29 division ss. Traitors

First chapter

29th SS Grenadier Division (1st Russian)

The formation of the first Russian formation as part of the SS Troops - the 29th Grenadier Division under the command of Brigadeführer Bronislav Kaminsky - was the result of the successful anti-partisan activity of the armed formations subordinate to the latter on the territory of the Oryol region and Belarus. Therefore, it would be quite logical to begin our story from the moment the so-called Russian Liberation People's Army was born.

So, the German troops entered the administrative center of the Brasovsky district of the Oryol region - the village of Lokot - on October 4, 1941. Almost immediately, people appeared in the village who expressed a desire to help the German army. Among the most enterprising collaborators were Konstantin Pavlovich Voskoboinik and Bronislav Vladislavovich Kaminsky. Enlisting the support of the German command, they set about creating a civil administration and police agencies necessary to establish order.

Konstantin Pavlovich Voskoboinik was born in 1895 in the town of Smela, Cherkasy district, Kyiv province, in the village of a railway engineer. He graduated from the gymnasium in Cherkasy, from 1915 he studied at the law faculty of Moscow University. In 1916, Konstantin joined the 449th Kharkov Infantry Regiment as a volunteer. He graduated from the courses of machine gunners. In the autumn of 1916, as part of the regiment, he had a chance to participate in the Brusilov breakthrough. In the winter of 1916–1917, Voskoboinik was sent to study at the ensign school. In the summer of 1918, he ended up on the Middle Volga, where he joined the People's Army of the Committee of the Constituent Assembly (KomUch). However, in September 1918 he left her and joined the ranks of the 5th Red Army. He fought as a platoon commander in the Consolidated Cavalry Division against the army of Admiral Kolchak. At the beginning of 1920, Voskoboinik was demobilized due to a wound complicated by typhus. Shortly after demobilization, he married Anna Kolokoltseva.

At the end of 1920, the young family went to the city of Khvalynsk, Saratov province. Here Voskoboinik worked as a secretary of the local district military commissariat, and in January 1921, outraged by the excesses during the requisitioning, he joined the anti-Soviet rebel detachment of the former Red commanders K. Vakulin and F. Popov that had come from the Don. He fought as part of a machine gun team. During the defeat of the rebels by the Bolsheviks in April 1921, he was wounded in the arm. Hiding from the persecution of the Cheka, he fled with his wife to Astrakhan, where he obtained forged documents in the name of Ivan Yakovlevich Loshakov. He re-registered his marriage with his wife (who also performed under a new surname). Together with his wife, he first moved to Syzran, then to Nizhny Novgorod. In 1924, they moved to Moscow, where Voskoboinik-Loshakov received the position of hunting instructor in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. In 1930 he graduated from the Institute of National Economy with a degree in electrical engineering and became the head of the electrical workshops at the Chamber of Weights and Measures of the RSFSR. Under the conditions of growing political repressions, Voskoboinik decided to turn himself in to the OGPU with a confession. By a special meeting at the OGPU under article 58-2 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, he was sentenced to 3 years in labor camps for "an armed uprising against Soviet power". He served his sentence in the Novosibirsk region. In 1934–1935, he ended up in Ukraine, then moved to the city of Orsk, Orenburg Region, where he got a job as an electrical engineer at the Orskkhimstroy enterprise. In September 1937, Voskoboinik moved with his wife and daughter to the village of Lokot, Orel Region. Here he worked as a teacher of physics, first at the Brasov Irrigation Technical School, and then at the Lokot Forest Chemical College. With the beginning of the occupation of the Brasov region in October 1941, he headed the local administration.

According to the remark of the former journalist of the Oryol occupation newspaper "Rech" V.D. Samarin, “those who knew Voskoboinik remember him as a man of great intelligence and a pure soul. They say that he ignited people with his faith in a bright future for post-Bolshevik Russia.

Another collaborator from journalism is M.S. Bobrov (aka Golubovsky) - also enthusiastically evaluates the activities of the first head of the Lokot autonomy. However, Bobrov's memoirs are distinguished not only by extreme subjectivism (after the war, he joined the "Left Vlasovites"), but are also full of all sorts of speculation and even frankly false statements. He writes: “At the very beginning of the war, engineer Voskoboinikov appeared in this district [so in the text, the mistake in spelling the end of Voskoboinik’s last name is quite common. - Note. ed.], who was imprisoned in one of the Western political isolators captured by the Germans during the offensive. Voskoboinikov was a longtime staunch enemy of the communist regime. He spent many years in exile, in forced labor, in prisons. However, this did not break his will to fight, and when he unexpectedly received freedom, he went to the people to help the people find the right path. In the depths of the Bryansk forests, far from the railway and from important strategic routes, lies the Lokotsky district, a district with 35 thousand people. Voskoboynikov came here in 1941. An excellent organizer, a man of great spiritual purity, Voskoboynikov immediately won the sympathy of the population. At his suggestion, the district was declared self-governing, independent of the belligerents. The German command, which was interested in maintaining calm in its rear, readily agreed and recognized this district.

A former colleague of Kaminsky, a well-known émigré historian and writer Boris Bashilov, calls Voskoboinik "a man of strong character, a true patriot."

It is known about the second leader of the Lokotchans that Bronislav Vladislavovich Kaminsky was born on June 16, 1899 in the village of Dobrzhin, Polotsk district, Vitebsk province. His father was a Pole, and his mother was a Russified German. In 1917 he entered the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute. In the fall of 1918, Kaminsky volunteered to join the Red Army, in which he served as an ordinary Red Army soldier in the 27th Omsk Red Banner Division. Italian proletariat. In 1921, he was demobilized and continued his studies at the Petrograd Institute of Chemical Technology, which he graduated from only after 1930, since he worked at the Respublika chemical plant in parallel. Shortly after demobilization from the Red Army, he married and subsequently became the father of four children in this marriage. Until 1937, he worked at the Leningrad Chemical Plant as an engineer-technologist of chemical production. During these years, Kaminsky joined the ranks of the CPSU (b), however, he soon joined the "right opposition" and began to openly criticize Stalin's course towards the collectivization of agriculture and the authoritarian tendencies in the policy of the party leadership. In 1935, he was expelled from the party, and in 1937 he was arrested on charges of involvement in "the case of Chayanov's counter-revolutionary group - the Labor Peasant Party." Kaminsky was sentenced to 10 years in the camps. He served his term in Shadrinsk, Kurgan Region. In early 1941, he moved to the village of Lokot, Brasovsky District, Oryol Region, where he got a job as an engineer at a local distillery. After the area was occupied by German troops, he became deputy K.V. Voskoboinik as the head of the local collaborationist administration.

Here is what V. Samarin writes about Voskoboinik's assistant: “The personality of Kaminsky himself is of undoubted interest. There was some duality in it. On the one hand, he was a man of great personal courage and courage, on the other hand, hysterics. A man undoubtedly gifted, a good organizer and a talented military leader, he did not know, however, a sense of proportion. For example, he was told that he, Bronislav Vladislavovich Kaminsky, was the leader of the new Russia, and this flattered his pride. At the local theater, the performance did not start until he arrived. Kaminsky entered - the whole hall got up. Only then did the curtain go up."

The comparative assessment of Voskoboinik and Kaminsky by Yale University professor Roman Dneprov (during the war years he fought as part of the Cossack units of the Wehrmacht) is not without interest: “Of this pair, Voskoboinikov was clearly a man of higher moral qualities.” P. Ilyinsky, a member of the NTS, who lived in Belarusian Polotsk during the years of the occupation, generally notes that Kaminsky "was considered by many to be a semi-bandit."

On October 4–5, an armed self-defense detachment (“people's militia”) was created in Lokta, numbering 18 volunteers. On October 16, with the sanction of the German occupation authorities, the number of the Lokot detachment was increased to 200 people (R. Michaelis writes that the initial number of the detachment was 20 people, then it reached 50). Similar formations were created in other settlements of the Lokot volost. The overall command of these forces was in the hands of Voskoboinik and Kaminsky.

In addition, they formed the Viking People's Socialist Party of Russia (NSPR), and in the large villages closest to Lokt (Tarasovka, Kholmets, Krupets, Shemyakino, etc.) a campaign was carried out aimed at promoting the ideas of this organization.

According to B. Bashilov, “a piece of semi-independent Russian territory was created around Lokt. The head of this territory, Voskoboinik, received weapons from the Germans, had good neighborly relations with them, but all civil and military power belonged to him.

This area is growing every day. Former collective farmers created detachments and won more and more villages and towns from the partisans. This made a great impression on the inhabitants of neighboring regions, who saw how, with weapons in their hands, the Russian people conquered their native land from the Bolsheviks.

The question of the fight against Soviet partisans and the underground confronted Voskoboinik and Kaminsky almost immediately after the NSPR issued its manifesto (November 25, 1941) and a number of other appeals addressed to the local population. According to A. Dallin, these documents "represented a strange mixture of principles and intentions." Propaganda of the ideas of the NSPR was met with hatred on the part of the partisans, who set themselves the goal of destroying party leaders and leaders of self-government. But until the end of 1941, the people's avengers of the southern regions of the Bryansk region practically did not take any serious and active actions, if we do not take into account the shelling and attacks on individual representatives of the new government.

It should be noted that in the Brasov region itself, the organization of the partisan movement and the underground failed at first. The population of the district has never been distinguished by loyalty to the Soviet authorities and at the first opportunity they openly demonstrated these sentiments. Those few party and Soviet workers who did not have time to evacuate were either handed over to the German military authorities or killed with their own hands. It was this fate that befell Evstafy Filippovich Sedakov, who, on the eve of the war, acted as head of the Brasov police department. When the German units entered the neighboring village of Lokot, Sedakov unsuccessfully tried to escape into the forest in order to lead the Brasov partisan detachment "For the Motherland" (in the conditions of the flight of almost all the party activists and security officers of the area). After the death of Sedakov, Vasily Kapralov became the head of the detachment, later shot by the Chekists for the murder of his commissar and numerous facts of desertion, drunkenness and looting that took place in the For the Motherland detachment.

In fairness, it must be said that such a situation has not developed in all regions of the Bryansk region. For example, the party activists and security officers of the Navlinsky district managed to consolidate the forces loyal to the Soviet government and create a fairly powerful partisan movement and underground.

It was thanks to the efforts of the Navlina partisans that by the beginning of the winter of 1941, it was possible to intensify sabotage and terrorist work. On December 4, Navlina partisans blew up a large ammunition depot on the highway Trubchevsk - Vygonichi. On December 26, 1941, the German police garrison was defeated in the regional center - the village of Suzemki. And the next day, Navlya was attacked by partisans. During the raid, the head of the Navlinsky district, Kalmykov, the burgomaster Navli Tanenkov, several dozen German soldiers and Russian policemen were killed, the police premises were burned, and a significant number of trophies were seized.

After analyzing the current situation, K.P. On December 27, Voskoboinik issued an appeal to the partisans, calling on the Soviet patriots hiding in the forests to stop all resistance and surrender their weapons within a week: later on January 1, 1942, hand over your weapons to the elders and appear yourself for registration in Lokot. Be in small groups of 2-3 people. All those who did not appear will be considered enemies of the people and destroyed mercilessly.

In response to the appeal of the Lokot burgomaster, Soviet partisans attacked Lokot on the night of January 7-8, 1942. This episode, in our opinion, deserves special attention.

According to partisan memoirs, the attack on Lokot was organized by the joint headquarters of partisan detachments under the command of NKVD Major A.N. Saburov and his deputy Z.A. Bogatyr. Junior Lieutenant of State Security D.V. Yemlyutin, who headed the regional task force of the 4th department of the NKVD, had nothing to do with this operation (according to I. Ermolov and S. Verevkin), although his people, who were in the Saburov detachments, participated in this raid. Five partisan formations were allocated for the raid: A.N. Saburova and Z.A. Bogatyr, Trubchev detachment. Stalin (commander M.I. Senchenkov), the Kharkov detachment K.I. Pogorelov, the Kharkov detachment of I.F. Borovik, Brasov detachment "For the Motherland" V.A. Kapralova (deputy commander - M.V. Balyasov).

S. Verevkin's statement that Lokot was attacked by the operative groups of the OMSBON NKVD ("Friendly", "Combat" and "Falcon") is the fruit of the author's wild imagination and has nothing to do with history. Not knowing military terminology, Verevkin talks about the conduct of a "special military operation" by the NKVD, which generally puts himself in an absurd position. To some extent, the publicist is the continuer of the myth-making line of M. Bobrov, who claimed that “in 1942 a large landing of Soviet troops was thrown into the district”, after which Voskoboinik was killed.

At least three assault groups were created to capture objects inside the village. The first consisted mainly of partisans of the "For the Motherland" detachment. The group was directed to seize the stone building of the barracks. The second group, consisting of Pogorelov's Kharkov partisans, was ordered to seize the district prison. The third group - from the partisans of the Trubchev detachment. Stalin - was supposed to capture the burgomaster's house and destroy the leaders of the NSPR. In addition, the fighters from the detachment of Saburov and Bogatyr were supposed to block the road to Brasovo and prevent the breakthrough of police reinforcements into Lokot - this task was entrusted to Ignat Borodavko. The Kharkov detachment of Borovik covered the retreat of the partisans, and he also constituted the reserve of the joint headquarters. In total, about 600 partisans took part in the raid.

The people's avengers (after a grueling night march in severe frost and deep snow) concentrated near Lokt around 6 o'clock in the morning. They couldn't come earlier. Therefore, it is necessary to discard the widespread version of the evening or night attack on Lokot, as well as the fact that during the attack there was a meeting of the NSPR, as stated by Bryansk veteran security officers and S. Verevkin.

Contrary to the statements of the researcher I.G. Yermolov, the epicenter of the battle was not the house of the burgomaster, but the barracks of the "people's militia". It was stormed by partisans from the “For the Motherland” detachment (this, for example, can be seen from the memoirs of N.I. Lyapunov). Their actions were led by a representative of the joint headquarters, Ivan Fedorov. The barracks was located in the building of one of the former educational institutions (in the memoirs of A.N. Saburov, an agricultural technical school is called, but information about a forest chemical technical school appears most often). Here the partisans encountered stubborn resistance and failed to capture the brick building, turned into a stronghold (the words of Z.A. Bogatyr about the wooden barracks do not correspond to reality). All their attempts to knock out "policemen" from there ended in failure.

An equally important object was the Voskoboynikov Palace, where, as the avengers believed, the central committee of the NSPR was also located. The task of eliminating the party elite was assigned to a group from the Trubchev detachment named after. Stalin. The group was headed by the commissar of the detachment Pavel Kuzmin (therefore, the statements of N.I. Lyapunov and M.V. Balyasov, who were allegedly in this assault group, cannot be considered reliable; their group just stormed the barracks, as can be seen from the memoirs of A.N. Saburov and Z.A. Bogatyr). The group of Alexei Durnev (and not “comrade Malyshev”, as M.V. Balyasov writes, and not “comrade Astakhov”, who was asked by N.I. Lyapunov) was assigned to destroy the leaders of the NSPR and Voskoboinik. Moreover, a photograph of A. Durnev's group is known - it is given in the memoirs of K.F. Firsanov.

From the available material, we can conclude that the partisans had not yet managed to approach the house, when fire was opened on them. Fire from machine guns and rifles for a long time held back the people's avengers, and they failed to take possession of the house on the move. The guerrillas must have suffered casualties before they took up advantageous firing positions. According to Bogatyr's confessions, the people's avengers could not break the resistance of the police and the guards of the leader of the NSPR. As a result, the partisans were forced to retreat from the burgomaster's house, as the police and reinforcements approached began to surround the raiders.

One way or another, Voskoboinik was seriously wounded by partisans in his residence (but not at all in the "house of culture", as S. Verevkin writes). In this sense, the people's avengers were lucky, although they failed to take the burgomaster's house by storm. And besides, at the time of the battle, the partisans did not know for sure whether the leader of the NSPR was killed or not, - A.N. Saburov became aware only two days later, on January 10, when he was preparing a message to Moscow.

According to R. Dneprov, the death of Voskoboinik happened like this: “Several individual partisans managed to get through the posts of the Kamintsy, as they were later called, and throw several grenades into the house where Voskoboinikov spent the night. Voskoboinikov himself and, if I am not mistaken, the secretary of his headquarters, died.

Another object that needed to be captured - the district prison - was stormed by Ukrainian partisans led by Pogorelov. After some time, a messenger arrived at Saburov. He reported on the break into the prison of Kochetkov's group. The guards, who at first retreated under the blows of the partisans, returned again and blocked the object. Kochetkov with people was under siege.

Realizing the complexity of the situation, Saburov took under his command a unit (probably the reserve one - Borovik) and hurried to the rescue of those who were blocked. According to Saburov himself, he was surprised by such stubborn resistance of the guards, who, according to intelligence, were no more than five, while a platoon ended up in prison. Even when Saburov's unit arrived at the scene, no one broke through to the building - the guards kept all the approaches to it under heavy automatic fire. But after some time, success smiled at the partisans, they broke into the prison.

While fighting was going on in Lokta at the barracks, the burgomaster's house and the prison, Borodavko's detachment held back the attacks of the reinforcements that had approached from Brasovo. The fighting on the outskirts of Lokt was fierce, and the partisans had very serious problems. Moreover, Borodavko received a personal order from Saburov to hold his positions at all costs and prevent the enemy from entering the settlement (that is, to act on the principle of "not a step back").

Borodavko's partisans repulsed the first attacks. However, then the onslaught intensified and it was no longer possible to hold the enemy. Apparently, at the same time, Saburov received another unpleasant news: Borovik's partisans, who were in reserve and intended to cover the retreat, entered the battle with police reinforcements from Komarichi. Such a turn of events in the joint headquarters was not expected. Now Saburov had to leave Lokt, otherwise he was expected to be defeated.

The retreat of the partisans was carried out in conditions of direct contact with the enemy. Separate groups were still operating in Lokt itself, hastily appointed to ensure the withdrawal of other units of the people's avengers from the battle. Obviously, the partisans besieging the burgomaster's house were the last to withdraw.

In the memoirs of Saburov, the departure from Lokt was presented as some kind of triumphal procession. Some partisans were even willing to stay in Lokta to hunt "cuckoos"(snipers). However, with an objective analysis of the situation that developed on the morning of January 8, 1942, there could be no question of any victory. The enemy forced the partisans to make a forced withdrawal, which is usually used in conditions when it is impossible to hold the occupied settlement with the available forces and means and a real threat of encirclement and destruction of their units is created. It was in this position that Saburov's partisans found themselves. They had to retreat to the designated area, to the final line - the village of Krasnaya Sloboda, Suzemsky district.

The attack by partisan detachments on Lokot, as well as its results, certainly became the subject of analysis by the joint headquarters. The losses of the partisans were many times greater than those of the defending garrison. In the battles for the barracks and the burgomaster's house, the assault groups had to lose about half of their composition, since they were met with powerful organized fire. There were losses in the battles on the outskirts of Lokt, when the Borodavko group repelled the advance of reinforcements from Brasovo. And here the losses, most likely, were heavy, since the group commander sent messengers to Saburov three times with a request to provide him with support.

It is not entirely clear how the battle for the district prison ended. Most likely, the partisans lost people there too. In addition, fighting took place on the streets of Lokt, for the commandant's office and other strongholds, when leaving the village. In all these clashes, the partisans lost people. The attempts of Saburov and Bogatyr to present the matter as if the people's avengers managed to take out all their wounded and killed from Lokt must be recognized as untenable. At the beginning of the attack on Lokot, this was still possible, but after reinforcements arrived from Brasovo and Komarichi, and a counterattack began from the barracks of the "people's militia", the partisans could no longer take anyone with them, and therefore they simply threw their wounded and killed comrades into village.

It should also be noted the poor organization of the entire Lokot operation, from its preparation to the direct control of the battle. Not only did Saburov's headquarters not have a clear combat plan, at certain moments of the battle he lost control over the situation, was engaged in shuffling assault units and failed to properly establish interaction between partisan units. All this, of course, led to unjustified losses among the personnel, who were physically exhausted even before the attack.

The total losses of the partisans should be estimated in the range from 150 to 250 people.

In principle, if not for the death of Burgomaster Voskoboinik, then the Lokot operation could be called a failure. The partisans failed to defeat the local self-government, the core of the NSPR was not destroyed (Kaminsky, Mosin, Ivanin remained alive), the units of the "people's militia" were not exterminated.

After the death of Voskoboinik, Kaminsky took his place, concentrating all power in the territory of self-government in his hands.

Former editor of the Orel newspaper Rech, Mikhail Oktan, recalled: “At the headquarters in Orel, I met Kaminsky, who was called here in connection with the death of the chief of the Lokotsky district, Voskoboynikov ... I witnessed several meetings between Kaminsky and General Gamman [commandant of Orel. - Note. ed.]. Having enlisted his support, Kaminsky promised to maintain closer contacts with the German military administration upon his return to Lokot and, with the help of his police units, to ensure the protection of the rear of the German army and the food supply of the German units.

In order to exclude an attack on Lokot in the future, the new burgomaster obtained permission from the German command to mobilize citizens from 17 to 30 years old living in the Suzemsky, Sevsky, Dmitrievsky, Komarichsky and Navlinsky districts of the Oryol region into the people's militia.

It should be said that the German occupation authorities quickly gave their consent. As you know, the High Command of the German Ground Forces (OKH), by order of the first quartermaster of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F. Paulus of January 9, 1942, authorized the command of army groups to form auxiliary security units in the required number from prisoners of war and residents of the occupied regions hostile to Soviet power . The whole process was controlled by the mobilization department of the Lokot administration.

Mobilization was carried out in several stages. Conscription commissions worked not only in the countryside, but also in prisoner of war camps under the jurisdiction of the logistic authorities of Army Group Center. As noted in the memorandum of the NKVD of the Central Front dated March 20, 1943, "... the contingent for recruitment were traitors to the Motherland from among the prisoners of war, deserters of the Red Army who remained in the occupied territory, and persons who showed dissatisfaction with the Soviet government" . Head of the UNKVD for the Oryol region K.F. Firsanov wrote in his memoirs: “Some of the servicemen, having lost hope of escaping from the encirclement, settled in the villages, hoping to sit out. But they failed to sit in dark corners: the Nazis forcibly mobilized them into the police and other punitive bodies.

In February 1942, part of the mobilization activities was completed. More than 1,200 people were placed under arms in the "people's militia" and 3 battalions were formed. Police units were stationed in Lokta, on the Kholmetsky farm and in the village of Krasny Kolodets (Vladimirsky farm). Feeling his strength, B.V. Kaminsky, following the example of K.P. Voskoboynik, published on February 9, 1942 an appeal to the people's avengers. The burgomaster also stated that the fight against the partisans is one of the priority tasks of the "people's power", and ordered the preparation of the first operation. It was decided to break up the detachment of the Brasovsky district "For the Motherland" (number - 100-130 people; commander Vasily Kapralov, commissioner Alexei Malyshev) - a formation that took part in the attack on Lokot. The operation went well. 160 police officers and 60 Wehrmacht servicemen acted against Kapralov's subordinates. The partisans were squeezed out of the territory of Komarnitsky, and then Luhansk administrative formations.

According to the documents of the people's avengers - for example, partisans from the lead detachment "Death to the German occupiers" (established in the Navlinsky district; commander Pyotr Ponurovsky, commissar Alexander Suslin) - intense fighting between the police and Soviet patriots did not stop. The battles for Navlya, Altukhovo, Sheshuyevo and other settlements went on until the end of March 1942.

An important place in the struggle of Soviet patriots against the Lokot autonomy is occupied by hostilities in the spring of 1942 in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe villages of Tarasovka and Shemyakino (Brasovsky district), in which impressive garrisons of the "people's militia" were stationed (anti-partisan operations periodically began from there). Bryansk Chekist M.A. Zabelsky recalled after the war: “Under the noses of the partisans ... in the villages of Shemyakino and Tarasovka, more than one hundred and fifty policemen lived freely. The police managed to collect all the weapons and ammunition left by our military units during the withdrawal, and dragged them to their villages.

The first attempt to storm the villages took place on March 1. The detachments "For the Power of the Soviets", named after Stalin, "For the Motherland" and "Bolshevik" participated in the raid. In the battle, 24 collaborators were killed, 20 were captured. The losses of the partisans amounted (according to Soviet information) to seven people killed and 12 wounded. After that, the Tarasovsky and Shemyakinsky garrisons were significantly strengthened: in the same month, 400 Kaminets were already stationed here, pillboxes, trenches, minefields, and barbed wire were equipped. It is not surprising that the subsequent two attempts to storm the villages by partisans ended in failure and led to heavy losses.

It was decided to take measures to decompose the garrisons from the inside. This work was directed by experienced Chekists V.A. Zasukhin and A.I. Kuguchev. Their agents managed to recruit the headman of the village of Shemyakino Mashurov, the commander of the local garrison - a former prisoner of war Vladimir Popov, and commandant V.P. Not bad, A.G. Vdovenkova, P.S. Ageev and M. Vrotsky. In addition, scout Maria Kulakova was sent to Tarasovka and Shemyakino, not without whose participation a strong underground group was formed in the garrisons by the end of April, headed by a certain Gapeenkov.

On the night of May 1, 1942, an assault group consisting of the “For the Power of the Soviets” and “Bolshevik” detachments under the command of Dorofeev launched another assault on the villages, this time crowned with success, since the actions of the collaborators were paralyzed by the underground Gapeenkov group, which had rebelled at the same moment. According to the memoirs of D.V. Yemlyutin, the Kalinin detachment and three "self-defense groups" also participated in the assault. Chekist V.A. Zasukhin, apparently underestimating the actual size of the assault group, recalled: “On the night of May 1, having the password and response that Comrade told us. Mashurov, we entered these villages in a small group of about sixty people, removed the guards without firing a shot, neutralized the guards, and then began to gather the rest of the traitors to the Motherland, in which we were already helped by disarmed soldiers.

As a result of the operation, the partisans captured Tarasovka and Shemyakino, captured 150 prisoners (according to other sources - 264), more than twenty 45-mm and 76-mm guns, 18 heavy machine guns, 4 mortars, a flamethrower, 284 rifles, one tank and other weapons and military property . According to the propaganda of the “Kaminists”, Soviet patriots massacred the policemen, their wives and children: “Partisans tortured and shot 115 people of local residents, including many women and children, and half of these victims were subjected to torment and abuse: their victims were bandits first they chopped off fingers and toes, gouged out their eyes, pierced their ears with ramrods, and after a few days they were completely exhausted, bleeding, already half dead, shot. According to the documents of the people's avengers, they executed 57 police officers, and no one allegedly touched civilians.

On May 3, 6 and 8, units of the "people's militia" under the command of Deputy Burgomaster G.N. Balashov tried unsuccessfully to storm Tarasovka and Shemyakino. Only on May 11, with the support of five aircraft and two armored vehicles, the Kaminians (about 500 fighters) liberated the villages, losing 30 people killed and wounded in the battles. The commander of the Kokorevsky partisan detachment V.V. was captured. Checherin, who was sentenced to death by a military field court. The sentence was carried out by the commander of the armored division, Captain Yu.F. Samsonov, who cut off the head of a partisan with a saber. The execution took place with a large gathering of residents of the village of Red Well. The “atrocities” of the partisans were covered in the press of the autonomy (July 15, 1942, the Lokot newspaper “Voice of the People” published an article “Terrible secrets of the Kokorevsky forest”).

V. Makarov and V. Khristoforov believe that Kaminsky himself arranged the execution of the inhabitants of Tarasovka and Shemyakino, since everyone who lived in these villages went over to the side of the partisans. The burgomaster allegedly organized a punitive action, cracked down on the families of "traitors", and then, in order to embitter the people, conducted a fake investigation in order to attribute all the atrocities to the partisans. Such an interpretation of events cannot, in principle, be ruled out. On January 31, 1943, the "Voice of the People" directly called these events "a betrayal of Tarasovka and Shemyakino." At the same time, it would be naive to believe that the partisans, in the conditions of a deadly battle with the enemy, “were not capable” of cruel and inhuman actions (numerous facts of this kind are confirmed by the reports of the special officers of the partisan formations).

By the end of April 1942, about 2,000 people were serving in the ranks of the people's militia (the 4th battalion was formed back in March). At the end of May 1942, heavy fighting was going on near the settlements of Altukhovo, Krasny Pakhar and Sheshuyevo. The main part of the Kokorevsky detachment was destroyed. The Krapivensky, Sheshuevsky, Altukhovsky (commander Yambulatov, commissar Bobylev), Vzdruzhensky (commander Gavrilin, commissar Vaskin) detachments were defeated. The partisans from the Brasov detachment "For the Motherland" were dispersed. "Kamintsy" captured three 45-mm and two 76-mm guns, four machine guns "Maxim", six company and two battalion mortars, a lot of ammunition.

During the spring and summer of 1942, the police managed to defeat the Glybochensky (commander Khlyustov, commissar Kostromin), Svyatovsky (commander Volkov, commissar Zyablov), Saltanovsky (commander Kuznetsov, commissar Shcherbin) detachments, and the Sidorovsky detachment (commander Yumashev, commissar Miroshin) suffered heavy losses. These formations were subordinate to the lead detachment "Death to the German occupiers", under the command of which there were 11 partisan units. By the time when the brigade of the same name began to form on the basis of the “Death to the German Occupiers” detachment, five of the eleven detachments that had previously operated in the Navlinsky and Brasovsky districts remained.

The successes of Kaminsky in the fight against the partisans made a very favorable impression on the Germans. It is no coincidence that in March 1942, the Suzemsky and Navlinsky districts were transferred to the Lokot self-government. In May of the same year, the Lokotsky district was transformed into a county, as part of the Suzemsky, Navlinsky and Komarichsky districts of the Oryol region, as well as the Dmitrovsky district of the Kursk region.

It should be noted that the opinion that “as a result of a powerful upsurge of the nationwide partisan movement, by the spring of 1942, the German fascist invaders were expelled from a vast territory and a partisan region was created” was widely spread. The territory of this "partisan region", according to a number of authors, extended from north to south up to 140 km, from west to east - up to 100 km. The "border points" of this "partisan republic" are also called: in the north - three kilometers south of the Bryansk-Gomel railway, in the east - three kilometers west of the Bryansk-Navlya railway and further along the boundary of the settlements of Borshchevo, Shemyakino, Igritskoye, Golitsyno . In the south - along the border of the settlements of Izbichnya, Chemlyzh, Polevye Novoselki, Golubovka, Znob, Sobichi. In the west - along the boundary of the settlements of Pine Bog, Vypolzovo, Radutino, Borodenko, Glybochka, Vasilyevka. Thus, in the spring of 1942, the forest soldiers allegedly controlled almost the entire territory of the Lokot Autonomous Okrug.

Some researchers go even further. So, V. Perezhogin claims that the detachments under the command of A.N. Saburova and Z.A. Bogatyrs, numbering 1800 people, controlled the territory of the Vygonichsky, Navlinsky, Suzemsky, Trubchevsky and Brasovsky districts by February 1942.

On the territory of the "partisan region" the district committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the executive committees of the Trubchevsky, Navlinsky, Vygonichsky, Pochepsky, Suzemsky, Komarichsky district Soviets allegedly "legalized and restored their activities". These bodies "immediately began work to establish and restore revolutionary order in all the liberated settlements."

Of course, all this, to put it mildly, does not fully reflect the real situation. The fact is that in the memorandums sent “upstairs”, the leaders of the “forest soldiers” not only extremely arbitrarily determined the number of losses inflicted on the invaders and their accomplices, but also tried to create a picture that testified to their incredible successes. And so the “partisan region” appeared. A kind of "loophole", which allowed confirming the erroneous data of the partisan command, was the actual fact that during the specified period of time (winter - spring 1942) there were practically no German troops on the territory of the Lokot autonomy. On the other hand, units and subunits of the Russian Liberation People's Army were stationed here, which, alas, quite effectively fought against the people's avengers.

However, in addition to the partisans themselves, a reconnaissance and sabotage underground operated on the territory of the Lokot autonomy, which was under the tight control of the NKVD and, due to the special nature of its work, sometimes caused a lot of trouble for the Kaminians. Methods such as sabotage, terror against the leadership echelon of the autonomy, active recruitment of personnel of the "people's army" undoubtedly hid a much greater danger than military clashes and raids by partisan formations.

Of course, by no means in all areas of the Lokotsky district, underground work was organized flawlessly. So, the Brasov underground for a long time existed only on paper. The local underground district committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was actually inactive throughout the occupation, and only with the approach of the Red Army units (already in 1943) did it try to portray "violent activity", expressed, in particular, in the hasty admission of local residents to the party. A little more than 20 people were recruited who were willing and “worthy” (for comparison: “colleagues” from the neighboring Navlinsky Bolshevik party underground managed to recruit 590 party members and 781 candidates for the ranks of the CPSU (b) by September 1943.

An outright failure ended in the Brasovsky district and an attempt to organize the Komsomol underground. According to indirect data, it can be assumed that it was organized not without the participation of provocateurs (in order to identify and eliminate the pro-Soviet youth of the region). Brasov underground Komsomol organization. Shchorsa was organized in July 1942 and lasted a little over two months. On October 2, 1942, all members of the Brasov underground were handed over to the Abwehrgroup-107 by the head of the organization Konstantin Vasilyev.

Nevertheless, one can also name a number of very successful actions of the underground, especially the Chekists. Intelligence officer M.S. successfully operated in the Sevsky district of the Lokotsky administrative district. Grigorov, who worked in Sevsk before the occupation of the city. The head of the special department of the Bryansk joint headquarters of the partisan movement, V. Zasukhin, in his memoirs, described the work of Grigorov as follows: “Being in an illegal position, he skillfully used personal pre-war connections; in a short time, he recruited employees of German administrative bodies, medical and veterinary workers, and teachers. The group collected and transmitted to us military-political information, identified German agents, traitors and traitors to the Motherland, distributed reports from the Soviet Information Bureau, partisan leaflets and newspapers. At great risk to their lives, Soviet patriots sabotaged the implementation of German orders and instructions that required the sending of young people to Germany, the seizure of livestock and food from the population, etc. ” .

Zasukhin himself managed to recruit an employee of the Abwehrgroup-107 (stationed in Orel, its branch was located in Lokta) Roman Andrievsky. The scout recalled: “Thanks to Roman’s dedication and perseverance, we had a fairly complete picture of the subversive activities of Abverstelle-107 ... we knew about the points of transfer and channels of penetration of enemy agents into our rear. The Smersh counterintelligence department of the Bryansk Front, after receiving this information, organized a thorough check of all suspicious wounded and revealed many spies. Roman's information about the relocation of enemy military units, about the concentration of military equipment at a particular railway station was of great value to the command of the Red Army and partisans ... Andrievsky's desire to cause as much harm to the enemy as possible was unstoppable. Risking his life, risking failure, he sought out and attracted new people to his side, carried out active work to decompose the police battalion guarding the railway near the Kholmichi station, saved Soviet patriots from inevitable death.

In the second half of June 1942, the rear forces of the 2nd Panzer Army decided to conduct a large-scale anti-partisan operation "Green Woodpecker" (Grunspecht). The operation was carried out from June 19 to 27, and police units from the Lokot district were connected to it. During the fighting, the partisans suffered heavy losses. Flight began from their ranks. So, in the Suzemsky district, 427 people deserted from the partisan detachments, 65 of whom went over to the side of the enemy.

For the fighters of Kaminsky, the operation was successful. They showed themselves from the best side. It was the military merits of the “Kaminians” that prompted the German command to change the status of the Lokot administration again. On July 19, 1942, the commander of the 2nd Tank Army, Colonel-General Rudolf Schmidt, signed an order to reorganize Lokotsky Uyezd into Lokotsky Okrug. This administrative unit included the territories of the pre-war Brasovsky, Komarichsky, Suzemsky, Navlinsky, Sevsky (Oryol region), Mikhailovsky, Dmitrovsky and Dmitrievsky (Kursk region) districts, with a total population of 581 thousand people (according to S. Steenberg - 1, 7 million people, according to I. Gribkov - 700-800 thousand people).

By the way, the partisans operating on the territory of the Kursk region did not carry out large-scale operations at the moment in question. The local detachments had no combat experience, they were scattered and small groups, there was a lack of weapons in all detachments, there were many cases of desertion and cowardice among the personnel. In the summer of 1942, the combat activity of the Kursk partisans remained still low (despite a number of sensitive blows inflicted on the German police garrisons, for example, on the fortified settlement, the Mikhailovka settlement). Zheleznogorsk researcher of the partisan movement in the north-west of the Kursk region A. Kolesnikov, describing the situation in the ranks of the "people's avengers" of the Mikhailovsky district, writes: "There were also those who could not stand it in this difficult time and left the detachment." The situation began to change only by the beginning of the autumn of 1942.

Around the same time, Kaminsky and the central committee of the NSPR began to conduct active agitation and propaganda against the partisans. The people's avengers captured in the battles, after appropriate processing, issued open letters to their recent comrades in the struggle. Here, in particular, mention should be made of an open letter from Nikolai Smirnov, a member of the "Death to the German Occupiers" brigade. In it, the author told how partisan commanders and commissars discourage people from going over to Kaminsky's side, how they force people to fight through threats and intimidation. Novikov's letter was signed by former partisans Beresnev, Pakhomov, Kuzin, Anisimov, Polyakov, Baranova and Yermakov.

In a slightly different vein, a letter signed by I.I. Chistyulin, P.A. Platonenko, I.F. Chentsov, T.S. Safonov, F.K. Klyagin and I.N. Kapanin. This time it was about how well people live in the Lokotsky district. It was described in detail how and what the population and militia soldiers eat, how they earn a living, what assistance local authorities provide to citizens. At the end, as usual, there was a call to leave the detachments of "forest bandits" and come to settlements where there is a Russian administration.

The propaganda campaign had a certain effect: some partisans came out of the forest and joined the units and subdivisions of the police.

By the end of the summer of 1942, partisan detachments from the northwestern regions of the Kursk region were activated. According to the documents, the people's avengers from the Mikhailovsky district disabled the railway bridge between the Blokhin and Lukashevka stations, destroyed the bridge on the Tuskar River between the Budanovka and Zolotukhino stations. Partisans of the Dmitrievsky district blew up the railway bridge across the Svapa River, 10 km from Dmitriev. Subversive groups of Dmitrievsky and Dmitrovsky partisans also blew up the railway bridge on the stretch Deryugino - Evdokimovka.

In addition, the Kursk partisans (primarily the Bozhenko detachment), together with the formations of D.V. Yemlyutin received the task of clearing the settlements of Kokushkino, War (Suzemsky district), where large police forces were concentrated. However, at that moment, the Kaminians carried out a special operation in a timely manner. As a result of the offensive on August 21 and 26, 1942, by the police and German units, the partisans were forced to retreat at the beginning across the Nerussa River, and then to the left bank of the Desna.

By the autumn of 1942, large partisan forces were based in the Bryansk forests - more than 50 detachments, united in eight brigades and numbering 11,150 fighters. They were armed with 4 tanks, 2 armored vehicles, 61 guns of various calibers, 114 mortars, 10,435 small arms. As can be seen from the documents, the group was given the task of firmly holding the southern massifs of the Bryansk forests.

The German command, represented by the rear forces of the 2nd Panzer Army, decided to narrow the territory of the so-called "Bryansk partisan region", isolate the southern and northern groups of "people's avengers", cutting them off from settlements and thereby depriving the food support from the local population. To this end, attempts were made - operations "Triangle" (Dreieck) and "Quadrangle" (Viereck) - dissecting the partisan region into two enclaves, for which units and subunits of the 108th Hungarian Infantry Division, an SS motorized infantry battalion, 8 security battalions were involved , as well as a consolidated police regiment under the command of Kaminsky. The direction of the main attack was planned in the most convenient place - north of the Navli River, where the Kaminsky regiment and the SS battalion were advancing towards the 108th division.

The operation began on 16 September. Avoiding direct clashes, the partisans retreated across the Navlya River. By the end of the month, having not met the partisans who had evaded the battle, the German-militia and Hungarian forces deployed their battle formations to the south, in the direction of the Nerussa River, preparing a new blow. The command of the partisan brigades tried to forestall the actions of the enemy. On October 1, two detachments that penetrated behind enemy lines attacked artillery batteries, headquarters, ammunition depots, and the remaining detachments struck from the front. The Germans and Hungarians tried to fight back and retreat in an organized manner, while Kaminsky's regiment got bogged down in the fighting. In some divisions of the Kaminians, as the people's avengers claimed, panic began. At the same time, more than 150 policemen died, the same number surrendered, and Kaminsky, having been wounded, almost fell into the hands of partisans.

In addition, the "Kamins" participated in the resettlement of local residents from the area of ​​operations. From the operational report of the command of the rear area of ​​the 2nd Panzer Army, it is known that about 18 thousand local residents were resettled south of Lokt. The headquarters of the Army Group "Center" proposed to combine these residents into work teams and use the units and formations of the 2nd Panzer Army to strengthen the defensive lines.

The German operations "Triangle" and "Quadrangular" were not as disastrous as is sometimes believed. An operational report prepared by the rear services of the 2nd Panzer Army reported 2,244 partisans killed and captured.

Having replenished their forces at the expense of "self-protection", Lokt's militia units took part in operations "Polar Bear" (Eisbar).

The first operation was carried out on the territory of the Dmitrovsky, Dmitrievsky and Mikhailovsky districts of the Kursk region and had three phases: from October 10 to 25, from November 3 to 11 and from November 17 to 20, 1942. The operation was accompanied by combing forests and settlements.

The German command tried to block and destroy the united formations of partisans operating on the territory of the Mikhailovsky, Dmitrievsky and Dmitrovsky districts - first of all, against the detachments of the 1st Kursk partisan brigade (named after Zheleznyak, Mikhailovsky, Dmitrovsky, Dmitrievsky, Trosnyansky, Cavalry partisan detachments) . To implement the plan, the German troops were given police units from Mikhailovka and Dmitriev.

The fighting took place at a tense pace. On October 10, German units and the police, with the support of equipment and artillery, started fighting with the Trosnian partisans in the Zhernovets forest tract. At the same time, there was a concentration of German police forces in the area of ​​​​the villages located around the natural boundaries of Berlazhon and Opage with the aim of encircling and completely destroying the bases of partisan detachments. On October 11, the police carried out reconnaissance of the area and occupied a number of settlements. At 7 o'clock on October 12, an offensive began from the villages of Kurbakino and Tolchenoe, from the villages of Medovy and Mikhailovsky to the location of the bases of the headquarters of the United Partisan Detachments of the Kursk Region (OPOKO), Mikhailovsky and Cavalry. From the side of the villages of Veretenino and Razvetye, the police began to attack in the direction of the villages of Vostochny, Zvezda, Bolshoi Oak, at the location of the bases of the detachment named after. Zheleznyak.

The partisans tried not to let the enemy through, but under the influence of dense artillery fire, under the pressure of the numerical superiority of the Germans and the police, they were forced to retreat from the Berlajon forest to the Zhernovets forest.

On October 14, 1942, a meeting of the heads of the German police units (GUF and gendarmerie), as well as police commanders, was held in Mikhailovka. At the meeting, issues related to the interaction between different security units were discussed in detail. On the same day, reinforcements from Lokt arrived. On the morning of October 15, the police launched an offensive against partisans from the Mikhailovsky and Cavalry detachments, the detachment named after. Zheleznyak. The partisans resisted for some time, knocked out several armored vehicles, but were eventually forced to retreat into the forests of the Dmitrievsky district, where they took up all-round defense, using the villages (Volkovo, Panino, Ryasnik, Novo-Georgievskaya) as strongholds.

Fierce fighting ensued, lasting several days. In an effort to break out of the blockade, the people's avengers were looking for a weak spot in the enemy's battle formations, and it was found. A breakthrough from the encirclement occurred in the area where, according to E. Hesse, the police from Lokt were stationed (although, apparently, these were formations from Mikhailovka that did not have serious experience in fighting partisans).

On October 19, German police forces withdrew to the area of ​​​​the villages of Kurbakino, Razvetye, Mikhailovka, Dmitrovsk. In addition, the main parts of Kaminsky were withdrawn to the Kromy region (40 km southwest of Orel).

In the period from October 20 to November 2, 1942, the Germans and the police, concentrating their forces in the area of ​​​​the city of Dmitrovsk, the settlement of Mikhailovka and the village of Trosna, conducted reconnaissance of the location of partisans in the forest tracts of Zhernovets (the base of the Mikhailovsky, Trosnyansky, Zheleznyak, Cavalry, headquarters of the OPOKO) and Dry Khotyn (the base of the Dmitrovsky and Dmitrievsky detachments). The offensive of the Germans and the police resumed on November 3 and was directed to the area of ​​the Zhernovets tract. During the day, the partisans repelled enemy attacks, and at night they moved to the Dry Khotyn forest.

On November 6, attacks on the partisans continued. The militia battalion from Dmitrov took the most active part in them. Although the police failed to break through the all-round defense of the "people's avengers" and enter the Dry Khotyn tract, they were able to destroy 10 pillboxes, 200 dugouts and eliminate 150 partisans. The Dmitrovsky militiamen showed themselves well in the battles in the area of ​​​​the Dolbenkovsky forests, where they destroyed 30 pillboxes, 300 dugouts and 50 "forest bandits".

On November 17, 1942, after a week-long lull, the third phase of the operation began. An expedition with a total strength of 3,500 people was sent against the partisans of the Kursk region, consisting of police units of six garrisons (Komarichsky, Dmitrievsky, Dmitrovsky, Mikhailovsky, Sevsky and Lokotsky) and a Hungarian infantry battalion. Due to heavy losses, the partisans refused to make combat contact with the enemy and made another maneuver, moving from the territory of Dmitrievsky to the territory of the Mikhailovsky district, but the people's avengers failed to completely avoid fighting with the police and Hungarian soldiers.

In general, Operation Polar Bear did not bring the expected results, although the losses of the partisans were heavy. The situation in the rear area of ​​the 2nd Panzer Army was in principle controlled, but it was clearly far from the establishment of a normal occupation order. The partisans were increasingly causing problems for the Germans, and the fight against them was very costly for the German side and the collaborationist formations. So, in the report “on the fight against banditry”, compiled for the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, it was noted that in the period from April to December 1942, partisan losses were determined at 5644 people killed. The losses of the Germans and auxiliary forces amounted to 2402 people, including the wounded and missing. These figures show what a cruel and merciless war was going on in the Bryansk region.

In the meantime, while the units of the Dmitrovskaya, Dmitrievskaya and Mikhailovskaya militia participated in the operation "Polar Bear", Kaminsky issued order No. 114 "On the fight against partisans" (dated October 31, 1942). Along with the fact that the order spoke in detail about the crimes committed by the partisans against the fighters of the 2nd, 4th and 8th battalions, it also talked about the creation of a special motorized fighter company at the headquarters of Kaminsky, consisting of 150 people and about strengthening alerts, in case of the appearance of "forest bandits" in the villages.

In addition, according to the NKVD, in November 1942, Kaminsky announced in the district the second mobilization among the local population aged 17 to 40 years in the brigade being formed (to a certain extent, the emphasis was on men born in 1922-1925) .

To carry out the mobilization and accounting of military personnel and human resources, a military department (headed by Deputy Kaminsky G.N. Balashov) and a mobilization sub-department (V. Belousov) were created as part of the district administration. The former captain of the Red Army I.P. became the chief of staff of the brigade. Shavykin. The operational department of the headquarters was headed by the former captain of the Red Army I. Frolov, the mobilization department was headed by the former major of the Red Army I. Nikitinskiy, the intelligence department was headed by the former major of the Red Army B.A. Kostenko, counterintelligence - former captain of the Red Army F.A. Kapkaev. Kaminsky's adjutant was the former junior political instructor R.K. Belai.

On the basis of police units, battalions began to form. Each battalion had 4 rifle companies, mortar and artillery platoons. In practice, as emphasized by S.I. Drobyazko, "both in personnel and in the armament of individual battalions, there was no uniformity." The number of battalions could vary from 300 to 1000 fighters, and “the availability of weapons depended mainly on the nature of the tasks performed. While some battalions even had armored vehicles, others were armed mainly with rifles and had almost no light and heavy machine guns. Nevertheless, Kaminsky managed to form a fully combat-ready brigade. It included 14 battalions (according to R. Michaelis - 13 battalions stationed in Tarasovka, Kholmetsky, Dubrovka, Navl, Igritsky, Selechna, Dmitrovsk, Dmitrov, Sevsk, Suzemka, Mikhailovka; there were two battalions and headquarters in Lokta), armored division , anti-aircraft battery, commandant platoon, fighter company. The strength of the brigade at the end of 1942 was about 10 thousand people. The unit was named "Russian Liberation People's Army" (RONA).

At the end of December 1942 - at the beginning of January 1943, Kaminsky's units were involved in Operation Polar Bear II and were attached to the corps group of Lieutenant General Baron Werner von und zu Gilz. The operation was carried out due to the fact that the united partisan detachments of the northwestern regions of the Kursk region from mid-December 1942 constantly attacked the German police garrisons. At this time, police units were destroyed in the settlements of Alyoshin, Malo-Bobrovo, Pogodino, Evdokimovka, Esman and Ostapovo. There was a real threat that the partisans would disable the Deryugino railway station - an important junction through which military echelons followed to the front.

In accordance with the plan of operation developed in the 1st Kursk partisan brigade, the Dmitrievsky detachment was tasked with capturing the station and destroying all objects. The battalion of the Dmitrovsky detachment carried out the task of screening from the May 1 state farm to the village of Deryugino. The cavalry detachment was supposed to take up defense east of the station, a detachment of them. Zheleznyak - at the crossroads of the railway line and the road, the village of Bychki - Deryugino station.

On the night of January 2, 1943, partisans attacked the Deryugino station. But they failed to take it by storm. The police successfully repulsed all the attacks of the Dmitrievsky detachment of partisans (700 people). Met by the fire of the "Kaminians" guarding the station, the partisans were forced to retreat, leaving their dead and wounded behind.

After the raid on the Deryugino station, the German command decided to concentrate German and police forces numbering 1,500 in the Mikhailovsky district in order to encircle and destroy detachments of the 1st Kursk partisan brigade. Since the battles with the police and Wehrmacht soldiers led to heavy losses, the command of the partisan brigade gave the order to retreat to the Khinel forests, where the "people's avengers" took up defensive positions. There they fought defensive battles until they received an order from the Bryansk headquarters of the partisan movement (BShPD) to leave the forests to join units of the Red Army.

RONA units also participated in Operation Polar Bear III (end of January - February 1943). They were again given to the German troops, but this time - to the Ryubzam combat group. During the fighting, the "Kaminsky" destroyed 23 partisans and captured a large convoy, but during the fighting, Kaminsky's deputy G.N. was killed. Balashov. According to I. Gribkov, this was a serious loss for the brigade, since it was Balashov who carried out the development and conduct of all anti-partisan operations in the Lokotsky district, maintained discipline, and led the formation and provision of battalions.

The soldiers of the RONA also had to participate directly in the battles with the Red Army. The first combat clashes between the "Kaminians" and the latter took place during the so-called "Sevsky raid", or the Dmitriev-Sevskaya offensive operation, which took place in late February - March 1943. On the orders of the German command, some parts of the RONA were platoon and company merged into the German and Hungarian units, and German officers were sent to each battalion of the Kaminets.

Actually Sevsk defended the garrison of 1750 people, which was based on two battalions of the 108th Hungarian division, as well as RONA units: 10th (commander - P.A. Konstantinov) and 14th (commander - M.G. Drachenko) battalions and an artillery battery (commander - N.A. Kosyrev) of the 4th regiment under the command of the chief of staff of the regiment A.N. Demin. These units were reinforced with 30 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The regiment commander himself, Major Reitenbach, was with his 12th battalion, which, together with the 5th regiment of the RONA, Major Turlakov, covered the Sevskoye direction. At the time of the start of the Soviet offensive, the Reitenbach and Turlakov units were operationally subordinate to the SS Battle Group Z of SS Standartenführer A. Zehender (8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer) and during subsequent battles operated in the Toporichny - Radovanie - Valdysh - Kozlovsky area .

The 2nd Soviet cavalry corps and ski brigades, which broke through to the rear of the German troops, soon found themselves surrounded. Cavalry rifle group of General V.V. Kryukova began a retreat to Sevsk. In heavy battles at Vovna and Seredina-Buda, the Mikhailovsky and Znob-Novgorodskaya farms, Svetovo and Borisovo, at Podlesny Novoselki and Maritsky Farm, most of the Soviet forces of the ball were defeated by the Germans, Hungarians and collaborators.

On March 17, 1943, the defense of Sevsk began. The Soviet command could do nothing to help the defenders. The main grouping was defeated near Komarichiny. On March 19, German and Hungarian units, together with RONA units, entered the city. For two days there were street fights for every house. On the night of March 26, German flamethrower tanks rushed to the city, burning everything around. Self-propelled guns and infantry followed the tanks. The defense broke up into separate pockets in the ruins and cellars of destroyed houses. By the morning of March 27, there was no one to defend Sevsk. Most of the cavalrymen of the 2nd Guards Quad Corps and skiers died. The few survivors took up defensive positions along the Sev River.

Around Sevsk, fighting continued until mid-April, after which the defense stabilized. Only during the raid and defense of the city of Sevsk, more than 15 thousand cavalrymen and skiers were killed.

Immediately after these events, the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, Colonel-General R. Schmidt, sent a letter of thanks to Kaminsky, noting the merits of his subordinates to the German army: "We owe a lot to you and your capable People's Army for the successful outcome of the events."

In the literature, there is sometimes an indication that the 4th regiment of the RONA, Major Reitenbach, at the end of August 1943, was "put up to ensure a general withdrawal" and participated in the defense of Sevsk in August 1943. During the capture of Sevsk by units of the Red Army, Reitenbach was allegedly tied to a tank, after which he was dragged through the city until he died.

This version was first published in a book by Sven Steenberg (Steenberg), a former employee of the Abvergroup-107. However, when analyzing the relevant passage, there is no doubt that the author means the capture of Sevsk by units of the 2nd Corps on March 1, 1943 (despite the fact that Steenberg erroneously dates these events to “autumn 1943”). He literally writes that "the 4th regiment of the Kaminsky brigade had to hold the city of Sevsk in order to ensure the general German offensive." Of course, there was no question of any German offensive at the end of the summer - in the fall of 1943 ... In addition, Steenberg does not indicate the name of the regiment commander. As you know, in March, his chief of staff A.N. Demin (it is possible that under the above tragic circumstances). Reitenbach himself was not in Sevsk then. He was together with the 12th battalion of his regiment as part of the battle group of SS Standartenführer A. Zehender and, apparently, died during the March operation of the German-Hungarian troops to encircle and destroy the equestrian and ski group of General Kryukov that had broken through to the rear.

In April 1943, the Soviet offensive was halted and the German front stabilized. The Kaminsky brigade received a small respite and the opportunity to restore the combat capability of its units. The next (third) mobilization of the local population was announced. Citizens born in 1925–1926 were subject to conscription for military police service. The mobilization was successful, and the number of units reached 12 thousand people.

In parallel with this, apparently, activities were completed to bring the RONA units into 5 regiments of a three-battalion composition:

1st Rifle Regiment: Major Galkin - 1st, 2nd, 11th battalions (1300-1500 people), location - Pchela village;

2nd Rifle Regiment: Major Tarasov - 4th, 6th, 7th battalions (1300-1500 people), location - Bobrik village;

3rd Rifle Regiment: Major Turlakov - 3rd, 5th, 15th battalions (1300-1500 people), location - Navlya village;

4th Rifle Regiment: Major Proshin - 10th, 12th and 14th battalions (500–600 men). Probably, the personnel of this regiment took the most active part in the battles against the Soviet cavalry and suffered heavy losses;

5th Rifle Regiment: Captain Filatkin - 8th, 9th and 13th battalions (1300–1500 men), stationed at Tarasovka - Kholmech.

In preparation for Operation Citadel, the command of Army Group Center decided to carry out a series of special measures to reduce partisan activity in areas where Wehrmacht tank and motorized formations were arriving. In May 1943, on the territory of the Oryol region, the rear services of Army Group Center, with the support of army formations, carried out several operations. In particular, units of the 47th Panzer Corps (7th Infantry, 10th Motorized, 292nd Infantry, 4th and 18th Panzer, 442nd Special Purpose Divisions) prepared a large-scale operation "Gypsy Baron" (Zigeunerbaron ) .

German units and formations intended for the operation were concentrated in the area of ​​Vygonichi, Navlya, Suzemka, Trubchevsk. Since the anti-partisan activities were to take place in the dense forests between the Desna, Navli and Nerussa (south of Bryansk), the German command decided to use formations from collaborators. 4 RONA regiments were involved in the operation (the 1st, 2nd and 11th battalions of the 1st regiment, as well as the 3rd battalion from the 3rd regiment), the 709th special purpose regiment, volunteer regiment "Desna", cavalry group "Trubchevsk", several battalions of auxiliary police.

The total strength of the group was about 40 thousand people, from the air it was supported by aircraft. The Germans counted on applying simultaneous strikes from the Navlya River, the Altukhovo-Suzemka railway and from the Nerussa River to cut the forest into a number of isolated areas, disunite the partisan brigades, deprive them of their general leadership and, pushing them to the Desna, destroy them. Assuming that part of the partisans would try to get out of the encirclement, the Germans had previously created strong barriers on the outskirts of the forest. To block the partisans, fortifications were built along the right bank of the Desna.

Before the start of the operation, the command of the 2nd Panzer Army issued an order (dated May 11, 1943) to evacuate the civilian population from the battle zone. In the 1st and 4th paragraphs of the order, it was noted: “The population of villages and settlements in the enemy territory to be cleared must be completely evacuated ... road Lokot - Bryansk. The troops must take the required convoy for this. This order indirectly indicates that the police were not only supposed to take part in the hostilities, but also to evacuate the civilian population to safe areas defined according to the plan.

By May 20, the people's avengers ran out of ammunition and food supplies, communication and control of the detachments were lost. The situation was saved by the fact that at night the besieged brigades were dropped from aircraft with food, ammunition and explosives.

On May 21, the Germans captured the railway Khutor Mikhailovsky - Unecha. The partisans were driven out of the forest. By May 31, the "people's avengers" were pressed against the Desna. At this critical moment, the command of the brigades decided to break through to the east. On June 7, with huge losses, the partisans broke out of the blockade. In a special message from the 1st department of the 4th department of the NKGB of the USSR addressed to the Commissar of State Security of the 2nd rank B.Z. Kobulov spoke in detail about the position of the partisans during the operation “Gypsy Baron”: “All the partisan brigades are badly battered, two brigade commanders and many commanders of the detachments were killed, many partisans were taken prisoner by the enemy. Part of the partisans of one of the brigades went to the police. The situation is extremely bad, the number of armed men in brigades and detachments has decreased, and there is famine. The enemy blocks the partisans. To fight the partisans, the police brigade of the head of the Lokot district Kaminsky was withdrawn into the forest.

In general, the results achieved in the operation "Gypsy Baron" were assessed by the German command as positive. The partisans were almost defeated. Of the 6,000 people's avengers who were in the area, 1,584 were killed, 1,568 were taken prisoner, and 869 deserted. 207 camps, 2930 dugouts and firing points were destroyed. More than 2,400 "bandit accomplices" were also brought to trial, 60,000 rounds of ammunition, 5,000 hand grenades, dozens of machine guns, hundreds of small arms were seized.

By the way, the failed actions of the partisans during the operation "Gypsy Baron" soon became known to Stalin himself. A message was prepared in his name by the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) (dated June 1, 1943). Noting the very difficult situation of the "people's avengers", the head of the TsSHPD P.K. Ponomarenko blamed the commander of the Bryansk combined brigades D.V. for all the failures (and in part quite deservedly). Emlyutin, who showed ignorance of tactics and operational art. The document emphasized:

“The commander of the Bryansk detachments, Yemlyutin, showed complete confusion in the first days, lost control and communication with the detachments, completely removed himself from the organization of resistance, decided that the situation was completely hopeless and, as a result, did not consider it necessary and did not insist on measures of assistance from our side. Detachments and brigades became disorganized and went over to the side of the enemy. In this situation, on the spot, with the sanction of the Secretary of the Oryol Regional Committee of the CPSU (b), Comrade Matveev, it was decided to appoint Lieutenant Colonel Gorshkov of the Border Troops under Commissar Hero of the Soviet Union Bondarenko as the commander of groups and detachments.

For our part, we support such a measure as expedient and clearly approved by the commanders of brigades and detachments. Yemlyutin has now arrived in Yelets on a U-2 plane.

Simultaneously with the operation "Gypsy Baron" from May 21 to May 30, German troops, primarily parts of the 45th Army Corps (5th Tank, 6th Infantry, part of the 707th Security (747th Infantry Regiment) divisions, " Eastern Headquarters - 455"), conducted Operation Free Shooter (Freischutz). Together with the Germans, parts of the Kaminsky brigade participated in the operation. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Regiment were attached to the 6th Infantry Division. The 11th battalion of the 1st regiment and the 3rd battalion of the 3rd regiment received combat missions related to the completion of the rout, together with units of the first echelon of the German troops of the brigade partisan reserves. In addition to the Kaminians, the 587th and 791st security battalions, the 807th infantry battalion, which consisted of Azerbaijanis, and armored train No. 4 were also involved in the operation "Free shooter".

All basic preparations for the operation were completed by May 12, when the Germans concentrated in the areas indicated by him. The plan of the operation provided for the clearing of partisans from the forests to the north and north-west of Bryansk - in the area of ​​Dyatkovo - Ivot - Zhukovo. The command of the 45th Corps intended to destroy the "people's avengers" with a concentric strike in the army zone between Bolkhov and the Bryansk-Zhukovo highway, and then finally defeat them in the open area near Vetnya.

On May 21, after covert deployment, the Germans went on the offensive. The actions of the ground troops were supported by aviation, which in the first two days alone made more than 100 sorties.

Having assessed the strength of the enemy, the partisans decided not to engage in positional combat with him. They dispersed into separate units. But by the end of the third day of the operation, the partisan formations were surrounded. The reconnaissance of the people's avengers was more and more persistently looking for weaknesses in the battle formations of the Germans and collaborators - with one goal: to determine the direction of the breakthrough. Such was the area occupied by soldiers from the eastern battalions. On the night of May 25-26, the partisans, having concentrated on the main direction, broke out of the encirclement with heavy losses and retreated to the north.

But the German command, deciding that only a small part of the partisans had escaped, gave the order to continue the operation. On May 28, the German group, as well as police units, concentrated in the "partisan region". In this area, during the cleansing operations, 30 separate camps, about 300 residential dugouts, 100 dugouts, 200 prepared firing points connected by communication lines were discovered.

The fighting against the people's avengers continued. During the fighting, the Germans and the police received air support from two units of bombers and fighters. The partisans once again suffered heavy losses, but were not completely defeated. According to the German command, which generally positively assessed the results of the operation, the losses of the "forest bandits" were characterized by the following figures: 1459 killed, 420 captured, 6 deserted. 2392 people were evacuated from the combat zone.

At the same time, a special “pacification” action (Befriedungsaktion) was carried out as part of Operation Free Gunner. The victims of the action were 1419 people from among the sympathetic "forest bandits" of the civilian population, 13 villages were burned, 317 houses were destroyed. West German researchers W. Preg and W. Jakobmeyer indirectly indicate that in addition to the Wehrmacht soldiers, fighters from Kaminsky's battalions also participated in punitive measures. However, data of this kind need documentary confirmation, which has not yet been done.

According to some reports, Kaminsky's people were involved in three more operations - "Help a Neighbor" (Nachbarhilfe), "Spruce House" (Tannenhauser) and "East" (Osterei).

Operation Citadel ended in failure for the Wehrmacht and the SS troops. An attempt to cut off the Kursk ledge was unsuccessful, and now the German army had no choice but to move on to defensive actions and begin a gradual withdrawal of troops from the blows of the Red Army. The days of Lokotsky district self-government were running out. But RONA did not think of laying down her arms. The 3rd and 5th rifle regiments of the brigade, reinforced by the auxiliary police, in July 1943 in the Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky area repelled the attacks of the Red Army units. Losses in Kaminsky's brigade increased significantly, since his people did not face the formations of the people's avengers, whom they mostly successfully defeated, but with regular units that already had combat experience.

At the same time, on August 5, 1943, Kaminsky issued Order No. 233 on the evacuation of the military and civilian structures of the Lokotsky District, as well as the local population, which "does not want to live in the Bolshevik hell", to Belarus. At the cost of enormous efforts, this task was completed, and on August 26, 1943, units of the RONA (up to 7,000 people) with equipment, the civil administration, members of their families, as well as anti-Soviet civilians (about 30 thousand people) were loaded and evacuated by rail to district of the Belarusian city of Lepel.

Kaminsky's people found themselves in one of the most disadvantaged and troubled regions of occupied Belarus. Dozens of partisan formations were active here, paralyzing during August-September 1943 (the “Rail War”) the rear communications of the 3rd Panzer Army (Colonel-General Hans Reinhardt) on the outskirts of Vitebsk and Orsha. The command of the Army Group "Center" decided to use the Kaminsky brigade in the special operation "Hubert" (Hubertus).

In Lepel, the Kaminsky formation changed its name and became known as the Kaminsky People's Army Brigade (Volksheer-Brigade Kaminski).

Before the start of Operation Hubert, parts of the compound were located at the following points:

The 1st Rifle Regiment (commander Major Galkin) was located from Lepel to Bocheikovo in strong points;

The 2nd Infantry Regiment (commander Major Golyakov) is located in Senno;

The 3rd Rifle Regiment (commander Major Turlakov) is located in Beshenkovichi and in the Bocheikovo stronghold;

The 4th Infantry Regiment (commander Major Proshin) covered Lepel from the north and southwest;

a separate guards battalion (commander Lieutenant Shurgin) was located in Lepel;

the armored division (commander lieutenant Samsonov) was in Lepel;

anti-aircraft division (senior lieutenant Plokhin), location - Lepel.

Operation Hubert was carried out with the aim of clearing the communications of the 3rd Panzer Army on the Senno-Chashniki line and began on October 16th. Parts of Kaminsky acted quite successfully: after several days of fighting, they destroyed 562 partisans, and captured 35. The losses of the brigade amounted to 34 people killed, 61 wounded, 38 missing. During the fighting, 2 submachine guns (MP-40), 13 light machine guns, 5 anti-tank rifles, 4 self-loading rifles, 1 mortar, 139 rifles, 3 revolvers were captured, 2 tanks were destroyed (1 T-26 and 1 BT-7 ), but at the same time 2 light machine guns, 4 mortars, 6 submachine guns, 1 gun, 1 T-34 and 1 BT-7 were lost.

It should be noted that during the summer-autumn of 1943, the Kaminsky brigade faced desertion, or the transition of entire units to the side of the partisans. For example, in the period of August - September 1943, 500 fighters went over to the partisans, of which 350 fled on the way to Belarus. On September 15, another attempt at desertion was made: a company under the command of Captain Provatorov went to the “forest bandits” in full force along with 15 horses, 12 wagons, a mortar, 3 machine guns, 10 machine guns and 60 rifles. Major Tarasov, commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment, was also preparing for the transition. But the transition did not take place - unexpectedly, Kaminsky appeared at the headquarters of the regiment, and most of the officers who had previously supported Tarasov quickly turned away from him. As a result, Tarasov and 8 more people from among the "active degenerates" were executed. However, in September 1943, at least two more cases of desertion were noted: on the night of September 16-17, “27 fighters led by Captain Malakhov went over to the partisans,” and another 126 people from different “battalions of the 2nd regiment, and on September 25 30 tankers deserted from the brigade.

On October 11, 1943, the head of the TsShPD P.K. Ponomarenko reported to Stalin: “From the Kaminsky brigade ... desertion and cases of going over to the side of the partisans continue. As of 4.10, the food supply base of the Lepel zone supplies Kaminsky with food for only 3,665 people. This is probably all that remains of his brigade, which numbered 12 thousand people in August.

However, by establishing strict discipline and identifying those who were corrupting the brigade, Kaminsky brought order to his unit. In October - November 1943, the number of the brigade began to increase again due to the Belarusian policemen. By November 25, 1943, there were still five regiments in the RONA (with a regular strength of the regiment of 1260 people) and a guards battalion. In service there were 12 tanks (one KB, eight T-34s, three BT-7s), three armored vehicles (BA-10), three tankettes, one 122-mm howitzer, three 76-mm and eight 45-mm guns, 8- 10 battalion mortars, 15 heavy and 50–60 light machine guns. The severe crisis that had hit the brigade since leaving Lokt was gradually overcome.

In November 1943, after many painful upheavals, Kaminsky decided to reorganize the NSPR. Now it has received the name of the National Socialist Labor Party of Russia (NSTPR). Former employees of the Lokot administration were actively involved in the work, becoming part of the Lepel district administration. But in the foreground, despite all the concerns of civil engineering, the fight against the partisans nevertheless came to the fore. That is, the military factor in the versatile activities of Kaminsky and his associates became the main and dominant one.

However, it must be said that, having become the mayor of the Lepel district, Kaminsky carried out active ideological work. So, already on September 12, 1943, a youth meeting organized by RONA propagandists took place in the hall of the Lepel Theater. RONA officers and civilian propagandists spoke. The subject of the reports was to explain the essence of the "Russian liberation movement". An appeal was addressed to the local residents to join the ranks of the "People's Army". One of the speakers then noted: "The goal of our life is to create a Great New Russia on the ruins of Bolshevism."

The Union of Russian Youth (SRM) was active under RONA. On January 15, 1944, the newspaper “Voice of the People” published an article “Youth at a Great Break”, which noted: “Now that the“ Chinese Wall ”created by the Bolsheviks has collapsed, and we have the opportunity to get acquainted with other teachings ... capable of recreating our greatness and, on the basis of this, put our Motherland on the world peaks, when we have the opportunity to rally around the National Socialist Labor Party of Russia and the Union of Russian Youth, we must do this.

In the same issue, the goals and objectives of the RRM were revealed: 1) educating the younger generation of a sense of love for the motherland, for their people; 2) all possible assistance and active participation in the struggle for the overthrow of Bolshevism and the establishment of a new system in Russia; 3) exposing the teachings of Marx as harmful and anti-people, beneficial only to Jews who do not have a homeland; 4) instilling love for any work aimed at the good of the state and the nation, remembering that labor is a source of property, labor property is a guarantee of freedom; 5) education of high moral and moral qualities, honesty and solidarity.

It should be recognized as untenable the opinion of the Belarusian researcher E. Grebn that the activities of the RONA in the propaganda direction turned out to be zero. Kaminsky in a short time managed to establish life in the Lepel district, replenish the ranks of his combat formations, reorganize the party - this is a clear evidence of the success of the former head of the LAO. Grebnya's statements about the RONA's propaganda of the ideas of great-power Russian chauvinism, addressed exclusively to the Belarusian population, are only surprising. It is well known, for example, that in the eastern part of Belarus (in the same Vitebsk region where Lepel was located) a considerable number of Russian and Russian-speaking citizens lived, there were also many former Red Army soldiers who were captured in the summer of 1941 and went to cooperate with the German authorities. In addition, Belarus in the form that Comb is talking about did not exist at that time. And therefore, the use of the corresponding “great power” rhetoric by the RONA propagandists (as well as the German propaganda organs) was a completely logical and natural step that corresponded to the specific situation.

Placed at strongholds around several cities and towns, RONA units were involved in security services. In the third decade of October 1943, they had to repel an attack by partisan brigades on Lepel and Chashniki. This attack was part of a large-scale operation (“Lepel Offensive Operation”), developed at the Belarusian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (BShPD) (order No. 0054 “On the defeat of the enemy and the capture of Lepel” was signed on October 5, 1943 by the head of the TsShPD P.K. Ponomarenko) . The purpose of the operation was to completely destroy the Lepel garrison. The city was a strategic center and was a junction of the highways Vitebsk - Lepel - Minsk, st. Lovsha - Lepel - Borisov, Lepel - Orsha, the most important stronghold for the protection of communications of the 3rd tank army of the Wehrmacht. In the event of its defeat, a vast "partisan region" would be formed from several districts of three regions of Belarus: Vitebsk, Vileika and Minsk. This, of course, would have complicated the already difficult situation of the 3rd Panzer Army, whose rear services could not cope with the constant attacks of the partisans.

In addition, in the event of a successful outcome of the operation, the people's avengers could have weighty political arguments in their hands: the Belarusian partisans destroyed the RONA. This could negatively affect the psychological state of the personnel of some other units and subunits of the "Eastern troops" stationed here and lead to their disintegration.

More than 20 brigades of people's avengers were involved in the Lepel operation. The overall management of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the Chashnik partisan unit "Dubov", Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General F.F. Dubrovsky. According to order No. 1, the Lepel brigades were to strike at the Lepel garrison. I.V. Stalin (the duties of the brigade commander during the operation were performed by the chief of staff D.T. Korolenko), "Dubova", Senno partisan brigade (brigade commander B.S. Leonov), them. IN AND. Chapaev (brigade commander V.V. Melnikov) and the formation of them. PC. Ponomarenko (brigade commander N.V. Utkin). The main objects that needed to be destroyed were: the railway station, the agricultural commandant's office, the MTS, the building materials plant, the military camp, ammunition depots and barracks.

According to partisan intelligence, the 1st and 4th regiments of Kaminsky, a separate guards battalion of the RONA, an infantry regiment of the Wehrmacht, a tank battalion, two artillery and one mortar battery were located in Lepel. The city was surrounded by a dense network of bunkers and barbed wire. All stone buildings were equipped for defense. Minefields were created in the most important directions.

In addition to the complete destruction of the Lepel garrison, the operation involved strikes against the regional center of Chashniki, as well as the settlements of Kamen and Bocheikovo. The task of defeating and capturing the district center of Chashniki was assigned to the Smolensk partisan regiment I.F. Sadchikov, 1st Vitebsk, 1st them. K.S. Zaslonov and Liozno partisan brigades. The defeat of the garrisons in the settlements of Kamen and Bocheikovo was assigned to the partisan brigades "For Soviet Belarus", "Aleksey", 2nd im. K.S. Zaslonova. Covering the flanks of the strike group of brigades, especially those advancing on Lepel, was assigned to the formations of P.M. Romanov (Beshenkovichi-Lepel road) and L.I. Selitsky (blocking the road Senno - Chashniki).

The partisan operation began on the night of October 19-20, 1943. The formations of the people's avengers concentrated south of Lepel and, after the signal of the rocket, went on the assault. Encountering no resistance in the village of Zaboenye, where auxiliary police posts were stationed, the assault groups of partisans approached the southern defensive ring of Lepel. After that, fighting began on the southern outskirts of the city. By morning, several blocks located in the south of Lepel were in the hands of the people's avengers. However, at dawn, reinforcements arrived in the city (German tanks, RONA armored division). And the partisans, having no fire support, retreated to their original area - the villages of Svyada and Svyaditsa. The results of the attack on Lepel turned out to be modest: 39 Wehrmacht soldiers and officers were killed (according to partisan documents), 15 were wounded and 16 policemen and Kaminets were captured.

On the same night, the partisans stormed the military town of Lepel, where there was a food depot, a gas depot, and ammunition depots. The town was surrounded by bunkers and wire fences in four rows. In the night battle, the partisans, according to the Soviet side, killed 146 people, captured 18 prisoners, burned 9 cars, 3 tractors, and destroyed the bakery. As trophies they took 4 machine guns, 31 rifles, 1 mortar, 2 motorcycles. However, the "forest soldiers" could not destroy the military camp, and during the attacks of the defensive line, which consisted of bunkers, they suffered heavy losses from machine-gun and mortar fire.

Simultaneously with the assault on Lepel, battles began for the regional center of Chashniki. Here, the defense was held by about 500 Wehrmacht servicemen and the 3rd regiment of the RONA brigade. The partisans began the assault at exactly 2.00 on October 20, 1943. At first, luck accompanied the "people's avengers": they broke through to the city, captured its southeastern part, and suppressed several enemy firing points. However, in the morning the situation changed. Firstly, reinforcements came from Senno, and secondly, the Germans and the Kaminians gradually ousted the partisans from Chashnikov, returned their previously abandoned positions, and over the next day (!) repelled the fierce attacks of the "forest soldiers". October 21 at 15.00 F.F. Dubrovsky gave the order for the withdrawal of partisan detachments from the battle. Twice more, on October 23 and 24, the people's avengers tried to take Chashniki, but, having met organized resistance, they were forced to withdraw.

Thus, the “Lepel Offensive Operation” of the Belarusian partisans ended in failure, which was greatly facilitated by the actions of the fighters of the Kaminsky formation.

In December 1943, the RONA brigade was involved in a major operation to clear the rear of the 3rd Panzer Army from partisans. The final intelligence report of the TsSHPD for December 1943 of the year (dated January 14, 1944) noted:

“At the end of November, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, Colonel General Reinhardt, issued an order to clear the area adjacent to the dirt roads Lepel - Ushachi - Polotsk, Lepel - Pyshno - Dokshitsy, Lepel - Begoml from partisans.

Fulfilling this order, in the period from December 9 to 28, the enemy, with a force of up to 15,000 soldiers and officers, supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft, waged active battles with the partisans. From December 10 to 13, German units and up to two regiments of the Kaminsky brigade, with the support of 70 tanks and 21 aircraft, captured the Berezino and the Berezino-Dokshitsy road.

For successful actions in the fight against the "forest bandits", Kaminsky received several medals for the "eastern peoples" by January 1944, and on January 27 he was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd class. All these events took place at a time when RONA almost did not leave the battles with the partisans. So, from January 18 to 25, the 3rd regiment of the brigade, having become part of the von Gottberg combat group (Kampfgrupre "von Gottberg" - the Higher Fuhrer of the SS and Police of Central Russia and Belarus), took part in the battles in the Dokshits area, where they still partisan formations were active. Together with RONA, units of the 20th motorized infantry regiment of the 60th motorized infantry division, the 185th and 187th infantry regiments of the 8th infantry division, the 31st regiment of the German order police, the 720th reserve regiment , 743rd and 858th eastern battalions, 314th and 513th reserve infantry battalions. The partisans suffered heavy losses, although they managed to avoid defeat.

After this operation, the Kaminsky brigade firmly takes its place among the units and formations of the police and SS troops, subordinate to the General Commissar of Belarus, SS Gruppenführer and Police Lieutenant General Kurt von Gottberg. Even after February 15, 1944, when the brigade and civilian refugees were transferred to Western Belarus in the Dyatlovo region, Kaminsky's fighters were directly subordinate to Gottberg, who concentrated several top police and civil positions in his hands at once and had de facto dictatorial powers.

Starting in the spring of 1944, the German occupation authorities of Belarus decided to conduct a series of large-scale operations to destroy the partisans. First of all, it was decided to liquidate the people's avengers operating in the so-called. Polotsk-Lepel, Polotsk-Ushach, Senno-Orsha and Borisov-Begoml zones. To this end, German field troops, SS and police units, various collaborationist formations began to concentrate around the "partisan territories".

The main efforts were aimed at defeating the partisans in the area between Lepel and Minsk and completely clearing the rear of Army Group Center from them. For this, 12 SS and police regiments, units of the 6th airfield, 252nd, 95th, 56th and 195th infantry, 211th security and reserve divisions were pulled together. Regiments (1st, 3rd and 5th) of the RONA, battalions of the Belarusian Regional Defense (BKA), Cossack hundreds, parts of the Belarusian and Ukrainian police were connected to the operations. In total, 60 thousand soldiers and officers, 137 tanks, 236 guns, 70 aircraft, 2 armored trains were to participate in the fighting against the partisans. The anti-partisan activities were led by the General Commissar of Belarus K. von Gottberg and the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, Colonel General G. Reinhardt.

By April 10, 1944, the Polotsk-Lepel zone was blocked. On April 11, the command was given to start two operations at once - Drizzling Rain (Regenschauer) and Downpour (Regenfass). The tasks of these operations, contrary to the opinion of Soviet historians, were basically completed, which allowed von Gottberg to proceed with the implementation of a larger operation - "Spring Holiday" (Fruhlingsfest). The partisans suffered such heavy losses in battles with the police and SS troops that after three weeks of hostilities, dozens of detachments and several brigades were bled to death. At the same time, Kaminsky's regiments showed their best side: they acted much more efficiently than some SS field units.

Despite the fact that the partisans nevertheless managed to break out of the blockade, the main goal of the operations - ensuring security in the rear areas of Army Group Center - was achieved. According to the headquarters of the 3rd German Panzer Army, only in the period from April 11 to May 15, 1944, partisan losses amounted to 14,288 people killed and captured. In battles with the German expedition, the commanders of partisan brigades - the secretary of the Beshenkovichi underground district party committee, Hero of the Soviet Union P.M. Romanov (team "For Soviet Belarus"), Hero of the Soviet Union A.F. Danukalov (team "Alexey"), D.T. Korolenko, commissars of brigades I.F. Korenevsky, B.C. Svirid and G.G. Zhizhov, commander of the detachment S.A. Patzey. The Kaminsky brigade also contributed to this matter. It was the RONA fighters who defeated the 1st Anti-Fascist Brigade (the former 1st Russian National SS Brigade "Druzhina"). For the successful actions of his fighters, the commander of the Russian formation was awarded the Iron Cross 1st class.

Following the operation "Spring Holiday", the Kaminsky brigade was involved in one more, the last for the RONA fighters, action - "Cormorant" (Kormoran). The purpose of this operation was to clear the area north of the railway line Minsk - Borisov from the avengers. The fighting began on May 22 with the advance of units of the 3rd Panzer Army on Senno. Connection Kaminsky was sent to the most difficult areas. By the beginning of June, 21 partisan brigades were surrounded: 4 from the Polotsk-Ushach zone, 7 from the Senno-Orsha zone and 10 from the Borisov-Begoml zone - a total of about 22 thousand fighters and commanders. The partisans had to break out of the encirclement in small groups.

As a result of the operation, it was possible to completely clear the front line from Polotsk to Orsha from partisans. The losses of the people's avengers were: 4911 killed, 354 captured. Captured: 5 mortars, 62 machine guns, 14 anti-tank rifles, 56 submachine guns, 639 rifles, 13 pistols, a large amount of equipment, ammunition, food, livestock, 457 camps were destroyed. Kaminsky's people were again noted for the better.

For two years, fighters from the Kaminsky compound fought a fierce fight against the Bryansk and Belarusian partisans. At the same time, the brigade units basically acted quite effectively against the people's avengers, which was noted more than once by the German command, which used the unit in major operations. In connection with the transfer of the RONA to Belarus, the brigade experienced a decline in combat capability, and its units were subject to decomposition by the partisans. Despite the desertion and the poor state of discipline, by November 1943 the situation in the brigade had improved, and in January 1944 the unit reached its previous level. Participation in such anti-partisan operations as "Downpour", "Spring Holiday" and "Cormorant", once again confirmed that RONA was a serious opponent for the people's avengers. Largely due to this, in the summer of 1944, the RONA was included in the SS troops: on June 17, 1944, it became the assault brigade of the SS Troops "RONA" (field mail number 45155).

On July 30, 1944, Kaminsky and Shavykin arrived in Rastenburg to meet with Himmler. On July 31, the brigade commander was awarded the rank of Waffen-brigadeführer. The head of the "Black Order" thanked Kaminsky for the successful actions of the brigade and personally awarded him the Iron Cross 1st Class. On August 2, Bach-Zelewski wrote in his diary: “The day before yesterday I spoke with the Reichsführer SS and met Guderian. Kaminsky, the commander of the Russian Volunteer Corps, was also present here.

On August 1, 1944, the SS Main Operations Directorate issued an order to deploy the RONA to the 29th SS Waffen Grenadier Division / Russian No. 1 / (29. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS / Russische Nr. 1 /). It was planned to form the 72nd (based on the 1st rifle regiment), the 73rd (based on the 2nd and 3rd rifle regiments) and the 74th (based on the 4th and 5th rifle regiments) waffen- grenadier regiments, 29th supply regiment, fusilier, engineer and reserve battalions, anti-tank battalion, communications battalion, anti-aircraft artillery battalion, sanitary and veterinary companies. The artillery regiment of the brigade was reorganized into the 29th Waffen Artillery Regiment (according to real states - a division). Parts of the guards battalion were distributed among the regiments and units of the new division. The formation was armed with about 20 guns, 30 mortars, more than 100 machine guns.

During a personal conversation, Himmler promised Kaminsky to withdraw his unit for reorganization into a military training camp in Neuhammer, and to evacuate refugees (approximately 10,500 people) to Hungary as soon as conditions were created.

In August 1944, an uprising broke out in Warsaw. The commander of the Home Army (AK) Tadeusz Komarovsky (nicknamed "Bur") gave his units in the capital (about 40 thousand people) an order to start an open armed struggle against the German garrison of the city.

The operational department of the German General Staff immediately reacted to the uprising that broke out in Warsaw, preparing an analytical report on the situation in the city. The Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General G. Guderian, personally addressed Hitler with a proposal to declare Warsaw part of the operational zone of the 9th Wehrmacht Army and send troops into it, but the Fuhrer, after a recent assassination attempt on him organized by senior army officers, rejected Guderian's proposal and assigned the task of suppressing the uprising to the SS. At the same time, the Wehrmacht had to coordinate all its actions with the SS and provide Himmler's people with all the help they needed.

The Reichsführer SS entrusted the command of the operation to destroy the rebels to SS Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach, a specialist in the fight against gangs. The SS chief gave him detailed instructions. On August 2, 1944, von dem Bach left for Warsaw. By August 6, almost half of the troops (7496 people) allocated to suppress the uprising entered the city. Gradually, the composition of the von dem Bach grouping of forces and means was determined, as well as its strength - 16 thousand 696 people.

The fact that the RONA soldiers were involved in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, Kaminsky learned while in Berlin. He, as the historian K. Semenov writes, received a telegram from Himmler with the following content: "I am waiting for your help in this matter."

Upon arrival at the formation, Kaminsky held a meeting, which was attended by the chief of staff of the division, I.N. Shavykin, head of intelligence B.A. Kostenko, adjutant of divisional commander R.K. Belay, head of the military investigation department G.S. Protsyuk, commanders of the 1st, 2nd and 5th regiments I.F. Frolov, Golyakov and Romanov, commander of a separate guards battalion Burygin. Kaminsky said that the unit was renamed the division of the German SS troops and assigned to it No. 29; he was promoted to the rank of major general and ordered to send part of the division to Warsaw. Each regiment commander must allocate 400 people (“according to the battalion of reliable people”). It was necessary to form a combined regiment under the command of the Waffen-Obersturmbannführer SS I.D. Frolov (Chief of Staff of the Waffen-Hauptsturmführer SS Nochevkin) and prepare for transfer to the former Polish capital.

The consolidated regiment was formed from both family and unmarried servicemen, and consisted of four rifle battalions, four T-34, Su-76 tanks and two 122-mm howitzers. The number of the regiment, according to German documents, was 1700 people, according to the testimony of officers of the division I.D. Frolova and P.R. Mayorova - from 1500 to 1600 people.

In the early morning of August 3, the personnel boarded vehicles and moved to the designated area. On August 8, the regiment arrived in the village of Rakov, located four kilometers southwest of Warsaw. The next day, Kaminsky arrived at the unit with an order from the German command for an offensive.

Frolov's regiment was included in the battle group of the SS Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the SS troops and police Heinz Reinefarth - it was he who von dem Bach instructed to suppress the uprising. The Reinefart combat group was divided into several operational formations that carried out the cleansing of Warsaw - these were the Rek, Rohr, Dirlewanger, Schmidt combat groups, the Sarnov cover group, etc. Each group was assigned a site, divided into sectors.

On August 9, the subordinates of Frolov and Nochevkin became part of the combat group of Major General Günther Rohr. Parts of the latter operated in the "South" sector, sector "D". In addition to the "Kamins" in the group "Ror" (total number of 6161 people, according to R. Michaelis - 12,700 people) were the 627th engineer battalion, engineer company No. 500, the 80th anti-aircraft regiment, the III division of the artillery regiment 5- th SS Panzer Division "Viking", security police units of Colonel V. Rodewald and the Birknet SD team. The unit was tasked with clearing quarters from the rebels in the areas of Volya, Okhota, Oketsie and Mokotov.

"Kamintsy" fought against the rebels, entrenched in the Okhota region. The firing points of the Poles were suppressed with the help of artillery. Participants in those battles recalled how Frolov personally fired from a 122-mm howitzer at houses, from where AK fighters offered resistance.

The battles for residential quarters were distinguished by great cruelty, both sides did not take prisoners. Already on the first day, when the offensive from Rakov to Okhota was carried out, the Kaminians had to go on the defensive, since the losses from the rebel fire were sensitive (50 people were killed and wounded). But, having got used to it, the RONA soldiers began to push the Poles, clearing street after street.

On August 11, the Kaminians tried to take over a factory in the suburbs of Warsaw. After some time, one of the battalion commanders arrived at the headquarters of the regiment and reported to Frolov that it was impossible to take the factory by force of the infantry. Frolov reported this to Kaminsky. Then Kaminsky personally took control of the battle. On August 12, after a two-hour battle, the factory was taken. The regiment lost about 70 men. For this battle, Kaminsky and Shavykin were presented by the German command for awards, which they received on August 18.

On August 16, RONA soldiers continued to fight in the streets. After clearing several blocks, the assault groups stopped. Three German tanks, supporting the SS with fire, were burned. In this battle, the Kaminians lost another 40 people killed and wounded. Subsequently, the regiment lost daily from 5 to 20 people.

By August 19, the Okhota region was more than half cleared of the rebels, but the Kaminians could not complete the task to the end in 10 days - to reach the Vistula River in their area. Having accepted Kaminsky's proposal, the German command decided to change the regiment. Frolov received an order to advance to an area located 25–30 km northwest of Warsaw and comb the forests where Polish partisans had become more active.

Historians sometimes explain the withdrawal of the regiment from Warsaw by the fact that among the "Kaminians" discipline seriously fell, they killed several Germans and robbed the population. Some facts of this kind actually took place. But it should be remembered that the Germans themselves gave carte blanche to marauding actions. RONA fighters seized the things of the civilian population, but not in such numbers as other parts of the SS and the Wehrmacht. In the first ten days of the uprising alone, the Germans took out about 7,000 railway wagons with various property. The SS men of Dirlewanger were the absolute leaders in this matter.

On August 19, Frolov's regiment was ordered to withdraw from Warsaw. The battalions of the regiment were withdrawn gradually, as their positions were occupied by German units, so the Kaminians continued to fight until August 28 inclusive. From the diary of the Russian SS man I. Vashenka, it is known that by August 18, the losses of the regiment amounted to about 500 people killed and wounded. According to P.R. Mayorov, more reliable, in our opinion, the losses amounted to more than 200 people. But these were not the last casualties in Warsaw, since on August 22 the combined company of the 16th battalion was almost completely killed. The death of the company, according to Vashenka's words, was due to the indiscipline of the personnel. Having occupied one of the houses, the soldiers dispersed through the floors in search of jewelry, food and vodka. Polish fighters, hiding in the basements and on the upper floors, suddenly opened fire from machine guns and threw grenades and Molotov cocktails at the Russian SS men. It is not known how the command of the battalion and regiment reacted to this unpleasant episode. There is no mention of this case in the testimonies of the former Kaminians.

While the regiment's units were leaving Warsaw, around August 22, an officer from von dem Bach's headquarters arrived at the unit's headquarters. From him, Kaminsky received an order to arrive in Krakow, and the regiment was to advance to the area of ​​​​Augustowska Forest, where by that time significant forces of Polish partisans had concentrated - about 14 thousand people. Before leaving, as Frolov recalled, Kaminsky drew him on the map the route of the regiment and the place where the units were to concentrate.

By August 28, the regiment was withdrawn from Warsaw. On the same day, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the part was built. Frolov made a short speech, calling on the personnel to honor the memory of the fallen soldiers and officers. After that, he completed the task. Then the regiment was sent to fight the partisans in the area of ​​​​the village of Truskav (20 km from Warsaw), where it concentrated. Frolov was inactive, did not conduct active operations, which the Polish partisans took advantage of. On the night of September 2-3, 1944, a detachment of lieutenant "Dolina" attacked Truskav, where they caught two battalions of the combined regiment by surprise. During the fighting, the regiment allegedly lost about 100 people killed and about 100 wounded. The AK fighters captured one 75-mm gun, two heavy machine guns, 23 light machine guns, 16 machine guns, two 82-mm mortars, 48 ​​rifles, 10,000 rounds of ammunition, 11 horses, four carts with food and uniforms, and a field radio station.

It seems that it was the unsuccessful battles of the “Kaminians” in Truskava that finally convinced the German command to withdraw the regiment and send it to the place of deployment of the brigade.

Below we will touch upon the question of the causes of the death of the commander of the 29th division. The most widespread version in the literature was the version according to which Kaminsky was shot on the orders of von dem Bach due to the facts of disobedience, looting and the fall in discipline in the units of the consolidated regiment.

In his memoirs, G. Guderian writes that von dem Bach reported to him about the atrocities perpetrated by the fighters of Kaminsky and Dirlewanger. Guderian informed Hitler about everything and demanded the removal of SS units from the city. Hitler refused to comply with these demands, but after Himmler's representative - SS Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein - confirmed Guderian's words, the Fuhrer ordered the withdrawal of SS troops from Warsaw. Further, Guderian remarks: "von dem Bach made sure that Kaminsky was shot."

According to Heinz Hehne, Hitler allegedly provided von dem Bach with the opportunity to remove Kaminsky as "an unwanted witness and the main marauder."

According to von dem Bach himself, it turns out that he gave the order to shoot Kaminsky on his own initiative, because deep down, as he admitted after the war, he opposed the inhuman order of the Reichsführer to kill women and children: “I interfered with Himmler’s orders and even shot the boss that brigade and its employees, because they carried out these orders.

However, in his testimony given to the British military, von dem Bach called a completely different reason for the execution: "... the basis for the application of the military court procedure could only be a refusal to carry out orders in the face of the enemy."

It is not entirely clear why exactly Kaminsky was sentenced to an exceptional measure of punishment in combat conditions and why Himmler (who later resented the commander of the grouping of forces and means) was not informed about this.

As far as the documents permit, Kaminsky, on the contrary, tried his best to carry out all the orders of the German command. There are, however, completely absurd attempts to prove the opposite. For example, V. Samarin writes: “I must tell about the conversation between Kaminsky and the SS general, who demanded that Kaminsky leave his brigade to suppress the Warsaw Uprising. Kaminsky, crossing his arms over his chest, answered the SS man: “Mr. General, firstly, I am a Pole by origin, and secondly, I am a Russian patriot. My soldiers and I fight only against Bolshevism, for the freedom of Russia. I can't participate in the fight against them." Shortly after this, Kaminsky was killed. Approximately the same is written by a member of the NTS P. Ilyinsky: “Kaminsky ... was not only a bandit. He was soon shot by the Germans, as they say, for refusing to lead his division to pacify the insurgent Warsaw. Of course, this "version" can only be regarded through the prism of propaganda.

There is a version that there was a very strained relationship between Kaminsky and von dem Bach. According to some accounts, the commander of the Russian SS was outraged by the ugly supply of his units and showed his displeasure personally to von dem Bach.

On what day was Kaminsky executed, and where did it happen? According to some historians, Kaminsky and the people accompanying him were shot by a team from the Kulmhof (Chelmno) concentration camp under the leadership of SS Hauptsturmführer Hans Botman. The execution was carried out on August 26, 1944 in the forest near Litzmanstadt (Lodz), not far from the Jewish ghetto. According to another version, Kaminsky was sentenced by the SS military field court, and the execution took place on August 19 (this version is no longer valid, since no SS court considered Kaminsky's case).

There is a curious opinion that Kaminsky allegedly illegally left Warsaw and began to make his way to the Carpathians in order to meet with representatives of the UPA. Not far from Tarnow, his official car was stopped by the employees of the Krakow SD. Their chief, SS Brigadeführer Walter Birkampf, ordered a staged attack for the purpose of robbery, the victim of which allegedly was Kaminsky, who was shot after his arrest. But this version looks far-fetched and does not inspire confidence (why did the Ukrainian nationalists suddenly need a half-German, half-Polish, to whom Russians and Belarusians are subordinate?)

Another version was expressed by NTS member Roman Redlikh, who served in RONA for some time. According to him, Kaminsky was summoned by the Germans before the start of the Warsaw Uprising, and he disappeared without a trace, and then there were rumors about his execution. As far as is known, the members of the NTS themselves were going to liquidate Kaminsky, since he refused to voluntarily enter into submission to the command of the ROA and his activities, according to the entees, compromised the "Russian liberation movement." Historian A.V. Okorokov with reference to an interview with V.D. Poremsky writes: “When the“ Vlasov movement ”began to develop, and Kaminsky refused to become subordinate to the ROA, a decision was made at the council of the NTS to liquidate it ... The execution of the action was entrusted to members of the NTS who served in the RONA. However, for a number of reasons, the liquidation of Kaminsky could not be carried out.

Recently, there is often a point of view according to which the death of Kaminsky was facilitated by those who sympathized with Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, high-ranking SS men (Gottlob Berger and Günther D "Alken), since the commander of the 29th division allegedly claimed to be the leader of Russian collaborationism.

By the autumn of 1944, Vlasov was actually chosen to be the commander of the united Russian armed formations. On September 16, 1944, after a personal meeting with a former Soviet general at his headquarters in Rastenburg, Himmler gave Vlasov a promise to soon begin organizational formalization of the armed forces of the ROA (and indeed, after some time, the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia - the Armed Forces of the KONR - were created). Until that moment, Vlasov was just a "wedding general" in the service of the German propaganda machine.

Unlike Vlasov, Kaminsky since October 1941 really showed himself in military operations against partisans (although German propaganda was silent about this experience, as well as about the existence of the RONA and the Lokot autonomy). In principle, given the ambitious nature of the commander of the 29th division, one cannot completely exclude his claims to a leading position in the "Russian liberation movement." However, if Kaminsky seriously counted on this role, he would undoubtedly begin to take some concrete steps for this. While none of his former subordinates after the war remembered anything like that.

It is unlikely that Kaminsky was afraid of the possibility of being subordinate to Vlasov. It is known that a number of commanders of Russian collaborationist formations (for example, the commander of the so-called "Russian National Army" General B.A. Holmston-Smyslovsky) refused to join the KONR Armed Forces. The fact that parts of the RONA were eventually transferred to the Vlasov army is explained solely by the fact of the death of Kaminsky. At the same time, Vlasov himself and his entourage were not at all delighted with such a “gift”.

According to another version, events developed differently. On August 22, 1944, when the fighting in Warsaw reached its peak, Kaminsky drove his car to von dem Bach's headquarters in order to arrive at a meeting. At the entrance to Litzmannstadt, Polish partisans attacked the car, as a result of which Kaminsky and his companions were killed. On the same day, the car was found and delivered to the Headquarters of von dem Bach. For identification, the car was presented to the officers of the division.

In a somewhat “special” form, this version is voiced by the emigrant M. Bobrov: “On the way from Warsaw to Ratibor, where the division was located, he was killed. How Kaminsky died - no one knew about it. His car was found on the road, covered in blood. Together with him, the driver and the chief of staff were killed. The bodies disappeared to nowhere. The Germans undertook an investigation, but, indeed, there were no traces left that would allow unraveling the mystery of the disappearance.

B. Bashilov writes the following: “.. There was a rumor that Kaminsky, along with those who were traveling with him, was killed by partisans along the way. Who killed Kaminsky is not exactly known. The Polish partisans could have killed him, the Germans could have killed him too. Knowing how aggravated the relationship between Kaminsky and the Germans, I personally am inclined to think that the Germans killed Kaminsky, wanting to get rid of the obstinate person.

There is also a version that the attack on Kaminsky's official car was organized not by Polish partisans, but by Soviet saboteurs who arrived from the territory of Slovakia. This version was shared by the former head of counterintelligence division F.A. Kapkaev. Moreover, the circumstances and methods of the murder - an ambush attack, the shooting of a car by people in German uniforms - resemble similar operations already carried out by Soviet saboteurs: the murder of Metropolitan Sergius (Voskresensky) in April 1944, Ataman S.V. Pavlova in June 1944 and others.

One cannot write off the fact that von dem Bach could indeed order the execution of Kaminsky, guided by a verbal order from Hitler (which still needs to be confirmed) or personal considerations. In the latter case, von dem Bach's appeal to the tough and predatory behavior of the "Kaminians" should, in our opinion, be taken into account in the very last turn, since the German units did the same on an even larger scale. In addition, we should not forget that the post-war testimony of von dem Bach, who wanted to avoid execution at all costs, bears the imprint of opportunistic subjectivism, which determined not only the form, but also the factual content of his testimony, which still raises many questions.

Of course, the death of Kaminsky was a heavy loss for the refugees and military personnel of the 29th division, who lost their commander. The National Socialist Care Service took care of Kaminsky's wife and child.

After the death of Kaminsky, the SS did not abandon, contrary to popular belief, the idea of ​​forming the 29th Waffengrenadier Division of the SS, but with a new, German command. But after the death of the commander and chief of staff, the division lost its restraining beginning and began to rapidly decompose.

Nevertheless, on August 30, the SS Brigadeführer and Major General of the SS troops Christoph Diem was appointed commander of the division, who commanded the formation until September 27, after which 3000 "Kamins" were transferred to Neuhammer (Silesia), where the 600th Wehrmacht Infantry Division was created ( Russian). According to some reports, the rest of the personnel, under the leadership of the new acting division commander - SS Gruppenführer and Police Lieutenant General Heinrich Jurs - were used in anti-partisan operations in Slovakia.

After October 11, an inspection led by SS Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger completed its work, which recognized the unit as incapable of combat and subject to disbandment.

All this time, the division was held by the authority of individual commanders. Belay himself, "a staunch supporter of General Vlasov," refused to lead the division and demanded that the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia be transferred to the Armed Forces that were being created. This decision was also supported by Major B.A. Kostenko. Such uncertainty, which dragged on for 2 months, only contributed to the decomposition. However, at the same time, despite the fall in discipline, the high authority of the commanders remained among the soldiers, weapons and equipment were maintained in excellent condition.

In early November 1944, the 29th SS division was transferred to the Münsingen training ground, where the 1st division of the KONR Armed Forces was formed. Some of the fighters joined the refugees. Separate groups of fighters decided to continue the fight on their own on the territory of Belarus and, possibly, the Bryansk region.

As part of the KONR Armed Forces, the Kaminians were not united into one unit. As part of the 1st division, they formed the 2nd Infantry Regiment (3,000–3,500 men). Small groups of "Kaminians" were included in other parts of the division. Almost completely from the former military personnel of the 29th SS division, a Separate reconnaissance battalion of the 1st division of the Armed Forces of the KONR was formed, which was formed and led by Major of the Armed Forces of the KONR (SS Waffen-Sturmbannführer) B.A. Kostenko. The former commander of the armored division of the 29th SS division, captain of the Armed Forces KONR (SS Waffen-Sturmbannführer) Yu. Samsonov, became the deputy commander of the tank battalion of the division.

A little later, about 1000 "Kaminians" will be included in the 2nd division of the Armed Forces of the KONR. In addition, individual officers and soldiers were in almost all parts of the KONR Armed Forces. However, there were only a few in leadership positions. Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed Forces KONR R.K. Belay became the head of the officer reserve of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the KONR. The former chief of artillery of the 29th Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS, Colonel of the Armed Forces KONR A.S. Perkhurov took up the positions of deputy head of the 13th (artillery) department of the Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the KONR and an inspector for artillery weapons.

It remains to add that on the part of the "Vlasovites" Kaminsky's former subordinates met with an extremely negative attitude towards themselves. The leadership of the Armed Forces of the KONR defiantly did not want to recognize the titles and awards received by the Russian SS men. All this forced the commander of the 1st division of the Armed Forces KONR S.K. Bunyachenko issued an order (dated December 5, 1944), which required not to allow insults to the soldiers and officers of the "1st Russian SS division." The order also ordered to explain to the personnel that the replenishment arriving in the formation should unite, become a monolithic whole in the struggle for the liberation of Russia from Bolshevism.

The further fate of the "Kaminians" is connected with the history of the Armed Forces of the KONR. It should be noted that the majority of Russian SS men shared the fate of their new colleagues and were extradited to the USSR. Only a few of them managed to avoid repatriation, in particular, intelligence chief B.A. Kostenko and the head of counterintelligence F.A. Kapkaev, as well as most of their subordinates. This is not surprising, since Western - primarily American - intelligence agencies were very willing to use the services of former Nazi and collaborationist fighters of the "invisible front".

It was not possible to place this topic in the sections about the Second World War.
Didn't want to mess up sections.

Russian division of the SS RONA. Lokot "republic"

It is well known about the Latvian, Estonian and Ukrainian SS divisions. About Belarusian - only to historians. But few have heard of the Russian SS division. But it was and left its cruel mark in the history of the Great Patriotic War.
The history of the 29th SS division began in the Bryansk region, when in October 1941 the troops of the German 2nd Panzer Army entered the city of Lokot.
Elbow- a small town in the Oryol (now Bryansk) region, the former estate of Prince Mikhail Romanov. The rapidly advancing German troops urgently demanded order and security in the occupied territory. There were also those who wanted to do it.
In Lokta, there were enough sent here by the authorities NKVD in the 30s. The vast majority of them were, to put it mildly, not enthusiastic about Stalin's management methods. It was on their initiative and with the warm support of the command of the 2nd Panzer Army that the autonomous Lokotsky region was created. It was headed by a physics teacher at the local technical school, Konstantin Pavlovich Voskoboinik.

K.P. Voskoboynik

He was appointed chief burgomaster of Lokt and launched a vigorous activity in the formation of power structures, not forgetting about the armed forces. The troops were given the name Russian Liberation People's Army, i.е. RONA. It had its own intelligence, a newspaper and even a theater.
The command of the 2 TA, making sure that the local government is able to secure the rear areas on its own, transformed the Lokotsky district first into a county, and then into a district and included 8 districts of the Kursk and Oryol regions with a population of 581,000 people. So the town with a funny name became the fascist capital of the Bryansk region.
The main state institutions began to operate in Lokta, canteens worked, newspapers were published, and taxes were regularly collected. On January 8, 1942, Konstantin Voskoboinik dies in a battle with partisans. He was replaced by Bronislav Kaminsky. He managed to create a very effective management structure in Lokte.

The militarized militia, which at first numbered about 200 people, began to actively fight the partisans. Kaminsky launched a vigorous activity and soon cleared a large territory of them. It was he who was called the "Master of the Bryansk Forest." By the spring of 1942, the number of militia increased to 1,700 people.
Moscow, of course, understood the danger of spreading this positive experience for the Germans to most of the occupied territory. Reconnaissance and sabotage groups were thrown into the Lokt area. They were given the task of physically eliminating Kaminsky, but without much success. Moreover, the Kamenites quickly fine-tuned their intelligence and counterintelligence, already practicing throwing their agents to the partisans.
Under the harsh hand of Kaminsky, life gradually improved. It should be noted that the Lokot Autonomous Okrug was not only an experiment of the military, but rather the leaders of the Third Reich. Even Adolf Hitler knew about its existence, not to mention the Rosenberg Ministry and the SS Headquarters. The militia of the republic was transformed into an assault brigade RONA. It should not be confused with the Vlasov army, which had the name ROA. If the Germans did not really trust the Vlasovites, then the Kamenites had a completely different attitude.
What rights did Kaminsky, says such an episode. In the summer of 1943, 2 German soldiers robbed a mill standing on the outskirts, killed its owner and were caught by the Lokot police. The court of the Lokot Republic sentenced them to death. The sentence was carried out on the square in front of a huge crowd, despite the objections of the German high command.
Inspired by success and with the support of the German command, Kaminsky sought to expand its activities as much as possible. In a small town, he became crowded. Kaminsky announced mobilization. Captured officers of the Red Army were involved as commanders.
Assault Brigade RONA became a significant military force and was transferred to the subordination of the SS. By the end of the forty-second year, it included fourteen rifle battalions, an anti-aircraft battery, an armored division, a commandant platoon and a fighter company. The total number is up to 10,000 people. All these forces were used to fight the partisans, which began from the very beginning of the existence of the new government and continued until the evacuation of RONA units from Lokt.
Kaminsky's party also received its development. Its program was practically written off from the program of the German Nazis. In fact, the National Socialist order was established in the Lokot Republic. For example, marriages between non-Jews and Jews were forbidden. Jews were subjected to various restrictions, additional requisitions and forced labor.
In Lokta, only marriages consecrated by the church were recognized, divorces were prohibited. Abortions were banned, a struggle was waged to preserve the family, and fertility was encouraged. Personal ownership of land was restored, private trade was stimulated in the cities. Free trade and the division of land among local peasants caused a flourishing in areas of the district that were not attacked by partisans.
There were many exiles in Lokotsky and neighboring areas who were forbidden to live in large cities of the Soviet Union, so initially Kaminsky had enough supporters. However, the majority gradually became disillusioned with him and with Hitler. And on the fronts, the situation began to change. At the beginning of March of the forty-third year, Soviet troops approached the outskirts of the district, and the 3rd and 5th regiments of the RONA took part in the hostilities against the Red Army, suffering heavy losses. Many, not accepting the battle, deserted, about 700 people went to the partisans. But, in general, the actions of the Kaminians were successful.
RONA spent the whole spring and summer of 1943 fighting partisans. In fact, this brigade was responsible for the rear of the German armies on the Orel-Kursk line. The largest and most successful operation was the "Gypsy Baron", during which more than 1,500 partisans were killed and the same number captured. In addition, more than 200 partisan bases were destroyed. By participating in these battles, the assault brigade attracted the attention of the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler. The brigade began not only to obey, but also to be structurally part of the SS troops. Kaminsky was awarded a medal, and he was given the rank of SS Brigadeführer, which corresponded to Major General.

In the spring of 1944 in NKVD the so-called "Liter case" was opened, in which documents were filed on the planning of the assassination attempt on Kaminsky. This case was supervised by the captain of state security Frolov, who then had the pseudonym "comrade Altai". Initially, they wanted to plant a bomb in the house where the head of the autonomous region had been. The explosives were supposed to be carried by the recruited chief of the economic unit RONA.
To accomplish the task of destroying Bronislav Kaminsky, several operational groups were deployed to the brigade's area of ​​operations. They included both trained saboteurs and experienced operative agents. If it was impossible to carry out a terrorist attack directly against Kaminsky, it was planned to recruit people from his immediate circle and persuade them either to kill the Brigadeführer or to transfer him alive into the hands of the partisans.
But plans are plans, but sometimes the most banal things can change everything. Agent Sophia,
who was sent with the Sokol sabotage group, did not complete the task and instead got married and left with the child for the location of the group. Despite the failed task, "Sophia" was not punished. Subsequently, after checking and retraining, she was again transferred to the front line.
In addition to the Chekists, partisans also acted against Kaminsky, they have RONA had their accounts.
In the summer of 1943, the situation in the district became threatening, and Kaminsky in agreement with the Nazi command, he ordered the evacuation of the RONA and the civilian population to the city Lepel Vitebsk region. Having loaded tanks, artillery and other equipment, RONA units, together with the civil administration of the district and members of their families, a total of up to 30,000 people, left for Belarus.
The Lepel Special District was already formed, and Kaminsky was appointed its mayor. All power in this territory was concentrated in his hands. The rigidity of the executive power was combined with elements of democracy like rural gatherings. The orders established in Lepel were similar to the Lokot ones.
The positive experience for the Germans of creating a Russian quasi-state was transferred to Belarus. In practice, the RONA brigade was considered as an exemplary model for managing the occupied territories. The main task assigned to the settlers was to fight the partisans.
Kaminsky carried out a number of major operations to clear his zone of partisans. With the changed situation on the fronts, the backwater Lepelsky district became a strategically important rear zone of Army Group Center. And at the same time, the offensive of the Red Army and the efforts of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement caused the intensification of the actions of the patriots in the German rear. These operations caused even greater hatred for the invaders.
In such a situation, the transfer of the solution of such problems to the hands of Kaminsky suited everyone. The Germans practically did not interfere in what was happening in the district. They were quite satisfied that a sufficiently large territory practically did not cause them any trouble. Police formations from local residents were transferred under the command of the Brigadeführer. Needless to say, they were quite numerous. The local peasantry, as well as throughout the Soviet Union, was dissatisfied with collectivization, and many residents saw the Germans as liberators from the Bolsheviks.
However, the relationship between the settlers and the local population was not easy. Moreover, most of the arrivals were settled in the homes of local residents, to put it mildly, without their consent. There was a difference in language and customs, and simply a factor of strangers who arrived from nowhere and put things in order. The locals called them either Orlovtsy or Narodniks.
In fact, the Kaminians behaved in Belarus, like occupiers, and failed to include the locals in the life of their republic. The partisans of the Lepel zone also did not sit idly by. And besides purely military operations, one of the most effective ways to deal with punishers was propaganda. True, things were not so simple with the Kamenites, although serious efforts were made. The scale of the resources used was impressive, right down to the planes that delivered letters from relatives to potential defectors. In Moscow, great importance was attached to this activity, and there were very great successes in this work.
Here is one of those stories. Through their intelligence channels, a group of Kaminians came to the partisans, they wanted to go over to their side. The main one in this group was a certain Kostya. But at the same time they wanted some guarantees that they would simply not be shot as traitors to the Motherland. We agreed to meet at the crossing.
The partisans made it a condition that the defectors bring their commander, dead or alive, with them. He was the chief of police of the Lepel district, the right hand of Kaminsky, Pakhomov. The Kaminites complied with the condition and arrived at the appointed place with Pakhomov, in uniform, with weapons, on several carts. The carts were loaded with mines and shells. They also carried 2 cannons with them.
The guerrillas and Kaminians, not being able to destroy each other in direct combat, directed considerable efforts towards propaganda. Everything was used: newspapers, leaflets, and cartoons. But the advance of the Red Army had the greatest influence on the minds. Many began to think about their future fate, looking for their salvation in the transition to the partisans.
There were transitions of Kaminians to the side of the partisans, but earlier this phenomenon was not of a mass nature. On the one hand, a significant part of them were enemies of the Soviet regime by conviction, on the other hand, everyone understood that their struggle on the side of Hitler was unlikely to be forgiven. Yes, and Kaminsky's propaganda also worked.
War is not done with white gloves, and cruelty was shown not only by the punishers, but also by the partisans, giving food for the Brigadeführer's propaganda. The brigade commander tried to maintain iron discipline in the RONA, not stopping at any measures. By this time, his brigade had become a fairly organized and experienced SS unit.

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The successes of Kaminsky in the fight against the partisans did not go unnoticed. In the winter-spring of 1944, the brigade RONA fought constant battles in the rear of Army Group Center. Kaminsky for participation in these battles he was awarded the Iron Cross of the 1st class, and Heinrich Himmler drew attention to the assault brigade.
In the summer of 1944, Kaminsky was called to the headquarters of the Reichsfuehrer in East Prussia. The Reichsfuehrer personally thanked him for the actions of the Ronovites, and the brigade itself RONA By order of Himmler, they were transformed into the 29th SS Grenadier Division.
In Lepel, all Kaminsky's ideas about creating "Russia without Jews and Bolsheviks" gradually faded away. He never managed to find support from the local population. Neither repression nor propaganda helped. The dense anti-Semitism of Kaminsky in Lepel, which was a Jewish town before the war, looked wild at all. The local Jewish population, which is several thousand people, was completely destroyed by the Germans and local police even before they arrived. RONA. Therefore, in the eyes of a significant part of the local residents, Kaminsky's anti-Semitic propaganda looked like wild dances on the graves of innocent fellow countrymen.
However, in the context of the intensification of the partisan struggle and the punitive measures of the Germans, questions of ideology began to fade into the background. Mutual hatred flared up, where the watershed passed already by the name of Hitler, and not by the name of Stalin.
The Red Army, which had already begun to liberate Belarus, left no doubt about the end result of the entire war. Therefore, in an effort to hasten the already inevitable fall of the Germans, the partisans stepped up their actions.
On the eve of the summer campaign of 1944, the Nazi command, for its part, sought to secure its rear. Therefore, in the winter of the 44th, all the forces of the punishers were thrown against the partisans. To support their actions, infantry units were allocated, aviation and armored vehicles were actively used.
To a large extent, this zone was cleared of partisans, all this was accompanied by huge casualties among the civilian population. In an effort not only to drive the partisans out of their bases, but also to deprive them of the possibility of returning, the punishers ruthlessly burned the villages so that henceforth no one could help the partisans either voluntarily or without it.
The first successes appeared among the operatives who worked against RONA. The reaction to the military successes of the Soviet Union was different. Someone even more embittered, someone was looking for ways of salvation. According to archival documents, interdistrict residency NKVD Belarus had agents, both among ordinary fighters and among some leaders.
However, despite the good position in the collection of information, the solution of the main issue - the physical destruction of Kaminsky - still remained unrealized. It should be noted that the counterintelligence regime in the occupied territories has sharply increased. M
numerous security agencies of the occupiers, together with the formations of collaborators, launched a large-scale hunt for scouts and partisans. Both undercover work and widespread raids were intensified.
This was caused both by the increased activity of Soviet reconnaissance and sabotage groups, and by a simple increase in the concentration of various kinds of traitors and provocateurs who had gathered in Belarus from all the previously occupied territory. But for many of them, the fear of impending retribution became more important. Some of them, even conscious of their crimes, still went over to the partisans.
In the summer of 1944, the Lepel special district became front-line. Due to the lack of trains, it was not possible to carry out a planned evacuation to Czechoslovakia. Fighter family members RONA ended up in Germany, where they became ordinary eastern workers without any privileges.
August 2 in Warsaw, the Poles raised an uprising, and the Germans called on the Kaminians to suppress it.

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The actions of the Ronovites were accompanied by mass robberies and murders. And, to a large extent, those residents of Warsaw who did not take part in the uprising. Some of them were actually Germans. Polish historians claim that soldiers of the 29th SS division killed more than 15,000 people during the fighting.
To the demand of the Germans to reassure their soldiers, Kaminsky, who was wounded in these battles, replied that his people had lost all their acquired property during the fight against the Bolsheviks, and there is nothing wrong if they want to improve their financial condition at the expense of the Poles, who are hostile to the Germans.

The death of Kaminsky

Still doing atrocities, Kaminsky's soldiers continued to fight in Warsaw. Since RONA left Soviet territory and was left almost without a livelihood, the brigade commander was powerless to tame his fighters. In other words, then few people could have known that the 29th SS division would soon be disbanded. Kaminsky has a few weeks left to live.
The 4th direction of the Belarusian NKVD finally managed to find a way to deal with the commander RONA. According to official German data, in the midst of the fighting in Warsaw, Kaminsky was summoned to the commander. He did not return from this trip. On a forest road, bandits attacked his car with the aim of robbery. All escorts and the brigadeführer himself were killed. Allegedly, the bandits took away all the valuables and documents, and then set fire to the car.
All this happened in late September or early October 1944. The Germans showed the RONA officers the burnt car of the Brigadeführer, overturned into a ditch and riddled with bullets.
But all this was a staging staged under the direction of Birkampf, chief of the Krakow SD. In fact, Bronislav Kaminsky was killed by the Germans themselves. But what really happened then in Poland?
Field Marshal Guderian wrote in his materials that Kaminsky was destroyed by the decision of the SS court. But for what? To this day, this has remained a mystery to almost all researchers.
There were 2 versions of this. First: for special cruelty to the inhabitants of Warsaw. Sentence to the Brigadeführer of the SS for special cruelty in Nazi Germany?! This is complete nonsense. Another version boiled down to the fact that Kaminsky was removed in order to clear the way for Vlasov. But at the end of the war, the Germans were unlikely to sacrifice such an important figure as the RONA commander. After all, he began to fight on the side of the Nazis even when the general Vlasov successfully fought in the Red Army.
When Vlasov sat in a German concentration camp and when he began to create a school of propagandists, all this time Kaminsky with his fighters participated in real battles, and not without success. In addition, according to German law, he was German because he had a German mother. If we compare Vlasov and Kaminsky in the opinion of the Germans, then Bronislav was clearly preferable. But why Vlasov stayed alive and Kaminsky shot? The answer to this mystery lay under the heading "Top Secret" in the archives of the special services.
So, after an unsuccessful attempt to kill or kidnap Kaminsky, the NKVD managed to destroy him with the hands of the Germans. Here is another secret of the special services. It turns out that back in 1937, the NKVD forced Kaminsky to become their informant. He then received the pseudonym "Ultramarine". He was recruited by an employee of the Orel Department of the NKVD. The task of "Ultramarine" was to denounce exiles like him. It turns out that RONA commanded by an NKVD agent!
A form has been preserved, approved by the People's Commissar for Security of Belarus, Tsanava, which says, neither more nor less, about an attempt to recruit Kaminsky again. The recruiting agent was supposed to be his sister, who was specially transferred across the front line. It was to be provided with photocopies of Kaminsky's signature and his own handwritten reports.
However, this whole story hardly says anything new about Bronislav's personality. Then the time was such that refusal to cooperate with the authorities meant high treason, and such subscriptions were forced to give almost everyone who fell into the hands of the NKVD. During the years of repressions of the 30s, the NKVD intelligence apparatus grew thousands of times. Although the vast majority of these people were practically not used, many had a hook.
As it turned out, he was also on Kaminsky. Why they waited so long before launching it remains a mystery. It can be assumed that the documents of the Orel Department for the recruitment of "Ultramarine" were simply lost in the military turmoil and were found much later.
Since the brigadeführer refused to cooperate, the original documents about his recruitment in the 37th slipped to the Germans. Having discovered that the SS general was a Russian agent, they had no choice but to quietly remove him. It was an undoubted success of the NKVD, although somewhat belated.
The Kaminsky brigade was practically disbanded, and the personnel were transferred to the unit of General Vlasov. Thus ended perhaps the most daring experiment of the Nazis in Russia.

RON B. Kaminsky is a gang of punishers, traitors and Nazi accomplices. And not fighters against Bolshevism.

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The emblem of the division is a stylized St. George's Cross

29th Grenadier Waffen Division SS "RONA" (1st Russian) (German 29. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS "RONA" (russische Nr. 1)), also known as the "Kaminsky Brigade" - Russian collaborationist paramilitary formations created as the "Russian Liberation People's Army" on the territory of the Lokot self-government during the Second World War

Initially, on the territory controlled by the Lokot self-government, "national police" (about 200 people) and self-defense units (about 20 people) were formed, but this was not enough. Deserters and criminals robbed the roads. In the forests around Lokt, a large number of encircled and special groups formed by the NKVD and the GRU were hiding, which later became the backbone of the partisan detachments. All this human mass was fed by night robberies of villages, warehouses, raids on single German cars. In order to defend the Lokotsky district, the RONA was created, the number of which was rapidly increasing and by the summer of 1943 amounted to 8 - 8.5 thousand people. Initially, the RONA units acted against the partisans of the Bryansk region. In the period from June 19 to June 27, 1942, 427 partisans crossed over to the side of the RONA; 65 of them joined RONA. In the summer of 1943, during the turning point in the war, the partisan movement recovered from its initial defeats, and the RONA began to suffer heavy losses, despite German help. Several partisan attempts were made on Kaminsky. P. Sutulin cites the following facts about the activities of the RONA punishers:

"In order to fight against the same partisans, the villages of Krasnaya Svoboda, Trebushka, Cherp, Gavrilova Guta, Kokorevka, Konushino, Chukhra, Smilichi, Igritskoye, Dobrovolsky, Altukhovo, Shushuyevo were completely burned, and their residents were forcibly evicted to other areas. According to the State Extraordinary Commission, which conducted investigations into the activities of the RONA, during the period of the existence of the republic, its punishers executed 10,000 people, and more than two hundred were burned alive.

In 1942, in the Bryansk region, as part of the Gilza II combat group, the Kaminsky brigade took part in the anti-partisan operation Vogelsang (Vogelsang, the name of the large Nazi elite training complex in the Eifel. Sometimes the name of the operation is indicated as "Bird Trill" or "Singing birds", which is a literal translation of a proper name from German), under the command of Lieutenant General Baron Werner von und zu Giles. The battle group included a tank regiment of the 5th division, units of the 216th infantry division, Kaminsky policemen, units of the 102nd and 108th Hungarian light divisions - about 6.5 thousand people in total. During the operation, 1,193 partisans were killed, 1,400 were wounded, 498 were captured, and more than 12,000 people were evacuated; the punishers lost 58 people killed and 130 wounded, which indicates the nature of the operation: against the civilian population.

March 21, 1944, Belarus. Anti-partisan operation. Bronislav Kaminsky with a group of members of his headquarters and officers of the order police. Also, the Kaminsky police, together with other eastern volunteers, took part in the following operations:

* "Neighborly Help" (German: Nachbarhilfe) - mainly the 98th division and the 108th Hungarian light division, Kaminsky's police performed auxiliary functions;
* "Gypsy Baron" (German: Zigeunerbaron) - the largest operation involving the XLVII Panzer Corps, the 4th, 7th, 292nd Infantry Divisions, the 18th Panzer, 10th Motorized and 102nd Hungarian Light Divisions and during which 207 partisan camps were destroyed, 1584 partisans were killed and 1568 were taken prisoner;
* "Free shooter" (German Freischütz) - in addition to the Kaminsky militia, the 5th tank division, the 6th infantry and the 707th division took part;
* “Tannenhäuser” (German: Tannenhäuser. Translated means “Spruce Houses”, but perhaps the name of some settlement was used) - RONA and eastern volunteers took part in the operation;
* "Easter Egg" (German: Osterei) - operation of the RONA and parts of the Eastern Volunteers.

Parts of the RONA took part in the unsuccessful operation "Citadel" for the German army on the Kursk Bulge. During the retreat, about 30 thousand RONA fighters and their families left the Lokot self-government.

Commanding Officer - Major Ivan Frolov (center) with RONA officers during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. The officer to the right of Ivan Frolov is Lieutenant Mikhalchevsky. The soldier on the right, apparently, belongs to the ROA (judging by the patch). Ivan Frolov will die on August 21 at the corner of Srebrna and Towarowa streets; SU-76 and 2 x 122-mm howitzers.

The Kaminsky division took an active part in suppressing the uprising in the Okhota and Vistula regions. On August 4, 1944, the RONA consolidated regiment was thrown to storm the Poles' stronghold in the building of the Tobacco Monopoly Reduta Kaliski, which was defended by about 300 people. In this battle, RONA suffered its first losses - 22 killed. From the very first day, the units became involved in mass robberies and drunkenness - they smashed and robbed warehouses and shops, shot local residents who simply found themselves in the area. Other formations involved in the suppression of the uprising were also engaged in this with the approval of the commander of the 9th Army and Heinrich Himmler. According to Polish researchers, between 15,000 and 30,000 people became victims. Executions in the courtyards of Warsaw streets continued for several weeks. Numerous facts of looting, rape and pogroms took place. Members of the RONA brigade also raped two German girls from the KDF organization (German: Kraft durch Freude / Strength through joy).

The actions of the Kaminsky brigade aroused the indignation of the Wehrmacht and veterans of the First World War. The commander of the 9th Army of the Panzer Forces, Nikolaus von Hofmann, in whose area of ​​​​responsibility Warsaw was, sent a protest against the actions of the RONA brigade to Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski, who tried to resolve the issue in a working order. However, Kaminsky's subordinates refused to follow the orders of anyone other than Kaminsky. Kaminsky said that his subordinates have the right to loot, as they have lost all their property in Russia.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Heinz Guderian (who had previously supported the idea of ​​​​creating the Lokot autonomy) wrote in his memoirs:
“… von dem Bach… informed me about the atrocities of his subordinates, which he is not able to stop. His messages made my hair stand on end, so I was forced to report everything to Hitler that evening and demand the removal of both brigades (note by Kaminsky and Dirlewanger) from the Eastern Front. »

The looting of the brigade was reported upstairs. According to the testimony of Alfred Jodl, head of the operations department of the OKW, given at the Nuremberg trials, he made a report to Hitler, who personally ordered the dissolution of the brigade. Kaminsky was recalled from the location of the brigade.

A few days later, on August 28, Kaminsky was shot by members of the Sonderkommando SS operating in the Litzmannstadt (Lodz) ghetto under the command of Hans Botman. At the Nuremberg trials, his murder was confirmed by Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski, according to him, his “measures consisted in the execution, according to the laws of wartime, of the brigade commander Kaminsky and his associates, because they authorized the further advancement of robberies and requisitions.” Kaminsky's subordinates were informed that he was killed by Polish partisans. According to some reports, the murder was preceded by a formal court-martial. sources