How many people died during the battle of Stalingrad. Monuments of the Battle of Stalingrad

The Battle of Stalingrad is one of the largest battles of World War II and the Great Patriotic War, which marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the war. The battle was the first large-scale defeat of the Wehrmacht, accompanied by the surrender of a large military group.

After the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow in the winter of 1941/42. front has stabilized. When developing a plan for a new campaign, A. Hitler decided to abandon a new offensive near Moscow, as insisted on by the General Staff, and concentrate his main efforts on the southern direction. The Wehrmacht was tasked with defeating Soviet troops in the Donbass and on the Don, breaking through to the North Caucasus and capturing the oil fields of the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. Hitler insisted that, having lost a source of oil, the Red Army would not be able to conduct an active struggle due to lack of fuel, and for its part, the Wehrmacht needed additional fuel for a successful offensive in the center, which Hitler expected to receive from the Caucasus.

However, after an unsuccessful offensive for the Red Army near Kharkov and, as a result, an improvement in the strategic situation for the Wehrmacht, Hitler in July 1942 ordered the Army Group South to be divided into two parts, setting each of them an independent task. Army Group "A" Field Marshal Wilhelm List (1st Panzer, 11th and 17th Armies) continued to develop the offensive in the North Caucasus, and Army Group "B" Colonel General Baron Maximilian von Weichs (2nd, The 6th Army, later the 4th Panzer Army, as well as the 2nd Hungarian and 8th Italian armies) received an order to break through to the Volga, take Stalingrad and cut the lines of communication between the southern flank of the Soviet front and the center, thereby isolating it from the main grouping (if successful, Army Group "B" was supposed to strike along the Volga to Astrakhan). As a result, from that moment on, Army Groups "A" and "B" advanced in divergent directions, and the gap between them constantly increased.

The task of directly capturing Stalingrad was entrusted to the 6th Army, which was considered the best in the Wehrmacht (commanded by Lieutenant General F. Paulus), whose operations were supported from the air by the 4th Air Fleet. Initially, she was opposed by the troops of the 62nd (commanders: Major General V.Ya. Kolpakchi, from August 3 - Lieutenant General A.I. Lopatin, from September 9 - Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov) and 64th ( commanders: Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov, since July 23 - Major General M.S. Shumilov) armies, which, together with the 63rd, 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th and 8th On July 12, 1942, the th air armies formed a new Stalingrad Front (commander: Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, from July 23 - Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov, from August 10 - Colonel General A.I. Eremenko ).

July 17 is considered the first day of the Battle of Stalingrad, when those advanced to the line of the river. Chir, the advanced detachments of the Soviet troops came into contact with the German units, which, however, did not show much activity, since these days the preparations for the offensive were only being completed. (The first combat contact took place on July 16 - at the positions of the 147th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army.) On July 18-19, units of the 62nd and 64th armies entered the front lines. For five days there were battles of local significance, in which the German troops went directly to the main line of defense of the Stalingrad Front.

At the same time, the Soviet command used the lull at the front to speed up the preparation of Stalingrad for defense: the local population was mobilized, sent to build field fortifications (four defensive lines were equipped), and formations of militia units were deployed.

On July 23, the German offensive began: parts of the northern flank attacked first, two days later the southern flank joined them. The defense of the 62nd Army was broken through, several divisions were surrounded, the army and the entire Stalingrad Front found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Under these conditions, on July 28, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 was issued - "Not a step back!", Forbidding the withdrawal of troops without an order. In accordance with this order, the formation of penal companies and battalions, as well as barrage detachments, began at the front. At the same time, the Soviet command strengthened the Stalingrad grouping by all possible means: in a week of fighting, 11 rifle divisions, 4 tank corps, 8 separate tank brigades were sent here, and on July 31, the 51st Army, Major General T.K. Kolomiets. On the same day, the German command also strengthened its grouping by deploying the 4th Panzer Army of Colonel General G. Goth, which was advancing to the south, on Stalingrad. From that moment on, the German command declared the task of capturing Stalingrad a priority and decisive for the success of the entire offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front.

Although success was generally on the side of the Wehrmacht and the Soviet troops, suffering heavy losses, were forced to retreat, nevertheless, thanks to the resistance, the plan to break through to the city on the move through Kalach-on-Don was thwarted, as well as the plan to encircle the Soviet group in the bend Don. The pace of the offensive - by August 10, the Germans advanced only 60-80 km - did not suit Hitler, who on August 17 stopped the offensive, ordering to begin preparations for a new operation. The most combat-ready German units, primarily tank and motorized formations, were concentrated on the main strike directions, the flanks were weakened by the transfer of them by the Allied troops.

On August 19, the German troops again went on the offensive, they resumed the offensive. On the 22nd, they crossed the Don, gaining a foothold on the 45-km bridgehead. For the next XIV Panzer Corps, Gen. G. von Wittersheim to the Volga at the Latoshinka-Rynok section, being only 3 km from the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, and cut off parts of the 62nd Army from the main ones of the Red Army. At the same time, at 16:18, a massive air strike was launched on the city itself, the bombing continued on August 24, 25, 26. The city was almost completely destroyed.

The German attempts to take the city from the north on the following days were stopped due to the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, who, despite the superiority of the enemy in manpower and equipment, managed to launch a number of counterattacks and on August 28 stop the offensive. After that, the next day the German command attacked the city from the southwest. Here the offensive developed successfully: the German troops broke through the defensive line and began to enter the rear of the Soviet grouping. To avoid the inevitable encirclement, on September 2, Eremenko withdrew troops to the internal line of defense. On September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was officially entrusted to the 62nd (operating in the northern and central parts of the city) and 64th (in the southern part of Stalingrad) armies. Now the battles were already directly behind Stalingrad.

On September 13, the German 6th Army struck again - now the troops were tasked with breaking through to the central part of the city. By the evening of the 14th, the Germans captured the ruins of the railway station and, at the junction of the 62nd and 64th armies in the Kuporosny area, fell through to the Volga. By September 26, German troops entrenched in the occupied bridgeheads completely shot through the Volga, which remained the only way to deliver reinforcements and ammunition to the defending units of the 62nd and 64th armies in the city.

The fighting in the city entered a protracted phase. A fierce struggle went on for Mamaev Kurgan, the Krasny Oktyabr plant, the tractor plant, the Barrikady artillery plant, individual houses and buildings. The ruins changed hands several times, in such conditions the use of small arms was limited, and soldiers often engaged in hand-to-hand combat. The advance of the German troops, who had to overcome the heroic resistance of the Soviet soldiers, developed extremely slowly: from September 27 to October 8, despite all the efforts of the German shock group, they managed to advance only 400-600 m. In order to turn the tide, General. Paulus pulled additional forces to this sector, bringing the number of his troops in the main direction to 90 thousand people, whose actions were supported by up to 2.3 thousand guns and mortars, about 300 tanks and about a thousand aircraft. The Germans outnumbered the troops of the 62nd Army in personnel and artillery 1:1.65, in tanks - 1:3.75, and aviation - 1:5.2.

German troops launched a decisive offensive on the morning of October 14. The German 6th Army launched a decisive offensive against the Soviet bridgeheads near the Volga. On October 15, the Germans captured the tractor factory and broke through to the Volga, cutting off the grouping of the 62nd Army, which was fighting north of the factory. However, the Soviet fighters did not lay down their arms, but continued to resist, creating another hotbed of fighting. The position of the defenders of the city was complicated by the lack of food and ammunition: with the onset of cold weather, transportation across the Volga under constant enemy fire became even more complicated

The last decisive attempt to take control of the right-bank part of Stalingrad was made by Paulus on 11 November. The Germans managed to capture the southern part of the Barrikady plant and take a 500-meter section of the Volga coast. After that, the German troops finally ran out of steam and the battles moved into the positional stage. By this time, Chuikov's 62nd Army held three bridgeheads: in the area of ​​​​the village of Rynok; the eastern part of the Krasny Oktyabr plant (700 by 400 m), which was held by the 138th Infantry Division of Colonel I.I. Lyudnikova; 8 km along the Volga bank from the Krasny Oktyabr plant to the 9th of January Square, incl. northern and eastern slopes of Mamaev Kurgan. (The southern part of the city continued to be controlled by units of the 64th Army.)

Stalingrad strategic offensive operation (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943)

The encirclement plan for the Stalingrad enemy grouping - Operation Uranus - was approved by I.V. Stalin on November 13, 1942. It provided for strikes from bridgeheads north (on the Don) and south (Sarpinsky Lakes region) of Stalingrad, where a significant part of the defending forces were German allies, to break through the defenses and envelop the enemy in converging directions on Kalach-on-Don - Soviet. The 2nd stage of the operation provided for the sequential compression of the ring and the destruction of the encircled group. The operation was to be carried out by the forces of three fronts: Southwestern (General N.F. Vatutin), Don (General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad (General A.I. Eremenko) - 9 field, 1 tank and 4 air armies. Fresh reinforcements were poured into the front-line units, as well as divisions transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command, large stocks of weapons and ammunition were created (even to the detriment of supplying the group defending in Stalingrad), regrouping and the formation of strike groups in the directions of the main attack was carried out secretly from the enemy.

On November 19, as was envisaged by the plan, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts went on the offensive, on November 20 - the troops of the Stalingrad Front. The battle developed rapidly: the Romanian troops, who occupied the areas that turned out to be in the direction of the main attacks, could not stand it and fled. The Soviet command, having introduced pre-prepared mobile groups into the gap, developed the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the troops of the Stalingrad Front took Kalach-on-Don, on the same day, units of the 4th Tank Corps of the South-Western Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the Soviet farm area. The encirclement was closed. Then, the inner front of the encirclement was formed from the rifle units, and the tank and motorized rifle units began to push the few German units on the flanks, forming the outer front. The German group turned out to be surrounded - parts of the 6th and 4th tank armies - under the command of General F. Paulus: 7 corps, 22 divisions, 284 thousand people.

On November 24, the Soviet Headquarters ordered the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts to destroy the Stalingrad group of Germans. On the same day, Paulus turned to Hitler with a proposal to start a breakthrough from Stalingrad in a southeasterly direction. However, Hitler categorically forbade the breakthrough, saying that fighting in the encirclement, the 6th Army pulls large enemy forces onto itself, and ordered the defense to continue, waiting for the encircled group to be released. Then all the German troops in the area (both inside and outside the ring) were united into a new army group "Don", headed by Field Marshal E. von Manstein.

The attempt of the Soviet troops to quickly eliminate the encircled grouping, squeezing it from all sides, failed, in connection with which military operations were suspended and the General Staff began the systematic development of a new operation, code-named "Ring".

For its part, the German command forced the conduct of Operation Winter Thunder (Wintergewitter) to deblockade the 6th Army. To do this, Manstein formed a strong grouping under the command of General G. Goth in the area of ​​​​the village of Kotelnikovsky, the main striking force of which was the LVII Panzer Corps of General of Panzer Troops F. Kirchner. The breakthrough must be carried out in the sector occupied by the 51st Army, whose troops were exhausted by battles and had a large shortage. Going on the offensive on December 12, the Gotha grouping failed the Soviet defense and on the 13th crossed the river. Aksai, however, then got stuck in battles near the village of Verkhne-Kumsky. Only on December 19, the Germans, having brought up reinforcements, managed to push the Soviet troops back to the river. Myshkov. In connection with the emerging threatening situation, the Soviet command transferred part of the forces from the reserve, weakening other sectors of the front, and was forced to revise the plans for Operation Saturn from the side of their limitation. However, by this time the Gotha group, which had lost more than half of its armored vehicles, had run out of steam. Hitler refused to give the order for a counter breakthrough of the Stalingrad grouping, which was 35-40 km away, continuing to demand that Stalingrad be held to the last soldier.

On December 16, Soviet troops launched Operation Little Saturn with the forces of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts. The enemy defense was broken through and mobile units were introduced into the breakthrough. Manstein was forced to urgently begin the transfer of troops to the Middle Don, weakening incl. and the G. Goth group, which was finally stopped on December 22. Following this, the troops of the Southwestern Front expanded the breakthrough zone and pushed the enemy back 150-200 km and reached the Novaya Kalitva - Millerovo - Morozovsk line. As a result of the operation, the danger of deblockade of the encircled Stalingrad grouping of the enemy was completely eliminated.

The implementation of the plan of operation "Ring" was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front. On January 8, 1943, the commander of the 6th Army, General Paulus, was presented with an ultimatum: if the German troops did not lay down their arms by 10 o'clock on January 9, then all those surrounded would be destroyed. Paulus ignored the ultimatum. On January 10, after a powerful artillery preparation of the Don Front, he went on the offensive, the main blow was delivered by the 65th Army of Lieutenant General P.I. Batov. However, the Soviet command underestimated the possibility of resistance of the encircled group: the Germans, relying on defense in depth, put up desperate resistance. Due to new circumstances, on January 17, the Soviet offensive was suspended and a regrouping of troops and preparations for a new strike began, which followed on January 22. On this day, the last last airfield was taken, through which the communication of the 6th Army with the outside world was carried out. After that, the situation with the supply of the Stalingrad group, which, on the orders of Hitler, was carried out by air by the forces of the Luftwaffe, became even more complicated: if earlier it was also completely insufficient, now the situation has become critical. On January 26, in the area of ​​​​Mamaev Kurgan, the troops of the 62nd and 65th armies advancing towards each other united. The Stalingrad group of Germans was divided into two parts, which, in accordance with the plan of the operation, were to be destroyed in parts. On January 31, the southern group capitulated, along with which Paulus, who was promoted to field marshal on January 30, surrendered. On February 2, the northern group, commanded by General K. Strecker, laid down its arms. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad. 24 generals, 2500 officers, more than 91 thousand soldiers were taken prisoner, more than 7 thousand guns and mortars, 744 aircraft, 166 tanks, 261 armored vehicles, more than 80 thousand cars, etc. were captured.

Results

As a result of the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad, it managed to seize the strategic initiative from the enemy, which created the prerequisites for preparing a new large-scale offensive and, in the long term, the complete defeat of the aggressor. The battle became the beginning of a radical turning point in the war, and also contributed to the strengthening of the international prestige of the USSR. In addition, such a serious defeat undermined the authority of Germany and its armed forces and contributed to increased resistance from the enslaved peoples of Europe.

Dates: 17.07.1942 - 2.02.1943

Place: USSR, Stalingrad region

Results: USSR victory

Enemies: USSR, Germany and its allies

Commanders: A.M. Vasilevsky, N.F. Vatutin, A.I. Eremenko, K.K. Rokossovsky, V.I. Chuikov, E. von Manstein, M. von Weichs, F. Paulus, G. Goth.

Red Army: 187 thousand people, 2.2 thousand guns and mortars, 230 tanks, 454 aircraft

Germany and allies: 270 thousand people, approx. 3,000 guns and mortars, 250 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,200 aircraft

Side forces(to the beginning of the counteroffensive):

Red Army: 1,103,000 men, 15,501 guns and mortars, 1,463 tanks, 1,350 aircraft

Germany and her allies: c. 1,012,000 people (including approx. 400 thousand Germans, 143 thousand Romanians, 220 Italians, 200 Hungarians, 52 thousand Khivs), 10,290 guns and mortars, 675 tanks, 1216 aircraft

Losses:

USSR: 1,129,619 people (including 478,741 irrevocable people, 650,878 - sanitary)), 15,728 guns and mortars, 4,341 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,769 aircraft

Germany and its allies: 1,078,775 (including 841 thousand people - irrevocable and sanitary, 237,775 people - prisoners)

Introduction

On April 20, 1942, the battle for Moscow ended. The German army, whose offensive seemed unstoppable, was not only stopped, but also thrown back from the capital of the USSR by 150-300 kilometers. The Nazis suffered heavy losses, and although the Wehrmacht was still very strong, Germany no longer had the opportunity to attack simultaneously on all sectors of the Soviet-German front.

While the spring thaw lasted, the Germans developed a plan for the summer offensive of 1942, code-named Fall Blau - "Blue Option". The initial goal of the German strike was the oil fields of Grozny and Baku with the possibility of further development of the offensive against Persia. Before the deployment of this offensive, the Germans were going to cut off the Barvenkovsky ledge - a large bridgehead captured by the Red Army on the western bank of the Seversky Donets River.

The Soviet command, in turn, was also going to conduct a summer offensive in the zone of the Bryansk, Southern and Southwestern fronts. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the Red Army was the first to strike and at first the German troops were pushed back almost to Kharkov, the Germans managed to turn the situation in their favor and inflict a major defeat on the Soviet troops. On the sector of the Southern and Southwestern fronts, the defense was weakened to the limit, and on June 28, the 4th Panzer Army of Hermann Goth broke through between Kursk and Kharkov. The Germans went to the Don.

At this point, Hitler, by personal order, made a change to the Blue Option, which later cost Nazi Germany dearly. He divided Army Group South into two parts. Army Group "A" was supposed to continue the offensive in the Caucasus. Army Group B was to reach the Volga, cut off the strategic communications that connected the European part of the USSR with the Caucasus and Central Asia, and capture Stalingrad. For Hitler, this city was important not only from a practical point of view (as a major industrial center), but also purely for ideological reasons. The capture of the city, which bore the name of the main enemy of the Third Reich, would be the greatest propaganda achievement of the German army.

The alignment of forces and the first stage of the battle

Army Group B, advancing on Stalingrad, included the 6th Army of General Paulus. The army consisted of 270 thousand soldiers and officers, about 2200 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks. From the air, the 6th Army was supported by the 4th Air Fleet of General Wolfram von Richthofen, which numbered about 1200 aircraft. A little later, towards the end of July, the 4th Panzer Army of Herman Goth was transferred to Army Group B, which included on July 1, 1942 the 5th, 7th and 9th Army and the 46th Motorized corps. The latter included the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich.

The Southwestern Front, renamed Stalingrad on July 12, 1942, consisted of about 160,000 personnel, 2,200 guns and mortars, and about 400 tanks. Of the 38 divisions that were part of the front, only 18 were fully equipped, while the rest had from 300 to 4000 people. The 8th Air Army, which operated along with the front, was also significantly inferior in numbers to von Richthofen's fleet. With these forces, the Stalingrad Front was forced to defend a sector more than 500 kilometers wide. A separate problem for the Soviet troops was the flat steppe terrain, on which enemy tanks could operate at full strength. Taking into account the low level of anti-tank weapons in front units and formations, this made the tank threat critical.

The offensive of the German troops began on July 17, 1942. On this day, the vanguards of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht entered into battle with units of the 62nd Army on the Chir River and in the area of ​​​​the Pronin farm. By July 22, the Germans pushed the Soviet troops back almost 70 kilometers, to the main line of defense of Stalingrad. The German command, which expected to take the city on the move, decided to surround the Red Army units at the villages of Kletskaya and Suvorovskaya, seize crossings across the Don and develop the offensive against Stalingrad without stopping. For this purpose, two strike groups were created, advancing from the north and south. The northern group was formed from units of the 6th Army, the southern group from units of the 4th Panzer Army.

The northern group, striking on July 23, broke through the defense front of the 62nd Army and surrounded its two rifle divisions and a tank brigade. By July 26, the advanced units of the Germans reached the Don. The command of the Stalingrad Front organized a counterattack, in which the mobile formations of the front reserve, as well as the 1st and 4th tank armies, which had not yet completed the formation, took part. Tank armies were a new regular structure within the Red Army. It is not clear who exactly put forward the idea of ​​their formation, but in the documents this idea was first voiced to Stalin by the head of the Main Armored Directorate, Ya. N. Fedorenko. In the form in which the tank armies were conceived, they did not last long enough, subsequently undergoing a serious restructuring. But the fact that it was near Stalingrad that such a staff unit appeared is a fact. The 1st Panzer Army struck from the Kalach area on July 25, and the 4th from the villages of Trekhostrovskaya and Kachalinskaya on July 27.

Fierce fighting in this area lasted until August 7-8. It was possible to unblock the encircled units, but it was not possible to defeat the advancing Germans. The development of events was also negatively affected by the fact that the level of training of the personnel of the armies of the Stalingrad Front was low, and a number of errors in the coordination of actions made by the unit commanders.

In the south, Soviet troops managed to stop the Germans near the settlements of Surovikino and Rychkovsky. Nevertheless, the Nazis were able to break through the front of the 64th Army. To eliminate this breakthrough, on July 28, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered, no later than the 30th, the forces of the 64th Army, as well as two infantry divisions and a tank corps, to strike and defeat the enemy in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Nizhne-Chirskaya.

Despite the fact that the new units entered the battle on the move and their combat capabilities suffered from this, by the indicated date the Red Army managed to push the Germans and even threaten their encirclement. Unfortunately, the Nazis managed to bring fresh forces into battle and help the group. After that, the fighting escalated even hotter.

On July 28, 1942, another event occurred that cannot be left behind the scenes. On this day, the famous Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227, also known as "Not a step back!", was adopted. He significantly toughened the penalties for unauthorized retreat from the battlefield, introduced penal units for the guilty fighters and commanders, and also introduced barrage detachments - special units that were engaged in detaining deserters and returning them to duty. This document, for all its rigidity, was adopted quite positively by the troops and actually reduced the number of disciplinary violations in military units.

At the end of July, the 64th Army was nevertheless forced to withdraw beyond the Don. German troops captured a number of bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. In the area of ​​​​the village of Tsymlyanskaya, the Nazis concentrated very serious forces: two infantry, two motorized and one tank division. The headquarters ordered the Stalingrad Front to drive the Germans to the western (right) bank and restore the line of defense along the Don, but it was not possible to eliminate the breakthrough. On July 30, the Germans went on the offensive from the village of Tsymlyanskaya and by August 3 made significant progress, capturing the Repair station, the station and the city of Kotelnikovo, the settlement of Zhutovo. On the same days, the 6th Romanian corps of the enemy came to the Don. In the zone of operations of the 62nd Army, the Germans went on the offensive on August 7 in the direction of Kalach. The Soviet troops were forced to retreat to the left bank of the Don. On August 15, the Soviet 4th Tank Army had to do the same, because the Germans were able to break through its front in the center and split the defense in half.

By August 16, the troops of the Stalingrad Front withdrew beyond the Don and took up defensive positions on the outer line of the city fortifications. On August 17, the Germans resumed the onslaught and by the 20th they managed to capture the crossings, as well as a bridgehead in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Vertyachiy. Attempts to discard or destroy them were unsuccessful. On August 23, the German group, with the support of aviation, broke through the defense front of the 62nd and 4th tank armies and advanced units reached the Volga. On this day, German aircraft made about 2,000 sorties. Many quarters of the city were in ruins, oil storage facilities were on fire, about 40 thousand civilians died. The enemy broke through to the line Rynok - Orlovka - Gumrak - Peschanka. The struggle passed under the walls of Stalingrad.

Fighting in the city

Having forced the Soviet troops to retreat almost to the outskirts of Stalingrad, the enemy threw six German and one Romanian infantry divisions, two tank divisions and one motorized division against the 62nd Army. The number of tanks in this grouping of the Nazis was approximately 500. From the air, the enemy was supported by at least 1000 aircraft. The threat of the capture of the city became tangible. To eliminate it, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transferred to the defenders two completed armies (10 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades), re-equipped the 1st Guards Army (6 rifle divisions, 2 guards rifle, 2 tank brigades), and also subordinated the 16th to the Stalingrad Front air army.

On September 5 and 18, the troops of the Stalingrad Front (September 30, it will be renamed Donskoy) carried out two major operations, thanks to which they managed to weaken the German onslaught on the city, pulling back about 8 infantry, two tank and two motorized divisions. Again, it was not possible to carry out the complete defeat of the Nazi units. Fierce battles for the internal defensive bypass went on for a long time.

Urban battles began on September 13, 1942 and continued until November 19, when the Red Army launched a counteroffensive as part of Operation Uranus. From September 12, the defense of Stalingrad was entrusted to the 62nd Army, which was transferred under the command of Lieutenant General V. I. Chuikov. This man, who before the start of the Battle of Stalingrad was considered insufficiently experienced for military command, set up a real hell for the enemy in the city.

September 13 in the immediate vicinity of the city were six infantry, three tank and two motorized divisions of the Germans. Until September 18, there were fierce battles in the central and southern parts of the city. South of the railway station, the onslaught of the enemy was held back, but in the center the Germans drove out the Soviet troops up to the Krutoy ravine.

The battles on September 17 for the station were extremely fierce. It changed hands four times during the day. Here the Germans left 8 burnt tanks and about a hundred killed. On September 19, the left wing of the Stalingrad Front tried to strike in the direction of the station with a further attack on Gumrak and Gorodishche. The advance was not carried out, however, a large enemy grouping was held down by battles, which facilitated the situation for the units fighting in the center of Stalingrad. In general, the defense here was so strong that the enemy did not manage to reach the Volga.

Realizing that success could not be achieved in the center of the city, the Germans concentrated troops to the south to attack in an easterly direction, to Mamaev Kurgan and the village of Red October. On September 27, Soviet troops launched a pre-emptive attack, operating in small infantry groups armed with light machine guns, Molotov cocktails, and anti-tank rifles. Fierce fighting continued from 27 September to 4 October. These were the same Stalingrad city battles, stories about which freeze the blood in the veins even of a person with strong nerves. There were battles not for streets and quarters, sometimes not even for entire houses, but for individual floors and rooms. The guns were fired with direct fire almost at point blank range, an incendiary mixture was used, fire from short distances. Hand-to-hand fights have become commonplace, as in the Middle Ages, when edged weapons ruled the battlefield. In a week of continuous fighting, the Germans advanced 400 meters. Even those who were not intended for this had to fight: builders, soldiers of pontoon units. The Nazis gradually began to run out of steam. The same desperate and bloody battles were in full swing at the Barrikady plant, near the village of Orlovka, on the outskirts of the Silicate plant.

In early October, the territories occupied by the Red Army in Stalingrad were so reduced that they were shot through with machine-gun and artillery fire. Support for the fighting troops was carried out from the opposite bank of the Volga with the help of literally everything that could float: boats, steamers, boats. German aircraft continuously bombed the crossings, making this task even more difficult.

And while the soldiers of the 62nd Army fettered and crushed the enemy troops in battle, the High Command was already preparing plans for a large offensive operation aimed at destroying the Stalingrad group of Nazis.

"Uranus" and the surrender of Paulus

By the time the Soviet counter-offensive began, in addition to the 6th Army of Paulus, there were also the 2nd Army of von Salmuth, the 4th Panzer Army of Gotha, the Italian, Romanian and Hungarian armies near Stalingrad.

On November 19, the Red Army, with the help of three fronts, launched a large-scale offensive operation, code-named "Uranus". It was opened by about three and a half thousand guns and mortars. The artillery barrage lasted about two hours. Subsequently, it was in memory of this artillery preparation that November 19 became a professional holiday for artillerymen.

On November 23, the encirclement ring closed around the 6th Army and the main forces of the 4th Panzer Army of Goth. On November 24, about 30 thousand Italians capitulated near the village of Raspopinskaya. By November 24, the territory occupied by the encircled Nazi units covered about 40 kilometers from west to east, and about 80 from north to south. Further "compression" progressed slowly, as the Germans organized a dense defense and clung to literally every piece of land. Paulus insisted on a breakthrough, but Hitler categorically forbade it. He still did not lose hope that he would be able to help the encircled from outside.

The rescue mission was entrusted to Erich von Manstein. Army Group Don, which he commanded, was supposed to release the besieged army of Paulus in December 1942 with a blow from Kotelnikovsky and Tormosin. On December 12, Operation Winter Storm began. Moreover, the Germans did not go on the offensive with full strength - in fact, by the time the offensive began, they were able to put up only one Wehrmacht tank division and a Romanian infantry division. Subsequently, two more incomplete tank divisions and some infantry joined the offensive. On December 19, Manstein's troops clashed with the 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky, and by December 25, the "Winter Thunderstorm" died out in the snowy Don steppes. The Germans retreated to their original positions, having suffered heavy losses.

Grouping Paulus was doomed. It seemed that the only person who refused to admit it was Hitler. He was categorically against retreat when it was still possible, and did not want to hear about capitulation when the mousetrap finally and irrevocably slammed shut. Even when the Soviet troops captured the last airfield from which the Luftwaffe aircraft supplied the army (extremely weak and unstable), he continued to demand resistance from Paulus and his people.

On January 10, 1943, the final operation of the Red Army began to eliminate the Stalingrad group of Nazis. It was called "The Ring". On January 9, the day before it began, the Soviet command issued an ultimatum to Friedrich Paulus, demanding to surrender. On the same day, by chance, the commander of the 14th tank corps, General Hube, arrived in the boiler. He conveyed that Hitler demanded that resistance be continued until a new attempt was made to break through the encirclement from the outside. Paulus carried out the order and rejected the ultimatum.

The Germans resisted as best they could. The offensive of the Soviet troops was even stopped from 17 to 22 January. After the regrouping of the Red Army, they again went on the attack and on January 26 the Nazi forces were split into two parts. The northern group was located in the area of ​​the Barrikady plant, and the southern group, in which Paulus himself was, was located in the city center. Paulus' command post was located in the basement of the central department store.

On January 30, 1943, Hitler awarded Friedrich Paulus the rank of field marshal. According to the unwritten Prussian military tradition, field marshals never surrendered. So on the part of the Fuhrer, this was a hint of how the commander of the encircled army should have ended his military career. However, Paulus decided that it is better not to understand some of the hints. On January 31, at noon, Paulus surrendered. It took two more days to liquidate the remnants of the Nazi troops in Stalingrad. On February 2, it was all over. The battle of Stalingrad is over.

About 90 thousand German soldiers and officers were captured. The Germans lost about 800 thousand killed, 160 tanks and about 200 aircraft were captured.

Representatives of different nationalities fought in the ranks of the Wehrmacht during the battle for Stalingrad - Italians, Hungarians, Romanians, Finns, Estonians. Among them were the so-called "Khivi" - voluntary assistants to the German army from among Soviet citizens.

After the defeat near Moscow, the German army was still a formidable force, but it had already begun to experience personnel difficulties. Hitler made a difficult decision for himself - to understaff the German units with allied divisions. So 27 Romanian, 17 Finnish, 13 Hungarian, 9 Italian, 2 Slovak and 1 Spanish divisions were sent to the Eastern Front. Many of them were transferred to the southern sector of the front, from where the attack on Stalingrad was planned.

However, the "International" did not bring real reinforcement to the Wehrmacht. The allied troops were ill-prepared for prolonged hostilities: their military discipline was lame and, on the whole, they were not very eager to give their lives for the Fuhrer. Following the rapid defeat of the flanks, which covered the Romanian divisions, by the beginning of February 1943, the Red Army forced the 6th Army of Friedrich Paulus to capitulate.
Among the defeated were not only the Western allies of the Third Reich, but also Soviet citizens, as well as white emigrants who actively replenished the 6th Army on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad. The most regrettable thing is that in the “international” of the German satellites, the “Russian units” of the Wehrmacht were the first in terms of numbers. In some divisions, the number of "Khivi" reached 27%. Soviet historiography preferred to remain silent about this.

A large influx of volunteers into the ranks of the Wehrmacht occurred after the Nazis seized the lands of the Don Cossacks: at first, defectors were used as loaders, drivers, ammunition carriers, sappers, liaisons, but in the midst of the Stalingrad events they began to be more often involved in military operations.
The commander of one of the Wehrmacht battalions, Jochen Leser, recalled how two Red Army soldiers joined the ranks of his formation shortly after being captured and immediately joined the fighting. One of them became the second number in the machine gun crew, and as soon as the first one died, he took his place.
The civilian population of the USSR, who defected to the side of the enemy, was often used in the authorities in the territories of the Stalingrad region occupied by the Germans and in the occupied areas of Stalingrad itself. They served as elders, burgomasters, and also in the auxiliary police. Among those were many residents of Ukraine.

At the final stage of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Von Stumpfeld division (named after its commander, Lieutenant General Hans Joachim von Stumpfeld), formed mainly of Russian fighters, loudly declared itself. Toward the end of the battle, it began to be actively replenished with former officers of the Red Army, who were appointed to command posts. For example, in January 1943, the former major of the Red Army Tukhminov led the Kamensky battalion.
The division was formed on December 12, after the 6th Army was surrounded. The place of its deployment - the western bank of the Chir River between height 161 and the Lisinsky farm - was an extremely important strategic foothold. Stumpfeld willingly attracted the Cossacks, who knew the area thoroughly, to combat sorties. It is curious that the Cossacks, who were called "Volunteers of the Eastern Forces", in this division were equated in status with fighters of German nationality. The soldiers of the Stumpfeld fought mostly with captured Soviet weapons. So, they were armed with 42 Soviet-made anti-tank rifles.
The defeat of the division occurred shortly after the surrender of Field Marshal Paulus and his 6th Army. The last line of defense of the Von Stumpfeld division, the Tractor Plant, could hold out no more than a week after the end of the main part of the battle for Stalingrad.

However, even after the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad, scattered, abandoned to the mercy of fate, "Russian formations" continued to resist parts of the Soviet army. The position of the traitors was hopeless. They were waiting for either execution after being captured, or death on the battlefield. For example, the Cossack unit of Yesaul Nesterenko tried to break through to the West to connect with the surviving formations of the Wehrmacht, but ultimately found his death in the war-ravaged lands of Stalingrad.
Part of the "Khivi", together with the Nazis, continued to wage a guerrilla war in an extensive network of Stalingrad dungeons. The most large-scale actions were in the area of ​​​​the Confectionery Factory, where on the eve of the surrender, the Germans, with the involvement of captured Red Army soldiers and civilians, built a real underground city.

The remnants of the "Russian units" from the 6th Army fought until the end of the spring of 1943. So, according to the testimony of one of the NKVD officers, on May 4, not far from the city of Konstantinovsk, which is 300 kilometers west of Stalingrad, a group of fighters dressed in Soviet military uniforms was detained. Later it turned out that five of them turned out to be German soldiers, and two were former fighters of the Red Army. The Russians, after a short interrogation, were shot, and the Germans were transferred to the NKVD department of Rostov-on-Don.

The exact number of Soviet citizens who fought on the side of the Wehrmacht is unknown. Many of them died during the fighting, many died from illnesses and wounds in the first days of captivity, but someone still managed to break through to the West. But with most of the traitors, the Soviet authorities cracked down on the spot.
According to the archives of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht, 20,300 Russians fought in its composition, some German historians give a figure of 70 and even 90 thousand. In the works of Manfred Kerig and Rüdiger Overmans, the number of encircled German groups is calculated. There are about 50,000 Russians there. For comparison, there were only about 5 thousand Romanians in it.

Losses of the parties in the Battle of Stalingrad

In order to determine the losses of the parties during the Battle of Stalingrad, it is necessary first of all to determine the total amount of losses of the parties during the Second World War.

Since the official estimate of the irretrievable losses of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War at 8,668,400 dead and dead is clearly an underestimation, for an alternative estimate we used higher numbers of irretrievable losses of the Red Army than those given in the collection "The Classification Removed".

Meanwhile, a significantly higher value of irretrievable losses of the Red Army for 1942 is given by D. A. Volkogonov - 5,888,236 people, according to him - "the result of long calculations according to documents."

This figure is 2.04 times higher than the figure given in the book "Secrecy Removed", and, apparently, it does not include non-combat losses, but also those who died from wounds. With a similar monthly accounting of irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht, those who died from wounds are included.

Most likely, the calculation of irretrievable losses for 1942 was made at the beginning of 1943. D. A. Volkogonov gives a breakdown of losses by months.

For comparison, we have the monthly dynamics of the losses of the Red Army defeated in battles for the period from July 1941 to April 1945 inclusive. The corresponding schedule is reproduced in the book of the former head of the Main Military Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army, E. I. Smirnov, “War and military medicine.

Monthly data for 1942 on the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces are given in the table:

Table. Losses of the Red Army in 1942

Here it should be noted that the figure "hit in battle" includes the wounded, shell-shocked, burned and frostbite. And the indicator "wounded", most often used in statistics, usually includes only the wounded and shell-shocked. The proportion of the wounded and shell-shocked among those killed in battles for the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War is 96.9 percent. Therefore, without a large error, it is possible to attribute the indicators for the wounded to all those injured in battles and vice versa.

Even before the publication of these data, D. A. Volkogonov tried to estimate Soviet losses in the Great Patriotic War, and then he most likely already had the above data on the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in 1942. According to Volkogonov, “the number of dead military personnel, partisans, underground workers, civilians during the years of the Great Patriotic War fluctuates, apparently, in the range of 26-27 million people, of which more than 10 million fell on the battlefield and died in captivity. Particularly tragic is the fate of those who were part of the first strategic echelon (and the bulk of the strategic reserves), who endured the main hardships of the war in 1941. The main, primarily personnel, part of the personnel of formations and associations of this echelon laid down their lives, and about 3 million military personnel were taken prisoner. Our losses were a little less in 1942."

Probably, Volkogonov also had in front of him data on the number of Soviet prisoners by year, published by the American historian Alexander Dallin (more on them below). There, the number of prisoners in 1941 is determined at 3,355 thousand people. Probably, Volkogonov rounded this figure up to 3 million. In 1942, the number of prisoners, according to A. Dallin, who used OKW materials, amounted to 1,653 thousand people. It is likely that Volkogonov subtracted this figure from his 1942 irretrievable loss figures, deriving the number of killed and dead at 4,235,000. , and then the losses of 1941 by those killed were estimated at about half of the losses of 1942, that is, at 2.1 million people. It is possible that Volkogonov decided that starting from 1943, the Red Army began to fight better, the average monthly losses in killed were halved compared to the level of 1942. Then in 1943 and 1944, he could estimate the annual losses at 2.1 million people killed and dead, and in 1945 - at about 700 thousand people. Then the total losses of the Red Army killed and dead, without those who died in captivity, Volkogonov could estimate at 11.2 million people, and A. Dallin estimated the number of dead prisoners at 3.3 million people. Then Volkogonov could estimate the total losses of the Red Army in killed and dead at 14.5 million people, which was more than 10 million, but less than 15 million. The researcher was probably not sure of the accuracy of this figure, which is why he wrote carefully: “more 10 million." (but not more than 15 million, and when they write "more than 10 million", it is understood that this value is still less than 15 million).

Comparison of the table data allows us to conclude that the data of D. A. Volkogonov significantly underestimate the true amount of irretrievable losses. So, in May 1942, the irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops allegedly amounted to only 422 thousand and even decreased by 13 thousand people compared to April. Meanwhile, it was in May that German troops captured about 150 thousand Red Army soldiers on the Kerch Peninsula and about 240 thousand in the Kharkov region. In April, the Soviet losses of prisoners were insignificant (the largest number of them - about 5 thousand people, was taken during the liquidation of the group of General M. G. Efremov in the Vyazma region). It turns out that in May the losses of those killed and those who died from wounds, diseases and accidents did not exceed 32 thousand people, and in April they reached almost 430 thousand, and this despite the fact that the number of those killed in battles from April to May fell by only three points, or less than 4 percent. It is clear that the whole point is in the colossal underestimation of irretrievable losses during the period of the general retreat of the Soviet troops from May to September inclusive. After all, it was then that the vast majority of the 1,653 thousand Soviet prisoners of 1942 were captured by the Germans. According to D. A. Volkogonov, during this time, irretrievable losses reached 2,129 thousand against 2,211 thousand in the four previous months, when losses by prisoners were insignificant. It is no coincidence that in October the irretrievable losses of the Red Army suddenly increased by 346,000 compared to September, with a sharp drop in the number of those killed in battles by as much as 29 points and the absence at that time of any large encirclement of Soviet troops. Probably, the losses of the previous months were partially included in the October losses.

The most reliable data seems to us on irretrievable losses for November, when the Red Army suffered almost no losses in prisoners, and the front line was stable until the 19th, when the Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Stalingrad. Therefore, we can assume that the losses in the dead were taken into account in this month more fully than in the previous and subsequent ones, when the rapid movement of the front and headquarters made it difficult to count, and that the irretrievable losses in November fell almost exclusively on the dead, since the Soviet troops suffered almost no losses as prisoners. Then, for 413,000 killed and dead, there will be 83 percent of those killed in battle, i.e., for 1 percent of the average monthly number of those killed in battle, there are approximately 5,000 killed and died from wounds. If we take January, February, March or April as the baseline, then there the ratio, after excluding the approximate number of prisoners, will be even greater - from 5.1 to 5.5 thousand dead per 1 percent of the average monthly number of those killed in battles. The December figures clearly suffer from a large underestimation of irretrievable losses due to the rapid movement of the front line.

The ratio established for November 1942 between the number of casualties in battle and the number of those killed seems to us close to the average for the war as a whole. Then the irretrievable losses of the Red Army (excluding prisoners who died from wounds and non-combat losses) in the war with Germany can be estimated by multiplying 5 thousand people by 4,656 (4,600 is the sum (in percent) of losses struck in battles for the period from July 1941 to April 1945, 17 - casualties in battles for June 1941, 39 - losses in battles for May 1945, taken by us for one third of the losses in July 1941 and April 1945, respectively). As a result, we come to the figure of 23.28 million dead. From this number, one should subtract 939,700 military personnel who were reported missing, but after the liberation of the respective territories, they were again drafted into the army. Most of them were not captured, some escaped from captivity. Thus, the total number of deaths will be reduced to 22.34 million people. According to the latest estimate of the authors of the book “Secrecy Removed”, the non-combat losses of the Red Army amounted to 555.5 thousand people, including at least 157 thousand people who were executed by tribunals. Then the total irretrievable losses of the Soviet armed forces (without those who died in captivity) can be estimated at 22.9 million people, and together with those who died in captivity - at 26.9 million people.

I. I. Ivlev, using the files of losses of privates and officers of the Ministry of Defense, believes that the losses of the Soviet armed forces in killed and dead could not be less than 15.5 million people, but they could be 16.5 million and even 20 -21 million people. The last figure is obtained as follows. The total number of notifications from the military registration and enlistment offices about the dead and missing who ended up in the families of the Arkhangelsk region exceeds 150 thousand. According to Ivlev, approximately 25 percent of these notifications did not reach the military registration and enlistment offices. At the same time, there are 12,400,900 notices in the military registration and enlistment offices of the Russian Federation, including 61,400 for the dead and missing in the border troops and 97,700 for the internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR. Thus, 12,241,800 notices were received from units of the NPO and the Naval NK. Of this number, according to Ivlev, about 200 thousand account for repetitions, survivors, as well as people who served in civilian departments. After their deduction, at least 12,041,800 unique notices will be obtained. If the proportion of notices that did not reach the military registration and enlistment offices for the whole of Russia is approximately the same as was determined for the Arkhangelsk region, then the total number of unique notices within the Russian Federation can be estimated at no less than 15,042 thousand. To estimate the number of unique notices, which should to be in the rest of the former Soviet republics, Ivlev suggests that the proportion of dead Russians among all the irretrievable losses of the Red Army and Navy is approximately equal to the share of Russians in the irretrievable losses given in the books of G. F. Krivosheev’s group - 72 percent. Then the remaining republics account for approximately 5,854,000 notices, and their total number within the USSR can be estimated at 20,905,900 people. Taking into account the losses of the border and internal troops of the NKVD, the total number of unique notices, according to Ivlev, exceeds 21 million people.

However, it seems to us incorrect to estimate the share of notices located outside the Russian Federation based on an estimate of the share of the non-Russian population among irretrievable losses. Firstly, not only Russians live and lived in Russia. Secondly, Russians lived not only in the RSFSR, but also in all other union republics. Thirdly, according to Krivosheev, the share of Russians in the number of dead and dead military personnel is estimated not at 72 percent, but at 66.4 percent, and it is not taken from the document on irretrievable losses, but is calculated on the basis of data on the national composition in the payroll of the Red Army in 1943-1945. If we add here an assessment of the losses of the peoples who lived mainly in the RSFSR within today's borders - Tatars, Mordvins, Chuvashs, Bashkirs, Udmurts, Maris, Buryats, Komis, peoples of Dagestan, Ossetians, Kabardians, Karelians, Finns, Balkars, Chechens, Ingush and Kalmyks - then the share of losses of the Russian Federation will increase by another 5.274 percent. It is possible that Ivlev added here half of the losses of the Jews - 0.822 percent, then the losses of the peoples of the RSFSR will increase to 72.5 percent. Probably, having rounded this number, Ivlev got 72 percent. Therefore, in our opinion, to estimate the number of unique notices outside the Russian Federation, it is more correct to use data on the share of the population of the RSFSR in the population of the USSR as of January 1, 1941. It was 56.2 percent, and minus the population of Crimea, transferred to Ukraine in 1954, and with the addition of the population of the Karelian-Finnish SSR, included in 1956 in the RSFSR, - 55.8 percent. Then the total number of unique notifications can be estimated at 26.96 million, and taking into account notifications in the border and internal troops - 27.24 million, and minus those who remained in exile - 26.99 million people.

This figure practically coincides with our estimate of the losses of the Soviet armed forces in dead and dead at 26.9 million people.

As Russian historian Nikita P. Sokolov notes, “according to Colonel Fyodor Setin, who worked in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense in the mid-1960s, the first group estimated the irretrievable losses of the Red Army at 30 million people, but these figures “were not accepted at the top.” N. P. Sokolov also notes that G. F. Krivosheev and his comrades do not take into account “the mobilization carried out directly by units of the active army on the territory of the regions occupied by the Germans after their liberation, the so-called unorganized march replenishment. Krivosheev indirectly admits this when he writes that “during the war years, the following were withdrawn from the population: in Russia ... 22.2 percent of able-bodied citizens ..., in Belarus - 11.7 percent, in Ukraine - 12.2 percent." Of course, in Belarus and Ukraine no less “able-bodied population” was called up than in Russia as a whole, only here a smaller part was called up through military registration and enlistment offices, and a large part - directly to the units.

The fact that the volume of Soviet irretrievable losses was enormous is evidenced by those few surviving veterans who personally happened to go on the attack. So, Guards Captain A.I. Shumilin, a former commander of a rifle company, recalled: “More than one hundred thousand soldiers and thousands of junior officers passed through the division. Of those thousands, only a few survived. And he also recalls one of the battles of his 119th Infantry Division on the Kalinin Front during the counteroffensive near Moscow: “On the night of December 11, 41, we went out near Maryino and lay down on the starting line in front of the village in the snow. We were told that after two shots from the forty-five, we should get up and go to the village. It's already dawn. There were no shots. I asked on the phone what was the matter, I was told to wait. The German rolled out anti-aircraft batteries for direct fire and began to shoot the soldiers lying in the snow. Everyone who ran was torn to pieces at the same moment. The snowy field was covered with bloody corpses, pieces of meat, blood and splashes of intestines. Out of 800 people, only two managed to get out by the evening. I wonder if there is a list of personnel for December 11, 41? After all, no one from the staff saw this massacre. With the first shot of anti-aircraft guns, all these participants fled in all directions. They didn’t even know that they were hitting the soldiers with anti-aircraft guns.”

The losses of the Red Army in 26.9 million dead are approximately 10.3 times higher than the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front (2.6 million dead). The Hungarian army, which fought on the side of Hitler, lost about 160 thousand killed and dead, including about 55 thousand who died in captivity. The losses of another ally of Germany, Finland, in the fight against the USSR amounted to about 56.6 thousand killed and dead, and about 1 thousand more people died in battles against the Wehrmacht. The Romanian army lost in the battles against the Red Army about 165 thousand killed and dead, including 71,585 killed, 309,533 missing, 243,622 wounded and 54,612 dead in captivity. 217,385 Romanians and Moldavians returned from captivity. Thus, from among the missing, 37,536 people must be attributed to the dead. If we assume that approximately 10 percent of the wounded died, then the total losses of the Romanian army in battles with the Red Army will be about 188.1 thousand dead. In the battles against Germany and its allies, the Romanian army lost 21,735 killed, 58,443 missing and 90,344 wounded. Assuming that the mortality among the wounded was 10 percent, the number of deaths from wounds can be estimated at 9 thousand people. 36,621 Romanian soldiers and officers returned from German and Hungarian captivity. Therefore, the total number of killed and died in captivity from among the missing Romanian military personnel can be estimated at 21,824 people. Thus, in the fight against Germany and Hungary, the Romanian army lost about 52.6 thousand dead. The Italian army lost about 72 thousand people in the battles against the Red Army, of which about 28 thousand died in Soviet captivity - more than half of the approximately 49 thousand prisoners. Finally, the Slovak army lost 1.9 thousand dead in battles against the Red Army and Soviet partisans, of which about 300 people died in captivity. On the side of the USSR, the Bulgarian army fought against Germany, losing about 10 thousand dead. Two armies of the Polish Army, formed in the USSR, lost 27.5 thousand dead and missing, and the Czechoslovak corps, which also fought on the side of the Red Army, lost 4 thousand dead. The total losses on the Soviet side, taking into account the losses of the allies who fought on the Soviet-German front, can be estimated at 27.1 million military personnel, and on the German side - at 2.9 million people, which gives a ratio of 9.3: 1.

Here is the dynamics of Soviet losses as prisoners on the Eastern Front in 1942:

January - 29 126;

February - 24,773;

March - 41,972;

April - 54,082;

May - 409,295 (including Army Group South - 392,384, Army Group Center - 10,462, Army Group North - 6,449);

June - 103,228, including Army Group South - 55,568, Army Group Center - 16,074, Army Group North - 31,586);

July - 467 191 (including Army Group A - 271 828, Army Group B - 128 267, Army Group Center - 62 679, Army Group North - 4 417);

August - 220,225 (including Army Group A - 77,141, Army Group B - 103,792, Army Group Center - 34,202, Army Group North - 5,090);

September - 54,625 (including Army Group A - 29,756, Army Group Center - 10,438, Army Group North - 14,431, Army Group B did not provide data);

October - 40,948 (including Army Group A - 29,166, Army Group Center - 4,963, Army Group North - 6,819, Army Group B did not provide data);

November - 22,241 - the minimum monthly number of prisoners in 1942 (including Army Group A - 14,902, Army Group Center - 5,986, Army Group North -1,353; Army Group B, no data presented);

December - 29,549 (including Army Group "A" -13,951, Army Group "B" - 1,676, Army Group "Center" - 12,556, Army Group "North" - 1,366, Army Group "Don" data did not present).

It is easy to see that a significant decrease in the number of prisoners occurs already in August - by 2.1 times. In September, the loss of prisoners is reduced even more sharply - four times. True, the prisoners taken by Army Group B are not taken into account here, but given the lack of significant encirclements and the fierce nature of the fighting in Stalingrad, it would hardly be significant and in any case not exceed the number of prisoners captured by Army Group B. By the way, the fact that there were no casualties reported from Army Group B may reflect the fierce fighting in Stalingrad, where almost no prisoners were taken.

To complete the picture, we note that in January 1943, the last month of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Germans captured only 10,839 prisoners (8,687 - Army Group Center, 2,324 - Army Group North). There are no data on prisoners taken by Army Groups A, B and Don, but if they were, then in negligible numbers, since all three army groups were only retreating in January.

The losses of the German ground forces in 1942 changed by months as follows.

January - 18,074 killed, 61,933 wounded, 7,075 missing;

February - 18,776 killed, 64,520 wounded, 4,355 missing;

March - 21,808 killed, 75,169 wounded, 5,217 missing;

April - 12,680 killed, 44,752 wounded, 2,573 missing;

May - 14,530 killed, 61,623 wounded, 3,521 missing;

June - 14,644 killed, 66,967 wounded, 3,059 missing;

July - 17,782 killed, 75,239 wounded, 3,290 missing;

August - 35,349 killed, 121,138 wounded, 7,843 missing;

September - 25,772 killed, 101,246 wounded, 5,031 missing;

October - 14,084 killed, 53,591 wounded, 1,887 missing;

November - 9,968 killed, 35,967 wounded, 1,993 missing;

December - 18,233 killed, 61,605 wounded, 4,837 missing.

Monthly and very incomplete data on the losses of the German allies, both in the ground forces and in the Air Force, on the Eastern Front in 1942 are available only for November and December.

For the period from June 22, 1941 to October 31, 1942, the total losses of the German allies amounted to:

19,650 killed, 76,972 wounded, 9,099 missing.

The Italians lost 4,539 killed, 18,313 wounded and 2,867 missing.

The Hungarians lost 5,523 killed, 23,860 wounded and 2,889 missing.

Romanians lost 8,974 killed, 33,012 wounded and 3,242 missing.

The Slovaks lost 663 killed, 2,039 wounded and 103 missing.

Here it is necessary to make a reservation that the Romanian losses here are greatly underestimated, since in 1941 a significant part of the Romanian troops acted not as part of the German armies, but independently. In particular, the Romanian 4th Army independently besieged Odessa, and during the siege from August 8 to October 16, 1941, its losses amounted to 17,729 killed, 63,345 wounded and 11,471 missing. The German allies in the German army suffered the bulk of their losses in 1942.

In November 1942, the German allies lost 1,563 killed, 5,084 wounded and 249 missing.

The Italians lost in November 83 killed, 481 wounded and 10 missing.

The Hungarians lost in November 269 killed, 643 wounded and 58 missing.

Romanians lost 1,162 killed, 3,708 wounded and 179 missing in November.

The Slovaks lost 49 killed, 252 wounded and two missing.

In December 1942, the German allies lost 1,427 killed, 5,876 wounded and 731 missing.

The Italians lost in December 164 killed, 727 wounded and 244 missing.

The Hungarians lost 375 killed and 69 missing.

The Romanians lost 867 killed, 3,805 wounded and 408 missing.

The Slovaks lost 21 killed, 34 wounded and 10 missing.

In January 1943, the German Allies lost 474 killed, 2,465 wounded and 366 missing.

The Italians lost 59 killed, 361 wounded and 11 missing.

The Hungarians lost 114 killed, 955 wounded and 70 missing.

The Romanians lost 267 killed, 1,062 wounded and 269 missing.

The Slovaks lost 34 killed, 87 wounded and 16 missing.

The losses of the German allies in November and December 1942 and in January 1943, during the period of the Soviet counter-offensive, are significantly underestimated, primarily due to prisoners and missing dead. And in February, only the Romanians continued to participate in the hostilities, who lost 392 killed, 1,048 wounded and 188 missing.

The monthly ratio of Soviet and German irretrievable losses on the Eastern Front in 1942 changed as follows, remaining all the time in favor of the Wehrmacht:

January - 25.1: 1;

February - 22.7: 1;

March - 23.1: 1;

April - 29.0: 1;

May - 23.4: 1;

June - 28.8: 1;

July - 15.7: 1;

August - 9.0: 1;

September - 15.3: 1;

October - 51.2: 1;

November - 34.4: 1;

December - 13.8:1.

The picture is distorted by a significant underestimation of Soviet losses in May-September, as well as in December, and, conversely, by their significant exaggeration in October due to the underestimation of previous months (in October, during the stabilization of the front, many of those who were not In addition, the German allies suffered significant losses from August until the end of the year.According to Soviet data, between January 1 and November 18, 1942, 10,635 Germans and their allies fell into Soviet captivity , and in the period from November 19, 1942 to February 3, 1943 - 151,246. At the same time, the Stalingrad Front captured 19,979 prisoners until March 1, 1943, and the Don Front - 72,553 prisoners. All these prisoners were captured before February 3 1943, since these fronts were disbanded before that date.Almost all the prisoners were from the encircled Stalingrad group and the vast majority were Germans.In addition, among them there were prisoners from two Romanian divisions and one Croatian regiment surrounded at Stalingrad. In total, the two fronts took 92,532 prisoners, which is very close to the traditional figure of 91,000 German prisoners in Stalingrad, as well as to 91,545 - the number of prisoners registered by the NKVD in the Stalingrad region. It is interesting that by April 15 this number increased by 545 people due to the NKVD recruits at the assembly points. Of this number, 55,218 people had died by that time, including 13,149 in the field hospitals of the 6th German army, 5,849 on the way to assembly points, 24,346 at the assembly points of the NKVD and 11,884 in Soviet hospitals. In addition, six prisoners managed to escape. By the end of May 1943, 56,810 out of 91,545 prisoners had already died. In addition, before May 1, 1943, another 14,502 Stalingrad prisoners died during transportation to the rear camps and shortly after arriving there.

Probably the remaining 48,714 prisoners captured by the Red Army from November 19, 1942 to February 3, 1943, were mainly from among the German allies. We will distribute these prisoners equally between November, December and January. And we will estimate the Soviet losses in the dead for May-October and December by multiplying the monthly indicators of the number of wounded as a percentage of the average monthly for the war by a factor of 5 thousand killed.

The adjusted deadweight ratio would then look like this:

January - 25.1:1 (or 23.6:1 based on the monthly number of wounded);

February - 22.7:1 (or 22.4:1 based on the monthly number of wounded);

March - 23.1:1 (or 23.8:1 based on the monthly number of wounded);

April - 29.0:1 (or 30.6:1 based on the monthly number of wounded);

May - 44.4: 1;

June - 22.7: 1;

July - 42.0: 1;

August - 20.2: 1;

September - 19.4: 1;

October - 27.6: 1;

November - 13.8:1 (or 14.6:1 based on the monthly number of wounded and taking into account the losses of the allies);

December - 15.7:1.

Thus, the turning point in the ratio of deadweight losses begins in August. This month, this ratio becomes the smallest in favor of the Germans in the first eight months of 1942 and decreases by 2.1 times compared to the previous month. And this despite the fact that in August, Soviet losses in killed and wounded peaked in 1942. Such a sharp drop in this indicator also occurs in June, but then this is a consequence of a sharp decrease in the number of prisoners after the May battles that were disastrous for the Soviet troops in the Crimea and near Kharkov. But then this indicator in July almost returned to May due to a significant number of prisoners taken at the front of Operation Blau and in Sevastopol. But after the August fall, the ratio of deadweight losses was never again so favorable for the Germans as in May and July 1942. Even in July and August 1943, when Soviet losses in killed and wounded, thanks to the Battle of Kursk, reached their maximum for the war, the ratio of losses was respectively 20.0:1 and 16.6:1.

In January 1943, German troops in the East lost 17,470 killed, 58,043 wounded and 6,599 missing. Of this number, the 6th Army accounted for 907 killed, 2,254 wounded and 305 missing. However, during the last ten days of January, reports of losses from the headquarters of the 6th Army were no longer received. According to the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, on November 1, 1942, the number of units and formations of the 6th Army that fell into the "cauldron" was 242,583 people. Most likely, this figure includes two Romanian divisions encircled in Stalingrad and a Croatian regiment, since it certainly includes Soviet Hee-Vis from the 6th Army that were surrounded. The losses of the 6th Army between 1 and 22 November were 1,329 killed, 4,392 wounded and 333 missing. From November 23, 1942 to January 20, 1943, 27 thousand people were evacuated. 209,529 people remained in the "cauldron". Of this number, in the period from November 23, 1942 to January 12, 1943, according to ten-day reports, 6,870 people were killed, 21,011 were wounded, and 3,143 people were missing. The remaining 178,505 people in the "cauldron" were listed as missing. Obviously, this number includes both those killed and captured. Strictly speaking, some of them were killed or captured on February 1 and 2. But we conditionally attribute all these losses to January 1943. Then, taking into account another approximately 6,000 losses of German allies captured outside Stalingrad, the total irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht and its allies on the Eastern Front will amount to about 210,000 killed and captured.

The ratio of deadweight losses in January 1943 can be estimated at 3.1:1 in favor of the Wehrmacht, which is many times less than in any of the months of 1942. The Germans did not have such an unfavorable ratio of losses on the Eastern Front until July 1944, when, after the Allied landing in Normandy, disasters befell them in Belarus, and then in Romania.

Hitler, of course, had no accurate idea of ​​Soviet losses. However, in August, he must have been alarmed - German losses had almost doubled, and the number of Soviet prisoners had been reduced by four. In September, the situation did not improve, and the Fuhrer removed Field Marshal List (September 10) and General Halder (September 24), commander of Army Group A, from their posts. But the turning point in favor of the USSR has already taken place. Throw to the Caucasus and Stalingrad, in fact, failed. The right decision would have been not just a transition to the defensive, as Hitler ordered in September, but also, at a minimum, the withdrawal of German troops from the Volga to the Don line. However, Hitler, believing that the Red Army did not have enough strength for a large-scale counter-offensive, decided to completely take over Stalingrad as a kind of "consolation prize" to increase the prestige of Germany and ordered the continuation of offensive operations in the city itself.

According to the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, the strength of the 6th Army by October 15, 1942 was 339,009 people, including 9,207 officers and 2,247 military officials. Of this number, by the time of the encirclement, 7,384 people had died, including 209 officers and 10 officials, and 3,177 people were missing, including 33 officers and four officials. In addition, 145,708 people found themselves outside the encirclement, including 3,276 officers and 1,157 officials. Thus, 182,740 German military personnel were in the "cauldron", including 5,689 officers and 1,076 officials. Of this number, 15,911 named wounded and sick military personnel were evacuated, including 832 officers and 33 officials, and another 434 healthy military personnel, including 94 officers and 15 officials, were evacuated from the "cauldron" as specialists. According to this estimate, 11,036 German military personnel, including 465 officers and 20 officials, were reliably killed in the "cauldron", and another 147,594, including 4,251 officers and 1,000 officials, were missing. The fate of 7,765 people, including 47 officers and eight officials, turned out to be unclear. Most likely, most of them were evacuated from the "cauldron" as the wounded, sick and specialists, but they did not declare this to the commission to determine the fate of the 6th Army servicemen. Then the total number of evacuated German troops can be estimated at 24 thousand people. About 3,000 more evacuees could have been Romanians, Croats, and wounded Soviet Hee-Vis. The difference between the number of eaters remaining in the "cauldron" - 236,529 people and the number of German troops remaining there - 182,740 people is 53,789 people, obviously formed at the expense of the Romanians, Croats and Hee-Vi, as well as the ranks of the Luftwaffe. There were no more than 300 Croats within the ring. Romanian divisions could number 10-20 thousand people, and "hi-vi", respectively - 15-20 thousand people. The ranks of the Luftwaffe could be 14 thousand people from the 9th Air Defense Division and parts of the airfield services, and many of them, if not most, could be evacuated and were not included in the figure of 16,335 evacuated military personnel, since it refers only to the ground forces . According to the testimony of the former first quartermaster of the headquarters of the 6th Army, Lieutenant Colonel Werner von Kunowski, the 9th Air Defense Division consisted of about 7 thousand people, and the airfield service units also had about 7 thousand people. He also determined the number of "hi-vi" that fell into the "cauldron" at 20 thousand people. In addition to 91,545 German, Romanian and Croatian prisoners, several thousand Heavies were probably taken prisoner. If the proportion of prisoners among the "hi-vi" was approximately the same as among the Germans, Romanians and Croats, then 15-20 thousand "hi-vi" could be captured. According to German historians, only 5-6 thousand Germans, captured in Stalingrad, returned to their homeland. With this in mind, up to 1 thousand Romanians, several dozen Croats and 1-1.5 thousand Heavies could return from captivity.

According to other sources, 24,910 wounded and sick, as well as 5,150 various specialists, couriers, and so on, were taken out of the "boiler". There is also information that a total of 42 thousand people left the “cauldron”. It is possible that the difference of 12 thousand people falls on military personnel and civilian personnel of the Luftwaffe. But it is more likely that the number of Luftwaffe evacuees was the difference between 30,060 and 24,100 if we include all those whose fate is not clear among the evacuees. Then the number of evacuated Luftwaffe officials can be estimated at 6 thousand people. Then the irretrievable losses of the German Luftwaffe servicemen as part of the encircled group can be estimated at 8 thousand people. Note that the air defense forces have always served a lot of "hi-vi".

Soviet troops in the Stalingrad direction, according to official data, in the period from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943, lost 1,347,214 people, of which 674,990 were irrevocable. This does not include the troops of the NKVD and the people's militia, whose irretrievable losses were especially great. During the 200 days and nights of the Battle of Stalingrad, 1,027 battalion commanders, 207 regiment commanders, 96 brigade commanders, and 18 division commanders perished. The irretrievable losses of weapons and equipment amounted to: 524,800 small arms, 15,052 guns and mortars, 4,341 tanks and 5,654 combat aircraft.

The number of lost small arms suggests an incomplete record. It turns out that the small arms of almost all the wounded were safely carried out of the battlefield, which is unlikely. Most likely, the irretrievable loss of life was greater than indicated in the reports, and the weapons of the unaccounted dead and missing were not indicated as lost.

The former director of the Tsaritsyn-Stalingrad Museum of Defense Andrei Mikhailovich Borodin recalled: “The first and last attempt to establish the scale of our losses in the Battle of Stalingrad was made in the early 1960s. Evgeny Vuchetich wanted the names of all the soldiers and officers who died in the Battle of Stalingrad to be engraved on Mamaev Kurgan. He thought it was, in principle, possible, and asked me to compile a complete list. I willingly undertook to help, the regional committee released me from all other work. I rushed to the Podolsky archive, to the Bureau of Losses of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. The Major General, who was then in charge of this Bureau, said that the secretary of the Central Committee, Kozlov, had already set them such a task.

After a year of work, he called the general and asked about the results. When I learned that they had already counted 2 million dead, and the work for many more months, he said: “Enough!” And the work was stopped.

Then I asked this general: “So how much did we lose at Stalingrad, at least approximately?” "I won't tell you."

Probably, the figure of more than 2 million dead and missing Soviet soldiers during the Battle of Stalingrad, from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943, is closer to the truth than the official figures, which, as we found out, usually underestimate irretrievable losses are about three times.

There are no reliable data on the number of civilians who died as a result of the bombing, shelling and starvation of the civilians of Stalingrad, but it, in all likelihood, exceeded 100 thousand people.

The irretrievable losses of the 6th Army, mainly by prisoners, in the period from October 15, 1942 to February 2, 1943, including the losses of the Luftwaffe, amounted to about 177 thousand people. In addition, there were at least 16 thousand wounded Germans who were outside the "cauldron".

The losses of the 6th Army between July 11 and October 10 were 14,371 killed, 2,450 missing and 50,453 wounded.

The losses of the 4th Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht in the period from July 11, 1942 to February 10, 1943 amounted to 6,350 killed, 860 missing and 23,653 wounded.

It is also known that during the operation of the "air bridge" the Luftwaffe lost about 1000 people, mostly irretrievably. It can be assumed that outside the "cauldron" and the airfields serving Stalingrad, the losses of the Luftwaffe could be twice as high, especially among the ground battle groups defending on the Chir front. Then the total losses of the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Stalingrad, but without taking into account those who were in the army of Paulus, can be estimated at no less than 3 thousand people, including at least 2 thousand irrevocably. In addition, the losses of the 15th airfield division could be up to 2 thousand killed, wounded and missing.

The total irretrievable losses of the Germans during the Stalingrad campaign can be estimated at 297 thousand people, of which about 204 thousand are irretrievable.

Between July 1 and October 31, 1942, the Romanian army lost 39,089 people, including 9,252 killed and 1,588 missing. These losses account for both the offensive towards Stalingrad and the fighting in the Caucasus. Between November 1 and December 31, 1942, the Romanians lost 109,342 men, including 7,236 killed and 70,355 missing. These losses fell entirely on the Battle of Stalingrad. Finally, between January 1 and October 31, 1943, Romanian losses were 39,848, including 5,840 killed and 13,636 missing. These losses were suffered in the final phase of the Battle of Stalingrad and in the struggle for the Kuban bridgehead. Probably, the missing people during this period are mainly Romanian soldiers who died and were captured in Stalingrad. The total losses of the Romanian army during the Battle of Stalingrad from July 1942 to early February 1943 are estimated by Romanian historians at 140 thousand killed, wounded and missing, of which 110 thousand - in the period starting from November 19, 1942. Of this number, about 100 thousand people died and went missing. The Romanians lost half of their soldiers and officers who fought at the front in the Battle of Stalingrad, while the Germans lost only 10 percent. The Romanian army never recovered from this blow.

The total losses of the Axis in the Battle of Stalingrad can be estimated at 437 thousand people, including 304 thousand irrevocably. If we accept that Soviet losses in the Battle of Stalingrad amounted to about 2 million killed and missing and at least 672 thousand wounded, then the ratio of total losses will be 6.1: 1, and irretrievable losses - 6.6: 1, in all cases - in favor of the Germans. However, this ratio was much less favorable for the German side than the ratio of losses for 1942 as a whole. In the struggle directly with the grouping surrounded in Stalingrad, Soviet losses were much less than the German-Romanian ones, but the exact figure of the losses of the Red Army in this struggle is unknown.

Of the Soviet troops that participated in the Battle of Stalingrad, one can more or less accurately calculate the losses of the 2nd Guards Army, the Guards Army, which was formed in Tambov on the basis of the 1st Reserve Army. By November 2, it had the following composition: 1st Guards Rifle Corps, 13th Guards Rifle Corps, 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps.

By December 1, the 17th Guards Corps Artillery Regiment, the 54th Guards Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion, the 408th Separate Guards Mortar Battalion, and the 355th Separate Engineer Battalion were added.

By January 1, 1943, the 4th Cavalry Corps, 300th Rifle Division, 648th Army Artillery Regiment, 506th Cannon Artillery Regiment, 1095th Cannon Artillery Regiment, 1100th Cannon Artillery Regiment, 1101st Cannon Artillery regiment, 435th anti-tank artillery regiment, 535th anti-tank artillery regiment, 1250th anti-tank artillery regiment, 23rd guards mortar regiment, 48th guards mortar regiment, 88th guards mortar regiment, 90th 1st Guards Mortar Regiment (without the 373rd Division), 15th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, 3rd Guards Tank Corps, 6th Mechanized Corps (became 5th Guards by February 1), 52nd Separate Tank Regiment, 128 1st separate tank regiment, 223rd separate tank regiment and 742nd separate mine-sapper battalion.

By February 1, 1943, the 4th Cavalry Corps and the 90th Guards Mortar Regiment were withdrawn from the 2nd Guards. Instead, the 488th mortar regiment and the 4th guards mortar regiment, as well as the 136th separate tank regiment and the 1st pontoon-bridge brigade were added to the army.

On December 20, 1942, the 2nd Guards Army had 80,779 personnel, and on January 20, 1943, only 39,110 people. Consequently, even without taking into account possible replenishments, the losses of the army amounted to at least 41,669 people. However, in fact, the losses of the 2nd Guards Army were much greater.

"Brief military-historical information on the 2nd Guards Army on December 20, 1943" claims that by November 25, six rifle divisions of the 1st and 13th Guards Rifle Corps totaled 21,077 combat personnel. By December 3, when the order was received to load the army, “the number of combat personnel was 80,779 people. The transportation was carried out in 165 echelons.” However, it is completely incomprehensible how the combat strength of the 2nd Guards Army almost quadrupled in a week. After all, during this time, the composition of the army increased by the 2nd mechanized corps, numbering 13,559 people in the state, as well as by the 17th guards corps artillery regiment, the 54th guards separate anti-tank artillery battalion, the 408th separate guards mortar division and the 355th separate engineering battalion, which in total hardly numbered more than 3 thousand people. Most likely, in this case, 80,779 people are not combat, but the total strength of the army, especially since, as you can understand, it was 80,779 people who were transported by 165 echelons.

The leading staff of the parties participating in the Battle of Stalingrad (counteroffensive stage, outer front of the encirclement) Stalingrad FrontCommander Colonel General A.I. EremenkoMember of the Military Council N.S. KhrushchevChief of Staff Major General I.S. Varennikov8th

From the book Battle of Stalingrad. Chronicle, facts, people. Book 1 author Zhilin Vitaly Alexandrovich

During the Battle of Stalingrad, employees of the Special Departments of the Stalingrad, Don and South-Eastern Fronts informed the military command, the leadership of the NKVD and NGOs on the following groups of issues: on the course of military operations in the city area and on its outskirts; descriptions of damage

From the book Unknown Stalingrad. How history is distorted [= Myths and truth about Stalingrad] author Isaev Alexey Valerievich

Foreign detachments of the Special Departments of the NKVD during the Battle of Stalingrad Most authors, when they talk about the foreign detachments of the Special Departments of the NKVD, limit themselves only to 1941. Although as of October 15, 1942, 193 barrages were formed in the Red Army

From the book Soviet Airborne: Military Historical Sketch author Margelov Vasily Filippovich

THEY COMMANDED FRONTS AND ARMIES IN THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD BATOVPavel IvanovichGeneral of the Army, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. He participated in the Battle of Stalingrad as commander of the 65th Army. He was born on June 1, 1897 in the village of Filisovo (Yaroslavl Region). In the Red Army from 1918.

From the book Battle of Stalingrad. From defensive to offensive author Mirenkov Anatoly Ivanovich

Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad

From the book of the USSR and Russia in the slaughter. Human losses in the wars of the XX century author Sokolov Boris Vadimovich

Annex 1 Composition of weapons of the infantry divisions of the 6th Army at the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad 2 - 47-mm Pak

From the book Washed with Blood? Lies and truth about losses in the Great Patriotic War author Zemskov Viktor Nikolaevich

1. In the Battle of Stalingrad In the summer of 1942, the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front became extremely complicated. In April and early June, the Soviet Army conducted a series of operations in the Kharkov region, in the Crimea and in other areas in order to consolidate the successes of the past winter campaign,

From the book The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People (in the context of World War II) author Krasnova Marina Alekseevna

4. In the battle for the Dnieper By the second half of September 1943, Soviet troops defeated the Nazi troops in the Left-bank Ukraine and in the Donbass, reached the Dnieper on a 700-kilometer front - from Loev to Zaporozhye and captured a number of bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper. Capture

From the book Secrets of World War II author Sokolov Boris Vadimovich

The role of the ideological factor in the Battle of Stalingrad The study of wars and military conflicts proves the importance of achieving superiority over the enemy not only in the material and technical equipment of the army and navy, but also in the moral and psychological awareness of the importance of defeat

From the book Battle of Borodino author Yulin Boris Vitalievich

Losses of the civilian population and the general losses of the population of Germany in World War II It is very difficult to determine the losses of the civilian German population. For example, the number of deaths as a result of the bombing of Dresden by Allied aircraft in February 1945

From the book The Battle for the Sinyavino Heights [Mginskaya Bulge 1941-1942] author Mosunov Vyacheslav

5. Losses of other participants in the war and the ratio of irretrievable losses

From the author's book

2. Oath of Komsomol Members and Komsomol Members of the Stalingrad Region Who Joined the Ranks of the Defenders of Stalingrad November 1942 German barbarians destroyed Stalingrad, the city of our youth, our happiness. They turned into piles of ruins and ashes the schools and institutes where we studied, factories and

From the author's book

Losses of the civilian population and the total losses of the population of the USSR Regarding the losses of the Soviet civilian population in 1941-1945, there is no any reliable statistics. They can only be determined by estimation, by first establishing the total irretrievable losses

From the author's book

The losses of the sides Here is what the historian Shvedov writes about the losses: “The starting point for assessing the losses of the Russian troops in the battle, of course, is the list of losses compiled at the headquarters of M. And Kutuzov by September 13–14. To verify the data of this list of losses, it is important to assess the forces

From the author's book

Chapter 6. Losses of the parties According to official data, the losses of the Volkhov, Leningrad fronts and the Ladoga military flotilla amounted to: Killed: 40,085 people; Wounded: 73,589 people; Total: 113,674 people. The headquarters of the Volkhov Front presented the following figures in its reporting documents

Forgers continue to damage the Red Army

The Battle of Stalingrad, which began on July 17, 1942, ended on February 2, 1943, with the defeat and capture of the troops of the 6th German Army. For the first time the Wehrmacht suffered losses of this magnitude. The captured commander of the 376th Infantry Division, Lieutenant-General A. von Daniel, assessed the actions of the Soviet troops as follows: “The operation to encircle and liquidate the 6th German Army is a masterpiece of strategy ...” But all the post-war period, former German generals, a number of Western historians and some domestic authors are stubbornly trying to sow doubts about the greatness of the Stalingrad victory, to belittle the feat of the Soviet troops mainly by exaggerating our losses.

B. Sokolov in his book "The Miracle of Stalingrad" claims that the irretrievable loss of Soviet troops was 9.8 times higher than the losses of the Wehrmacht. This figure does not correspond to reality, primarily because of the author's uncritical attitude to German military statistics and ignoring the differences in the concepts of military operational losses used by the Red Army and the Wehrmacht when comparing them.

A correct comparison of the human damage of the Red and German armies at the walls of Stalingrad is possible only with a single interpretation of the concept of "irrecoverable losses in battle." It corresponds to the following definition: irretrievable losses in the battle (decrease) - the number of servicemen excluded from the lists of troops during the battles and not returning to duty until the end of the battle. This number includes the dead, captured and missing, as well as the wounded and sick sent to rear hospitals.

Losses are mythical and real

“Paulus claimed: the total number of those who were on allowance at the time of the Russian offensive was 300 thousand people in round numbers”

In Russian literature, there are two fundamentally different opinions regarding the scale of the human losses of the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad. They are huge, says Sokolov. However, he did not even try to calculate them, but took the "ceiling" figure for the estimate - two million dead, captured and missing Red Army soldiers, citing the fact that supposedly official data usually underestimated losses by about three times. Taking into account the proportion of the wounded and sick evacuated to rear hospitals, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad, based on Sokolov's figures, amounted to approximately 2320 thousand people. But this is absurd, since the total number of Soviet soldiers participating in the battle, according to B. Nevzorov's estimates, was 1920 thousand. Secondly, Sokolov, as has been repeatedly shown, with the help of falsifications and forgeries overestimates the irretrievable losses of the Red Army by three or more times (in the Battle of Moscow, for example, Sokolov overestimated the losses of the advancing Soviet troops by more than five times).

Another assessment of the results of Stalingrad is given by a team of military historians headed by G. Krivosheev (“The Great Patriotic War without a secrecy stamp. Book of Losses”), authors led by M. Morozov (“The Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Campaigns and strategic operations in numbers” , v. 1), as well as S. Mikhalev (“Casual losses in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Statistical study”). The dead, captured and missing Soviet soldiers - 479 thousand, sanitary losses - 651 thousand people. These figures are considered close to reality by most authoritative historians.

However, for the same assessment of the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, it is necessary to add to the number of dead, captured and missing Soviet soldiers from the sanitary losses a part of the wounded and sick sent to rear hospitals. N. Malyugin, in an article on the logistics of the troops (Military History Journal, No. 7, 1983), writes that in the Battle of Stalingrad, 53.8 percent of the wounded and 23.6 percent of the sick were evacuated to the rear. Since the latter in 1942 accounted for 19–20 percent of all medical losses (“Soviet health care and military medicine in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945”, 1985), the total number sent to rear hospitals during the fighting was 301–321 thousand people. This means that the Red Army irrevocably lost 780-800 thousand soldiers and officers in the Battle of Stalingrad.

"Stalingrad is a grave for German soldiers..."

Information about heavy losses was contained in almost all the letters of the Wehrmacht soldiers, in the reports of the troops of the 6th German Army. But in the documents, the estimates differ significantly.

“In the Battle of Stalingrad, the relative losses of the Red Army were 1.6-1.9 times less than that of the Wehrmacht”

According to 10-day reports of the troops, the irretrievable losses (loss) of Army Group B advancing on Stalingrad from July to December 1942 amounted to about 85 thousand people. Mikhalev's book "Casual losses in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Statistical Research”, published in 2000, contains a generalized certificate of the loss of personnel of the Ground Forces in the East from December 1, 1941 to May 1944. It has a higher (2.5 times) figure of irretrievable losses of Army Group "B" for July - November 1942 - 219 thousand people. But even it does not fully show the damage suffered by the personnel of the Wehrmacht in the Stalingrad defensive operation. Real losses were much higher. Thus, the loss in October 1942 was estimated at 37.5 thousand people, but calculated according to archival documents by A. Isaev, only in five infantry divisions of the 6th German army and only in seven days of fighting (from October 24 to October 31, 1942) amounted to more than 22 thousand. But another 17 divisions fought in this army, and the losses in them were no less.

If we assume that the losses of the divisions fighting in Stalingrad are approximately equal, the actual level of loss of personnel of the 6th Army for a week of fighting (from October 24 to November 1, 1942) amounted to about 75 thousand people, which is twice as high as indicated in the certificate of the Wehrmacht for the whole of October 1942.

Thus, information about the loss of German troops contained in ten-day reports does not provide the necessary reliability. But focusing mainly on them, Sokolov "calculated" in the book "The Miracle of Stalingrad" that the Wehrmacht irretrievably lost 297 thousand people. The following errors should be noted here. Firstly, Sokolov, based on the data of the 6th Army from October 15, 1942 to February 3, 1943, set the number of servicemen who were in the “Stalingrad cauldron” (183 thousand) by subtracting from the composition at the time of the encirclement (328 thousand people) of troops outside the ring (145 thousand). This is not true. In the "cauldron", in addition to the 6th Army itself, there were many attached units and subunits, and the number of troops outside the encirclement was overestimated by Sokolov. A participant in the battle, General G. Derr, gives other data. The soldiers and officers of the 6th Army who did not get surrounded were 35 thousand people. In addition, in the annex to the 10-day reports of the German troops on losses for February 1943, it is indicated that after November 23, 1942, 27,000 wounded were taken out of the encirclement, and 209,529 people remained in the ring (in total - 236,529), which is almost 54 thousand more than Sokolov indicates. Secondly, the calculations of the losses of the 6th Army from July 11 to October 10, 1942 and the losses of the 4th Panzer Army from July 11, 1942 to February 10, 1943 are based on ten-day military reports containing underestimated data. They do not give a correct estimate of the loss of the Wehrmacht in Stalingrad. Thirdly, Sokolov's estimates did not take into account the decline in the formations that were part of the 8th Italian Army (three infantry, two tank and security divisions - of which two infantry and one tank were destroyed, and the guard was defeated). Fourthly, he ignores the decline of the German units that are part of the Holidt operational groups (a tank and two airfield divisions were destroyed in battles, one infantry division was defeated) and Fretter-Pico (a mountain rifle division and an infantry brigade were defeated in January 1943) . In general, Sokolov's "calculated" loss of life of the Wehrmacht in Stalingrad is underestimated by more than two times.

Due to the unreliability of the information contained in the ten-day reports and in the certificates of the Wehrmacht, we will estimate the German losses by calculation.

The loss of troops in battles includes losses during the attack on Stalingrad (July 17 - November 18, 1942), when the 6th Army was surrounded (11/19/23/1942), in the ring (11/24/1942 - February 2, 1943) and outside it (11/24/1942 - 2.02.1943).

An estimate can be obtained from the balance of the number of troops at the beginning and end of the operation, taking into account replenishment. The main battles in the offensive were fought by the 6th Army. At the beginning of the operation (07/17/1942), it included 16 divisions: 12 infantry, 1 light infantry, 2 motorized and 1 security. At the end of the operation (11/18/1942) - 17 divisions: 11 infantry, 1 light infantry, 3 tank, 2 motorized. As part of the army at the beginning of the operation, as A. Isaev determined in the book “Myths and Truth about Stalingrad”, there were 430 thousand fighters. By the end - minus the security and infantry divisions plus three tank divisions - 15-20 thousand fighters were added. As General Derr, a participant in the battle, noted (an article in the collection “Fatal Decisions”), to Stalingrad “from all over the front ... reinforcements, engineering and anti-tank units were gathered ... Five sapper battalions were transferred by air to the battle area from Germany ...” This reinforcement included about 10 thousand people. Finally, marching reinforcements arrived in the troops. In July - November 1942, Army Groups A and B, according to Major General B. Müller-Gillebrand ("Land Army of Germany 1933-1945. War on two fronts", vol. 3), received more than 230 thousand soldiers. According to the testimony of the former adjutant of Field Marshal Paulus, Colonel V. Adam (“Swastika over Stalingrad”), most of this replenishment (approximately 145-160 thousand people) went to the 6th Army. Thus, during the Stalingrad defensive operation, approximately 600-620 thousand people fought in it.

F. Paulus in 1947 stated: “The total number of those who were on allowance at the time of the start of the Russian offensive ( November 19, 1942.– V. L.) - 300 thousand people in round numbers. It, according to the chief quartermaster of the 6th Army, Lieutenant Colonel V. von Kunowski, included about 20 thousand Soviet prisoners of war, who were used as auxiliary personnel (“hivi”). Thus, the number of personnel of the 6th Army at the time of the end of the Stalingrad defensive operation was 280 thousand people. Consequently, the total irretrievable losses of this army are 320-340 thousand military personnel.

In addition to it, 11 German divisions operated in the Stalingrad direction - 6 infantry, 1 tank, 2 mechanized and 2 security. Of these, two (22nd Panzer and 294th Infantry) were in the reserve of Army Group B, one (336th) was transferred to the 2nd Hungarian Army, and four (62nd and 298th Infantry, 213 and 403 th security) were part of the 8th Italian army. The listed formations almost did not conduct combat operations, and their losses are insignificant. The remaining four divisions (297th and 371st Infantry and 16th and 29th Mechanized) actively fought for most of the defensive operation as part of the 4th German Panzer Army. Even according to the underestimated 10-day reports of the Germans in August, September and November 1942 (there is no information for October), she lost about 20 thousand people killed, missing and wounded, sent to rear hospitals. The total irretrievable losses of the Germans in the Stalingrad defensive operation amounted to 340-360 thousand troops.

In the battles during the encirclement of the 6th Army (11/19–23/1942), the main losses were suffered by the Romanian troops, but the Nazis were also battered. The combat effectiveness of a number of German divisions participating in the battles decreased significantly. Only the military commander of the 6th Army H. Schreter (“Stalingrad. The Great Battle through the Eyes of a War Correspondent. 1942–1943”) gave an estimate of the loss during the encirclement: “During the Russian breakthrough from November 19 to 21, the losses amounted to 34 thousand people, on Chir front - 39 thousand people ... ".

The composition of the troops of the 6th Army, surrounded, liquidated and captured near Stalingrad, is clearly defined and does not cause controversy. With regard to the number of formations that ended up in the "Stalingrad cauldron" - there are different opinions.

Major General B. Müller-Gillebrand (“Land Army of Germany 1933-1945 War on two fronts”, vol. 3) provides data characterizing not the number of blocked troops, but the losses of the 6th Army (excluding allies) from the moment encirclement until surrender. But at that time, according to various sources, from 29 thousand to 42 thousand wounded were taken out by plane from the 6th Army. Taking them into account, the total number of encircled, based on the information about the losses given by Müller-Gillebrand, is 238,500 - 251,500 German troops.

Paulus determined the number of encircled 6th Army soldiers at the end of November 1942 at 220,000. But it does not take into account the formations and units of the 4th Panzer Army reassigned to the 6th Army after the start of the offensive of the Soviet troops (the 297th and 371st infantry and 29th motorized German divisions were reassigned on November 23, 1942). The total number of listed formations and units was at least 30 thousand fighters.

P. Carell in the book "Hitler Goes East", based on the information from the combat logs of the 6th Army and the daily reports of various corps, determines the number of military personnel in the "cauldron" on December 18, 1942 at 230 thousand people, including 13 thousand Romanian military. Since the encirclement of the troops took place on November 23 and until December 18 the Germans suffered losses in ongoing battles, by November 23, 1942, the number of German and allied forces surrounded by Stalingrad was at least 250-260 thousand people.

M. Kerig in the book "Stalingrad: analysis and documentation of the battle" (Stalingrad: Analise und Dokumentation einer Schlacht) gives the following data on the encircled troops: 232 thousand Germans, 52 thousand "Khivi" and 10 thousand Romanians. In total - about 294 thousand people.

General Tippelskirch believes that not only Germans, but also allied soldiers were surrounded by 265 thousand ("History of the Second World War"). Since there were about 13 thousand of the latter, there were 252 thousand German soldiers.

Paulus's adjutant, Colonel Adam, writes in his memoirs that on December 11, 1942, the Chief Quartermaster of the 6th Army, Colonel Baader, told him: in accordance with reports of December 10, 270,000 encircled people are on allowance. Since from November 23 (encirclement of the 6th Army) to December 10, 1942, the troops suffered losses in ongoing battles, on November 23, the number of German and allied troops surrounded near Stalingrad was approximately 285-295 thousand people. This is taking into account the 13 thousand Romanians and Croats who were in the "cauldron".

Military commander H. Schroeter calculated that 284 thousand people were surrounded. A. Isaev in the book "Myths and Truth about Stalingrad" focuses on Schroeter's data, adding that there were about 13 thousand Romanians among the encircled.

Thus, in reality, German military personnel (excluding allies) who ended up in the "Stalingrad cauldron" on November 25, 1942, were 250-280 thousand people. Among the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht, only the Germans who died, were captured during the surrender, the wounded and sick, taken out of the encirclement, should be attributed. This means that about 20,000 Soviet prisoners of war and Khivs must be subtracted from the total number of encircled troops. The interval estimate of the irretrievable losses of the German troops of the encircled grouping of the 6th Army lies in the range of 230-260 thousand people.

Let us again turn to the evidence of Muller-Hillebrand: “Outside the“ Stalingrad pocket ”were ... destroyed two infantry (298th, 385th), two tank (22nd, 27th) and two airfield (7th, 8th) divisions.” The latter were formed in October 1942, and took part in the battles from January 1943. In total, they were about 20 thousand people. The remaining four divisions by the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops were no longer fully staffed formations, their total number was approximately 10-15 thousand military personnel. This corresponds to the loss of at least 30-35 thousand people.

In addition, during the operation "Winter Thunderstorm" (an attempt to release the troops of the 6th Army in December) and in the battles for the preservation of the entire southern wing (December 1942 - January 1943), other formations of the Don Army Groups also suffered significant losses. " and "B". General Derr, although he does not give general figures, notes the high level of German losses during the release attempt. Field Marshal Manstein in his memoirs reports heavy losses of the 57th Panzer Corps while trying to unblock the encirclement. British journalists W. E. D. Allen and P. Muratov in the book “Russian Campaigns of the German Wehrmacht. 1941–1945” claim that by December 27, 1942, in the battles to break through the encirclement of the 6th German Army, “parts of Manstein lost 25 thousand killed and captured.”

In the battle for the preservation of the entire southern wing of the German army (December 1942 - January 1943), in Army Groups "B" and "Don" until February 2, 1943, the 403rd security division and the 700th tank brigade were destroyed, 62 , 82, 306, 387th infantry, 3rd mountain rifle, 213th security divisions and the Schuldt infantry brigade. Losses - at least 15 thousand people.

Thus, the irretrievable loss of troops of groups "B" and "Don" in the Stalingrad offensive operation amounted to 360-390 thousand soldiers, and the total losses of the Wehrmacht in the battle are 660-710 thousand people.

Balance in favor of the Red Army

The reality of the losses of the Wehrmacht in Stalingrad can be roughly estimated from the balance of the German armed forces in 1942-1943. The loss of the Wehrmacht (NУВ) for any period is calculated as the difference between the numbers at the beginning (NНВ) and the end (NКВ) of the estimated period, taking into account the replenishment (NМВ). For the period from the middle of 1942 to the middle of 1943, the decline, calculated according to the Müller-Gillebrand data, is equal to:

NHC = 8310.0 + 3470.2 - 9480.0 = 2300.2 thousand people.

The decline of the Wehrmacht in the second year of the war shows that the figures of losses calculated above (660-710 thousand people) in the Battle of Stalingrad do not contradict the balance of troops from mid-1942 to mid-1943.

The real ratio of the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht was (1.1-1.2): 1, which is 8-9 times less than Sokolov's "calculated". Taking into account the Romanian and Italian troops allied with Germany, the losses of the Red Army were 1.1–1.2 times less than those of the enemy.

It is important that, with some excess in absolute numbers, the relative - irretrievable damage (the ratio of irretrievable losses of the army to the total number of its military personnel who took part in the battle) of the Red Army was significantly lower than that of the German troops. According to Nevzorov's estimates, 1920 thousand Red Army soldiers and 1685 thousand Germans and soldiers of the allied forces of the Wehrmacht (3rd and 4th Romanian, 8th Italian armies) took part in the Battle of Stalingrad, the total number of which was about 705 thousand people. There were 980,000 Germans who participated in the Battle of Stalingrad. Relative losses: Red Army - (780-800)/1920 = 0.41-0.42, Wehrmacht - (660-770)/980 = 0.67-0.78. Thus, in the Battle of Stalingrad, the relative losses of the Red Army were 1.6–1.9 times less than those of the Wehrmacht.