R. I. Sementkovsky

E. F. Kankrin

His life and state activity

Biographical sketch

FROM portrait of Kankrin, engraved in St. Petersburg by K. Adt

“The Pharisee thanks God that he has more than others and is satisfied with this, but my heart bleeds: there are still slaves, serfs, Irish peasants, English factory workers and proletarians more or less everywhere ... I did what I could."

Introduction

Count Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin is recognized as the most remarkable of the Russian finance ministers. He did not acquire this fame for nothing. It is enough to point out two of his merits in order to understand what a tremendous significance he had for Russian state and people's life: firstly, thanks to his financial and administrative abilities, the Patriotic War - this grandiose catastrophe in the life of the Russian people - was incredibly cheap in terms of money. , and therefore Count Kankrin should undoubtedly be ranked among the heroes of our Patriotic War, along with those heroes who, on the battlefields, acquired the gratitude of posterity; secondly, he did something that neither before nor after him any of the Russian finance ministers managed to do: he restored our monetary system, which was upset to the last extreme and caused countless victims in the national economy - he restored the value of our ruble after an unprecedented his fall. These two merits would be enough to perpetuate his name in Russian history. But his life and work are extremely interesting and deeply instructive in other respects as well. Count Kankrin lived and acted at a time when personal initiative played a very weak role, when it seemed very difficult to occupy a prominent post in the public service and at the same time maintain full independence. In this respect, Kankrin is an absolutely exceptional figure. In Nicholas's time, he not only remained true to himself from beginning to end, did not change one iota of his convictions, but managed to achieve their triumph in life, not obeying anyone, but, on the contrary, forcing others to obey him. The profound instructiveness of Kankrin's life and work becomes even more clear if we add that throughout his life he fought not for personal gain, but for an idea, for the benefit of the people, as he understood it, and never resorted to any no unworthy receptions, to flattery, intrigue. On the contrary, he was always truthful and honest, not only in the aims he pursued, but also in the means he used. From this point of view, Kankrin can be called an ideal figure. When he was Minister of Finance, everyone undermined him, everyone intrigued against him: he opposed these intrigues and intrigues a business, and this argument turned out to be so immutable and strong that Kankrin retained his influential position until the moment when old age and illness struck him out of the ranks of the workers for the benefit of the people. All this makes us rank Kankrin among the most remarkable figures of the first half of the 19th century. He was not only an outstanding minister of finance, but also a whole character in the best sense of the word, who never entered into a deal with his conscience and fervently, in his own mind, defended the good of the people. In this regard, his personality deserves special attention: his political, economic and financial theories, which in many respects turned out to be untenable, were already untenable in his time and therefore can be forgotten without any harm to posterity; his economic activity, based on these theories, also turns out to be untenable in many ways, although in other respects, as we have seen, it gave brilliant results; but his devotion to the cause of the people, his ability to serve it, his endurance, truly worthy of the name iron, the methods by which he achieved his goal at the most difficult and unfavorable time for the manifestation of personal initiative, will long, if not always, serve as worthy of imitation example. If we also take into account that he was a foreigner and until the end of his life he did not even learn how to write and speak Russian correctly, then his activity will seem instructive to us in yet another respect: we will see what even a person can do for Russia, devoid of a sense of patriotism in the physiological sense of the word, when he is inspired by the idea of ​​the people's welfare, when he knows how to serve it and is ready to sacrifice all other interests for it. It is from this point of view that I will try to acquaint readers with the life and work of Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin.

It is not an easy task to present a complete characterization of him within the narrow framework of a publicly available biography. Kankrin is still waiting for his biographer: in this respect he was less fortunate than Speransky and Mordvinov, who found more or less competent biographers. The biographies of Kankrin, very few in number, are characterized by brevity, one-sidedness, and paucity of data. In order to acquaint readers with the literature on this subject and give them the opportunity to navigate in it, we will touch here on those works that we ourselves used in compiling this biographical sketch. The first place here is occupied, of course, by the works of Kankrin himself. We present them in chronological order, because there is still no complete list of them in our literature.

1. Dagobert, eine Geschichte aus dem jetzigen Freiheitskriege, in two parts, Altona, 1797 and 1798 (“Dagobert, a novel from the present war of liberation”).

2. Fragmente uber die Kriegskunst nach Gesichtspunkten der Militarischen Philisophi, St. Petersburg, 1809; the second edition was published in Braunschweig (“Excerpts concerning the art of war from the point of view of military philosophy”).

3. Weltreichrum, Nationalreichtuin und Staatswirtschaft, Munchen, 1821 (“World Wealth, National Wealth and the State Economy”).

4. Ueber die Militar-Oekonomie im Frieden und Kriege und ihr Wech-selverhaltniss zu den Operationen, St.-Petersburg, 1820 – 1823 (“On military economy during peace and war and its relation to military operations”).

5. Die Elemente des Schonen in der Baukunst, St.-Petersburg, 1836 (“Elements of beauty in architecture”).

6. Phantasiebilder eines Blinden, Berlin, 1845 (“The Fantasies of a Blind Man”).

7. Die Oekonomie der menschlichen Gesellschaft und das Finanzwesen, von einem ehemaligen Finanzminister, Stuttgart, 1845 (“Economy of human society and finance, op. by the former Minister of Finance.” This is the only work of Kankrin, under the preface of which the author's name is placed).

8. Aus den Reisetagebuchern des Grafen Kankrin. Aus den Jahren 1840 - 1845. Mit einer Lebensskizze Kankrin "s, herausgegeben von A. Grafen Keyserling, Braunschweig, 1865 (“From the travel diaries of Count Kankrin 1840 - 1845 with a biographical sketch of Kankrin. Edition of Count A. Keyserling").

9. Im Ural and Altai. Brifewechsel zwischen A. Humboldt und dem Grafen Kankrin, aus den Jahren 1827 – 1832, Leipzig, 1869 (“In the Urals and Altai, correspondence between A. Humboldt and Count Kankrin, 1827 – 1832”).

10. Of the more detailed notes compiled by Kankrin, the following deserve special attention: farmers, especially in Russia.” “Russian archive” for 1865); b) Note “regarding the campaigns against the Turks dated August 21, 1819”. “Military collection”, vol. 99; c) “Remarks of the Minister of Finance Count Kankrin” on the project of an institution for the administration of the province in 1825 in “Materials collected for the commission on the transformation of provincial and district institutions”, 1870, part 1.

In all Russian and foreign literature, there is only one somewhat detailed biography of Kankrin, compiled by his son-in-law, Count Keyserling. It is set out on fifty pages, printed in quick succession, and, of course, somewhat one-sided, since it belongs to a close relative. In addition, it is incomplete: to embrace and evaluate Kankrin's extensive scientific, literary and state activities in a few pages is unthinkable. The biography of Count Keyserling is placed, as indicated, in the form of a preface to the travel diaries of Kankrin himself. The reader will find a brief extract from this biography with a few additions in the Russian Archive for 1866. The second, somewhat more detailed, assessment activities Count Kankrin (but not the biography) belongs to an unknown author and is placed in the “Journal de St. Petersbourg" for 1860 (No. 137 - 143) under the title "George Cancrine". Finally, the third, again very short, biography was included in the books of Mr. Skalkovsky: “Our statesmen and public figures” and “Les ministres des finanses de la Russie”, 1891, who used mainly the first two biographies with the addition of very incomplete data from our historical journals. All other biographies of Kankrin (“Essay on the life and work of Count Kankrin”, St. Petersburg, 1866, and various obituaries and articles published in Russian magazines and newspapers: in the “Library for Reading” for 1864, in “Domestic Notes” for 1865 and 1866, in the “Illustrated Newspaper” for 1866, in the “World Illustration” for 1874, in the “St. Petersburg Vedomosti” for 1865 and 1866, in the “Russian Archive” for 1867, in “Activities” for 1868, etc.) contain almost no new data or considerations other than those found in the above-mentioned biographies. This shows how incomplete the work on covering Kankrin's life is. The evaluation of his financial performance, in particular, has a more extensive literature, but even this must be recognized as very insufficient. A careful reading, if possible, of all magazine and newspaper articles devoted to this issue, convinced us that when criticizing Kankrin's financial activities, only two points of view were mainly meant: some condemned, others praised Kankrin for his protective aspirations. From this side, they wrote mainly about Kankrin. The question of the restoration of metallic circulation also has a very modest literature. The most complete work belongs to the Baltic German, Herr Schmidt. This is his master's thesis: “Das russische Geldwesen wahrend der Finanzverwaltung des Grafen Cancrin”, St. Petersburg, 1875. Then we can point to the article by prof. Bunge: "Count Kankrin's Thoughts on Paper Money", placed in the "Russian Bulletin" for 1864, and on general studies on our money circulation (Gorlov, Kaufman, Goldman, Bezobrazov, Bunge, Brickner, etc.). The question of Kankrin's activity in supplying our army during the Patriotic War has not been worked out at all. This activity, which gave Kankrin a prominent place among our administrators, remained shrouded in thick darkness. Finally, not one of Count Kankrin's biographers has yet attempted to shed any light on his general worldview and personality, to present an objective description of it, so that one has to collect fragmentary data, scattered a little everywhere, in order to form a more or less clear idea of ​​\u200b\u200bhis personal qualities and shortcomings of this outstanding Russian statesman of the first half of the 19th century. Let us try to combine all these materials and, having eliminated from them everything unverified or obviously false, to present, as far as possible, a complete description of the life and work of the most remarkable of the Russian finance ministers.

In 1825, Russia's external debt reached 102 million silver rubles. The country was flooded with paper banknotes, which the government was trying to cover military expenses and foreign debt payments. the value of paper money has steadily fallen.

Not long before his death, Alexander I appointed the well-known scientist and economist Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin to the post of Minister of Finance. A staunch conservative, Kankrin did not raise the question of deep social and economic reforms. But he soberly assessed the possibilities of the economy of serf Russia and believed that the government should proceed precisely from these possibilities. Kankrin sought to limit government spending, used credit carefully, and adhered to a system of protectionism, imposing high duties on goods imported into Russia. This brought income to the state treasury and protected the fragile Russian industry from competition.

Just on the eve of Kankrin's appointment as minister, the liberal customs tariff of 1819 was abolished, and this time the government returned to protectionism for a long time. The new tariff of 1822 was developed with the assistance of Kankrin. And throughout his tenure in the ministry, the protection system remained in place, which led to the firm conviction among the general public that Kankrin was an ardent and narrow-minded protectionist who hated free trade. But such a simplified view of Kankrin's policy is not at all fair. Kankrin was well aware of the benefits of free trade. In criticizing the position that a free trade system could give Russia, he proceeded from the fact that at the moment it was necessary for Russia, first of all, to have in mind the development of national independence, national independence; he pointed out that under a free trade system, uncultured Russia was in danger of falling into complete dependence on foreign interests (in particular, on the interests of such a developed and active country as England).

Kankrin managed to accumulate a significant stock of gold and silver in the state treasury, with which he could decide to destroy depreciated banknotes and replace them with new banknotes. In addition to random favorable circumstances (large gold and silver mining), the formation of the metal reserve was helped by the "deposit notes" and "series" issued by Kankrin. A special deposit office accepted from individuals gold and silver in coins and bullion and issued depositors safe receipts, "deposit tickets" that could circulate like money and were exchanged for silver ruble for ruble. Combining all the conveniences of paper money with the virtues of metal money, the deposits were a great success and attracted a lot of gold and silver to the deposit box. The "series" had the same success, i.e. state treasury tickets, which brought the owner a small percentage and went like money with an unhindered exchange for silver. Deposits and series delivered a valuable metal fund, at the same time accustomed the public to new types of paper money, which had the same value as a silver coin.

In 1825, Russia's external debt reached 102 million silver rubles. The country was flooded with paper banknotes, which the government was trying to cover military expenses and foreign debt payments. The value of paper money has steadily fallen.

Since 1769, banknotes were introduced in Russia: change tickets or banknotes for a change bank in exchange for copper money, the turnover with which for significant amounts was a great inconvenience. The value of banknotes was provided by special capital (first in copper, then in silver coins), deposited in a bank. Soon, however, banknotes acquired the character of paper money; their release in quantities significantly exceeding cash security, as well as the abundance of counterfeit ones that appeared in circulation, lowered their market value: in 1815, the banknote ruble fell to 20 silver kopecks. Later, by withdrawing a certain number of banknotes from circulation (they were burned), as well as through loans, it was possible to raise its value to 28 kopecks, but no more.

Kankrin considered the streamlining of monetary circulation to be his main task. In 1839, the silver ruble became its basis. Credit notes were then issued, which could be freely exchanged for silver. Kankrin made sure that the number of banknotes in circulation corresponded in a certain proportion to the state stock of silver (about six to one).

The monetary reform of Kankrin (1839 - 1843) had a favorable effect on the Russian economy, contributed to the growth of trade and industry.

Egor Frantsevich Kankrin was one of the most prominent statesmen of Russia in the first half of the 19th century. A native of Germany, he left his homeland in his youth, endured poverty and hardship for a long time, but thanks to his buildings, organizational skills and incorruptibility, he managed to become first the chief quartermaster of the Russian army during the wars of 1812-1815, and then the minister who restored the ruined financial system of Russia.

Kankrin was born in Hanau on November 16, 1774. His father left for Russia before him. He was a talented specialist in the field of construction equipment and mining. Unable to compromise, he could not stay in the service of the petty German princes and in 1783. left Germany. In Russia, his knowledge was appreciated, he received a high salary and for a long time served as director of salt works, and later was a member of the mining board.

Kankrin-son successfully graduated from the University of Marburg, but he could not find a job in Germany. His father called him to Russia, where he arrived in 1798. However, apparently, the conflict with his father, which arose due to the intransigence of the characters of both, left him without a livelihood. Not knowing the Russian language, without connections, he tried to teach, was a commission agent, worked as an accountant for a wealthy tax farmer; for almost three years he lived in deep poverty, often starving.Finally, in 1800. chance smiled at him: he wrote a note on the improvement of sheep breeding in Russia, which pleased the Vice-Chancellor Count I. A. Osterman. Thanks to his patronage, he was first appointed assistant to his father to salt works, and in 1803 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior on an expedition of state property.

In the ministry, Kankrin performed various assignments, largely related to traveling around the country: he was engaged in forestry, salt business, and helping the hungry. Knowledge and business acumen made everyone treat him with respect despite the severity of his temper and harshness in dealing with people. He began to receive awards and after six years he earned the rank of State Councilor. Kankrin's quick bureaucratic career was all the more remarkable because he never showed servility to his superiors. Characteristic in this regard is the following episode: somehow Count A. A. Arakcheev summoned him to his place and, addressing him as "you", offered to solve a number of issues related to forest management on his estate. Kankrin listened to him, said nothing, turned his back on him and left. Then Arakcheev demanded that the Minister of Internal Affairs seconded Kankrin to him officially, but this time, interested

Yurovsky Vladimir Evgenievich - candidate of technical sciences.

in restoring order in his forestry, treated Kankrin kindly and considerately.

A new stage in the life of Kankrin came in 1809, when he published a work entitled Notes on the Art of War from the Point of View of Military Philosophy. In this work, Kankrin expressed the idea that during the war the state should use geographical factors as its advantage: the vastness of the territory, the length of communications, the severity of the climate. The work aroused great interest in military circles, where during this period there was a lively debate on the question of whether a possible war with Napoleon should be offensive or defensive. Kankrin's work attracted the attention of Minister of War M. B. Barclay de Tolly and the well-known military theorist General K. L. Pfuel, who was close to Alexander I. The emperor became interested in Kankrin's personality and demanded a certificate about him. Kankrin was reported to him as "a knowledgeable and capable man, but with a bad temper."

Pfuel involved Kankrin in the development of plans for a future war, in which supply issues played a large role. In 1811 Kankrin was appointed assistant general-proviantmeister with the rank of real state councilor, and at the very beginning of the war he became the quartermaster general of the western army and soon all the active troops.

The ability to quickly find solutions in a difficult environment, energy and disinterestedness allowed Kankrin to brilliantly cope with his tasks. According to many eyewitnesses, the Russian army in the course of all hostilities was well financially provided, and in this regard, the war of 1812-1815. favorably differed from the subsequent ones - Crimean and especially Turkish, when, due to embezzlement and abuse, soldiers were often left without bread and in rotten boots. At the same time, the costs of maintaining the troops made by Kankrin were relatively small. So, in three years, the treasury spent 157 million rubles, which is less than the costs, for example, only for the first year of the Crimean War. The impeccable honesty of Kankrin himself played a significant role in this. A man who is not rich and at the same time an uncontrolled master of army money, he could, for example, receive millions of bribes in settlements with allied governments; instead, he did a stupendous job of verifying the invoices and paid only one-sixth of them, proving that the rest of the claims were illegal.

M. I. Kutuzov highly appreciated Kankrin's abilities, used his advice and usually supported his proposals. Here are two episodes in which Kankrin's personality manifested itself most clearly. When in May 1813, during the days of the most difficult battle at Bautzen in Saxony, more than 180 thousand Russian and allied troops concentrated on a narrow sector of the front, Alexander I summoned Kankrin to him and asked him to solve the most difficult task of supply in these conditions, promising a generous an award; Kankrin managed to carry out the order - and the supply of the units was secured.

The second case almost ended with the resignation of Kankrin: he stood up for the inhabitants of a small German town who suffered from the atrocities of the troops, which brought the wrath of Grand Duke Konstantin upon himself. The incident will be settled by Kutuzov, who declared to the Grand Duke: "If you eliminate people who are extremely necessary to me, those who cannot be purchased even for millions, then I myself cannot remain in office."

At the end of the war, Kankrin was forgotten; he was no longer needed and remained only a member of the military council without specific duties. But he was a man who could not sit idle; during this period he wrote a work on economics, World Wealth, National Wealth and the State Economy, published in Munich in 1821. In 1816 Kankrin married E.Z. Muravyova, a cousin of the future Decembrist Sergei Muravyov-Apostol, whom he met at an officer's ball at the headquarters of Barclay de Tolly.

The emperor remembered Kankrin in 1821 and took him with him to the congress in Leibach (Ljubljana), where the question of the possible participation of Russian troops in the suppression of the revolutionary movement in the Kingdom of Naples was discussed. Soon Kankrin was appointed a member of the State Council, and in 1823 - Minister of Finance. It was not for nothing that even ten years earlier, in 1813, M. M. Speransky said: "We do not have a person in the whole state who is more capable than Kankrin to be the Minister of Finance."

The appointment of Kankrin was met with bewilderment by secular society, and by many with hostility: it was difficult to imagine an uncouth German in the place of his predecessor, Count D. A. Guryev, an amiable man whose salon was always open to noble applicants for money. Former guards officer, father-in-law of the Minister of Foreign Affairs K. V. Nesselrode, Guryev understood little about finances; he was fond of cooking, and everyone was well aware of the "Guryev porridge" invented by him. He willingly distributed state money to influential people, and in the end, when he refused, for lack of funds, to give money to help the starving Belarusian peasants and at the same time offered to allocate 700 thousand fish. for the purchase by the treasury of the ruined estate of one nobleman, the emperor decided to remove it.

Russia's finances were in a catastrophic state: By the end of the reign of Paul I, the total debt of the state was 408 million rubles. This is the financial legacy of the 18th century. in amount exceeded the four-year state budget revenue of that time (2). However, at that time there was no fixed budget, the money was often spent at the direction of the monarch or favorites, although the state treasurer appointed from 1796 was obliged to keep records.

The instability of the financial system was largely due to the paper money in circulation - banknotes. They were introduced in 1768 by Catherine II to partially replace the depreciated copper coin, and their appearance at that time was justified. However, the issuance of more and more new banknotes became an easy way to cover any public expenditure, and their number in circulation grew rapidly, and the cost fell rapidly, leading to the high cost of all commodities (3).

When Kankrin assumed the post of minister, the situation in the field of finance was difficult. Kankrin had his own views on how to overcome the crisis. He did not consider it necessary to redeem banknotes by entering into loans or saving funds from the budget. In his opinion, the withdrawal of banknotes had to be postponed for a long time - until a sufficient fund of silver coins was accumulated. Prior to this, new issues should have been stopped, thereby securing the value of already circulating paper money. Kankrin carried out this plan with amazing skill: not a single banknote ruble was issued for all his management, while the value of a paper ruble was kept within 25-27 kopecks. silver(4).

Kankrin directed his main efforts to combat the budget deficit and to create cash reserves. He wrote: "It should be the main rule that deficits be averted by cutting spending, and to increase taxes proceed at one extreme." In his opinion, “in the state, as in private life, it is necessary to remember that one can go bankrupt not so much from capital expenditures as from daily petty expenses. how kopecks grow into rubles "(5).

Kankrin, with unflagging stamina and skill, repelled all attempts on state property, he worked 15 hours a day, he himself checked many documents, identified and mercilessly prosecuted embezzlers, usually knew how to prove that this or that case requires less costs than requested. As a result, he reduced the budget of the military ministry by more than 20 million rubles, the budget of the ministry of finance - by 24 million rubles. etc. (6). In general, over the four years of management, he managed to reduce expenses by 1/7 and accumulate capital of 160 million rubles. banknotes (7).

In an effort to meet the budget without a deficit and create cash reserves, Kankrin applied some economic measures, which he himself did not approve of in principle. So, in 1827. he introduced a farming system in the wine trade, instead of government administration, accompanied by large expenditures of the treasury and abuses of officials. The vice-governors were responsible for the receipt of income from the sale of wine, which opened up wide opportunities for embezzlement. Not without reason, when one day many governors came to a meeting in St. Petersburg, one joker answered the question "Why did they come?" answered: "They want to ask the emperor to transfer them to vice-governors." Introducing the payoffs, Kankrin was not mistaken: the income from the sale of wine increased from 79 to 110 million rubles (8). True, at the same time he said: "It is difficult to manage finances while they are based on income from drunkenness."

Another measure, carried out with the direct participation of Kankrin in 1822, was the increase in import customs duties, which had been reduced three years earlier, as a result of which the revenues of the treasury increased from 31 to 81 million rubles. Income growth was the main, but not the only, goal: by increasing duties, Kankrin understood that protectionism in this period was useful for the development of a weak domestic industry, although he was aware that in the future the absence of foreign competition would be harmful. Kankrin also took into account the fact that luxury goods occupy a significant place among imported goods, and therefore the increase in duties, accompanied by an increase in the prices of imported goods, will be a kind of tax on the rich.

Kankrin paid great attention to the mining industry, whose revenues increased from 8 to 19 million rubles, and gold production increased from 25 to 1 thousand poods (9).

The years Kankrin managed the finances were weighed down by many extraordinary expenses. So, in 1827-1829. expenses were required for the Persian and Turkish wars, in 1830 - to suppress the uprising in Poland; in 1830 cholera raged in the country, and in 1833 famine caused by crop failure. Military expenses were especially burdensome for Kankrin. He once said: "My labors will be lost, everything I have accumulated will be swallowed up by barracks, fortresses, etc." Indeed, even in the "peaceful" year of 1838, 45% of the budget went to the army and navy (10).

During Kankrin, a phenomenon called "common people's mess" attracted a lot of attention. It disrupted the normal sustainable economic life of the country. Lage (the discrepancy between the exchange rate of banknotes and the real one) arose due to the fact that on the free market banknotes were exchanged for silver in a ratio exceeding their purchasing power, moreover, this ratio was unstable and spontaneously changed according to the laws of supply and demand. The reason was the "advantage" that banknotes had over silver: they were accepted in payment of taxes and government fees. The means of combating crap were published in 1831-1833. decrees allowing partial settlement with the treasury of a metal coin.

Finally, the time came when Kankrin found it possible to proceed with monetary reform. In June 1839, a decree was promulgated, which stated: "The silver coin will henceforth be considered the main coin of circulation. Banknotes will henceforth be considered secondary signs of value and their exchange rate against the silver voiced coin once and for all remains unchanged, counting the silver ruble at 3 rubles. 50 k. banknotes". Although the treasury had already accumulated a significant amount of silver by this time, Kankrin considered that it was better to have a larger supply, and opened a special cash desk that issued deposit tickets to those who wished in exchange for specie, with an obligation to return the deposited silver money on demand. This deposit fund enjoyed complete confidence among the population, it grew rapidly and, when it reached the amount of 100 million rubles, was solemnly transported to the Peter and Paul Fortress and checked in the presence of dignitaries and deputies from the nobility and merchants. With this solemn procedure, Kankrin wanted to convince the whole world that Russia had done away with paper money circulation and established silver monometallism. This possibility was also facilitated by the fact that Russia maintained a positive foreign trade balance for several years, and the influx of silver from abroad was quite large. In 1843 a manifesto was proclaimed on the destruction of banknotes and their replacement with credit notes, which, upon presentation, were exchanged for a coin: 596 million rubles. banknotes were exchanged for 170 million rubles. credit notes (11).

Before their implementation, all important proposals on economics and finance were supposed to be discussed in the finance committee, which consisted of ten members of the state council, among whom there were many ideological opponents of Kankrin (N. S. Mordvinov, P. D. Kiselev, K. F. Drutsky-Lyubetsky and etc.). Kankrin usually managed to carry out his decisions thanks to the support of Nicholas I. As is known, Nicholas I demanded from his ministers not independent actions, but strict execution of his orders. Kankrin was an exception: the emperor even allowed objections on his part and listened to him attentively, realizing that he could not find another such minister of finance. Demanding impeccable observance of all the rules for wearing a military uniform, Nicholas I forgave Kankrin for his

an untidy overcoat, pantaloons tucked into the tops of boots, a woolen scarf tied around the neck. Once he made a remark to him, to which Kankrin replied: "Your Majesty does not want, of course, that I catch a cold and go to bed; then who will work for me?" The emperor not only gave up on his clothes, but, not tolerating smoking himself, allowed Kankrin to smoke a pipe stuffed with cheap tobacco during his reports.

In 1829, Kankrin was elevated to the dignity of a count; he repeatedly received significant monetary rewards, but in everyday life he was exceptionally modest, content with the cheapest, and when he was reproached for stinginess, he answered: "Yes, I am a miser for everything that is not needed." He was a witty man, and his statements, though often quite rude, were passed from mouth to mouth. So, he was asked why he never goes to funerals. He replied, "A person is only required to attend a funeral once—on his own." Once, when someone was proudly talking about his honest deed, Kankrin said: "He could just as well boast that he was not born a woman."

Kankrin tried not to attend official receptions, avoided festivities, balls, but was a passionate lover of poetry, music, architecture, he played the violin. In addition to the novel Dagobert, written in his youth, he wrote a treatise on architecture, Elements of Beauty in Architecture, a collection of short stories, Fantasies of a Blind Man; he left in his diaries many interesting remarks about music and the visual arts.

Kankrin paid great attention to the development of domestic industry and the training of personnel for it. He founded the St. Petersburg Practical Technological Institute, he did a lot to expand the Forest Institute, created by Peter I. in the mining districts, etc. Kankrin founded Kommercheskaya Gazeta and Gorny Zhurnal, under his leadership the Agricultural Newspaper was published, the editor of which was the former director of the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, E. A. Engelgard, who was well acquainted with agricultural issues; in order for this newspaper to be publicly available, Kankrin allocated an allowance from the treasury for it, so that an annual subscription cost less than a ruble. The newspaper published his article on the division of Russia into climate zones, which attracted the attention of European scientists.

Kankrin understood that the development of industry depends on the success of science, and managed to convince Nicholas I to invite the famous traveler, natural scientist A. von Humboldt to Russia. Humboldt became famous for his research in Central and South America, he passed through the Cordillera, sailed to the headwaters of the Orinoco, establishing that this river communicates with the Amazon. Initially, Kankrin entered into correspondence with him about platinum found in South America and the possibility of making coins from this metal. In 1829 Humboldt came to Russia. Kankrin made sure that considerable sums of money were allocated for his journey, a change of horses was waiting for him at each post station, and where security conditions required it, he was accompanied by a military escort. Humboldt traveled almost 15 thousand miles, explored various regions of the Urals, Rudny Altai and the Caspian Sea, and summarized the results in the study "Central Asia", which was a major contribution to the science of the 19th century.

The characterization of Kankrin will be incomplete if one does not talk about his attitude to serfdom. He expressed his views in a private note submitted to Alexander 1 in 1818 in connection with the famine in Belarus and entitled "Study on the origin and abolition of serfdom." Kankrin wrote in it: “Agriculture is nowhere making real progress with us, because until now all the efforts of the rural owners have been directed not so much to improving the life of the peasants as to their oppression. To increase the exactions from the farmer is the only goal of the landowner.” Analyzing the situation in Europe, he comes to the conclusion that the liberation of the peasants without land or the liberation from the power of the landowner with attachment to the land does not solve the problem. Kankrin proposes a plan for the gradual redemption of the peasants from the land at the expense of a special loan bank, and the unit allocated to the land should be the yard, and the poll tax should be replaced by the household. Just as with the monetary reform, Kankrin considered rapid change undesirable.

nym; he broke his plan into stages, hoping to complete it in full in 30 years. In government circles, Kankrin's proposal was ignored.

Kankrin left the post of minister at the beginning of 1844, already being a seriously ill person. He devoted the last years of his life to the completion of his voluminous work "The Economics of Human Society and the Science of Finance". He died in Pavlovsk on September 9, 1845.

The financial system created by Kankrin - silver monometallism - lasted about 15 years. Then it was destroyed by the enormous costs of the Crimean War. In the following decades, there was a tendency to critically evaluate the activities of Kankrin. Supporters of free trade reproached him with protectionism, fighters for morality - the introduction of wine farming, propagandists of technical progress - resistance to the construction of railways, for which he really did not want to give money, fearing that new exorbitant costs would have a harmful effect on the country's finances. It was widely believed that he was a talented practitioner, but a man little familiar with the achievements of modern science. He was accused of not exchanging banknotes for silver ruble for ruble during the monetary reform, which undermined confidence in the obligations of the state. He was blamed for temporarily taking certain sums from private deposits in the state bank to replenish the budget, for not fighting enough against "common people's crap", etc. (12).

Time has shown that these reproaches in no way detract from Kankrin's achievements: the main thing to which he devoted his life was the restoration of normal money circulation in Russia, and this task, despite numerous obstacles, he successfully completed. The reformers of Russian finance of later periods - S. Yu. Witte and L. N. Yurovsky - highly appreciated the activities of Kankrin and, perhaps, partially used his experience (13). In the history of the domestic economy, Kankrin certainly has a place of honor.

Notes

1. Russian archive, M., 1874, no. 11, p. 735; SEMENTKOVSKY R. I. E. F. Kankrin, his life and state activity. SPb., 1893, p. 21; BOZHERYANOV I. N. Count E. F. Kankrin, his life, literary works and twenty years of activity of the management of the Ministry of Finance. SPb. 1897.

2. BLIOKH I. O. Finances of Russia in the 19th century. SPb. 1882, p. 59, 85.

3. BRZHESKY N. K. State debts of Russia. SPb. 1884, pl. The state debt includes banknotes that were in circulation; the data is indicative, since accurate financial accounting at the end of the 18th century. did not have.

4. Witte S. Yu. Lecture notes on the national and state economy. M. 1997, p. 287-289.

5. Kankrin E. F. Brief review of Russian finances. In: Collection of the Russian Historical Society. T. 31. St. Petersburg. 1880.

6. Sementkovskiy R. I. Uk. op., p. 36, 37.

7. SKALSKOVSKY KA Our statesmen and public figures. SPb. 1891, p. 444.

8. E. F. Kankrin, Uk. op., p. thirty.

9. Sementkovskiy R. I. Uk. op., p. 37, 77.

10. Kankrin E. F. Uk. op., p. 64.

11. WITTE S. Yu. Uk. op., p. 288.

12. SKALKOVSKY K. A. Uk. op., p. 438, 439.

13. Yurovsky LN Monetary policy of the Soviet government. M. 1996, p. 32.

Egor Frantsevich Kankrin

Kankrin Yegor Frantsevich (1774-1845), Count (1826) - Minister of Finance (1823-1844). Honorary member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences (1824). In 1839-1843, he carried out a financial reform, introduced the silver ruble as the basis of monetary circulation, and established a mandatory rate of banknotes. Achieved deficit-free state budgets, temporarily strengthened Russia's finances.

Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin (1774-1845), count, from 1821 - member of the State Council for the Department of State Economy, Minister of Finance (1823-1844). He achieved deficit-free budgets, maintained protective customs tariffs, promoted the development of industry and technical education in Russia (projects for the creation of an exchange and industrial societies, a Technological and Forestry Institute, a Central Physical Observatory, etc.). The name of Kankrin is associated with the financial reform of the late 30s - early 40s, which was aimed at restoring metal money circulation in the country.

Used materials from the book Russia under supervision. Reports of the III branch. 1827-1869. M., 2006.

Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin (November 16, 1774 - September 10, 1845) - Russian statesman, count (since 1829). A native of Germany, since 1797 he was in the Russian service. In 1823-1844 - Minister of Finance. Almost completely stopped lending to industry, did not allow the creation of private banks. The guild reform carried out by Kankrin in 1824 hindered the process of separating capitalist elements from among the “trading peasants” and philistines. But Kankrin could not completely ignore objective economic needs: he maintained protective customs tariffs, in which the owners of factories based on serf labor, as well as the industrial bourgeoisie, were interested. Kankrin achieved deficit-free budgets through a drastic reduction in household costs, the development of a drinking-farming system. Author of works on economic and other topics, mainly in German.

S. Ya. Borovoy. Odessa.

Soviet historical encyclopedia. In 16 volumes. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. 1973-1982. Volume 6. INDRA - CARACAS. 1965.

Literature: Bozheryanov I. N., Graf E. R. Kankrin, St. Petersburg, 1897; Ministry of Finance. 1802-1902, v. 1, St. Petersburg, 1902; Borovoy S. Ya., On the history of prom. Russian policy in the 20-50s. 19th century, in collection: IZ, (vol.) 69, (M.), 1961; Ryndzyunsky P. G., Kankrin's guild reform of 1824, in collection: IZ, (vol.) 40, (M.), 1952.

Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin (1774-1845) - statesman and military figure, count (since 1829).

A native of Germany, he graduated from the university there with a degree in law and politics; doctor of law. Since 1797 - in the Russian service with the rank of court adviser. With the essay “On the Art of War” (1809), he attracted the attention of the Minister of War, Barclay de Tolly, who recommended him to Alexander I.

In 1811, with the rank of real state councilor, he was appointed assistant to the general proviantmeister, in 1812 - general proviantmeister of the 1st Army.

From 1813 he was the quartermaster general of the Russian troops. Kankrin, the Russian army owes the fact that from 1812-1813. the provision of the troops was relatively well supplied, as a result of which some savings were even achieved from the amounts allocated for the conduct of the war, and in settlements with the allies after the war, it was proved that many claims against Russia were unfounded. He outlined his actions as quartermaster general in a note to Alexander I (1815) and in the extensive work “On the Military Economy”.

The constant and firm defense of the state interest, the persecution of bribe-takers did not find support in the highest spheres, and in 1820, according to a petition, he was dismissed from his post and appointed a member of the Military Council. In 1822 he became a member of the State Council, and in 1823 - Minister of Finance.

Remaining in office until 1844, he achieved deficit-free budgets, improved government financial reporting, and continued protectionist customs tariffs.

Used materials of the book: A.A. Grigoriev, V.I. Gasumyanov. History of state reserves of Russia (from the 9th century to 1917). 2003.

In the Russian Empire, at one time the Minister of Finance was Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin (aka Georg Ludwig), a native of Germany in the Russian service. It is clear that the distribution of finance always and in any country causes serious passions. Those offended by the unfair (in their opinion) distribution of the financial pie are usually more than satisfied. It was then said about Kankrin that with him "several foreigners are in charge of the business, acting in favor of the British." We hear something similar these days about the policy of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. Are such statements correct? Look for the answer to this question in modern publications. For example, in the article cited here at this address https://www.msk.kp.ru/daily/26833/3873556/ you can read about the latest developments in the banking system of the Russian Federation. And these events over the past few years have been growing like a snowball.

KANKRIN Yegor Franievlch (Georg Ludwig) (11/16/1774, Hanau, Hesse-Kassel - 9/9/1845, Pavlovsk, St. Petersburg province), count (09/22/1829), general of infantry (8/25/1828). The son of a real state councilor, a mining engineer. Educated at Hesse and Magdeburg Universities. He began his service in 1794 as an adviser to the board in the Duchy of Anhalt-Brenburg. In 1797 she moved to Russia and on January 17, 1800, she was appointed as a collegiate adviser as an assistant to the board of the Staraya Russian salt works. 11/16/1803 under the patronage of Vice-Chancellor I.A. Osterman was appointed to the Ministry of the Interior as an adviser to the State Economy Expedition. From 7.8.1809 inspector of foreign colonies of the St. Petersburg province. His scientific work attracted the attention of Gen. M.B. Barclay de Tolly, who recommended K. to the emperor. On February 28, 1811, he was promoted to full councilor of state and appointed assistant to the Provision Master General of the War Ministry. During the Patriotic War of 1812 he was quartermaster general of the 1st Western Army, and from 29/04/1813 - of the entire active army. On January 17, 1813, he was promoted to major general. K. was responsible for organizing food supplies for the army. Thanks to prudent management, K. managed to meet the allocated funds and even achieve savings of 26 million rubles. He actively fought against corruption in the commissaries. After the end of hostilities, he was engaged in the liquidation of settlements with foreign states. The former allies and France initially demanded almost 360 million rubles from Russia, but thanks to K.'s negotiations, this amount was reduced to 60 million. On August 30, 1815, he was promoted to lieutenant general. In Aug. 1816 married Ekaterina Zakharovna Muravieva, a relative of the wife of Barclay de Tolly. Since 1820 he was a member of the Military Council. From 10/21/1821 member of the State Council. From April 27, 1823 to May 1, 1844, they held the post of Minister of Finance. On February 25, 1824, he was an honorary member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. One of the largest financial figures in the history of Russia. He carried out a reform of the monetary system, guilds, etc. Author of a large number of theoretical works on finance.

Materials of the book were used: Zalessky K.A. Napoleonic Wars 1799-1815. Biographical Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow, 2003.

Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin (11/16/1774-9/9/1845), count, minister of finance. He received his education in Germany. He came to Russia to his father in 1796. For the first time, he drew attention to himself with his work on the troops and their food supply, which is why in 1811 he was appointed assistant to the food master general, the next year - quartermaster general, and in 1820 - a member of the Military Council. He criticized the financial system of the Minister of Finance D. A. Guryev, shortly after which he was appointed Minister of Finance (in 1823), having stayed in this position until 1844. Kankrin became most famous as the author of a successful reform to destroy banknotes and replace them with a credit ruble. In addition, he streamlined the financial economy, introducing correct reporting and budgeting. In other respects, Kankrin's views and activities are characterized by the following features: he was a supporter of protectionism and therefore greatly strengthened the customs patronage of the factory industry, especially by introducing a common tariff in 1841. At the same time, Kankrin had a negative attitude towards the development of credit institutions, not only private, but also state-owned. ; not a single new bank was established under him. Kankrin had the same negative attitude towards the railway business. Under him, a tobacco excise tax was first introduced, and instead of the state-owned sale of wine, which had existed since 1818, a farming system, which left an unkind memory, was introduced, quite beneficial for the treasury, but extremely difficult for the population. Existing taxes did not decrease, but, on the contrary, increased. Kankrin paid much attention to forestry, in which he achieved serious success by compiling a special "instruction".

Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin (November 16, 1774–September 9, 1845), Count, Minister of Finance. He received his education in Germany. He came to Russia to his father in 1797. For the first time, he drew attention to himself with his work on the troops and supplying them with food, which is why in 1811 he was appointed assistant to the food master general, the next year - quartermaster general, and in 1820 - a member of the Military Council. He criticized the financial system of the Minister of Finance D.A. Guryev, soon after which he was appointed Minister of Finance (in 1823), having stayed in this position until 1844. He pursued a policy of flexible patronage of domestic industry, revised the rates of customs duties several times (in 1823, 1826, 1831, 1834, 1836, 1843).

He opposed subsidizing individual industrial enterprises at the expense of state credit institutions. He introduced a rule according to which every long-term loan of an industrial nature must be issued by state banks only with the permission of the Ministry of Finance. He spoke out against unjustified from an economic point of view. e. construction. He did not allow the organization of issuing joint-stock banks that issued loans with bank notes. In 1829, he lowered the interest paid by state credit institutions on deposits from 5% to 4% and levied on loans from 6% to 5%. In 1842, with the participation of Kankrin, the organization of savings banks began, accepting deposits from 50 kopecks. up to 750 rub. Largely thanks to the support of Kankrin, the first insurance companies arose: fire insurance (1827) and personal insurance (1835).

Contributed to the improvement of the organization of Russian trade. In 1832, a new charter on bills was adopted, a charter on commercial insolvency, a charter for commercial courts, and a charter for the St. Petersburg Stock Exchange; in 1836 - a law forbidding stock trading with shares (repealed in 1893).

Carried out the Guild reform of 1824; in 1827 nobles and manufacturers were allowed to enroll in the guild. The increase in state revenues through the introduction of new taxes and fees regarded as an emergency. Restored the system of wine farming (1827), introduced the payment of poll tax by foreigners (1830), the original system of taxation of tobacco (1838). Reduced the tax on salt, abolished internal shipping duties (1823). The amount of direct taxes during the management of Kankrin's finances increased by 10 million rubles. silver. Kankrin struggled with budget deficits also by reducing expenditure items, but did not achieve success due to the high costs of the war with Turkey, the suppression of the Polish uprising and the war in the Caucasus. In just 20 years of Kankrin's tenure as minister, the deficit amounted to 160.6 million rubles. silver. In order to maintain Russian state credit, Kankrin insisted on maintaining strict secrecy regarding data relating to the state of public finances. To cover the budget deficit, he resorted to the use of funds from state-owned credit institutions and state loans. In 1828–29, 1831, 1832, 1840, 1843 he made foreign loans, the actual interest on which was 5.42%, the amount was 92.2 million rubles. silver. The annual loan payments to the Kankrin ministry were lower than those of his predecessors, which contributed to the improvement of the balance sheet of the Russian Empire. Kankrin created a new form of domestic public debt. In 1831, State Treasury tickets (the so-called "series") were put into circulation with a face value of 250 Russian banknotes, bringing their owners 4% per annum.

The series were issued for a period of 4 years, then for 6 years, and were redeemed in the last 4 years. Pledges for farming out, government contracts, deliveries, etc. were accepted at a nominal price, and in relations between individuals - by agreement. In fact, the "series" were interest-bearing money, and the population willingly acquired them. The proceeds from domestic and foreign loans were used mainly to cover military expenses and only partially for economic needs: the construction of highways (about 5 thousand miles), the installation of shipping systems (Vyshnevolotsk, Mariinsky, Tikhvin, etc.), marine ports. The proceeds from foreign loans in 1842 and 1843 went entirely to the construction of the Nikolaev railway. e. In total, the state debt under Kankrin increased by 116.39%. Nevertheless, the positive balance of trade and settlement balances contributed to maintaining a stable exchange rate of the Russian ruble and filling the money circulation channels with gold and silver coins. Kankrin objected during a discussion in the State Council about a number of measures (withdrawal from circulation of certificates of deposit, old banknotes, giving the credit ruble a forced exchange rate), which later became an integral part of Kankrin's monetary reform.

Used materials from the Great Encyclopedia of the Russian people.

Section III says:

The merchant class in this respect shares the opinion of the landlords and complains about the decline in trade in locally produced goods, such as leather, etc.: they are unhappy that the government does not come to the aid of private individuals, does not create for them the conditions necessary to improve their situation. things and what under the city of Kankrin, several foreigners are in charge of the business, acting in favor of the British .

Section III Report: A Brief Survey of Public Opinion in 1827.
Quoted from the book: Russia under supervision. Reports of the III branch. 1827-1869. M., 2006.

Read further:

Patriotic War of 1812 (chronological table).

Members of the Napoleonic Wars (biographical guide).

Literature on the Napoleonic Wars (list of references)

Russia in the 19th century (chronological table).

France in the 19th century (chronological table).

Compositions:

Economics of human society and finance. SPb., 1846.

Literature:

Count Kankrin and his essays on political economy and finance. SPb., 1894;

Bozheryanov I.N. Count Cancrin. Lit. works and 20 years of activity of the management of the Ministry of Finance. SPb., 1897;

Migulin P.P. Russian state loan. T. 1. Kharkov, 1899;

Borovoy S.Ya. Credit and Banks of Russia (middle of the 12th century - 1861). M., 1958;

Kankrin E.F.//Domestic history. Encyclopedia. T. 2. M., 1996.

Ministry of Finance. 1802-1902, v. 1, St. Petersburg, 1902;

Borovoy S. Ya., On the history of prom. Russian policy in the 20-50s. 19th century, in collection: IZ, (vol.) 69, (M.), 1961;

Ryndzyunsky P. G., Kankrin's guild reform of 1824, in collection: IZ, (vol.) 40, (M.), 1952.

LECTURE XVII

(the ending)

Kankrin activities. – His principles and his policies. - Protectionism and its impact on industry and trade. – Reducing the growth of military spending. – The cost of the wars of 1827–1831. - Drinking reform. – Monetary reform of 1839–1843. - The role of Nikolai himself in this matter. - Kankrin's concerns about improving cultural conditions.

Portrait of Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin

As for the history of customs legislation during this time, the main figure here was the repeatedly mentioned Minister of Finance, Mr. E. F. Kankrin, who held his responsible post for almost 21 years (from 1823 to 1844).

Kankrin was a man of extremely original and outstanding mind. He was originally a German, but even under Catherine, his father was called to Russia to manage the salt business. Young Kankrin, however, was brought up in Germany and, having received a good education in one of the German universities, only at the very end of the 18th century. came to Russia. At first - and for quite a long time - he had to survive, occupying various small positions: he was an accountant for one farmer, took various private classes, and, in general, did not disdain any work. During the Napoleonic Wars, he advanced, going to serve in the commissariat department, where he became a completely unprecedented phenomenon, since he was almost the only honest and educated person in this environment. On the one hand, of course, he provoked great and malicious attacks on himself, but on the other hand, he attracted the attention of the higher authorities and Alexander himself.

Alexander soon appreciated Kankrin, as he showed himself to be a knowledgeable person not only in the food of the army, but also in the military administration in general. In 1812 Kankrin was at first the Provision Master General of one of the two active armies, and then even of the entire active army in Russia. In this position, he showed his extensive knowledge, economic talents and versatile mind. It turned out that he was not only able to organize the food supply for the army well, but could successfully participate in the discussion of special tactical tasks. Thus, when the war plan of 1812 was being discussed, Kankrin greatly influenced the learned author of the "Scythian" war plan, General Pful. Subsequently, Kankrin published an essay on the theory of war, which again drew the attention of Emperor Alexander to him.

When the theater of operations was transferred to Germany and then to France, here too Kankrin was at the height of the situation: it turned out that in the allied army, among the persons in charge of food supplies for the troops, he had no rival, so in all difficult cases they always turned to Kankrin, and he managed more than once to lead the allies out of great difficulties. Thus, during the Napoleonic Wars, Kankrin, one might say, gained European fame as the most competent person in the field of military economy.

When great abuses in the military department were discovered in Russia and the Minister of War, Prince. Gorchakov, many thought that Kankrin would take his place, who, for his services during the Napoleonic Wars, was renamed major general from active state councilors, and then promoted to lieutenant general; but Alexander seemed to have forgotten about Kankrin at that time and for some reason did not give him movement. However, in 1818, Kankrin again reminded him of himself, giving him a very sensible note on the release of serfs, a note that, according to some, served as the main impetus for Alexander to instruct Arakcheev in 1818. draw up a plan for the gradual emancipation of the peasants.

In 1822, Alexander was finally convinced of the impossibility of keeping Guriev as Minister of Finance, the secret of whose influence was that he knew how to win over all the powerful of this world by distributing large sums of money under plausible pretexts, thanks to which he stayed as minister for 11 years . In 1822 there was a famine in Belorussia; Guriev, having significantly cut the sums allocated for the starving peasants, at the same time decided to allocate 700 thousand rubles. to buy an estate from an important landowner who needed money. When this was discovered, Guryev lost his post, which Alexander, on the advice of Arakcheev, offered to Kankrin.

Even earlier, Arakcheev Kankrin was appreciated by Speransky, who, during his exile in Perm, said back in 1813 that, in his opinion, Kankrin was the only person capable of managing Russian finances.

Financial policy of Kankrin

Just on the eve of Kankrin's appointment as minister, the liberal customs tariff of 1819 was abolished, and this time the government returned to protectionism for a long time. The new tariff of 1822 was developed with the assistance of Kankrin. And throughout his administration of the ministry, the protection system remained in place, which established in the general public a strong belief that Kankrin was an ardent and narrow protectionist who hated free trade. But such a simplified view of Kankrin's policy is not at all fair. Kankrin was well aware of the benefits of free trade. In criticizing the position that a free trade system could give Russia, he proceeded from the fact that at the moment it was necessary for Russia, first of all, to have in mind the development of national independence, national independence; he pointed out that under a system of free trade, uncultured Russia is in danger of becoming completely dependent on foreign interests in its industrial life (in particular, on the interests of such a developed and active country as England).

It was from this point of view that he considered it necessary to defend the development of Russian folk production. But he never allowed the creation of too favorable conditions for domestic manufacturers with the help of high customs rates, on the contrary, he believed that it was necessary to watch vigilantly that Russian industry could not sleep, and considered it necessary to constantly regulate the customs system in order to force Russian manufacturers to convert attention to all sorts of improvements in production technology under the threat of foreign competition. Therefore, the conditionally protective tariff that he set was revised many times precisely from this point of view. In certain industries, duties were constantly lowered, and especially at those moments when Kankrin considered it necessary to encourage Russian industry from the other end, threatening it with foreign competition.

Thus, it must be admitted that at that time his policy, his protection system, was moderate and reasonable protectionism, and one cannot in any way accuse him of a senseless enthusiasm for the idea of ​​protectionism.

On the other hand, he was also guided by fiscal considerations in his tariff policy. The fact is that he received the Ministry of Finance at a time when Russian finances were in the greatest decline. In 1822 the treasury was almost bankrupt; it was impossible to make any loans on any tolerable terms, and the rate of paper money did not increase, despite the fact that in the last years of Guryev's administration, thanks to the system of repayment of the assigned debt, which he adopted, this debt decreased from 800 to 595 million rubles. This reduction was achieved at the cost of entering into interest-bearing loans on very difficult terms, and thus the non-interest-bearing banknote debt turned to a large part into a debt with an obligation to constantly pay very high interest. Kankrin believed that under such conditions it was not worth repaying the banknote debt, but one should only strive not to make new loans and not to issue new banknotes. In his scientific works, Kankrin, as I have already said, put the well-being of the masses as the main principle of financial policy. He repeatedly expressed the idea that the actual goal of rational financial activity should not be the growth of state revenues, but precisely the increase in the people's well-being - and by this he understood mainly the well-being of the masses.

Proceeding from this point of view, he was a supporter of the most austerity and an opponent not only of all loans, but also of any increase in the burden of taxation. Therefore, in his practical activities, refusing to the last opportunity to increase taxes, he began to cut all the departments of those, of course, at every step he acquired strong enemies in the world of the highest bureaucracy, which, however, was never embarrassed.

I have already mentioned how intractable Kankrin was with Emperor Nicholas himself.

The austerity system that Kankrin pursued so persistently yielded noticeable results in the very first years of his management of finances and created in the European money markets a completely different attitude towards Russian state credit than that which existed under Guryev.

Those principles of state economy, which guided Kankrin in general in the conduct of the state economy, he applied to the tariff issue.

He believed that customs taxes could be tolerated only insofar as they were taxes on luxury goods or on consumer goods of the more prosperous sections of the population, and therefore he believed that as much government revenue as possible should be taken from customs. Thanks to this understanding, when regulating the tariff in 1822, he constantly took into account precisely the increase in customs revenue. And under him, customs revenue increased by 2.5 times - from 11 million rubles. up to 26 million rubles silver, amounting to a very large item in the then state budget.

To put an end to the customs tariff, we must also dwell on the history of Russian-Polish trade and customs relations. The fact is that for Poland, as a country more culturally developed, especially in relation to the factory industry, which could flourish there more than in Russia, thanks to the conditions I have already indicated, a permanent market was important for the sale of its manufactured goods, and Poland looked at Russia precisely as a very good market for their goods. In addition, the Asian markets were also very important for her, which she could only exploit under the condition of free transit through Russia. Proceeding from such considerations, back in 1826, the Minister of Finance of the Kingdom of Poland, Prince Lubecki, specially came to St. Petersburg to obtain tariff benefits for Poland, and he proved, not embarrassed by the existence of the constitution of 1815, that, in essence, Poland is a part of Russia. Of course, Kankrin raised very strong objections to this. From Kankrin's point of view, the already existing customs system in relation to Poland was unfavorable for the Russian population. After the formation of the Kingdom of Poland, when the customs question first arose, it was established that the raw materials of both countries were imported duty-free; as for manufactured goods, it was established that manufactured goods made from their own raw materials are imported for a negligible duty - no more than 1% of the value of the goods, while for manufactured goods from foreign raw materials a duty of about 3% ad valorem was established, but at the same time for some items special customs rates were established - for example, items of the cotton industry were taxed at 15%, sugar; - in 25%. As a result, it turned out that the main item of the Polish manufacturing industry, cloth, was taxed at 3%, while Russian cotton products were taxed at 15%.

The Moscow manufacturers, of course, yelled against such an order, and Kankrin, objecting to Lyubetsky, not only did not consider it possible to abolish internal customs duties, but demanded higher rates for certain goods, the competition of which was especially dangerous for Russian manufacturers. In the end, it was decided to leave the previous position. Then the question of Russian-Polish customs relations was resumed after the uprising of 1831. When Poland ceased to exist as a separate state, and the government of Nicholas raised the question of the complete incorporation of Poland, customs duties between Russia and Poland were an anomaly, and, naturally, the question of the destruction of the border traits. This was joined by the question of a common tariff in relation to foreign powers, since Poland until that time had had its own special tariffs for the western border. This question led to a huge long discussion and ended only by the 50s, after it was discussed in a special commission, after the death of Kankrin. In this commission, the main figure was the Polish economist Tengoborsky, who, it seems, was recommended to the Russian government by Lyubetsky and who turned out to be a very knowledgeable person who studied Russian economic relations in detail. In the 1950s, the border line between Russia and Poland was destroyed, and differential duties were introduced in relation to foreign trade, adapted to the needs of both countries and differed depending on where the goods imported from abroad went - to Poland or to Russia. .

An important issue in the financial policy of that time, as now, was the cost of the army. I have already pointed out that Kankrin achieved significant savings in ordinary spending on the army in the first 12 years of his administration. But just during this period, along with the reduction of ordinary expenses for the army, Russia had to endure a number of wars that required extraordinary expenses, which, no matter how Kankrin opposed this, had to be covered by loans. In these very years there was a war with Persia, which began almost immediately after the accession of Nicholas, then, in 1828–1829, a war with Turkey, which absorbed more than 120 million rubles. silver, finally, in 1831 - an extremely costly nine-month Polish campaign. Thanks to these wars, already in the first years a number of loans had to be made, the amounts of which reached almost 400 million rubles. silver. But it must be said that these loans were better than the previous issues of banknotes; although they were interest-bearing, their conditions were quite favorable. In general, as I have already said, by the 1930s, the reputation of Russian finance under the management of Kankrin had improved so much that Russian papers on foreign markets were constantly quoted by alpari, which had never happened before.

Kankrin reform in the field of drinking fees

As an unconditionally negative measure, almost all researchers of the history of Russian finance put Kankrin in minus the reform of drinking fees that he carried out in 1826.

You remember that under Guryev, wine leases were abolished and a system of state-owned wine monopoly was introduced. This system continued to exist under Kankrin until 1826. Even under Guryev, income from drinking, which initially increased, then drastically decreased due to unrest in state administration and especially due to the exorbitant theft that reigned here.

It became obvious that it was impossible to conduct this business in the absence of a staff of any honest and trained officials. And in 1826, Emperor Nicholas ordered Kankrin to draw up a report on streamlining drinking fees. Kankrin wrote the report fairly objectively. He outlined the ways of exploiting the wine income that existed then in various states, and pointed out that one of three systems could be chosen: either the system of state administration, the state wine monopoly, which excluded any trade in wine, except state wine, and which existed in Russia in that very moment, or the system of wine farming, which existed until the early 1920s, and consisted in bidding private individuals the right to operate the state wine monopoly, or, finally, the system of free trade in wine drinks with an excise tax, which is collected from each bottle or other utensils in various ways. Kankrin admitted that, in general, the system of free wine trade in general - which at that time was very strongly supported by such an influential person as Mordvinov, who always proceeded in his views from the premises of economic science - that this system, of course, is better in theory, but it it requires a certain culture and, above all, the organization of correct control, and with the presence of completely worthless officials, this system is impossible. In the same way, he recognized the system of direct state monopoly that existed at that time as unprofitable. Finally, he said that perhaps a fourth system could still be proposed - to distribute drinking income among the provinces and instead establish a direct tax, leaving the internal layout and collection of it to local authorities. But here, too, Kankrin, based on distrust of the local noble authorities, pointed out that if such “marked” cases were transferred to local authorities, then the nobility would be just as bankrupt as the bureaucracy.

Therefore, recognizing that farming is evil, he at the same time argued that under the given conditions they would be the lesser evil, if the exploitation of wine income, which everywhere makes up a huge part of the state budget, is not completely abandoned. And so, not considering it possible to replace it with another income, especially in view of the fact that we did not yet have any statistics at that time, and it was impossible to even think of replacing drinking income with land taxation or any other tax, Kankrin decided that he would completely abandon exploitation income from wine is impossible, and if so, the most convenient way is to pay off. He admitted that in the event of tax farming, the whole business would be carried out by the tax-farmers, who would accumulate huge capital at the expense of the people, but he thought that if such an accumulation of capital was left to anyone, it would be better to leave such an accumulation to the tax-farmers, since they would use this capital. on industry that is useful to the people, while industry does not even benefit from the theft of officials.

These are the reasons why Kankrin, in view of the bleak management of the then state-owned economy, recognized it as possible to restore the farm. Nevertheless, their restoration turned out to be, of course, a great evil; The tax-farmers not only enriched themselves, but bribed and enslaved the entire local administration. All the then provincial bureaucracy received from the tax-farmers a second content, no less than the official one. No wonder that when the interests of tax-farmers collided with someone else's interests, the case was always decided in favor of the tax-farmer, both in administrative and judicial places. Thus, the harm of farming out was enormous and was not atoned for by the considerations that Kankrin cited in his report in 1826.

Monetary reform Kankrin

Perhaps the most significant of all the undertakings carried out under Kankrin was the monetary reform. This reform led in the end to the devaluation of banknotes - to their redemption at a reduced price, and this was often seen as its whole meaning, but in essence the meaning of this reform at the moment when it was undertaken was not in this. The reform was undertaken by Kankrin not in the interests of the fiscal, but in the interests of facilitating all kinds of trade relations, from the disorder of which the people suffered greatly. The fact is that the exchange rate of the paper ruble constantly fluctuated, and there were even several rates: there was a bill of exchange rate, which was established by bill transactions with foreign merchants, there was a tax rate, a state one, at which banknotes were accepted by state institutions, and finally, there was a common people's rate, which was established arbitrarily in private transactions. And this common people's rate was especially fluctuating and arbitrary: at the same time it fluctuated in different places from 350 to 420 kopecks. banknotes for a ruble of silver. This happened due to the fact that all transactions were concluded on banknotes, meanwhile, due to constant fluctuations in the exchange rate, it was not known at what rate you would have to pay, and now it became a habit when concluding conditions for purchases and supply contracts, in view of the fact that the rate of banknotes was always assumed to be falling , to set for the moment of payment for the delivered products the exchange rate for bank notes somewhat lower than that existing at the time of the transaction, so that in some cases it was artificially lowered to 420 kopecks. per ruble (instead of the normal rate of 350–360 kopecks).

Suppliers of goods easily agreed to this (peasants especially suffered from this), thinking that since it was said so in the deal, then they would also pay their expenses at the same price, for example, taxes, and then, when taxes had to be paid, it turned out that the official rate did not correspond at all to the common people. In this situation, an organized system of swindle reigned in the trading world of the buyers. All this gave rise to such distrust of banknotes that the public, in search of more stable metal money, began to accept and put into circulation foreign voiced coins called “lobanchiks” and “efimki”. A special kind of merchants bought it abroad and delivered it to Russia. These foreign coins, in turn, confused all calculations and undermined the correct circulation. Under such conditions, Kankrin came to the need to issue a law on the obligatory completion of all transactions in silver, and in order to achieve this, he decided to give banknotes a mandatory fixed rate at which they would be constantly accepted by the treasury. After some exchange of views between him and Speransky, who, just before his death, wrote a note on this issue, Kankrin settled on a course of 350 kopecks. for the ruble And so, in June 1839, a very brief law was issued, which established that from now on, both in all settlements of the treasury with the population, and in all commercial transactions, the account should be kept in silver. The silver ruble was declared the main coin, although bank notes retained their value as a current coin, their rate was determined once and for all at 350 kopecks. for the ruble The consequences of this law for commercial transactions were enormous: the whole system of trickery in transactions with the common people's rate ceased, the possibility of deceiving the most simple-hearted suppliers ceased. But Kankrin did not stop there; Exactly six months later, he suggested that it would be convenient, in parallel with the banknotes, to replace all the Lobanchiks and Efimki with a new Russian paper unit, which would be completely freely exchanged for specie and would circulate like metal money. And so he released the so-called deposits, for the first time not less than 25 rubles, which were issued to those who wished to deposit into the state treasury those metal money that were inconvenient to handle, and ingots of gold and silver, and it was announced that the metal money and precious metals deposited for these deposits would remain on storage in full and will be issued at the first request back.

There was a huge demand for these deposits. The public rushed to take them, and within a few months until the end of 1842, more than 25 million rubles were contributed. sound coin. The following year, more than 12 million rubles were contributed. Within just two years, the treasury had the opportunity to issue 40 million rubles. new paper money, the rate of which was equal to the rate of silver.

Thus, in the state monetary system, three coins got their way: voiced, deposits and banknotes, the rate of which was precisely determined at 350 kopecks. for the ruble Kankrin soon decided to go further, namely, to issue such credit papers, which, as in other states, would not be fully secured by ruble for ruble specie, but only by such a fund as experience required for continuous exchange.

It was decided to introduce such credit cards, moreover, it was established that their exchange is provided by a metal fund equal to one sixth of the issued tickets. And this operation turned out to be successful: new credit notes went into use, and their rate also remained alpari.

Then the idea arose to replace all banknotes with one form of credit paper money, which is exchanged without interference for specie, and therefore does not depreciate.

Kankrin himself, however, was very afraid that if these paper money were introduced, then in time, especially after his death or resignation, it would again be tempting in case of difficulties to issue such credit notes beyond measure, and that in the end things would come to the same banknotes. But Emperor Nicholas, who at the beginning of his reign was completely ignorant of financial matters, little by little acquired from Kankrin some information on the financial side and began to consider himself an experienced financier; therefore, when Kankrin hesitated, Emperor Nicholas himself came up with his own project, the original of which, transcribed by the hand of the heir Alexander Nikolayevich, has been preserved, a project drawn up quite sensibly, in which he, arguing with Kankrin, defended the possibility of replacing all paper money, in including deposits and banknotes, some credit notes. At the same time, he intended to gradually redeem the banknotes at the price at which they were fixed by the law of 1839, i.e., 350 kopecks. for a ruble of silver. Thus, since the total number of bank notes was 595 million rubles, it was necessary to collect a fund of 170 million rubles in order to redeem them. silver; to ensure one-sixth of the banknotes issued in exchange for them, it was necessary to have in cash in the state treasury at all times only about 28 and a half million rubles. sound coin.

Emperor Nicholas believed that this could be done immediately; for this, he considered it first of all necessary to stop issuing deposits; he did not consider it possible to destroy the deposits themselves and turn their fund directly into collateral for credit notes, because this would be a breach of public confidence, but decided, as the deposits would go to the treasury, to destroy them, taking the appropriate part from the deposit fund and on to issue new credit notes, and to put one-sixth of the metal fund into their security, and to place the rest in a reserve fund, which would make it possible to make new issues of credit notes.

According to the calculation of Emperor Nicholas, it was possible to complete this entire operation in five years, and although Kankrin resisted for a very long time, in the end, after two meetings in which Nicholas against Kankrin was supported, of course, by all ministers, and after Nikolai drew up a new note, also very detailed, this final measure was taken, which put the final touch on the monetary reform: it was decided to buy out all banknotes, gradually replacing them with the issuance of credit notes, in total for 170 million rubles. silver, which would be secured by a fund of 28 million rubles. sound coin.

The whole operation was quite successful, so that when this fund - one-sixth of all issued credit notes - was deducted as security for the issued "credit cards", then the rest of the specie, which by that time was at the disposal of the government, amounted to much more than this part: it turned out to be about 66 million in specie, which was solemnly transported to the Peter and Paul Fortress, where it was counted and placed. Thus, at the disposal of the government was a huge reserve fund, which supported the exchange rate of banknotes until the Eastern War of 1853.

A few more words should be said about the cultural and social activities of Kankrin, which was also very significant and manifested itself in the activities that he took to develop technical knowledge: for example, he founded the Technological Institute in 1828, he transformed and, one might say, the Mining and Forest Institutes were put on their feet. It was he who brought the whole area, called the "forest building", into a cultural form thanks to the construction of the necessary roads and the laying out of the park.

For the first time in Russia, he established exhibitions of industry, which were then periodically held in Moscow, created the Gorygoretsky Agricultural Institute, started an agricultural newspaper, which he himself supplied to a large extent with articles.

In a word, this side of his cultural activity, not to mention valuable buildings, such as the stock exchange building and many other buildings and premises for various institutions and technical educational institutions in St. Petersburg, was an undoubted positive merit of Kankrin, traces of whose activities St. many of its parts.