Background: Lenin "How do we organize the Rabkrin. Creation of the People's Front for Russia under Putin! Background: Lenin" How do we organize the Rabkrin How do we reorganize the Rabkrin quotes

see from 9:20
Original taken from evgeniy_kond in "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin"

This title of Lenin's article, memorable almost from childhood, is quite clear if we understand it like this - "How can we get rid of the services of Comrade S.?" Indeed: “Lenin sharply criticized the work of the People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, which “now does not enjoy a shadow of authority. nothing to ask" [" Better less is better"]. Until the middle of 1922, Stalin was at the head of the Rabkrin, and it was clear to the communists who these Leninist words were directed against."
From the book. Vadim Rogovin, "Was there an alternative?".
http://bookfi.org/dl/989847/d3e108

In general, this book is the "History of the Party" for the 1920s. in the form in which we should have studied it in due time.

But the following was news to me:

... in connection with an attempt to lift the ban on the sale of vodka and other high-grade drinks, introduced by the tsarist government after the outbreak of the First World War and maintained after the October Revolution [ In December 1919, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR adopted a resolution signed by Lenin "On the prohibition on the territory of the RSFSR of the manufacture and sale of alcohol, strong drinks and alcohol-containing substances that are not related to drinks." This decree allowed the production and sale of only grape wines with a strength of up to 12 degrees. At the beginning of 1921, it was allowed to produce alcoholic beverages with a strength of up to 14 degrees, and in December of the same year - to raise the strength of the produced drinks to 20 degrees and start beer production.]. In 1923, the issue of introducing a state vodka monopoly was submitted to the June plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). Upon learning of this, Trotsky sent a letter and a draft resolution on this issue to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, which stated that the legalization of the sale of vodka in order to replenish the budget could only have a detrimental effect on the revolution and the party.
Trotsky wrote that "an attempt to transfer the budget to an alcohol basis is an attempt to deceive history." First, such a measure will weaken the dependence of the state budget on successes in the field of economic development. Secondly, an attempt to steal people's money through the sale of alcohol will have a demoralizing effect on the working class and lower the real wages of workers.
…
... At the same time, throughout the struggle with the left opposition, Stalin stubbornly evaded answering the question about the sources of industrialization. His only "contribution" to the solution of this issue was that he proposed as a specific source of investment in the development of industry - increasing the production of state-owned vodka.
This measure was carried out by the ruling faction in a sharp struggle with Trotsky and his associates, who believed that the issue of the state sale of vodka was of tremendous importance, since it "cut into the life of the broad masses." Criticizing the "method of gradual, imperceptible introduction of state vodka" as a harmful and unacceptable measure, Trotsky refuted the judgment that this measure is a means of combating moonshine. "One of two things, either we want to have a serious income, that is, by producing expensively, we want to sell even more expensively - then the peasant will prefer moonshine; and if we want to compete with moonshine, then we will have no incentive fiscal motive."
Trotsky demanded that the issue of introducing the state sale of vodka be discussed at a party congress or conference. This proposal was rejected by the majority of the Politburo, after which the state production and sale of vodka was finally legalized by a resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of August 25, 1925. Thus began an unprecedented campaign to solder the people.

So this is who the generations of wives and children who suffered from violent-in-drunk husbands/fathers (or just bitter drunkards) should have directed their curses!

Well, about the ratio of the class and its state. device.

[At the 14th Congress] Krupskaya stressed the need to direct the increased activity of the working class towards "making our state industry socialist to the end" and criticized Molotov and Bukharin for their proposition that the state apparatus is already a broad organization of the working class. Zinoviev argued that the relations that have developed in state enterprises cannot be considered consistently socialist, since wage labor, a strict division into managers and managed, etc., are preserved there. The main argument put forward by Bukharin and other representatives of the majority against this thesis boiled down to the following: that the labor enthusiasm of the workers would be weakened if they were told that state-owned enterprises were not entirely socialist. The ideologues of the ruling faction defending the thesis about the consistently socialist nature of relations developing at state enterprises represented an important step towards the Stalinist thesis about socialism built in the USSR.

§ 5. POLITICAL blackmail of STALIN "BY ILYICH'S LETTER ON THE SECRETARY"

Chapter 3

§ 1. METAMORPHOSIS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LENIN'S "NOTES" INTO A "LETTER TO THE CONGRESS"

CHAPTER 4. V.I. LENIN - AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR

§ 1. STRENGTHENING THE DICTATORY OF THE PROLETARIAT IS THE MAIN CONDITION FOR THE VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION

§ 2. COOPERATION AS A WAY OF INVOLVING THE PEASANTS IN THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

Page 5 of 20

§ 2. LENIN'S ARTICLE "HOW WE SHOULD REORGANIZE THE RABKRIN" AT THE CENTER OF THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF THE BOLSHEVIK-LENINISTS AND TROTSKY

The second problem raised by V.I. Lenin in the "Testament" and found itself at the center of the political struggle, was the plan for the reorganization of the Central Control Commission-RCI proposed by him in the article "How We Can Reorganize the Rabkrin". During the discussion, the same front of confrontation arose as in connection with the discussion of the question of reorganizing the system of managing the national economy: Lenin and his supporters against Trotsky and his supporters. In contrast to the discussion on the State Planning Commission, this article seems to have played a special role in the appearance of those texts of the Testament, whose Leninist authorship cannot be proven.

By the end of 1922, there was a need to reorganize the top echelon of the party and state leadership in order to increase the efficiency of its work. Work on the new Rules began on the eve of the Eleventh Congress, and questions of admission to the Party were discussed at the Congress itself. In August 1922, the XII Party Conference specifically considered questions of organizational and party building. Lenin and Trotsky proposed to the 12th Congress two completely different concepts for the reorganization of the party's central organs.

IN AND. Lenin formulated and substantiated his proposals in the last two articles - "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin (Proposal to the XII Party Congress)" and "Better less, but better." Their content was disclosed above, so we will only note that they provided for the preservation of the Central Committee without structural changes, without changing the functions and correlation of the organs of the Central Committee. Strengthening the position and authority of the Central Committee of the Party was to be ensured through a profound reorganization of the Central Control Commission. Lenin proposed expanding the composition of the Central Control Commission by including workers from the machine tool and peasants from the plow, establishing the practice of their presence at meetings of the Central Committee and the Politburo, allowing them to get acquainted with all documents and participate in the preparation of questions for Politburo meetings in order to give them the skill of solving important party and public affairs, improve the efficiency of discussion and resolution of them. This was supposed, according to Lenin, to reduce friction in the Politburo and the danger of a split in the Central Committee. All this work was to be organized by the Secretariat of the Central Committee and carried out under its control. The members of the Central Control Commission had to use the knowledge gained during the inspections of the state apparatus, carried out jointly with the employees of the NC RCT. The increase in the political strength of the Central Control Commission was not achieved by diminishing the role and powers of the Central Committee of the Party, on the contrary, the reorganized Central Control Commission was supposed to strengthen the ability of the Central Committee to solve the problems facing the party and the state. This achieved the desired effect - the strengthening of the system of the central organs of the party.

For the first time, the Politburo was acquainted with these proposals of Lenin at the end of January 1923, when Lenin handed over for publication the article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin". This was the first of V.I. Lenin, included in the complex of his "Political Testament", which turned out to be at the center of Trotsky's political struggle against Lenin and his supporters. Over time, the history of the discussion in the Politburo of the issue of publishing this article became overgrown with myths and legends, which we will analyze a little later, and here we will restore this story from documents.

Members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - participants in these events - wrote in a letter to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated December 31, 1923 * that Lenin's article "was addressed by mistake or absent-mindedly to the Presidium of the Congress of Soviets, which met as once in a while in Moscow. Such an address caused bewilderment among the members of the Politburo. Familiarization with the article caused not only a lively discussion, but also a certain bewilderment about certain provisions of the article. Kuibyshev wrote that “before the meeting of the Politburo, when not all the members of the Politburo had gathered yet and the meeting had not yet opened, members of the PB gradually entered Comrade Stalin’s office one after another and briefly got acquainted with Lenin’s article, when they got acquainted with it in separate passages, on which drew the attention of this or that comrade, I personally at first got the impression that Vlad[imir] Ilyich's illness, which had intensified by that time, was reflected in the article. This impression was intensified by the nervous insistence of Comrade Lenin and the pressure on Comrade Bukharin to have the article published at all costs in tomorrow's issue and shown to him. Meanwhile, attention was drawn to certain separate passages of the article, which, taken separately, were incomprehensible and seemed strange: a split in the party, the best people's commissariat of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, a detailed determination of the number of employees of the RKI, etc. **, finally, attention was drawn to the incorrect address of the article . Particularly striking were the passages about the split, since they did not correspond to the then specific relations within the Central Committee and the Politburo. The reprint of Ilyich's article went from hand to hand, separate remarks were heard (I remember, for example, Comrade Trotsky's remark - "why is the NKID the best people's commissar?"). Volatile comments and suggestions were made. In this nervous situation, which was created due to fears for Ilyich’s health, I repeat, who had not really read the article as a whole, the thought flashed through me: “If Ilyich is ill and this illness is reflected in the article, and if it is necessary for Ilyich to show this article printed, then why not dial a special number for Pravda?" I expressed this idea. But these were flying thoughts aloud. I immediately abandoned this idea. I didn’t repeat it again, I didn’t insist on discussing it. ” “Not everything was still clear (and for whom was Ilyich’s article immediately clear?), Much did not immediately fit in the mind.” After reading the article at a meeting of the Politburo, Kuibyshev wrote, “there was no sound no one votes against publication neither from the members of the Politburo, nor from the other present. The only question discussed was when to publish and in what form: an editorial or a regular article, whether to accompany Lenin's article with an explanation of how the phrase about a possible split in the party should be interpreted; if such an article is published, is it possible to be in time for tomorrow's issue, is it possible to postpone the publication of Comrade Lenin's article in connection with this; how to notify local organizations so that there is no false interpretation of Ilyich's phrase about the split - these are approximately the questions around which the discussion revolved. It was decided to publish the article immediately, and to notify local organizations by a special letter signed by all members of the Politburo that the Politburo was unanimous on all major issues and that the practice of the work of the PB did not give any grounds for concern for the unity of the party.

Stalin, speaking on October 26, 1923 at a meeting of the joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the RCP (b) about the discussion of the issue of Lenin's article, admitted that the members of the Politburo "hesitated whether to print Lenin's article on the Rabkrin", because in it "in 3- In places there was a mention of the danger of a split. They were afraid that the party would not be disorganized.” Regarding the question of whether to publish the article or not, here “there was not even a shadow of disagreement in the PB. We found a way out: to send out to the provincial committees simultaneously with the article a notice from all members of the PB that there is no shadow of a split. The same, but in a more expanded form, Stalin repeated in his response to the request of the party conference of the Khamovnichesky district, emphasizing that "the Politburo unanimously decided to publish an article about the Workers' Committee without delay", dwelling in more detail on explaining the causes of anxiety about the "integrity of the Central Committee" and on the search for measures capable of preventing "anxiety in the party".

Such surprise is understandable. The danger of a split is not an ordinary danger. She speaks of a deep crisis in the party. But there was no indication of such a crisis or the threat of its growth in the article. On the contrary, it expressed confidence in the successful solution of all the problems facing the country. Trotsky was also struck by the thesis about the threat of a split, otherwise he would not have agreed to sign a letter disavowing this provision of the article, all the more so to take responsibility for preparing a draft letter from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) “To Gubernia and Regional Committees of the Party”, in which, in particular , it was said: “Some comrades drew the attention of the Politburo to the fact that this article by Comrade. Lenin can be interpreted by the comrades in the localities in the sense that the internal life of the Central Committee of late has revealed some sort of inclination towards a split, and this is precisely what prompted Comrade. Lenin to put forward the organizational proposals set out in his article ... comrade. Lenin does not take part in the meetings of the Politburo and they do not even send him - again in strict accordance with the instructions of the doctors - the protocols of the Politburo and the Orgburo. “Already these external conditions for writing the article “How can we reorganize the Rabkrin” testify that the proposals contained in this article were inspired not by any complications within the Central Committee, but by the general considerations of Comrade. Lenin about the difficulties that still lie ahead for the party in the coming era ... there are absolutely no circumstances in the internal work of the Central Committee that would give any grounds for fearing a split.

Trotsky reacted negatively to Lenin's fundamental proposals, he believed that "the party is too merging with the state", "control] commissions [are] taking over party political functions." As you can see, his objections were directed against that most important general political position - about the expediency of a certain combination, the merging of party institutions with state ones, which was the starting point for Lenin.

At the same time, the question arose of improving the work of the Central Committee of the Party itself. On January 25, 1923, at a meeting of the Politburo, Trotsky proposed to streamline the work of the Central Committee and its bodies. Perhaps his proposals were connected with the discussion of Lenin's proposals contained in the article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin". The Politburo decided: “To instruct the Secretariat of the Central Committee to collect and systematize all the already existing resolutions concerning the exact distribution of the functions of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat, and also to submit to the Politburo their proposals for a more correct distribution of them.”

On January 29, 1923, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) presented its proposals on the distribution of functions between the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). It was proposed to increase the composition of the Central Committee to 50 people at the expense of "comrades who have come forward in practical party and economic work, mainly workers (directors, leaders of regional organizations, the most authoritative members of national communist parties, etc.)" "to ensure strong ties with localities", for " the formation of new cadres of political leaders from among the still inexperienced, but sufficiently advanced comrades. These proposals meant that the Leninist idea of expanding the Central Committee in order to strengthen its connection with the masses and increase its ability to conduct effective leadership in socio-economic construction was accepted.

On February 2, 1923, the Politburo considered the question "On Regulatory Bodies" and, since responses to Lenin's article on the Workers' Peasants' Committee were expected, decided to "postpone this issue for the next meeting." During the discussion, an agreement was reached "not to make any separate proposals on this acute issue, but to try to come to an agreement by exchanging views at each meeting." But Zinoviev, violating this agreement, bypassing the Politburo introduced his theses on party building for the February (1923) Plenum of the Central Committee. Trotsky made a formal protest and sent his proposals for the reorganization of the Central Committee, in all points opposing both the proposals of Lenin, known from the article "How can we reorganize the Rabkrin", and the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Trotsky suggested: “The Central Committee must retain its strict formality and ability to make quick decisions. Therefore, further expansion of it does not make sense. It would introduce only a certain additional number of tsentroviks (mainly "governor generals") into the Central Committee, thus increasing very little contact with the masses. Meanwhile, the expansion of the composition of the Central Committee and the establishment of new, more complex relations between the Politburo and the plenum threatens to cause extreme damage to the accuracy and correctness of the work of the Central Committee. Based on these general considerations, Trotsky proposed reduce, not expand the Central Committee of the party and organize it as follows: “The Central Committee is being created as part of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat, with a small, perhaps additional, number of members or candidates. Thus, the Central Committee, as such, is somewhat reduced in comparison with the current one, and, in any case, does not expand.

According to Trotsky's version, the Party's Central Committee does not choose its leading bodies from among its members, but is "composed" of them. Trotsky did not explain how he thought about the process of forming the Central Committee, but according to the meaning of the phrase, the organs of the Central Committee were to be formed not by the Plenum of the Central Committee, but by the Party Congress. According to the Charter of the party, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was elected by the congress and then he himself formed the bodies necessary for its work, in particular, the formation of the secretariat and the appointment of the general secretary were also the prerogative of the Plenum of the Central Committee.

In the existing system, Trotsky's ability to seize the Central Committee of the party was severely limited, since, unlike the congress delegates, the members of the Central Committee knew better not only the visible, but also the hidden part of the struggle. At the congress, however, it was possible to take advantage of the insufficient awareness of the majority of its delegates, to try to influence their opinion****. Trotsky's proposals were aimed at conquering the Central Committee without creating a formal faction, thus circumventing the decision of the 10th Party Congress to ban factions and groups: to change the internal structure and composition of the Central Committee, to increase the number of its supporters in it, to place them in key positions in the leading bodies of the Central Committee . Trotsky's political interest can be seen without difficulty if we evaluate his proposals in the context of the struggle that he waged in 1921-1927.

We have arrived at a position important for our topic: only if individual organs of the Central Committee, including its Secretariat, are formed by the Party Congress, it would make sense to address the Party Congress with a proposal to resolve the personal issue of the General Secretary.

That is, one of the central passages of the Letter to the Congress, without being supported by Lenin's political legacy, turns out to be directly connected with Trotsky's proposals for the reorganization of the Central Committee! For Lenin, who completed on January 23, 1923, the article “How do we reorganize the Rabkrin”, the problem of warning the party congress about the inadmissibility of electing Stalin as general secretary or about “moving” him from this position congress just didn't exist. This demand contradicts the thoughts that he developed in his last works, but it is organically inscribed in the scheme that Trotsky proposed to the Twelfth Congress. Lenin strove to strengthen the position of the Central Committee in the Party and to enhance its role. Trotsky came up with a directly opposite proposal - to create, along with the Central Committee of the RCP (b), a Party Council. He was to be elected by the party congress from members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and members of the Central Control Commission of the party, as well as two to three dozen representatives of regional committees and local party organizations. The Party Council was to issue directives to the Party Central Committee and supervise its activities. This proposal was assessed as an attempt to introduce a "two-center" in the party and inevitably led to a belittling of the role and importance of the party's Central Committee and its bodies (the Politburo, the Orgburo, the Secretariat).

Politically, Trotsky's interest in such a reorganization (obviously opposed to Lenin's plan) is easily explained. The dual-centric approach allowed Trotsky and his supporters to create a foothold outside the Central Committee to continue the struggle against the Central Committee in the event that they failed to carry out their scheme of reorganizing the Central Committee and win a majority in it. Trotsky's proposal also showed an attempt to revive those organizational forms that the Bolshevik Party had long abandoned as inconsistent with the character and spirit of the revolutionary Marxist Party. It is not surprising that at that time Trotsky was spoken of as a half-Menshevik, a non-Bolshevik*****.

The political meaning of Trotsky's proposal was to prevent the strengthening of the ties between the Central Committee and party, state and economic bodies. Lenin, on the other hand, wanted to strengthen these ties. There is an obvious difference not only in positions, but also in approaches to the problem of building the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat in its most important part.

However, Trotsky was already on the beaten path, he was not a pioneer in this matter. Even at the XI Party Congress, opponents of Lenin D.B. Ryazanov and V.E. Tsifrinovich expressed the idea of giving the Central Control Commission the functions of control over the Central Committee on behalf of the Party Congress. Then, too, it was actually about creating a two-center in the party. To these proposals, which frankly smacked of Menshevism and were aimed at weakening the Central Committee, Lenin opposed the line of strengthening the Central Committee, which was achieved primarily by strengthening its Secretariat, introducing the post of general secretary and placing Stalin in it.

Now Lenin proposed taking one more step in this direction - by increasing the efficiency of the work of the Central Committee and by reorganizing the Central Control Commission, as well as by a certain merging of the Central Control Commission with the RKI.

February (1923) Plenum of the Central Committee, according to K.E. Voroshilov, passed under the sign of a sharp struggle between the majority of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and Trotsky. The results of the voting testify to the severity of the struggle. "For" the proposal of Zinoviev: "the project of reorganization and improvement of the work of the central institutions of the party to take as a basis" was voted by 20 people and 5 - "against". "For" the expansion of the composition of the Central Committee - 17, "against" - 7, "abstained" - 1. An insignificant majority - 13 people - voted for the establishment of the number of the Central Committee at 35 people. 20 voted in favor of maintaining and expanding the Central Control Commission, 5 were against. The question of the number of members of the Central Control Commission and all other amendments were submitted to the commission, which included Zinoviev, Stalin, Trotsky, Tomsky, Frunze, Rudzutak, Solts and Molotov. She was also entrusted with the final development of the theses and the report to the Plenum of the Central Committee. It was decided: “The theses should not be published until the preliminary communication of their comrade. Lenin. If the latter demands a revision of the issue, convene an emergency Plenum”*****. This document entered the Lenin secretariat, but due to poor health, Lenin was not acquainted with it.

Rebuffed, Trotsky disavowed his proposal, stating that it had been misunderstood, and attempted to present it as in line with Lenin's ideas of enhancing the role of the Central Control Commission and developing it. This was a hopeless undertaking, since in Lenin's proposals for the reorganization of the Central Control Commission there was no hint of limiting the tasks and functions of the Central Committee. As soon as Trotsky retreated, the members of the Central Committee accepted Trotsky's explanation, and the "misunderstanding" was over. Later, Trotsky repeatedly referred to this, trying to justify the inconsistency of the reproach for striving to establish a dual center in the party. This is not true, and Trotsky knew very well that on the part of the Central Committee this statement was only a tactical move, that the members of the Politburo confirmed their assessment of Trotsky's proposal as an attempt to establish a two-center approach in the party in a letter to the Central Committee dated December 31, 1923, evaluating it as anti-Leninist in its own way. essence.

The February (1923) Plenum of the Central Committee decided to make the organizational issue an independent item on the agenda of the XII Party Congress and approved, with some amendments, the theses prepared by the Central Committee on improving the work of the central organs of the party, which not only took into account Lenin's proposals, but also went beyond them.

After Lenin's third stroke, which put an end to his political activities, Trotsky not only opened up new prospects in the struggle for leadership in the party, but also the opportunity to use Lenin's authority to conduct it. On March 22, the Politburo considered the issue of reorganizing and improving the central institutions of the party," and the next day, Trotsky sent a letter to the Politburo in which he raised (among others) the shortcomings of party work: "Acute questions of intra-party life (principled and organizational conflicts within the organization) remained completely out of sight of the Politburo as an institution. In general, the internal questions of party life partly returned to the Politburo after a year's absence as a result of Comrade Lenin's well-known article on the Rabkrin.

This statement is not true: between the Politburo and the Orgburo and the Secretariat, as organs of the Central Committee, there was a division of labor: the bulk of issues of party building and party life went through the Orgburo and the Secretariat. All questions of inner-party life, if they did not receive permission from the Secretariat or the Orgburo, were transferred to the Politburo. The fundamental questions of the party's policy were decided in the Politburo. In total, in the period between the XI and XII congresses, the Politburo considered 1322 issues, including those related to personal appointments in the party - 20 (1.5%) and intra-party - 113 (8.5%), and in total - 133, which will amount to 10 %. If we also take into account the issues indicated as “organizational” (54, i.e. 4.1%), “agitation and propaganda” (92, i.e. 6.9%), which, if not completely, then to a large extent parts related to party building and party activities, the total number of internal party issues will reach 259 (21%). Trotsky could not have been unaware of this. He deliberately exaggerated the colors.

The new attack on the party and its leadership did nothing for Trotsky. His proposals were not accepted, Lenin's proposals on increasing the size of the Central Committee and reorganizing the Central Control Commission were taken as a basis. On April 5, the Politburo adopted the theses “On the reorganization and improvement of the central institutions of the party”, prepared by Zinoviev on behalf of the Politburo of March 30, 1923. The final formulation of these theses was entrusted to Stalin, Molotov and Zinoviev, after which “in the absence of disagreements”, it was decided to publish them "as approved by the Central Committee."

The 12th Congress considered a proposal on the reorganization of the central authorities prepared by the Party Central Committee. Trotsky no longer submitted his proposals to reduce the Central Committee of the Party for discussion at the congress. The decisions adopted by the Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b) were based on Lenin's proposals, which were seriously corrected, however, in a number of important issues. The composition of the Central Committee was increased to 40 members and 15-20 candidates (at Stalin's suggestion) at the expense of mainly "local workers, especially workers who are most connected with the proletarian masses", with the involvement of "practical administrators and students of higher educational institutions." The Central Control Commission was created from 50 members - "mainly from workers and peasants, with the most serious party experience and suitable for party control and Soviet control work." Its main task was defined as "work to ensure in all respects the party line in the activities of all Soviet bodies." Its Presidium was composed of those members who met the requirements for members of the Central Committee. It was they who received the right to participate in the work of the Central Committee. The presence of members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission was allowed at the Plenums of the Central Committee, and at meetings of the Politburo and the Organizing Bureau of three permanent representatives from the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. They could get acquainted with the materials coming to them, but they did not receive any rights in the matter of preparing their meetings. On the contrary, the Central Control Commission submitted all its proposals to the Central Committee for their discussion, and the decisions of the All-Russian Conference of Control Commissions were subject to approval by the Central Committee of the Party. It was allowed to combine membership in the Central Control Commission and the status of a candidate member of the Central Committee. At the first Plenum of the new Central Committee of the RCP(b) the question of "representation of the Central Committee in the Central Control Commission" was also considered. This significantly changed the balance of relations between the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in comparison with the scheme outlined in Lenin's articles on the reorganization of the Central Control Commission and the Central Control Commission, but did not contradict the main idea - increasing the role and authority of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, and corresponded to the principle scheme for building the central organs of the party, adopted by the congress. The plenum decided “to approve the representatives of the Central Committee in the Central Control Commission, vols. Stalin, Zinoviev, Dzerzhinsky, Zelensky and Molotov. It is enough to compare the representation of the Central Control Commission in the Central Committee and the representation of the Central Committee in the Central Control Commission to understand that the political strengthening of the Central Control Commission in no way diminished the possibilities of the Central Committee of the Party and its position in the system of central organs of the Party remained dominant. This was in line with the spirit of Lenin's proposals.

Similar decisions, going, on the one hand, in line with Lenin's proposals made by him in his last letters and articles, and, on the other hand, running counter to Trotsky's proposals, were also adopted with regard to the reorganization of the Central Control Commission-RKI. Consequently, the congress supported Lenin's proposal to unite, merge the party and state apparatuses.

The pre-Congress discussion and decisions of the XII Party Congress testify that the political positions of Lenin and his supporters in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the party, on the one hand, and Trotsky, on the other, diverged more and more at that time. It is noteworthy that in the course of this discussion, Trotsky used Lenin's article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin" as a weapon in the fight against Lenin's supporters in the Politburo. Who knows, maybe it was precisely the circumstances of the discussion of the article “How can we reorganize the Rabkrin” and the discussion around it that gave rise to the idea of using in this struggle texts whose authorship can be attributed to Lenin.

* This letter was signed by Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kalinin, Kamenev, Molotov, Rudzutak, Rykov, Stalin, Tomsky (News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. P. 218).

** The scheme proposed by Lenin assumes that a worker or peasant member of the Central Control Commission will be able to really control the decisions taken by the Central Committee. In other words, he must understand the most complex practical and theoretical problems, in matters of economics, politics, finance, judge the disagreements of people who are much more knowledgeable and experienced in these matters, more informed. The validity of such an assumption is not obvious. It is not clear why they can do what the members of the Central Committee failed to ensure - "to achieve ... the strictest correctness of the matter," why they are guaranteed not to be included in the intra-party struggle on the side of one of the parties or as an independent force.

*** More precisely, they were sent to his secretariat, but not handed over personally.

**** This is exactly what Trotsky was doing on the eve of the Twelfth Party Congress, raising the question of Lenin's article on the national question, and before the Thirteenth Congress - the question of the General Secretary and the dangers posed by the old composition of the Central Committee, the old Bolsheviks, the old generation of the party, etc. .

***** Some historians interpret Trotsky's proposals as aimed at supporting Lenin's proposals and fully consistent with them. For example, V.I. Startsev, referring to such issues as the expansion of the Central Committee, the question of the General Secretary, the reorganization of the Central Control Commission-RKI, wrote: “It is impossible not to see that in these months, February and March 1923, Trotsky tried to help Lenin in defending his point view on a number of issues of internal party policy" ( Startsev V.I. Political leaders of the Soviet state in 1922 - early 1923 // History of the USSR. 1988. No. 5. P. 121).

****** This provision, as well as a similar formulation of the question in relation to the theses on the national question (“The theses should not be published, informing Comrade Lenin (with the permission of the doctors). If Comrade Lenin demands a revision of the theses, convene an emergency Plenum”) speaks, firstly, against the "blockade of Lenin", etc., and, secondly, about the preservation of the authority that he enjoyed before.

Notes:

Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 383-388.

News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 215.

News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 11. S. 189.

There. pp. 188-189.

There. 1990. No. 10. S. 185.

There. 1989. No. 11. S. 190, 192.

There. pp. 179-180.

Trotsky archive. T. 1. S. 20.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 331. L. 2.

Trotsky archive. T. 1. S. 19-20.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op.3. D. 333. L. 1.

Trotsky archive. T. 1. S. 30, 31.

Cm.: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 600.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 109. L. 4.

There. D. 88. L. 2.

News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 215; see also: News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 11. S. 182.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 94. L. 1.

There. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 412. L. 111.

Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stenographer. report. pp. 43-44.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 346. L. 2.

Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 218–219, 234–235.

CPSU in resolutions... Ed. 9th. T. 3. M., 1984. S. 91, 94–96.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 98. L. 2.

CPSU in resolutions ... T. 2. S. 89-92.

(PROPOSAL TO THE XII CONGRESS OF THE PARTY)216

Undoubtedly, the Rabkrin presents an enormous difficulty for us, and that this difficulty has not yet been resolved. I think that those comrades who solve it by denying the usefulness or necessity of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee are wrong. But I do not deny at the same time that the question of our state apparatus and its improvement seems to be a very difficult, far from solved, and at the same time an extremely urgent question.

Our state apparatus, with the exception of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, is to the greatest extent a relic of the old, least of which has been subjected to any serious changes. It is only slightly touched up on top, and in other respects it is the most typical old of our old state apparatus. And so, in order to look for a way to really update it, we must turn, it seems to me, for experience to our civil war.

How did we act in the more dangerous moments of the civil war?

We concentrated our best party forces in the Red Army; we resorted to mobilizing the best of our workers; we looked for new strength to where the deepest root of our dictatorship lies.

In the same direction, we should, in my opinion, look for the source of the reorganization of the Rabkrin. I propose to our Twelfth Party Congress to adopt

384 V. I. LENIN

the next plan for such a reorganization, based on a kind of expansion of our Central Control Commission.

The plenary session of the Central Committee of our Party has already revealed its desire to develop into a sort of supreme Party conference. It meets on average no more than once every two months, and the current work on behalf of the Central Committee is carried out, as you know, by our Politburo, our Orgburo, our Secretariat, etc. I think that we should complete the path we are taking in this way. joined, and finally turn the plenums of the Central Committee into the highest party conferences, convened every two months with the participation of the Central Control Commission. And this Central Control Commission should be connected under the conditions indicated below with the main part of the reorganized Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

I propose that the congress elect 75 to 100 (all figures, of course, approximate) new members of the Central Control Commission from among the workers and peasants. Those who are elected must be subjected to the same Party scrutiny as ordinary members of the Central Committee, for those who are elected will have to enjoy all the rights of members of the Central Committee.

On the other hand, Rab krin should be reduced to 300-400 employees, especially checked in terms of conscientiousness and in terms of knowledge of our state apparatus, and also who have passed a special test regarding their familiarity with the basics of the scientific organization of labor in general and, in particular, managerial, clerical work etc.

In my opinion, such a combination of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee with the Central Control Commission will be of benefit to both of these institutions. On the one hand, Rabkrin will gain such high prestige in this way that it will become at least as good as our NKID. On the other hand, our Central Committee, together with the Central Control Commission, will definitively set out on that road of transformation into the highest Party conference, which it has, in essence, already embarked on and along which it must go to the end in order to fulfill its tasks correctly, in two respects: planned, expedient and systematic in its organization and work, and in connection with the truly broad masses through the best of our workers and peasants.

HOW WE REORGANIZE RABKRIN 385

I foresee one objection, coming either directly or indirectly from those spheres that make our apparatus old, i.e., from those who advocate keeping our apparatus in the same impossibly, obscenely pre-revolutionary form in which it remains to this day (by the way, , we now have a rather rare case in history to fix the deadlines necessary for the production of fundamental social changes, and we now clearly see what can be done in five years and what much longer terms are needed for).

This objection consists in the fact that, as if from the transformation I propose, only chaos will result. Members of the Central Control Commission will wander around all the institutions, not knowing where, why and to whom they should turn, introducing disorganization everywhere, tearing employees away from their current work, etc., etc.

I think that the malicious source of this objection is so obvious that it does not even require an answer. It goes without saying that on the part of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and on the part of the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee and his collegium (as well as, in appropriate cases, on the part of our Secretariat of the Central Committee), more than one year of hard work will be required to properly organize our People's Commissariat and its work together with CCC. The People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, in my opinion, can remain (and should remain) a People's Commissar, like the entire Collegium, while retaining leadership of the work of the entire Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, including all members of the Central Control Commission, who will be considered "seconded" to his disposal. The 300-400 employees of the Workers' Committee who remain, according to my plan, will, on the one hand, perform purely secretarial duties to other members of the Workers' Committee and to additional members of the Central Control Commission, and on the other hand, they must be highly qualified, especially checked, especially reliable, with high salaries, completely relieving them of their current, truly unfortunate (not to say worse), position of an official of the Rabkrin.

I am sure that reducing the number of employees to the figure I have indicated will improve the quality many times over.

386 V. I. LENIN

workers of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee, and the quality of all work, while at the same time giving the people's commissar and members of the collegium the opportunity to concentrate entirely on the organization of work and on that systematic, steady improvement in its quality, which is such an unconditional necessity for the worker-peasant government and for our Soviet system.

On the other hand, I also think that the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee will have to work on, partly, merging, partly, coordinating those higher institutions for the organization of labor (the Central Institute of Labor, the Institute for the Scientific Organization of Labor, etc.), which we now have in the republic is not less than 12. Excessive monotony and the resulting desire for merger will be harmful. On the contrary, here it is necessary to find a reasonable and expedient medium between the merging of all these institutions together and their correct differentiation, provided that each of these institutions is known to be independent.

There is no doubt that no less than Rabkrin will benefit from such a transformation, and our own Central Committee will benefit both in terms of connection with the masses and in terms of the regularity and solidity of its work. Then it will be possible (and should) introduce a more rigorous and responsible procedure for preparing Politburo meetings, which must be attended by a certain number of members of the Central Control Commission - determined either by a certain period of time or by a known plan of organization.

The People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee, together with the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, will have to establish the distribution of the work of its members from the point of view of their obligation to attend the Politburo and check all the documents that one way or another go to its consideration, or from the point of view of their obligation to devote their working time to theoretical training, the study of scientific organization of labor, or from the point of view of their obligation to practically participate in the control and improvement of our state apparatus, starting with the highest state institutions and ending with the lowest local ones, etc.

HOW WE REORGANIZE RABKRIN 387

I also think that in addition to the political advantage that the members of the Central Committee and the members of the Central Control Commission under such a reform will be many times better informed, better prepared for the meetings of the Politburo (all papers relating to these meetings must be received by all members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission no later than as a day before a meeting of the Politburo, with the exception of cases that absolutely brook no delay, which cases require a special procedure for familiarizing the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission and the procedure for solving them), one of the gains will also include the fact that our Central Committee will have less influence purely personal and accidental circumstances, and thereby reduce the danger of a split.

Our Central Committee has formed itself into a strictly centralized and highly authoritative group, but the work of this group has not been placed in conditions corresponding to its authority. The reform I propose should help this, and the members of the Central Control Commission, who are obliged to be present in a certain number at each meeting of the Politburo, must form a close-knit group, which, "regardless of persons," will have to see to it that no one's authority, neither the general secretary, nor anyone - any of the other members of the Central Committee could not prevent them from making an inquiry, checking documents and, in general, achieving unconditional awareness and the strictest correctness of affairs.

Of course, in our Soviet Republic the social system is based on cooperation between two classes: workers and peasants, to which the "Nepmen", that is, the bourgeoisie, are now admitted under certain conditions. If serious class differences arise between these classes, then a split will be inevitable, but in our social system there are no necessary grounds for the inevitability of such a split, and the main task of our Central Committee and Central Control Commission, as well as our Party as a whole, is to closely monitor circumstances from which a split may flow, and forestall them, for in the final analysis the fate of our republic will depend on whether the mass of the peasantry will go with the working class, remaining faithful to its alliance with it, or whether it will give to the "Nepmen", i.e., new bourgeoisie,

388 V. I. LENIN

to separate oneself from the workers, to split oneself with them. The more clearly we see this twofold outcome before us, the more clearly all our workers and peasants understand it, the greater the chance that we will be able to avoid a split that would be fatal to the Soviet Republic.

Signature: Η. Lenin

Published according to the record of the secretary (typewritten copy), verified with the text of the newspaper

The Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Rabkrin, RKI) is a system of authorities that dealt with issues of state control. The system was headed by the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (NK RKI).

Created in 1920, disbanded on February 11, 1934. Since 1923, he acted jointly with the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks as a single Soviet-party body, while the People's Commissar of the RCT concurrently headed the Central Control Commission.

On February 7, 1920, the People's Commissariat of State Control was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (NKRKI, Rabkrin), headed by I.V. Stalin. He remained in this position until 1922.
In the first years after its creation, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate carried out financial audits (including preliminary ones, based on spending plans).

Since 1922, Rabkrin has also been engaged in the so-called "normalization" of labor, what was later called the NOT - the scientific organization of labor: controllers and inspectors checked the efficiency of the work of various departments and contributed to the introduction of innovations in all sectors.

Immediately after its creation in 1920, Rabkrin began to grow and develop intensively. A fuel inspection (August 1921) and an inspection of foreign relations (February 1921) were organized within the People's Commissariat, and a legal department and a normalization department were created (March 1922).

On April 30, 1923, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, V. V. Kuibyshev (1923-1926; 1934-1935) was appointed People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Under his leadership, the Regulations on the People's Commissariat of the RCT of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR were developed and approved on November 12, 1923.

At the All-Union Conference of the leaders of the RCT and representatives of the Control Commissions of the RCP (b), held on February 3-4, 1924 in Moscow, it was decided to gradually merge the party (CCK) and state (RCI) control bodies, coordinate their work at the first stage, and in further, unification in one body.

In November 1926, G. K. Ordzhonikidze (1926-1930) was appointed head of the Rabkrin. The main change in the work of the inspection was the transition from sectoral segmentation of work to a territorial one.

Fundamentally, the functions of the Rabkrin changed after the adoption on May 4, 1927 of the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the expansion of the rights of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate." In particular, the Rabkrin was allowed to make decisions on the imposition of disciplinary sanctions, as well as the removal and dismissal of officials for mismanagement, bureaucracy and red tape, and the elimination of unnecessary divisions and representative offices.

Lenin (Ulyanov) Vladimir Ilyich

How can we reorganize the Rabkrin

(proposal to the XII Party Congress)

How did we act in the more dangerous moments of the civil war?

We concentrated our best party forces in the Red Army; we resorted to mobilizing the best of our workers; we looked for new strength to where the deepest root of our dictatorship lies.

In the same direction, we should, in my opinion, look for the source of the reorganization of the Rabkrin. I propose to our Twelfth Party Congress to adopt the following plan for such a reorganization, based on a kind of expansion of our Central Control Commission.

The plenary session of the Central Committee of our Party has already revealed its desire to develop into a sort of supreme Party conference. It meets on average no more than once every two months, and current work on behalf of the Central Committee is carried out, as you know, by our Politburo, our Organizing Bureau, our Secretariat, and so on. I think that we should complete the path we have thus embarked upon and definitively transform the plenums of the Central Committee into higher Party conferences, convened once every two months with the participation of the Central Control Commission. And this Central Control Commission should be connected under the conditions indicated below with the main part of the reorganized Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

On the other hand, the Rabkrin should be reduced to 300-400 employees who have been specially tested in terms of conscientiousness and in terms of knowledge of our state apparatus, as well as who have passed a special test regarding their familiarity with the basics of the scientific organization of labor in general and, in particular, managerial, clerical and etc.

I foresee one objection, coming either directly or indirectly from those spheres which make our apparatus old, i.e. from supporters of preserving our apparatus in the same impossibly, obscenely pre-revolutionary form in which it remains to this day (by the way, we have now received a rather rare opportunity in history to set the deadlines necessary for the implementation of fundamental social changes, and we now clearly see what can be done in five years and for which much longer periods are needed).

I think that the malicious source of this objection is so obvious that it does not even require an answer. It goes without saying that on the part of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and on the part of the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee and his collegium (as well as, in appropriate cases, on the part of our Secretariat of the Central Committee), more than one year of hard work will be required to properly organize our People's Commissariat and its work together with CCC. The People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, in my opinion, can remain a People's Commissar (and should remain one), like the entire collegium, retaining the leadership of the work of the entire Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, including all members of the Central Control Commission, who will be considered "seconded" to his disposal. The 300-400 employees of the Workers' Committee who remain, according to my plan, will, on the one hand, perform purely secretarial duties to other members of the Workers' Committee and to additional members of the Central Control Commission, and on the other hand, they must be highly qualified, especially checked, especially reliable, with high salaries, completely relieving them of their current, truly unfortunate (not to say worse), position of an official of the Rabkrin.

I am sure that lowering the number of employees to the figure I have indicated will improve the quality of the workers of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee many times over, and the quality of all work, while at the same time enabling the people's commissar and members of the collegium to concentrate entirely on the organization of work and on that systematic, steady improvement in its quality. which is such an absolute necessity for the workers' and peasants' power and for our Soviet system.

On the other hand, I also think that the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee will have to work on, partly, merging, partly, coordinating those higher institutions for the organization of labor (the Central Institute of Labor, the Institute for the Scientific Organization of Labor, etc.), which we now have in the republic is at least 12. Excessive monotony and the resulting desire for merger will be harmful. On the contrary, here it is necessary to find a reasonable and expedient medium between the merging of all these institutions together and their correct differentiation, provided that each of these institutions is known to be independent.

There is no doubt that the Rabkrin and our own Central Committee will benefit from such a transformation no less than the Rabkrin and our own Central Committee, it will benefit both in terms of connection with the masses and in terms of the regularity and solidity of its work. Then it will be possible (and should) introduce a more rigorous and responsible procedure for preparing Politburo meetings, which must be attended by a certain number of members of the Central Control Commission - determined either by a certain period of time or by a known plan of organization.

Our Central Committee has formed itself into a strictly centralized and highly authoritative group, but the work of this group has not been placed in conditions corresponding to its authority. The reform I propose should help this, and the members of the Central Control Commission, who are obliged to be present in a certain number at each meeting of the Politburo, must form a close-knit group, which, "regardless of persons," will have to see to it that no one's authority, neither the General Secretary, nor anyone - or from other members of the Central Committee, could not prevent them from making an inquiry, checking documents, and generally achieving unconditional awareness and the strictest correctness of affairs.

Of course, in our Soviet Republic the social system is based on the cooperation of two classes: workers and peasants, to which the "Nepmen" are now admitted under certain conditions, i.e. bourgeoisie. If serious class differences arise between these classes, then a split will be inevitable, but in our social system there are no necessary grounds for the inevitability of such a split, and the main task of our Central Committee and Central Control Commission, as well as our Party as a whole, is to closely monitor circumstances from which a split may flow, and forestall them, for in the final analysis the fate of our republic will depend on whether the mass of the peasantry will go with the working class, remaining faithful to its alliance with it, or whether it will give to the "Nepmen", i.e. new bourgeoisie, to separate itself from the workers, to split itself with them. The more clearly we see this twofold outcome before us, the more clearly all our workers and peasants understand it, the greater the chance that we will be able to avoid a split that would be fatal to the Soviet Republic.

Signature: Η. Lenin

Printed according to the record of the secretary (typewritten copy),

matched with the text of the newspaper

IN AND. Lenin, PSS, 5th edition, vol. 45, pp. 383-388

“How can we reorganize the Rabkrin” - an article by V. I. Lenin, in order to fight against bureaucracy and the danger of a split in the party, proposes to establish a close organizational connection between the leading bodies of state (Workers 'and Peasants' Inspectorate) and party (Central Control Commission) control. Written on January 23, 1923, on the eve of the XII Party Congress. First published in the Pravda newspaper on January 25, 1923 in No. 16.
The work is directly related to the "Letter to the Congress" and continues his ideas. It contains proposals for the unification of the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate and for vesting the joint body with broad powers in order to minimize and reduce the cost of the state apparatus. In his work, Lenin proposes the following changes:
The members of the Central Control Commission, who are obliged to be present in a certain number at each meeting of the Politburo, must form a close-knit group, which, “regardless of persons”, will have to ensure that no authority, neither the General Secretary, nor any of the other members of the Central Committee, can prevent them from making an inquiry, checking documents, and generally achieving unconditional knowledge and the strictest correctness of affairs.
At the same time, Lenin attached fundamental importance to the inclusion of ordinary workers and peasants in the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in order to improve the situation in the party, reduce the danger of a split and bureaucratization of the apparatus.
At the XII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the issue of the Rabkrin was not included in the agenda and was hardly discussed. The Central Control Commission, with the powers outlined by Lenin, was not created and did not become an organ equal in rights to the Central Committee.

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