reveals its cards. In a telegram to Stalin, Hitler announces: Germany "from now on has decided to secure the interests of the Reich by all means" in the conflict with Poland. He proposes to receive Ribbentrop "on Tuesday, August 22, but at the latest on Wednesday, August 23." The visit "should last at most two days, a longer period, taking into account the international situation, is impossible." It was clear that the German war machine was already on and an attack on Poland could happen any day now.
On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed for a period of ten years.
The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol that demarcated the spheres of influence of the parties in Eastern Europe: “Agreement was reached as follows:
1. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be the line separating the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania's interest in the Vilna region is recognized by both sides.
2. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR will be delimited approximately along the lines of the Narew, Vistula and San rivers.
The question of whether it is desirable in the interests of the parties to preserve the independence of the Polish state, about the boundaries of such a state, will be finally decided only by the course of future political events.
Regarding South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side indicated its interest in Bessarabia. The German side has clearly stated its complete political disinterest in these territories.
Thus, the sphere of influence of the USSR included Finland, Estonia, Latvia and the eastern territories of the Polish state - Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well as Bessarabia, forcibly torn away from the Soviet Republic after the First World War.
It can, of course, be argued that the conclusion of a secret protocol with Germany drew the Soviet state into the imperialist redistribution of the world as an ally of Hitler, but one cannot help but notice the formation of a bloc of aggressive states on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the signing of the Munich Agreement, tacit and often active encouragement of the aggressor with side of the Western powers. This protocol can be understood in the context of that time. A clash between the Soviet Union and Germany was inevitable. Stalin believed that in the name of final victory in a future war, it would be better if this clash took place on lines 200-300 kilometers away from the former borders of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet-German non-aggression pact cannot be regarded as an isolated phenomenon, as a bare fact in isolation from the events that were then taking place in the world. The treaty was concluded when fascist aggression was already hanging over the European states. The economic and political plans of the aggressor were supported by the very influential forces of England, France, and also the United States. These were circles that hoped to deal with the Soviet Union with Hitler's hands.
But not only in Moscow thought so. Here is an excerpt from a conversation between the Soviet plenipotentiary in London Maisky and Churchill at the end of October 1939, already in the conditions of the outbreak of World War II.
“From the point of view of correctly understood interests of England, the fact that the whole East and South-East of Europe are outside the zone of war,” Churchill said, “is not negative, but positive. For the most part, Britain has no reason to object to the actions of the USSR in the Baltics. Of course, some of the sentimental figures may shed a tear about the Russian protectorate over Estonia or Latvia, but this cannot be taken seriously ... ". “Churchill,” reports Maisky, “understands that the USSR should be the master on the eastern coast of the Baltic world, and is very glad that the Baltic countries are included in our, and not in the German state system. This is historically normal and at the same time reduces the possible "living space" for Hitler. Churchill at the same time sweepingly drew along the line of the Soviet-German demarcation and declared: "Germany must not be allowed further than this line." Churchill later wrote of the treaty: “It is impossible to say who was more disgusted by it - Hitler or Stalin. Both realized that this could only be a temporary measure dictated by circumstances. The antagonism between the two empires and systems was deadly. Stalin no doubt thought that Hitler would be a less dangerous enemy for Russia after a year of war against the Western powers. Hitler followed his "one by one" method. The fact that such an agreement was possible marks the full extent of the failure of British and French policy and diplomacy in a few years.
In favor of the Soviets, it must be said that it was vital for the Soviet Union to move as far to the West as possible the starting positions of the German armies so that the Russians would have time to gather forces from all over their colossal empire. The catastrophes that their armies suffered in 1914, when they rushed to the offensive against the Germans, were imprinted in the minds of the Russians with red-hot iron, had not yet completed their mobilization. And now their borders were much further east than during the first war. They needed to occupy the Baltic states and most of Poland by force or deceit before they were attacked. If their policy was coldly calculating, it was also at that moment highly realistic.
The agreements reached in August 1939 put a limit on the spread of fascist expansion in Eastern Europe, and therefore they can be regarded as directed not against, but in defense of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
Currently, the opinions of researchers on the issue of concluding a Soviet-German non-aggression pact drastically differ, but they are based, in our opinion, on political likes and dislikes, and not on an objective analysis of the facts.
The conclusion of such an agreement allowed the USSR to get away from the danger of being drawn into a war on two fronts, made it possible to win some time for the development and strengthening of the country's defense.
On September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany attacked Poland. The allies of the latter - England and France - declared war on Germany. World War II has begun. Fascist states, embarking on the path of aggression, threatened the territorial integrity, independence, and even the very existence of many countries and peoples. Fascism has become the main danger to all progressive, democratic, freedom-loving forces.
After Munich, the diplomatic departments of England, France and the United States carefully studied the situation: in general, diplomats accredited in the Axis countries were unanimous - a trip to the East was not far off. There was even a reason that Hitler, apparently, would choose to open hostilities: the "attachment" of Soviet Ukraine to Transcarpathian Ukraine! These calculations, however, were based on sand, because the development of events in the capitalist world was determined by imperialist contradictions, and not by the thoughts of the advocates and conductors of the "balance of power" policy. The goals of this policy were clearly visible. In a report at the 18th Party Congress on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I. V. Stalin said: “The policy of non-intervention shows a desire, a desire - not to interfere with the aggressors from doing their dirty work, not to prevent, say, Japan from getting involved in a war with China, and even better with the Soviet Union, not to prevent, say, Germany from getting bogged down in European affairs, getting entangled in a war with the Soviet Union, letting all participants in the war get bogged down deep into the mire of war, encouraging them in this on the sly, letting them weaken and exhaust each other, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to step on the stage with fresh forces, to speak, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate their conditions to the weakened participants in the war ... It must, however, be noted that the big and dangerous political game begun by supporters policy of non-intervention, may end for them in a serious failure" ( "XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b) Verbatim report", pp. 12, 15.)
On March 15, Germany captured the rest of Czechoslovakia. At the end of March, as a result of a conspiracy organized by the imperialists, the Spanish Republic fell. On April 7, fascist Italy occupied Albania. The governments of the Western powers essentially resigned themselves to new conquests. On February 27, England and France, and on April 1, the United States also recognized the Franco regime. But a number of facts testified that Hitler's Germany could strike in the West.
Significant confusion among the people of Munich was caused by the news that Hitler had handed over the Transcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary. The eastern campaign, obviously, was postponed. In England and France, dissatisfaction was growing even in the ruling circles, who were seriously concerned about the threat to the national security of both countries. Under pressure from the public, on March 31, 1939, England and France granted guarantees of "independence" to Poland, and then to Romania. On April 15, F. Roosevelt sent a message to Hitler, asking him to assure that Germany would not attack its neighbors for 10 years. However, Danzig was omitted from the list of the latter, and its annexation to Germany became an occasion for a noisy anti-Polish campaign in Germany.
Only the Soviet Union took a position of principle against more and more acts of aggression. After Munich, on October 9, 1938, the Soviet government asked Prague if Czechoslovakia wanted its new borders to be guaranteed by the Soviet Union. On October 12, this proposal was rejected. When Czechoslovakia disappeared from the map of Europe on March 15, 1939, Moscow declared: “The Soviet government cannot recognize the lawful incorporation of the Czech Republic into the German Empire, and in one form or another also Slovakia as lawful and consistent with the generally recognized norms of international law and justice or the principle of self-determination peoples." The consistent defense by the Soviet Union of the interests of international peace and security has raised the prestige of our country. The broad masses of the people in the Western countries saw that without the USSR it would be impossible to successfully repulse aggression. In Britain and France, the positions of those circles that insisted with increasing force on concluding an agreement with the Soviet Union on repulsing aggression in order to defend the West in self-defence, strengthened. On April 15, 1939, Britain and France offered the USSR to enter into negotiations. Although the previous policy of the Anglo-French ruling circles could not but undermine their confidence, the Soviet government did not want to miss the slightest opportunity to prevent war. The West's proposal to start negotiations was accepted.
Negotiations with the USSR were a new tactic of England and France, but by no means marked a change in strategy. “All of Paris,” as Geneviève Tabouy ironically calls French high society at that time, reasoned as follows: “The defeat of Germany would mean the collapse of the main bulwark against the communist revolution. And, consequently, the defeat of Germany would be a greater evil than the defeat of France. After all, isn't it better for France to be crushed by Hitler than to be victorious with the help of Stalin? The London "Sunday Times" wrote on May 7, 1939: "Victory with the help of Russia could not help pushing the frontiers of Bolshevism to the West." On April 15, the British government invited the Soviet Union to make a declaration that in the event of an attack on any of the European neighbors of the USSR, the latter would render him assistance "if it was desired." Mutual obligations to help the Soviet Union were not provided. Moreover, although England and France gave guarantees to Poland and Rumania, in the event of aggression against the Baltic countries and Finland, they were free from any obligations. In other words, the direction of the strike was unambiguously indicated to Hitler - against the USSR in the Baltic Sea area. And given the anti-Soviet orientation of the policy of the then rulers of Poland and Romania, there were good reasons to believe that they would eventually become allies of Germany in the "crusade" against communism. On April 17, the Soviet government proposed to conclude a 5-10-year mutual assistance treaty between the USSR, Britain and France - the three powers undertake to provide all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, to the Eastern European states lying between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering on the USSR. The Soviet government proposed to start immediately the development of a military convention, which would be signed simultaneously with the political treaty. The Soviet proposals opened the way to the creation of a stable collective security front. That is why they proved unacceptable to the Western powers.
In the summer of 1939, the British government entered into secret negotiations with the Nazis, expressing their readiness to make concessions in the interests of an anti-Soviet conspiracy with Germany. The Chamberlain government proposed concluding an agreement on the division of the world, naming even the Soviet Union and China as countries to be divided between British and German imperialism. England was ready to renounce the guarantees given to Poland, to influence France to cancel the Soviet-French pact of mutual assistance. However, the Nazis drew different conclusions from the proposals of the Chamberlain government in Berlin, saw in them new evidence of the weakness of the West and accelerated preparations for war. Chamberlain's insistence on complicity with Germany convinced Hitler and his entourage that aggression against Poland would go unpunished. The decision of the US Congress in July 1939, defiantly upholding the law on "neutrality", in the eyes of the Nazis was a new weighty proof of this. The American weekly "Time" cynically pointed out at the time: for Germany, this would be such a win, "as if Hitler had already succeeded in seizing the Ukraine."
The international situation worsened every day. On May 22, 1939, the so-called "Steel Pact" was signed in Berlin with great hype - a military-political treaty of mutual assistance between Germany and Italy. And the British and French governments, with the support of the United States, continued their unworthy game in negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet government, taking into account the rapidly growing danger of war, proposed, without waiting for the completion of political negotiations, to begin military negotiations. The Anglo-French ruling circles could not fail to see the serious public concern in their own countries with the development of events and were forced to accept the Soviet proposals. However, the British and French military missions arrived in Moscow very late and consisted of minor persons. Moreover, it turned out that they did not have the authority to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union at all. Meanwhile, the Soviet side during the military negotiations was represented by a delegation headed by K. E. Voroshilov, who had the authority to immediately sign a military convention.
When negotiations opened in Moscow on August 12, 1939, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to send 136 divisions to the front against the aggressor. The Soviet delegation proposed a clear plan for the joint conduct of the war against the aggressor. In response, the British delegation reported that Great Britain was using six divisions on the continent at the beginning of the war. The partners of the USSR at the conference table did not at all think of a serious rebuff to the aggressor. The head of the French military mission, General Doumenc, under the greatest secrecy, informed the meeting of the "plan" of the Anglo-French in the event of a war. According to him, "if the main forces of the fascist troops are sent to the eastern front, the Germans will be forced to leave at least 40 divisions against France, in which case General Gamelin will attack with all his might." So it was said for the information of the Soviet side. By this time, however, the British and French staffs had already drawn up a plan for the war, which provided for a completely different course of action, namely: at the initial stage of the war "our strategy will be generally defensive ... our subsequent policy should be aimed at containing Germany and while delivering decisive blows to Italy, at the same time build up our forces in order to be able to launch an offensive against Germany. These plans, published many years after the end of the war, also explain the meaning of the Anglo-French "guarantees" to the countries of Eastern Europe. “The fate of Poland,” was written in the decisions of the Anglo-French headquarters, “will be determined by the overall results of the war, and the latter in turn will depend on the ability of the Western powers to defeat Germany in the final analysis, and not on whether they can ease the pressure Germany to Poland at the very beginning.
The simple calculation of the Anglo-French politicians was to drag the Soviet Union into the war with Germany, and themselves stay out of the way, at least at the first stage of the war. In other words, they were still trying to implement the supreme principle of the "balance of power" policy - not only to fight by proxy, but also to weaken both their potential opponents and the Soviet Union. The game was sewn with white thread, and the Soviet government figured it out. According to the logic of the Anglo-French imperialists, the Soviet Union had to wait until the Nazi hordes, having passed through the Eastern European countries, reached its borders, and only then enter the war. The Soviet government believed that the Soviet Armed Forces should be allowed through the territory of Poland and Romania in order to repel aggression. The USSR demanded a clear and precise answer to this question. Incited from London and Paris, the rulers of the boyar Romania and pan Poland refused to agree to the passage of the Soviet troops. Then, at the last meeting of the Anglo-French-Soviet military missions, K. E. Voroshilov declared: “If, however, the French and the British turn this axiomatic question into a big problem that requires a long study, then this means that there is every reason to doubt their desire for real and serious military cooperation with the USSR.
Worried about the coming to power of reactionary forces in a number of countries - Japan, Italy, Germany ... The Soviet Union in February 1933 proposed to the Western powers to adopt a declaration on the definition of aggression and the attacking side, but did not meet with reciprocity.
(J) What is the content of the declaration? In November 1933, the USSR invited the United States, Japan, China and other states to conclude a regional Pacific collective security pact. In December 1933, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to launch a struggle for the creation of an effective system of collective security in Europe, the conclusion of the "Eastern Pact". In September 1934, the Soviet Union joins the League of Nations with the aim of using it as a tribune to explain its foreign policy views and condemn the actions of the aggressors. In November, the USSR proposed a specific program for resolving the conflict between Paraguay and Colombia. In 1935, he condemned the Italian aggression against Ethiopia... In response to the proposals of the USSR on the creation of collective security, the Western powers are pursuing a policy of bilateral agreements, which, in the opinion of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, MLitvinov, "do not always serve the goals of peace." (J) Why was the Soviet Union against such treaties? In 1934, Germany concludes a non-aggression pact with Poland. In 1935, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed... Revealing the aggressive plans of Poland, Germany, Japan, Finland, one of the heralds of Polish imperialism, V. Studnitsky, wrote in the beginning of 1935 in the book "The Political System of Europe and Poland": that "together with Germany, Poland could go to the Ukrainian experiment." In addition to Ukraine, these powers could "tear Crimea from Russia ... Karelia, Transcaucasia and Turkestan." It was also envisaged that "the Far East up to Lake Baikal should go to Japan." Thus, the creation of collective security in Europe was significantly narrowed. The conclusion of the German-Polish non-aggression pact effectively ruled out the signing of the Eastern Pact. In addition, France, Czechoslovakia and other European countries did not want to spoil relations with Germany and Poland for the sake of the USSR. The Soviet Union was forced to change the methods of searching for allies in the fight against the aggressor. A powerful blow to the collapse of Soviet initiatives was the agreement of the heads of the four powers - Germany, Britain, France and Italy, concluded in September 1938 in Munich, which led to the liquidation of independent Czechoslovakia and opened the way for fascist aggression to the East. On March 20, 1939, the Soviet Union declared its non-recognition of the inclusion of the Czech Republic and Slovakia into the German Empire. The essence of the Munich agreement, the anti-Soviet orientation of the policy of the Western powers were disclosed in the Report on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the XVIII Party Congress on March 6, 1939. In the report of the Central Committee, tasks in the field of foreign policy of the USSR were formulated: “1. Continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries; 2. Be careful and not let our country be drawn into conflicts by provocateurs of war, who are accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands; 3. To strengthen in every possible way the combat power of our Red Army and the Red Navy; 4. Strengthen international ties of friendship with the working people of all countries who are interested in peace and friendship among peoples. f Comment on the document. On April 17, 1939, the Soviet Government presented England and France with a draft treaty of mutual assistance against aggression for a period of 5-10 years. However, an equitable and effective mutual assistance pact could not be reached. The British and French could not solve another cardinal issue - the passage of Soviet troops through the territory of Poland. On August 21, 1939, the Soviet side declared: “The Soviet mission believes that the USSR, which does not have a common border with Germany, can provide assistance to France, England, Poland and Romania only if its troops pass through the Polish and Romanian territories, because there are no other ways to get in touch with the aggressor's troops... This is a military axiom.” Why did Poland refuse to let the Red Army troops into Czechoslovakia? The perniciousness of the actions of British politicians was expressed by the leader of the Liberal Party, Lloyd George: "Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax and Sir Simon do not want an alliance with Russia." Thus, the obvious unwillingness of England and France to agree with the USSR on collective security placed it in conditions of complete isolation before the aggressor.
More on the topic The struggle of the USSR for collective security:
- FORMATION OF HOTS OF WAR IN THE FAR EAST AND IN EUROPE. THE STRUGGLE OF THE USSR FOR THE PREVENTION OF A NEW WORLD WAR, FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM
- THE STRUGGLE OF THE USSR TO END THE ARMS RACE AND FOR DISARMAMENT IN THE 1960s. THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
- 1. The struggle of the USSR, the countries of the socialist community for peace and security in Europe in the 50s - early 60s
- THE CONQUERATION OF AUSTRIA BY GERMANY. THE MUNICH AGREEMENT OF THE IMPERIALIST POWERS. THE STRUGGLE OF THE USSR FOR A COLLECTIVE RESPONDANCE TO AGGRESSION (1937-1938)
- THE AGGRESSION OF GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN AND THE POLICY OF "NON-INTERVENTION" OF THE WESTERN POWERS. THE STRUGGLE OF THE USSR FOR THE COLLECTIVE RESPONDANCE TO THE AGGRESSORS (1935-1937)
The question of international politics in the 1930s. is very complex. There was preparation for war. Everywhere, young people sang the song "If tomorrow is war, if tomorrow is on a campaign ...". The coming war was surrounded by a romantic haze, they were waiting for it, they were preparing for it. In practice, such training has been going on since the 1920s. A military bloc was formed, which included Germany-Japan and Italy. In 1939, Hungary, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and other countries joined the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. The 1930s is the period of recognition of the USSR as an independent and powerful state. In 1934 the USSR was admitted to the League of Nations. The main task of international politics in the 1930s. The USSR sees the creation of a solid system of collective security. In 1939 the USSR was conducting a diplomatic struggle, taking part in negotiations with Britain and France. The goal was to reach an agreement on mutual assistance against the aggressor. But the USSR looked at these countries as bourgeois imperialist states, which was manifested in the negotiations. As a result, the partners did not trust each other and the chance to stop the war was missed. The USSR was afraid of a war on two fronts - in the West and in the East.
The UK was the first to break the emerging understanding. A few months before the start of negotiations in Moscow with the USSR and France on security issues, she signed an agreement with Germany (non-aggression pact). In 1939, Hitler gave Stalin an ultimatum to sit down at the negotiating table. Having interrupted negotiations with France and England, I.V. Stalin began negotiations with Germany. On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was signed with Germany. The Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian lands were returned to the USSR. Germany did not prevent the introduction of Soviet troops into the Baltic states in 1940. After that, three Soviet republics were formed on the territory of the Baltic states. Having received Bessarabia in 1940, the USSR completed the formation of the state. The last, fifteenth republic, Moldova, was formed.
After reaching a consensus with the USSR, Germany attacked Poland. The USSR declared its neutrality. On September 1, 1939, World War II began.
On September 28, 1939, an agreement was signed between the USSR and Germany on friendship and borders, which allowed the USSR to gain time and roll back its military experience. Diplomatic relations with England and France became complicated. In 1938 - early 1940s. passed the "small" wars of the USSR. The most famous is the war with Finland. Stalin intended to conquer the territory of Finland in a short time and establish the "Finnish Democratic Republic" there. In the autumn of 1939, the non-aggression pact signed with Finland in 1932 was violated, and hostilities began. But the Soviet army did not know the doctrine of defense, and could not develop the offensive competently. The Finns, led personally by the head of state, General Mannerheim (a graduate of the Academy of the General Staff of Russia, a former personal adjutant of Nicholas II), caused significant damage to the Red Army. In 1940, after an unsuccessful winter military campaign, negotiations began that returned the borders of 1809 to the USSR. In the late 1930s. The USSR participated in military campaigns on Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin Gol River, on the territory of Mongolia, where it fought with the forces of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The victories won in the east allowed the USSR to achieve territorial concessions.
By 1940, both Germany (carrying out the Barbarossa plan in stages) and the USSR were intensively preparing for the war. The production of weapons increased, and in 1939 a new law on universal conscription entered into force in the USSR. More funds began to be allocated to armaments. In 1941, this amounted to 43.4% of the entire state budget. But the country was shaken by repression. 5 chiefs of the Main Intelligence Directorate were destroyed. Stalin still remained confident that Hitler would not start a war anytime soon. This was one of his fatal mistakes.
Literature:
Bessonov B. Fascism: ideology and practice. M., 1985.
Igritsky Yu.I. Concepts of totalitarianism: lessons from many years of discussions in the West // History of the USSR. 1990. No. 6.
Trotsky L.D. Stalin's crimes. M., 1989
Conquest R. The Great Terror. In 2 books. Riga, 1991
Khlevnyuk O.V. 1937: Stalin. NKVD and Soviet society. M., 1992
Section 4. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (1941-1945).
Two heads and six legs; four walk, and two lie still
Self-esteem - what is it: concept, structure, types and levels
Cassandra's Path, or Pasta Adventures War on Earth and Underground