The second front was opened on the territory. Second Front and Lend-Lease: Their Role in the Victory over Nazi Germany

SECOND FRONT against fascist Germany, its allies and satellites in Western Europe during World War II .

Opened 6/6/1944 by the landing of the Anglo-American expeditionary forces in North-West France. The main goal of the second front was formulated in the speech of the British Prime Minister W. Churchill already on June 22, 1941, on the day of the perfidious invasion of the German Wehrmacht into the USSR and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War: to destroy Hitler and the Nazi regime, to help Russia and the Russian people because the Nazi regime is a danger to both England and America, and the struggle of every Russian person for his home and hearth is the struggle of every free person in every corner of the globe.

The decision to create a second front was made by representatives of the USSR, the USA and England (see. Anti-Hitler coalition) in connection with the difficult development of events on Soviet-German front, on which the owl. people fought alone Wehrmacht and the armies of Germany's European allies. The joint communiqué, adopted on 12/6/1942, stated that "complete agreement has been reached on the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942."

The timely implementation of this decision could not only provide significant assistance to the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the struggle against fascist Germany and its allies, but also significantly accelerate the defeat of the fascist bloc, reduce the duration of the war and the number of its victims.

However, instead of creating a second front in Europe, Anglo-American troops landed in North Africa and carried out the North African landing operation of 1942. The opening of the second front was postponed (without agreement with the USSR) to 1943. But even that year the second front was not opened. The allied forces, having carried out the Sicilian landing operation of 1943 and started the Italian campaign, diverted only no more than 6-7% of the Wehrmacht forces from the main for Germany - the Soviet-German front (eastern front). Owls. The Union continued to bear the brunt of the war.

Landing of the allied troops in Normandy. 1944

On the morning of June 6, 1944, after massive air strikes and artillery shelling of ships, the landing of allied troops on the Normandy coast of France began. Thus a second front was opened.
The idea of ​​a second front arose literally in the first days of Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. The leaders of England, although in words they declared their support for the USSR, in fact did not even think about opening it. They considered inevitable the imminent defeat of the USSR in the war with Germany and sought only to drag it out. The interests of the British leadership were directed to the Middle East, where the British troops were fighting against the Italo-German grouping led by the German General Rommel. American top military leaders considered it necessary to help the Soviet Union. As a result, US President Roosevelt decided to supply arms and equipment to the USSR.

In 1942, among the American leadership, the idea of ​​​​an invasion of allied forces across the English Channel into Western Europe matured. Churchill also supported the idea in the spring of 1942. In a communiqué issued on June 11–12, 1942, after Soviet-British and Soviet-American negotiations, the decision was made to open a second front in 1942. However, this decision remained on paper. Churchill and Roosevelt countered the common interests of the anti-Hitler coalition with their special interests in North Africa, where the position of the British troops worsened. The leaders of the allied powers referred to military-technical reasons. But their economic and military potential made it possible to carry out an invasion of northwestern France in 1942. Instead of opening a second front, the Allies sent troops to distant North Africa, forgetting coalition interests for the sake of national interests. They preferred quick and easy success in Africa to heavy battles with the main enemy in Europe, thus striving to increase their authority among the British and Americans, who expected at least some success from the leaders of both countries in the war against the fascist bloc.

Map of the offensive of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1944

For the same reason, the second front was not opened in the next year, 1943. In 1942 and 1943, the main forces of England were in North Africa and the Mediterranean. 60% of the US ground forces and aviation ended up in the Pacific Ocean, and the grouping of American troops, designed for a war with Germany, was in the Mediterranean. Only 15 divisions of the Wehrmacht fought against the allies at that time, and 233 German divisions operated on the Soviet-German front.

In mid-1943, the attitude of the leaders of the allied powers to the opening of a second front changed significantly. This was facilitated by the victory of the Red Army in the grandiose Battle of Kursk and its entry to the Dnieper. The strategic initiative was finally assigned to the Soviet armed forces. It was a turning point in the course of the entire Second World War. It became clear not only that the Soviet Union alone was able to liberate its territory from the invaders, but also that the entry of its armies into Eastern Europe was not far off. The allies of Nazi Germany began to look for a way out of the war, on July 25, 1943, Mussolini was overthrown in Italy.

The Allies were afraid that the Red Army would independently defeat Nazi Germany and liberate the countries of Europe from Nazi occupation. It was then that, not in words, but in deeds, they began to actively prepare for an invasion of Northern Europe. The conference of the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, held on November 28 - December 1, 1943 in Tehran, decided to open a second front in Western Europe in May 1944. The Allies could not ignore the fact that during the summer-autumn campaign the Red Army pushed back the Wehrmacht troops to the west by 500-1300 kilometers, freeing two-thirds of the Soviet territory they occupied from the invaders.

To land on the continent, the Anglo-American command concentrated huge forces on the British Isles. The Allied Expeditionary Forces numbered 1.6 million people, while they were opposed by the Nazi forces of 526 thousand people. The allies had 6,600 tanks and self-propelled guns, the Germans had 2,000, guns and mortars, respectively, 15,000 and 6,700, combat aircraft - 10,850 and 160 (more than 60 times superiority). The allies also had an overwhelming advantage in terms of ships. In addition, the German troops were not the best, the best were on the Eastern Front.

Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill. Tehran conference. 1943

The landing operation was prepared covertly and carried out suddenly for the Germans. Moreover, the enemy could not determine the landing site and was not ready to meet the invasion forces. The German troops defending the coast, having suffered significant losses from bombing attacks and Allied naval artillery fire, offered little resistance. And by the end of the first day of landing, the Allies created several bridgeheads, and by the end of June 12, they occupied the coast with a length of 80 kilometers along the front and 13-18 kilometers in depth. By June 30, the Allied bridgehead had increased to 100 kilometers along the front and 20–40 kilometers in depth. By that time, there were about 1 million Allied soldiers and officers in France.

The German command could not reinforce its troops in Normandy, since at that time the Red Army was advancing in Belarus and the main forces of Germany were in the East. Furthermore. To close the huge gap in the center of the Soviet-German front, the German command was forced to transfer 46 divisions and 4 brigades there from other sectors of the Eastern Front and from Western Europe. As a result, 4 million soldiers and officers participated in the battle on both sides. In the West, the Wehrmacht troops, who were there even before the start of operations in Normandy, quickly left the territory of France, which allowed the Allies to reach the borders of Germany by the end of August. The second front, with the opening of which there were hopes for pulling several dozen divisions from the Eastern Front, did not justify these hopes as early as 1944. On the contrary, the Red Army, by its decisive offensive actions, provided assistance to the American-British troops stationed on the second front.

In mid-December 1944, German troops, unexpectedly for the Allies, launched an offensive in the Ardennes. The tank units of the Germans were advancing rapidly. The allied command was literally at a loss. By the end of December, German troops had advanced 110 kilometers west. For a further offensive they needed reserves. However, the encirclement of the 188,000-strong group of Nazi troops in Budapest in December by the Red Army forced the Nazi command to transfer four divisions and two brigades to deblockade them. German troops in the Ardennes received no reinforcements.

Soviet troops in Berlin. May 1945

However, the offensive of the German troops in the Ardennes continued in early January 1945. Churchill was forced to send a telegram to Stalin asking for military assistance. The Soviet leadership promised the British government to launch a major Soviet offensive against the Germans no later than the second half of January. The Red Army unleashed a blow of enormous force on the Wehrmacht troops. This forced the Nazi command to remove the 6th SS Panzer Army and the most combat-ready divisions from the Western Front and send them to the Eastern Front. The powerful offensive of the Soviet troops in Poland and East Prussia in January 1945 led to the failure of the German offensive in the West. As a result, operations to cross the Rhine and capture the Ruhr were facilitated to a large extent by the American-British troops. This is the result of the largest battle on the second front.

On January 19, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the pre-war German-Polish border. On January 29, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front entered German soil. The beginning of the fighting in Germany was a harbinger of its imminent collapse.

The rapid offensive of the Red Army pushed the allies to more effective actions on the Western Front as well. The German troops, weakened in the Ardennes, offered practically no resistance to the allies. From February 8 to March 25, their offensive ended with access to the Rhine. They crossed the river in several places, and by the end of March they had advanced 40–50 kilometers east of the Rhine in a number of places. The war with Germany was drawing to a close.

In this situation, the question arose of who would take Berlin. Naturally, the capture of the capital of the Third Reich was of great political and moral-psychological significance. Churchill really wanted Berlin to be captured by the Allies, and the meeting with the Russians would take place as far east as possible. However, one had to keep in mind that by the beginning of April the allied armies were 450-500 kilometers from the capital of Germany, and the Soviet troops were stationed on the Oder, 60 kilometers from Berlin. This already predetermined that Berlin would be taken by Soviet troops. In addition, the heads of the three governments at the Yalta Conference decided that Berlin would enter the Soviet zone of occupation, but the troops of the four great powers would be stationed in the city itself. The question of the capture of Berlin was finally resolved by the Berlin operation of the Red Army that began on April 16 to capture the capital of the Third Reich.

The act of surrender of Germany. 9 May 1945

Meanwhile, the Allied forces continued to capture German cities with little or no resistance. On April 16, the mass surrender of the Wehrmacht troops in the west began. In order to avoid official surrender, the commander of the Nazi troops opposing the Allies, Field Marshal V. Model, ordered the disbandment of his troops, and shot himself. From that moment on, the Western Front practically ceased to exist. The Allies marched across Germany, where the guns were already silent, at a free pace. On April 17, the allied troops surrounded the Ruhr and he surrendered, in the Ruhr operation they captured 317 thousand soldiers and officers and rushed to the Elbe. The Germans surrendered to the allies in whole divisions, while they fought with the Red Army with a frenzy. But it was already agony.

On April 15, Hitler addressed a special appeal to the troops of the Eastern Front and issued an order to repel the offensive of the Red Army at all costs. On the advice of Jodl, he decided to remove Wenck's 12th Army from the Western Front and send it against the Soviet troops. But nothing could save the Nazis from inevitable defeat. On April 24, the Red Army closed the ring around Berlin. The next day, in the Torgau area on the Elbe, the forward detachments of the American 1st Army met with units of the 5th Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. As a result, the entire front of the Nazi troops was torn apart: the armies in North and South Germany were cut off from each other. The Third Reich was living its last days.

At the beginning of the day on May 2, 1945, the commander of the defense of Berlin, General Weidling, announced to the Soviet command that he agreed to unconditional surrender. By 3 pm on May 2, the resistance of the Berlin garrison had completely ceased. By the end of the day, the Red Army occupied the entire city. On May 7, in Reims, the Allies signed the act of surrender of Germany with General Jodl. The USSR insisted on its preliminary character. The Soviet Supreme High Command believed that the act of unconditional surrender should be accepted by all the great allied powers. Moreover, in Berlin, where the fascist aggression began.

Such an act was adopted on the night of May 8-9, 1945 on the outskirts of Berlin Karlshorst. The act was signed by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov from the Soviet Supreme High Command, Air Chief Marshal A. Tedder from the British High Command, General C. Spaats, Commander of the US Strategic Military Forces from the United States Armed Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army from the French Armed Forces General J.-M. de Latre de Tassigny. The Third Reich has ceased to exist.

The second front accelerated the victory over the Wehrmacht and the troops of the allies of Nazi Germany. However, the decisive contribution to the overall victory was made by the Soviet Union. The evidence for this is the facts. The second front operated for 11 months. During this time, the allies liberated France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, part of the territory of Austria and Czechoslovakia, entered Germany and reached the Elbe. The length of the second front - from the Baltic near Lübeck to the Swiss border - was 800-1000 kilometers.

The Great Patriotic War lasted 1418 days and nights - about four years. The length of the Soviet-German front in different years of the war ranged from 2000 to 6200 kilometers.

Most of the Wehrmacht troops and German satellite troops were on the Soviet-German front. At various times, from 190 to 270 of the most combat-ready divisions of the Nazi bloc fought here, that is, up to 78% of all its forces. The Wehrmacht also used most of the weapons against the Red Army. Namely: 52–81% of guns and mortars, 54–67% of tanks and assault guns, 47–60% of aircraft. These figures indicate which front the Germans considered the main one, with the actions on which they connected the fate of Germany. And most importantly: on the Soviet-German front, most of the troops of the common enemy were crushed. 607 divisions of the Third Reich and its satellites defeated the Soviet troops, the allies defeated 176 enemy divisions.

Facts are the most convincing evidence. They irrefutably testify to the contribution of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition to the victory over Nazi Germany.

To the 70th anniversary of the Allied landing in Normandy (Operation Overlord)

The solemn celebration of the 70th anniversary of the start of Operation Overlord corresponds to the ideas embedded in the public consciousness of the West that only after June 6, 1944, a turning point occurred in World War II, and the liberation of Europe from Hitlerism began. Admission to these celebrations was evidence of a positive or negative assessment of a particular country, regardless of its historical role in the victory over Nazi Germany and its allies.

Therefore, against the invitation of the President of our country, which made a decisive contribution to the victory, a vicious campaign was launched in the West. On the other hand, Poroshenko, who had not yet been sworn in, was unconditionally invited to the celebrations, whose victory in the elections became possible, in particular, thanks to the revelry of neo-Nazi forces in Ukraine.

Why was the front in Western Europe considered "second"?

No such celebrations with the invitation of the heads of governments and member states of the anti-Hitler coalition have ever been held on the occasion of the anniversaries of the battles near Moscow, Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge, which really became a turning point in the course of World War II. No wonder. Western media usually keep silent about such dates. In school textbooks in Western countries, it is almost impossible to find references to these battles, as well as to the military operations of the Red Army in general. The front, which was opened by the allies of the USSR in Normandy and then called the "second" all over the world, is now portrayed as decisive in the battles of 70 years ago, thanks to many years of efforts to process public consciousness.

The concept of "second front" was first used by Stalin in his message to Churchill on September 3, 1941, in which he returned to his earlier proposal to open "a front against Hitler in the West (Northern France) and in the North (Arctic)". Pointing out that the Soviet Union was "facing a mortal threat," Stalin wrote: "There is only one way out of this situation: to create a second front somewhere in the Balkans or in France this year."

This concept was constantly used by Churchill, starting with his answer to Stalin on September 6, 1941. And soon the words "second front" became common, because the Soviet-German front was considered the first, or main front. The correctness of such assessments, which were formed back in the years of the Second World War, is evidenced by the data given by Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences G.A. Kumanev. He wrote: "Of the 1418 days and nights of the existence of the Soviet-German front, active operations continued here for 1320 days, while in the West European - 293." Kumanev noted that the length of the Soviet-German front ranged from 3,000 to 6,200 km, while the length of the Western front was 800 km.

"Of the total number of casualties suffered by the Nazi army in World War II, more than 73% fell on the Eastern Front." Kumanev also pointed out that on the Soviet-German front, Germany and its allies lost over 75% of their aircraft, 74% of their artillery, 75% of their tanks and assault guns.

The myth of the impassable Atlantic Wall

It should also be taken into account that during the three years of the war the "second front" was an abstract concept that did not reflect reality. The Western allies of our country were responsible for this state of affairs. Rejecting Stalin's proposals to open a second front, Churchill invariably referred to the invincibility of the German defense along the English Channel. In the autumn of 1941, he wrote: "Only in France alone, the Germans have forty divisions, and the entire coast for more than a year was fortified with purely German zeal and bristled with guns, barbed wire." Churchill argued that the implementation of the British landing would be in the hands of Hitler and would bring harm not only to England, but also to the USSR. He wrote: "To undertake a landing with large forces would mean suffering a bloody defeat, and small raids would only lead to failures and would cause much more harm than good to both of us."

True, whenever the Allies discovered that the Red Army could enter Western Europe without them, they stopped talking about the difficulties of landing across the English Channel. So it was after the start of the counter-offensive of the Red Army during the battle near Moscow, and then after the Battle of Stalingrad. However, when the Germans went on the offensive, the Allies again recalled that a landing across the English Channel could be a disaster for the Allies and even for the Red Army. Therefore, they retracted their obligations in Churchill's message to Stalin of July 18, 1942, that is, at the height of the offensive of the Nazi troops that began three weeks ago, and then in the message of Roosevelt, which Stalin received on June 4, 1943 after the Red Army left Kharkov and Belgorod and the beginning of preparations by the Germans for Operation Citadel. Only after November 1943, when the Red Army continued its offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German front, did the Allies renounce their obligations that they had given at the Big Three conference. Then, in Tehran, they informed Stalin about the preparations for a landing operation in Northern France, called "Overlord".

It would seem that in the two years that have passed since the allies announced to the whole world their intention to open a second front, the Germans could actually make their defense along the English Channel impregnable. However, this was hindered by the demands of the Soviet-German front. German Lieutenant General B. Zimmermann wrote after the war: "Despite the fact that the Supreme High Command did everything possible to strengthen the West with both troops and weapons, all the measures taken in 1943 were only a drop in the ocean, since the East urgently demanded new forces ... Therefore, the Germans failed to create operational reserves in the West!The construction of the Atlantic Wall was still far from being completed ... If the Atlantic Wall had been built based on mobile defense, then, perhaps, it would have become decisive, but this did not happen, and therefore the rampart only demanded "garrisons" who, in fact, were completely helpless here.

Despite the fact that German intelligence had comprehensive information about the imminent Allied invasion, the military leadership of the Reich continued to keep its main forces on the Soviet-German front.

By June 1944, there were 165 of the most combat-ready divisions there. 59 less combat-ready Wehrmacht divisions were scattered, according to the general and historian Kurt Tippelskirch, along the entire coast "from Antwerp to the Bay of Biscay." According to him, these divisions had no more than "50% of the regular strength." American General Omar Bradley recalled that the German divisions "were extremely heterogeneous. Seventeen divisions were field and intended for counterattacks. However, most of them had long been left without transport, except for the most necessary. Therefore, they did not have the mobility required in maneuver warfare. Twenty four coastal defense divisions were also extremely heterogeneous in composition and had even less mobility due to lack of transport. The remaining divisions were training formations, staffed mainly by recruits. "

Relying on the power of Anglo-American military equipment

In preparation for Operation Overlord, the Allies used the enormous potential of the US and British military industries. Thanks to this, the Allies had an undeniable superiority over the Germans in the air force. By the beginning of the invasion, wrote Tippelskirch, “the Allies had at their disposal 5,049 fighters, 1,467 heavy bombers, 1,645 medium and light bombers, including torpedo bombers, 2,316 transport aircraft and 2,591 gliders. At the same time, only 500 German aircraft were concentrated on French airfields , of which only 90 bombers and 70 fighters were in full combat readiness."

This superiority was strengthened by the purposeful actions of the Anglo-American aviation. In January 1944, Allied aviation destroyed 1311 German aircraft, in February - 2121, in March - 2115. The English historian Max Hastings wrote: "However, it was not the loss of aircraft that was more catastrophic for the Luftwaffe, but the loss of experienced pilots, which grew much faster than replenishment them ... By June, the Germans no longer had enough pilots or aircraft to offer no more than token opposition to the Allied invasion of France.

The Allies also took care in advance of the destruction of fuel for German aviation. In May 1944, they launched raids on synthetic fuel plants.

As a result, the supply of aviation alcohol to the Luftwaffe dropped from 180,000 tons in April to 50,000 tons in June and to 10,000 tons in August.

B. Zimmerman pointed out: “The superiority of the Western Allies in aviation turned in the spring of 1944 into their complete dominance in the air. The time came when the Anglo-American aviation began to destroy not only military facilities, but also industrial enterprises. All the most important turned into piles of ruins railway junctions; the entire transport system of the western regions fell into unimaginable chaos. Communication was now managed to be maintained only with the help of various tricks and temporary measures. The outer ring of the Paris railway junction was subjected to such air strikes that sometimes it completely failed for several days ... Actions enemy fighter-bombers, penetrating far inland, ruled out any possibility of movement on the roads during the day and caused heavy losses among the troops and the civilian population.

As the German Admiral Marshall noted, "on the day of the landing, the Western Allies lifted up to 6,700 aircraft into the air, which were opposed by only 319 German aircraft."

Hastings believed that "the victory of the Americans in the air battle over Germany was achieved many weeks before the first soldier of the Allied armies set foot on the French coast."

A huge advantage was achieved by the allies and at sea.

Marshall wrote: “Before the landing itself and during it, 317 enemy minesweepers cleared almost all German minefields. Under the cover of light ships and with the support of powerful fleet formations, which included 6 battleships, 23 cruisers and 104 destroyers, enemy landing craft approached coast of Normandy, having previously destroyed the weak forces of the outposts of the Germans.

In three years, 4,600 landing craft were built in Britain. Already after the landing, the British and Americans began, according to Marshall, to build "artificial ports, using for this purpose 60 specially equipped merchant steamers, 146 giant 6000-ton floating caissons and up to 100 floating breakwaters and piers. All this was lowered to the bottom near the coast and turned into an artificial barrier 8 km long.

The leaders of the operation took a long time to choose the most suitable conditions for the landing, in accordance with the state of the sea, moonlight and many other circumstances. It seemed that everything was prepared for a brilliant victory. The predominance in military equipment and material support, constant many months of training, during which the soldiers were familiarized with the conditions of the landing, convinced many of them that the victory over the German troops would be quick and crushing.

Private Lindley Higgins recalled that before the invasion "we really believed that at any moment the whole Reich was about to collapse. We believed that as soon as we landed on the other side, all the Fritz would raise their hands."

The generals also shared confidence in an early victory. They also believed that this victory was to lead to a new triumph for the United States and Great Britain. As O. Bradley recalled, in March 1944, General George Patton, supporting the proposal to create Anglo-American clubs, said: "The idea underlying the organization of such clubs is very timely, because, undoubtedly, we are destined to rule the whole world" . Patton's words received wide publicity.

Day-D

The leadership of the expeditionary corps appointed "D-day" -

The start date for the operation is June 5th. D. Eisenhower recalled: "The whole of southern England was packed with troops awaiting the last command. Around were piles of military materials and a mass of military equipment prepared for the transfer across the English Channel ... All this powerful force was tense, like a compressed spring, ready to the right moment to rush across the English Channel to carry out the greatest amphibious operation in history." However, "as the prospects for decent weather grew worse and worse, tensions among the command staff mounted."

From the morning of June 5, as Eisenhower recalled, "our small camp was shaking under gusts of wind that reached almost hurricane force, and the rain seemed to fall like a solid wall." It was impossible to even think about the beginning of the operation. However, the meteorologists promised: "By the next morning there will be a hitherto completely unforeseen period of relatively good weather lasting about thirty-six hours." Eisenhower recalled: “The possible consequences of a further delay justified the great risk, and I quickly announced the decision to proceed with the landing on June 6 ... None of those present expressed their disagreement, on the contrary, a certain enlightenment appeared on their faces, and each without further ado went to the command post to immediately radio his troops the decision that will set them in motion."

Describing the first hours after the start of Operation Overlord on the morning of June 6, 1944, Kurt Tippelskirch wrote: “After dawn, aircraft and ships bombarded the northern coast of Normandy from the Ory River to the Grand Vey Bay and further with a hail of bombs and shells. They suppressed German batteries , destroyed defenses, swept away wire fences, destroyed minefields and damaged mine lines of communication. Under the cover of this hellish fire, landing craft approached the shore. "

However, contrary to the forecast, the weather remained bad. Tippelskirch wrote: “The storm force of the northwest raised the tide level higher than expected, the waves began to overwhelm the barriers near the coast. The raging sea threw small landing craft like shells, many of them were thrown onto reefs or capsized. on the water amphibious tanks, with the support of which the infantry had to go ashore.The barriers set up near the coast, in a storm, could not be completely removed, so they caused significant losses. on beach".

Tippelskirch admitted that "eight regiments, fully manned according to the wartime staff and concentrated at five landing points, went on the offensive against one and a half times weaker German divisions stretched along the entire coast of Normandy, of which only a part could engage in battle in the areas directly attacked points. And yet, despite the clear predominance of the Anglo-American forces, the Germans managed to organize counterattacks. Thanks to this, as Tippelskirch noted, "the Americans in their landing areas throughout the day did not go beyond the captured narrow bridgeheads. It was especially hard for the two regiments advancing in the Vierville area: they ran into the 352nd division here ... The advancing Americans suffered heavy losses, and at times it even seemed that they would not be able to hold on."

However, in his memoirs, Dwyat Eisenhower stated: "The landing was quite successful." He only vaguely mentioned the bad weather on the day of the invasion and the "exceptionally fierce battle" that unfolded on one sector of the front.

Although combat missions were generally completed, many soldiers realized for the first time how great the difference was between those who planned the operation and those who carried it out. Their thoughts were reflected by the writer Irwin Shaw in his novel "Young Lions".

“People on the scene,” I. Shaw wrote, “were not consulted about the duration of air preparation. Forecasters did not instruct them about the rise or fall of the tides in June and the possible likelihood of storms. They did not sit at meetings that discussed how many divisions could be lost to reach the required milestone by 1600... All they see is helmets, vomit, green water, geysers from explosions, clouds of smoke, crashing planes, blood plasma, underwater obstacles, guns, pale, meaningless faces, a disorderly crowd of drowning people, who run and fall and all this has nothing to do with what they have been taught since they left their classes and their wives to put on the military uniform of their country ... When a person on the scene is injured or injured his neighbor, when a sailor on the bridge shouts in a high-pitched girlish voice: “Mother!”, because he already has nothing below the waist, then it seems to the person on the scene that he is in a terrible mess and he cannot It is impossible to imagine that 80 miles away there is a person who foresaw this trouble, prepared it and now can report ... that everything is going according to plan.

Informing Stalin on June 7 about the progress of the operation, Churchill wrote: “We crossed with small losses. We expected to lose about 10 thousand people. We hope to have most of a quarter of a million people on the shore tonight, including a significant number of special vessels or those that reached the shore under their own power.

Secondary front?

For almost 50 days (June 6 to July 24) the Allies continued to build up their forces on the French coast, only partly moving forward. During this time, 2,876,439 US, British and Canadian troops and a huge amount of military equipment were landed in France. On July 25, an offensive was launched deep into the European continent.

On August 24, Anglo-American troops entered Paris, and Ernest Hemingway, who accompanied the American troops as a war correspondent, described his excitement when he saw through his binoculars "a gray and as always beautiful city."

American General Omar Bradley wrote: “By September 1, a pitiful handful of demoralized enemy soldiers remained on the Western Front ... We marched victoriously along the roads of Europe, full of optimism and bright hopes ... The defeat of the enemy east of Paris was so crushing that our troops, rushing rushing forward in 2.5-ton trucks, began to consider such a rapid advance as a harbinger of an imminent transfer to the Sino-Burmese-Indian theater of operations.This sense of optimism even seized the staffs, whose officers tirelessly counted the vehicles and talked about the possibility of getting home for Christmas."

However, as Bradley admitted, "September 1944 is marked on our calendars as the month of great bankruptcy ... Our dash to the Rhine was unsuccessful, and with it our cherished dream of an early surrender to Germany was dispelled."

Why, then, did the Anglo-American troops, significantly superior to the German ones in terms of the degree and quality of armament, "stuck", according to Bradley, "in the steel teeth of the Siegfried Line"? To a large extent, this was due to the "human factor", primarily, the low military and psychological preparation for combat operations of American soldiers and officers, who made up the majority of the expeditionary force.

Hastings wrote: “Some of the American formations were dangerously unprepared; they were led by commanders who were not competent enough to carry out the task that was to be carried out ... From the first to the last day of the war, the American army could never be mistaken for anything other than what it was in fact, civilians in uniform... Where in the German army officers made up only 2.86% of the personnel, in the American army there were 7% of them, and many of them had never been even close to the front.

Hastings noted that, once in the armed forces, everyone who could afford it tried to get into those branches of the military that were not associated with actions on the battlefield. He wrote: “During the Second World War, young Englishmen from the privileged strata of society still gravitated towards infantry and tank regiments, while their American counterparts preferred more prestigious appointments in aviation, in the strategic services office, in administrative positions in the army or in diplomatic office.

Service as an officer in combat units on the front lines never became fashionable among young Americans...

The army suffered many losses due to poor possession of weapons and, oddly enough, the insufficient armament of the soldiers. Hastings remarked: "The amount of ammunition for small arms in a German infantry company was more than twice that in an American infantry company: 56,000 rounds and 21,000." Only after the war did it become clear that they did not want to overload the American soldier with ammunition at the expense of food, which he carried in a duffel bag.

Having 2 times less ammunition than the Germans, the American soldiers received much more significant food rations than the German ones. Max Hastings wrote: "The daily ration of every American soldier in Normandy was six and a half pounds, compared with a little over three pounds for a German soldier." At the same time, the Americans were determined "the size of sweets in one ounce, biscuits in two ounces and one packet of chewing gum for each person." As a result, it was difficult for American soldiers to pass with their tightly packed duffel bags where the distance between the walls was small and they scolded the British cars for too narrow doors.

And yet, despite the concern for food supplies, Americans, as in all wars in which they participated since the Revolutionary War, did not tolerate the conditions of uncomfortable, military life and were often sick.

German marksmanship and disease caused significant damage to the American army. According to Tippelskirch, "the American infantry continuously suffered significant losses, moreover, many were out of action due to illness. The drain of manpower gradually assumed such proportions that the command, in order to increase the combat strength of its divisions, had to ... replace the male personnel in headquarters, except for the military, by women, as well as to remove excess service personnel from the Air Force units.

Despite the fact that the Allied forces on the Western Front significantly exceeded the German ones (in terms of personnel, the ratio was 2: 1, in armored forces - 4: 1, in aviation - 6: 1), the German army launched an offensive on December 16, 1944 on the Belgian plateau Ardennes. Explaining the motives of the German actions, the English historian Chester Wilmont argued: "The German offensive in the Ardennes was military in nature and was Hitler's response to the failure of the Allies to use their opportunities in the fall. But it also had a political goal, since Hitler sought to split the Great Union, to force allies to sign a compromise peace and keep the Russians out of Germany."

Ch. Wilmont called this offensive the "Pearl Harbor of the war in Europe." The Allied defenses were broken, and the American units in Bastogne were surrounded.

A large number of American aircraft were destroyed on the ground. Many prisoners were captured, among whom was the future American writer Kurt Vonnegut. On January 1, 1945, the Germans went on the offensive in Alsace.

Then Churchill's famous appeal to Stalin for help in the form of military operations on the Soviet-German front followed. For the sake of the Western Allies, it was decided to speed up the offensive of the Red Army in January 1945. The Germans again transferred the bulk of their forces to the East. However, despite the mass surrender of the Germans to the Allies and secret negotiations with Himmler on surrender to the Western powers, the Anglo-American troops were clearly lagging behind in their advance towards the center of the Reich compared to the Soviet troops,

that “the Russian armies will undoubtedly capture all of Austria, and enter Vienna. If they also capture Berlin, will they not have an overly exaggerated idea that they have made an overwhelming contribution to our common victory, and might this lead to them to a frame of mind which will cause serious and very significant difficulties in the future?Therefore, I think that from a political point of view we should move as far east as possible in Germany and in the event that Berlin is within reach, we will certainly should take it."

And although in his desire to stop the Red Army, Churchill was even ready to resort to the help of German soldiers, giving the order not to disarm them, but to keep them at the ready (Operation Unthinkable), these efforts were made too late and did not lead to anything. General Patton's dream that an Allied triumph would demonstrate the US and UK's right to rule the world proved illusory. Although the Western Allies were able to liberate France and Belgium and then occupy the western part of Germany, the contribution of the second front to the defeat of Hitlerism was obviously less significant than the contribution of the Red Army.

Special for the Centenary

70 years ago, on June 6, 1944, the allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition launched the Normandy operation. The strategic operation of the Allies to land troops in French Normandy (Operation Overlord) is considered the date of the creation of the Western (second) front of World War II. The Normandy operation is the largest landing operation in the history of mankind - more than 3 million people took part in it, crossing the English Channel from England to Normandy. Suffice it to say that on the first day of the operation, 5 infantry divisions, 3 armored brigades and a number of other formations (about 100 thousand people) were landed.

Until that moment, neither the actions of the allied forces in Africa, nor the landings in Sicily and Italy could claim the title of "Second Front". The Allies captured a large bridgehead, which allowed them to land entire armies, launch an offensive through French territory and liberate Paris. German troops were able to restore a new front line only in September 1944 on the western border of Germany.

The opening of the Western Front led to the approach of victory over the Third Reich. Berlin had to use significant infantry and tank formations in the fight against the allied forces (mainly the armies of the USA, Great Britain, Canada and parts of the French resistance movement). And although the war on the Western Front for the most part did not take on such a fierce and stubborn character as on the Eastern Front, Berlin still could not transfer these troops against the Soviet Union. As a result, Victory Day occurred on May 9, 1945, and not at the end of 1945 or the beginning of 1946. The Soviet Union saved hundreds of thousands of lives. The USSR would have broken Germany alone, but this would have happened later and with more serious human and material losses.

So, on June 23, 1944, one of the largest military operations in the history of mankind began - Operation Bagration. Moreover, the success of the Belarusian operation significantly exceeded the expectations of the Soviet command. It led to the defeat of the Army Group "Center", the complete cleansing of the enemy of Belarus, the Germans recaptured part of the Baltic states and the eastern regions of Poland. The Red Army on the front of 1100 km advanced to a depth of 600 km. The successful offensive endangered Army Group North in the Baltic, which subsequently greatly facilitated the conduct of the Baltic operation. In addition, two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula were captured, which facilitated the Vistula-Oder operation.

According to a number of military historians, the offensive of the Soviet fronts was facilitated by the appearance of the Western Front. The German command did not have the opportunity to transfer reserves from France, including large tank formations. Their presence on the Eastern Front seriously complicated the conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation. In addition, it is worth considering that a significant part of the German artillery was in the West, as was aviation. This allowed the Soviet Air Force to quickly gain air superiority and smash the retreating German columns without opposition from the Luftwaffe.

On the other hand, the powerful Soviet offensive did not allow the German command to concentrate forces to eliminate the Allied bridgehead in Normandy. Already on June 10, the Red Army launched an offensive on the northern wing of the front, and on June 23, Operation Bagration began.

However, one should not forget that the Allies landed in France much later than expected, and they promised. In fact, the top military-political leadership of England and the United States waited until the last moment. The Anglo-Saxons initially believed that Hitler, who was allowed to subjugate most of Europe to mobilize its economic and human resources, would quickly crush the USSR, but would get stuck fighting partisans and mastering vast Russian spaces. Then the generals were to eliminate him and restore normal relations with England and the United States. This was facilitated by the fact that most of the German leadership before World War II, and even during its first stage, dreamed of an alliance with Britain.

The British Empire was the model of their "Eternal Reich", it was she who created the racial system throughout the planet, the first concentration camps and reservations. In addition, the Anglo-Saxons were originally the creators and sponsors of the Third Reich project. Adolf Hitler was a figure in the Great Game, the man who once again pitted Germany and Russia against each other, natural allies that could be thrown into the Anglo-Saxon world order.

Germany was not able to crush the USSR with one lightning strike, a protracted war of attrition and fortitude began, in which the Russian people had no equal. Then England and the USA began to wait for the enemies to weaken each other in order to get all the fruits of victory and establish complete control over the planet. But here, too, the enemy was mistaken - the USSR, although it suffered terrible losses in this battle of the titans, was able to intensify and the process of liberating Soviet lands began, and then the liberation of Europe. There was a threat that the USSR would be able to put under its control not only part of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, but Central and Western Europe. It was necessary to land troops in Western Europe, so as not to be late for the division of the skin of the killed German bear.

For the first time, the question of opening a second front was officially raised in a personal message from the head of the Soviet government, Joseph Stalin, dated July 18, 1941, to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Welcoming the establishment of allied relations between the USSR and England and expressing confidence in the defeat of the common enemy, Stalin noted that the military position of the two powers would be significantly improved if a front was created against Germany in the West (Northern France) and in the North (Arctic). This front could have drawn significant German forces off the Eastern Front and made it impossible for Hitler to invade Britain. But Churchill rejected Stalin's proposal, citing a lack of forces and the threat of a "bloody defeat" of the landing force.

In September 1941, in the midst of a severe crisis on the fronts, Stalin again returned to the issue of a second front. In messages dated September 3 and 13, 1941, Stalin wrote to Churchill that Germany had transferred more than 30 fresh infantry divisions, a large number of aircraft and tanks to the Eastern Front, and intensified the actions of its allies, as a result of which the USSR lost more than half of Ukraine and the enemy went to Leningrad . According to him, the German command considered "the danger in the West a bluff" (and it was) and calmly transferred all forces to the East. Germany got the opportunity to beat their opponents one by one: first the USSR, then England. This gave England a good opportunity to open a second front. Churchill, recognizing that the entire burden of the struggle against Germany fell on the Soviet Union, said that the opening of a second front was "impossible."

The victories of the Red Army in the winter of 1941-1942 opened up new opportunities for opening a second front. Supply Minister Lord Beaverbrook reported to the British War Cabinet that Russian resistance was giving England new opportunities. Russian resistance created "an almost revolutionary situation in all the occupied countries and opened up 2,000 miles of coastline for the landing of British troops." However, the leadership of England still considered Europe a no-go zone for British troops. The British Cabinet and the Imperial General Staff did not share Beaverbrook's views.

On December 7, 1941, the United States entered the war. They skillfully provoked Japan to attack and fell victim to a surprise attack. American public opinion, which was inclined to remain neutral, forgot about the principles of neutrality and isolationism. The US Army Headquarters began developing a strategic plan that called for the concentration of American military potential against Germany. England was to be the springboard for the invasion of northern France. The plan was discussed on April 1, 1942 at a meeting in the White House and approved by American President Franklin Roosevelt.

Roosevelt attached great political and military-strategic importance to this plan. The American president believed that it was necessary to assure Moscow of the speedy opening of a second front. This gave the support of the broad masses of the US people, who sympathized with the struggle of the USSR against the Nazi invaders, and was important in anticipating the forthcoming congressional elections at the end of 1942. From the point of view of military-strategic plans, Washington wanted to enlist the support of the USSR in the defeat of the Japanese Empire in the Pacific theater of operations. President Roosevelt and the Chiefs of Staff attached the greatest importance to the participation of the USSR in the Pacific War.

Roosevelt sent his special assistant, G. Hopkins, and the US Army Chief of Staff, General J. Marshall, to London to brief the British leadership on their plans. The British leadership agreed in principle to the landing of a limited landing of the Western Allies in 1942 and the opening of a second front in 1943. On April 11, President Roosevelt invited A. A. Gromyko, adviser to the Soviet embassy, ​​and handed him a personal message to the head of the Soviet government. Roosevelt proposed sending a Soviet delegation to Washington for negotiations to discuss the question of opening a second front.

On April 20, Stalin announced his agreement to a meeting between Molotov and the American president to exchange views on the opening of a second front. London was also supposed to take part in the negotiations. As a result of difficult and tense negotiations between Vyacheslav Molotov and the military-political leadership of the United States and Britain, a decision was made to create a second front in Europe. On June 12, it was reported that an agreement had been reached on the opening of a second front.

However, neither in 1942 nor in 1943 was the second front opened. The landing of troops in Europe in 1942 was postponed due to the advance of the American-British troops in North Africa. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on this without the participation of Soviet representatives. From a military point of view, the Allied operations in North Africa were insignificant and could not weaken the military power of Germany on the Eastern Front and lead to its defeat. In addition, the operation in North Africa, which began in November 1942, ruled out the organization of a second front in Europe and in 1943

Churchill informed Moscow of the decision. In August 1942, the head of the British government arrived in the USSR for negotiations. The personal representative of the American President Harriman also took part in them. On August 13, 1942, Stalin handed Churchill and Harriman a memorandum stating that 1942 represented the best time to open a second front. The best forces of the German Empire were fettered by battles with the Red Army. However, Churchill announced the final refusal of the United States and Britain to open a second front in Western Europe in 1942. At the same time, he assured that the front would be opened in the spring of 1943. Moscow understood the interests of the United States and Britain quite well, but decided not to aggravate the issue.

Berlin, taking advantage of the passivity of Britain and the United States, launched a powerful offensive in the summer and autumn of 1942 on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. The Wehrmacht rushed to the Volga and tried to capture the Caucasus in order to deliver a mortal blow to the USSR. If the German offensive was successful, Turkey and Japan could oppose the Soviet Union. England and the United States, at the expense of the USSR, retained their forces and resources, planning to use them at the final stage of the war in order to dictate the terms of the post-war world order.

1943 was marked by a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole. The gigantic battle on the Volga, which lasted 200 days and nights, ended with a brilliant victory for the Soviet troops. The Wehrmacht received a terrible wound. His strategic offensive failed. Germany also lost the battle for the Caucasus. The Allies in May 1943 defeated the grouping of Italo-German troops in North Africa. In the Pacific, the situation stabilized and the strategic initiative passed into the hands of the Allies (Battle of Guadalcanal). The Allies were able to focus their efforts on Europe and open a second front.

After the Battle of Stalingrad and the continued offensive of the Red Army in relation to the great Western powers to the USSR, a new factor appeared. Now they began to fear a premature, from their point of view, defeat of Germany. The task of maximally weakening the USSR in the war has not yet been realized. London and Washington began to understand that the USSR could not only hold out, but also win, sharply increase its position and weight in the world. Therefore, they decided to delay the opening of the second front so as not to weaken Germany. The policy of sabotaging the second front and exhausting the USSR acquired decisive importance in the policy of the Western powers.

“There is no doubt,” noted Soviet Ambassador M. M. Litvinov in the United States, “that the military calculations of both states (the United States and Great Britain) are based on the desire for maximum exhaustion and wear out of the forces of the Soviet Union in order to reduce its role in resolving post-war problems. They will wait for the development of hostilities on our front.

In January 1943, an Anglo-American conference was held in Casablanca, which showed that the Allies were not going to carry out any serious offensive in Europe in 1943. In fact, although this was not said directly, the opening of the second front was postponed until 1944. Churchill and Roosevelt sent a message to Moscow following the conference. It was drafted in vague terms and without giving dates or information about specific operations, expressing the hope that Germany could be brought to its knees in 1943.

On January 30, 1943, Moscow asked to be informed about specific operations and the timing of their implementation. After consultations with Roosevelt, Churchill sent an encouraging reply to Moscow, saying that the preparations for "crossing the Channel" (English Channel) were being carried out vigorously and the operation was planned for August. He also noted that due to the weather or for other reasons, it can be postponed until September, but then it will be carried out by larger forces. In fact, it was a deliberate deception. London and Washington, announcing the preparation of a landing operation in Northern France, at that time were preparing an operation in the Mediterranean theater. True, it was impossible to deceive for a long time, and in May Roosevelt informed Moscow about the postponement of the operation to 1944.

In addition, on March 30, the allies announced the decision to once again suspend the supply of military materials to the northern seaports of the USSR, speaking of the need to transfer all vehicles to the Mediterranean Sea. In anticipation of another German summer strategic offensive, the supply of military materials and equipment was stopped. So it was in 1942, the same thing happened in 1943. At the most difficult time, the allies refused to open a second front and left the USSR without the supply of weapons and materials.

On June 11, Moscow sent a message to Washington (its text was also sent to London). It pointed out that another delay in the opening of a second front "creates exceptional difficulties" for the USSR, which has been waging a hard struggle with Germany and its satellites for two years now. A further exchange of views heated up the situation even more - the Western powers had no arguments that could justify the delay in opening a second front. On June 24, Stalin sent Churchill a message in which he expressed the disappointment of the Soviet government in the allies. Stalin noted that we are talking about saving the lives of millions of lives in the occupied regions of Russia and Europe, the colossal victims of the Red Army.

The defeat of the most powerful enemy grouping on the Kursk Bulge, the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper River and their advance to the state borders of the USSR showed that the process of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War was completed. Germany and her allies were forced to move to a strategic defense. The victories of the Soviet troops in the summer - autumn of 1943 dramatically changed the entire military-political situation in Europe and the world. They showed that the USSR is capable of defeating Germany on its own, and the complete liberation of Europe from the Nazis is not far off. Fearing the entry of Soviet troops into Central and Western Europe before their own armies, the leadership of Britain and the United States stepped up the process of preparing the opening of a second front. The Anglo-Saxons were afraid to miss the time to invade Europe, capture the most important political and economic centers and strategic areas. There was a threat that the United States would not be able to dictate the terms of peace to Europe bled white by war.

In August 1943, a conference of heads of government and representatives of the command of the United States and Great Britain was held in Quebec. The final report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the Normandy operation would be the main offensive of the Anglo-American troops in 1944. The start of the operation was scheduled for May 1, 1944. This decision improved relations between the USSR and the Western powers. However, at the Moscow conference, the allies still did not provide specific data, wanting to maintain freedom of action. They only confirmed their intentions to launch an operation in northern France in the spring of 1944.

On November 19, 1943, on board the battleship Iowa, on the way to Cairo for the Anglo-American-Chinese conference (it preceded the conference in Tehran), the American president, speaking of the need to open a second front, noted that Russian troops had already come close to Poland and Bessarabia. Roosevelt pointed to the urgency of the Anglo-American occupation of as much of Europe as possible. Roosevelt gave France, Belgium, Luxembourg and South Germany into the English sphere of occupation. The Americans wanted to occupy Northwest Germany, the ports of Denmark and Norway. The Anglo-Saxons also planned to capture Berlin themselves.

Churchill also did not want to allow the appearance of Soviet troops in Western Europe and proposed the "Balkan option" - the invasion of the allied forces into the Balkans, which was supposed to cut off Soviet troops from Central Europe. In the countries of South-Eastern Europe, they were going to establish regimes with an Anglo-Saxon orientation. However, the Americans, who supported Churchill's Mediterranean strategy until mid-1943, believed that these plans were too late. Allied troops could get stuck in the Balkans, while the Soviet armies would capture the most important centers of Europe. The second front in France made it possible to prevent the Russians from entering the vital regions of the Ruhr and the Rhine.

The Soviet delegation in Tehran sought to obtain from the British and Americans a firm commitment to open a second front. In general, Stalin got his way. The "military decisions of the Tehran Conference" provided for the start of a landing operation in the North of France in May 1944. At the same time, the Allies planned to launch an operation in southern France. The USSR promised at that time to launch a decisive offensive to prevent the transfer of German troops from the Eastern Front to the Western. The decisions taken in Tehran determined the political decision to launch the Normandy operation.

Thus, the beginning of the Normandy operation was not connected with the desire to help an ally who was waging a difficult struggle with Germany and liberate Europe from Nazi occupation, but with the desire to establish an occupation regime in European countries and prevent the USSR from occupying a dominant position in the Old World. England and the USA were in a hurry to snatch the best pieces from the dying German bear.

The decision to create a second front against Nazi Germany in Western Europe during World War II was made by representatives of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain after negotiations in London and Washington in May-June 1942. At the Tehran Conference in 1943, the Western Allies pledged to open a second front in May 1944.

The second front was opened on June 6, 1944 as a result of the landing of the Anglo-American troops in Normandy - the Normandy landing operation, codenamed "Overlord" (English overlord - supreme ruler, sovereign). In terms of the scale and number of forces and equipment involved, this was the largest landing operation of the Second World War.

The operation was characterized by the achievement of secrecy in preparation and the surprise landing of a large group of troops on an unequipped coast, ensuring close cooperation between ground forces, air and naval forces during the landing and during the struggle for a bridgehead, as well as the transfer of a large number of troops through the strait zone in a short time and material resources.

The coast of Northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands was defended by the troops of the German Army Group "B" under the command of Field Marshal Evin Rommel, consisting of 528 thousand people, two thousand tanks, 6.7 thousand guns and mortars, supported by aviation consisting of 160 aircraft. Their positions were poorly prepared in terms of engineering.

The Allied expeditionary force under the command of General Dwight Eisenhower consisted of over 2.8 million people, about 10.9 thousand combat and 2.3 thousand transport aircraft, about 7 thousand ships and vessels.

These troops outnumbered the opposing group of German troops in ground forces and tanks three times, artillery - 2.2 times, aircraft - more than 60 times, warships - 2.1 times.

The plan of the Normandy landing operation provided for the landing of sea and air assault forces on the coast of the Bay of Seine and seizing a bridgehead 15-20 kilometers deep, and on the 20th day of the operation to reach the line of Avranches, Donfront, Falaise.

From the end of April 1944, Allied aviation carried out systematic raids on important enemy targets in France and during May-June disabled a large number of defensive structures, command posts, airfields, railway stations and bridges. During this period, strategic aviation delivered massive strikes against German military-industrial facilities, which sharply reduced the combat capability of German troops.

On the night of June 6, simultaneously with the passage of amphibious assault forces, allied aviation attacked artillery, resistance centers, command posts, as well as areas of concentration and rear areas of the enemy. During the night, two American airborne divisions landed northwest of Carentan and one British airborne division northeast of Caen, which quickly broke the weak resistance of the enemy and provided significant assistance to the amphibious assault in landing and seizing bridgeheads. The passage of landing detachments across the English Channel in stormy weather turned out to be unexpected for the German command, which only when they approached the shore began to put their troops on alert.

At 0630 hours on June 6, following massive air strikes and naval artillery fire preparations, the landing of allied forces on the Normandy coast began. The German troops defending it, having suffered significant losses from aviation and naval artillery fire, offered little resistance. By the end of the day, the allied forces captured five bridgeheads with a depth of two to nine kilometers. The main forces of five infantry and three airborne divisions landed on the coast of Normandy, consisting of over 156 thousand people, 900 tanks and armored vehicles, 600 guns. The German command reacted very slowly to the landing of the Allied troops and did not put forward operational reserves from the depths to disrupt it.

Having concentrated up to 12 divisions on the captured bridgeheads in three days, the Allied forces resumed the offensive on June 9 to create a single bridgehead. By the end of June 12, they occupied the coast with a length of 80 kilometers along the front and 13-18 kilometers in depth and increased the grouping of troops to 16 divisions and several armored units (equivalent to three armored divisions). By this time, the German command had pulled up three tank and motorized divisions to the bridgehead, bringing the grouping of its troops in Normandy to 12 divisions. It made an unsuccessful attempt to cut the grouping of allied troops between the Orn and Vir rivers. Lacking proper air cover, the German divisions suffered heavy losses from allied aviation and lost their combat effectiveness.

On June 12, formations of the American First Army launched an offensive from the area west of Sainte-Mere-Eglise in a western direction and on June 17 reached the western coast of the Cotentin Peninsula, captured Carteret, June 27 - Cherbourg, July 1 completely cleared the peninsula from fascist troops.

The offensive of the Anglo-Canadian troops, undertaken on June 25-26 to capture Caen, did not reach its goal. Despite the powerful fire support of aviation and artillery, they failed to overcome the resistance of the Nazis and only slightly advanced west of the city of Caen.

By June 30, the Allied bridgehead reached 100 kilometers along the front and 20-40 kilometers in depth with the Anglo-American troops stationed on it, 23 airfields were equipped for basing tactical aviation. They were opposed by 18 German divisions, which had suffered heavy losses in previous battles. The constant air strikes of the allies and French partisans on their communications limited the possibilities of the German command to transfer troops from other regions of France.

The main reason that did not allow the reinforcement of the Wehrmacht troops in the west was the offensive of the Soviet troops in Belarus.

During July, the troops of the American army, continuing to expand the bridgehead, advanced 10-15 kilometers southward and occupied the city of Saint-Lo. The British directed their main efforts to capture the city of Caen, which their troops captured on July 21.

By the end of July 24, the allies reached the Lesse line south of Saint-Lo, Caumont, Caen, creating a bridgehead about 100 kilometers along the front and up to 50 kilometers in depth.

As a result of the operation, the allied expeditionary forces, having absolute dominance in the air and at sea, seized a strategic foothold and concentrated a large number of forces and means on it for a subsequent offensive in northwestern France.

The losses of the Nazi troops amounted to 113 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, 2117 tanks and assault guns, seven submarines, 57 surface ships and combat boats, 913 aircraft.

Allied troops lost 122 thousand people, 2395 tanks, 65 surface ships and ships, 1508 aircraft. About 800 ships during the landing during the storm were washed ashore and damaged.

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