In what year was the battle of Stalingrad. The battle of Stalingrad - briefly about the main thing
Total > 1 million human.
| The Great Patriotic War |
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Battle of Stalingrad- a battle between the troops of the USSR, on the one hand, and the troops of Nazi Germany, Romania, Italy and Hungary during the Great Patriotic War. The battle was one of the most important events of World War II. The battle included an attempt by the Wehrmacht to capture the left bank of the Volga near Stalingrad (modern Volgograd) and the city itself, a confrontation in the city, and a counteroffensive by the Red Army (Operation Uranus), which resulted in the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht and other German allied forces inside and around the city were surrounded and partly destroyed, partly captured. According to rough estimates, the total losses of both sides in this battle exceed two million people. The Axis powers lost large numbers of men and weapons and subsequently failed to fully recover from the defeat. I. V. Stalin wrote:
For the Soviet Union, which also suffered heavy losses during the battle, the victory in Stalingrad marked the beginning of the liberation of the country and the victorious march through Europe, which led to the final defeat of Nazi Germany in.
Previous events
The capture of Stalingrad was very important to Hitler for several reasons. It was the main industrial city on the banks of the Volga (a vital transportation route between the Caspian Sea and northern Russia). The capture of Stalingrad would provide security on the left flank of the German armies advancing into the Caucasus. Finally, the very fact that the city bore the name of Stalin, Hitler's main enemy, made the capture of the city a winning ideological and propaganda move. Stalin may also have had ideological and propaganda interests in defending the city that bore his name.
The summer offensive was codenamed Fall Blau. variant blue). It was attended by the XVII armies of the Wehrmacht and the 1st tank with the 4th tank armies.
Operation Blau began with the offensive of Army Group South against the troops of the Bryansk Front to the north and the troops of the South-West to the south of Voronezh. It is worth noting that despite the two-month break in the active hostilities of the troops of the Bryansk Front, the result was no less disastrous than for the troops of the South-Western Front, battered by the May battles. On the very first day of the operation, both Soviet fronts were broken through for tens of kilometers and the Germans rushed to the Don. Soviet troops could only oppose the Germans with weak resistance in the vast desert steppes, and then they began to flock to the east in complete disorder. Ended in complete failure and attempts to re-form the defense, when the German units entered the Soviet defensive positions from the flank. Several divisions of the Red Army in mid-July fell into a cauldron in the south of the Voronezh region near the village of Millerovo
The offensive of the German troops
Sixth Army's initial offensive was so successful that Hitler intervened again, ordering Fourth Panzer Army to join Army Group South (A). As a result, a huge "traffic jam" was formed, when the 4th and 6th armies needed several roads in the zone of operations. Both armies were firmly stuck, and the delay turned out to be quite long and slowed down the German advance by one week. With the slow advance, Hitler changed his mind and reassigned the target of the 4th Panzer Army back to the Stalingrad direction.
In July, when the German intentions became quite clear to the Soviet command, they developed plans for the defense of Stalingrad. Additional Soviet troops were deployed on the eastern bank of the Volga. The 62nd Army was created under the command of Vasily Chuikov, whose task was to defend Stalingrad at any cost.
Battle in the city
There is a version that Stalin did not give permission for the evacuation of the inhabitants of the city. However, no documentary evidence of this has yet been found. In addition, the evacuation, albeit at a slow pace, but still took place. By August 23, 1942, out of 400 thousand inhabitants of Stalingrad, about 100 thousand were evacuated. On August 24, the Stalingrad City Defense Committee adopted a belated decision to evacuate women, children and the wounded to the left bank of the Volga. All citizens, including women and children, worked on the construction of trenches and other fortifications.
A massive German bombardment on August 23 destroyed the city, killing thousands of civilians and turning Stalingrad into a vast area covered in burning ruins. Eighty percent of the housing in the city was destroyed.
The burden of the initial struggle for the city fell on the 1077th Anti-Aircraft Regiment: a unit staffed mainly by young female volunteers with no experience in destroying ground targets. Despite this, and without the proper support available from other Soviet units, the anti-aircraft gunners remained in place and fired on the advancing enemy tanks of the 16th Panzer Division until all 37 air defense batteries were destroyed or captured. By the end of August, Army Group South (B) had finally reached the Volga north of Stalingrad. Another German advance to the river south of the city also followed.
At the initial stage, the Soviet defense relied to a large extent on the "People's Militia of Workers", recruited from workers not involved in military production. Tanks continued to be built and manned by voluntary crews, consisting of factory workers, including women. The equipment was immediately sent from the conveyors of factories to the front line, often even without painting and without sighting equipment installed.
Street fighting in Stalingrad.
The Headquarters considered Eremenko's plan, but considered it unfeasible (the operation was too deep, etc.)
As a result, the Headquarters proposed the following version of the encirclement and defeat of the German troops near Stalingrad. On October 7, the directive of the General Staff (No. 170644) was issued on the conduct of an offensive operation on two fronts to encircle the 6th Army. The Don Front was asked to strike the main blow in the direction of Kotluban, break through the front and go to the Gumrak area. At the same time, the Stalingrad Front was advancing from the Gornaya Polyana region to Elshanka, and after breaking through the front, the units advanced to the Gumrak region, where they connected with the DF units. In this operation, the front command was allowed to use fresh units. Don Front - 7th Rifle Division, Stalingrad Front - 7th St. K., 4 Apt. K. The operation was scheduled for October 20th.
Thus, it was planned to encircle and destroy only the German troops fighting directly in Stalingrad (14th Panzer Corps, 51st and 4th Infantry Corps, about 12 divisions in total).
The command of the Don Front was dissatisfied with this directive. On October 9, Rokossovsky presented his plan for an offensive operation. He referred to the impossibility of breaking through the front in the Kotluban region. According to his calculations, 4 divisions were required for a breakthrough, 3 divisions for the development of a breakthrough, and 3 more divisions for cover from German attacks; thus, 7 fresh divisions were clearly not enough. Rokossovsky proposed to strike the main blow in the Kuzmichi area (height 139.7), that is, everything according to the same old scheme: surround the units of the 14th Panzer Corps, connect with the 62nd Army, and only after that move to Gumrak to join units of the 64th th army. The headquarters of the Don Front planned 4 days for this: -24 October. The "Orlovsky ledge" of the Germans haunted Rokossovsky since August 23, so he decided to "insure" and first deal with this "corn", and then complete the complete encirclement.
The Stavka did not accept Rokossovsky's proposal and recommended that he prepare an operation according to the Stavka's plan; however, he was allowed to conduct a private operation against the Oryol group of Germans on October 10, without attracting fresh forces.
In total, more than 2,500 officers and 24 generals of the 6th Army were taken prisoner during Operation Ring. In total, over 91 thousand soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht were taken prisoner. The trophies of the Soviet troops from January 10 to February 2, 1943, according to a report from the headquarters of the Don Front, were 5762 guns, 1312 mortars, 12701 machine guns, 156,987 rifles, 10,722 machine guns, 744 aircraft, 1,666 tanks, 261 armored vehicles, 80,438 vehicles, 10,679 motorcycles, 240 tractors, 571 tractors, 3 armored trains and other military property.
Battle results
The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad is the largest military and political event during the Second World War. The great battle, which ended in the encirclement, defeat and capture of a select enemy group, made a huge contribution to achieving a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and had a decisive influence on the further course of the entire Second World War.
In the Battle of Stalingrad, new features of the military art of the Armed Forces of the USSR manifested themselves with all their might. Soviet operational art was enriched by the experience of encircling and destroying the enemy.
As a result of the battle, the Red Army firmly seized the strategic initiative and now dictated its will to the enemy.
The outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad caused bewilderment and confusion in the Axis. A crisis of pro-fascist regimes began in Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. The influence of Germany on its allies sharply weakened, and the differences between them became noticeably aggravated.
Defectors and prisoners
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According to some other sources, from 91 to 110 thousand German prisoners were taken prisoner near Stalingrad. Subsequently, 140 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were buried on the battlefield by our troops (not counting the tens of thousands of German soldiers who died in the "boiler" for 73 days). According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, almost 20 thousand "accomplices" captured in Stalingrad - former Soviet prisoners who served in auxiliary positions in the 6th Army - also died in captivity. They were shot or died in the camps.
The reference book “World War II”, published in Germany in 1995, indicates that 201,000 soldiers and officers were captured near Stalingrad, of which only 6,000 returned to their homeland after the war. According to the estimates of the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, published in a special issue of the historical journal Damalz dedicated to the Battle of Stalingrad, about 250,000 people were encircled near Stalingrad. Approximately 25,000 of them managed to be evacuated from the Stalingrad pocket and more than 100,000 Wehrmacht soldiers and officers died in January 1943 during the completion of the Soviet operation "Ring". 130,000 people were taken prisoner, including 110,000 Germans, and the rest were the so-called “voluntary helpers” of the Wehrmacht (“Hiwi” is an abbreviation for the German word Hillwillge (Hiwi), literal translation; “voluntary helper”). Of these, about 5,000 survived and returned home to Germany. The 6th Army had about 52,000 Khivs, for whom the headquarters of this army developed the main directions for the training of "voluntary assistants", in which the latter were considered as "reliable comrades in the fight against Bolshevism." Among these "volunteers" were Russian support personnel and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion manned by Ukrainians. In addition, in the 6th Army ... there were about 1000 people of the Todt organization, consisting mainly of Western European workers, Croatian and Romanian associations, numbering from 1000 to 5000 soldiers, as well as several Italians.
If we compare the German and Russian data on the number of soldiers and officers captured in the Stalingrad region, then the following picture appears. Russian sources exclude from the number of prisoners of war all the so-called “voluntary assistants” of the Wehrmacht (more than 50,000 people), whom the Soviet competent authorities never classified as “prisoners of war”, but considered them as traitors to the Motherland, subject to trial under the laws of wartime. As for the mass death of prisoners of war from the "Stalingrad cauldron", most of them died during the first year of their captivity due to exhaustion, the effects of cold and numerous diseases received during their time in encirclement. Some data can be cited on this score: in the period from February 3 to June 10, 1943 alone, in the camp of German prisoners of war in Beketovka (Stalingrad region), the consequences of the "Stalingrad cauldron" cost the lives of more than 27,000 people; and out of 1800 captured officers stationed in the premises of the former monastery in Yelabuga, by April 1943 only a quarter of the contingent survived
Great Patriotic and World War II. And it began with a successful Red Army offensive, code-named "Uranus".
Prerequisites
The Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad began in November 1942, but the preparation of the plan for this operation at the Headquarters of the High Command began in September. In autumn, the German march to the Volga bogged down. For both sides, Stalingrad was important both in a strategic and propaganda sense. This city was named after the head of the Soviet state. Once Stalin led the defense of Tsaritsyn from the Whites during the Civil War. Losing this city, from the point of view of Soviet ideology, was unthinkable. In addition, if the Germans had established control over the lower reaches of the Volga, they would have been able to stop the supply of food, fuel and other important resources.
For all the above reasons, the counteroffensive near Stalingrad was planned with particular care. The process was favored by the situation at the front. The parties for some time switched to positional warfare. Finally, on November 13, 1942, the counter-offensive plan, code-named "Uranus", was signed by Stalin and approved at Headquarters.
original plan
How did the Soviet leaders want to see the counteroffensive near Stalingrad? According to the plan, the Southwestern Front, under the leadership of Nikolai Vatutin, was to strike in the area of \u200b\u200bthe small town of Serafimovich, occupied by the Germans in the summer. This grouping was ordered to break through at least 120 kilometers. Another shock formation was the Stalingrad Front. Sarpinsky lakes were chosen as the place of his offensive. After passing 100 kilometers, the armies of the front were to meet with the Southwestern Front near Kalach-Soviet. Thus, the German divisions that were in Stalingrad would be surrounded.
It was planned that the counteroffensive near Stalingrad would be supported by auxiliary strikes of the Don Front in the area of Kachalinskaya and Kletskaya. At Headquarters, they tried to determine the most vulnerable parts of the enemy formations. In the end, the strategy of the operation began to consist in the fact that the blows of the Red Army were delivered to the rear and flank of the most combat-ready and dangerous formations. It was there that they were least protected. Thanks to good organization, Operation Uranus remained a secret for the Germans until the day it was launched. The unexpectedness and coordination of the actions of the Soviet units played into their hands.
Encirclement of the enemy
As planned, the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad began on November 19. It was preceded by a powerful artillery preparation. Before dawn, the weather changed dramatically, which made adjustments to the plans of the command. Thick fog did not allow aircraft to take off, as visibility was extremely low. Therefore, the main emphasis was on artillery preparation.
The first under attack was the 3rd Romanian army, whose defenses were broken through by Soviet troops. In the rear of this formation were the Germans. They tried to stop the Red Army, but failed. The defeat of the enemy was completed by the 1st under the leadership of Vasily Butkov and the 26th tank corps of Alexei Rodin. These parts, having completed the task, began to move towards Kalach.
The next day, the offensive of the divisions of the Stalingrad Front began. During the first day, these units advanced 9 kilometers, breaking through the enemy defenses on the southern approaches to the city. After two days of fighting, three German infantry divisions were defeated. The success of the Red Army shocked and disconcerted Hitler. The Wehrmacht decided that the blow could be smoothed out by a regrouping of forces. In the end, after considering several options for action, the Germans transferred two more tank divisions to Stalingrad, which had previously operated in the North Caucasus. Paulus, until the very day when the final encirclement took place, continued to send victorious reports to his homeland. He stubbornly repeated that he would not leave the Volga and would not allow the blockade of his 6th Army.
On November 21, the 4th and 26th tank corps of the Southwestern Front reached the Manoilin farm. Here they made an unexpected maneuver, turning sharply to the east. Now these parts were moving straight to the Don and Kalach. The 24th Wehrmacht tried to stop the advance of the Red Army, but all its attempts came to nothing. At this time, the command post of the 6th Army of Paulus urgently relocated to the village of Nizhnechirskaya, fearing to be caught by the attack of Soviet soldiers.
Operation "Uranus" once again demonstrated the heroism of the Red Army. For example, the advance detachment of the 26th Panzer Corps crossed the bridge over the Don near Kalach in tanks and vehicles. The Germans turned out to be too careless - they decided that a friendly unit equipped with captured Soviet equipment was moving towards them. Taking advantage of this connivance, the Red Army destroyed the relaxed guards and took up a circular defense, waiting for the arrival of the main forces. The detachment held its positions, despite numerous enemy counterattacks. Finally, the 19th tank brigade broke through to him. These two formations jointly ensured the crossing of the main Soviet forces, which were in a hurry to cross the Don in the Kalach region. For this feat, commanders Georgy Filippov and Nikolai Filippenko were deservedly awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
On November 23, the Soviet units took control of Kalach, where 1,500 soldiers of the enemy army were captured. This meant the actual encirclement of the Germans and their allies who remained in Stalingrad and the interfluve of the Volga and Don. Operation "Uranus" at its first stage was successful. Now 330 thousand people who served in the Wehrmacht had to break through the Soviet ring. Under the circumstances, the commander of the 6th Panzer Army, Paulus, asked Hitler for permission to break through to the southeast. The Fuhrer refused. Instead, the Wehrmacht forces, located near Stalingrad, but not surrounded, were united in a new army group "Don". This formation was supposed to help Paulus break through the encirclement and hold the city. The trapped Germans had no choice but to wait for the help of their compatriots from outside.
Unclear prospects
Although the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad led to the encirclement of a significant part of the German forces, this undoubted success did not mean at all that the operation was over. The Red Army continued to attack enemy positions. The Wehrmacht grouping was extremely large, so the Headquarters hoped to break through the defense and divide it into at least two parts. However, due to the fact that the front narrowed noticeably, the concentration of enemy forces became much higher. The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad slowed down.
Meanwhile, the Wehrmacht prepared a plan for Operation Wintergewitter (which translates as "Winter Thunderstorm"). Its goal was to ensure the elimination of the encirclement of the 6th Army under the leadership of the Blockade, the Don Army Group was supposed to break through. The planning and conduct of Operation Wintergewitter was entrusted to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. The main striking force of the Germans this time was the 4th Panzer Army under the command of Hermann Goth.
"Wintergewitter"
At the turning points of the war, the scales tilt to one side or the other, and until the last moment it is not at all clear who will be the winner. So it was on the banks of the Volga at the end of 1942. The beginning of the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad remained with the Red Army. However, on December 12, the Germans tried to take the initiative into their own hands. On this day, Manstein and Goth began to implement the Wintergewitter plan.
Due to the fact that the Germans delivered their main blow from the area of the village of Kotelnikovo, this operation was also called Kotelnikovskaya. The blow was unexpected. The Red Army understood that the Wehrmacht would try to break the blockade from the outside, but the attack from Kotelnikovo was one of the least considered options for the development of the situation. On the way of the Germans, seeking to come to the rescue of their comrades, the 302nd Rifle Division was the first. She was completely scattered and disorganized. So Gotu managed to create a gap in the positions occupied by the 51st Army.
On December 13, the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht attacked the positions occupied by the 234th Tank Regiment, which was supported by the 235th Separate Tank Brigade and the 20th Anti-tank Artillery Brigade. These formations were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Diasamidze. Also nearby was the 4th mechanized corps of Vasily Volsky. Soviet groups were located near the village of Verkhne-Kumsky. The fighting of the Soviet troops and units of the Wehrmacht for control over it lasted six days.
The confrontation, which went on with varying success on both sides, almost ended on December 19. The German grouping was reinforced by fresh units that came from the rear. This event forced the Soviet commanders to retreat to the Myshkovo River. However, this five-day delay in the operation played into the hands of the Red Army. During the time that the soldiers fought for every street of Verkhne-Kumsky, the 2nd Guards Army was brought up to this area nearby.
critical moment
On December 20, the army of Goth and Paulus was separated by only 40 kilometers. However, the Germans, who were trying to break through the blockade, had already lost half of their personnel. The advance slowed down and eventually stopped. Goth's powers are over. Now, to break through the Soviet ring, the help of the encircled Germans was needed. The plan for Operation Wintergewitter, in theory, included the additional plan Donnerschlag. It consisted in the fact that the blocked 6th Army of Paulus had to go towards the comrades who were trying to break the blockade.
However, this idea was never implemented. It was all about Hitler's order "not to leave the fortress of Stalingrad for anything." If Paulus broke through the ring and connected with Goth, then he would, of course, leave the city behind. The Fuhrer considered this turn of events a complete defeat and disgrace. His ban was an ultimatum. Surely, if Paulus had fought his way through the Soviet ranks, he would have been tried in his homeland as a traitor. He understood this well and did not take the initiative at the most crucial moment.
Manstein's retreat
Meanwhile, on the left flank of the attack of the Germans and their allies, the Soviet troops were able to give a powerful rebuff. The Italian and Romanian divisions that fought on this sector of the front retreated without permission. The flight took on an avalanche-like character. People left their positions without looking back. Now the road to Kamensk-Shakhtinsky on the banks of the Severny Donets River was open for the Red Army. However, the main task of the Soviet units was the occupied Rostov. In addition, the strategically important airfields in Tatsinskaya and Morozovsk, which were necessary for the Wehrmacht for the rapid transfer of food and other resources, became naked.
In this regard, on December 23, the commander of the operation, Manstein, gave the order to retreat in order to protect the communications infrastructure located in the rear. The maneuver of the enemy was used by the 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky. The German flanks were stretched and vulnerable. On December 24, Soviet troops again entered Verkhne-Kumsky. On the same day, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive towards Kotelnikovo. Goth and Paulus were never able to connect and provide a corridor for the retreat of the encircled Germans. Operation Wintergewitter was suspended.
End of Operation Uranus
On January 8, 1943, when the position of the encircled Germans finally became hopeless, the command of the Red Army issued an ultimatum to the enemy. Paulus had to capitulate. However, he refused to do so, following the order of Hitler, for whom a failure at Stalingrad would have been a terrible blow. When the Headquarters learned that Paulus was insisting on his own, the offensive of the Red Army resumed with even greater force.
On January 10, the Don Front proceeded to the final liquidation of the enemy. According to various estimates, at that time about 250 thousand Germans were trapped. The Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad had already been going on for two months, and now a final push was needed to complete it. On January 26, the encircled Wehrmacht grouping was divided into two parts. The southern half turned out to be in the center of Stalingrad, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Barricades plant and the tractor plant - the northern half. On January 31, Paulus and his subordinates surrendered. On February 2, the resistance of the last German detachment was broken. On this day, the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad ended. The date, moreover, became the final one for the entire battle on the banks of the Volga.
Results
What were the reasons for the success of the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad? By the end of 1942, the Wehrmacht had run out of fresh manpower. There was simply no one to throw into battles in the east. The rest of the energy was exhausted. Stalingrad became the extreme point of the German offensive. In the former Tsaritsyn it choked.
The key to the whole battle was precisely the beginning of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad. The Red Army, through several fronts, was able to first encircle and then eliminate the enemy. 32 enemy divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed. In total, the Germans and their Axis allies lost about 800 thousand people. The Soviet figures were also colossal. The Red Army lost 485 thousand people, of which 155 thousand were killed.
For two and a half months of encirclement, the Germans did not make a single attempt to break out of the encirclement from the inside. They expected help from the "mainland", but the removal of the blockade by Army Group "Don" from the outside failed. Nevertheless, in the given time, the Nazis set up an air evacuation system, with the help of which about 50 thousand soldiers got out of the encirclement (mostly they were wounded). Those who remained inside the ring either died or were captured.
The plan for the counteroffensive near Stalingrad was successfully carried out. The Red Army turned the tide of the war. After this success, a gradual process of liberation of the territory of the Soviet Union from Nazi occupation began. In general, the Battle of Stalingrad, for which the counteroffensive of the Soviet armed forces was the final chord, turned out to be one of the largest and bloodiest battles in the history of mankind. The battles on the burnt, bombed and devastated ruins were further complicated by the winter weather. Many defenders of the motherland died from the cold climate and the diseases caused by it. Nevertheless, the city (and behind it the entire Soviet Union) was saved. The name of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad - "Uranus" - is forever inscribed in military history.
Reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht
Much later, after the end of World War II, Manstein published his memoirs, in which, among other things, he described in detail his attitude to the Battle of Stalingrad and the Soviet counter-offensive under it. He blamed Hitler for the death of the encircled 6th Army. The Fuhrer did not want to surrender Stalingrad and thus cast a shadow on his reputation. Because of this, the Germans were first in the boiler, and then completely surrounded.
The armed forces of the Third Reich had other complications. Transport aviation was clearly not enough to provide the encircled divisions with the necessary ammunition, fuel and food. The air corridor was never used to the end. In addition, Manstein mentioned that Paulus refused to break through the Soviet ring towards Goth precisely because of the lack of fuel and the fear of suffering a final defeat, while also disobeying the order of the Fuhrer.
For the German command, the capture of Stalingrad was of key importance. This city greatly interfered with the Nazi troops - in addition to the fact that there were many defense plants in it, it also blocked the path to the Caucasus, a source of oil and fuel.
Therefore, it was decided to capture Stalingrad - and with one swift blow, as the German command liked. Blitzkrieg tactics at the beginning of the war worked more than once - but not with Stalingrad.
July 17, 1942 two armies - the 6th German Army under the command of Paulus and the Stalingrad Front under the command of Timoshenko - met on the outskirts of the city. Fierce fighting began.
The Germans attacked Stalingrad with tank troops and air raids, and infantry battles raged day and night. Almost the entire population of the city went to the front, and the remaining residents, without closing their eyes, produced ammunition and weapons.
The advantage was on the side of the enemy, and in September the fighting moved to the streets of Stalingrad. These street battles went down in history - the Germans, who were used to capturing cities and countries in a couple of weeks with swift throws, were forced to fight fiercely for every street, every house, every floor.
Only two months later the city was captured. Hitler had already announced the capture of Stalingrad - but this was somewhat premature.
Offensive.
For all their strength, the Germans had weak flanks. The Soviet command took advantage of this. Back in September, a grouping of troops began to be created, the purpose of which was to strike back.
And just a few days after the alleged "capture" of the city, this army went on the offensive. Generals Rokossovsky and Vatutin managed to surround the German forces, inflicting significant damage on them - five divisions were captured, seven were completely destroyed. At the end of November, the Germans tried to break the blockade around them, but failed.
Destruction of the army of Paulus.
The encircled German troops, who found themselves at the beginning of winter without ammunition, food and even uniforms, were asked to surrender. Paulus understood the hopelessness of the situation and sent a request to Hitler, asking for permission to surrender - but received a categorical refusal and an order to stand "to the last bullet."
After that, the forces of the Don Front almost completely destroyed the encircled German army. On February 2, 1943, the last resistance of the enemy was broken, and the remnants of the German forces - including Paulus himself and his officers - finally surrendered.
Significance of the Battle of Stalingrad.
The Battle of Stalingrad was the turning point of the war. After it, the Russian troops stopped retreating and launched a decisive offensive. The battle also inspired the allies - in 1944, the long-awaited second front was opened, and the internal struggle against the Nazi regime intensified in European countries.
Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad.
- Pilot Mikhail Baranov
- Pilot Ivan Kobyletsky
- Pilot Pyotr Dymchenko
- Pilot Trofim Voytanik
- Pilot Alexander Popov
- Pilot Alexander Loginov
- Pilot Ivan Kochuev
- Pilot Arkady Ryabov
- Pilot Oleg Kilgovatov
- Pilot Mikhail Dmitriev
- Pilot Evgeny Zherdiy
- Sailor Mikhail Panikakha
- Sniper Vasily Zaitsev
- And etc.
The encirclement of Red Army units near Kharkov in May 1942 and the defeat near Kerch sharply worsened the situation on the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front. The Germans almost without respite struck new blows. At the end of July 1942, the Germans managed to cross the Don in its lower reaches and capture Rostov. The tank and motorized columns of Field Marshal Liszt were advancing in an unstoppable stream across the vast expanses of the Kuban. Large oil fields in the Maikop region soon found themselves under German occupation. Again, as in the summer of 1941, mortal danger loomed over the country.
On July 28, 1942, the order of the Headquarters No. 227 appeared, signed personally, known as "Not a step back!"
(Unpublished)
The enemy is throwing ever new forces at the front and, regardless of heavy losses for him, he is pushing forward, tearing into the depths of the Soviet Union, seizing new areas, devastating and devastating our cities and villages, raping, robbing and killing the Soviet population. The fighting is going on in the Voronezh region, on the Don, in the south, at the gates of the North Caucasus. The German invaders are rushing to Stalingrad, to the Volga and want to capture the Kuban, the North Caucasus with their oil and grain wealth at any cost (...)
The population of our country, which treats the Red Army with love and respect, begins to become disillusioned with it, loses faith in the Red Army, and many of them curse the Red Army because it gives our people under the yoke of the German oppressors, and itself flows away to the east ( ...)
Every commander, Red Army soldier and political worker must understand that our means are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people—workers, peasants, intellectuals, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children... We no longer have superiority over the Germans either in manpower or in grain supplies. To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time ruin our Motherland. Each new piece of territory left by us will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defense, our Motherland in every possible way (...)
It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat.
Not one step back! This should be our main call now(...)
There is a lack of order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, tank units, air squadrons. This is now our main shortcoming. We must establish the strictest order and iron discipline in our army if we want to save the situation and defend the Motherland (...)
The Supreme High Command of the Red Army orders:
1. To the military councils of the fronts and, above all, to the commanders of the fronts:
a) to unconditionally liquidate retreating moods among the troops and to suppress with an iron fist the propaganda that we can and must supposedly retreat further to the east, that there will be no harm supposedly from such a retreat;
b) unconditionally remove from their posts and send them to Headquarters to bring to court martial the commanders of the armies who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the front command;
c) to form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send medium and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them on more difficult sections of the front, in order to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.
2. The military councils of the armies and, above all, the commanders of the armies (...)
b) to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in case of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland;
c) to form within the army from five to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 people each), where to send ordinary soldiers and junior commanders who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them in difficult areas army to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood (...)
Read the order in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, teams, headquarters.
People's Commissar of Defense I. STALIN. Living memory. Great Patriotic War: the truth about the war. In three volumes. Volume one. - FROM.Although in certain areas of Stalingrad the enemy was only 150-200 meters from the banks of the Volga, he could no longer move further. The struggle was for every street, for every house. The defense of just one house by fighters under the command of Sergeant Y. Pavlov became a legend. For 58 days and nights, Soviet soldiers defended their positions and did not surrender them to the enemy.
The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad began on the morning of November 19, 1942. The troops of the South-Western (commander General N. Vatutin), Donskoy (formed on September 28, 1942, commander General K. Rokossovsky), and then Stalingrad (commander General A. Eremenko ) fronts, breaking through the enemy defenses, rushed in converging directions to Kalach, located behind enemy lines. The main blows were inflicted on positions occupied mainly by the Romanian and Italian divisions. On the evening of November 21, Moscow radio broadcast an emergency message from the Sovinformburo stating:
The other day our troops stationed on the outskirts of Stalingrad went over to the offensive against the Nazi troops. The offensive began in two directions: from the northwest and from the south of Stalingrad. Having broken through the enemy's defensive line 30 km long in the northwest (near Serafimovich), and 20 km south of Stalingrad, our troops advanced 60-70 km over three days of intense fighting, overcoming enemy resistance ... Thus both railways supplying the enemy troops located east of the Don were interrupted. During the offensive of our troops, six enemy infantry and one tank divisions were completely destroyed. Heavy losses were inflicted on seven enemy infantry, two tank and two motorized divisions. During three days of fighting, 13 thousand prisoners and 360 guns were captured, as well as many machine guns, mortars, rifles, vehicles, a large number of warehouses with ammunition, weapons and food. The enemy left 14 thousand corpses of soldiers and officers on the battlefield. The troops of Lieutenant General Romanenko, Major General Chistyakov, Major General Tolbukhin, Major General Trufanov, and Lieutenant General Batov distinguished themselves in battle. The offensive of our troops continues.
Kulkov E.N., Myagkov M.Yu., Rzheshevsky O.A. War 1941-1945 Facts and documents. M., 2010.On November 23, 1942, the shock groups of the Soviet fronts joined in the Kalach region and closed the ring around 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total strength of more than 300 thousand people from the 6th field and 4th tank armies of the enemy. The Nazi army did not know such a shock.
FROM THE ULTIMATUM OF THE SOVIET COMMAND TO THE COMMANDER OF THE GERMAN 6TH ARMY, COLONEL GENERAL PAULUS, January 8, 1943
The 6th German Army, the formations of the 4th Panzer Army and the reinforcement units attached to them have been in complete encirclement since November 23, 1942. Parts of the Red Army surrounded this group of German troops in a dense ring. All hopes for the salvation of your troops by the advance of the German troops from the south and south-west did not come true. The German troops rushing to your aid were defeated by the Red Army and the remnants of these troops retreat to Rostov (...) The situation of your encircled troops is difficult. They experience hunger, sickness and cold. The harsh Russian winter is just beginning; severe frosts, cold winds and snowstorms are yet to come, and your soldiers are not provided with winter uniforms and are in severe unsanitary conditions.
You, as the commander and all the officers of the encircled troops, are well aware that you have no real opportunities to break through the encirclement. Your position is hopeless and further resistance does not make any sense.
In the conditions of the hopeless situation that has developed for you, in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, we suggest that you accept the following terms of surrender:
1) All German encircled troops, led by you and your headquarters, stop resistance.
2) You will transfer in an organized manner all personnel and weapons to our disposal. all military equipment and military property in good condition.
We guarantee life and safety to all officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who have ceased resistance, and after the end of the war, return to Germany or any country where the prisoners of war will express their desire.
We preserve military uniforms, insignia and orders, personal belongings, valuables for all personnel of the surrendered troops, and edged weapons for the highest officers.
All surrendered officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers will immediately be given normal food. All the wounded, sick and frostbite will receive medical assistance.
Representative of the Stavka
of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army Colonel-General of Artillery Voronov
Commander of the Don Front, Lieutenant General Rokossovsky
The Great Patriotic War. Military-historical essays. Book 2. Fracture. M., 1998. P. 429Paulus's refusal to capitulate to the Soviet troops as early as the beginning of January 1943 was, in fact, a death sentence for both those who fell in battle and captured German soldiers. The overwhelming majority of the 91,000 soldiers captured in Stalingrad had turned into living corpses by the beginning of February - frostbitten, sick, exhausted people. Hundreds of them died before they even reached the assembly camps. After the end of the battles in Stalingrad, the Soviet people rejoiced. Such a bright and obvious victory was inspiring. In Germany, on the contrary, a three-day mourning was declared, which became the external reaction of the German leadership to the events. “The possibility of ending the war in the East through an offensive no longer exists,” Hitler declared at a meeting of the Wehrmacht’s senior officers on February 1, 1943.
The battle for Stalingrad in terms of the duration and fierceness of the fighting, in terms of the number of people and military equipment participating, surpassed at that time all the battles of world history.
At certain stages, more than 2 million people, up to 2 thousand tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft, up to 26 thousand guns participated in it on both sides. The fascist German troops lost more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers, as well as a large number of military equipment, weapons and equipment, killed, wounded, captured.
Defense of Stalingrad (now Volgograd)
In accordance with the plan of the summer offensive campaign of 1942, the German command, having concentrated large forces in the southwestern direction, expected to defeat the Soviet troops, go to the big bend of the Don, seize Stalingrad on the move and capture the Caucasus, and then resume the offensive in the Moscow direction.
For the attack on Stalingrad, the 6th Army (commander - Colonel General F. von Paulus) was allocated from Army Group B. By July 17, it included 13 divisions, in which there were about 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars and about 500 tanks. They were supported by aviation of the 4th air fleet - up to 1200 combat aircraft.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command moved the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies from its reserve to the Stalingrad direction. On July 12, on the basis of the field administration of the troops of the Southwestern Front, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. On July 23, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov was appointed commander of the front. The front also included the 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined arms and 8th air armies of the former Southwestern Front, and from July 30 - the 51st Army of the North Caucasian Front. At the same time, the 57th, as well as the 38th and 28th armies, on the basis of which the 1st and 4th tank armies were formed, were in reserve. The Volga military flotilla was subordinated to the front commander.
The newly created front began to fulfill the task, having only 12 divisions, in which there were 160 thousand soldiers and commanders, 2.2 thousand guns and mortars and about 400 tanks, the 8th Air Army had 454 aircraft.
In addition, 150-200 long-range bombers and 60 air defense fighters were involved. In the initial period of defensive actions near Stalingrad, the enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops by 1.7 times in personnel, by 1.3 times in artillery and tanks, and by more than 2 times in the number of aircraft.
On July 14, 1942, Stalingrad was declared under martial law. Four defensive bypasses were built on the outskirts of the city: outer, middle, inner and city. The entire population, including children, was mobilized for the construction of defensive structures. The factories of Stalingrad completely switched to the production of military products. Militia units, self-defense work units were created at factories and enterprises. Civilians, equipment of individual enterprises and material values were evacuated to the left bank of the Volga.
Defensive battles began on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. The main efforts of the troops of the Stalingrad Front were concentrated in the large bend of the Don, where they occupied the defenses of the 62nd and 64th armies in order to prevent the enemy from forcing the river and breaking through it by the shortest route to Stalingrad. From July 17, the forward detachments of these armies fought defensive battles for 6 days at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers. This allowed us to gain time to strengthen the defense at the main line. Despite the steadfastness, courage and perseverance shown by the troops, the armies of the Stalingrad Front failed to defeat the enemy groupings that had penetrated, and they had to retreat to the near approaches to the city.
On July 23-29, the 6th German Army made an attempt to encircle them with sweeping attacks on the flanks of the Soviet troops in the large bend of the Don, go to the Kalach region and break through to Stalingrad from the west. As a result of the stubborn defense of the 62nd and 64th armies and the counterattack of the formations of the 1st and 4th tank armies, the enemy's plan was thwarted.
Defense of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
July 31, the German command turned the 4th Panzer Army Colonel General G. Goth from the Caucasus to the Stalingrad direction. On August 2, its advanced units reached Kotelnikovsky, creating a threat of a breakthrough to the city. Fighting began on the southwestern approaches to Stalingrad.
To facilitate command and control of troops stretched out over a 500 km zone, on August 7, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed a new one from several armies of the Stalingrad Front - the South-Eastern Front, the command of which was entrusted to Colonel General A. I. Eremenko. The main efforts of the Stalingrad Front were directed to the fight against the 6th German Army, which was advancing on Stalingrad from the west and northwest, and the South-Eastern Front was directed to the defense of the southwestern direction. On August 9-10, the troops of the South-Eastern Front launched a counterattack on the 4th Panzer Army and forced it to stop.
On August 21, the infantry of the 6th German Army crossed the Don and built bridges, after which the tank divisions moved to Stalingrad. At the same time, Gotha's tanks launched an offensive from the south and southwest. 23 August 4th Air Army von Richthofen subjected the city to a massive bombardment, dropping more than 1000 tons of bombs on the city.
Tank formations of the 6th Army moved towards the city, encountering almost no resistance, however, in the Gumrak area, they had to overcome the positions of anti-aircraft gun crews that had been put forward to fight the tanks until the evening. Nevertheless, on August 23, the 14th Panzer Corps of the 6th Army managed to break through to the Volga north of Stalingrad near the village of Latoshynka. The enemy wanted to break into the city on the move through its northern outskirts, however, along with the army units, self-defense units, the Stalingrad police, the 10th division of the NKVD troops, sailors of the Volga military flotilla, cadets of military schools stood up to defend the city.
The enemy's breakthrough to the Volga further complicated and worsened the position of the units defending the city. The Soviet command took measures to destroy the enemy grouping that had broken through to the Volga. Until September 10, the troops of the Stalingrad Front and the reserves of the Headquarters transferred to its structure launched continuous counterattacks from the north-west on the left flank of the 6th German Army. It was not possible to push the enemy back from the Volga, but the enemy offensive on the northwestern approaches to Stalingrad was suspended. The 62nd Army was cut off from the rest of the troops of the Stalingrad Front and was transferred to the South-Eastern Front.
Since September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to the 62nd Army, commanded by General V. I. Chuikov, and troops of the 64th Army General M.S. Shumilov. On the same day, after another bombardment, German troops launched an attack on the city from all directions. In the north, the main target was Mamaev Kurgan, from the height of which the crossing over the Volga was clearly visible, in the center the German infantry made its way to the railway station, in the south, Goth's tanks, with the support of the infantry, gradually moved towards the elevator.
On September 13, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 13th Guards Rifle Division to the city. Having crossed the Volga for two nights, the guards threw back the German troops from the area of the central crossing over the Volga, cleared many streets and quarters of them. On September 16, the troops of the 62nd Army, with the support of aviation, stormed the Mamaev Kurgan. Fierce battles for the southern and central parts of the city continued until the end of the month.
On September 21, on the front from Mamaev Kurgan to the Zatsaritsyno part of the city, the Germans launched a new offensive with the forces of five divisions. A day later, on September 22, the 62nd Army was cut into two parts: the Germans reached the central crossing north of the Tsaritsa River. From here they had the opportunity to view almost the entire rear of the army and conduct an offensive along the coast, cutting off the Soviet units from the river.
By September 26, the Germans managed to come close to the Volga in almost all areas. Nevertheless, Soviet troops continued to hold a narrow strip of the coast, and in some places even separate buildings at some distance from the embankment. Many objects changed hands many times.
The fighting in the city took on a protracted character. The troops of Paulus lacked the strength to finally throw the defenders of the city into the Volga, and the Soviet ones - to dislodge the Germans from their positions.
The struggle was for each building, and sometimes for part of the building, floor or basement. Snipers were active. The use of aviation and artillery, due to the proximity of enemy formations, became almost impossible.
From September 27 to October 4, active hostilities were waged on the northern outskirts for the villages of the Krasny Oktyabr and Barrikady factories, and from October 4 - for these factories themselves.
At the same time, the Germans were attacking in the center on Mamaev Kurgan and on the extreme right flank of the 62nd Army in the Orlovka area. By the evening of September 27, Mamaev Kurgan fell. An extremely difficult situation developed in the area of the mouth of the Tsaritsa River, from where the Soviet units, experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition and food and losing control, began to cross over to the left bank of the Volga. The 62nd Army responded with counterattacks of the newly arriving reserves.
They were rapidly melting, however, the losses of the 6th Army took on catastrophic proportions.
It included almost all the armies of the Stalingrad Front, except for the 62nd. Commander was appointed General K. K. Rokossovsky. From the composition of the South-Eastern Front, whose troops fought in the city and to the south, the Stalingrad Front was formed under the command General A. I. Eremenko. Each front was directly subordinated to the Stavka.
Commander of the Don Front Konstantin Rokossovsky and General Pavel Batov (right) in a trench near Stalingrad. Photo reproduction. Photo: RIA Novosti
By the end of the first decade of October, enemy attacks began to weaken, but in the middle of the month Paulus launched a new assault. On October 14, the German troops, after a powerful air and artillery preparation, went on the attack again.
Several divisions advanced on a sector of about 5 km. This offensive of the enemy, which lasted almost three weeks, led to the most fierce battle in the city.
On October 15, the Germans managed to capture the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and break through to the Volga, cutting the 62nd Army in half. After that, they launched an offensive along the banks of the Volga to the south. On October 17, the 138th division arrived in the army to support Chuikov's weakened formations. Fresh forces repelled enemy attacks, and from October 18, Paulus' ram began to noticeably lose its strength.
To alleviate the position of the 62nd Army, on October 19, troops from the Don Front went on the offensive from the area north of the city. The territorial success of the flank counterattacks was insignificant, but they delayed the regrouping undertaken by Paulus.
By the end of October, the offensive operations of the 6th Army slowed down, although in the area between the Barrikady and Krasny Oktyabr factories, no more than 400 m remained to go to the Volga. Nevertheless, the tension of the fighting weakened, and the Germans basically consolidated the captured positions.
November 11 was made the last attempt to capture the city. This time the offensive was carried out by the forces of five infantry and two tank divisions, reinforced by fresh engineer battalions. The Germans managed to capture another section of the coast 500-600 m long in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Barricades plant, but this was the last success of the 6th Army.
In other sectors, Chuikov's troops held their positions.
The offensive of the German troops in the Stalingrad direction was finally stopped.
By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Barrikady plant, and the northeastern quarters of the city center. The 64th Army defended the approaches.
During the period of defensive battles for Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet data, lost in July - November up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded, more than 1000 tanks, over 2000 guns and mortars, more than 1400 aircraft. The total losses of the Red Army in the Stalingrad defensive operation amounted to 643,842 people, 1,426 tanks, 12,137 guns and mortars, and 2,063 aircraft.
Soviet troops exhausted and bled the enemy grouping operating near Stalingrad, which created favorable conditions for a counteroffensive.
Stalingrad offensive operation
By the autumn of 1942, the technical re-equipment of the Red Army had been basically completed. At the factories located in the deep rear and evacuated, mass production of new military equipment was launched, which not only was not inferior, but often surpassed the equipment and weapons of the Wehrmacht. During the past battles, Soviet troops gained combat experience. The moment had come when it was necessary to wrest the initiative from the enemy and begin mass expulsion of him from the borders of the Soviet Union.
With the participation of the military councils of the fronts at Headquarters, a plan for the Stalingrad offensive operation was developed.
The Soviet troops were to launch a decisive counter-offensive on a front of 400 km, encircle and destroy the enemy strike force concentrated in the Stalingrad area. This task was assigned to the troops of three fronts - the South-Western ( Commander General N. F. Vatutin), Donskoy ( Commander General K. K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad ( Commander General A. I. Eremenko).
The forces of the parties were approximately equal, although in tanks, artillery and aviation, Soviet troops already had a slight superiority over the enemy. Under such conditions, in order to successfully complete the operation, it was necessary to create a significant superiority in forces in the directions of the main attacks, which was achieved with great skill. The success was ensured primarily due to the fact that special attention was paid to operational camouflage. The troops moved to the assigned positions only at night, while the radio stations of the units remained in the same places, continuing to work, so that the enemy had the impression that the units remained in their previous positions. All correspondence was forbidden, and orders were given only orally, and only to direct executors.
The Soviet command concentrated more than a million people on the direction of the main attack in a 60 km sector, supported by 900 T-34 tanks that had just rolled off the assembly line. Such a concentration of military equipment at the front has never happened before.
One of the centers of fighting in Stalingrad is an elevator. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
The German command did not show due attention to the position of its Army Group "B", because. was waiting for the offensive of the Soviet troops against the Army Group "Center".
Group B Commander General Weichs did not agree with this opinion. He was worried about the bridgehead prepared by the enemy on the right bank of the Don opposite his formations. According to his insistent demands, by the end of October, several newly formed Luftwaffe field units were transferred to the Don in order to strengthen the defensive positions of the Italian, Hungarian and Romanian formations.
Weichs' predictions were confirmed in early November, when aerial reconnaissance photographs showed the presence of several new crossings in the area. Two days later, Hitler ordered the transfer of the 6th Panzer and two infantry divisions from the English Channel to Army Group B as reserve reinforcements for the 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies. It took about five weeks for their preparation and transfer to Russia. Hitler, however, did not expect any significant action from the enemy until early December, so he calculated that reinforcements should have arrived in time.
By the second week of November, with the appearance of Soviet tank units on the bridgehead, Weichs no longer doubted that a major offensive was being prepared in the zone of the 3rd Romanian army, which, possibly, would also be directed against the German 4th tank army. Since all of his reserves were at Stalingrad, Weichs decided to form a new grouping as part of the 48th Panzer Corps, which he placed behind the 3rd Romanian Army. He also transferred the 3rd Romanian armored division to this corps and was about to transfer the 29th motorized division of the 4th tank army there, but changed his mind, because he also expected an offensive in the area where the Gota formations were located. However, all the efforts made by Weichs turned out to be clearly insufficient, and the High Command was more interested in building up the power of the 6th Army for the decisive battle for Stalingrad than in strengthening the weak flanks of General Weichs's formations.
On November 19, at 0850, after a powerful, almost one and a half hour artillery preparation, despite the fog and heavy snowfall, the troops of the Southwestern and Don fronts, located northwest of Stalingrad, went on the offensive. The 5th Panzer, 1st Guards and 21st Armies acted against the 3rd Romanian.
Only one 5th tank army in its composition consisted of six rifle divisions, two tank corps, one cavalry corps and several artillery, aviation and anti-aircraft missile regiments. Due to a sharp deterioration in weather conditions, aviation was inactive.
It also turned out that during the artillery preparation, the enemy’s firepower was not completely suppressed, which is why the offensive of the Soviet troops at some point slowed down. After assessing the situation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant-General N.F. Vatutin, decided to bring tank corps into battle, which made it possible to finally crack the Romanian defense and develop the offensive.
On the Don Front, especially fierce battles unfolded in the offensive zone of the right-flank formations of the 65th Army. The first two lines of enemy trenches, passing along the coastal hills, were captured on the move. However, decisive battles unfolded behind the third line, which took place along the chalk heights. They were a powerful defense center. The location of the heights made it possible to fire at all the approaches to them with crossfire. All the hollows and steep slopes of the heights were mined and covered with barbed wire, and the approaches to them crossed deep and winding ravines. The Soviet infantry that reached this line was forced to lie down under heavy fire from the dismounted units of the Romanian cavalry division, reinforced by German units.
The enemy carried out violent counterattacks, trying to push the attackers back to their original position. At that moment it was not possible to get around the heights, and after a powerful artillery raid, the soldiers of the 304th Infantry Division stormed the enemy fortifications. Despite the hurricane of machine-gun and automatic fire, by 4 p.m. the enemy's stubborn resistance had been broken.
As a result of the first day of the offensive, the troops of the Southwestern Front achieved the greatest success. They broke through the defenses in two areas: southwest of the city of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. A gap up to 16 km wide was formed in the enemy defenses.
On November 20, south of Stalingrad, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. This came as a complete surprise to the Germans. The offensive of the Stalingrad Front also began in adverse weather conditions.
It was decided to begin artillery preparation in each army as soon as the necessary conditions for this were created. It was necessary to abandon its simultaneous conduct on the scale of the front, however, as well as from aviation training. Due to limited visibility, it was necessary to fire at unobservable targets, with the exception of those guns that were launched for direct fire. Despite this, the enemy's fire system was largely disrupted.
Soviet soldiers are fighting in the streets. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
After the artillery preparation, which lasted 40-75 minutes, the formations of the 51st and 57th armies went on the offensive.
Having broken through the defenses of the 4th Romanian army and repelled numerous counterattacks, they began to develop success in the western direction. By the middle of the day, conditions were created for the introduction of army mobile groups into the breakthrough.
The rifle formations of the armies advanced after the mobile groups, consolidating the success achieved.
To close the gap, the command of the 4th Romanian army had to bring into battle its last reserve - two regiments of the 8th cavalry division. But even this could not save the situation. The front collapsed, and the remnants of the Romanian troops fled.
The incoming reports painted a bleak picture: the front was cut, the Romanians were fleeing the battlefield, the counterattack of the 48th Panzer Corps was thwarted.
The Red Army went on the offensive south of Stalingrad, and the 4th Romanian Army, which was defending there, was defeated.
The Luftwaffe command reported that due to bad weather, aviation could not support ground troops. On the operational maps, the prospect of encirclement of the 6th Wehrmacht Army clearly loomed. The red arrows of the blows of the Soviet troops hung dangerously over its flanks and were about to close in the area between the Volga and the Don. In the course of almost continuous meetings at Hitler's headquarters, there was a feverish search for a way out of the situation. It was necessary to urgently make a decision about the fate of the 6th Army. Hitler himself, as well as Keitel and Jodl, considered it necessary to hold positions in the Stalingrad region and confine themselves to a regrouping of forces. The leadership of the OKH and the command of Army Group "B" found the only way to avoid disaster in withdrawing the troops of the 6th Army beyond the Don. However, Hitler's position was categorical. As a result, it was decided to transfer two tank divisions from the North Caucasus to Stalingrad.
The Wehrmacht command still hoped to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops with counterattacks by tank formations. The 6th Army was ordered to stay where it was. Hitler assured her command that he would not allow the encirclement of the army, and if it did happen, he would take all measures to unblock it.
While the German command was looking for ways to prevent the impending catastrophe, the Soviet troops developed the success achieved. A unit of the 26th Panzer Corps, during a daring night operation, managed to capture the only surviving crossing over the Don near the town of Kalach. The capture of this bridge was of great operational importance. The rapid overcoming of this large water barrier by the Soviet troops ensured the successful completion of the operation to encircle the enemy troops near Stalingrad.
By the end of November 22, the troops of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts were separated by only 20-25 km. On the evening of November 22, Stalin ordered the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Yeryomenko, to join tomorrow with the advanced troops of the Southwestern Front, which had reached Kalach, and close the encirclement.
Anticipating such a development of events and in order to prevent the complete encirclement of the 6th field army, the German command urgently transferred the 14th tank corps to the area east of Kalach. Throughout the night of November 23 and the first half of the next day, units of the Soviet 4th mechanized corps held back the onslaught of enemy tank units rushing south and did not let them through.
The commander of the 6th Army already at 18 o'clock on November 22 radioed to the headquarters of Army Group "B" that the army was surrounded, the situation with ammunition was critical, fuel supplies were running out, and food was enough for only 12 days. Since the command of the Wehrmacht on the Don did not have any forces that could release the encircled army, Paulus turned to the Headquarters with a request for an independent breakthrough from the encirclement. However, his request went unanswered.
Red Army soldier with a banner. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
Instead, he was ordered to immediately go to the boiler, where to organize an all-round defense and wait for help from outside.
On November 23, the troops of all three fronts continued the offensive. On this day, the operation reached its climax.
Two brigades of the 26th Panzer Corps crossed the Don and launched an offensive against Kalach in the morning. A stubborn battle ensued. The enemy fiercely resisted, realizing the importance of holding this city. Nevertheless, by 2 p.m., he was driven out of Kalach, which housed the main supply base for the entire Stalingrad group. All the numerous warehouses with fuel, ammunition, food and other military equipment located there were either destroyed by the Germans themselves or captured by Soviet troops.
At about 4 p.m. on November 23, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts met in the Sovetsky area, thus completing the encirclement of the enemy's Stalingrad grouping. Despite the fact that instead of the planned two or three days, the operation took five days, the success was achieved.
An oppressive atmosphere reigned at Hitler's headquarters after the news of the encirclement of the 6th Army was received. Despite the obviously disastrous situation of the 6th Army, Hitler did not even want to hear about the abandonment of Stalingrad, because. in this case, all the successes of the summer offensive in the south would have been nullified, and with them all hopes for conquering the Caucasus would have disappeared. In addition, it was believed that the battle with the superior forces of Soviet troops in the open field, in harsh winter conditions, with limited means of transportation, fuel and ammunition, had too little chance of a favorable outcome. Therefore, it is better to gain a foothold in the positions occupied and strive to unblock the grouping. This point of view was supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reichsmarschall G. Goering, who assured the Führer that his aircraft would supply the encircled group by air. On the morning of November 24, the 6th Army was ordered to take up an all-round defense and wait for a deblocking offensive from the outside.
Violent passions also flared up at the headquarters of the 6th Army on November 23. The encirclement ring around the 6th Army had just closed, and a decision had to be made urgently. There was still no response to Paulus's radiogram, in which he requested "freedom of action". But Paulus hesitated to take responsibility for the breakthrough. By his order, the corps commanders gathered for a meeting at the army headquarters in order to work out a plan for further actions.
Commander of the 51st Army Corps General W. Seidlitz-Kurzbach called for an immediate breakthrough. He was supported by the commander of the 14th Panzer Corps General G. Hube.
But most of the corps commanders, led by the chief of staff of the army General A. Schmidt spoke out against. Things got to the point that in the course of a heated dispute, the infuriated commander of the 8th Army Corps General W. Gates threatened to personally shoot Seydlitz if he insisted on disobeying the Fuhrer. In the end, everyone agreed that Hitler should be approached for permission to break through. At 23:45, such a radiogram was sent. The answer came the next morning. In it, the troops of the 6th Army, surrounded in Stalingrad, were called "troops of the fortress of Stalingrad", and the breakthrough was denied. Paulus again gathered the corps commanders and brought them the order of the Fuhrer.
Some of the generals tried to express their counterarguments, but the army commander rejected all objections.
An urgent transfer of troops from Stalingrad began to the western sector of the front. In a short time, the enemy managed to create a grouping of six divisions. In order to pin down his forces in Stalingrad itself, on November 23, the 62nd Army of General V.I. Chuikov went on the offensive. Its troops attacked the Germans on the Mamayev Kurgan and in the area of the Krasny Oktyabr plant, but met with fierce resistance. The depth of their advancement during the day did not exceed 100-200 m.
By November 24, the encirclement was thin, an attempt to break through it could bring success, it was only necessary to remove troops from the Volga front. But Paulus was a too cautious and indecisive person, a general who was used to obeying and accurately weighing his actions. He obeyed the order. Subsequently, he confessed to the officers of his headquarters: “It is possible that the daredevil Reichenau after November 19, he would have made his way to the west with the 6th Army and then told Hitler: "Now you can judge me." But, you know, unfortunately, I'm not Reichenau."
On November 27, the Fuhrer ordered Field Marshal von Manstein prepare the deblockade of the 6th field army. Hitler relied on new heavy tanks - "Tigers", hoping that they would be able to break through the encirclement from the outside. Despite the fact that these machines had not yet been tested in combat and no one knew how they would behave in the conditions of the Russian winter, he believed that even one battalion of "Tigers" could radically change the situation near Stalingrad.
While Manstein received reinforcements from the Caucasus and prepared the operation, Soviet troops expanded the outer ring and fortified it. When on December 12 Panzer Group Gotha made a breakthrough, it was able to break through the positions of the Soviet troops, and its advanced units were separated from Paulus by less than 50 km. But Hitler forbade Friedrich Paulus to expose the Volga Front and, leaving Stalingrad, to make his way towards the “tigers” of Goth, which finally decided the fate of the 6th Army.
By January 1943, the enemy was driven back from the Stalingrad "cauldron" by 170-250 km. The death of the encircled troops became inevitable. Almost the entire territory occupied by them was shot through by Soviet artillery fire. Despite Goering's promise, in practice, the average daily aviation capacity in supplying the 6th Army could not exceed 100 tons instead of the required 500. In addition, the delivery of goods to the encircled groups in Stalingrad and other "boilers" caused huge losses in German aviation.
The ruins of the fountain "Barmaley" - which has become one of the symbols of Stalingrad. Photo: www.globallookpress.com
On January 10, 1943, Colonel General Paulus, despite the hopeless situation of his army, refused to capitulate, trying to tie down the Soviet troops surrounding him as much as possible. On the same day, the Red Army launched an operation to destroy the 6th field army of the Wehrmacht. In the last days of January, Soviet troops pushed the remnants of Paulus's army into a small area of the completely destroyed city and dismembered the Wehrmacht units that continued to defend. On January 24, 1943, General Paulus sent one of the last radiograms to Hitler, in which he reported that the group was on the verge of destruction and offered to evacuate valuable specialists. Hitler again forbade the remnants of the 6th Army to break through to his own and refused to take out of the "cauldron" anyone except the wounded.
On the night of January 31, the 38th motorized rifle brigade and the 329th sapper battalion blocked the area of the department store where Paulus' headquarters was located. The last radio message received by the commander of the 6th Army was an order for his promotion to field marshal, which the headquarters regarded as an invitation to suicide. Early in the morning, two Soviet parliamentarians made their way into the basement of a dilapidated building and handed over an ultimatum to the field marshal. In the afternoon, Paulus rose to the surface and went to the headquarters of the Don Front, where Rokossovsky was waiting for him with the text of surrender. However, despite the fact that the field marshal surrendered and signed the capitulation, in the northern part of Stalingrad the German garrison under the command of Colonel General Stecker refused to accept the terms of surrender and was destroyed by concentrated heavy artillery fire. At 16.00 on February 2, 1943, the terms of surrender of the 6th field army of the Wehrmacht came into force.
The Hitlerite government declared mourning in the country.
For three days, the funeral ringing of church bells sounded over German cities and villages.
Since the Great Patriotic War, Soviet historical literature has claimed that a 330,000-strong enemy grouping was surrounded in the Stalingrad area, although this figure is not confirmed by any documentary data.
The point of view of the German side on this issue is ambiguous. However, with all the scatter of opinions, the figure of 250-280 thousand people is most often called. This figure is consistent with the total number of evacuees (25,000), captured (91,000), and enemy soldiers killed and buried in the battle area (about 160,000). The vast majority of those who surrendered also died from hypothermia and typhus, and after almost 12 years in Soviet camps, only 6,000 people returned to their homeland.
Kotelnikovsky operation Having completed the encirclement of a large grouping of German troops near Stalingrad, the troops of the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front (commander - Colonel-General A. I. Eremenko) in November 1942 came from the north to the approaches to the village of Kotelnikovsky, where they entrenched themselves and went on the defensive.
The German command made every effort to break through the corridor to the 6th Army surrounded by Soviet troops. For this purpose, in early December, in the area of the village. Kotelnikovsky, an attack group was created consisting of 13 divisions (including 3 tank and 1 motorized) and a number of reinforcement units under the command of Colonel-General G. Goth - the Goth army group. The group included a battalion of heavy Tiger tanks, which were first used on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. In the direction of the main attack, which was inflicted along the Kotelnikovsky-Stalingrad railway, the enemy managed to create a temporary advantage over the defending troops of the 51st Army in men and artillery by 2 times, and in terms of the number of tanks - more than 6 times.
They broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and on the second day they reached the area of the village of Verkhnekumsky. In order to divert part of the forces of the shock group, on December 14, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Nizhnechirskaya, the 5th Shock Army of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. She broke through the German defenses and captured the village, but the position of the 51st Army remained difficult. The enemy continued the offensive, while the army and the front no longer had any reserves left. The Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in an effort to prevent the enemy from breaking through and releasing the encircled German troops, allocated the 2nd Guards Army and the mechanized corps from its reserve to reinforce the Stalingrad Front, setting them the task of defeating the enemy strike force.
On December 19, having suffered significant losses, the Goth group reached the Myshkova River. 35-40 km remained to the encircled grouping, however, Paulus's troops were ordered to remain in their positions and not strike back, and Goth could no longer move further.
On December 24, having jointly created approximately double superiority over the enemy, the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies, with the assistance of part of the forces of the 5th Shock Army, went on the offensive. The 2nd Guards Army delivered the main blow towards the Kotelnikov group with fresh forces. The 51st Army was advancing on Kotelnikovsky from the east, while enveloping the Gotha group from the south with tank and mechanized corps. On the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army broke through the enemy's battle formations and captured the crossings across the Myshkova River. Mobile formations were introduced into the breakthrough, which began to rapidly move towards Kotelnikovsky.
On December 27, the 7th Panzer Corps came out to Kotelnikovsky from the west, and the 6th Mechanized Corps bypassed Kotelnikovsky from the southeast. At the same time, the tank and mechanized corps of the 51st Army cut off the enemy grouping's escape route to the southwest. Continuous strikes against the retreating enemy troops were carried out by aircraft of the 8th Air Army. On December 29, Kotelnikovsky was released and the threat of an enemy breakthrough was finally eliminated.
As a result of the Soviet counter-offensive, the enemy's attempt to release the 6th Army encircled near Stalingrad was thwarted, and the German troops were thrown back from the outer front of the encirclement by 200-250 km.
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